

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

REVIEW

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
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
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
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POLITICAL AMBITIONS, VOLUNTEERISM, AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY*

KENNETH PREWITT
University of Chicago

A generally accepted interpretation of American politics today is associated with the "theory of electoral accountability." The salient features of this theory are well known. The thesis was initially shaped in Schumpeter's classic work on democracy, and since has been elaborated by a generation of scholars.¹ The elaboration, especially where grounded in empirical studies, has established (1) that the public, being largely apathetic about political matters and in any case ill-informed regarding public issues, cannot provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the maintenance of democratic procedures; (2) that a liberal political and social elite are committed to the preservation of democratic forms, at least more committed than the average citizen; therefore, (3) what maintains the democratic tradition is not extensive public participation in political policy-making, but, instead, competition among elites whose behavior is regulated by periodic review procedures. Competition among elites and review by citizens of political leaders are provided by elections. Thus elections hold political leaders accountable to non-leaders.²

* The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under grants GS 496 and GS 1898. I am indebted to several colleagues who read and sharply criticized an earlier version of this paper. I leave them unnamed for it is very possible they would prefer not to be associated with even this version.

¹ Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1947).

² Relevant studies are Bernard Berelson, *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago: University Press, 1954), especial-

ly chapter 14; Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) and Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961), especially chapter 21; S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960, Anchor Books edition, 1963); David Truman, "The American System in Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly*, 73 (December, 1959, pp. 481-97).

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³ Important statements are to be found in Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967); and Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," this REVIEW, Vol. LX (June, 1966), 285-95. A data article consistent with the thesis is Walter Dean Burnham's "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 7-28. A book which anticipates much of this critical literature is T. B. Bottomore's *Elites and Society* (London: Penguin Books, 1964), especially ch. VI.

political participation.⁴ The critics propose that the facts of American politics have been misinterpreted in such a manner as to disguise the extent to which democracy falls short of its promise. Further, in misinterpreting the facts, contemporary political science actually impedes the realization of a more democratic politics.⁵

The critical exchange about the propositions and findings associated with the theory of accountability has given little attention to the third assertion, that elections hold the few who govern accountable to the many who are governed.⁶ This is surprising, for with respect to democratic theory a proposition linking elections and accountability is necessarily a central one. Ours is an inquiry into the conditions under which elections do insure accountability.

I. ELECTIONS, AMBITIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY

A very few leaders govern the very many citizens. Although the many are often politically ignorant and apathetic, the few who govern are nevertheless responsive to the preferences of the many *because*, as elected officials, the few can be and are held accountable for their actions. Accountability is assured because men want to gain and to continue in office and because these men recognize that the voting public determines who will hold office. Therefore, since the electorate through periodic elections grants or withholds the privilege of governing, men who wish

⁴ It has been the substantial accomplishment of Geraint Parry to explicate this point. He writes that although elites may be disagreed on policy, "they may share similar views as to the appropriate decision-making process, namely negotiation between elites." *Political Elites* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), p. 90. The complete implications of Parry's point cannot be developed at this time. It is evident, though, that elites can simultaneously be committed to democratic norms and to a process of decision-making in which only they participate. It should be remembered that the data base for arguing that political leaders are committed to democracy is primarily survey items on civil liberties and not items on the wisdom of the participation of the "average" citizens in the decision processes.

⁵ I do not mean to imply that the scholars listed in footnotes three and four necessarily associate themselves with this critique of the political science discipline.

⁶ An exception to this is Murray Edelman who has very creatively called into question some of our assumptions about what elections do and do not do. See in particular the first chapter of *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1967).

to govern select policies they believe to be in accord with voter preferences.

This thesis has an honorable tradition. Schumpeter's famous definition of democracy is a useful beginning point: "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."⁷ In his most frequently cited essay on democracy Lipset writes of a "social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office."⁸ Or, as more succinctly stated by Downs, contestants for office "formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies."⁹ Dahl has been the most influential writer in the Schumpeter tradition. In a theoretical statement about democracy he notes that the effective political elites operate within limits "set by their expectations as to the reactions of the group of politically active citizens who go to the polls."¹⁰ This hypothesis is generally confirmed in his empirical study of New Haven; "elected leaders keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents constantly in mind in deciding what policies to adopt or reject."¹¹

The works of Schumpeter, Lipset, Downs, and Dahl, have been very influential among scholars theorizing about democracy. It has been the accomplishment of these scholars to examine a political process which provides a measure of citizen control over the few who are selected as political leaders. Thus the somewhat banal observation that fewer men issue commands than must obey them is converted into the more powerful theory that elections hold those few accountable for the commands they issue.

The theory of electoral accountability can be reviewed from another, complementary perspective to the one already suggested. Carl Friedrich's "rule of anticipated reactions"¹² provides

⁷ Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

⁸ S. M. Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 28.

¹⁰ Dahl, *Preface*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹¹ Dahl, *Who Governs?*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹² Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 199-215. Of course Friedrich's "rule" is much broader than what is implied by my use; he develops a theory of political influence based on the rule which refers to nearly all political interactions, not just to relationships between electorates and representatives. A study which applies the "rule of anticipated reaction" and comes to conclusions similar to those

the hint for this other perspective and Schlesinger's "ambition theory of politics"¹³ makes it explicit. Men in office anticipate the likely response of voters because the incumbents want either to retain that office or to move to a more elevated one. This perspective on accountability assumes that there is a supply of men intent on gaining and then holding political office. This assumption links directly to thinking about accountability. For if men are uninterested in gaining and holding office, why should they guide their actions in a manner sensitive to voter preferences?

Schlesinger has stated this point vigorously. "Ambition lies at the heart of politics," writes Schlesinger. He reasons, with particular relevance to democratic theory,

To slight the role of ambition in politics, then, or to treat it as a human failing to be suppressed, is to miss the central function of ambition in political systems. A political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as much in danger of breaking down as one unable to restrain ambitions. Representative government, above all, depends on a supply of men so driven; *the desire for election and, more important, for reelection becomes the electorate's restraint upon its public officials*. No more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for their political futures.¹⁴

We can now reformulate the theory of electoral accountability as we understand it.

Since periodic elections hold officeholders accountable, these officeholders select policies in anticipation of voter response and thus choose policies which broadly reflect the preferences of the governed.

This thesis, in turn, rests upon a prior assumption:

Men in political office work to gain their positions and wish to retain them.

II. SOME PUZZLING RESPONSES

In a study of the men who govern eighty-two cities of the San Francisco Bay Area, more than 400 city councilmen were interviewed with a lengthy and largely open-ended questionnaire. A wide variety of topics were covered, and councilmen were given ample opportunity to state the decision criteria they invoked as they set

advanced here is Roy Gregory, "Local Elections and the 'Rule of Anticipated Reactions,'" *Political Studies*, XVII (March, 1969), 31-47.

¹³ Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. 1966).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2, italics added.

about the task of governing their communities. In reading these protocols it becomes evident that often the sentiments voiced by these councilmen do not match well with what the "rule of anticipated reactions" leads us to predict. Indeed, if the reader of the protocols is bearing in mind the observation that elected leaders "formulate policies in order to win elections," then the responses can only be described as puzzling. For it is very clear that councilmen infrequently refer to elections and, when they do, it often is in a manner which directly contradicts the premises of a theory of electoral accountability.

For example, councilmen were asked if they felt it were easy or difficult to go against majority preferences when choosing community policies.

Easy, I am an independent type of individual. I don't feel the weight of voter responsibility. I am not all fired up for a political career.

You don't always follow the majority; you shouldn't give a damn whether you get elected or not. Don't be afraid to be defeated.

Yes, it is easy because I don't really care if I get elected or not.

I am free to do as I feel. In general it is easy to vote against the majority because I don't have any political ambitions.

Responding to a related question, another councilman explains why he and his colleagues ignore the pressures which mount from community influentials:

I doubt if the City Council would consider preferentially the opinion of such a person. This City Council doesn't give a damn if it is reelected.

More of the same is voiced in response to questions about the councilmen's political futures. One respondent, not sure whether he will stand for reelection, makes his position clear.

I won't know until my time is up. I don't think a councilman can do a good job if he is concerned about counting votes. If something is best for the city, you have to go against some groups. And you don't want to have to worry that these groups may not vote for you in the next election if you vote wrong.

Another doubtful candidate,

I promised myself I wouldn't decide ahead of time whether to run or not. I don't want to do things to collect votes:

These quotations, although clearly contradicting the theory of electoral accountability, do not constitute a data base on which to confirm or

falsify anything. For one thing, the quotations were selected to make a point. Moreover, they are responses from one small population of elected officials—nonsalaried, nonpartisan city councilmen from one region of one state. Yet these responses should not be dismissed too readily. The manner in which councilmen reflect on their relationships with the public indicates that the rule of anticipated reactions does not always operate. It is in order to ask whether there are political conditions which, if present, would make these councillor responses less puzzling. This inquiry is best initiated by specifying more exactly a proposition in the theory of electoral accountability.

III. THE SELECTION AND DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS

A very crude classification permits categorizing theories of democracy as having one of two emphases. One emphasis stresses widespread citizen participation in the making of public policy. Of relevance to scholars in this tradition are issues such as expansion of suffrage, citizenship training, methods of citizen petitioning, rights of association and free speech, mobilization of the public, and so forth. The second emphasis stresses procedures of leadership selection and displacement. Relevant issues are extent of organized competition for office, availability of regularized review procedures, tenure limitations, access of all social groups to political recruitment channels, circulation of elites, and so forth. Though no scholar is faced with an either-or choice, individual scholars as well as schools of thought tend to concentrate on one or the other set of issues.

The theory of electoral accountability largely directs attention to analysis of leadership selection and displacement. Schumpeter takes "the view that the role of the people is to produce a government." He continues, "it should be observed that in making it the primary function of the electorate to produce a government (directly or through an intermediate body) I intended to include in this phrase also the function of evicting it. The one means simply the acceptance of a leader or a group of leaders, the other means simply the withdrawal of this acceptance. . . . electorates normally do not control their political leaders in any way except by refusing to reelect them or the parliamentary majorities that support them."¹⁵ Lipset advances a similar argument: "Democracy, however, implies permanent insecurity for those in governing positions; and the more truly democratic the governing system, the greater the insecurity of the incumbent.

TABLE 1. PROPORTION OF COUNCILS
WITH VARIOUS APPOINTMENT RATES
(N = 81)

Percentage of Councilmen Initially Appointed to Office (N = 81)	Percentage of Cities With Different Appointment Rates
Fewer than ten	19%
10 to 19	16
20 to 29	23
30 to 39	11
40 to 49	10
50 to 74	14
75 to 100	7
	100%

Thus every incumbent of a position of high status within a truly democratic system must of necessity anticipate the loss of his position by the operation of normal political processes."¹⁶ The processes which provide for democracy are sustained competition for political office and regularized procedures for review by electorates of leaders; parties establish the former, and electorates establish the latter of these conditions.

Since the present task is to explain some "puzzling" responses of elected officials, attention should turn to the procedures for selecting and displacing these officials. The study of the city councils reveals four relevant facts, two related to the selection of the legislators and two related to the manner in which they are displaced.

1) *The Frequency of Appointment to Elected Office.* The theory of electoral accountability makes the tacit assumption that persons holding elected office earned them by competing for voter support. This need not be the case; nearly one-fourth (24 per cent) of the city councilmen interviewed had initially reached office by being appointed to fill an unexpired term. Such frequent use of a method of leadership selection which circumvents the election process will undoubtedly affect how the leaders, appointed as well as those who do the appointing, think about the sanctioning power of elections. Table 1 shows the frequency with which the appointment strategy is used among the cities in the study. These data are taken from aggregate election statistics over a ten-year period, five elections for each city. (Data are available for

¹⁵ Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 269, 272.

¹⁶ S. M. Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 241.

81 of the 82 cities in the study.) In seventeen cities half or more councilmen are initially appointed to office. More than four-fifths of the cities have at least one member appointed (councils are never fewer than five members). In cities where appointment is a regularly employed method of selecting some or most leaders, there may occur a nonchalance about elections.

2) *The Electorate as a (Small) Constituency.* It is well known that relatively few citizens express their preferences in local elections. This generalization holds true for the cities we are studying. Averaged over five elections, fewer than one in three of the adult citizens cast a ballot in the councilmanic elections. Although low voter turnout is normal, what is interesting is to consider the interaction between low turnout and the plurality method of counting ballots. The cities being studied are all nonpartisan and use some variant of at-large election procedures. Depending on the number of vacancies, the two or three candidates with the most votes win. Except in a very few cases, there are no run-off elections. Low turnout and plurality elections mean that a very small number of citizens can elect a candidate to office. Table 2 presents illustrative data showing, for five different size cities, the *minimum* number of votes it took to gain a council seat averaged for five elections. For instance, in a city of more than 13,000 residents, on the average as few as 810 voters elected a man to office. Such figures sharply question the validity of thinking that "mass electorates" hold elected officials accountable. For these councilmen, even if serving in relatively sizable cities, there is no "mass electorate"; rather there are the councilman's business associates, his friends at church, his acquaintances

TABLE 2. MINIMUM NUMBER OF VOTES NEEDED TO WIN OFFICE IN DIFFERENT SIZE CITIES

City Population (1964 estimate)	Average Total Vote of Lowest Winner— Five Elections* (1955-65)
71,000	5,298
28,750	1,931
13,450	810
6,675	518
500	64

* To compute the average total vote of the lowest winner, we simply added the votes of lowest winner for five elections and divided by five. Except in special elections, there are never fewer than two winners for any council election.

TABLE 3. PROPORTION OF CITIES WITH VARIOUS INCUMBENT WIN RATIOS (N=81).

Percentage of Incumbents Who Successfully Sought Reelection	Percentage of Cities With Different In- cumbent Win Ratios
90 to 100	30%
80 to 89	20
70 to 79	19
60 to 69	15
50 to 59	7
25 to 49	6
0 to 24	3
	100%

in the Rotary Club, and so forth which provide him the electoral support he needs to gain office.

These two observations, one pointing out the frequency of appointments and the other suggesting that the effective electorate for any given officeholder can be very small in local plurality elections, give pause to interpretations of politics which emphasize that selection to office is controlled by large electorates indirectly voicing policy preferences. In the present research site, selection of leaders is less controlled by a voting public than might be necessary for the conditions of electoral accountability to hold. What about the electorates' power to evict the governors?

3) *The Infrequency of Election Defeat.* Implicit in the theory of electoral accountability is the assumption that voters frequently enough remove men from office that election defeat is seen by officeholders as a threat to tenure. It is difficult to know how frequent is "frequent," but the success of incumbents at gaining reelection is commonly taken for granted by students of American politics. Over the ten-year period four out of five incumbent councilmen who stood for reelection were successful. This figure, though high, is even somewhat lower than one reported for members of the House of Representatives. During the years 1924-1956, 90 per cent of the congressmen who sought reelection were returned by the voters.¹⁷ Once in elected office men can feel relatively secure about staying there. Indeed, in 20 of the 82 cities studied, over a ten-year time period not one single incumbent seeking another term failed to be reelected. Table 3 presents pertinent data.

¹⁷ David A. Leuthold, *Electioneering in a Democracy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), p. 127.

Two speculations can be derived from this table, both of which run counter to the assumption that elections insure accountability. The frequency with which officeholders are returned to office suggests that they are unlikely to be constantly preoccupied with voter preferences. Moreover, the voting public, which already constitutes a minority of the eligible population, evidently does not see in elections the means by which to force leadership turnover.

4) *The Frequency of Voluntary Retirement from Elected Office.* In the cities we are studying, more men by far depart from elected office voluntarily than because of election defeat. Officeholders simply conclude that the obligations of office exceed the rewards. Among the nearly 500 men who govern the cities of the San Francisco Bay Area, about one-fifth will be planning to retire voluntarily at the end of the present term and another 30 to 50 per cent will be planning to retire after only one more term. It is not the electorate jealously guarding its power to sanction officeholders which establishes tenure limitations. Rather, there are widely shared norms among these councilmen which lead to self-imposed limitations. The single most important reason for voluntary departures is simply "I've been on long enough" or "I have done my duty." As one typical councillor states it:

No, I won't run again. I think this is the end. If I had my way, I'd limit it to two terms anyway. You get a lot of new blood that way. New ideas are needed and new councilmen can provide them. Give the next guy a chance.

Thus it is that norms held by the councilmen themselves often lead to turnover among officeholders, not the behavior of an aroused or impatient electorate. Table 4 presents data.

IV. THE NORM OF VOLUNTEERISM

This brief attention to the manner in which men enter and depart elected office in 82 California cities points uniformly in one direction. The quotations earlier reported, though puzzling when read in terms of electoral accountability perspectives, are not puzzling when read in the context of the cumulative impact of (1) the frequent reliance on appointment as a route to office, (2) the smallness of the electorate which can send and retain a man in office, (3) the overwhelming electoral advantage held by the incumbent, and (4) the high rate of voluntary retirement from office. Men enter and leave office not at the whim of the electorate, but according to self-defined schedules.

To the extent this is so, it is likely that a strong norm of volunteerism is at work in these

TABLE 4. PROPORTION OF CITIES WITH
VARIOUS VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE RATES
(N = 81)

Percentage of Councilmen Who Left Office Voluntarily	Percentage of Cities With Different Voluntary Departure Rates
90 to 100	1%
80 to 89	5
70 to 79	9
60 to 69	28
50 to 59	22
40 to 49	11
30 to 39	14
20 to 29	7
fewer than 20	3
	100%

city councils. This appears to result directly from the process by which councilmen are recruited into office, the images they hold of council service, and the manner in which they vacate office. They treat council service as a "citizen duty" in much the same manner as they treat service in the Chamber of Commerce, the PTA, the Library Board, and other such community service organizations. As we pointed out elsewhere, the norm of volunteerism "can serve to undermine an already weakened election system. Although the volunteer in office, especially if relatively indifferent to staying there, may be a devoted public servant as he defines the role, he is unlikely to be constantly sensitive to voter preferences. His political thinking has been formed by a series of experiences which minimize for him the importance of mass electoral."¹⁸

Volunteerism and the Theory of Electoral Accountability

It is clear why electoral accountability is weakened to the extent that volunteerism dominates in a political community. Both the choosers and the chosen come to think of movement into and out of political office as being regulated by self-selection and self-elimination patterns rather than electoral challenges. We have shown elsewhere that in communities where elections seldom evict governors, the officeholders tend to act in response only to their own image of what the community needs. The council which does

¹⁸ Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians* (Bobbs-Merrill, in press). This book includes a more detailed analysis of the survey data.

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTENT OF VOLUNTEERISM IN LEADERSHIP SELECTION AND SEVEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES RELATED TO THE THEORY OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Attribute of Council	Extent of Volunteerism*		
	Most Present (15)	Mixed (49)	Least Present (17)
a. Council votes with perceived majority public opinion.	35%	49%	53%
b. Council senses demands from the public.	29%	51%	73%
c. Council reflects concern with next election.	29%	45%	60%
d. Council activates constituencies in connection with policy-making.	35%	43%	73%
e. Council views many groups as politically influential.	29%	51%	67%
f. Council facilitates group access.	35%	61%	60%
g. Council performs services for constituents.	29%	41%	67%

* The councils scored as "most volunteerism" are those above the median of all councils with respect to frequency of appointment to the council and rate of voluntary retirement; those scored as "least volunteerism" are those below the median on these two measures; the "mixed" councils are high on one of the measures but low on the other.

not face the threat of election defeat is less likely than a council which does to respond either to attentive publics or to ad hoc issue groups.¹⁹ We can now carry this analysis a step further, by classifying cities with respect to the "norm of volunteerism."²⁰

For present purposes, two indicators of volunteerism are used: the frequency of appointment as a route to elective office and the frequency of voluntary departure from office. Cities were ranked high to low on each of these measures; they were then divided at the median and cities above the median on both measures are said to be the most characterized by the norm of volunteerism. Cities below the median on both measures are least characterized by this norm. Cities high on one measure but low on the other are for present purposes simply left as intermediate. Two indicators, then, are combined to construct an ordinal measure of volunteerism.

The hypothesis is very simple: councils characterized by volunteerism will exhibit traits which contradict what the theory of electoral accountability predicts about elected legislatures. Table 5 confirms this hypothesis. Where the norm of volunteerism is more prevalent, councils are (a) more likely to vote against

what they see as majority opinion, (b) less likely to feel under pressure from the public, (c) less likely to consider the upcoming election when choosing among policy alternatives, (d) less likely to involve constituencies as part of the strategy of policy-making, (e) less likely to view political groups as having an influential part to play in city politics, and (f) less likely to facilitate group access to the council, and (g) less likely to perform services for constituents.²¹

Each item in Table 5 merits discussion, for each one relates in its own manner to a theory of electoral accountability. For instance, if the anticipated reactions of the voting public are thought to be relevant to policies chosen by governors, then elected councils will likely involve constituencies as the council carries out its deliberations. Yet it is clear that councils characterized by volunteerism seldom mobilize constituencies as part of the activities which surround the making of policy. Or, another example, elected councils will feel under some pressure from publics if indeed the councils are

²¹ In every case the dependent items in Table 5 derive from some method of aggregating the responses of individual councilmen into a group measure. Two procedures are represented. With respect to all items but 'c' and 'd' the responses of individual councilmen were summed, a mean was computed, and the distribution of means was then used to assign councils as either above or below the median of all councils. With respect to the remaining items, a procedure relying on coder judgment to assign a score to each council was used. Footnote 9 in Prewitt and Eulau, *ibid.*, describes the procedure.

¹⁹ Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation," this REVIEW, LXIII (June, 1969), pp. 427-441.

²⁰ In this analysis the council in contrast to the individual councilman is taken as the unit of analysis. The theoretical rationale for this as well as some methodological considerations are spelled out in Prewitt and Eulau, *ibid.*

keeping the preferences of constituents in mind as they govern their cities. But we note that fewer than one-third of the more volunteeristic councils report being under such pressure. And so forth.

It would detract from the central argument to pursue every theoretical lead suggested by Table 5. Instead, a general summary observation can be advanced. The theory of accountability is both confirmed and confounded by the evidence of Table 5. On the one hand, councils in cities where elections play a greater role in the selection and eviction of governors appear to be more sensitive to public constituencies. On the other hand, there are processes at work, summarized by the term volunteerism, which weaken the capacity of elections to insure the accountability of the elected legislature to the voters.

This summary inference from Table 5 suggests, in turn, several ways in which to speculate about volunteerism, elections, and democratic accountability. First, however, it is important to raise the nagging question: How unusual are the Bay Area councils with respect to the norm of volunteerism?

Scattered Evidence About the Distribution of Volunteerism in American Politics

Although the measures used in this study forced some variation among the cities, it is plausible that if all political units in the U.S. could be arrayed along a continuum from the most to the least volunteeristic, the 82 units here studied would cluster well toward the "most volunteeristic" end. Systematic data for determining the accuracy of this guess are not readily available; however, there is sufficient evidence to confirm that volunteerism is far from being limited to a few Bay Area nonpartisan councils.

It has been noted already that the frequency with which incumbents are returned to office when they seek reelection is uniformly high for all types of legislatures in the United States. The rate of voter turnout is a more problematic variable because of the ambiguity of determining what is "high" and what is "low" turnout; however, both survey and aggregate data readily confirm that voter turnout fluctuates widely from one type of election to the next and, in the thousands upon thousands of elections below the state level, elections very often involve only small minorities of the eligible electorate. Data on appointment as a route to elective office are not available, but a reasonable guess is that the figure reported here (approximately one-fourth) does not greatly exaggerate the proportion of appointees to school boards, city and township

councils, and so forth. The proportion of appointees to state legislatures and to the national congress should be much lower.

There are more systematic data on the frequency with which elected officials voluntarily depart from office, the remaining indicator of volunteerism. James Young's *The Washington Community—1800–1828*, is a good beginning point. Evidence reported by Young indicate that the federal congresses of the early decades should be placed well toward the "most volunteerism" end of a hypothetical continuum; indeed, the legislative body empowered to guide the nation in its early years had higher rates of voluntary departure than the councils presently governing the Bay Area cities. "From 1797 to 1829 (5th through 20th Congresses) more Senators resigned than failed to be reelected by their state legislatures." And, "Each new Congress, moreover, brought a host of new faces to the community, drastically reconstituting its membership every two years. For the first four decades of national government between one-third and two-thirds of the congressional community left every two years not to return."²² On the average, the biennial turnover during the first decades of the founding was 41.5 per cent of the total legislative membership. Young's study is a prototype for investigating how voluntary turnover affects the governing process and especially the means by which accountability is insured. The burden of his analysis is that the legislators were "remote" from the citizens they were to govern and, in effect, that they were not held accountable for the policies they pursued.²³

To move to more recent times, and from the national to the state level, it is instructive to review the data on voluntary retirement collected by Charles Hyneman three decades ago. He reports that much turnover among state legislators is due not to election defeat, but to voluntary retirement. In his extensive study of twenty-five state chambers between 1925 and 1935, he found that fewer than one-third of the retire-

²²James S. Young, *The Washington Community—1800–1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 57, 89.

²³Young writes of the "remoteness of the rulers from the citizenry and remoteness of the citizenry from the rulers" and that the "isolated circumstances of the early governing group must have afforded a freedom of choice as nearly uninhibited as any representative government could have." *Ibid.*, p. 34, 36. Young, of course, is making much of the sheer fact of geographical isolation whereas volunteerism implies a distance between rulers and citizenry established not by geography but by the processes of leadership selection.

ments from state legislative office were due to election defeats; only 16 per cent came from general election defeats, the presumed sanction of the voting public. After his exhaustive study of turnover he commented, "The real task is to find why so many legislators, senators and representatives alike, choose not to run again."²⁴ Eulau, writing about state legislators some twenty years after the Hyneman study, reports similar figures. The proportion of legislators in each of four states who either intend not to stand for reelection or are doubtful about it is as follows: Tennessee—66 per cent; Ohio—40 per cent; California—34 per cent; and New Jersey—24 per cent.²⁵ Barber's study of Connecticut state legislators provides similar data. In Connecticut, "election defeat accounted for less than 26 per cent of retirement from the House in seven elections between 1946 and 1958. Thus, by far the largest proportion of retirements may be classified as pre-election turnover."²⁶ Among the first-term representatives interviewed by Barber, 35 per cent report that they definitely or probably would not be willing to serve more than two or three terms.

Additional confirmation that leadership turnover is often voluntary is to be found in data collected by Schlesinger. For twenty-nine states between 1914 and 1958, in only 17 per cent of 542 gubernatorial elections was the incumbent defeated. For thirty-six states during the same time period, in only one-fifth of the 616 senatorial elections was the incumbent defeated.²⁷ Although it is not possible to derive rates of voluntary retirement directly from these figures, Schlesinger presents other data which support the conclusion that rates of voluntary retirement are high even for governors and senators.²⁸

²⁴ Charles S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 195 (1938), p. 20.

²⁵ John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), computed from Table 6.1, p. 122.

²⁶ David Barber, *The Lawmakers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 8.

²⁷ Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 63 (Table IV-2).

²⁸ This inference seems warranted on the basis of evidence Schlesinger presents on p. 144, regarding the frequency with which the candidates for gubernatorial and senatorial elections differ from their predecessors, and his statement on p. 146 that the opportunity for men to be nominated for these offices is "impressively high, indicative of a great deal of fluctuation at the very top of the

This sketchy review suggests an hypothesis: there is an inverse relationship between volunteerism and perceived political stakes. "Important" legislatures have less volunteerism than "unimportant" ones. There are several variants on this theme. For instance, the higher the level of government, the fewer the number of voluntary departures from office. Another variant, the more professionalized (or better paid) the legislature, the lower the rate of volunteerism.²⁹ Further, the greater the competition to enter the legislature, the less volunteerism there is. And so on. Thus, whereas in the extent of volunteerism the national congresses of the 1800's may parallel nonpartisan city councils in the 1960's, the 80th Congress in no way resembles the 8th Congress.

Such qualifications, though important, do not negate the thesis developed in this paper. The thesis is theoretical—showing the relationship among variables pertinent to accountability theories, but also descriptive—discovering something about the likely distribution of these variables.

pyramid within state parties." His data, of course, include controls for tenure limitations. There are two interpretations possible. Either the political parties habitually fail to renominate the incumbent, or the rates of voluntary retirement are high for governors and senators. The latter seems the more reasonable inference.

²⁹ Schlesinger writes that the "impact of ambitions upon the behavior of public officials will be greater on those in high than in low office, greater upon congressmen than upon state legislators, greater upon United States Senators than upon United States Representatives." *Ibid.*, p. 193. Although this observation is intuitively persuasive, it is relevant to record that it is an inference and in no way is it directly confirmed by the massive amounts of evidence Schlesinger imaginatively analyzes. Evidence suggesting that salary differentials may promote or retard political ambitions at the state level is suggested by John W. Soule, "Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators," *Midwest Political Science Review*, XIII (August, 1969), pp. 443-444. For a study indicating that as a legislature becomes more professionalized over time, the incidence of volunteerism should drop, see Nelson Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U. S. House of Representatives," this *REVIEW*, LXII (March, 1968), 144-168. To read Polsby's study side-by-side with Young's analysis of the early congresses is very instructive, and indicates why volunteerism as an attribute of a legislature is variable over time.

To review the thesis: the theory of electoral accountability predicts that elected officials keep in mind the preferences of ordinary citizens because these officials are determined to remain in office. This proposition has been confirmed in several empirical studies, and, in fact, is confirmed in Table 5. What is generally ignored by scholars associated with the accountability theory is (1) clearly establishing the conditions under which elections hold the representatives accountable, and (2) providing evidence regarding the distribution of these conditions. Our analysis speaks to both of these points: where the methods of selecting and displacing political leaders encourage the norm of volunteerism, electoral accountability is weakened; moreover, though undoubtedly more prevalent at the local than the state and at the state than the national level, the norm of volunteerism in some degree is present in most legislatures.

A postscript to this latter point is in order. The overwhelming majority of the half-million elected legislators in the United States serve in legislatures where some recognizable degree of volunteerism is present. The skeptic can say that these legislative bodies—city councils, school boards, village governments, etc.—are “unimportant” because they deal with “low-stake issues.” While true that the House Committee on Education and Labor is far more important to the education of American citizens than any single school board, the cumulative impact of nearly 35,000 school boards is in turn far greater than the action of a Congressional Committee. Thus, whereas there is one national legislature and 50 state legislatures (where already evidence of volunteerism is apparent), there are in excess of 3,000 county governments, in excess of 35,000 municipalities, towns, and townships, nearly 35,000 school boards, as well as 18,000 special districts.

I do not deny the symbolic as well as material importance of the central government, yet if the ordinary citizen is subject at the local level to legislatures seemingly remote and indifferent, that citizen's “experience with democracy” falls short not only of the classical model but also of the neo-classical model which emphasizes electoral accountability. It is in this context that we should interpret survey results such as, for instance, McClosky's finding that approximately half of the general electorate “perceive government and politicians as remote, inaccessible, and largely unresponsive to the electorate's needs or opinions.”³⁰ Volunteerism among elected officials

may well be connected with political disillusionment among the electors.

V. SPECULATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps the most efficient manner in which to summarize the thesis and findings presented here is to organize the conclusions around a few general speculations. Speculations permit us to review prominent themes in writings about electoral accountability, from the viewpoint of findings about volunteerism, and yet avoid the dangers of premature precision.

Leadership Turnover, Accountability, and Volunteerism. To consider democratic politics from the perspective of electoral accountability theories has, for many writers, implied sharing with Lipset the belief that permanent insecurity for those in governing positions makes for democratic politics. When leaders are entrenched they form an oligarchy; and oligarchies are inimical to political processes which would insure some fit between the preferences of non-leaders and the policies of leaders. Insecure tenure, in contrast, assures that leaders will attempt to retain their high status positions by satisfying the policy demands of at least some sizable part of the citizenry.

This formulation seems reasonable until we encounter volunteerism in the methods of leadership selection. When movement into and out of office is self-determined, rapid turnover of elected leaders, far from being an indicator of insecurity and, hence accountability, is more likely related to an indifference among the elected to the sanctions of the ballot box. Indeed, when we discovered in the city council study that leadership turnover was not necessarily linked to election defeats, we were led to distinguish between the “circulation of elites” and the “replaceability of elites.” The former term implies that leadership turnover is associated with changes in the mood of the citizens and thus with changes in policies; the latter term makes no such assumptions. Where there is recruitment by replaceability, a procession of like-minded men move through public office with relatively little resultant shift in policies.

Civic Duty, Social Status, and Malrepresentation of Social Groups. The inquiry into volunteerism also encourages some revised thinking

³⁰ Herbert McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” this REVIEW, LVIII, (June, 1964), 361-382. For instance, as reported on pp.

370-371, more than half the general electorate agree that “It seems to me that whoever you vote for, things go on pretty much the same” and “There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do once he gets elected,” and “Nothing I ever do seems to have any effect upon what happens in politics.”

about a topic closely related to the issue of tenure insecurity. There is in the study of democratic politics considerable attention to the topic of social class and political recruitment. One perspective on this question treats the political processes which accentuate and those which depress the tendency for the members of the relatively better-off social groups in society to be significantly overrepresented in political leadership circles.

Where electoral accountability is fully operating, this tendency should be depressed. Candidates for office must appeal to a relatively wide range of social groups in order to reach and to hold political office. Where volunteerism affects leadership selection, class bias in the composition of the legislature is likely to be accentuated. The reasoning here is simple.

First, the smallness of the voting constituency increases the probability that the constituency is socially homogeneous, and, based on what we know about the correlates of voting behavior, consequently increases the probability that the constituency is middle and upper-middle class.³¹ Second, a more complicated but possibly more critical factor relates to the motives for seeking office. When the selection of leaders is characterized by volunteerism, the recruitment processes necessarily further careers of the self-selected. For the cities we study this implies that the pool of eligible recruits for city office are those citizens with a strong sense of civic duty. That the positions are nonsalaried adds to this tendency. Although the term "civic duty" can imply many things, among the citizens who govern cities and towns, school boards and special districts, and so forth, it very often implies a belief that one has the duty to direct the political community.³² This belief is never randomly distributed across all socio-economic groupings in society. Political socialization stud-

ies show that white middle and upper-middle class children, more so than children from less well-to-do social groups, are taught to believe in their "duties" as citizens and their "responsibilities" as community leaders. Civic duty tends to be little more than a middle-class version of *noblesse oblige*; it is not nobility status which obligates but bourgeois status. Political volunteerism derives from citizen duty, and malrepresentation of social groups in legislatures is one consequence.

Status Inequality, Ambitions, and Volunteerism. The investigation of volunteerism might make a contribution to a related inquiry which attempts to link accountability to issues of social status. Lipset, elaborating on Michels, notes that democratic accountability is threatened when the status difference between political leaders and political followers grows too great.³³ If there is great status inequality, those in office will have cause to resist leadership turnover and, moreover, will have the superior resources it requires to forestall challenges from an opposition. The difficulties of establishing constitutional democracy in several African nations lends support to this hypothesis.

A contrary position has been advanced by May³⁴ and, indirectly, by Schlesinger. When political office confers no status, then the motive for seeking office is not political ambition but, for instance, civic duty. Schlesinger reminds us that the absence of ambition in politics can be inimical to representative democracy: "No more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for their political futures."³⁵ The earlier cited responses of elected councilmen lends support to this point; as one councilman stated it, "I am free to do as I feel. In general it is easy to vote against the majority because I don't have any political ambitions."

The data on volunteerism helps clear up the contradiction between the "status inequality" hypothesis and the "ambition" hypothesis. The question is not whether political leaders have higher status for, as Eulau reminds us, this is almost certainly the case.³⁶ At issue is not the status distance, but whether office confers status

³¹ An interesting study which shows that the socio-economic composition of legislatures is related to voter turnout is that of Rosalio Wences, "Electoral Participation and the Occupational Composition of Cabinets and Parliaments," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 75 (September, 1969), pp. 181-192. A related discussion is in Kenneth Prewitt, "From the Many Are Selected the Few," *American Behavioral Scientists*, November, 1969.

³² A finding of McClosky's is instructive in this context. One of the very few items on which political influentials measured higher than the general electorate was as follows: "Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country." Seventy-seven percent of the influentials agreed and fifty-nine percent of the electorate did. *op. cit.*, p. 370.

³³ Lipset, et al., *op. cit.*, especially pp. 239-247.

³⁴ A paper by John D. May, unfortunately not yet published, is particularly insightful on this issue. See his "Democracy and Inequality," unpublished paper, Chicago, 1969.

³⁵ Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³⁶ Heinz Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation," in Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed) *Contemporary Political Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967), p. 80.

or whether office is simply a by-product of previously achieved status, which is to say previously acquired prestige, wealth, leisure, security, and so forth. Where political office is but a by-product, the conditions leading to volunteerism will be accentuated. Electoral accountability can be expected to suffer.

Volunteerism and the Political Formula. Inquiry into political representation, following Burke's lead, has established that representatives define their relationship with constituencies according to a trustee role-orientation, a delegate role-orientation, or, possibly, some mixture.³⁷ Available evidence testifies to the widespread presence of the trustee orientation among legislators in the United States; and though theories of electoral accountability have never been joined with studies of representational role-orientations, it is a reasonable speculation that trusteeship and volunteerism can comfortably coexist in the same legislative system.³⁸ Moreover, volunteerism and trusteeship are congenial to an interpretation of elections which stresses the ceremonial and ritualistic function they perform.

To suggest that volunteerism in political recruitment, trusteeship in political representation, and ritualism in political elections form a compatible package does not mean that these political phenomena necessarily coexist. But that they might coexist suggests an entirely new perspective on the theory of electoral accountability. Mosca will help us to sharpen this perspective.

For Mosca, the power of any political class rests upon a political formula or the set of moral principles which justifies the political hierarchy to those toward its bottom as well as those toward its top. Mosca describes the political formula in the United States: "The powers of all lawmakers, magistrates and governmental officials in the United States emanate directly or indirectly from the vote of the voters, which is held to be the expression of the sovereign will of

the whole American people."³⁹ That Mosca himself considered this belief to be myth does not make it so. That he was correct in asserting that the vast majority of Americans believe in the formula, however, cannot be denied. One need only consult a portion of the data stored in political socialization studies, survey data, civics textbooks, political histories, journalistic imagery, and campaign speeches to conclude, with Mosca, that political leaders in this society are granted legitimacy because they are elected.

It has been the accomplishment of theorists working with electoral accountability notions to effect a subtle translation of Mosca's observation. Mosca's insight into the process which *legitimizes* political leaders has been converted into a statement about the process which holds them *accountable*. But this is to confuse what should be separate issues. The electors and the elected can share a belief in the legitimacy of the political hierarchy because votes are cast and counted, without that same counting of ballots necessarily leading to accountability.

The operative political formula as described by Mosca is considered to be congenial to electoral accountability; less often noted is that the political formula is equally congenial to a politics where accountability does not proceed from electoral sanctions. Volunteerism in political recruitment, trusteeship in political representation, and ritualism in elections provide appropriate conditions. Political leaders are legitimated without feeling accountable. This would be so if, first, the norms shared by political leaders stress mutual responsibility for the public interest (trusteeship) without at the same time stressing accountability; such norms bring leaders closer together while simultaneously widening the distance between any given set of leaders and the constituency it represents.⁴⁰ And if, second, the political norms widely shared by citizens are such as to temper direct and regular involvement in political activities; that such is the case in the United States is the burden of much survey data.⁴¹

³⁷ Wahlke, Eulau, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, is the most elaborate application of the Burkean categories to the empirical study of legislators.

³⁸ A measure of a council attribute related to trusteeship is something we term the "city father ethos," a term which describes an orientation of paternalistic responsibility among the councilmen. Where volunteerism was most present, 65% of the councils are characterized by this orientation; where volunteerism is least present, 40% of the councils are characterized by the orientation. A great deal of additional analysis remains to be completed, however, before we can confirm that volunteerism and trusteeship are empirically linked.

³⁹ Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1939), p. 70.

⁴⁰ I have paraphrased the argument advanced in Parry, *op. cit.*, in this sentence. It has been the substantial and brilliant contribution of Theodore Lowi, in his *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), to document exactly this tendency in contemporary politics. See, for instance, chapter 3, where he relates his thesis to the problem of holding leaders accountable for their actions.

⁴¹ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

Two points remain to be made. First, the speculation advanced in these last few paragraphs refers to electoral accountability and not to whether leaders consult the preferences of non-leaders. The question of consultation is separate from the issue of accountability. The point we stress is that if the consultative process occurs to any significant extent where volunteerism is present, it is for reasons other than an accountability forced by electoral sanctions.

Second, the last few decades of empirical re-

1963), especially pp. 476-487. The authors actually refer to their finding as constituting a myth. The citizen's perception that he can be influential "may be in part a myth, for it involves a set of norms of participation and perceptions of ability to influence that are not quite matched by actual political behavior," p. 481.

search have seen an emphasis on electoral accountability as the process which links the few who govern and the many who are governed. The study of politics has been advanced by this insight. But if the theory of electoral accountability has added to an understanding of democratic politics, it has also distracted attention from political processes which weaken electoral sanctions. Volunteerism is one of these processes. Volunteerism as well as other political processes which weaken electoral sanctions are undoubtedly present in the strikingly large number of legislative systems in the United States. There are very many small groups of citizens elected to make laws for the greater number of citizens. It is a research task of practical as well as theoretical significance to discover what, if anything, establishes democratic controls over legislatures somewhat immune from electoral sanctions.

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY FROM TRUMAN TO JOHNSON¹

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I think [my grandchildren] will be proud of two things. What I did for the Negro and seeing it through in Vietnam for all of Asia. The Negro cost me 15 points in the polls and Vietnam cost me 20.

Lyndon B. Johnson²

With tenacious regularity over the last two and a half decades the Gallup Poll has posed to its cross-section samples of the American public the following query, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent) is handling his job as President?" The responses to this curious question form an index known as "Presidential popularity." According to Richard Neustadt, the index is "widely taken to approximate reality" in Washington and reports about its behavior are "very widely read"³ there, including, the quotation above would suggest, the highest circles.

Plotted over time, the index forms probably the longest continuous trend line in polling history. This study seeks to analyze the behavior of this line for the period from the beginning of the Truman administration in 1945 to the end of the Johnson administration in January 1969 during which time the popularity question was asked some 300 times.⁴

¹This investigation was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. At various stages helpful comments, criticisms, and complaints were lodged by Richard Fenno, Gerald Kramer, Richard Niemi, Peter Ordeshook, Alvin Rabushka, William Riker, and Andrew Scott.

²Quoted, David Wise, "The Twilight of a President," *New York Times Magazine*, November 3, 1968, p. 131.

³Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 205n.

⁴A general picture of what this line looks like can be gained from the figure in Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 107. The Presidential popularity data for the Johnson administration have been taken from the *Gallup Opinion Index*. All other poll data, unless otherwise indicated, have come from the archives of the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts.

Four variables are used as predictors of a President's popularity. These include a measure of the length of time the incumbent has been in office as well as variables which attempt to estimate the influence on his rating of major international events, economic slump and war. To assess the independent impact of each of these variables as they interact in association with Presidential popularity, multiple regression analysis is used as the basic analytic technique.

I. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY

The Presidential popularity question taps a general impression about the way the incumbent seems to be handling his job at the present moment. As Neustadt notes, the response, like the question, is "unfocused,"⁵ unrelated to specific issues or electoral outcomes. The respondent is asked to "approve" or "disapprove" and if he has "no opinion," he must volunteer that response himself. He has infrequently been asked *why* he feels that way—and many respondents when asked are able only vaguely to rationalize their position.⁶ And only at times has he been asked to register how strongly he approves or disapproves.

A disapproving response might be considered a non-constructive vote of no-confidence: the respondent registers his discontent, but he does not need to state who he would prefer in the Presidency. Thus the index is likely to be a very imperfect indicator of success or failure for a President seeking re-election. While approvers are doubtless more likely than disapprovers to endorse his re-election, on considering the opposition some approvers may be attracted into voting against the incumbent just as some disapprovers may be led grudgingly to vote for him.⁷

⁵*Op. cit.*, p. 96.

⁶See for example the breakdowns in *Gallup Opinion Index*, March, 1966, p. 4.

⁷There is also a more technical reason why the popularity index has little direct relevance to the electoral result: Gallup does not ask the question during a President's re-election campaign. Thus for the months between early summer and late fall in 1948, 1956, and 1964 no Gallup data on Presidential popularity exist. One other technical-

Whatever peculiarities there are in the question itself, they are at least constant. Unlike many questions asked by the polling organizations, wording has not varied from time to time by whim or fashion. The stimulus has therefore been essentially fixed; only the response has varied.

And the variation has been considerable. Harry Truman was our most popular President in this period—for a few weeks in 1945 when more than 85 percent of the public expressed approval—and our least popular—from early 1951 until March 1952 when less than 30 percent were usually found to be favorably inclined. Other Presidents have stayed within these limits with Lyndon Johnson most nearly approaching the Truman extremes. President Eisenhower's popularity was never higher than 79 percent, but it never dropped below 49 percent either. President Kennedy also maintained a rather high level of popularity but was in noticeable decline at the time of his death.

The proportion of respondents selecting the "no opinion" option, averaging 14 percent, remained strikingly constant throughout the period.⁸ This is a little surprising since it might be expected that when opinion changes, say, from approval to disapproval of a President, the move would be seen first in a decrease in the support figure with an increase in the no opinion percentage, followed in a later survey by an increase in the disapproval column with a decrease in the no opinion portion. There are a few occasions in which the no opinion percentage seems to rise and fall in this manner, one occurring in the early weeks of the Korean War, but by and large it would appear that if movements into the no opinion column do occur they are compensated for by movements out of it.

This means therefore that the trend in approval is largely a mirror image of the trend in

disapproval; the correlation between the two is —.98. And, most conveniently, this almost means that the President's popularity at a given moment can be rendered by a single number: the percentage approving his handling of the job. The no opinion percentage is almost always close to 14 percent and the percentage disapproving is, of course, the remainder.

There is, however, one small wrinkle. The no opinion percentage does get a bit out of hand, quite understandably, in the early weeks of the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations as substantial numbers of respondents felt inclined to withhold judgment on these new men. This inordinate withholding of opinion declined in the first weeks to more "normal" levels with the result that *both* the level of approval *and* disapproval tended to increase.⁹

Since one of the propositions to be tested in this study proposes that there exists a general downward trend in each President's popularity, this initial rating situation causes something of a problem. If the disapproval score is used as the dependent variable there will be a slight bias in favor of the proposition. It seems preferable to load things against the proposition; hence for the purposes of this study *the dependent variable is the percentage approving the way the incumbent is handling his job as President*.¹⁰ The average approval rating for the entire twenty-four year period is 58 percent.

II. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

If one stares at Presidential popularity trend lines long enough, one soon comes to imagine one is seeing things. If the things imagined seem also to be mentioned in the literature about the way Presidential popularity should or does behave, one begins to take the visions seriously and to move to test them.

⁸In the case of President Eisenhower, the no opinion response actually rose a bit before it began to descend, reaching the highest level recorded for any President in the period in March 1953 when 28 percent had no opinion. (President Nixon has proved to be the greatest mystery of all: fully 36 percent registered no opinion after his inauguration.)

⁹It is argued by some that percentages should not be used in their pure state as variables, but rather should be transformed into logits: $Y^* = \log_e [Y/(1-Y)]$. The transformation was tried in the analysis, but it made little difference. Therefore the more easily communicated percentage version has been kept. In any event the dependent variable rarely takes extreme values. It rises to 80 percent only three or four times and never dips below 23 percent.

ity is worth mention. There is a slight underrepresentation of data points in Truman's first years. By 1950, except for the election year phenomenon, the Gallup organization was asking the question on virtually every survey conducted—some dozen or sixteen per year. Before that time the question was posed on the average only about half as frequently. Neither of these technical problems, however, is likely to bias the results in any important way, especially since so much of the analysis allows each administration a fair amount of distinctiveness.

¹⁰The standard deviation for the no opinion response is 2.93. By contrast the comparable statistic is 14.8 for the approve response and 14.5 for the disapprove response.

In this manner were formulated four basic "independent" variables, predictor variables of Presidential popularity. They are: 1) a "coalition of minorities" variable that suggests the overall trend in a President's popularity will be downward; 2) a "rally round the flag" variable which anticipates that international crises and similar phenomena will give a President a short-term boost in popularity; 3) an "economic slump" variable associating recessions with decreased popularity; and 4) a "war" variable predicting a decrease in popularity under the conditions of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

1. *The "coalition of minorities" variable.* In a somewhat different context Anthony Downs has suggested the possibility that an administration, even if it always acts with majority support on each issue, can gradually alienate enough minorities to be defeated. This could occur when the minority on each issue feels so intensely about its loss that it is unable to be placated by administration support on other policies it favors. A clever opposition, under appropriate circumstances, could therefore forge a coalition of these intense minorities until it had enough votes to overthrow the incumbent.¹¹

Transposed to Presidential popularity, this concept might inspire the expectation that a President's popularity would show a general downward trend as he is forced on a variety of issues to act and thus create intense, unforgiving opponents of former supporters. It is quite easy to point to cases where this may have occurred. President Kennedy's rather dramatic efforts to force back a steel price rise in 1962, while supported by most Americans, tended to alienate many in the business community.¹² Administration enforcement of the Supreme Court's school desegregation order tended to create intense opposition among white Southerners even if the Presidential moves had passive majority support in most of the country.¹³

Realistically, the concept can be extended somewhat. From time to time there arise exquisite dilemmas in which the President must act and in which he will tend to alienate *both* sides no matter what he does, a phenomenon related to what Aaron Wildavsky has called a "minus sum" game.¹⁴ President Truman's seizure of the

steel mills in 1952 made neither labor nor management (nor the Supreme Court, for that matter) happy. For the mayor of New York, situations like this seem to arise weekly.

There are other, only vaguely related, reasons to expect an overall decline in popularity. One would be disillusionment. In the process of being elected, the President invariably says or implies he will do more than he can do and some disaffection of once bemused supporters is all but inevitable. A most notable example would be the case of those who supported President Johnson in 1964 because he seemed opposed to escalation in Vietnam. Furthermore initial popularity ratings are puffed up by a variety of weak followers. These might include leering opposition partisans looking for the first excuse to join the aggrieved, excitable types who soon became bored by the humdrum of post-election existence, and bandwagon riders whose fair weather support dissolves with the first sprinkle.¹⁵ As Burns Roper notes, "In a sense, Presidential elections are quadriennial myth builders which every four years make voters believe some man is better than he is. The President takes office with most of the nation on his side, but this artificial 'unity' soon begins to evaporate."¹⁶

For these reasons the coalition of minorities variable, as it is dubbed here, predicts decline. "Love," said Machiavelli, "is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose."¹⁷

The coalition of minorities variable is measured simply by the length of time, in years, since the incumbent was inaugurated (for first terms) or re-elected (for second terms). It varies then from zero to about four and should be negatively correlated with popularity: the longer the man has been in office, the lower his popularity. It is; the simple r is -.47. The decline is assumed to start over again for second terms because the President is expected to have spent the campaign rebuilding his popular coalition by soothing the disaffected, re-deluding the disillusioned, and putting on a show for the bored. If he is unable to do this, he will not be re-elected, something which has not happened in the post-war era although twice Presidents have declined to make the effort.

The analysis will assume a *linear* decline in popularity. That is, a President's popularity is assumed to decline at an even rate for all four

¹¹ *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 55-60.

¹² See the data in H. G. Erskine, "The Polls," 28 *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 341 and 338 (Summer 1964).

¹³ See John M. Fenton, *In Your Opinion* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 146.

¹⁴ "The Empty-head Blues: Black Rebellion and White Reaction," *The Public Interest*, Spring 1968, pp. 3-16.

¹⁵ On the bandwagon effect among nonvoters, see Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 110-115.

¹⁶ Burns Roper, "The Public Looks at Presidents," *The Public Pulse*, January 1969.

¹⁷ *The Prince*, ch. XVII.

years of his term: if a decline of 6 percentage points per year is indicated, he will be down 6 points at the end of his first year, 12 at the end of the second, 18 at the end of the third, and 24 after four years. There is nothing in the justification for the coalition of minorities variable which demands that the decline must occur with such tedious regularity but, when curvilinear variants were experimented with, little or no improvement was found. Hence the reliance in this study on the linear version which has the advantage of simplicity and ease of communication.

2. The "rally round the flag" variable. This variable seeks to bring into the analysis a phenomenon often noted by students of the Presidency and of public opinion: certain intense international events generate a "rally round the flag" effect which tends to give a boost to the President's popularity rating. As Kenneth Waltz has observed, "In the face of such an event, the people rally behind their chief executive."¹⁸ Tom Wicker: "Simply being President through a great crisis or a big event . . . draws Americans together in his support."¹⁹ Richard Neustadt notes "the correspondence between popularity and happenings,"²⁰ Burns Roper finds "approval has usually risen during international crises,"²¹ and Nelson Polsky observes, "Invariably, the popular response to a President during international crisis is favorable, regardless of the wisdom of the policies he pursues."²²

The difficulty with this concept is in operationalizing it. There is a terrible temptation to find a bump on a popularity plot, then to scurry to historical records to find an international "rally point" to associate with it. This process all but guarantees that the variable will prove significant.

The strategy adopted here to identify rally points was somewhat different and hopefully more objective. A definition of what a rally point should look like was created largely on *a priori* grounds and then a search of historical records was made to find events which fit the definition. Most of the points so identified *are* associated with bumps on the plot—that after all was how the concept was thought of in the first place—but quite a few are not and the

bumps associated with some are considerably more obvious than others.

In general, a rally point must be associated with an event which 1) is international and 2) involves the United States and particularly the President directly; and it must be 3) specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.

It must be international because only developments confronting the nation as a whole are likely to generate a rally round the flag effect. Major domestic events—riots, scandals, strikes—are at least as likely to exacerbate internal divisions as they are to soothe them.

To qualify as a rally point an international event is required to involve the United States and the President directly because major conflicts between other powers are likely to engender split loyalties and are less likely to seem relevant to the average American.

Finally the event must be specific, dramatic and sharply focused in order to assure public attention and interest. As part of this, events which transpire gradually, no matter how important, are excluded from consideration because their impact on public attitudes is likely to be diffused. Thus sudden changes in the bombing levels in Vietnam are expected to create a reaction while the gradual increase of American troops is not.

Errors in this process could occur by including events whose importance is only obvious in retrospect or by ignoring events like the Geneva summit of 1955 which may seem minor in historical perspective but were held significant at the time. For this reason more reliance has been put on indexes of newspaper content than on broad, historical accounts of the period.²³ In general if there has been a bias in selecting rally points it has been in the direction of excluding border-line cases. This was done in profound respect for the lack of public interest and knowledge on most items of international affairs.

At that, some 34 rally points were designated. In general they can be said to fall into six categories. First, there are the four instances of sudden American military intervention: Korea, Lebanon, the Bay of Pigs, and the Dominican Republic. A second closely related category encompasses major military developments in ongoing wars: in Korea, the Inchon landing and the Chinese intervention; in Vietnam, the Tonkin

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crisis" in James N. Rosenau, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 272.

¹⁹ Tom Wicker, "In the Nation: Peace, It's Wonderful," *New York Times*, July 4, 1967, p. 18.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

²¹ *Op. cit.*

²² *Congress and the Presidency* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 25.

²³ Especially valuable was Eric V. Nordheim and Pamela B. Wilcox, "Major Events of the Nuclear Age: A Chronology to Assist in the Analysis of American Public Opinion," Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, August 1967. Other sources often consulted included the *New York Times Index* and the Chronology section of the *World Almanac*.

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Bay episode, the beginning of bombing of North Vietnam, the major extension of this bombing, and the Tet offensive. Third are the major diplomatic developments of the period: crises over Cuban missiles, the U-2 and atomic testing, the enunciation of the "Truman doctrine" with its offer of aid to Greece and Turkey, the beginning of, and major changes in, the peace talks in Korea and Vietnam, and the several crises in Berlin. Fourth are the two dramatic technological developments: Sputnik and the announcement of the first Soviet atomic test. The fifth category includes the meetings between the President and the head of the Soviet Union at Potsdam in 1945, Geneva in 1955, Camp David in 1959, Paris in 1960, Vienna in 1961, and Glassboro in 1967. While these events are rarely spectacular they, like crisis, do generate a let's-get-behind-the-President effect. Because they are far less dramatic—even if sometimes more important—Presidential conferences with other powers (e.g., the British at Nassau) are excluded as are American meetings with the Soviet Union at the foreign minister level.

Sixth and finally, as an analytic convenience the start of each Presidential term is rather arbitrarily designated as a rally point. Presidents Truman and Johnson came in under circumstances which could justifiably be classified under the "rally round the flag" rubric although the crisis was a domestic one. The other points all involve elections or re-elections which perhaps might also be viewed as a somewhat unifying and cathartic experience.

These then are the events chosen to be associated with the rally round the flag variable. No listing will satisfy everyone's perspective about what has or has not been important to Americans in this 24 year period. However, in the analysis the variable has proven to be a rather hardy one. Experimentation with it suggests the addition or subtraction of a few rally points is likely to make little difference.

The rally round the flag variable is measured by the length of time, in years, since the last rally point. It varies then from zero to a theoretical maximum of about four or an empirical one of 1.9. Like the coalition of minorities variable, it should be negatively correlated with popularity: the longer it has been since the last rally round the flag event, the lower the popularity of the incumbent. It is; the simple r is $-.11$. Some experiments with curvilinear transformations of the variable were attempted but, since improvement again was marginal at best, the variable has been left in linear form.

Each rally point is given the same weighting in the analysis. One effort to soften this rather crude policy was made. The rally points were

separated into two groups: "good" rally points (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis) in which the lasting effect on opinion was likely to be favorable to the President and "bad" one (e.g., the U-2 crisis, the Bay of Pigs) in which the initial favorable surge could be expected to be rather transitory. Two separate rally round the flag variables were then created with the anticipation that they would generate somewhat different regression coefficients. The differences however were small and inconsistent. The public seems to react to "good" and "bad" international events in about the same way. Thus, to this limited extent, the equal weighting of rally points seems justified.

In tandem, the concepts underlying the coalition of minorities and rally round the flag variables predict that the President's popularity will continually decline over time and that international crises and similar events will explain short term bumps and wiggles in this otherwise inexorable descent.²⁴

3. *The "economic slump" variable.* There is a goodly amount of evidence, and an even goodlier amount of speculation, suggesting a relationship between economic conditions and electoral behavior. The extension of such thinking to Presidential popularity is both natural and predated. Neustadt, for example, concludes the recession in 1958 caused a drop in President Eisenhower's popularity.²⁵

The economic indicator used here will be the unemployment rate. The statistic recommends itself because it is available for the entire period and is reported on a monthly basis.²⁶ It is used as a general indicator of economic health or malaise and is not taken simply as a comment about the employed. It is assumed that the individual respondent, in allowing economic perceptions to influence him, essentially does so by comparing how things are *now* with how they were when the incumbent began his present term of office. If conditions are worse, he is in-

²⁴ Roper notes that President Kennedy's highest point of popularity occurred after the Bay of Pigs invasion and concludes this fact says something special about that crisis event (*op. cit.*) But this phenomenon is due to *two* effects—the rally round the flag effect *and* the fact that the event occurred very early in Kennedy's administration when the value for the coalition of minorities variable was yet very low.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 97ff.

²⁶ Data were gathered from Geoffrey H. Moore (ed.), *Business Cycle Indicators*, Vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 122; and, for more recent data, issues of the *Monthly Labor Review*.

clined to disapprove the President's handling of his job, if things are better he is inclined to approve. The economic variable therefore becomes the unemployment rate at the time the incumbent's term began subtracted from the rate at the time of the poll.²⁷ It is positive when things are worse and negative when things are better. It should be negatively correlated with popularity. But it isn't.

Unemployment reached some of its highest points during the recessions under the Eisenhower administration. The problem, to be examined more fully in Section VI below, is that Eisenhower was a *generally* popular President. Thus even though his popularity seemed to dip during the recessions, high unemployment comes to be associated with a relatively popular President. This problem can be handled rather easily within regression analysis by assigning to each of the Presidential administrations a "dummy" variable, the care and feeding of which will be discussed more fully in Section III below.

However, even when this circumstance is taken into account, the correlation coefficient and the regression coefficient for the economic variable remain positive. This seems to be largely due to the fact that *both* unemployment and the popularity of the incumbent President were in general decline between 1961 and 1968. The correlation for the period is .77.

Therefore a final alteration administered to the economic variable was to set it equal to zero whenever the unemployment rate was lower at the time of the survey than it had been at the start of the incumbent's present term. This alteration is a substantive one and is executed as the only way the data can be made to come out "right." In essence it suggests that *an economy in slump harms a President's popularity, but an economy which is improving does not seem to help his rating*. Bust is bad for him but boom is not particularly good. There is punishment but never reward.

Perhaps this can be seen in a comparison of the 1960 and the 1968 campaigns. In 1960, as

²⁷ One wrinkle, which is intuitively comfortable but makes little difference in the actual results, was to do something about the unemployment rates at the start of the first terms of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower when unemployment was "artificially" depressed due to ongoing wars. Presumably the public would be understanding about the immediate postwar rise in unemployment. Therefore for these two terms the initial unemployment level was taken to be that level which held six months after the war ended while the economic variable for the few months of the war and the six month period was set equal to zero.

Harvey Segal notes, "What was important was the vague but pervasive feeling of dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy, the pain that made the public receptive to JFK's appeals."²⁸ In 1968, representing administrations that had presided over an unprecedented period of boom, Vice President Humphrey never seemed able to turn this fact to his advantage.

It is important to note that in practice this variable, which will be called the "economic slump" variable because of its inability to credit boom, takes on a non-zero value only during the Eisenhower administration and during the unemployment rise of 1949-50. In symbolic form the variable's peculiarities can be expressed in the following; the units are the percentage of unemployed:

$$E = U_t - U_{t_0} \quad \text{if } U_t - U_{t_0} > 0 \\ = 0 \quad \text{if } U_t - U_{t_0} \leq 0$$

where

U_t = Unemployment rate at the time of the survey

and

U_{t_0} = Unemployment rate at the beginning of the incumbent's present term

4. *The "war" variable.* It is widely held that the unpopular, puzzling, indecisive wars in Korea and Vietnam severely hurt the popularity of Presidents Truman and Johnson.²⁹ As noted in the quotation that heads this report, President Johnson himself apportions 20 percentage points of his drop in popularity to the Vietnam War.

This notion seems highly plausible. The popularity of Presidents Truman and Johnson was in steady decline as the wars progressed with record lows occurring during each President's last year in office at points when the wars seemed most hopeless and meaningless. The wars unquestionably contributed in a major way to their decisions not to seek third terms and then, when they had stepped aside, the wars proved to be major liabilities for their party's candidates in the next elections. Overall, the correlation between Presidential popularity and the presence of war is -.66.

There are problems with this analysis, however. The coalition of minorities concept argues that decline is a natural phenomenon and, indeed, a glance at a plot of Presidential popularity clearly shows Truman and Johnson in decline *before* the wars started. Furthermore, as

²⁸ "The Pain Threshold of Economics in an Election Year," *New York Times*, July 15, 1968.

²⁹ Waltz, *op. cit.*, pp. 273ff, 288; Neustadt, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-99; Wicker, *op. cit.*; Roper, *op. cit.*

will be seen, both men experienced noticeable declines during their *first* terms when they had no war to contend with. The real question is, then, did the war somehow add to the decline of popularity beyond that which might be expected to occur on other grounds?

An answer can be approached through multiple regression analysis. After allowing for a general pattern of decline under the coalition of minorities variable, the additional impact of a variable chosen to represent war can be assessed. It is also possible in this manner to compare the two wars to see if their association with Presidential popularity differed.

The presence of war is incorporated in the analysis simply by a dummy variable that takes on a value of one when a war is on and remains zero otherwise. The beginning of the Vietnam War was taken to be June 1965 with the beginnings of the major US troop involvement. At that point it became an American war for the public; before that ignorance of the war was considerable: as late as mid-1964, 25 percent of the public admitted it had never heard of the fighting in Vietnam.³⁰

Other war measures of a more complex nature were experimented with. They increase in magnitude as the war progresses and thus should be able to tap a wearying effect as the years go by and should be negatively associated with popularity. These measures, however, are very highly correlated with the coalition of minorities variable for the two relevant Presidential terms and thus are all but useless in the analysis. The simple dummy variable suffers this defect in lesser measure, although it is far from immune, and thus, despite its crudities, has been used.³¹

5. *Other variables.* The analysis of Presidential popularity will apply in various ways only the four variables discussed above—a rather austere representation of a presumably complex process. As will be seen, it is quite possible to get a sound fit with these four variables, but at various stages in the investigation—

which involved the examination of hundreds of regression equations—a search was made for other variables which could profitably be added to the predictor set.

International developments are reasonably well incorporated into the analysis with a specific variable included for war and another for major crisis-like activities. Domestically, however, there is only the half-time variable for economic slump and the important but very unspecific coalition of minorities variable.

Accordingly it would be valuable to generate some sort of domestic equivalent to the rally round the flag variable to assess more precisely how major domestic events affect Presidential popularity. Operationally, however, this is a difficult task. First, while it is a justifiable assertion that international crises will rebound in the short term to a President's benefit it is by no means clear how a domestic crisis, whether riot, strike, or scandal, should affect his popularity. Furthermore major domestic concerns have varied quite widely not only in intensity and duration, but also in nature. Labor relations, which rarely made big news in the mid-1960s, were of profound concern in the middle and late 1940s as a multitude of major strikes threatened to cripple the nation and the adventures of John L. Lewis and the Taft-Hartley bill dominated the headlines. In the 1950s, however, labor broke into the news only with an occasional steel or auto strike or with the labor racketeering scandals in the last years of the decade. On the other hand, race relations, of extreme importance in the 1960s, made, except for the Little Rock crisis of 1957 and an occasional election-time outburst, little claim to public attention before that time. From the late 1940s into the mid-1950s sundry spy and Communist hunts were of concern, but the issue fairly well fizzled after that. Other issues which might be mentioned had even briefer or more erratic days in the sun: the food shortage of 1947, the MacArthur hearing of 1951, various space flights. Similarly, personal crisis for the Presidents such as heart attacks and major surgery for Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson and the attempted assassination of President Truman could not readily be fashioned into a predictor variable. In any event, these events seem to have far more impact on the stock market than on popularity ratings.

Scandal is a recurring feature of public awareness and thus is more promising as a potential variable in the analysis. Besides the scandals associated with alleged spies and Communists in the government during the McCarthy era and those associated with labor in the late 1950s, Americans, with greatly varying degrees

³⁰ A. T. Steele, *The American People and China* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 294. In May 1964 Gallup found almost two-thirds of the population said they paid little or no attention to developments in South Vietnam. Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New York: Clarion, 1968), pp. 59–60.

³¹ Although the Korean War continued into President Eisenhower's administration, he is not "blamed" for the war in the analysis since of course he was elected partly because of discontent over the war. Accordingly the war variable is set at zero for this period.

of pain, have suffered through the five percent scandal of 1949-50; charges of corruption in the RFC in 1951, in the Justice Department in 1952, and in the FHA in 1954; and scandals over Sherman Adams in 1958, over television quiz shows in 1959, over industry "payola" in the late 1950s, over Billie Sol Estes in 1962, and over Bobby Baker in 1963. While scandal is never worked into the regression analysis some preliminary suggestions as to its relevance to a "moral crisis" phenomenon which may in turn affect Presidential popularity are developed in Section VI below.

Some thought was given to including a "lame duck" variable when it was observed that the popularity of Presidents Truman and Johnson rose noticeably after they decided not to seek third terms. The trouble is, however, that President Eisenhower was a lame duck for his entire second term and it was found easier to ignore the whole idea than to decide what to do about this uncomfortable fact.

One domestic variable which did show some very minor promise was a dummy variable for the presence of a major strike. The variable takes on a zero value almost everywhere except in parts of President Truman's first term. After that time major strikes were rather unusual and, when they did occur, usually lasted for such a short time that there was barely time to have a public opinion survey conducted to test their effects. Despite these peculiarities, the variable did show statistical significance, though only after the Korean War dummy had been incorporated in the equation to allow for a major peculiarity of President Truman's second term. Substantively the variable suggests a popularity drop of less than three percentage points when a major strike is on and, as such a minor contributor, it is not included in the discussion below. Its small success, however, may suggest that further experimentation with the effects of specific domestic events could prove profitable.

III. RESULTS WITHOUT THE WAR VARIABLE

In summary the expected behavior of Presidential popularity is as follows. It is anticipated 1) that each President will experience in each term a general decline of popularity; 2) that this decline will be interrupted from time to time with temporary upsurges associated with international crises and similar events; 3) that the decline will be accelerated in direct relation to increases in unemployment rates over those prevailing when the President began his term, but that improvement in unemployment rates will not affect his popularity one way or the other; and 4) that the President will experience an additional loss of popularity if a war is on.

In this section the relation of the first three variables to Presidential popularity will be assessed. In the next section the war variable will be added to the analysis.

The association between the first three variables and Presidential popularity is given in its baldest form in equation 1 in Table 1.³² The equation explains a respectable, if not sensational, 22 percent of the variance. The coalition of minorities variable shows, in conformity with the speculation above, a significant negative relationship. The equation suggests that, in general, a President's popularity rating starts at 69 percent and declines at a rate of about six percentage points per year.

However, while the coefficients for the rally round the flag and economic slump variables are in the expected direction, they are not significant either in a statistical or a substantive sense. The trouble with the economic slump variable was anticipated in the discussion about it in Section II: the economic decline occurred during the relatively popular reign of President Eisenhower; while the slump seems to have hurt his popularity, even with the decline he remained popular compared to other Presidents: hence what is needed is a variable to take into account this peculiar "Eisenhower effect."

To account for this phenomenon, equation 2 mixes into the analysis a dummy variable for each of the Presidents. This formulation insists that all Presidents must decline (or increase) in popularity at the same rate but, unlike equation 1, it allows each President to begin at his own particular level. Thus peculiar effects of personality, style, and party and of differences in the conditions under which the President came into office can be taken into account.³³

The addition improves things considerably.

³² Each equation is displayed vertically. The dependent variable, the percentage approving the way the President is handling his job, has a mean of 57.5 and a standard deviation of 14.8. The number of cases is 292. The figures in parentheses are the standard errors for the respective partial regression coefficients. To be regarded statistically significant a regression coefficient should be, conventionally, at least twice its standard error. All equations reported in this study are significant (F test) at well beyond the .01 level. The Durbin-Watson *d* is an indicator of serial correlation which suggests decreasing positive serial correlation as the statistic approaches the value of 2.0. All equations in this study exhibit a statistically significant amount of positive serial correlation.

³³ The dummy variables formalize the sort of discussion found in Neustadt, *op. cit.*, p. 98. They account for what a singer might call tessitura.

TABLE 1. REGRESSION RESULTS INCLUDING ADMINISTRATION EFFECTS

	Equations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	69.37	54.51	68.15	71.52
Independent variables				
Coalitions of minorities (in years)	-6.14 (0.71)	-5.12 (0.48)		
Rally round the flag (in years)	-0.31 (1.95)	-2.15 (1.35)	-1.87 (1.07)	-2.63 (1.07)
Economic slump (in % unemployed)	-0.09 (0.96)	-3.18 (0.75)	-5.30 (0.60)	-5.86 (0.60)
Dummy variables for administrations				
Eisenhower		24.08 (1.42)	0.51 (2.29)	
Kennedy		23.87 (1.82)	11.33 (2.96)	
Johnson		10.46 (1.54)	4.26 (2.48)	
Coalition of minorities variable for administrations (in years)				
Truman			-11.44 (0.84)	-12.54 (0.50)
Eisenhower			0.83 (0.57)	0.13 (0.47)
Kennedy			-5.96 (1.36)	-1.58 (0.82)
Johnson			-9.12 (0.67)	-8.68 (0.50)
<i>d</i>	.13	.30	.46	.44
Standard error of estimate	13.16	8.88	6.86	7.06
<i>R</i> ²	.22	.65	.79	.78

The fit is much better and the rally round the flag and economic slump variables attain respectable magnitudes in the predicted direction, although the rally round the flag variable does not quite reach statistical significance.

The equation suggests that the Presidents have declined at an overall rate of over five per-

centage points per year but that each has done so at his own particular level. President Truman's decline is measured from a starting point of 54.51 percent (when the dummy variables for the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations are all zero). President Eisenhower declines from a much higher level, about 79 per-

cent (54.51 + 24.08), President Kennedy from 78 percent, and President Johnson from 65 percent.

The importance of these dummy variables clearly demonstrates that *an analysis of Presidential popularity cannot rely entirely on the variables discussed in Section II, but must also incorporate parameters designed to allow for the special character of each administration.* To an extent this is unfortunate. The beauty of equation 1 is that it affords a prediction of a President's popular rating simply by measuring how long he has been in office, how long it has been since the last rally point, and how many people are unemployed. Such predictions, however, would be quite inaccurate because the fit of the equation is rather poor. Instead one must include the administration variables, the magnitudes of which cannot be known until the President's term is over. So much for beauty.

In equation 3 administration effects are incorporated in a different manner, greatly improving fit and reducing serial correlation. In this formulation each President is allowed to begin at his own level of popularity as in equation 2, but in addition each may decline (or increase) at his own rate: for each administration there is a different coefficient for the coalition of minorities variable. Three of the four values so generated are strongly significant while the magnitudes of the administration dummies drop greatly. When the administration dummies are dropped entirely from consideration, as in equation 4, the regression coefficients mostly remain firm and the fit of the equation is scarcely weakened. It is clear that *the important differences between administrations do not lie so much in different overall levels of popularity, but rather in the widely differing rates at which the coalition of minorities variable takes effect.*

The popular decline of Presidents Truman and Johnson has been almost precipitous. President Truman's rating fell off at some 11 or 12 percentage points per year while President Johnson declined at a rate of around 9 points a year. President Kennedy was noticeably more successful at holding on to his supporters. Then there is the Eisenhower phenomenon: in spite of all the rationalizations for the coalitions of minorities concept tediously arrayed in Section II, President Eisenhower's rating uncooperatively refuses to decline at all.³⁴

³⁴It was noted in Section I that some minor bias in these results is introduced by an embellished rate of "no opinion" in the first weeks of the Kennedy and first Eisenhower terms. As this rate declined, there was some tendency for the Presidents' approval and disapproval rates to rise. To

In equation 3, Presidents who served two terms were required to begin each term at the same level and their rate of decline or increase also had to be the same in each term. Liberation from these restrictions is gained in the rather cluttered equation 5 of Table 2 which is like equation 3 except that it affords a term by term, rather than simply an administration by administration comparison. As can be seen President Eisenhower managed a statistically significant *increase* of popularity of some two and a half percentage points per year in his first term. His second term ratings showed a more human, but very minor and statistically non-significant decline.³⁵

No important differences emerge in the Eisenhower phenomenon when the economic slump variable, which functions mainly during the Eisenhower years, is dropped from the equation.

No matter how the data are looked at then the conclusion remains the same. *President Eisenhower's ability to maintain his popularity, especially during his first term, is striking and unparalleled among the postwar Presidents.* An examination of some of the possible reasons for this phenomenon is conducted in Section VI below.

The rally round the flag and the economic slump variables emerge alive and well in equations 3, 4, and 5 (and 6). Both are usually statistically significant but their substantive importance varies as one moves from an administration by administration formulation of the coalition of minorities variable (equations 3 and 4) to the term by term formulation in Table 2. Specifically, the rally round the flag variable gets stronger while the economic slump variable weakens.

The rally round the flag variable is very much a parasite—it is designed to explain bumps and wiggles on a pattern measured mainly by the other variables. Consequently the rally round the flag variable does very poorly on its own and only begins to shine when the overall trends become well determined by the rest of

see if this peculiarity had any major impact, equations 3 and 4 were recalculated using the percentage *disapproving* as the dependent variable. This manipulation causes no fundamental differences, although President Eisenhower's rating behaves a little less outrageously.

³⁵If the term dummies are dropped from the equation to attain a version comparable to equation 4, the Eisenhower phenomenon holds except that his first term increase drops to 2.00 (still significant) and his second term decrease is a slightly steeper -0.36 (still not significant).

TABLE 2. REGRESSION RESULTS INCLUDING TERM EFFECTS AND THE WAR VARIABLES

	Equations	
	(5)	(6)
Intercept	72.00	72.38
Independent variables		
Rally round the flag (in years)	-4.88 (1.04)	-6.15 (1.05)
Economic slump (in % unemployed)	-2.67 (0.65)	-3.72 (0.65)
Dummy variables for terms		
Truman—second	-15.25 (3.69)	-12.41 (3.57)
Eisenhower—first	-3.17 (3.15)	-2.41 (3.02)
Eisenhower—second	-5.30 (3.07)	-4.35 (2.94)
Kennedy	7.53 (3.29)	7.18 (3.14)
Johnson—first	7.14 (5.50)	6.77 (5.26)
Johnson—second	-1.15 (3.06)	-0.79 (3.25)
Coalition of minorities variable for terms (in years)		
Truman—first	-9.21 (1.41)	-8.93 (1.35)
Truman—second	-7.98 (1.00)	-2.83 (1.37)
Eisenhower—first	2.45 (0.85)	2.58 (0.82)
Eisenhower—second	-0.07 (0.65)	0.22 (0.62)
Kennedy	-5.11 (1.21)	-4.76 (1.16)
Johnson—first	-4.98 (14.01)	-3.71 (13.39)
Johnson—second	-8.15 (0.66)	-8.13 (0.80)
Dummy variables for wars		
Korea		-18.19 (3.43)
Vietnam		-0.28 (2.79)
<i>d</i>	.57	.67
Standard error of estimate	6.07	5.80
<i>R</i> ²	.84	.86

the equation. In the end, *the rally round the flag variable suggests a popularity decline of around five or six percentage points for every year since the last rally point*—about the same magnitude as the coalition of minorities variable in its general state as in equations 1 and 2.

The declining fortunes of the economic slump variable suggest that the variable in equations 3 and 4 was partly covering for the differences between the two Eisenhower terms: the first term was associated with increasing popularity and a smaller recession, the second with somewhat declining popularity and a larger recession. With the Eisenhower terms more thoroughly differentiated in equation 5, the variable is reduced to a more purely economic function. The magnitude of the coefficient of the *economic slump variable* in this equation suggests a decline of popularity of about three percentage points for every percentage point rise in the unemployment rate over the level holding when the President began his present term. Since the unemployment rate has varied in the postwar period only from about 3 to 7 percent, the substantive impact of the economic slump variable on Presidential popularity is somewhat limited.

IV. RESULTS WITH THE WAR VARIABLE ADDED

The variable designed to tap the impact on Presidential popularity of the wars in Korea and Vietnam was applied with no great confidence that it would prove to have an independent, added effect when the coalition of minorities had already been incorporated into the equation especially given the problem of multicollinearity. It is obvious from a perusal of a plot that, as noted in Section II and as demonstrated in equation 5, Presidents Truman and Johnson were in popular decline during their warless first terms.³⁶ Furthermore each was in clear decline in the first part of his second term before the wars started and it is not at all obvious that this trend altered when the wars began.

The equations suggest otherwise, however. When a war dummy was appended to the equations already discussed, it emerged significant and suggested that the presence of war depressed the popularity of Presidents Truman and Johnson by over seven percentage points.

The next step, obviously, was to set up a separate dummy variable for each war. This brought forth the incredible result documented in equation 6: *the Korean War had a large, significant, independent negative impact on President Truman's popularity of some 18 percentage points, but the Vietnam War had no independent impact on President Johnson's popularity at all.*

Confronted with a result like this, one's first

³⁶ Regression statistics relating to President Johnson's first term are very unreliable, as the size of the standard errors suggests, because the popularity question was posed so few times during this brief period.

impulse is to do something to make it go away. This impulse was fully indulged. Variables were transformed and transmuted, sections of the analysis were reformed or removed, potentially biasing data were sectioned out. But nothing seemed to work. The relationship persisted. In fact under some manipulations the relationship became stronger.

One's second impulse, then, is to attempt to explain the result. One speculates.

The wars in Korea and Vietnam differed from each other in many respects, of course, but it seems unlikely that these differences can be used in any simple manner to explain the curious regression finding. This is the case because, as one study has indicated, public response to the wars themselves was much the same. Support for each war, high at first, declined as a logarithmic function of American casualties—quickly at first, then more slowly. The functions for each of the wars for comparable periods were quite similar. Furthermore both wars inspired support and opposition from much the same segments of the population.³⁷

Therefore it is probably a sounder approach in seeking to explain the regression finding to look specifically at popular attitudes toward the *President's relation to the war*, rather than to perceptions of the war itself. A comment by Richard Neustadt seems strikingly relevant in this respect. "Truman," he observes, "seems to have run afoul of the twin notions that a wartime Chief Executive ought to be 'above politics' and that he ought to help the generals 'win.'"³⁸

President Johnson seems to have run considerably less afoul. In seeking to keep the war "above politics," he assiduously cultivated bipartisan support for the war and repeatedly sought to demonstrate that the war effort was simply an extension of the policies and actions of previous Presidents. He was especially successful at generating public expressions of approval from the most popular Republican of them all: General Eisenhower. Vocal opposition to the war in Vietnam came either from groups largely unassociated with either party or from members of the President's own party. Then, when the latter opposition began to move from expressions of misgivings at congressional hearings to explicit challenges in the primaries, President Johnson removed himself from the battle precisely, he said, to keep the war "above politics." And, while there were occasional com-

plaints from the right during Vietnam that President Johnson had adopted a "no win" policy there, these were continually being undercut by public statements from General William Westmoreland—a man highly respected by the right—insisting that he was receiving all the support he needed from the President and was getting it as fast as he needed it.

If these observations are sound, the single event which best differentiates the impact of the Korean and Vietnam wars on Presidential popularity was President Truman's dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur. That move was a major factor in the politicization of the war as Republicans took the General's side and echoed his complaints that it was the President's meddling in policy that was keeping the war from being won.³⁹

The differing impact of the wars on Presidential popularity therefore may be due to the fact that Korea became "Truman's war" while Vietnam never in the same sense really became "Johnson's war."⁴⁰

³⁹ See John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1959); also Neustadt, *op. cit.*, passim; and Trumbull Higgins, *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* (New York: Oxford, 1960). See also the data in George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," 15 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 601-23 (Winter 1951-52). Note especially the strong party polarization on the issue. That the public was strongly inclined to support General MacArthur in the dispute can be seen from poll data. The first polls, conducted as the General was making his triumphal, "old soldiers never die" return to the United States in April 1951, suggest more than twice as many people supported the General as supported the President. As Neustadt suggests (*op. cit.*, p. 97), emotion on the issue faded during the Senate Hearings on the issue which lasted until June and this seems to have been to the benefit of President Truman's position. The Truman point of view received its greatest support in late June and early July as peace talks were being begun. As the talks began to prove unproductive, however, public opinion began to revert to its previous support of General MacArthur, until, by the first days of 1952 (when the polling agencies grew bored with the issue), the MacArthur position was as strongly approved and President Truman's as strongly rejected as ever.

⁴⁰ There is evidence which suggests that World War II, a much more popular (and much larger) war than either Korea or Vietnam, may have worked to the distinct benefit of President Roose-

³⁷ John E. Mueller, "Patterns of Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam," unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, 1969.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

One other item of speculation might be put forth. Domestically, the war in Vietnam was accompanied by a profoundly important crisis as America confronted its long-ignored racial dilemma head on. There seems to have been nothing comparable during the Korean War. The clamor associated with McCarthyism comes to mind but many analysts feel that, however important to politicians, intellectuals, and journalists, McCarthyism was of rather less than major concern to public opinion.⁴¹ Furthermore its dramatic climax, the Army-McCarthy hearings, took place months after the Korean War had ended and over a year after President Truman left office.

It may be, then, that the discontent associated with the racial crisis was enough by itself to cause much of President Johnson's popular decline and thus that the unhappiness over the Vietnam War could make little additional inroad. In the Truman case, there was no profound independent domestic source of discontent: his second term coalition of minorities decline is usually found as in equation 5 to have been less than his first term decline and when, as in equation 6, a variable has already accounted for the war effect, his decline is quite moderate. Thus in a sense there was "room" for the war to have an independent impact.

It would be wise in concluding this section to emphasize what has and what has not been said. It has *not* been argued that the war in Vietnam had nothing to do with President Johnson's decline in popularity and thus the analysis cannot really be used to refute the President's own estimation of the impact of Vietnam as indicated in the quotation that heads this study. However it is argued that whatever impact the war had was tapped by the other variables in the equation, especially the coalition of minorities variable which is specifically designed to account for general overall decline. When the same sort of anal-

ysis is applied in the Korean period it is found that a variable associated with the Korean War does show significance even after other variables have been taken into account. What the regression analysis shows therefore is that, while the Korean War does seem to have had an *independent, additional* impact on President Truman's decline in popularity, the Vietnam War shows no such relation to President Johnson's decline.

V. THE RESIDUALS

An analysis of the residuals finds that equation 6 predicts worst in President Truman's first term. The President's extremely high initial ratings are not well predicted suggesting that the equation does not adequately account for the trauma of President Roosevelt's death⁴² combined as it was with the ending of World War II and with important peace conferences. It was almost as if Americans were afraid to disapprove of President Truman.

From these spectacular highs, President Truman plunged to great lows during the labor turmoil of 1946. These ratings are also badly specified by the equation. The Truman popularity rose in early 1947, as the labor situation eased, and then declined for the rest of the term. Thus while President Truman's first term, like the other Democratic terms, shows an overall decline of popularity, that decline was considera-

⁴¹ In late November 1945, over six months after President Roosevelt's death, Gallup asked his sample, "In your opinion, who is the greatest person living or dead, in world history?" Fully 28 percent proffered Roosevelt's name. Abraham Lincoln was mentioned by 19 percent, Jesus Christ by 15 percent, and George Washington by 8 percent. No one else received more than 2 percent. And the aura lasted. A survey conducted in June 1949 in the city of Philadelphia (which had voted 59 percent for Roosevelt in 1944 as against a national rate of 55 percent) posed this question: "Could you tell us the name of a great person, living or dead, whom you admire the most?" The most commonly mentioned names were Roosevelt with 42 percent, Lincoln with 9 percent, and Washington with 5 percent. (The absence of Jesus Christ on this latter list presumably can be laid to the peculiarities of question wording—or of Philadelphians.) Fillmore H. Sanford, "Public Orientation to Roosevelt," 15 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 190-91, 200 (Summer 1951). In 1948, Roper found 43 percent of a national sample offering Roosevelt's name when queried, "Considering all the men in America who have been prominent in public affairs during the past 50 years, which one or two have you admired the most?" Dwight Eisenhower was second at 17 percent. E. Roper, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁴² Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), especially ch. 3; Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51; Nelson W. Polsby, "Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism," 8 *Political Studies* 250-71 (October 1960); Elmo Roper, *You and Your Leaders* (New York: Morrow, 1957), pp. 250-51.

bly more erratic than the others. The dummy variable for strikes, discussed briefly in Section II, improved matters only slightly.

Beyond this, the residuals are reasonably well behaved. There are small but noticeable effects from the lame duck phenomenon at the end of the Truman and Johnson administrations and from the "no opinion" peculiarity of the initial weeks of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. And here and there are data points whose magnitudes have somehow managed to escape specification by the variables in the regression equation. One can of course generate a unique explanation for each of these but this procedure clutters the analysis more than it is worth. Besides, the laws of sampling insist that Gallup must have made *some* mistakes.

As the magnitude of the Durbin-Watson d indicates, serial correlation has by no means been eliminated in the regression equations. Allowing the coalition of minorities variable to be specified for each term improved things considerably, but much is left to be desired.

VI. THE EISENHOWER PHENOMENON

Great noise was made in Section II about the coalition of minorities variable with its stern prediction that a President's popularity would decline inexorably over his four year term. The noise was not entirely unjustified since the variable proved to be a hardy and tenacious predictor for the postwar Democratic administrations.

The variable fails for the Eisenhower administration, however, especially for the General's first term. The analysis suggests then that if a President wants to leave office a popular man he should either 1) be Dwight David Eisenhower, or 2) resign the day after inauguration.

The Eisenhower phenomenon, noted but left dangling without explanation or rationalization in Section III, deserves special examination. Why didn't President Eisenhower decline in popularity like everybody else? A number of suggestions can be proffered.

1. To begin with, credit must be given to President Eisenhower's *personal appeal*: he was extremely likeable—a quality very beneficial in a popularity contest and one lacked in abundance by, say, Lyndon Johnson. As Fillmore Sanford has observed, "The American people, in reacting to a national leader, put great emphasis on his personal warmth"⁴³—a quality projected to an unusual degree by President Eisenhower. As part of this, he was able to project an image of integrity and sincerity which many found to be enormously attractive.⁴⁴

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

⁴⁴ See Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux,

2. Early in his first term President Eisenhower was able to present to the public one sensational achievement: he *ended the Korean War*—or, at any rate, presided over its end. This accomplishment was seen by the public as he left office to be a great one⁴⁵ and was used with profit by the Republicans in a Presidential campaign a full 15 years after it happened. From the standpoint of public opinion it may well have been the most favorable achievement turned in by any postwar President. As such it may have tended to overwhelm the negative impact of anything else the President did, at least for the first years of his administration. Some credit for this is given in the regression analysis since the signing of the truce is counted as a rally point, but this may be a totally inadequate recognition.

There is another aspect of President Eisenhower's first term which may not be sufficiently accounted for in the rally round the flag variable: the euphoria of the "spirit of Geneva" period toward the end of the term when the President's popularity should have been at its lowest ebb.

3. President Eisenhower's *amateur status* may also have worked to his benefit, at least for a while. The public may have been more willing to grant him the benefit of a doubt, to extend the "honeymoon" period, than it would for a President who is a political professional. It is also easier under these circumstances for the President to appear "above the battle" and thus to be blamed only belatedly and indirectly for political mishaps, thereby softening their impact.

4. President Eisenhower may have been curiously benefited by the fact that, especially on the domestic front, *he didn't do anything*.⁴⁶ In-

"De Gaulle and Eisenhower: The Public Image of the Victorious General," in Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 292-345.

⁴⁵ In December 1960 the public was asked what it felt was Eisenhower's greatest accomplishment. The ending of the Korean War was mentioned by 11 percent and a related comment, "except us out of war," was suggested by an additional 32 percent. No other specific accomplishment was mentioned by more than 5 percent; only 1 percent mentioned anything having to do with the domestic scene. See also Neustadt, *op. cit.* p. 98.

⁴⁶ As Irving Kristol argues, "... when a conservative administration does take office, it pursues no coherent program but merely takes satisfaction in not doing the things that the liberals may be clamoring for. This, in effect, is what happened during the two terms of President Eisen-

deed analysts of the Eisenhower administration often argue that its contribution lies in what it *didn't* do. The times called for consolidation, they argue, and President Eisenhower's achievement was that he neither innovated nor repealed, but was content to preside over a period of placidity in which he tacitly gave Republican respectability to major Democratic innovations of earlier years: the programs of the New Deal domestically and the policies of the Truman Doctrine internationally.⁴⁷

In terms of the justification for the coalition of minorities variable as discussed in Section II, such behavior could have a peculiar result. It was assumed in part that the President would enact programs which, while approved by the majority, would alienate intense minorities which would gradually cumulate to his disadvantage. But suppose the President doesn't do anything. Those who want no change are happy while, if things are sufficiently ambiguous, those who support change have not really been denied by an explicit decision and can still patiently wait and hope. At some point of course those who want change begin to see that they are never going to get their desires and may become alienated, but this will be a delayed process. At least in moderate, placid times, a conservative policy may dissipate some of the power of the coalition of minorities phenomenon. Were polls available, one might find that President Warren Harding maintained his popularity as strikingly as President Eisenhower.

5. Although it might be difficult to sort out cause and effect, it is worth noting that President Eisenhower's first term (and most of his second) coincided with a *period of national goodness*. In a brilliant article Meg Greenfield has noted that "moral crises" as appraised and bemoaned by intellectuals seem to follow a cyclic pattern: we go through a period in which the popular journals are filled with articles telling us how bad we are after which there is a period of respite.⁴⁸

Miss Greenfield's main indicator of these ethical cycles is exquisite: the number of items under the heading, "US: Moral Conditions," in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. The pattern, elaborated and duly pedantified, is given in Table 3. As she notes, our first moral

hower . . . "The Old Politics, the New Politics, and the New, New Politics," *New York Times Magazine*, November 24, 1968, p. 167.

⁴⁷ See Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960), pp. 161-78.

⁴⁸ Meg Greenfield, "The Great American Morality Play," *The Reporter*, June 8, 1961, pp. 13-18.

TABLE 3. THE GREENFIELD INDEX

Number of Items under the Heading, "US: Moral Conditions" in <i>Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature</i> , 1945-1968, by year	
1945	1
1946	0
1947	8
1948	1
1949	1
1950	3
1951	35
1952	17
1953	1
1954	4
1955	2
1956	0
1957	7
1958	0
1959	9
1960	32
1961	23
1962	10
1963	11
1964	5
1965	6
1966	7
1967	18
1968	10

crisis in the postwar period arose in the early 1950s and was associated with "five percenters," deep freezes, mink coats, the Kefauver hearings, and a series of basketball fixes," while "the symbols of our present [1961] decline are Charles Van Doren, payola, cheating in school, and the decision of Frances Gary Powers not to kill himself." We never recovered as thoroughly from that crisis as we did from the earlier one for, as the crisis showed signs of waning (the success of the Peace Corps began to show how good we were at heart), new elements—Billie Sol Estes, Bobby Baker, President Kennedy's assassination, campus revolts, the hippies, and the city riots—proved once again that we have a "sick society." Our moral crises are regenerated every eight years and seem to coincide with the end of Presidential administrations.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ It may, or then again may not, be worth noting that Presidential elections in which the incumbent party was removed, 1952, 1960, and 1968, occurred during moral crises while the elections in which the President was retained, 1948, 1956, and 1964, all took place during times of relative goodness.

Of course objective indicators of public morality have not been careening in this manner. Much of the fluctuation in the Greenfield index is no doubt due to journalistic fad. A sensational fraud, scandal or disruption causes theologians, journalists, and other intellectuals to sociologize: society is sick. Others pick up the idea and it blossoms into a full moral crisis. In a year or two the theme no longer sells magazines and the space is filled with other profundities. Fraud, scandal, and disruption continue, but the moral crisis eases.

But—and this is a logical and empirical leap of some magnitude—to the extent that these patterns reflect and influence public attitudes, they may be relevant to Presidential popularity. The early Eisenhower years are notable for their absence of moral anguish and they differ from other between-crisis periods in an important respect: not only were we not demonstrably bad, we were positively good for we were undergoing a religious revival. Miss Greenfield looked at the items under the heading, "US: Religious Institutions." She finds only six items in the 1951–53 period, but 25 in 1953–55 while "in the 1955–57 volume, at the height of our virtue . . . the religious listings reached thirty-four with twenty-eight 'see alsos.'"

If we were so good ourselves, how could we possibly find fault in our leader?

VII. FURTHER RESEARCH

This study has been reasonably successful at generating a regression equation based on only four rather simple variables, which fits quite well the erratic behavior over 24 years of the Presidential popularity index. There is, however, much room for improvement and refinement.

Little has been done to separate out from the coalition of minorities variable the specific and divergent influences of domestic events on Presidential popularity. There was one variable designed to account in a general way for changes in the economy, some limited analysis was made of the relevance of major strikes, and comments were interjected about the role of scandal and "moral crisis." But domestic life is considerably more complicated than this and more precise social, political, and economic indicators can be sought.

It would also be of value to get better estimates of the impact of different *kinds* of international events on Presidential popularity—although, as already suggested, such analysis may find that all dramatic international events affect popularity in much the same way no matter how they may differ in historical significance.⁵⁰

⁵⁰It may prove valuable to attempt to see how

The analysis strongly suggests that Presidential style as well as the ideological and political nature of the administration and the times can make a sizeable difference in the way popularity ratings behave. A more precise assessment of these relationships would be most desirable.

The study has dealt entirely with general popular approval of the President. Left unexamined are the ways population groups differ in their approach to the President. Supporters of the President's own party, for example, are more likely to approve the way he handles his job. Presumably they are also relatively hard to alienate, are more likely to be enchanted by his successes, and are more tolerant of his blunders.

It should also be possible to extend the analysis to other bodies of data. Somewhat comparable data from the Roosevelt administration are available. Although the popularity question was posed with far less regularity in those days (and was largely dropped during World War II) and although there are problems with varying question wording, students of President Roosevelt's popularity ratings emerge with findings which fit well with those of this study.⁵¹ The popularity ratings of Governors and Senators in states with active statewide polls can also be analyzed as can data on national leaders from such countries as Britain, Canada, and France.⁵²

spectacular and cumulative international events and shifts in governmental policy—to use the distinction made by Karl Deutsch and Richard Meritt—differ in impact. "Effects of Events on National and International Images" in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.) *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, 1965), pp. 132–87.

⁵¹Wesley C. Clark has found some relation between the Roosevelt popularity and the state of the economy in the 1937–1940 period. He also notes a general "downward slant" in the rating over time and finds a rise of popularity during international crises. ("Economic Aspects of a President's Popularity," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1943, pp. 41, 28, 35). See also B. Roper, *op. cit.*, and E. Roper, *op. cit.*, chapters 2 and 3. And V. O. Key has observed that during 1940 "the popularity of Roosevelt rose and fell with European crises." *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1952, 3rd. ed.), p. 596 (cited in Waltz, *op. cit.*, p. 272.)

⁵²British observers have noted an apparent relation between unemployment and party preference in their country: rising unemployment seems to have benefited Labor while declining unemployment favors the Tories. Henry Durant, "Indirect Influences on Voting Behavior," 1 *Polls* 7–11 (Spring 1965). Extensive data from France on the popularity of President De Gaulle have been

VIII. SUMMARY

This investigation has applied multiple regression analysis to the behavior of the responses to the Gallup Poll's Presidential popularity question in the 24 year period from the beginning of the Truman administration to the end of the Johnson administration. Predictor variables include a measure of the length of time the incumbent has been in office as well as variables which attempt to assess the influence on his rating of major international events, economic slump, and war. Despite the austerity of this representation of a presumably complex process, the fit of the resulting equation was very good: it explained 86 percent of the variance in Presidential popularity.

This degree of fit could only be attained, however, by allowing the special character of each Presidential administration to be expressed in the equation. Thus it does not seem possible to predict a given President's popularity well simply by taking into account such general phenomena as the state of the economy or of international affairs.

The first variable, dubbed the "coalition of minorities" variable, found, as expected, the popularity of most Presidents to be in decline during each term. The important differences between administrations do not lie so much in different overall levels of popularity, but rather in the widely differing rates at which this coalition of minorities variable takes effect. Specifically, the popular decline of Presidents Truman and Johnson was quite steep while President Kennedy seems to have been somewhat better at maintaining his popularity. President Eisenhower's popularity did not significantly decline at all

during his second term and actually increased during his first term.

In considering this Eisenhower phenomenon it is suggested that a combination of several causes may be relevant: the President's personal appeal, his ending of the Korean War, his amateur status, his domestic conservatism at a time when such a policy was acceptable, and his fortune in coming to office at a time of national goodness.

The second variable, the "rally round the flag" variable, predicts short term boosts in a President's popularity whenever there occurs an international crisis or a similar event. The variable proves to be a sturdy one and suggests a popular decline of about five or six percentage points for every year since the last "rally point."

Economic effects were estimated in the third variable. The variable could only be made to function if it was assumed that an economy in slump harms a President's popularity, but an economy in boom does not help his rating. A decline of popularity of about three percentage points is suggested for every percentage point rise in the unemployment rate over the level holding when the President began his present term.

The fourth variable attempted to take into account the influence of war on Presidential popularity. It was found that the Korean War had a large, significant independent negative impact on President Truman's popularity of some 18 percentage points, but that the Vietnam War had no independent impact on President Johnson's popularity at all. It is suggested that this difference may be due to the relationship between the Presidents and the wars: President Truman was less able than President Johnson to keep the war "above" partisan politics and he seemed to the public to be interfering and restraining the generals. The absence in the Truman case of a domestic crisis comparable to the racial turmoil of the Johnson era may also be relevant.

published: for example, *Gallup Opinion Index*, March 1968, pp. 27-28. A study by Howard Rosenthal has investigated regional aspects of the General's popularity. "The Popularity of Charles De Gaulle: Findings from Archive-based Research," 31 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 381-98 (Fall 1967).

ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN RECENT AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT*

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Theoretical discussions of civil disobedience on ethical and political grounds received special attention in this country during the Nuremberg trials, the security and loyalty controversies of the 1950's and the pre-arms control years of nuclear power. A fourth wave of interest formed after the early civil rights protests and a fifth is appearing to consider dissent from national policies on the Vietnam War. In this paper civil disobedience is viewed from a trough between the fourth and most recent wave. The phenomenon is interpreted with selected ideas from the study of political obligation¹ and unconventional dissent. The essay first assesses recent American analysis of civil disobedience to determine what the criteria should be to distinguish it from other forms of political action and to discover its political ethics. Secondly, there is an attempt to answer the question: Is there any appreciable service that carefully defined civil disobedience might perform in American democratic thought? The complete enterprise is provoked by a need to examine new strategies for democratic citizenship in a time when the deficiencies of American political life are becoming known to increasing numbers and varieties of people instead of remaining the preserve of enlightened elites.

I. CURRENTS OF THOUGHT

The rule-breaking aspect of "civil disobedience," a term usually credited to Thoreau, offers fewer difficulties for an examination of the topic than the "civil" feature. Typically, "disobedience" is breaking a legal norm that has authoritative sanction. The norm does not have to be a state law but might be a rule of a subsidiary group, such as the university, which in American constitutional theory and practice has the right to make and enforce internal regulations, subject to the state's writ and charter. Although this discussion has implications for disobedience within subsidiary groups, in the main it revolves around citizen resistance to the laws and policies of the state. "Civil" is open to several interpretations. These five meanings cover most possibil-

ities:² 1) recognition of citizen obligations for the existing legal order; 2) the opposite of military; 3) civilized or moral; 4) public instead of private; and 5) affecting the political society. All of these, but especially 1), 3) and 5), are directly pertinent for the objectives of this paper. The meanings of both parts of the term become clarified when criteria are examined.

Many of the suggestions for the criteria of "responsible" civil disobedience can be identified with one or the other of two currents of thought and sometimes with both. One will be called "neo-conservative."³ It views political obligation from a stress on the rule of law as the balance-wheel between majority will and minority rights. The rule of law includes the judicial development of civil liberties and the legislative protection of civil rights. The pattern has no internal agreement about rates and kinds of innovations

seau, and notably T. H. Green who may have been the first to use the term. A study of Green's thought and environment is Melvin Richter, *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). Reassessments include John R. Carnes, "Why Should I Obey The Law?," *Ethics*, 71 (1960), 14-26; Hanna Pitkin, "Obligation and Consent," *This Review*, 59 (1965), 990-1000, and 60 (1966), 39-52; John Plamenatz, *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); T. C. Pocklington, "Protest, Resistance, and Political Obligation," a paper presented at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 3-6, 1969; and Joseph Tussman, *Political Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

² Christian Bay, "Civil Disobedience," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. II, pp. 473-486, at pp. 473-474.

³ Representative statements are Francis A. Allen, "Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order," *University of Cincinnati Law Review*, 36 (1967), 1-38, 175-195; Abe Fortas, *Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience* (New York: The New American Library, 1968); Erwin N. Griswold, "Dissent—1968," *Tulane Law Review*, 42 (1968), 726-739; and Sidney Hook, "Social Protest and Civil Disobedience," *The Humanist*, 27 (Sept.-Dec., 1967), 157-159, 192-193.

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¹ Prominent commentary on political obligation was offered by Thomas Aquinas, Locke, Rous-

required to strengthen democracy. Yet, it sets a premium on acceptance of the out-put of the historical constitutional system as the hallmark of the good citizen. Reflecting more than a trace of positivism, the neo-conservative tendency sharply distinguishes between private motives and legal behavior. The current is unlikely to give any significant aid to an interpretation of sovereignty whereby the citizen realizes his true morality through conformity to the state's determination of right in the tradition of Bosanquet.³ Lacking dedication to this notion, the neo-conservative current participates in discussions of the special conditions under which civil disobedience might take place without endangering a democratic system.⁴ Its outlook, however, is often negative, aligning easily with the Kerner Report's finding that in the recent past "uncivil" disobedience shared with white terrorism and defiant officials the responsibility for creating a climate that encouraged and approved violent protest.⁵

The neo-conservative current sometimes approves or condones civil disobedience, especially to test the constitutionality of statutes, but it contrasts with a second current which welcomes the incorporation of responsible law-breaking into democratic theory as a beneficial, though rarely used, mechanism. This second alignment will be called "institutional libertarian" or simply "libertarian."⁶ Ranging from the idioms of

welfare capitalism to social democracy, it combines a defense of a legal democratic order with sponsorship of evolutionary changes in the distribution and uses of power to better meet human needs. Divided about a number of issues, the current has yet to show if its future lies with those concerned with perpetuating the due process tradition who attempt to define civil disobedience, such as Morris Keeton, or with "radical liberals" who are more interested in urging newer versions of democracy than in explaining how to achieve them.⁷ The libertarian persuasion often serves as an infrequently acknowledged ally of black power and radical New Left groups in their "anti-oligarchy" struggles. The relationship is not one whereby these groups offer substantial analysis of civil disobedience. For the black power advocates this condition may stem from an emphasis within the early civil rights movement, and certainly from without, on its obligation to use non-violent means. The older stress invalidates discussion of civil disobedience for newer black leaders who believe, as academicians came to believe about the anti-communist provision of the National Defense Act, that a minority community had been affronted, and it would no longer tolerate the condition.⁸ An explanation of why the radical New Left has not contributed to discussion of civil disobedience is that it tends to consider the phenomenon as little more than a mechanical strategy in the struggle against the alleged evils of the American and associated systems, causing a dearth of analysis according to values other than those of the crucible. The relative silence of the radical New Left about the philosophical significance of civil disobedience may be valid testimony that the subject is indeed worthless.⁹

507-525; and Michael Walzer, "The Obligation to Disobey," *Ethics*, 77 (1967), 163-175.

⁷ Civil disobedience is one, undefined form among many "disorderly surrogates" for socially acceptable types of protest in the stockpile of the "politics of radical pressure," recommended in Arnold S. Kaufman, *The Radical Liberal* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), pp. 56-75, at 70.

⁸ The anti-patrician and self-determinist spirit is evident in Floyd B. Barbour (ed.), *The Black Power Revolt* (Boston: Sargent, 1968), and Nathan Wright, Jr., *Black Power and Urban Unrest* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967).

⁹ It is true that Herbert Marcuse has referred to "uncivil" disobedience. See *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 68-69. But his view of the phenomenon is controlled by beliefs that capitalist "pseudo-democracy" eventually absorbs any kind of non-mass opposition and hypocritically distracts attention from its own brutality through discovery of "illegitimate" re-

³ There are commentators whose alarm about civil disobedience suggests that there is a fully conservative category. See Morris I. Liebman, "Civil Disobedience—A Threat to Our Law Society," John W. Richm, "Civil Disobedience—A Definition," *American Criminal Law Quarterly*, 3 (1964), 21-26, 11-15; and former Justice Whittaker's remarks in Charles E. Whittaker and William Sloane Coffin, Jr., *Law, Order and Civil Disobedience* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1967), pp. 1-25. A majority of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence held that civil disobedience, including non-violent action, is potential anarchy: *New York Times*, Dec. 9, 1969, pp. 1, 44.

⁴ *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 92.

⁵ Internal agreements on justification, and means and ends of ethical resistance provide considerable diversity to the current. But consult Hugo A. Bedau, "On Civil Disobedience," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 58 (1961), 653-665; Harrop A. Freeman and Bayard Rustin in Harrop A. Freeman, ed., *Civil Disobedience* (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1966), pp. 2-10, 10-13; Morris Keeton, "The Morality of Civil Disobedience," *Texa Law Review*, 43 (1965),

But since this paper's presumption is that the topic deserves study, it will have to proceed. Because black power and the radical New Left are not substantively concerned with civil disobedience, non-conservatives and libertarians are challenged to demonstrate that it is significantly involved in those broad issues of defining and reaching a better political life that energize non-debaters as well as many discussants.

Without pausing here to identify the specific points where the neo-conservative and libertarian currents agree or differ on the standards for "responsible" civil disobedience, I find that together they suggest the following criteria: 1) The act must be performed openly—secrecy is prohibited. 2) It must be a deliberate, not an accidental step. 3) The action is clearly unlawful, i.e., not permissible under existing laws and court interpretations of civil rights and liberties. 4) The illegal act is voluntary, not induced by others. 5) The conduct proceeds from "conscientious" dissent, inspired by moral or religious beliefs. 6) The objective sought is a concrete, public reform. 7) Legal remedies must be exhausted before disobedience is undertaken. 8) The disobedient is obligated to use "non-violent" means. 9) Throughout his challenge he demonstrates concern for the rights of others. 10) A proximate relation exists between the rule under attack and the reasons for dissent. 11) The disobedient must submit to the legal consequences of his act. This is not an exhaustive list, but it is suggestive of numerous criteria.

One can immediately comment on 1), 2) and 3). Meant to exclude subversion or evasion of law, the public test is open to a claim of exemption for some who violated the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, the 18th Amendment and current state laws on abortions. If clandestine infractions are acceptable, perhaps only retrospective sorting by disinterested or "winning" historians can judge the disobedients. Meanwhile, one can reasonably expect that generally the public test must be met. The criterion of deliberate infraction is troublesome when the

public standard is forgiven, thus making proof difficult. To consider an act eligible for "responsible" civil disobedience in the absence of evidence of advertancy, one may have to assume, intending no entrapment, its deliberate commission. On the test of illegality, there would seem to be no great difficulty in accepting the standard. A problem is how to treat the opinion that civil disobedience is not involved when the breaking of a law is subsequently found to be no violation because the "law" was invalid under superior legislation or a constitutional ruling.¹⁰ To accept this view narrowly limits "civil disobedience" to unsuccessful, legal challenges and denigrates political and ethical justification of disobedience. This is an inhibiting prospect for political philosophy.

II. THE ISSUE OF "CONSCIENTIOUS" OBJECTION

On the assumption that the disobedient act must be public, deliberate and illegal, this paper will examine four tests of civil disobedience which are crucial for distinguishing it from other kinds of political action and exploring its political ethics. They are the criteria of "conscientious" objection, willingness to accept the legal consequences of disobedience, "non-violent" means, and a proximate relation between the target and the grievance. To take the first, the stipulation that the infraction must be based on moral or religious conviction, i.e., the dictates of one's conscience, is found among both neo-conservatives and libertarians. Although definitions are seldom offered, both groups tend to consider "conscience" as a sacred and sovereign monitor, operating as if in the presence of God, rather than to imply Freud's super-ego, a product of fear and guilt. Moreover, they tend to think of conscience responding to significant, public challenges.¹¹ Neo-con-

¹⁰ Legalists associated with federal civil rights activities have argued that civil disobedience is not present when rule-breaking is later held legal under existing Congressional legislation or Constitutional principles: William L. Taylor, "Civil Disobedience," in Donald B. King and Charles W. Quick (eds.), *Legal Aspects of the Civil Rights Movement* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), pp. 227-235, at 228-229; and Burke Marshall, "The Protest Movement and the Law," *Virginia Law Review*, 51 (1965), 785-803, at 795-796. The focus of Taylor and Marshall is on the sit-ins in the early 1960's and the arrests that followed but never received Supreme Court approval.

¹¹ On the possibly quandary of the nuclear commander, see Guenter Lewy, "Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of Conscience in the Atomic Age," *this Review*, 55 (1961), pp. 2-23.

sistance. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65, 76-77. A radical New Left view of the national and world scene is Carl Oglesby's section in Carl Oglesby and Richard Schaul, *Containment and Change* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), pp. 3-176. For a glimpse of strategy in Students for a Democratic Society targeting, see "The Rudd October Proposals," in Cox Commission Report, *Crisis At Columbia* (New York: Random House, 1968), Appendix B. The sources, ideas and literature of the New Left in Europe and the United States are reviewed in Rosemary Ruether, "The New Left: Revolutionaries After the Fall of the Revolution," *Soundings*, 51 (1969), 245-263.

servatives and libertarians are not alike on exemplification. Libertarians pay tribute to such exemplars as Gandhi and Thomas More. These men, it is held, demonstrated the qualities of mind and spirit and the political ethics which all potential rule-breakers should emulate. The neo-conservatives do not take this tack usually. A representative outlook is that of Erwin N. Griswold who, instead of valuing famous disobedients, gives recognition to the "forum of conscience" described in Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in *U.S. v. MacIntosh* as an area where "duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been maintained."¹² Having done this and acknowledged a moral right to commit civil disobedience when there is a conflict of loyalties, Griswold stresses that the act is a rare event never to be cloaked with the legitimacy of civil liberties as construed by the Supreme Court and seldom to be tolerated by the majority's legislative will. Although this rendering does not rule out innovative rule-breaking, the outlook implies that conscientious disobedience has few contributions to offer democratic theory.

In contrast, institutional libertarians find civil disobedience a potential resource. Frequently they show the influence of liberal theology and resistance ideas indebted to Roger Williams, the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* and John Knox. Of special interest, these commentators provide for individual civil disobedience which the elitism of Reformation traditions normally would have excluded. The method is to interpret St. Peter's "Obey God rather than men" dictum (Acts 5:29) to deny the state's absolutism and to permit citizen disobedience by divine authority without reference to human institutions.¹³ The Petrine injunction has two weaknesses which are illuminated by Leslie W. Dunbar's criticism of natural law renditions for failing to require that the disobedient must always take the burden of justifying his act. He objects to a special defect:

This comes about when the tradition asserts that the right of conscientious disobedience represents obedience to God rather than man; thus

¹² 283 U.S., 605, 633 (1931); Griswold, *op. cit.*, 728-738.

¹³ A leading statement of this view which rests its certainty in Christ is John C. Bennett, "The Place of Civil Disobedience," *Christianity and Crisis*, 27 (Dec. 25, 1967), 299-302. Religious institutions, it has been urged, have a duty to speak and act corporately on the great issues of conscience and not limit themselves to urging individual members to speak and act: Robert McAfee Brown, *et al.*, *Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience* (New York: Association Press, 1967), pp. 62-106, at 63.

"God justifies." That this borders on blasphemy is a truth which at least two millennia have conspired in suppressing. It is of a piece with the other too numerous manifestations of western civilization's pathetic repudiation of its own responsibility for its moral values. When we take the step of civil disobedience no presumptuous claim that "God justifies me" must be on our lips; only a plea that he do so. It is not God rather than man that we obey, but God rather than man that we seek to please, and therein lies a tremendous difference. We cannot explore this matter here, other than to note that what one offers to God cannot be logically evaluated.¹⁴

While Dunbar's larger finding is that mass black protest in the South was genuine disobedience and that it was justified, not by conscience or natural law, but by its political ends and non-violent means, his unhappiness with God's "validation" is an instructive reminder that some "conscience" justifications of disobedience raise the issue of self-certification through rationally unreachable claims, and they manipulate theological ideas. The first problem complicates the task of determining constructive rebels from their opposites. Dunbar offers an appealing solution: After the mystical disobedient offers up his act, he must appeal to men for secular judgment. Thereby two courts will have the benefit of review. On manipulating theological notions, one could say that this condition is difficult to avoid in an age when inner direction is widely respected or tolerated and those who believe in extra-human causes are experiencing revolutions. A more critical response is to suggest that Dunbar's point about pleasing instead of appealing to God implies a significant part of the "Obey God rather than man" directive that is often omitted—the possibility of God's punishment if the disobedient is acting contrary to divine will and law.¹⁵ In *Antigone* the heroine pitted her understanding of higher law against Creon's state command, but although she perished, in an ultimate sense the Gods vindicated her and punished him. Is it unfair to argue that when a disobedient invokes the Petrine doctrine, he ought to admit that he is in principle subject to the risk that God's penalties may be visited on him, not as testimony to state sovereignty,

¹⁴ "Sources of Political Rights," paper read to Southern Political Science Association, Durham, N.C., November 13, 1964. Mimeo., p. 7. Italics in the original.

¹⁵ There is also the possibility that the Devil rather than God is the source of inspiration. The perplexing implications of this option for actor and authorities were found at least as recently as John Brown of Harpers Ferry.

but because the law was more in tune with God's justice than his act? I think not. For without the corollary of God's justice, the "obey God rather than men" formula allows rule-breakers who invoke it to try to have the best of the subjective world in which they presumably believe. This is a questionable procedure in terms of limiting self-certification.¹⁶

A comment should be made here about recent developments in non-selective conscientious objection to compulsory military service which reveal a conflict between public policy and claimed moral impulse. Applying the protection of due process, but denying that Congress had violated the First Amendment by requiring belief in a Supreme Being, the Supreme Court in *U. S. v. Seeger* held that an objector, not an atheist, with sincere and meaningful beliefs parallel to the convictions of theists who is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form is qualified for exemption from combatant training and service.¹⁷ In the 1967 Selective Service Act, Congress responded to *Seeger* by removing the Supreme Being test; but, intending to exclude *Seeger*-type beliefs, it retained religious training and belief as the origin of conscientious objection and kept a ban on exemption based on essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a personal moral code. In 1968 the Selective Service introduced a form to review *Seeger*-type beliefs. *Seeger* and the changes are only slight adjustments in the government's effort to determine sincerity and uphold equity. Together with the premises of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, they do not contribute to a common understanding of "conscience," and they raise questions about the government's right to define and apply tests about highest convictions.¹⁸

Political obedience and the issue of conscience are joined especially in controversies about se-

¹⁶ An example of the self-protecting formula is found in William Sloane Coffin, Jr.'s comments in Whittaker and Coffin, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-41.

¹⁷ 380 U.S., 163 (1965).

¹⁸ See Christopher H. Clancy and Jonathan A. Weiss, "The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in Conceptual Clarity and Constitutional Considerations," *Maine Law Review*, 17 (1963), 143-160. If upheld, the Federal District Court ruling in *U. S. v. Sisson* (297 F. Supp. 902, 1969), which found that the 1967 law unconstitutionally discriminates against non-theists, religious or not, with profound moral convictions, will move the C. O. issue closer, either to the opening of Pandora's box or the victory of the inner light, depending on one's view. Ending compulsory military service would retire the question, unless there is another major war.

lective objection to military service, for which there is no statutory provision in the United States. For present purposes the importance of the controversies lies in their debate of the question: do convictions that a particular war is immoral and unjust meet the test of conscientious objection? The neo-conservative is likely to hold that selective objection is judgmental, i.e., "political," and should not be confused with traditional, i.e., "religious," conscientious objection which is a fundamental and rare phenomenon that government can and should legally tolerate. To this view sincere claims of selective objection to particular wars are worthy of respect. But they cannot be honored because they do not have the requisite "religious" quality and they clash with the idea that the government's will is paramount until changed by the representative machinery or public opinion.¹⁹ The libertarian, however, is apt to be sympathetic to a temporal faith interpretation of conscientiousness and willing to consider selective objection as potentially legitimate and not an indefensible challenge to national defense or democratic theory.²⁰ The difference between the two currents on the issue of selective objection focuses attention on how far each will permit legal exemptions from the requirements of citizenship to be extended in the name of conviction. Essentially the neo-conservative will allow non-performance that does not injure the rights of others or public safety, as with the constitutional refusal of Jehovah Witnesses to salute the flag, or that does not seriously affect a public mission, as in the instance of traditional conscientious objection to bearing arms at any time. In contrast to the neo-conservative, the libertarian will take greater risks in exempting non-confor-

¹⁹ Fortas, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

²⁰ On selective objection to military service, the American Civil Liberties Union has equated the genuine objector's belief with conscience that is entitled to First Amendment protection whether or not he claims to be "religious." Although no testing formula was suggested, it has held that administrative scrutiny of the objector will detect the unconscientious and discourage this means to avoid the draft. *Civil Liberties* (March, 1966). Without plebiscites, church elites have endorsed selective objection. A statement upholding conscientious resistance to military service in particular wars received the approval of most American delegates to the Fourth (1968) Assembly of the World Council of Churches. The selective objection issue is a new and ambivalent question for historical critics of all wars. See American Friends Service Committee, *The Draft?* (New York: A.F.S.C., 1968), esp. Chapter 3, "From Witness to Resistance: The New C.O."

mists from public affirmation of national loyalty and performance of citizen duty. The former moves with court and legislative answers, the latter anticipates favorable responses from them, making their agreement on a conscience test of civil disobedience an unlikely prospect.

III. WHAT OBLIGATIONS DOES THE DISOBEDIENT ASSUME?

To leave the criterion of conscientious dissent suspended between two schools is not a happy condition. However, I will let it remain there until later to consider other evidence of good will, asking about civil disobedience what T. H. Green asked of the legal obligation to obey—what external things should be expected?²¹ For this purpose two standards are useful—the disobedient's willing acceptance of legal penalties and his use of "non-violent" means. For the rule-breaker to voluntarily submit to the legal consequences of his act is held, especially by neo-conservatives, to be a central proof of one's good faith and lack of criminal or revolutionary intentions.²² It is conceded that voluntary submission obliges the state to consider that the disobedient, not the rule, should be vindicated. For many neo-conservatives the test of full submission is for the disobedient to willingly plead guilty. Even though on moral and constitutional grounds he usually opposed his own formal guilt, the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. is valued by neo-conservatives because of his sacrificial style and testimony to the ideal of law expressed in this way: "And I submit that the individual who disobeys the law, whose conscience tells him it is unjust and who is willing to accept the penalty by staying in jail until that law is altered, is expressing at the moment the very highest respect for the law."²³

²¹ Thomas Hill Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), pp. 35–38.

²² Sidney Hook, *The Paradoxes of Freedom* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967), pp. 116–118; Allen, *op. cit.*, 10–11; Fortas, *op. cit.*, p. 34. See also "A Declaration of Confidence in Columbia's Future," signed by faculty members of the Columbia Law School, *New York Times*, May 17, 1968, p. 41. Neo-conservatives honor Socrates as the Responsible Disobedient, holding that he drank the hemlock to testify to the state's integrity and the rule of law even as he believed that he had been unjustly accused and convicted. A variation is that the Gadfly's submission proved that he would let others disobey laws if they would assume the risk he had assumed: Charles Fried, "Moral Causation," *Harvard Law Review*, 77 (1964), 1258–1270, at 1269.

²³ Martin Luther King, Jr., "Love, Law and Civil

On the question of submission, libertarians are likely to refer to the varieties of legal situations under which civil disobedience might take place and to the possible weakening of protections for the accused through guilty pleas. The two patterns agree on minimum requirements that the disobedient should not become a fugitive from justice and after arrest should use conventional, legal means.

Protest circles have produced criticisms or rejections of the submission criterion, especially the neo-conservative version. Notable arguments hold that only obscurantist or craven men accept the requirement; by their courageous disobedience to reform democracy for philosophical reasons, a few men have prepaid society for any inconvenience they may have caused; acceptance of punishment encourages the state to keep and enforce the law or policy under attack; not to resist imprisonment or other penalty is to discredit the logic of disobedience; the law disobeyed is clearly unjust or unconstitutional so that acceptance of punishment is testimony to moral or legal falsehood. Howard Zinn's censure of neo-conservative submission covers some of these notions and adds others:

If a specific act of civil disobedience is a morally justifiable act of protest, then the jailing of those engaged in that act is immoral and should be opposed, contested to the very end. The protestor need be no more willing to accept the rule of punishment than to accept the rule he broke. There may be many times when protestors choose to go to jail, as a way of continuing their protest, as a way of reminding their countrymen of injustice. But that is different than the notion that they *must* go to jail as part of a rule connected with civil disobedience. The key point is that the spirit of protest should be maintained all the way, whether it is done by remaining in jail, or by evading it. To accept jail penitently as an accession to "the rules" is to switch suddenly to a spirit of subservience, to demean the seriousness of the protest.²⁴

A radicalization of protest idiom is clearly evident in many of these ideas. Conceivably they suggest an understanding of civil disobedience that calls into doubt the foundations of the democratic state, as known to date. But even

Disobedience," *New South*, 16 (1961), 3–11, at 8. It is less clear that King's adherence to the edifice of the law prevailed in his last few years when war policies and the maldistribution of wealth became his targets.

²⁴ Howard Zinn, *Disobedience and Disorder: Nine Fallacies on Law and Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 120–121. Italics in the original.

granting the presence of revolutionary ideas, the disciplined observer should not be hasty to conclude that conspiracy is at work and the commonwealth is imperiled. On the grounds that civil disobedience is a relief valve for an uncertain mixture of insurgent thought and non-revolutionary opinion, some concessions to the criticisms of the submission test should be made. In particular, the neo-conservative insistence on a guilty plea should be eliminated. The result would be to make the submission criterion no more and no less than the requirement of a *legal* struggle *within* the state's jurisdiction. A search for "sanctuary" or flight to avoid prosecution would be evidence of something other than civil disobedience.

There is a close relationship between the submission test and the question of "non-violent" means. Christian Bay's encyclopedia article states that civil disobedience requires "carefully chosen and legitimate means," but holds that they do not have to be "non-violent."²⁵ Yet, neo-conservatives and institutional libertarians usually agree on the need for this criterion which is meant to certify the actor's acceptance of the legal structure and to help the act's efficacy by avoiding society's fear of violence and preventing counter-force. There are vexing problems of definition. Criteria-makers have come to no agreement as they face "non-violent" conduct ranging from Mennonite non-resistance through attempts to block a submarine launching to self-immolation. A main source of difficulty is the fact that efforts to expound on the moral or practical value of non-violence, efforts which have a permanent place in American social and intellectual history, have not completed the task of developing a theory of political institutions based on the norm.²⁶

The problems of defining and institution-

²⁵ Bay, *op. cit.*, p. 474.

²⁶ Commenting from within the peace movement on the division between the non-violent ethic and politics, A. J. Muste observed: "And since, in itself pacifism does not provide criteria for political discrimination, these criteria must be found elsewhere. In their search for sound criteria not all pacifists mine the same political quarry." Quoted in James A. Finn, *Protest: Pacifism and Politics* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 200. Pacifist and related writings from William Penn to Bayard Rustin are collected in Staughton Lynd (ed.), *Non-violence in America* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1966). Gandhian resistance to reform the law is urged in Harris Wofford, Jr., "Non-Violence and The Law," *Journal of Religious Thought*, 15 (1957), 25-36. *Satyagraha* is appraised in my "Toward a Reassessment of Gandhi's Political Thought," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (1963), 99-108.

alizing "non-violence" imply a discussion of its opposite. The key question here is who may use violence legitimately? Drawing on traditional political obligation, the neo-conservative has answered with a moderate but explicit doctrine of state sovereignty. The libertarian is not greatly different, holding that the state alone has a legitimate monopoly over violence. While one could reasonably argue that the state has only a *de facto* and not a *de jure* monopoly over violence until the principle of consent is more fully realized, I see no viable alternative to retaining the neo-conservative, and by and large the libertarian insistence, that violence is rightly employed only by legal authorities who through legislative and judicial means determine what is and what is not anti-social behavior. In the crucible, public executives and their agents may equate illegality with violence and anarchism and act repressively on the confusion. The disobedient can help to prevent these defects by his peaceful conduct. More explicitly, the disobedient should be governed by the moral conviction that he is a witness to charity that he finds lacking in the state, obligating him to abstain from physical injury to persons and things. To hold that there ought to be a distinction between the lesser evil of violence to things and the greater evil of injury to persons is to invite a further debate about arson and theft, a process that will undermine the original ethic that was invoked.²⁷ "No contusions or breakage" may have little claim as a sophisticated rule for civil disobedience, but it is readily comprehensible and testifies to a prime democratic value, peaceful change.

A discussion of civil disobedience as potential revolution is suggested by the last criterion to be examined, a proximate relation between the violated rule and the cause for grievance. The neo-conservative tendency interprets the standard as insisting on a cause and effect bond. It is unsettled about any other understanding. Francis A. Allen writes:

But dilemmas arise when the object of protest is a condition that does not result from the enforcement of any particular law or from the conduct of any readily identifiable person or group, but

²⁷ Contrast Zinn, *op. cit.*, p. 46. For a dualistic thesis that when avenues for peaceful change have been closed, exhausted or found ineffective, violence is needed as much as peaceful civil disobedience as a mechanism to advance democratic values, subject to the government's enforcement of order and its removal of the causes of the outbursts, see Ralph W. Conant, "Rioting, Insurrection and Civil Disobedience," *The American Scholar*, 37 (1968), 420-433, at 433.

which, on the contrary is the consequence of a whole complex of social, cultural, and historical factors . . . Direct action that assumes the characteristics of a secondary or tertiary boycott is not well calculated to a call for the moral response from the larger community upon which the classic theory of civil disobedience largely relies. Moreover, such programs contain a large and unmistakable ingredient of irrationality . . . Such forms of protest, whatever the provocations that induced them, represent a retreat from reason and ultimately threaten the nonviolent character of the present movement.²⁸

Although Allen's illustration of a non-proximate condition is Negro disobedience for the proclaimed goal of increased economic opportunities, his comment is representative of neo-conservative concern about civil disobedience launched recently against national military policies. The libertarian tendency, which is equally devoted to rationality and peaceful means, does not share the neo-conservative objections to secondary and thus "political" relationships. To this view, Thoreau's refusal to pay his poll tax to draw attention to his objections to the Mexican War and slavery had no logical defects. Similarly, it is unlikely to fault the logic of the 1967 March on the Pentagon to publicize and alter Vietnam policies, however the means and the grievance are themselves judged.²⁹ Unlike the neo-conservative pattern, the libertarian outlook construes broadly the relevancy of a disobedient act for the rule broken. Although not all libertarians may object to *U. S. v. O'Brien's* denial of immunity for acts of "symbolic speech" which protested the wisdom of distant governmental decisions by challenging their legal armor,³⁰ the tendency they represent is fundamentally tolerant about the secondary character of rule-breaking which aims at the Leviathan through one of its peripheral laws.

Civil disobedience should not have to meet

the neo-conservative exclusion of a secondary relationship between the violated law and the basic grievance. The breaking of a marginal, innocuous statute to communicate protest about a legally distant wrong is either individual witnessing or interest group behavior that a self-confident democracy can withstand without serious injury, especially in view of the public obloquy visited by majority opinion on non-conformists. If civil disobedience is restricted to the testing of rules believed unjust or unconstitutional—as the neo-conservative test of proximate relation between object and complaint requires—civil disobedience would be confined to an essentially quasi-legal function when it may have a legitimate, politicized role as a "Question Time" for the majority will transcribed through the existing representative system. Under the heading of proximate relationship, it would seem sufficient to ask and expect an affirmative answer to the question, "Is the protest directed toward a specific need or wrong, clearly identified among the protesters; and has care been exercised to communicate its nature to bystanders and opponents?"³¹ An "immoral" war or "retrogressive" tax policy would seem to be sufficiently specific; "poverty" or "racism" would probably be too general to qualify.

It would be premature to conclude that the norms of concreteness and honest publicity are enough to convince those who ask for a proximate relationship between the infraction and the grievance that the prospect of revolution is thereby significantly lessened. Indeed, the question whether revolution is or is not immediately beyond the threshold of civil disobedience can be raised at several turns in the discussion of standards for acceptable rule-breaking. Opinion falls between two limits. One is identifiable with conservatism and holds that civil disobedience is incipient rebellion.³² The other is on the outer frontier of institutional libertarianism and asks that civil disobedience as "non-violent revolution" should be given legal immunity.³³ Although the bulk of the commentators are willing to avoid bracketing civil disobedience with revolution, neo-conservatives are apt to entertain and answer forebodingly the question: "Is there an attack on the system?" This phenomenon implies their general misgiving about allowing any rule-breaking in an operating, if imperfect, pluralist democracy. Libertarians are less

²⁸ Allen, *op. cit.*, 12–13.

²⁹ The preparations and conduct of the October, 1967 demonstrations at the Pentagon had factors of interest to the student of civil disobedience. One participant-observer finds the criteria of advance notice, "non-violence," and appeal to the public conscience. He also suggests as the claim that the government was obliged to negotiate on how it would be disobeyed. See Norman Mailer, *The Armies of the Night* (New York: New American Library, 1968). A situational description of the Pentagon events as a mixture of Gandhian and insurgency tactics is reported in *Liberation*, 12 (November, 1967) 3–7 (David Dellinger), 26–28 (Arthur Waskow).

³⁰ *U. S. v. O'Brien*, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).

³¹ Keeton, *op. cit.*, 515. Italics of the original removed.

³² Riehm, *op. cit.*, 14. See also Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr., "Civil Disobedience: Destroyer of Democracy," *American Bar Association Journal*, 55 (Feb., 1969), 123–126.

³³ Freeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.

fearful about civil disobedience being or becoming an attempt to displace the current regime. They depend on the standards of disclosure and "non-violence" to build a wall around the disobedient to tell him from the insurgent.

The neo-conservative fear that rebellion is inherent in rule-breaking is especially troublesome for the task of establishing criteria for civil disobedience. If the concern becomes overriding there is a risk that under its weight other criteria will fall. To avoid this contingency the discerning student will have to do one of two things. Either he will try to work out his own set of answers to show that there is no insuperable logical difficulty in viewing civil disobedience as a non-revolutionary question.³⁴ The other option is for him to rely on a belief that in a democratic context "principled" lawbreaking is worthy of ethical examination regardless of the risk that it may produce, intentionally or otherwise, the reality of political violence. I would recommend the second alternative, and support it with the addition of two widely-proposed criteria—the exhaustion of legal remedies before disobedience is undertaken and demonstrated care for substantial rights of others, e.g., First Amendment rights. The former helps to maintain the validity of redress procedures, which if discredited by non-use, may not provide adequate justice for anyone. The latter requires the disobedient to show non-ideological evidence of the humanism which he has proclaimed as his *weltanschauung*.

Civil disobedience therefore emerges as rule-breaking which meets certain standards. Assuming the act to be deliberate, it should be an articulated, public deed, aimed at a specific wrong and conducted peacefully with concern for others inside the state's jurisdiction after completing legal, remedial action. Selective borrowing from neo-conservative and libertarian norms opens the way to a discussion of whether there are significant tasks in democratic theory which might be performed through civil disobedience. Before that enterprise is undertaken some settlement must be made of the test of conscientious dissent.³⁵

IV. WHAT IS "CONSCIENTIOUSNESS"?

Because of the centrality of "conscientiousness" for many definitions of civil disobedience, it deserves the most careful evaluation as a possible source for justification of rule-break-

ing in a democratic context. The standard is open to two defective understandings. On the neo-conservative side there is the risk of sacrificing the possibly creative voice to the rule of law. Among libertarians there is the chance of the absolutism of individual conscience overcoming civic virtue and order. Even if a balance were struck between the tendencies, application would be a basic problem of the test. "There cannot be," Franz Neumann wrote, "a universally valid statement telling us when man's conscience may legitimately absolve him from obedience to the laws of the state."³⁶ Neumann may have been premature in closing the door on scientific determination of conscientiousness, but his comment recalls the near inscrutability of the inner light and the extreme difficulty of giving it consensual recognition. An amendment may be in order to require an affirmative response from the "conscience" of others as evidence of the disobedient's own credentials. The implications of this qualification include the transference of the testing process from the actor to his audience. This amendment has the drawbacks of opening the question of how significant followership or its absence is to judging the disobedient and recalling Rousseau's general will as a "conscience" for the whole community. The former leads to a discourse on effective leadership, not valid rule-breaking; and the latter leads to controversies about the meanings of the *Social Contract* that are unsettled two centuries after its publication. Because of these problems, the amendment does not offer a reliable way to determine the individual's merit.

Given the diversity of meanings and the many questions about recognition and application which spring up around "conscientiousness"

1945 London Agreement on moral choice in the face of immoral state orders tends to assign the principles to a category of inner judgment. [The Agreement is in *Journal of International Law*, 39 (1945), Supp., 257-264.] It is debatable whether that judgment is "only" entitled to decide for disobedience or is *obligated* to so decide. The latter interpretation has been influential in popular resistance ideas. See Benjamin Spock, "Vietnam and Civil Disobedience," *The Humanist*, 28 (1968), 3-7, at 6. This stand was also adopted by Capt. Howard B. Levy in his military trial. *United States v. Levy*, CM416463 (Army Bd. of Rev. Aug. 29, 1968), *et cetera*. His view was an interpretation of Army Field Manual 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare* (1965). Yet, this document, which outlines legal responsibility for war crimes, stipulates neither entitlement nor obligation to disobey.

³⁶Franz L. Neuman, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), p. 158.

³⁴For this position, see Richard Wasserstrom, "Disobeying the Law," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 58 (1961), 641-653.

³⁵Appeals to Nuremberg principles to justify disobedience have a close affinity to conscientious dissent. The focus of the relevant passages of the

as a guide to identifying disobedience which a more perfect democracy would permit, one is left with the choice of either eliminating the criterion from consideration as Sidney Hook has done in the name of secular humanism³⁷ or relying on an interdependency of the disobedient and the state that will salvage some acts of conscience from its power.³⁸ Recognizing significant problems in either direction that require further exploration, I would choose the second course, endorsing Professor Dworkin's thesis that the regime's discretionary authority not to prosecute is the least unsatisfactory device to recognize the existence and condone the public results of the dictates of private conscience.³⁹ Some will object that the solution leaves conscience the prisoner of state theory—any state theory. The complaint has reasonable grounds, but it overestimates the achievements of those who wish to realize the ideal in which no man is ever forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience.⁴⁰ Another objection is that anti-pop-

³⁷ Hook contends that "conscience" is a dangerous guide for principled action, which if accepted, opens the way for totalitarians along with peace workers. See especially *Paradoxes of Freedom*, Chapter 3. His thesis is overly dependent on viewing conscience as a basis for *political theory*, whereas many who claim its guidance are no more or less than moralists who may be correct or mistaken in their judgments but who seldom offer political theories. I agree with Hook's evaluation that individual conscience alone is an untrustworthy basis for consent to law. Contrast Harold J. Laski, *Authority in the Modern State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 32-47. Recent controversies have caused constitutional libertarians to attempt to combine political respect for and legal skepticism about disobedience based on highest principle: "The American Civil Liberties Union Statement on Civil Disobedience," February 1, 1969, mimeo.

³⁸ A third way is possible if one believes that the entire question of civil disobedience is based on what may be owed to others through shared values and associations. For this approach, which differs from mine, see Walzer, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³⁹ Ronald Dworkin, "On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience," *New York Review of Books*, 10 (1968), 14-21.

⁴⁰ The ideal has received notable support from the Roman Catholic Church in Vatican Council II's "Declaration on Religious Freedom." A state, even one that is democratic, can make a declaration of this kind only at its peril. No longer a state, but still a government, the Church faces numerous dilemmas in combining the "no-coercion-toward-conscience-even-when-wrong" ideal with Apostolic and Papal theories. As discussed in the Encyclical

ulist favoritism is practiced through forgiveness of "principled" rule-breaking, an indulgence not to be extended to the "generality" of men—a term used by Judge Charles Wyzanski, Jr. when he accepted a man's refusal on non-theistic, conscientious grounds to be inducted for combat service in Vietnam.⁴¹ The criticism is especially difficult to answer because it exposes the elitist character of civil disobedience to which so little attention has been paid.⁴²

The main problem, however, is to avoid two extremes. To ignore individual conscience as a guide to state response to disobedience is an undesirable concession to legal positivism and philosophical relativism. To elevate conscience as a self-determined yardstick is an unwelcome step toward political atomism. A balance is possible when the non-prosecution option is accepted. It depends on the forbearing character of the American state. Less than optimal, the quality ought to be refined and strengthened; but its present condition is intrinsically valuable to help recognize and respect the dictates of private conscience.

V. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

With the completion of the foregoing sketch of criteria for civil disobedience that reveals certain political ethics and distinguishes it from political revolution and conventional dissent, a provisional response can now be made to the question whether resistance of this kind contributes a service to American democratic thought. A subsidiary issue deals with the possible defects of the current. From the standpoint of American political obligation the area that is most pertinent is the Lockean dispensation. According to this theory, primordial consent established a political society out of which a state emerged, probably through a second contract, as Althusius had argued more clearly than Locke. In any event, original consent entitles the state to a basic loyalty. The citizens retain a portion of their pre-civil authority to self-government through the persistence of inviolable rights and a representative system operating through ma-

Humane Vitae, the birth control issue is one controversy in which the difficulties are revealed. For the American Catholic Bishop's 1968 statement on the issue in which on net balance conscience "as a law unto itself" is subordinated to the Church's teaching authority, see "Human Life in Our Day," *Catholic Mind*, 66 (1968), 1-28.

⁴¹ *U. S. v. Sisson*, 297 F. Supp. 902 (1969).

⁴² For the caution that in a democratic context civil disobedience is minority rule, see John H. Schaar, *Loyalty in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), p. 52.

majority will. It is the delegational machinery which normally keeps the state accountable to its citizens who give a few men a fiduciary power to govern. *In extremo*, citizens may legitimately use violence to remake the state when it violates the terms of its mandate. Minority discontent is no proof that the mandate is broken. Only majority sanction can legitimize the claim. Private conscience is recognized by the Lockean tradition, but it is not the basis for a right to rule-breaking.⁴³

The Lockean view of obedience and dissent has two main weaknesses. The fiction of voluntary membership in a political community is at best a literary metaphor or at worst a device for assuring the state consensualist value under the guise of a myth. For civil disobedience a result of the fault is to assign an awesome burden of moral justification for any illegal act to the disobedient, even when the law violated is patently inequitable. The civil disobedient learns what other law-breakers have found, that he faces not only the immediate legal network, but a surrogate to which presumably he had consented in a primeval cavern. Not all evidence of this problem in American political thought lies with Lockean theory, Hobbes' single contract and Leviathan having made themselves felt despite the stronger current of the former. Still, Lockean explanation about the genesis of political obligation gives the state an unearned title to expect and exact obedience even before the stuff of the second contract, the representative system, comes into focus.

The second weakness of Lockean theory lies in its anti-individualist and conformist bent that contrasts with Locke's natural rights and social ideas. The bias shows in his insistence that majority will is needed to begin the valid overthrow of unjust rulers and in the politically undernourished place given to conscience. The influence of these beliefs on any kind of dissent is especially revealed in a condition Robert A. Dahl calls a "J-Curve" situation where the bulk of the citizens agree on many political issues. Relating this condition to political philosophy, he writes:

A vast number of questions that might be of abstract interest to philosophers, moralists, theologians, or others who specialize in posing difficult and troublesome questions are, in any stable political system, irrelevant to politics because nearly everyone is agreed and no one can stir up much of a controversy. If a controversy does arise because of the persistence of a tiny dissenting minor-

⁴³ A similar understanding of Lockean obligation and dissent is Harry Prosch, "Toward An Ethics of Civil Disobedience," *Ethics*, 77 (1967), 176-191, at 178-179.

ity, in a republic the chances are overwhelming; that it will soon be settled in a way that corresponds with the view of the preponderant majority.⁴⁴

The condition described is precisely the kind where there *ought* to be an opportunity to ask troublesome questions and to demand answers from public authorities that are innovative. In an unstable system many voices are heard and the democratic state is apt to change its policies and laws. Sympathetic to Dahl's "others," I detect a need to keep open the possibility of challenges to laws and policies, regardless of the opinion of the "preponderant majority." That this can be allowed in terms of Lockean understandings of dissent is doubtful.

It would be unwise to conclude that because Lockean ideas about obedience and dissent have drawbacks their framework should be discarded. Not only are alternatives, e.g., Hobbesian or Marcusian theories, antithetical to such democratic values as privacy and self-fulfillment, but the Lockean tradition has developed intellectual commitments to civil liberties and participatory government that are crucial for the protection and advancement of human rights and regime accountability. What might be done profitably is to adopt an idea of "justice" to link, without confusing, the rulers and the governed. Skeptical of founding "justice" on the mythical soil of contract, I agree, nonetheless, that some understanding of the notion might overcome the weaknesses of Lockean theory.⁴⁵ Understood as a trans-political, moral ideal rooted in the nature and destiny of man, "justice" partakes of T. H. Green's "common good,"⁴⁶ despite the reservations that can be introduced about his statism and unclear teleology. For civil disobedience an eclectic conception of "justice" which is not mortgaged to primordial contract or state "ends" provides a shared field for presumption about obedience to compete with disciplined challenges. The competition is on terms which do not preordain the outcome, although they unapologetically respect systemic legitimacy.

To proceed this far is to go beyond the mat-

⁴⁴ Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), pp. 272-273.

⁴⁵ Justice and contract are joined in John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in *Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice*, Hugo Adam Bedau, ed. (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 240-255.

⁴⁶ On Green's "common good," suggesting that its social context is true but because of faulty use of words he failed to distinguish different goods, see Plamenatz, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-81.

ter of imperfections in the predominant stream of American democratic thought and to enter a discussion of whether civil disobedience is well qualified to guard and further democratic ideals. On this question, Bay is a prominent spokesman for the affirmative. He suggests that civil disobedience can be a new and vital way to realize human values no longer served by majoritarianism because of the inroads of modern knowledge and the distortion of the rule of law and representative machinery into ultimate goods. Visualizing a non-elitist polity with a reallocation of power that lessens poverty and violence and expands human rights, he wishes to substitute for the classic justification of democracy through political obligation an ethic of individual responsibility for the likely results of one's political conduct, including obedience to law.⁴⁷ This proposal is valuable to the degree that it reminds conservative and neo-conservatives of Bracton's dictum that the king is *sub deo et lege*, and how in our time the rule of law means that "the law itself is based on respect for the supreme value of human personality."⁴⁸ Bay's reliance on individual rectitude is more controversial, for although he denies that Thoreau is the model for civil disobedience, his ideas align with the New Englander's thesis that the free man defines his own responsibility.⁴⁹ The realization of Bay's goals, which others seek, requires limits. I contend that the limits mean that the free and responsible man operates within a community that develops his rectitude and the state's. Is this stand close to that of David Spitz who refers to the foundation of the problem of political obligation in the Aristotelian question about whether a good man can always be a good citizen? He argues that it is possible to be true to both through the loyalty of

the citizen to the principles of democracy, despite the presence of unjust laws. In the last analysis, Spitz relies on the goodness and honesty of man operating from moral principles to judge rationally the likely results of his disobedience, and to bring his pressure to bear on the state to try to produce a greater benefit than what is apt to come from obedience.⁵⁰ As an amendment, I would suggest that, in addition to combining the good man's work for the development of the state, the state must be allowed to help him. This is not testimony to the sanctity of the state.⁵¹ As in classical liberalism, he will control the moral balance, but there is or there ought to be a mutuality between man and the state.⁵² For state power can help to liberate him from deprivations. Existentialism to the contrary, he cannot perform the task alone.

Applied to responsible civil disobedience, mutuality does not mean that legal immunity ought to be extended to it. This would be to legitimize and normalize civil protest into a formal, remedial institution that the democratic system already provides in other ways. Routinization would also destroy the logic and spontaneity of disobedience. Yet, civil disobedience can aid, as it has in the past, the selective incorporation into civil rights and liberties of public speech and behavior previously denied to citizens. While some attempts fail and may deserve to fail in such marshy areas of criminal law as conspiracy and trespass, disobedience of the law, as the neo-conservative admits, is sometimes a useful tool to expand the arena of liberty. Moreover, responsible civil disobedience can continue to aid social changes that are beyond the capacity or will of representative institutions. Although civil rights disobedience within individual states had their approval, this is a basic frontier neo-conservatives would rather not pass. They can be answered with the reply that civil rule-breaking can energize the political system to take additional steps to advance social progress, provided it is understood that the criteria suggested in this paper or similar tests

⁴⁷ Bay, *op. cit.*, pp. 484-485. The populism inherent in Bay's ideas is more apparent than real, for he would trade the elitism behind liberal democracy for a new elitism of radicals who would produce bold policies.

⁴⁸ International Commission of Jurists, *The Rule of Law In A Free Society: A Report on the International Congress of Jurists, New Delhi: 1959* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1960), p. 196. Bay criticizes the dogma of the rule of law in pluralist, democratic theory in "Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass Society," in *Political Theory and Social Change*, David Spitz, ed. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), pp. 163-183.

⁴⁹ "The only obligation which I have a right to assume," Thoreau said, "is to do at any time what I think right." "Civil Disobedience," *The Works of Thoreau*, Henry S. Canby, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1937), 789-808, at 790-791.

⁵⁰ David Spitz, "Democracy and the Problem of Civil Disobedience," this REVIEW, 48 (1954), 386-403, at 401-403.

⁵¹ On some dangers of civil religion, see Lewis Lipsitz, "If as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What are We To Do To Save Our Souls?," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 527-535. A vineyard note is Barbara Deming, "Desanctifying Authority," *Liberation*, 12 (November, 1967), 32-33.

⁵² "Mutuality" between citizen and state is explored in Robert J. Pranger, *Action, Symbolism, and Order: The Existential Dimensions of Politics in Modern Citizenship* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), pp. 54-57.

are developed as insurance that principled disobedience is not a threat to the constitutional order, but an effort to retain it because of its demonstrated values.⁵³

Those who believe that the representative model, operating fundamentally by "majority" will, coalition leadership and a developing system of rights and liberties, is the best arrangement to be expected in an imperfect world, are unlikely to invite civil disobedience into the house of Madison and Lincoln. Essentially, this is the neo-conservative current. Some, but perhaps not all, libertarians are open to the prospect of legitimizing civil disobedience as a genuinely democratic method. They believe, and I would agree, that civil disobedience can provide a theoretical service in a democracy through the reform of the delegational pyramid. For without contending that Rousseau's city-state ought to be the paradigm for democracy, I suggest that the representative structure which welfare democracy inherited from last century's liberalism and improved in this century has not been so administratively effective or so politically virtuous that it cannot be improved by new arrangements for combining obedience and consent. To experiment is a risk for democratic political obligation. But is there not an equally serious risk if stability is valued ahead of the expansion of accountability?⁵⁴ Distinguished from the use of force to impose decisions and from the existing regime of rights and liberties, disciplined civil disobedience is possibly a creative way to ask the citizens of the state if they are satisfied with other aspects of the delegational model that has served well but which may not

have produced the most equitable and efficient allocation of power and resources to deal with emergent disaffection and unmet needs in the national polity.

But how *necessary* is civil disobedience, given the availability of many legal forms of political opposition and reform? To face this question is to appeal for empirical studies of the benefits or costs of civil disobedience undertaken in our time, measured against the reasonably well-known strengths and drawbacks of conventional forms of political opposition. Recent studies of violence in the United States are of no great value because they have proceeded almost without the aid of ethical distinctions about various kinds of disorder.⁵⁵ The distinctions, as I have tried to show, can be made. The task is to use some set to isolate *civil* disobedience from other forms of unconventional dissent and after empirical analysis to declare whether there is a *need* for this special form of opposition in terms other than the ones that are used frequently to justify it.

Meanwhile, three compelling reasons support the incorporation into American democratic philosophy of *civil* disobedience. As a buffer between civil liberties and rights, and direct action and Communardist ideas, having kinship with both, it provides a testing zone for challenges to representative democracy without complete submission to either established or new rules of the game. Civil disobedience takes soundings for the operative formulas of democracy, not the least of which is how to probe for a conception of justice held by dissidents and state alike. Finally the phenomenon is an educational strategy to rethink persistent questions of political obligation. For all three reasons incentives are supplied, not only by intellectual curiosity, but also by the power, merits and inadequacies of discontent itself.

⁵⁵ A minority of the Eisenhower Commission on Violence cited ethical criteria in its dissent from the majority's faulting of civil disobedience: n. 4, *supra*.

⁵³ For this point, see Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Civil Disobedience and Contemporary Constitutionalism: the American Case," *Comparative Politics*, I (1969) 211-227, at 221.

⁵⁴ Political obligation rests on a narrow interpretation of order and stability in Charles S. Hyman with Charles E. Gilbert, *Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), 274-275.

RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN POLITICS: EVIDENCE FROM A THREE PERSON GAME*

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I. THE CONCEPT OF "RATIONAL BEHAVIOR"

A fundamental controversy in political theory from ancient times until the present concerns the rationality of political actors, what it is, if it exists at all, and whether or not humans display it in politics. Many political scientists are impatient with this controversy because it remains open after so much (apparently futile) discussion. But they ought not be. The problem of rationality is necessarily imbedded in even the simplest kinds of political research, where, if overlooked, it can occasion misinterpretation and even outright error.

Suppose, for example, in an investigation of legislators one uses the notion of party loyalty as an independent variable to explain behavior. This notion seems simple and straightforward enough and not, therefore, likely to involve one in philosophical controversy. But in fact party loyalty can be interpreted in a variety of ways and the choice among them necessarily involves a choice on one side of the controversy over rationality. Loyalty can be thought of, for example, as a truly independent variable, as a product of political socialization, as an expression of affect, and hence as an essentially irrational motive. On the other hand, it may be thought of as itself dependent on bargains rationally satisfying the preferences of legislators. Such bargains may be either short term or long term so that a legislator's manifest party loyalty may result from a series of advantageous bargains with party leaders on particular bills or from an implied bargain with them on career advantage. But, in either case, if party loyalty is the product of bargains, it is something quite different from loyalty based on affect. And this difference in turn makes a profound difference in interpreting the behavior of legislators for a loyalty based on bargains is subject to strains and stresses not found in a loyalty based on affect.

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Which kind of loyalty exists thus makes a difference in the prediction of behavior and, furthermore, the quality of prediction thus depends on a decision in the philosophical controversy.

This controversy is pervasive in political science. The controversy implicit in the notion of party loyalty as applied to legislators is equally implicit in the notion as applied to voters, and, beyond that, is implicit in such notions as class interest, national interest, alliance membership, etc., when used as variables to explain the behavior of men or nations. It is not possible, therefore, to avoid the controversy in serious political research.

Pervasive as this controversy is, political science has made remarkably little effort to resolve it for its own concerns. Although the present form of the question is: "Are men rational in making decisions?," the greater portion of the philosophizing about political rationality has been in terms of the issue as it was raised by Plato, the Stoics, and the philosophers (e.g. Hobbes and Rousseau) and lawyers (e.g. Grotius and Blackstone) of early modern times. These writers saw no issue in whether or not men are rational. All assumed men are. Rather they debated the nature of this rationality: do men, in behaving rationally, seek to maximize self-interest or to maximize some external goal as set forth for them in divine law, natural law, or the general will? An illustration of the regressive quality of much of current political philosophy is the recent volume of *Nomos* on rationality in which almost all the discussion is in these anachronistic terms.¹

But while political philosophers keep on debating the issues raised by Hobbes and Rousseau, the controversy has changed. Now, as a result of philosophical and scientific inquiry in

¹ Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), *Nomos VII: Rational Decision* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964). There is, however, one work which blends the old and the new very nicely, Paul Diesing, *Reason in Society* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

the two intervening centuries, the question has become: "When faced with the necessity of decision among several alternatives, do men order their preferences among them and choose that alternative which maximizes their utility?" where, of course, utility is understood as a measure of ordered preferences. Or, assuming a general affirmative to that question: "On the basis of what goals do men order their preferences?"² Around these questions today there are a variety of philosophical positions, among the most important of which are:

1. *Those which assert that choosers maximize utility.* Although the contemporary intellectual world is often described as anti-rationalist, the science of economics, which is the most practically successful and intellectually elegant of the social studies, is built entirely on the premise of rational behavior. In an anti-rationalist world, it has kept alive one side of the older rationalism (i.e., the radical individualism and nominalism of Hobbes and Bentham); but it has so refined the problem that its genetic resemblance to its ancestor is only barely visible. Its picture of the rational calculus is that men order preferences according to their tastes, although they impose on the ordering some elementary logical requirements of coherence and consistency. Once ordered, men then behave in situations involving risky choice as if they were maximizing expected utility, where utility is a numerical measure on preference orders. If one assumes that tastes are given and inscrutable, then the will appears as arbiter of taste, and reason appears as the efficient servant of the will. In such a view of rationality, which we call procedural, men are invariably rational. The only way an observer can discover the inscrutable goals is by observing choices among alternatives. From the choice, and from the assumption that the chooser maximized his utility, the observer infers the subject's goals. Although this theory is tautological, it does assert something testable, namely that men behave as if they were rational calculators. In many economic and political applications, however, one assumes further that a particular goal is appropriate for all men in the particular circumstances of the choice. In this view of rationality, which we call substantive, men as producers are said to maximize profit, men as consumers are said to minimize cost, etc. This theory, since it is not tautological, allows tests of assertions about calculation but unfortunately it also involves the scientist in attributing goals

and necessarily, therefore, involves the chance of error from this source. Both versions of rationality, regardless of whether or not a goal is postulated, do, however, assume that men are rational calculators, which is what other, subsequently listed, theories do not assume.

2. *Those which assert choosers choose by habit and discovery rather than by analysis of preference.* Learning theory, which derives from that great nineteenth century realization that man is part of the animal kingdom and from the great twentieth century realization that laboratory animals (and thence man) could be taught to respond positively to stimuli associated with rewards, offers a totally different picture of choice from that implied in the question as we have stated it. In learning theory, choices are said to occur as a result of rewards and punishments administered for previous behavior. If a subject—man or rat—chooses in random exploration an alternative that results in a reward, then on subsequent presentation with the same alternatives he chooses that which led to the reward. The chooser, of course, has preferences, even ordered preferences. And in this sense learning theory is like the theory of rationality in that men are said to choose what is preferred over what is not preferred. But the theories differ in that, in learning theory, the choice results not from a calculus but from the recall of previous consequences. Naturally, there is no maximization of utility here, merely the satisfaction of some desires, which are not necessarily the most pressing ones.

3. *Those which assert that choosers do not maximize utility.* Here the most well-known position is the psychoanalytic, which ultimately derives from the exaltation of will against reason in such writers as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. As against the rationalistic view that reason is the servant of the will, here will and reason are at war. Not unexpectedly, therefore, the very notion of ordering preferences is rejected as an unrealistic description of behavior. Instead, choice is interpreted as the product of sexual forces modified by rationalizing and socializing counter forces in an essentially disorderly way. To the psychoanalyst, therefore, the answer to the question of whether or not men choose so as to maximize utility is not simply "no" but rather that men are likely to choose exactly oppositely. Somewhat similar to the psychoanalytic position in this respect is the theory of cognitive dissonance. According to this notion, the relation of choice to preference as we stated it in our initial question is a reversal of nature. Instead of choosing so as to maximize utility (a measure of preference), men are said to construct preferences in order to rationalize

² This question, while superficially resembling the old one, differs in the expectation that goals be empirically investigated rather than attributed in arm-chair dicta.

choice. What comes first is choice based on some wholly unrationalized affect such as identification or Oedipal urges or what not. If this choice is challenged, then preferences are ordered to rationalize it. Hence choice is first and preference second, an outright reversal from the theory of rational behavior. Naturally, the theory of cognitive dissonance, like psychoanalysis, has no place for choice that maximizes utility.

Such is the confrontation of rationalism and anti-rationalism as it appears today in social science. A remarkable feature of the dispute is that each of the viewpoints, while supposedly universal, is actually quite closely linked to the behavior studied. Thus the main contemporary exponents of the model of calculating man are economists, who study behavior in the market. The main exponents of the model of choice by habit and discovery are learning theorists, who study behavior in the rat-maze and the class room. The main exponents of the model of choice by reason of sexual drives are psychoanalysts, who study behavior in dreams and fantasy-making. And the notion of cognitive dissonance with its emphasis on choice as against preference was first applied in a study of religious behavior. Each theory, however, seems to work fairly well when applied to the behavior for which it was created and to appear insufficient when applied to behavior generally.

This fact creates a difficult problem for political theory. If, as we have argued, the quality of political research depends in part on the position the researcher takes on the question of rationality, he must choose among the theories in this spectrum. But to do so he needs to make some decision on the kind of behavior he is studying. Is political behavior closer to behavior in the market or to behavior in fantasy? If we could answer this question with assurance, we could adopt wholesale a theory from another discipline. But assuming politics is, in Easton's words, the authoritative allocation of values, it is uncertain whether utility theory or something quite different applies. So far as politics is allocation, it seems analogous to economics, which is often defined as the study of the allocation of scarce resources. So far as politics is authoritative, however, it seems analogous to the world where learning theory applies, with its emphasis on rewards and punishments or even to the dark and vicious world of fantasy where power is thinly-veiled sadism and authority is power with yet another veil.

Given this ambiguous nature of politics, it seems desirable, therefore, to investigate action in a political setting in order to determine in some preliminary way, at least, what kind of be-

havior is political behavior and hence what kind of theory about rationality is appropriate for political science. That is, we need to look at characteristically political behavior with a view toward determining what kind of theory of rationality fits it best.

To a small degree, such work has been done. A generation ago Harold Lasswell studied several politicians psychoanalytically, though the relation between their behavior on the couch and their behavior in political office was never made clear.³ Furthermore, Lasswell wrote as a proponent of a particular theory rather than as an evaluator of competing theories. More recently Robert Lane has studied by depth interviews the thought processes on political issues of a few ordinary citizens, although again the relation of their attitudes to their political actions was not investigated.⁴ Much of the early survey research on voting by Paul Lazarsfeld and, especially, Bernard Berelson was interpreted by its authors in anti-rationalist terms, thereby setting something of a style for subsequent writers; but V. O. Key responded in *The Responsible Electorate* with what reads very much like an interpretation in terms of utility theory of the whole range of data from survey research about voting.⁵ Recently Peter Ordeshook and the senior author attempted to interpret data on the decision to vote so that behavior followed directly from the assumptions of utility theory, although one term of the equation looks very much as if it originated in learning theory.⁶ Although Herbert Simon is responsible for introducing political scientists to learning theory (through his notion of "satisficing" as contrasted with "maximizing"), he never really used it to investigate political behavior. Others, however, have, especially Charles Lindblom, with his notion of incrementalism which is derived from Simon's "satisficing" and which is offered as a general rule of political decision.⁷ And

³ Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

⁴ Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962).

⁵ Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (N.Y.: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944). Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966).

⁶ William H. Riker and Peter Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *this REVIEW*, 62 (1968), 25-42.

⁷ David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *Strategy of Decision* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963).

Richard Fenno and Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky have applied something of this notion to explain appropriations decisions.⁸ Unfortunately this short survey mentions most of the important work that has been done. And except for the work by Key none of it has been undertaken in a mood of evaluation and for the purpose of offering an answer to the question of what kind of theory about rationality is appropriate for political science. Clearly more diverse investigations than these are desirable in order to clarify this question. In this essay, therefore, we offer a report on one such investigation which suggests that political behavior is the kind of behavior for which utility theory is appropriate.

II. THE GAME SETTING

It would be fortunate if we could study rationality in politics directly—and sometimes we can as when we investigate whether or not people vote in accord with previously expressed preference. But most political activity, especially that most interesting kind involving the work of professional makers of majorities and public policy, is not readily open to direct investigation. Consequently, we have used surrogate political subjects in a surrogate political setting and we offer evidence about their behavior as indirect evidence about political behavior in a wider world.

This study is based on the assumption that what happens in *n*-person games is closely analogous to what happens in politics. The main activity in an *n*-person game is making coalitions (that is, making policies that satisfy a majority), which is what political leaders spend most of their time doing. Political followers, when they act politically (as in voting), are mainly engaged in joining coalitions. Hence the game activity of making coalitions is very much like the essential activity of politics.

Games are not, of course, perfect analogies for unabstracted natural events, as indeed are not any other laboratory experiments in any social or natural science; but they are closer analogies for politics than any others yet offered. Surely they are closer to the characteristic action of politics than fantacizing on a psychoanalyst's couch. At least games involve those interpersonal transactions which are essential to politics, while behavior in confession does not even involve that. Games, furthermore, seem to us to be better analogies than learning experiments

which typically involve only problem solving and the avoidance of error. Politics does doubtless involve this, but it includes much more, especially the manipulation of relationships with others, creativity in organization, and the like. And these are precisely the kind of activities that are captured in the *n*-person game.

Conversely, behavior in games is probably more closely analogous to politics than is behavior in the market. Transactions in the market are by definition harmonious—at least in the absence of externalities—for every sale is a purchase and both buyer and seller invariably leave the market better off in utility. Even if no trades occur, no one is worse off. It is not so with politics. Some political situations such as elections, are zero-sum, i.e., such that the winner wins what the loser loses. And this guarantees the existence of losers, people who are worse off because they entered the political arena. Even if politics is not zero-sum, typically there are losers. Consider a civil war, say the American Civil War, which may have been zero-sum with respect to the governments but was surely not so with respect to the participants. The losers of that war precipitated it to protect (and extend) slavery; but what they got for their trouble was the Thirteenth Amendment. The war was not zero-sum because the winners did not get the slaves the losers lost. But the losers surely lost something and from hindsight we know they would have been wiser not to have fought at all. So it is with much of politics. Entry into the political arena necessarily involves the risk of loss which is not fully captured by market analogies. Game analogies, however, capture this feature of the real world.

There are, of course, many points at which the game analogy fails. One can try in the laboratory to introduce some of the features of the political world, but the game remains an analogy, not the real stuff of politics. In this experiment we have tried to compensate in a few ways not likely to occur to psychologists for the fact that the laboratory is not the wider world. For example, our subjects were self-selected (that is, they answered advertisements) and were allowed to drop out if they didn't like the game (usually because they lost), just as politicians are self-selected and remain or drop out by a kind of natural selection of winners. For another example, in some of the experiments the subjects played against each other several times and knew from the beginning that this would be so, just as politicians know and are constrained by the fact that they expect to meet again. (From the protocols, we know our subjects were conscious of the repetition, but we suspect that they were not nearly so preoccupied with it as

⁸ Richard Fenno, *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966). Otto Davis, M. A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," this REVIEW, 60 (1964), 529-547.

politicians are said to be.) Again, our subjects, while initially unacquainted, saw each other in the laboratory often enough in intense situations to develop strong feelings of friendship and enmity, which we interpreted as the laboratory equivalent of loyalty, hostility, and even ideology in the political world. But we know, of course, that these putative equivalents are pretty pale imitations of these forces in political life. So, although we have tried to fit the laboratory circumstance to the political circumstance, we know we have not been wholly successful and the game remains only an analogy of politics, not politics itself. But until we can get real politicians to answer questions they would surely regard as silly, we think games in the laboratory are about the best we can do to study political behavior in exhaustive detail.

III. FEATURES OF THE GAME

Although the senior author has elsewhere described this game in some detail, we repeat a brief description of its major features:⁹

1. There are three players. In most groups of subjects these have been college undergraduates, although one group consisted of businessmen. All were from middle class backgrounds. Subjects were assigned to all three positions so that each subject played each position in about one-third of the matches he played.
2. The players negotiate in pairs about coalitions, usually thus:
 - (1,2) for five minutes, while 3 is in another room.
 - (1,3) for five minutes, while 2 is in another room.
 - (2,3) for five minutes, while 1 is in another room.
 This order is then repeated for three (or in some cases, three to six) more conversations. With two groups the order of conversations was varied.
3. At the end of negotiations, players are asked privately and individually what coalition they have formed. If two agree, they are paid, otherwise not.
4. Payments are according to the following schedule:
 - if (1,2) forms, it receives \$4.00
 - if (1,3) forms, it receives \$5.00
 - if (2,3) forms, it receives \$6.00
 - if (1), (2), (3), or (1,2,3,) form, they receive nothing.
5. The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution to

this game is that one of the following divisions of the stakes occur (the "principal points"):

Player 1	Player 2	Player 3
1.50	2.50	0
1.50	0	3.40
0	2.50	3.50

or that any one of an infinity of divisions occur, having the properties either:

- 1) $1.50 \leq x_1 < 3.50$, $2.50 \leq x_2 < 4.50$, $0 < x_3 < 2.00$,

and

$$\sum_{i=1}^3 x_i = 6.00$$

- 2) $1.50 \leq x_1 < 2.50$, $0 < x_2 < 1.00$, $3.50 \leq x_3 < 4.50$

and

$$\sum_{i=1}^3 x_i = 5.00,$$

where x_i is the payment to the i th player.¹⁰ The informal rules of this game were such that a division of the latter two sorts were hard to arrive at, although a few of our ingenious subjects found ways to get to them.

IV. INITIAL FINDINGS

As we interpreted the behavior of the initial group of subjects, it became apparent that they were behaving rationally in some profound and not immediately obvious sense. Experimentation was started with a game which had a solution of [(0,2.00,0), (0,0,4.00), (0,2.00,4.00)] but then was changed to the present game because the subjects found the original game very boring. It was not until this first group had nearly completed its matches with the present game that we realized that they were averaging something quite close to the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, which is derived directly from utility theory and some elementary standards of rational behavior. That these subjects in these circumstances should, fairly consistently, come close to a socially rational solution seemed to us compelling evidence that utility theory was an appropriate description of their behavior. It seemed even more compelling from the fact that both the subjects and the experimenters were in effect unsophisticated about the solution.

Subsequent groups of subjects further and

¹⁰ John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 3rd edition), pp. 403-418. A simple exposition of the derivation of this solution from the notions of utility theory can be found in R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 200-203, and William H. Riker, "Bargaining in a Three Person Game," *op. cit.*

⁹ William H. Riker, "Bargaining in a Three Person Game," this REVIEW, 61 (1967), 642-656.

strongly confirmed our belief by coming as close or closer to the solution, although in some groups some of the subjects were initially sophisticated (either because they had solved the game immediately upon learning the rules or because they had learned the solution from subjects in previous groups) and communicated their knowledge among the other subjects as the matches progressed for several weeks. Of the seven groups reported on here, the first, fourth, and seventh were initially unsophisticated and the first and seventh remained so to the end. Since sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects behaved about the same way in arriving at outcomes and since we know from observation and protocols that sophisticated subjects seldom let their knowledge hinder them from pressing a bargaining advantage or sadly recognizing a disadvantage, the degree of sophistication appears to be irrelevant. On the other hand, in their consistent propensity, sophisticated or not, to come close to the solution, each group of subjects further confirmed the belief that they were in sum and on the whole behaving rationally. Even in the five matches in group six where three-person coalitions were formed, the divisions were within the solution and hence quite rational.

In Table 1 is recorded a summary of the results of 206 matches in seven groups. The actual outcomes of each match are reported elsewhere.¹¹ For each two-person coalition, Table 1 records in the first row the number of times this coalition occurred. (Matches in which only single-member coalitions occurred—16 in all—are omitted as are the 5 matches where three-person coalitions were formed.) In the second row is the mean amount ($\hat{\mu}$) earned by the player in the designated position, while the third row contains the standard deviation ($\hat{\sigma}$) around the mean. (Since we have treated these as samples out of a population of possible matches, we have put hats over μ and σ to indicate they are sample estimates, in the case of σ an unbiased estimate.) In the fourth row is the t statistic and in the fifth row in the probability that a t statistic of that absolute value might be achieved by chance.

The information in Table 1 permits us to observe how very close the subjects often came to the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. The null hypothesis is that the mean payoff to the

players is, for 1, \$1.50, for 2, \$2.50, and for 3, \$3.50. The probabilities of the occurrence of t 's of the particular absolute value (since this is a two-tailed test) indicate whether or not the null hypothesis can be rejected. From these probabilities, it is clearly apparent that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, except possibly in the case of coalition (2,3) for group 4.¹² All other t 's are well within the range of chance occurrence. The inference then is that in all but, perhaps, this one case, the variations around \$1.50, \$2.50, and \$3.50 are insignificant random variations showing no particular direction or amount of deviations. Furthermore, one also infers that whether the subjects knew it or not, they were coming close to the solution and hence were acting as if to secure the predicted dollar rewards.

Nevertheless, while the net results of transactions as expressed in the divisions appeared clearly to result from rational behavior, paradoxically the individual behavior did not in itself appear to be rational in the sense of maximizing utility. Often subjects voted (and usually thereby chose between two alternative coalitions) in such a way as to reject the coalition that offered them the largest absolute value. For example, player 3 might be offered \$3.80 out of \$5.00 by player 1 and \$3.45 out of \$6.00 by player 2—and yet might choose (2,3) and \$3.45 instead of (1,3) and \$3.80. On a simple interpretation of maximization, clearly such a player was not maximizing. Still his behavior on the average turned out to be very close to what an abstract maximizer is calculated to bring

¹² By reason of another consideration this one case in which rejection of the null hypothesis is feasible does not invalidate the inference because the exception has a special explanation. See William H. Riker, "Experimental Interpretation. . . ." In groups 1-3, 5, and 6, the order of negotiations was [(1,2), (1,3), (2,3)] so that player 1 was omitted from the last certain conversation. For group 7, the order was [(2,3), (1,2), (1,3)], so that 2 was omitted, while for group 4, it was [(2,3), (1,3), (1,2)], so that 3 was omitted. The effects of omission were, for 1 and 2, that they simply did not win as frequently as might be expected although they won the expected amounts in each match. Player 3, however, won just about as frequently when omitted, but won significantly less money. Recognizing that this variation in outcome was thus occasioned by the informal rule that brought the mathematical game into temporal reality, we can then understand that this one deviation in the outcomes reflects not a failure to achieve the rational solution but rather a rational adjustment of the solution in response to a special rule.

¹¹ For groups one to three, see Riker, "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game;" for groups four to seven, see Riker, "An Experimental Interpretation of Formal and Informal Rules of a Three Person Game," in Bernhardt Lieberman, *Social Choice* (forthcoming).

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES OF MATCHES BY GROUPS*

	Coalition (1, 2)		Coalition (1, 3)		Coalition (2, 3)	
	1	2	1	3	2	3
<i>Group 1</i>						
<i>n</i>	9		10		13	
$\bar{\mu}$	1.69	2.31	1.42	3.58	2.52	3.48
$\hat{\sigma}$.349	.349	.307	.307	.360	.360
<i>t</i>	.54		.25		.05	
$Pr[t]$	$P[t > .54] \simeq .60$		$P[t > .25] \simeq .80$		$P[t > .25] \simeq .96$	
<i>Group 2</i>						
<i>n</i>	4		3		12	
$\bar{\mu}$	1.56	2.44	1.62	3.38	2.47	3.53
$\hat{\sigma}$.658	.658	.262	.262	.589	.589
<i>t</i>	.09		.46		.05	
$Pr[t]$	$P[t > .09] \simeq .90$		$P[t > .46] \simeq .60$		$P[t > .05] \simeq .95$	
<i>Group 3</i>						
<i>n</i>	5		15		18	
$\bar{\mu}$	1.46	2.54	1.41	3.59	2.47	3.53
$\hat{\sigma}$.055	.055	.222	.222	.214	.214
<i>t</i>	.73		.41		.14	
$Pr[t]$	$P[t > .73] \simeq .50$		$P[t > .41] \simeq .60$		$P[t > .14] \simeq .85$	
<i>Group 4</i>						
<i>n</i>	9		5		14	
$\bar{\mu}$	1.44	2.56	1.77	3.23	2.88	3.12
$\hat{\sigma}$.556	.556	.365	.365	.187	.187
<i>t</i>	.10		.74		2.03	
$Pr[t]$	$P[t > .10] \simeq .90$		$P[t > .74] \simeq .50$		$P[t > 2.03] \simeq .06$	
<i>Group 5</i>						
<i>n</i>	8		11		16	
$\bar{\mu}$	1.39	2.61	1.48	3.52	2.55	3.45
$\hat{\sigma}$.306	.306	.265	.265	.295	.295
<i>t</i>	.35		.07		.17	
$Pr[t]$	$P[t > .35] \simeq .75$		$P[t > .07] \simeq .95$		$P[t > .17] \simeq .80$	
<i>Group 6**</i>						
<i>n</i>	11		7		15	
$\bar{\mu}$	1.55	2.45	1.66	3.34	2.53	3.47
$\hat{\sigma}$.151	.151	.374	.374	.142	.142
<i>t</i>	.33		.43		.21	
$Pr[t]$	$P[t > .33] \simeq .75$		$P[t > .43] \simeq .65$		$P[t > .21] \simeq .80$	
<i>Group 7</i>						
<i>n</i>	4		10		6	
$\bar{\mu}$	1.41	2.59	1.50	3.50	2.52	3.48
$\hat{\sigma}$.086	.086	.161	.161	.249	.249
<i>t</i>	1.05		0.00		.08	
$Pr[t]$	$P[t > 1.05] \simeq .35$		$P[t > 0.00] \simeq 1.00$		$P[t > .08] \simeq .90$	

* Matches resulting in single member coalitions omitted.

** Matches resulting in grand coalitions omitted.

about. Clearly, there is something wrong with an explanation in which individual irrationalities add up to group rationalities.

It seemed likely on the basis of unsystematic questioning, however, that the subjects were not really behaving irrationally in their individual choice. Instead of maximizing dollar amounts, they initially seemed to be maximizing expected values of the prizes. That is, they seemed to be discounting their anticipated share of the payoff to a coalition by the probability that the coalition would actually occur. Hence, the choice of a smaller amount over a larger might indicate simply a greater confidence that the coalition with the smaller individual payoff would actually form.

This concern for actual formation of a coalition provides a key to interpretation. The central interest of subjects lies not in the amounts won, but in the fact of winning. And if the fact of winning is the central concern, then the value of the prize is secondary. Indeed the subjective value of the prize is probably dependent on the chance one has of getting it. Thus a player proposes a given division of the payoffs because he feels that a coalition could form around this division and alters a proposed payoff structure in an attempt to increase the likelihood of forming a winning coalition. A player who wishes to win does not typically make proposals that he feels have little chance of acceptance.

In this view of subjects' goals, coalitions are seen as being only winning coalitions or losing coalitions with very little interest in the amount won. We assume that a player attempts to form that coalition which he perceives as having the highest probability of winning—i.e., he votes for the player he feels is most likely to vote for him. In this interpretation, then, utility maximization is maximization of the probability of winning.

In order to test for this possibility, subjects in groups 5, 6, and 7 were asked (after each set of three conversations) to estimate the probability that each of the others would vote for them, as well as probabilities for their own vote and for the formation of the several coalitions. To assure that these probabilities were not thoughtlessly estimated the questions were constructed so that the subject was forced to add them up to 1.00. The data from those questionnaires filled out just before the voting provides the basis for a test of the probability maximization interpretation.

Assume that the subject ordered his preferences so that, if P_1 and P_2 are the perceived probabilities of winning in each of two possible coalitions such that $0 < P_1 < P_2$, then the subject preferred P_2 to P_1 and P_1 to 0 and P_2 to

0. Note that this is an assumption of substantive rationality, that is, we have imposed a goal for the subjects to maximize toward and assumed that this goal is appropriate to the situation they are in. We know that his goal may not be wholly appropriate for at least two subjects, both of whom were fairly consistent losers. One subject in group five who, out of 10 matches, won only the first, third and ninth, became especially sulky after his eighth match. After a long dry spell, he had confidently expected to win because of a long term agreement made in his first match. But he lost and felt betrayed and announced he would play no more. He subsequently agreed to play the two further matches for which he was scheduled, but his heart was not in it. Although he actually won one of them, he behaved as if it were beneath his dignity to win and it is possible—though not certain—he preferred to lose. Another subject in group six, who, out of nine matches, won only the fourth and eighth, adopted a stance in bargaining that made him an almost certain loser. Midway in this series subjects invented a method of enforcing trust by exchanging objects of value (such as books, meal tickets, etc.) to be re-exchanged after a bargain to vote for each other was carried out. But the losing subject rejected all such bargains proffered on the ground, invented by himself, that they were not in harmony with the game. It seemed to these observers that his policy served the purpose only of providing himself beforehand with an excuse for anticipated failure. That is, he could say to himself, "I may be losing, but at least I am more ethical than these other fellows." So he too may actually have preferred to lose, for by guaranteeing himself a loss ahead of time he avoided thus the shame of losing when he was trying to win. But these are only two subjects out of 34 in the three groups and their possible preference for losing might have occurred in only six of their 19 matches. Using these two as contrasts, all other subjects appeared to the observers to want to win. We feel safe, therefore, in attributing to all subjects the preference order of P_2 to P_1 , P_1 to 0, and P_2 to 0.

To determine whether or not subjects were maximizing the subjective probability of winning, let $\hat{p}(ij)$ be the i th player's estimate of the probability that the j th player will vote for i , and let $\hat{p}(ik)$ be the i th player's estimate of the probability that the k th player will vote for i . If subjects were maximizing probabilities, then their decision rule must have been the following:

If $\hat{p}(ij) > \hat{p}(ik)$, then i votes for j ;
 If $\hat{p}(ik) > \hat{p}(ij)$, then i votes for k ;
 If $\hat{p}(ij) = \hat{p}(ik)$, then i votes for either j or k .

On the basis of this analysis, we find that the subjects' voting behavior overwhelmingly supports this probability maximization model.¹³ Almost 92% of the voting decisions studied (275 out of 300) can be explained by the probability maximization criterion. Considering that we were careful never to discuss their probability estimates with the subjects in order not to encourage them to rationalize their choices, 92% seems a remarkably high proportion of maximizations.

Yet not all of the 25 instances of failure to maximize can be consigned to the dark world of the irrational. For example, two subjects recognizing that they could more likely win by voting differently, nevertheless chose not to maximize in the current match in order to maximize in a future one. Thus in group 7, match 18, player 1 estimated his chances

from 3, \$1.65 @ odds of .8 or \$1.24
from 2, \$1.45 @ odds of 1.0 or \$1.45.

He voted for 3 and won, explaining his choice on the questionnaire thus: "I have 2, but am thinking of the future," (Since there were only six subjects in the group, each of whom was matched with each of the other four times, he knew for certain that he would meet 3, but not 2, in the one match remaining for him to play. In the conversation after the match, he indicated that this consideration had been the controlling one for him throughout the entire match and indeed he had used it as an argument to secure the adherence of 3.)

Thus of the 25 instances of non-maximization of the probability of winning, 11 appear to have involved an attempt to maximize dollars won. So it can be said that in 286 out of 300 cases, or about 95%, subjects behaved as if they were maximizing some utility of winning.

In the remaining 5% of the cases, however, subjects appear not to have maximized. Some failed to do so quite deliberately for they expressed (in remarks on the questionnaire) opinions that indicated other goals were greater for them than maximization of probability of winning. For some the sanctity of a promise was of greater value. Thus in group 6, match 16, player 3 (who lost) explained: "My word to player 1 is inviolable, although I don't think he considers it such. I'm probably throwing money away, but my vote is 1." (Player 3 was the one, previously mentioned, who almost always lost and refused to bargain in the accepted way because he—iconoclastically—believed this way to be out of harmony with the rules.) For others, it was

more important than money to avoid hurting another. Thus in group 6, match 38, player 1, who by reason of a row between 2 and 3 (of which he had taken advantage) knew that both would vote for him, wrote somewhat shamedly on his questionnaire: "I really feel rotten about the whole thing. I don't want to screw anyone, so I flipped a coin to determine which player to vote for." For still others, gambling itself was of greater value than a sure prize. Thus in the last match in group 7, player 1, who was sure of \$1.50 from 2 and less sure of \$1.55 from 3, still chose 3, explaining: "I'll try for 3 'cause I'm a gambling man—can't lose that much—even though joining with 2 seems a surer victory."

Of the 14 instances of apparent non-maximization, most seem to be based on a sense of honor or the impulse to gamble. Were we using a procedural criterion of rationality, these would also be considered rational since they clearly preferred honor and some money to dishonor and more money. But since we are using a substantive criterion (higher probability of winning rather than less), we must count them as irrational. The remaining instances seem to be that kind of conventional irrationality best summarized by the subject (group 6, match 7, player 1) who wrote on his questionnaire: "total confusion, total insecurity, complete distrust." In these instances, subjects probably behaved irrationally because they were confused (or in some cases, stupid) and distressed by losing.

V. EXPLANATION OF RESULTS

On the basis of the evidence just offered that from 92 to 95 per cent of the choosers tried to maximize the probability of winning and that the majority of others were apparently trying to maximize where some alternative other than winning stood higher in their order of preferences, it seems to us clearly the case that the probability maximization theory—here identical by our assumption to utility maximization theory—describes this surrogate political behavior very well. One can confidently expect, however, that proponents of other viewpoints will try to explain this fairly strong evidence away. Anticipating such reaction, therefore, we offer further evidence that, not only is probability maximization a good explanation, but also that it is a better explanation than the alternatives.

Those who assert that choosers do not employ a rational calculus but make up their preferences to fit some previously determined and affective choice are usually hard to answer because one has no way to get inside the choosers' psyches. So if it is said, for example, that player *i* voted for *j* because *i* felt an intense homosexual attraction for *j*, it is usually not

¹³ Details for the test of each case are available from the authors.

possible to prove or refute such an assertion. No evidence pro or con exists. And in the absence of evidence, the psychoanalytic and the probability maximization theories seem equally good (though equally unverifiable) explanations.

For this experiment, however, there is a way to get inside the psyches, at least a little bit, and thus to make a judgment on the adequacy of the alternative explanations. In this case, the choices made depend not only on the preference structure of the chooser but also on his estimate of the state of nature. One can, therefore, look at these estimates: Are they accurate or inaccurate? Do they apparently reflect an intent to make a careful estimate or do they reflect simply indifference?

We offer the following theory: If the subjects make accurate estimates of the actions of the others (the state of nature), then it can be supposed that, when they choose as if maximizing the probability of winning, they are in fact doing so. If, on the other hand, subjects make inaccurate estimates, then it can be supposed that the state of nature is irrelevant to their choice and that the apparent maximization is simply window dressing to cover up to themselves (i.e., reduce the cognitive dissonance occasioned by their Oedipal urges, etc.).

Suppose the subjects are found to make accurate estimates of the external world. Then the plausibility of the probability maximization theory is strengthened because it appears that subjects are making a careful estimate of their chances to win—the crucial feature of the probability maximization calculus. It appears also that in expending energy on careful estimates, subjects want to maximize. Suppose, however, subjects are inaccurate. Then the plausibility of the probability maximization theory is weakened for it appears to be based on a half-fictional calculation.

Conversely, for the antirational theories, inaccuracy about the external world renders calculation meaningless and suggests therefore that the subjects were not calculating to begin with—which is precisely what the notions of cognitive dissonance and psychoanalysis assert. Thus inaccuracy strengthens the plausibility of these theories. But accuracy weakens it, for if subjects expend enough energy to be accurate, it appears that subjects believe knowledge of the state of nature is important in their choice, in their calculation, indeed. Hence the probability estimates are more than window dressing and the plausibility of a theory that restricts them to this role is weakened.

In these experiments, subjects were on the average surprisingly accurate in their estimates of the state of nature (i.e., their judgments of

how the other players were going to vote). The data is set forth in Table 2, where the estimates of a player about the behavior of others are compared to what the other players actually did. Since the subjects estimated a probability between 0 and 1 for receiving the votes of each of the others, while the voting itself was dichotomous, one cannot measure individual accuracy except in a gross way. But the accuracy of the entire group of judgments can be measured, thus: For all those who estimated that another player would vote for them with a chance between 0 and .2, it should be the case, if the group is perfectly accurate, that ten per cent of those so estimated (i.e., the midpoint of the interval between 0 and .2) actually do so. For estimates in the interval .21 to .4, thirty per cent of those so estimated should actually do so, etc. Thus we have a definition of accuracy for the entire group. Inaccuracy, on the other hand, would occur if, for all those who estimate that another player would vote for them within a given interval of probability (say, again, 0 to .2), it is actually the case that fifty per cent of the others actually do so. Thus inaccuracy is discovered by the fact that voting by the others is random with respect to the subjects' estimates.¹⁴

The results stated in Table 2 are depicted in Figure 1, where the per cent voting for the estimator (on the vertical axis) is plotted against the estimates in intervals of .2 (on the horizontal axis). The straight lines in the Figure represent perfect accuracy and random behavior or inaccuracy, while the curved line indicates the actual degree of the subjects' accuracy about the other players' behavior.

It is apparent from Figure 1, that subjects were on the average quite accurate with respect to the behavior of the other players. The line connecting the per cent voting for in each of the five categories is close to and has about the same slope throughout as the line indicating perfect accuracy. Moreover, it has been demonstrated elsewhere that these discrepancies from perfect accuracy can be attributed to sampling error.¹⁵ On the basis of this evidence, therefore, it seems reasonable to reject anti-rationalist theories conclusively as explanations of this surrogate political behavior.

It is not so easy to reject learning theory. For the events of these experiments, an explanation in terms of learning theory would empha-

¹⁴ We wish to thank Gerald Kramer for help in developing this test.

¹⁵ William James Zavoina, *The Rational Calculus of Coalition Formation*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Rochester (1969).

TABLE 2. ACCURACY OF SUBJECTS' ESTIMATES OF OTHER PLAYERS' VOTES

Probability of Receiving Other's Vote	Subjects' Estimates of Other's Votes					
	0.0-.20	.21-.40	.41-.60	.61-.80	.81-1.00	Total
Others' Actual Vote	For Against	For Against	For Against	For Against	For Against	
Group 5 less victims of con- spiracy*	1 31 (-2)	10 11 (-1)	30 31 (-4)	40 33 (-8)	38 15 (-3)	240 (-18)
Group 6 less victims of con- spiracy*	4 32 (-1) (-1)	9 19	34 45 (-1)	29 20	43 5 (-1)	240 (-4)
Group 7	4 4	3 16	5 16	17 16	31 8	120
Total Votes	8 64	22 45	68 88	86 61	112 24	583
Percent Received	11%	33%	44%	60%	83%	

* In eleven matches, two of the players formed a conspiracy against the third thus: i and j agreed on a satisfactory imputation and on a plan of conversations of i with k and j with k . This plan typically provided that both would falsely report to k an (i, j) agreement highly advantageous to j and that i would then seek a better agreement with k though still not as good for i as the real (i, j) agreement, while j would seek an agreement with k (also not as good for j as the real (i, j) agreement) on the ground that he (k) distrusted i 's extravagant offer. Functionally, this served to guarantee to both i and j that they were better off with each other and that they could trust each other. Of course, it also meant that k 's judgment of the external world had no relevance to what that world was really like. Since his judgment concerns a fictional world created for him by the conspirators, we have omitted k 's judgments from this table.

size that subjects determined their partners, not by a calculus but by more or less random experimentation which, if successful, would be repeated and, if not, not. And indeed something of this appears to have happened. One can reject learning theory, therefore, not because it fails to explain behavior, but simply because it does not explain it as well as the utility maximization theory.

In the 100 matches studied here, there were, of course, 300 pairs of subjects. Of these 160 pairs were inexperienced with each other in the sense that they had not met previously in a match—and in most cases had never met consciously at all. There were, however, 140 pairs in which subjects were experienced with each other in the sense that the members of the pair had played with each other in a previous match, in some cases in two or even three previous matches. While learning theory could hardly say much about behavior of subjects in the 160 inexperienced pairs, it can say something about the behavior in the 140 experienced ones.

In general, learning theory suggests that, for these 140 pairs, if previous experience had led to success (i.e. voting for or against and winning),

then the members of these pairs would repeat the previous choice. If previous experience had led to failure (i.e. voting for or against and losing), then the prediction is not so clear. However, if on previous experience in a pair, a player voted for and lost, it would seem to be a good indication to vote against on the second match, if only because he knows that voting for is not successful. On the other hand, if a player voted against another and lost on the first meeting, there is almost no guide to action. He knows only that voting against the other did not work, but he is quite inexperienced about the results of voting for. In such case, there is no really good prediction inasmuch as it is reasonable either to vote for as an experiment or to vote against on the basis of experience.

The data to validate these predictions is set forth in Table 3, where the individual experience on the just-previous match—earlier matches, when they occurred, are ignored—is compared with the action taken by the individuals in the current match.

As is apparent from Table 3, the tests of the predictions from learning theory are in part beyond reasonable chance. But still the explanation




FIGURE 1. Accuracy of Subjects' Estimates of the State of the External World

is not as good as the explanation from utility theory. In the first place, learning theory says nothing about the majority of the cases for the subjects had to act in an environment that denied them a previous experience. (Some will say this is not a fair test of a theory; but then the world is full of new conditions and the rat has to go through the maze a first time.) Even when a previous experience was provided, however, the explanation from learning theory is weak. Only 43 per cent of the relevant behavior is explained (i.e., that recorded in the first three columns of row one of Table 3), while in the probability maximization theory from 92 to 95 per cent of the relevant behavior is explained. Furthermore, only the behavior summarized in column 1 of Table 3 is explained well because the favorable results of the test in columns 2 and 3 may easily have occurred by chance. On the other hand, the possibility that chance may have produced the result in the test of probability maximization is almost zero. This is, the probability that one might obtain by chance 275 "yes" out of 300 tries is less than .000001. This value is considerably smaller than that associated with the best prediction under learning theory. Thus, comparing the two viewpoints, learning theory only weakly explains behavior in

the limited range of behavior to which it applies, while the theory of probability maximization explains behavior most of the time. Certainly, for this surrogate political behavior, probability maximization appears to be the more plausible theory.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the introduction we observed that each of the viewpoints toward rational behavior was supported by good evidence in the area of behavior to which the viewpoints were originally applied. Furthermore, we pointed out that, owing to the neglect by political theorists, we had no idea of which area of behavior was the one where political behavior typically belonged and hence we had no idea of what viewpoint toward rationality was appropriate for political science. Finally, we indicated that, whether we wanted to or not, our ignorance on this point had to be repaired if we wished to do sophisticated political studies.

This essay is an effort to repair this ignorance. Unfortunately it deals with surrogate politicians in a surrogate political setting. Since this is probably the best we can get, however, the conclusion that the theory of probability maximization is a more plausible explanation than its alternatives for the behavior studied suggests

TABLE 3. VOTING IN EXPERIENCED PAIRS

		Experience of Subject in Just Previous Match Involving Other Player in Pair			
Action of Subject in Current Match	Votes For	Voted For		Voted Against	
		Won	Lost	Won	Lost
		63	22	36	27
		31	26	50	25
		94	48	86	52
		Truth Value		Binomial Probability	
cell (1, 1) > cell (2, 1)		True		$*Pr[63 \text{ For}] < .00063$	
cell (1, 2) < cell (2, 2)		True		$Pr[22 \text{ For}] < .33$	
cell (1, 3) < cell (2, 3)		True		$Pr[36 \text{ For}] < .08$	
cell (1, 4) \simeq cell (2, 4)		Approximately True [#]			

* That is, assuming independent choices with a .5 probability of choosing For, the probability of obtaining by chance 63 or better Fors out of 94 tries is less than .00063.

[#] Since there is no standard of randomness here, a probability of deviation from it cannot be calculated.

that in the interpretation of real political phenomena it is safest to assume that politicians are calculating maximizers.

Doubtless, however, some will resist the analogy from the game saying that the behavior studied was "really" economic rather than political since it involves a monetary reward. But at least since Marx most students of politics have been willing to admit that all of politics involves monetary rewards. And certainly the calculating behavior in this game involves something more than the economic process of maximizing a monetary reward inasmuch as the subjects had to maximize in the face of a highly political kind of uncertainty about how others would vote.

Doubtless, also, some will resist the analogy saying that the behavior studied was simple compared to the complex world of real politics. But it is hard to be sure about degrees of complexity. Surely our subjects often faced a world fully as uncertain as the world of politicians. And while they had but two alternatives to choose from, it is also true of the political world that politicians constantly seek to narrow their range of choice, not only in personal decision, but also in our institutions. Thus, we vote on two candidates, we vote yea and nay on motions, we are offered two parties (or, failing that, government and opposition), etc., etc. In short, in the world outside the laboratory, we seek constantly to make the problem of decision

no more complex than the decisions facing our subjects. So far as we succeed, there is not much difference in complexity between the two worlds.

Nevertheless, still others will resist the analogy saying that, even if politicians succeed in simplifying their decision problems, still the laboratory scene and the people in it lack all that lush growth of ideology and organization found in the real political world. This we of course admit; but it still is true that our subjects, while simply students, were drawn from the class of people who grow up to be politicians and that the laboratory scene did have those features of coalition-formation winning and losing, manipulation of others by both rhetoric and contrivance, etc.—all of which are fundamental to politics and are the building blocks of ideology and organization.

It is possible that one kind of real political situation exists for which the game analogy is quite inappropriate and this is the situation where participants are not conscious of having a choice. One can hardly compare alternatives where there are none to compare. And it may be that much of the time people have no choice, though one strong theological and philosophical tradition insists that choice is always present. But where choice is possible, the message in the evidence from this experiment, though indirect, is crystal clear: utility maximization is the theory that fits political behavior best.

BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY REVIEW

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"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master—that's all."

Through the Looking Glass

I. INTRODUCTION¹

It is not hard to find reasons why Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship* has had such widespread influence.² Its approach, that of comparative, historical sociology, seeks clues to the present in the past, and Moore demonstrates mastery of a wide range of historical materials. Yet I feel that the book is ultimately unsatisfactory, for it is marred by a lack of respect for its own sources of information and by contradictions and *non-sequiturs* at critical points in the argument.

In this critique I shall first examine the general thesis of the book and then turn to the case studies which Moore uses to support his arguments. I shall also attempt to account for the sharp contrasts in the quality of scholarship which characterize the study, and will attribute them to Moore's preconceived ideological assumptions about the nature of the good society.

II. THE OVERT ANALYSIS

The central argument of the volume seems to be about as follows:

Historically, societies have industrialized in one of three ways. Each of these has involved violence and the exploitation or oppression of a large bulk of the population by a "ruthless" ruling class. (24, 28-29, 287, 297, 386, 410, 506.)³

The first route taken by England—and with variations by France and the United States—may be called the bourgeois-capitalist-demo-

cratic road. This route required a violent revolution designed to destroy the power of at least a portion of the traditional elite. It also involved the "ruthless" exploitation of both the peasantry and the working class in the early stages of industrial development.

The second road was taken by Germany and Japan. Here the bourgeoisie, too weak to assert itself, joined with a quasi-feudal landowning class in an attempt to modernize society within its traditional social framework. Industrialization was not achieved without exploitation, but revolutionary upheaval was avoided. However, the ultimate outcome was Fascism, and in Germany at least, genocide.

The third route, that of Communism, has occurred in those societies in which the ruling classes could not successfully industrialize. Communist regimes generally come to power on the backs of peasant revolutions, and end with the elimination of the peasantry and the development of a repressive system comparable to although different from that in capitalist countries.

One of these three roads, Moore argues, has been more or less inevitable, and together they exhaust the possibilities of social change. Today the bourgeois capitalist route to modernization seems obsolete, the Fascist road too horrible to contemplate, and even the traditional Communist road (i.e., the Soviet road) historically dated, although China may avoid Russia's mistakes.

Indian political leaders have attempted to avoid these choices and to modernize democratically. Moore thinks they have failed, and he hints fairly strongly that an authoritarian regime will have to emerge if India is to solve her problems.⁴

The evidence Moore brings to his argument is to be found in his case studies. Thus, his choice of cases becomes crucial. Moore could not deal with every country in the world, but his general theory of social change, so far as I can determine, is not at all applicable to black Af-

¹ Professors R. Jackson Wilson, Daniel Aaron, Cecelia Kenyon, Murray Kitley, Guenter Lewy and Malcolm Smith all read an earlier version of this essay and offered criticisms. Professors Wilson and Aaron were especially helpful. Naturally, the errors which remain are mine.

² (Boston, 1966).

³ As with many other of his statements, Moore occasionally hedges (508, for example), but this is the overall thrust of his analysis.

⁴ The general argument is summarized on pp. xv-xvi, 413-414. On the obsolescence of bourgeois capitalism and Russian Communism, see pp. 507-508, 483. On Moore's hopes for China, see p. 230. I will add additional references in the sections on specific countries.

rica or to the Middle East, and, thus, to much of the "third world." In addition its applicability to countries like Sweden or Norway seems problematical.⁵ Moore specifically excludes the Scandinavian countries from his discussion, arguing that, since they are small countries which "depend economically and politically on big and powerful ones . . . the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries." (xiii) Moore offers no support for this argument, yet deals in great detail with at least one country—India—which was influenced in very decisive ways by an outside power. One suspects, then, that other reasons lay behind his choices.

Of more significance at this point are Moore's neo-Marxist assumptions as to the underlying pattern of social causation. He argues (1) that the mode of production in a given society determines ideology of the social classes of which it is composed and its political structure, and (2) that all ruling classes have as their primary goal the fullest possible exploitation of those whom they dominate. Ecological factors are unimportant and cultural variables are epiphenomenal since they either reflect the economic system or are mechanisms used by the ruling classes to further their own interests. Thus, Northern commitment to an anti-slavery position in the American Civil War is to be explained by the emergence of an urban capitalist civilization; and Hinduism and the caste system, symptoms of India's historical backwardness, both survived only because they served the interests of the ruling strata. (123, 136, 335-36.) Nor are Japanese cultural patterns relevant to an understanding of the Meiji Restoration, which was based entirely on the self-interest of a particular segment of the ruling class, just as the support of social legislation by the English bourgeoisie in the mid-nineteenth century was merely a sop to the lower orders, because everyone knew that the bourgeoisie now dominated English politics. (240, 245, 441.)

The mode of production and class exploitation are key to Moore's overall historical analysis. Past revolutions have been inevitable, because the ruling classes were unable to transcend their own ideologies and unwilling to accept lim-

itations upon their opportunities for exploitation.

Moore essentially claims that his frame of reference enables him to systematize the study of comparative history more effectively than alternate models, and that he was forced to his conclusions by the facts themselves. (356, 505 and the Preface.) However, Moore also levels a sharp theoretical attack upon models that give more weight to cultural variables, specifically the work of Max Weber, who emphasized the uniqueness of European history, and developed what is perhaps the most powerful modern theoretical alternative to a Marxist or neo-Marxist analysis.

An overall evaluation of the value of Moore's categories must await an examination of their utility in dealing with the various countries with which he is concerned, but the following reflections are not out of order at this point.

First, Moore's two central propositions have no necessary connection. The values of a given social class may be determined by its economic position, but this does not prove that these values necessarily involve the maximization of its opportunities for "exploitation."

Further, the propositions are not equal in explanatory value. The discovery of economic correlates for the *Weltanschauung* of a particular class may be offered as evidence that these factors were causal, but to assert that a given *Weltanschauung* is supported because it is self-serving explains little or nothing. Even if the ruling classes in India were only interested in exploitation, this would not tell us why they chose Hinduism and the caste system as their instruments. Moore's volume, as we shall see, is full of question-begging explanations of this type.

Sometimes, as a last resort, Moore does give an independent role to cultural and ecological variables, even though he would seem to weaken his thesis in the process. For example, what is one to do with an analysis which continually downplays the role of ideas and then lists as one reason for the mild treatment of the Chartists by the English ruling classes the fact that:

Russell was a doctrinaire Whig devoted to the ideal of liberty and anxious to avoid encroaching on the free discussion of political issues. (34.)

There are many other instances of the *ad hoc* introduction of other variables. After emphasizing economic factors in the behavior of the English bourgeoisie, Moore suddenly brings in England's reliance upon a Navy (stemming, one assumes, from the fact that the country is an island) as among those factors which explain the

⁵ For that matter the analysis seems inapplicable to those countries in Southeast Asia, e.g., Thailand, which, for all practical purposes, lack a landowning gentry. On Thailand see: David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Ithaca, 1962), p. 52; James Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behavior" in W. J. Siffin (ed.) *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington, 1959), pp. 283-288; and D. Insor, *Thailand* (New York, 1963), pp. 44-45.

lack of repressiveness of English society. (32, 444.) It is almost the only time that this variable is mentioned with regard to England, and Moore doesn't even consider why Japan's island position did not play a similar role. Or, to take another example, he argues that Japan's imperialism was the result of economic contradictions which led to Fascism. English imperialism, on the other hand, was the result of:

... a combination of adventure, reasons of state, commerce, and plunder: motives and causes that were really indistinguishable during that burst of energy released all over Europe by the decay of the traditional Christian medieval civilization and the rise of a new and much more secular one. (342.)

Moore's habit of blending quasi-economic determinism with other whimsically introduced factors, including cultural variables, makes it hard to systematize his position, and raises serious questions about his interpretation of the societies which he uses to illustrate his general theory. Indeed, since he offers no explicit criteria one gets the impression that decisions as to what weight he should accord cultural factors were based less on a concern with placing his material in a theoretical perspective, than upon a desire to convince his readers of the validity of assumptions brought to his study.

Moore's discussion of exploitation suffers from similar limitations. He considers the concept objective and measurable. In fact, he lists the criteria which determine whether a given class relationship is exploitive. But, although in theory he allows for gradations in exploitation, the English, French, German, Japanese, Indian and Chinese aristocracies all seem to have shared one aim, that is, to squeeze as much out of their peasants as possible.

One wonders whether a concept which is not used to differentiate among societies, has any empirical utility. The confusion is increased by Moore's tendency to hedge. Peasants, he argues, revolt because of objective exploitation. If they revolt even while their objective situation is improving, it is only because they realize that the "lord's exactions increased and his contribution . . . declined." (473.) If they don't, their failure to revolt is explained by inertia. As for those peasants who resist the revolution, Moore redefines them as being part of the exploiting classes because of shared ideas. Thus they present no analytic problem. Moore says of the French Revolution that:

To be sure, there were members of roughly the same social strata fighting on opposite sides. But they were fighting for opposed social objectives. . . . Victory for one side or the other meant the victory or defeat of class privileges. On these

grounds alone it seems impossible to deny that the Terror was an instrument of class warfare. . . . (518.)

Furthermore the evidence which he offers to prove that a given ruling class has been entirely exploitive and almost entirely parasitic is not always very compelling. For example, he argues that the Chinese gentry fulfilled hardly any useful function in Chinese society. (203-05.)⁶ Most contemporary scholars, on the other hand, would contend that China attained relatively high levels of general prosperity, social order and cultural and commercial development during the height of the Ch'ing dynasty in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Certainly the political order must have played some role.⁷ But, Moore argues that the increase in population which occurred at that time and which most observers might take as a sign of effective social organization and rising living standards, did not stem from these factors. Rather it was the gentry who increased the birthrate of the peasants in order to drive up the price of land and to impoverish the masses. (168.) On the face of it the argument is less than convincing. During the early part of the period, at least, living standards continued to rise despite the increase in population, partially because the regime sponsored the opening of new areas for cultivation and introduced new crops.⁸ Ping-ti-

⁶ Moore does mention the improvement of irrigation, but downplays its importance. Indeed the major purpose of improving irrigation was to increase the possibilities of exploitation. (169.) He also argues that its role in the maintenance of order was unimportant, given the place of the clans in administering local justice. Besides, when large scale banditry did develop it was largely the consequence of exploitation by the ruling class. What evidence, one wonders, is relevant to the question of measuring exploitation? Moore, in effect, has it both ways. If a ruling class does literally nothing, it is clearly parasitic, but whatever functions it performs are performed for bad reasons and it is still parasitic.

⁷ See Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 268-270. Moore cites Ho several times but appears to deny that living standards were rising for the population as a whole. (*Origins*, 179.) Interestingly enough, however, he does argue, at least indirectly, that China was better off than India in this regard, and Japan was better off than China (*Origins*, 330-333 and *passim*.).

⁸ Ho, *op. cit.*, 269. Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (Boston, 1958), I, p. 393.

Ho, whom Moore relies on for population data, argues that the Chinese were hoist by their own petard. Having created conditions of general prosperity, the régime was finally faced by over-population in relation to resources, under circumstances in which it had reached the limits of its capacity to raise levels of productivity within the framework of the existing system.

Whether or not the Chinese gentry did at one time serve some function in Chinese society has little to do with the general conclusions which Moore reaches about the necessity for a modernizing revolution in China. The difference between Moore's view and one which emphasizes the irony of Chinese development is a difference between a view of history as involving genuine tragedy, and one which sees it as a conflict between heroes and villains. Despite Moore's explicit disclaimers, it is quite clear that the latter is his perspective.

Finally, Moore's stake in proving that all ruling classes are completely exploitive sometimes leads to contradictory appraisals. Thus, he usually describes Feudalism as "gangsterism." But, in talking of modernizing elites, he concedes that feudal arrangements had at least protected the peasants against grosser forms of exploitation.⁹

* * *

Moore offers several reasons for rejecting approaches to the study of society which give significant weight to cultural factors. He implies, first, that such explanations tend to emphasize continuity and downplay change, and thus have a conservative bias. (485-86.) There seems little intrinsic reason why this should be so, and Moore offers none. Max Weber, whom Moore spends a good deal of time criticizing, uses cultural variables, in part, to explain the great European revolutions which began in the seventeenth century, and Robert Heilbroner has come to conclusions about the third world at least as radical as those of Moore, by emphasizing the role of cultural impediments to peaceful change.¹⁰ But, even if the charge were true, it would not constitute an adequate scholarly reason for rejecting explanations of this type.

Nevertheless, his attack on the use of "cultural-continuity" explanations is worth examining in detail because it undermines his own approach, although he may not realize this. "The assumption . . . that cultural and social continuity do not require explanation," notes Moore:

⁹ Compare, for example, *Origins*, 10, 214, 241 with *Origins*, 12, 194.

¹⁰ In "Counterrevolutionary America," *Commentary* (April, 1967), pp. 3-10.

obliterates the fact that both have to be recreated anew in each generation, often with great pain and suffering. To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched . . . cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot. . . . To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete interest and privileges that are served by indoctrination . . . (486.)

Earlier he had argued:

Such explanations are logically the same as the famous explanation of the effects of opium as being due to its "dormitive" properties. They beg the fundamental question: why did this particular outlook prevail when and where it did. (240.)

Moore is unfair. Those who argue that the cultural inheritance of a society is a significant part of any explanation of its dynamics do so on the basis of some fairly sophisticated propositions concerning the transmission of cultural values. And Moore himself, despite his strictures, is sometimes forced to recognize the "stickiness" of cultural patterns. In the same chapter from which the above quotation is taken, he explains the revolt of at least some samurai against the new Japanese regime as a function of the difficulties of shedding romantic "feudal notions." (252.)

More importantly, as Moore's own "question-begging" explanations indicate, economic self-interest does not exist in a vacuum. If we must take account of the concrete interests that are served by adherence to certain cultural norms, the reverse is also true; men define their interests in terms of the values which they deem important.

Further, Moore himself tends to emphasize continuity, albeit in a rather different way from those whom he criticizes. For example, in explaining the acceptance by the Chinese peasant of a regime which was fundamentally exploitive, Moore argues:

. . . it seems more realistic to assume that large masses of people, and especially peasants, simply accept the social system under which they live without concern about any balance of benefits and pains . . . unless and until something happens to threaten and destroys their daily routine. Hence, it is quite possible for them to accept a society of whose working they are no more than victims. (204.)

Is this explanation of continuity any more satisfactory than a "cultural" explanation? Indeed it is less so, for it does not suggest any mechanism by which ideas about these institu-

tions are transmitted. Unlike most sociologists concerned with the transmission of culture, Moore puts considerable emphasis on the violence done the individual by the socialization process. Somehow, he seems to feel that this weakens an argument which takes cultural continuity for granted. But why? If the process of socialization were as brutalizing as he makes it out to be, it might strengthen the hands of those who urge that continuity is natural, and change that must be explained. Having given up so much in the process of becoming part of any society, adult members of that society would resist proposed changes in the value structure with considerable ferocity. In short, Moore's argument proves nothing.

In criticizing Max Weber Moore wishes to undermine an interpretation of European developments which stresses the role played by Christianity and more specifically English Calvinism. His basic argument is that one can find the characteristics associated with the Protestant ethic in all of the societies under study, and that therefore the emergence of Calvinism cannot be used as an explanation for English economic and political developments. But, as Reinhard Bendix points out, Weber never argued that the Protestant ethic was the only reason that capitalism emerged first in Europe. Rather, his analysis deals with Protestantism as one variable among others.¹¹ Secondly, in proving the existence of a "Protestant ethic" in India, or China, or Japan, Moore relies heavily upon travelers' reports. These, of course, are of very limited value, and Weber never denied that at least some of the values associated with the "Protestant" ethic might be found to a limited degree among segments of any population.

Further, Moore has a very limited understanding of the attitudes which Weber believed characterize modern capitalism. In dealing with France, for example, he quotes Forster's study of the nobility of Toulouse to prove that many of the provincial nobility were characterized by "thrift, discipline, and strict management," as well as a powerful desire to increase their wealth. (51.) As Moore sees it, this shows that their attitudes were the same as those described by Weber as constituting the Protestant ethic. The only difference between the French nobility and the English gentry was that the former, instead of rationalizing their estates, "used the prevailing social and political framework to 'squeeze more grain out of the peasants and sell it.'" (53.)

¹¹ See Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, 1962).

Whether or not this description of the French nobility is accurate, it does not support Moore's argument. Weber never argued that the desire to increase one's wealth or even the organized effort to do so was a peculiarly capitalist phenomenon. What differentiates the capitalist orientation from pre-capitalist orientations is not only its greater rationality in terms of organization, but also its emphasis upon mastery of the environment. Profit is the unintended consequence (and in some ways unwanted consequence) of this Calvinist drive toward mastery, toward changing the external world through labor. Thus profits based primarily on colonial or fiscal exploitation, on the basis of force guaranteed by political authority, i.e., continuous earnings through compulsory payments, or various methods of tax-farming, are considered by Weber to be part of pre-capitalist economic structures.¹²

Indeed a good many scholars have pointed to just the characteristics Moore describes, in contrasting both the French aristocracy and the bourgeoisie with their English counterparts before and after the Revolution. Their point is that French attitudes remained pre-capitalist in so far as they were not innovative.¹³ Forster himself is careful to point out that the limited sample of provincial nobles he studied had made very few efforts to follow the English example of exploring new techniques for raising the general level of productivity.¹⁴

Moore's attack on Weber is less than successful. It remains to be seen whether or not the application of his own frame of reference to the countries studied is more adequate than one derived from a Weberian model.

III. THE WESTERN CASE STUDIES

The assumptions which guide Barrington Moore's analysis reveal themselves only grad-

¹² Bendix, *op. cit.*, 53.

¹³ See, for example: Bert F. Hoselitz, "Entrepreneurship and Capital Formation in France and Britain Since 1700," in National Bureau of Economic Research, *Capital Formation and Economic Growth*, p. 311; David Landes, "French Entrepreneurship and Industrial Growth in the Nineteenth Century," in Barry E. Supple (ed.), *The Experience of Economic Growth* (New York, 1963), pp. 340-353; and George V. Taylor, "Non-capitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution," *American Historical Review*, 72 (January, 1967), pp. 469-496.

¹⁴ Robert Forster, "The Provincial Noble: A Re-appraisal," *American Historical Review*, 68 (April, 1963), p. 687.

ually in his historical case studies, and it is to these we must now turn. My knowledge of the material varies widely with the countries involved, and my analysis will not be directed primarily at "disproving" his argument on the basis of the evidence, but rather on pointing up some of the contradictions in his analysis.

Moore's Western case studies are confined to England, France, and the United States, with briefer scattered references to both Germany and Russia. Although I will stress those aspects of Moore's work with which I disagree, I should note that the differences are only in emphasis, for much of what he says is part of a general scholarly consensus. However, as in most matters of social analysis, differences of emphasis often result in radically different conclusions.

England, to Moore, is a paradigm case of industrialization, and his chapter is designed primarily to prove three propositions. First, he attacks the notion that the English have some peculiar knack for settling social disputes peacefully. (4.) The relative peacefulness of English society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was preceded *necessarily* by an outburst of violence in the seventeenth century. Without this violent revolution produced by intemperate and violent men, the later development of peaceful parliamentarianism would have been inconceivable. (20, 39.)

Second, the English civil war was essentially a contest between two societies based on differing economic systems, between the traditional aristocracy, and the commercially oriented gentry supported by urban commercial interests. (14-20.)

Third, the industrial revolution in England was accompanied by "massive violence exercised by the upper classes against the lower," (29.) which was not different in kind from that exercised by other "ruthless" elites during the process of industrialization.

Competent historians, of course, do not subscribe to a non-violent myth of English history any more than does Moore. The fact remains, however, that even the English Civil War was relatively mild by continental standards, something which Moore himself recognizes and attempts to explain. The Civil War aside, it is still the relative peacefulness of British evolution since the eighteenth century which poses the more interesting problem.

For his economic interpretation of the Civil War, Moore relies heavily upon Tawney's "rise of the gentry" thesis, a position which commands far less than universal support among English scholars today, including some of those

he cites.¹⁵ Moore relies, too, upon an analysis of the geographic distribution of the opposing forces in the Long Parliament, noting, as have all previous commentators, that the more "commercial" sections of the realm generally supported the Parliament, while the more backward generally supported the monarchy. (510-514.) The problem lies in the fact that even in the areas supporting the Parliament, there was strong latent support for the king, and, further, these were the same areas in which the dissenting sects were strongest.¹⁶ Moore's case for a basically economic interpretation of the revolution, one which de-emphasizes religious and other factors, is not very strong.

Indeed Moore seems to be in a quandary, for he admits in the end that the Civil War did not result in the displacement of one class by another. Its major contribution to bourgeois democracy seems to have been the killing of an English king—a killing which served as a stern reminder to later monarchs. (18, 17.)

The killing of the king, of course, was a political rather than an economic act. It is not clear why it should have been so traumatic. As Plumb and others have pointed out, this was far from the first king the English had killed. Down to the seventeenth century the English had something of a reputation as regicides.¹⁷ What caused the trauma? If, as Moore suggests, the Civil War did not produce a fundamental alteration in the class structure of the society, it is at least possible that the changing political culture of

¹⁵ He cites Lawrence Stone as more or less supporting Tawney's thesis. (*Origins*, 15). Stone, however, specifically rejects his own previously held belief in the key role played by such factors. Indeed, he calls for the replacement of economic interpretations of the Civil War by broader sociological interpretations, and argues that other factors, including religious factors, played a key role in the conflict. See Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy* (New York, 1967; Abridged edition), pp. 4, 7-9, 345-354.

¹⁶ See, for example, Ivan Roots, *The Great Rebellion* (London, 1966), pp. 62-68; Stuart E. Prall (ed.), *The Puritan Revolution* (New York, 1968), ix-xxii, and Charles Wilson, *England's Apprenticeship* (New York, 1965), pp. 108-140.

¹⁷ J. H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England* (London, 1967), p. 19. In the 200 years before Henry VII established the Tudor dynasty, England had been ruled by twelve monarchs. Only three reigned until death overtook them. Of the remaining nine, seven were deposed, five of whom lost their lives by violence, and two went insane.

English society played some role, and that religious factors played at least as important a role in these changes as did economic.

No one seriously doubts the importance of economic factors in explaining changes in political and other values in England and elsewhere, but the evidence indicates that religious and constitutional issues were at least as significant, and were not merely dependent variables. Wide agreement had been reached in the Long Parliament on purely economic issues; it was the political and religious question, as well as Charles' personality, which ultimately produced the conflict.¹⁸ It is hard to believe that the English Civil War could have occurred without the political aggressiveness of the dissenting sects, and there is every reason to believe that another Monarch might have been able to escape with his head.¹⁹

There is little evidence that enclosures or the commercialization of agriculture were greatly accelerated by the Civil War itself, and, in any event, the dissenting sects were rather more favorably inclined to enclosure than other religious groups.²⁰ I should note that while Moore sometimes sees the Civil War as opening the floodgates to enclosure, he offers no evidence for this assertion, and at other times is quite willing to admit that the process was a gradual one until the late eighteenth century, to which we may now turn. (19, 25.)

Moore's analysis of English industrialization represents what must be called a "post-revisionist" position, in that he sharply criticizes those scholars who have tried to alter the traditional picture of the consequences both of enclosure and of industrialization. Before we analyze his attack in somewhat more detail, let us consider briefly the revisionist account of the changes which took place in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England.

First of all, such scholars as Mingay, Jones and Thompson deny that the wave of enclosures which swept over England in the late eighteenth century served to break the back of the small peasant proprietor and to convert him into a rural or urban proletariat. They argue that

while the concentration of landownership by about 1830 was greater than in the seventeenth century, it was not much greater, and that the increase had been a very gradual one.²¹ In fact, while the enclosures of the late eighteenth century took land from some peasants, others received land. The evidence seems to indicate that the number of small owner occupiers actually increased for a short time.²² The proportion of agricultural workers to owners was about $1\frac{3}{4}$ to 1 at the end of the seventeenth century; 140 years later it had risen to only about $2\frac{3}{4}$ to 1.²³ The real source of the gradual decline in small holders was not enclosure, but the relative disadvantages of small-scale agriculture in an era of commercial farming.²⁴

Revisionist scholars argue further that enclosures did not depopulate the countryside. Instead the rural population actually increased during the period. In many cases the largest migrations took place from unenclosed areas, or areas which had been enclosed much earlier. The creation of an urban and even a rural proletariat was far more the result of the increase in population than it was the result of enclosures.²⁵

²¹ Some of the important works on the subject include: E. L. Jones and G. E. Mingay (ed.), *Land, Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution* (London, 1967); E. L. Jones, *Agriculture and Economic Growth in England 1650-1815* (London, 1967); J. D. Chambers and G. E. Mingay, *The Agricultural Revolution, 1750-1850* (London, 1966); F. M. L. Thompson, "The Social Distribution of Landed Property in England Since the Sixteenth Century," *Economic History Review*, XIX, 3 (1966), pp. 505-517. A classic and much earlier "revisionist" analysis is J. H. Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 1926), I, pp. 98-142. See also B. H. Slicher Van Bath, *The Agrarian History of Western Europe* (London, 1963), pp. 318-321. The edited volumes contain some of the classic earlier studies which are the basis for much of the revisionists' case.

²² Chambers and Mingay, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

²³ Clapham, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

²⁴ Chambers and Mingay, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

²⁵ The classic essay is J. D. Chambers, "Enclosure and Labor Supply in the Industrial Revolution," reprinted in Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-127. A recent detailed study by Lawrence White, concludes that there is absolutely no significant relationship between enclosure and migration to the city, or between enclosure and increases in poor rates. The study was done on the basis of an analysis of all English counties, using regression analysis. See Lawrence White, "Enclosures and Population

¹⁸ Root, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-42, and *passim*.

¹⁹ Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (Cambridge, 1965), p. 114. H. R. Trevor Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in Trevor Aston (ed.), *Crisis in Europe* (New York, 1967), pp. 99-100.

²⁰ W. E. Tate, *The Enclosure Movement* (London, 1967), pp. 143-153, and Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

Further, they argue, all the evidence we have indicates that living standards for workers, both rural and urban, did not fall during the period of industrialization. Rather the picture is one of gradual amelioration interrupted by such things as the effects of the Napoleonic wars, bad harvests, et cetera. On the whole, real wages increased at about the same rate as the relatively slow growth of per capita national product. The evidence indicates that income may have been becoming rather more equally distributed among social classes during the whole period of industrialization. Certainly income inequality does not seem to have increased.²⁶

To be sure there was a good deal of suffering among certain groups as old skills became outmoded, or, especially in the south, because of a lack of labor mobility. Certainly the transition might have been made more easily and more humanely in a perfect world. But, the fact of the matter is that the great growth of urban centers and industrialization took place first in England, and in the early nineteenth century. It must be judged by these standards. The alternatives were mass starvation and migration as in Ireland or land hunger and migration to cities in which no jobs were available as in France. In both of these countries population increased during the eighteenth century, but industrialization did not absorb excess labor.²⁷ Moore conveniently forgets to point out that in France migration to the cities occurred without the benefit of massive enclosures.

Moore agrees with the revisionists that the dismal picture painted of the results of enclosures and early industrialization by radical historians was somewhat overdrawn, but insists, without offering any new evidence, that the radical case still stands in its broadest outline. His critique of the revisionists rests on three kinds of arguments which may, for want of better terms, be called "adjectival," "rhetorical" and "psychological." The "adjectival" argument turns on the tendentious use of key words. Thus

Movements in England, 1701-1831." It will be published in a forthcoming issue of *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*.

²⁶ The best summary of the data is to be found in Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, *British Economic Growth, 1688-1559* (Cambridge, 1967, 2nd ed.), pp. 25, 27-28, 283, 301, and Lee Soltow, "Long Range Changes in British Income Inequality," *The Economic History Review*, XXI (April, 1968), p. 1729. Needless to say the issue is still fairly controversial.

²⁷ C. E. Labrousse, *La Crise de l'économie française à la fin d'Ancien Régime et au début de la Révolution* (Paris, 1943), xxii-xxiii.

when revisionists cite the lack of peasant resistance to enclosure in the nineteenth century as evidence for the fact that peasant hostility to enclosure was not that great. Moore, citing them, states that "... the old peasant community finally gave way and disintegrated." (28.) Or where some commentators might see the poor laws and other measures as a sign of the relative responsiveness of the English ruling classes to changes which were but imperfectly understood, Moore emphasizes the horrors of being forced to receive public assistance. He neglects to point out, of course, that however many people were on poor relief in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, evidence for the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries indicates that

At a conservative estimate, a quarter of the population could be regarded as permanently in a state of poverty and underemployment if not of total unemployment. This was their chronic condition. But when bouts of economic depression descended, the proportion might rise to something nearer a half of the population.²⁸

The rhetorical argument is simply that no matter how it occurred, the fact is that the peasantry was destroyed. An entire social class was eliminated. The psychological argument is tied in very closely with the rhetorical argument and is best summarized in Moore's own words:

... it still seems plain enough that, together with the rise of industry, the enclosures greatly strengthened the larger landlords and broke the back of the English peasantry, eliminating them as a factor from British political life. From the standpoint of the issues discussed here, that is, after all, the decisive point. Furthermore, for the "surplus" peasant it made little difference whether the pull from the towns or factories was more important than the push out of his rural world. In either case he was caught ... between alternatives that meant degradation and suffering, compared with the traditional life of the village community. That the violence and coercion which produced these results took place over a long space of time ... must not blind us to the fact that it was massive violence exercised by the upper classes against the lower. (28-29.)

This passage is based on a mis-statement of the facts, in so far as it ignores population growth and other causal factors. However, let us disregard that and analyze the other components of the argument.

First, to assert that the elimination of a class and its occupation is by itself evidence of "mas-

²⁸ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

sive violence" is to blur key distinctions. Isn't it important whether the change took place suddenly or over a longer time? And doesn't it make a difference for peasants whether they were driven to the city or attracted to it? Common sense, I think, would urge that these considerations are of significance if we are concerned with the human costs of social change. According to Moore, after all, industrialization was both necessary and inevitable, and as with all major social changes it involved a good deal of pain. We can evaluate the relative costs in a moral sense (if at all) only in terms of the alternatives which were available at the time, and by comparison with other societies.

Migration to the cities undoubtedly involved degradation for some. That it took place gradually, and that peasants often went to cities not far from their homes probably made the transition less severe. Moreover it was younger people who most often left and they may well have gone to the city because of the wider opportunities it offered.

It is true that, in some cities at least, death rates probably rose with the initial spurt in population, but as Englishmen learned to cope with problems of sanitation, urban mortality began to fall rapidly, and continued to do so during most of the nineteenth century.²⁹ I suspect that this was a net psychological gain for all city dwellers. Further, there is at least some evidence that by the early nineteenth century, city dwellers were taller and healthier than their rural counterparts, as even a Marxist like Hobsbawm must admit.³⁰ The disorganization and despair supposedly characteristic of the new working class is based on unproved suppositions, and there is at least some evidence on the other side. Crimes of violence declined in England during the nineteenth century and sporadic riots were increasingly replaced by organized political and trade union activity.³¹ Isn't this perhaps a sign that leaving a condition which Marx described as "idiocy," the ability of these peasants turned workers to shape their own destiny was increasing?³² Isn't it also possible that the rela-

tive peacefulness of political activity on the part of the working class was related to gradually improving conditions, and to the general sense of responsibility which, as Moore sometimes admits, characterized both the English aristocracy and the English middle classes?

One more issue deserves consideration in dealing with England, both for its intrinsic importance and for later discussion. Moore is forced to ask himself why English capitalists did not have to engage in the kind of repression during the nineteenth century which he will describe as characteristic of other nations, and thus did not have to turn to the aristocracy for assistance:

Other capitalist tasks, such as the further disciplining of the labor force, English industrial leaders could carry on their own with a minimum of help from the state or the landed aristocracy. They had to do so because the repressive apparatus of the English state was relatively weak, a consequence of the civil war, the previous evolution of the monarchy, and of reliance on the navy rather than on the army (32.)

One detects here a conservative streak in Moore. It is almost as if institutional and cultural patterns once established have a life of their own. Indeed, to use Moore's own arguments, there is no reason that British industrialists should not have created a repressive apparatus if they felt the need for it. Actually Moore sometimes is forced to admit that conditions in England were improving during the nineteenth century, an improvement he ascribes to English industrial pre-eminence and imperialism, and also to "a strong current of *opinion* in favor of doing something to alleviate mass distress . . . which is traceable to England's historical experience. . . ." (34.)³³

Despite Moore's rhetoric we have come full

this from contemporary developments. Alex Inkeles, in an intensive study of urban migrants in Chile, and other countries, argues that the adjustment from rural to urban life and to the factory is not nearly so difficult as is sometimes imagined. Indeed urban factory workers from rural backgrounds not only regard their situation as an improvement over rural conditions, but, on most indices which have been used, are more able to cope with the world. The results of Professor Inkeles' work will be published in book form in the near future.

³³ The emphasis in the quote is mine. At one point much later Moore literally brings in the kitchen sink and relates British attitudes to England's whole historical tradition including the use of unpaid justices of the peace. See *Origins*, 444.

²⁹ See Deane and Cole, *op. cit.*, p. 131 and *passim*.

³⁰ E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (New York, 1962), p. 28. His data is from Belgium, but one suspects that it applied equally well to England.

³¹ J. J. Tobias, *Crime and Industrial Society in the 19th Century* (London, 1967), pp. 22-50.

³² This is certainly the impression left by E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1966), despite his attempt to prove rather a different kind of case. See, for example, pp. 830-831. We have some hard data on

circle. In fact, English developments were relatively peaceful, going back even as far as the Civil War, and English industrialization, given the era and the options, was relatively humane.

* * *

To Moore the French Revolution destroyed a feudal regime which was slowly changing and created the basic institutions of a bourgeois capitalist society. (105-06.) The Revolution took the form it did because, for reasons which Moore does not really explain, the French gentry while becoming capitalist, directed their energies to milking the peasants rather than driving them from the land. (52.)³⁴ Whatever the costs of the Revolution it was necessary, even in its radical phases, for it produced a society superior by far to the old regime and prevented France from eventually going through a Fascist phase. (78, 104-5, 413.)

As with his English case study Moore's analysis is essentially "pre-revisionist." It is quite clear for example that by the latter part of the eighteenth century, only remnants of what might be loosely called feudalism remained in France.³⁵ It is also quite clear that the supposedly sharp line between bourgeois and aristocrat was actually far more permeable than has been thought. More important, there is little evidence of a sharp differentiation between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie in their use of capital, their relation to the land, or their participation in commerce. Both groups, if we use the term loosely, were participating in "bourgeois" economic activities in much the same way, and, with exceptions, the economic activity of both groups combined some elements identified with a "capitalist" mentality as defined by Weber, and a pre-capitalist mentality.³⁶ Finally, it is quite clear that, at least in its early stages, the so-called bourgeois revolution was not initiated by the bourgeoisie, if we define the bourgeoisie in a narrowly economic sense. The leaders of the first moves consisted not of men of commerce but of professionals such as lawyers and bureaucrats of both a "bourgeois" and an aristocratic back-

ground. True, the bulk of the initiators were bourgeois, but only in the legal sense that they were not members of the aristocracy, i.e., the sense in which the term was used in the eighteenth century.³⁷

Moore admits some of this, and sometimes argues that the French Revolution was a bourgeois revolution not because it was caused by the bourgeoisie, but rather because it established a "capitalist" system of private property, and equality before the law. (105-06.)³⁸ This argument begs the basic question, i.e., the role played by changes in the system of production. Indeed, if the role of economic classes is not decisive, Moore's whole analysis falls apart, for then landed, non-commercial gentry can make a bourgeois revolution, and Fascism is not the inevitable outcome of the failure of the bourgeoisie to do so. Indeed Moore recognizes this. Throughout the chapter, as in other chapters, the emphasis is upon economic classes as the source of social change, except where it is inconvenient. (68-9 *passim*.)

It is impossible to know whether the terror was necessary for the partial victory of the "bourgeois revolution." Pace Moore, the radical phase of the Revolution contributed little to those basic changes in France's legal structure initiated from 1789-1791 and brought to fruition under Napoleon.³⁹ On the other hand the terror was one of a series of mechanisms by which the Revolutionaries were able to defeat their enemies at home and abroad.

It is also impossible to know whether a milder revolution or non-revolutionary reform would have resulted in a more pronounced "Fascist" phase in French life than she experienced. Moore's argument here depends upon his categories rather than any evidence he adduces. It might be well to point out, however, that while the Revolution did modernize the French legal system and uproot the old class system, paving the way for a more modern society, some of its

³⁴ His supposed explanation actually consists of a description of the differences between English and French gentry.

³⁵ Alfred Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1964), pp. 25-53.

³⁶ See Taylor, *op. cit.*, and Albert Goodwin, "The Social Structure and Economic and Political Attitudes of the French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century," in Comité International de Sciences Historiques, XII, Congrès International . . . , *Rapports*, I, (Vienna, 1965), pp. 356-367.

³⁷ Cobban, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-67. See also Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, "Who Intervened in 1788? A Commentary on the Coming of the French Revolution," *American Historical Review*, LXXI (October, 1965), pp. 77-103, and the debate which followed in Volume LXXII of the same journal, pp. 497-522.

³⁸ If establishing equality before the law and a modern system of private property are the essential features of bourgeois democracy, then the restoration in Japan established a bourgeois democratic regime, something which Moore denies.

³⁹ The definitive study is Jacques Godechot, *Les institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'empire* (Paris, 1951).

consequences inhibited later "capitalist" development. The very fact of Revolution and Napoleon's continental system were such that France had fallen much further behind England in terms of economic development by 1815 than she had been in 1789; some promising moves in the direction of free trade taken by the monarchy were dropped by the revolutionaries and Napoleon, and, more importantly, the creation of a large vested group of small peasant owners inhibited rather than aided the growth of commercial agriculture. Nor is there much evidence that the Revolution changed the attitudes of the commercial strata in the society. In fact, the mutual antagonism which characterized various social groups in the aftermath of the Revolution and the instability of French regimes, may have inhibited the development of a more dynamic entrepreneurial attitudes. In any event, French economic growth after 1815 was not any faster than under the old regime, and France did not begin to modernize until the late nineteenth century. In fact her economic structure remained highly traditional until the mid-twentieth century.⁴⁰ Nor did the Revolution really solve one of the major problems that had served to bring it about, i.e., the pressure of population on land. This problem was really solved (if this was a solution) by the peasants themselves, as they increasingly turned to birth control and the limitation of family size, a trend which had already manifested itself in the 1770's.⁴¹

Finally, in addition to the terror, French military casualties during the Revolution and the Empire are estimated at about 1,300,000 men, to which must be added those who died during famines which resulted from general disorder and military action.⁴² To all of this we must add the schism in French life produced by the Revolution—a schism which was at least partially responsible for the violence which characterized French life through most of the 19th and early 20th century, as well as the rapidity with which France collapsed during World War II. When Moore asks us whether we would have preferred

"moderate reform" to the Revolution, he neglects these results although he is quite willing to place in the balance all of the injustices of the old regime from time immemorial. (104.)

Even those who reject his neo-Marxism would agree that a Revolution like that which developed in France could not have occurred much before 1789. The real question, then, is, given a choice, which alternatives would have been the least costly? In abstract terms, it seems to me that gradual reform on the English model has much to be said for it.

Moore's analysis of the Revolution is unconvincing in its major dimensions. I certainly would not deny the role of the economic changes which were taking place in France in creating pressures for a restructuring of the society. Perhaps my major disagreement with him lies in my willingness to consider as key factors the ideas of the Enlightenment, and the example of England, as these undermined the legitimacy of traditional French society. It was this conjunction of ideological and cultural variables, together with economic changes, which was responsible for the unique development of modern Europe.⁴³

* * *

Moore's scattered references to Germany are designed to demonstrate that the failure of a bourgeois revolution and resulting modernization from above led to National Socialism. He never tells us why this should have been so, aside from a few remarks on the irrationality of the German economy. (442.) nor does he satisfactorily explain why the German bourgeoisie failed to create the kind of modern capitalist state which would not have succumbed to totalitarianism.

According to Moore, the bourgeoisie needed the aristocracy if Germany were to be unified and the German working class kept in its place. Not only did they support the aristocracy; they also adopted their life style and values. (36-7, 34, 437.) But why couldn't the German middle classes have supported the aristocracy and retained the "bourgeois" values which their economic position should, theoretically, have impelled them to adopt? By what mechanism is the rational acceptance of the leadership of one class by another transmuted into the acceptance of their values? Why could not the German bourgeoisie merely have accepted the leadership of the aristocracy, until the state had been unified and they were no longer needed,

⁴⁰ For references on this point, see the sources cited in footnote 37. See also Cobban, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-80, Alexander Gerschenkron, "Reflections on Economic Aspects of Revolutions," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War* (New York, 1964), pp. 180-204, and Arthur L. Lunham, *The Industrial Revolution in France* (New York, 1955), pp. 3-13.

⁴¹ Wesley D. Camp, *Marriage and the Family in France Since the Revolution* (New York, 1961), p. 101.

⁴² Marcel Reinhard, "Bilan démographique de L'Europe, 1789-1815," Comité International, *Rapports*, *op. cit.*, pp. 451-455.

⁴³ The classic study of these influences on the revolution is Daniel Mornet, *Les Origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1933).

and then dispensed with their services?⁴⁴ It is at points like this that Moore's neo-Marxism becomes vulgar Marxism and begins to lose all theoretical coherence.

Moore's discussion of Germany flows into his American chapter. In summary his argument is that in 1861, the United States made a choice between an essentially English pattern and a German (or perhaps Russian or Chinese) one. The alternatives were revolution (the Civil War was the "last capitalist revolution"), or an alliance of Northern businessmen and Southern "Junkers." (115, 131, 153, 421.) Moore's explanation of why the alliance did not take place is out of step with much of the best recent scholarship on United States history. But it may be more important to ask whether the materials for an alliance even existed. If they did not, Moore has created an interpretation of the Civil War by posing a false pair of alternatives.

No evidence exists pointing to a possible Northern business and Southern Junker alliance at any time before the Civil War. Neither before nor immediately after the Civil War was there a cohesive business community drawn into supporting common policies by a need to control or a fear of a "radical" working class. Businessmen split widely on every major issue that arose during the whole period, from banking to cheap money, to the tariff, the last of which is central to Moore's argument.⁴⁵

The dual program of cheap land and high

"We may also ask why the German working class was so much more of a threat to the German bourgeoisie than the English working class was to the English middle class? Despite the rhetoric, they were not notoriously more violent. And if the relatively mild rhetoric of British working class leaders is to be explained by rising living standards, as Moore suggests, why didn't this have the same effect on German workers whose real wages almost doubled between 1870 and 1914? See Ashok V. Desai, *Real Wages in Germany, 1871-1913* (Oxford, 1968), p. 36.

⁴⁵ Robert Sharkey, *Money, Class and Party*, Baltimore, 1967), discusses the Reconstruction period in some detail and reviews the general literature. The book is but one of a series which have succeeded in demolishing Charles Beard's portrait of Reconstruction beyond repair. On the Tariff question see Richard Hofstadter, "The Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil War," in Gerald D. Nash, *Issues in Economic History* (Boston, 1964), pp. 50-55, and David Montgomery, *Beyond Equality* (New York, 1967), pp. 64-65. On the bank issue see Bray Hammond, *Banking and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Princeton, 1954).

tariffs which, according to Moore, forged the economic alliance between the North and the West owed a good deal to the attempt by the Republican party to develop a majority by appealing to a wide variety of groups on the issues which were most salient to them. Moore finds it strange that Northern business never thought to marry the issues which they were supposed to be concerting to marry, and that it was left to "politicians and journalists" to do so. (125-28, 130.) It is only curious if one assumes that political parties are merely epiphenomenal, and that all social policies must be explained in purely economic terms.

The one constituency which supported both free land and higher tariffs was not Northern business, but rather the same elements who provided the "radical" core of the Republican party—small businessmen and farmers. Both groups were wedded to the idea of building a powerful America composed primarily of small property owners, and also saw both the tariff and cheap land as contributing to these goals.⁴⁶

Moore's attempt to differentiate between the North and the South on the basis of their economic systems (contrasting Capitalist systems) is no more successful. It is true that slavery was partly an economic institution, and that the origins of slavery must be sought in economic variables. But unless one assumes that slaves were notably more efficient than free labor, or that only Negroes could effectively work plantations, the fact that Negro slavery came to characterize Southern agriculture, and that the South fought so hard to retain it, cannot be explained by economics alone. On purely economic grounds, there was little reason for southern Americans to refuse to accept the kind of sharecropping arrangements which Brazilians found relatively easy to consider and which, in fact, they ultimately came to themselves in the aftermath of emancipation. In short, racism was a key variable.⁴⁷

We may ask, too, how closely the southern plantation owner resembled the Junker. While social mobility in the South was probably lower than in the North, class lines in the white community were considerably less sharp than in Europe. Indeed the South had accepted universal white suffrage, and Southern politicians had to

⁴⁶ This is the general thrust of W. R. Brock's analysis in *An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865-67* (New York, 1966).

⁴⁷ Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black* (Chapel Hill, 1968). Jordan proves fairly conclusively that negative attitudes toward Africans preceded the establishment of slavery, and were a key factor justifying it in the minds of English settlers.

take into account this constituency. The presence of the blacks also served to reduce social class distinctions between whites.⁴⁸ Further, as Moore points out, the Junker used the German peasant as an ally in order to maintain his position. (38.) If the Negro was, as Moore also argues, the only group in the United States resembling a conventional European peasantry, it is extremely difficult to conceive of an alliance of this kind ever developing. (111.)

Finally, if it was the North's economic system which produced anti-slavery feeling, one would expect to discover some correlation between type of economic activity and abolitionist sentiment. Moore tries to find this in the family farm in the North (although he is not sure why the same feelings are not produced by family farming in the South). (129.) The evidence belies this. Opposition to the extension of slavery among yeomen farmers in the North was often based on anti-black feeling.⁴⁹ On the other hand, if we look for the sources of abolitionist sentiment, the key factor seems to be religious. Abolitionists come in substantial numbers from radical Protestant backgrounds.⁵⁰

The assumption that Northern businessmen would have deferred to the leadership of Southern "Junkers" to produce a "German" solution to industrialization if the Civil War had not occurred is absurd. It does not tie in with our picture of the South or of the country in general. Did the North need the Southern Junker in order to create a national state? Did Northern businessmen emulate the life style or culture of the Southern gentry? On the contrary it was they who felt self-confident and the Southerners who felt on the defensive. One of the reasons that the Civil War came when it did was that Southern militants correctly believed that the balance of power was tipping rapidly in favor of an increasingly powerful industrialized North, and that, given ten or twenty years more, the South would be overwhelmed with ease. To talk of a German solution to industrialization in America is a little like assuming that it is the tail which wags the dog.⁵¹

⁴⁸ See the discussion in W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York, 1941), pp. 31-43.

⁴⁹ Eugene H. Berwanger, *The Frontier Against Slavery* (Urbana, 1967).

⁵⁰ David Donald, *Lincoln Reconsidered* (New York, 1961), pp. 19-36.

⁵¹ On the relative position of the North and South see Peter d'A. Jones, *The Consumer Society* (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 127-128. That the South faced a crisis of which this factor was part, is pointed out by Eugene D. Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery* (New York, 1967). Nevins

Nor is Moore on firmer ground in arguing that Reconstruction was liquidated by the creation of an alliance between Southern ex-Junkers, and northern businessmen, so fearful of nascent radicalism in the North that they were willing to leave the Negro to his fate. Woodward, whom Moore cites for this, offers little or no proof of the assertion in his book, which deals with the compromise of 1877. Rather, a reading of the volume indicates that the compromise, aside from particular political-economic gains for both sides, was forged largely because of a fear of renewed sectional violence.⁵²

In fact, the evidence points the other way. The Republicans abandoned the Negro because they had become self-confident enough to believe that they no longer needed his votes, and because the passions aroused by the Civil War had died away.⁵³ The failures of Reconstruction are to be laid to the continuing racism which characterized American society, and to the limitations of the very liberal ideology which was so instrumental in producing the crusade against slavery.⁵⁴

IV. THE ASIAN CASE STUDIES

While Moore recognizes some of the difficulties of comparing European and Asian countries, he is convinced that the categories he has developed are universally applicable and his discussions of China, Japan, and India are intended to round out both his theoretical and his moral case.

China's failure to break through to a modern society, Moore argues, stemmed not from cultural limitations or institutional structure but from concrete class interests. The Chinese gentry, rather than turning their efforts to raising productivity, preferred to increase their

certainly implies that this was one of the reasons for the militancy of at least some Southerners. See the selection from his *Ordeal of the Union*, Vol. I, in Edwin C. Rolywine, *The Causes of the American Civil War* (Boston, 1961), pp. 200-216.

⁵² Indeed Woodward himself lists this as the key factor in the compromise. See C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction* (Boston, 1951), pp. 13-14.

⁵³ Sharkey, *op. cit.*, points out the difficulty of uncovering a unified capitalist versus agrarian or worker position during the period. He is supported in this by Montgomery, *op. cit.*, and Irwin Unger, *The Greenback Era* (Princeton, 1964). Both of the latter stress the importance of ideological as well as economic variables.

⁵⁴ See Brock, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 274-304. See also Stanley P. Hirshon, *Farewell to the Bloody Shirt* (Bloomington, 1962), and Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Era of Reconstruction* (New York, 1966), especially pp. 186-215.

wellbeing by squeezing still more out of the peasantry. (179-80.) In the last analysis the only alternative to a Communist revolution was a quasi-Fascist road to modernization, although, because China was at a relatively early stage of development, this did not take quite the same form as it did in Europe. (196-7, 178.)⁵⁵

Moore's strictures against arguments which explain some of the differences between the West and China on cultural grounds are quite similar to those which he has used before. There is evidence that by the nineteenth century the Chinese were willing to turn to Western technology; the gentry were willing to engage in commerce, and all the right attitudes were available, though perhaps latent. (179.) Ultimately, however, the landed gentry controlled the state, and it was easier to increase the population and exploit peasants than to turn to methods designed to expand production. Why it should have been easier to operate in this fashion, Moore does not tell us, except to assert that "... there was no rapidly growing urban population with at least moderately diffused and increasing prosperity that could act as a stimulus to rationalized production for the market." (*Ibid.*)

The argument is unconvincing. Urbanization and moderately diffused prosperity may be a requisite for economic growth (the English gentry, then, were not that exploitive), but China had had both at various periods, including what, in some ways, was a highly developed system of commerce.⁵⁶ It is hard to escape the feeling that

⁵⁵ Moore is a little more cautious. He points out that the Kuomintang resembled European Fascism in a number of interesting ways. However, the general thrust of his argument is clear.

⁵⁶ According to Rhoads Murphey, large cities were proportionately more numerous in China than in Europe until the nineteenth century, and until the eighteenth century urbanism may have been higher. He argues that as much as a quarter or more of the population lived in towns and cities of more than 2500 population and perhaps 10 or 15 per cent in cities over 10,000. Most cities or towns of more than 5,000 had well defined commercial or manufacturing districts, and special areas for each important enterprise. These only represent educated guesses, but I gather that the order of magnitude is accepted as correct by most scholars in the field. See, "The City as a Center of Change; Western Europe and China," *Annals of the Association of Geographers*, LIV (1954), p. 354. Incidentally, in dealing with Japan, Moore drops the requirement of "moderately diffused and increasing prosperity." The key factors in Japan were peace and luxurious display on the part of the nobility (*Origins*, 234-235.)

cultural as well as institutional factors played a significant role in inhibiting Chinese development. Mary Wright, whom Moore cites to support his view that the restoration monarchy could not raise adequate revenues lest it alienate the gentry class, actually argues a quite different case. The regime's failure lay basically in its inability to conceive of efficient ways of using available resources because its institutional structure was based on Confucian precepts. The Japanese monarchy could restructure the economy because the loyalty of the gentry was to a given monarchy and a given nation. In China this was impossible because loyalty was to an institutionalized culture of a universalized type. (182-83.)⁵⁷ Moore denies that the Chinese gentry differed in kind from other aristocracies. He bases his case on the argument that since land was a key source of wealth, and wealth was a key source of acquiring bureaucratic position, the differences between the Chinese and other gentry were unimportant. (160-65.) But to paraphrase him, this is to confuse morphology with dynamics. In China potential entrepreneurial talent was diverted to the gentry scholar class through the examination system. In Japan, on the other hand, the fact that aristocratic status was hereditary and closely tied to the land may have been an important factor in the earlier development of an entrepreneurial class.⁵⁸

Chiang Kai-shek is both authoritarian and unattractive. It is less clear that he is a proto-Fascist. This is a key point, for Moore clearly uses Fascist as a scare word, evoking images of genocide. (304-05.) Let us try to deal with the issue. First, within the framework of Moore's own scheme, Chiang Kai-shek could not have established a Fascist regime. Fascism, after all, emerges only after conservative modernization has produced a series of fundamental economic

⁵⁷ Wright points out first that there were good economic arguments against increasing the tax on land, and, second, that there were other mechanisms available to the government which would not have alienated any major economic groups, but which it did not use. See Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism* (Stanford, 1957), pp. 169, 186, 193. Moore and I must have derived a different meaning from the text, for he cites almost the same pages. Wright does not deny that the regime was limited in its power by various interests. The real question, however, is the relation between interest and ideology.

⁵⁸ Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Simon Kuznets (ed.), *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan* (Durham, 1955), p. 523.

crises. China had not yet passed through such a phase. The point may seem a quibble, but it is extremely important, for if the Kuomintang regime was incipiently Fascist, then Fascism is not merely a later result of conservative modernization, and the whole dialectic of Moore's analysis is open to question.

What evidence does Moore offer? Chiang was an incipient Fascist, Moore argues, because he led a single party, which relied, in part, on a secret police apparatus; he used force to solve social problems; he was a nationalist; he urged moral regeneration rather than developing "realistic analyses" of Chinese problems, and he failed to discourage industrialization.

What do these arguments add up to? The leaders of many third world nations could be characterized in much the same way, including such diverse types as Bourguiba, Nasser, Sekou Touré, Nkrumah and Ayub Khan. To describe them all as latently Fascist or Communist would not seem to further political analysis.

Chiang's writings certainly lack detail on economic questions, but so have the writings of a good many modernizing oligarchs before they consolidated power. In fact, the regime did institute a good many legal and economic reforms between 1928 and 1937, and, it did encourage industrialization. Industrial growth in China between 1928 and 1937 is estimated at perhaps six to eight per cent per year.⁵⁹ If his regime made a fatal mistake in ignoring the problems of the peasantry, it demonstrated that it was capable of learning. Once on Formosa it initiated and carried through reforms based on the original Kuomintang program.⁶⁰

Chiang Kai-shek had not yet consolidated his power when the Japanese invaded in force, and his emphasis on building a modern military machine was based on a reasonable assessment of both Japanese and Communist intentions. His failure to press land reform was partly related to a feeling that the consolidation of power and national defense had first priority.⁶¹ Of course,

his control over local leaders actually decreased during the war itself.⁶²

His policy was clearly wrong. However, we do not know what he would have done had he consolidated his power. After all the Communists also subordinated agricultural reforms to the requirements of victory by downplaying collectivization, just as, at an earlier period, they had worked with the Kuomintang despite the "bourgeois" character of that party.

The creation by Chiang of a police state on the mainland and on Formosa can be explained, partially by the fact of very real opposition to his policies. On Formosa these policies include the fanatic desire to reconquer the mainland, a desire as pathetic as it is unreal. However, that a man nearing death should cling to the dream which has given his life meaning, says little about what his actions might have been under other circumstances.⁶³

Moore's critique of Chiang's emphasis upon the "excessive" individualism of the Chinese and his calls for moral regeneration is rather peculiar, in that he admits that the theme was not merely rhetorical, and is to be found in the writings of Sun Yat-sen. (208.) The same theme of moral regeneration finds its echoes, too, among the Chinese Communists, who are also relying upon moral rhetoric and compulsion to eliminate vestiges of "reactionary individualism."

Finally, as Moore points out in citing the evidence for the regime's incipient Fascism, Chiang argued against precipitant action and urged the importance of thinking correctly before acting. (198.) However, nothing could be further from Fascist doctrine, which urges the primacy of action over thought.

Whether Chiang Kai-shek could have succeeded in modernizing China at less cost than that exacted by the Communists or even at all we do not know. However, the description of his regime as incipiently Fascist does not really contribute to our understanding of either him or China.⁶⁴

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H. Michael and George E. Taylor, *The Far East in the Modern World* (New York, 1956), p. 409.

⁵⁹ Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China* (Chicago, 1963), p. 77 and *passim*.

⁶⁰ It is very difficult to get a clear picture of Chiang Kai-shek. Almost all of the writing about him is heavily rhetorical whether hostile or laudatory.

⁶¹ Revisionist analysts of the Communist revolution in China argue, contrary to Moore, that *per capita* food production was actually rising during the period 1900-1950; that tenancy had not in-

⁵⁹ For industrial growth during the period see J. K. Chang, "Industrial Development of Mainland China 1912-1949," *Journal of Economic History*, 27 (March, 1967), 56-81. Professor Chang develops his argument more fully in a new book, *Industrial Development in Pre-Communist China* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969). For a discussion of the efforts of the Kuomintang and the difficulties they faced see Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 691-704. Not all of the latter were of their own making.

⁶⁰ Neil H. Jacoby, *U.S. Aid to Taiwan* (New York, 1966), pp. 81-82.

⁶¹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, *op. cit.*, Franz

Moore's chapter on Japan is a paradigm study of the relationship between "conservative modernization" and the emergence of Fascism. Given a Japanese bourgeoisie which was too weak to assert itself, conservative oligarchs took charge of the modernization process. The industrialization which followed was characterized by repression, with the masses being kept at a subsistence level. After 1925 the evils of the system became apparent to everyone, and Japanese businessmen, unable to create a vigorous internal market, because it would have threatened their exploitive paternalism and their profits, joined with the military to create a Fascist regime. (290-91, 299-300, 3043-5.) The ultimate result was Pearl Harbor. Japan had escaped the horrors of radical revolution only to create greater horrors for herself. As Moore puts it, comparing Japan to China:

A hundred years from now, or perhaps in much less time, the partial nature of Japan's social and industrial revolution, especially the very limited "revolution" of the Imperial Restoration in 1868, may seem to be the essence of Japan's tragedy. . . . On the other hand, contemporary Chinese society, despite severe difficulties and setbacks, shows signs of moving ahead. By learning from Soviet mistakes, China could conceivably surpass Russia. (229-230.)

Moore's analysis of the sources of Japanese economic growth in the pre-Restoration period is unconvincing. If, as he argues, Chinese and Japanese landlords were equally exploitive in intention, and neither contributed in any way to such growth, wherein lies the difference between the two societies? Certainly late seventeenth and eighteenth century China, as Japan, was characterized by both peace and luxury; why did nothing comparable to Japanese development occur? Moore's discussion offers us no clues, unless the Japanese landlord was not as clever as his Chinese counterpart.⁶⁵

How repressive was post-Restoration Japan?

creased substantially, except around a few large cities, and that the Communists established their strongest and most important bases in areas of relatively low tenancy. See Roy Hofheinz, "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns, 1923-1945," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 3-77. His analysis is confirmed in an exhaustive study by Dwight H. Perkins. See his *Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969).

⁶⁵ Compare footnote 56.

If Moore wants to make a case for the "repressiveness" of the Japanese process of industrialization, he must demonstrate that the new regime was more repressive than the old, or that it was more repressive than comparable Asian societies of the period.

It is difficult to support either proposition. While Japan's progress until 1930 was uneven, it was moving in the direction of greater openness. That large numbers of people remained wedded to a traditional outlook is beside the point. A legal system had been created which established relative equality before the law by eliminating feudal privileges; both education and social mobility were rising sharply; the masses were slowly being drawn into the political process, and new ideas were reaching ever larger numbers of people through the press and in the universities.⁶⁶

Moore's contention that the great mass of the population benefited little if at all from industrialization is not supported by the evidence. Indeed the only data he offers are references to an article by Ohkawa and Rosovsky, and to Allen's *A Short Economic History of Japan*, to the effect that Japan was forced to import increasing amounts of rice. He also cites Allen to prove that *per capita* consumption of rice fell after 1925. (289.) Actually, he misreads Allen's figures, for the table cited shows *per capita* consumption of rice rising between 1925 and 1929 and only falling after that year.⁶⁷

It is true, as Allen points out, that Japan did import increasing amounts of rice beginning after World War I, in part, because Japanese agriculture could no longer advance as rapidly as previously within the existing agricultural framework. However, Allen adds, (and Moore fails to mention), that (1) Japanese population was increasing rapidly during this period. (2) It seemed wiser to grow rice more cheaply in Korea and Taiwan and diversify agriculture on the mainland.⁶⁸ Allen's figures show that rice consumption had been rising steadily since 1880. Since the transition to military rule and Fascism came in 1932, according to Moore, it seems a rash judgment to assert that three years of declining consumption are proof that 50 years of steady progress was a "short range success" which had already begun to display its "dubious side," and that now "the evils of the system had become apparent to everyone," especially when

⁶⁶ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 513-578.

⁶⁷ The table (X) appears on page 201 of Allen's volume.

⁶⁸ G. C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Japan* (London, 1962, 2nd edition), p. 116.

one remembers that the period of decline was partly the product of a world-wide depression. (289, 297.)⁶⁹ Japan's agricultural problem was not different from that of some other nations which lacked a traditional landlord class, nor is it true to assert that Japan's oligarchs were unwilling to create "a vigorous internal market." (290, 298.) As Allen indicates, almost eighty per cent of domestic production was for the internal market.⁷⁰

Thus far, I have only relied on sources which Moore cites. Other materials are available which demonstrate that despite a rapid growth in population, the general standard of living rose for the great bulk of the Japanese population. In fact, it rose about as rapidly as the per capita increase in gross national product for most of the period, and it rose more rapidly for peasants than workers in the period before World War I.⁷¹ While per capita consumption of rice

⁶⁹ One wonders who "everyone" was, given the fact, as Moore himself notes (*Origins*, 300), that right wing parties received only a small percentage of the vote in the 1936 elections. He fails to point out that relatively moderate pro-system parties captured the overwhelming bulk of the popular vote in 1932, 1936, and 1937, and that left wing parties were also quite small. See Robert Scalapino, "Elections and Political Modernization in Japan," Robert E. Ward (ed.), *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton, 1968), pp. 249-92. Since this essay was originally written, I have come across a very useful article on the subject by George M. Wilson. See his "A New Look at the Problem of 'Japanese Fascism,'" in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, X (July, 1968) 403-412.

⁷⁰ Allen, *op cit.*, pp. 159, 213, 224. Indeed Japanese prosperity in the postwar period indicates that democracy and reform are quite compatible with high profits.

⁷¹ Alan A. Gleason, "Economic Growth and Consumption in Japan," in William W. Lockwood (ed.), *The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 391-444. Gleason presents evidence which indicates that from 1890-1925 real consumption *per capita* rose somewhat more rapidly in Japan than in the United States. Some scholars have recently challenged the traditional picture of Japanese economic growth, claiming that living standards before the restoration were higher than is generally assumed, and, thus, subsequent growth was slower. I am in no position to come to any final conclusion on this, but Rosovsky's suggestion that the overall picture is not radically altered seems reasonable. See Henry Rosovsky, "Rumbles in the Ricefields: Professor Nakamura vs the Official Statistics," *The Journal*

fell between 1929 and 1932, per capita consumption of all foodstuffs did not fall but remained at 2,300 calories a day. As Gleason notes:

A postwar FAO study reported that when climate, body weights, age and sex composition of the population are taken into consideration, the estimated daily requirement per person in Japan is only 2,300 calories. If we accept this estimate as applying to earlier decades, then we may conclude that by 1926 Japan had reached an adequate level of food intake in terms of calories and that this, rather than population pressure, accounts for the stability of the intake during the following decade.⁷²

The Japanese economy faced serious problems in the 1930's, problems which stemmed in part from her social structure, in part from the international environment, and in part from the rapidity with which a country with limited natural resources had industrialized. Nevertheless all sections of the population had benefitted from economic growth.

Moore's assertion that big business was one of the main props of Fascism is equally unsupported. The decade of the 1920's, when business seemed to be moving toward domination, was a period during which Japan moved away from her previously imperialist policies; and during the 1930's business, although split, was less sympathetic to imperialist activities than many other groups.⁷³

Moore establishes his case by definition. Since the military elite could not do without big business, then big business must have been part of the coalition which supported Fascism. By this logic, any government which had come to power, except for a Socialist government, would have been the one at least partially engineered by big business, whatever the attitudes of business to-

of Asian Studies, XXVII (February, 1968), 347-360.

⁷² Gleason, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-403. In fact rice consumption per head has continued its decline in the postwar period as the Japanese have shifted to other foods, a pattern which began in the 1920's. It is this shift rather than a sudden decline in living standards which probably explains the data cited by Allen. For example Japanese consumption of meat increased 400% in the period between 1892-1896 and 1923-7. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

⁷³ For example, William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan* (Princeton, 1954), p. 76; Reischauer, Fairbank, Craig, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 510-511; William W. Lockwood, "Japan," in D. A. Rustow and Robert E. Ward (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 129-131.

ward it. The same logic can be, and is, used to prove that the Labor government in England came to power in 1945 as a result of its willingness to enter into a coalition with big business, as did the New Deal in the United States. The argument is on a level with one that asserts that the United States is ruled by clerks because all governments have been forced to rely on them.⁷⁴

German Fascism was based on a mass party which did draw upon anti-capitalist sentiment. No such party of any real size developed in Japan. To assert that genocide comparable to the Nazis' destruction of the European Jews did not occur in Japan only because capitalism was not sufficiently advanced seems to me a very dubious proposition. (304.) Dominant religious, racial, and ethnic groups have been committing genocide against other groups under all sorts of regimes down through human history. An understanding of the behavior of the Nazis *viz a viz* the Jews must take into account the whole complex relation between Jews and Christians in Europe.

I see little reason to ascribe Japanese imperialism solely to her peculiar economic problems. It is far more easily explained by the emergence of Japan as a nation in an international environment characterized by imperialist nationalisms, and a nationalist tradition of her own which probably finds its ultimate roots in her relation to China. To be sure, the nationalist drive was exacerbated by Japan's dependence on Foreign markets, given the nature of her industrialization, the depression, and the often hysterical reaction of European nations to supposed threats of inundation by Japanese goods. World War II was a tragedy for Japan but certainly not a greater one than France's imperialist adventure during the Napoleonic period, which, to use Moore's logic, must be seen as a natural outgrowth of the French Revolution.⁷⁵

* * *

Moore's Indian case study is his last, and in some ways his most interesting. India has had no bourgeois revolution, nor has it taken the conservative or Chinese road to modernization. Rather the effort has been to raise the standard of living of the Indian people through moderate social reform within the framework of relatively

⁷⁴ It could also be used to prove that Japanese democracy today is based on big business for the same reasons.

⁷⁵ In fact, given the population and weapons differentials which characterized the nations and the periods, it may have been rather less of a tragedy if we, as Moore seems to, take the number of people killed as our index.

democratic institutions. Thus far the effort has been less than successful, for growth has been slow and almost universal poverty and degradation are the norm. However, the full story has not yet been written and the future is somewhat open. Moore's chapter tries to determine why India chose the road it did, and attempts to evaluate the policies which have been followed.

Moore's analysis of traditional India is based on an examination of the Mogul Empire. He concludes that there were no real signs of incipient industrialization before the British arrived, and leaves the strong impression that Indian society was both far less developed and far more exploitive than either China or Japan. He attributes its failure to develop a surplus to two factors. First, the property of all members of the society could revert to the sovereign upon the death of its owner. The result was an emphasis upon lavish display during one's lifetime. Second, Mogul taxation of the peasant was a fixed proportion of the crop, rather than, as in Japan, a fixed assessment on the land, a practice which discouraged effective cultivation. (328, 333.)

Moore gives relatively little weight to religion or the caste system as a block to development. Caste did render central government superfluous, and inhibited the formation of an alliance of dissident aristocrats and peasants comparable to that which developed in Japan. (353.) However, this was, in the last analysis, of secondary importance. (355.) As for caste itself, its ability to survive for so long is probably due to its very diffuseness, and its origins are to be found in human nature:

Human beings in a wide variety of civilizations have an observable tendency to establish "artificial" distinctions. . . . Children elaborate artificial distinctions all the time in Western society. . . . The reason for this tendency toward snobbishness—highly developed in some of the most "primitive" societies—is not easy to perceive. Though I cannot prove it, I suspect that one of the few lasting and dependable sources of human satisfaction is making other people suffer and that this constitutes the ultimate cause. (338.)

While the British presence was not as exploitive as some Indian nationalists have charged, it inhibited development. The British imposition of law and order favored those who had property; their attempts to create an independent class of peasant farmers failed; they did not turn economic surpluses into industrial plant; and, most important, their presence precluded both the Japanese and Chinese approach to modernization. (345-47.) Rather, energies

which might have been turned in other directions were fused in a nationalist attack upon British rule. The fusion took place in the person of Gandhi, who was able to unite the urban bourgeoisie and the peasantry into one movement. Both he and the Congress Party appealed to commercial interests because his attacks on the British and thus the landlord class which their rule benefitted, were combined with support of the institution of private property. (371, 373, 377, 378.)

Since independence, India has made little progress. Relying on Gandhi's ideology, the government has emphasized programs based on the "felt needs" of the peasants, and has not broken the control of the upper classes in the villages. (392-3.) The fault lies primarily with Nehru, who refused to act decisively although he had much more political leeway than is commonly assumed. (407.) For the future, growth can be achieved by:

allowing the upper strata in the countryside free rein, but taxing their profits and organizing the market and credit mechanism in such a way as to drive out the moneylender. If the government in this way succeeded in tapping the present surplus generated in agriculture and encouraging the growth of a much bigger one, it could do a great deal more about industry on its own resources. (409.)

Alternatively the government could:

. . . go over to a much wider use of compulsion, more or less approaching the communist model. Even if it could be tried in India, it seems highly unlikely that it would work. Under Indian conditions for a long time to come, no political leadership—no matter how intelligent, dedicated and ruthless—could . . . put through a revolutionary agrarian policy. The country is too diverse and too amorphous still. . . . The administrative and political problem of forcing through a collectivization program against the barriers of caste and tradition in fourteen languages seems too formidable to require further discussion. (409.)

In conclusion:

Either masked coercion on a massive scale . . . or more direct coercion approaching the socialist model will remain necessary. (410.)

For, as Moore argues at the beginning of the chapter:

Political democracy may seem strange in both an Asian setting and one without an industrial revolution until one realizes that the appalling problems facing the Indian government are due to these very facts. (314.)

Moore's analysis neglects almost completely one aspect of India's historical development which differentiates it sharply from China and Japan—the fact that India has yet to develop what both of these countries developed a long time ago, social and political cohesion on a national scale. Historically, the very heterogeneity of the sub-continent must be regarded as an important source of her relative lack of development.⁷⁶ India has known only one period of political unity, and the relatively short lived Mogul Empire never covered the whole country. Even within the boundaries of the Empire the administrative unity developed cannot be compared to that of China.⁷⁷ If Moore is willing to cite the diversity of India as a serious impediment to any program of reform today, it certainly must be included as a key factor in the past. Nor does Moore touch at all upon ecological problems—India's resource base and the problems of a tropical agriculture dependent upon the monsoon. While such variables are less and less important in the modern period, it seems unreasonable not to deal with them in describing differential development in a pre-industrial past.⁷⁸

Moore's discussion of the origins and development of caste is equally unsatisfactory. The fact that caste is eroding today under the impact of economic change says nothing about its effect on economic development at an earlier period, and Moore's analysis of its origins in the cupidity of human nature fails to explain why human viciousness took the peculiar form it did in India. One wonders, too, why the particular method of exploitation characteristic of India, i.e., taking a fixed portion of the crop, should have so inhibited the development of a surplus; after all, the absolute amount available to the peasant would have grown if his productivity increased. Even if Moore's argument is correct, why was the equally exploitive Japanese ruling class so stupid as to fail to see the advantages of adopting Indian customs in determining their share of peasant efforts? One wonders, too, why Chinese rulers failed to latch on to a custom of expropriating wealth with death along the lines followed by Akbar?

The weakness of Moore's argument becomes

⁷⁶ A. L. Basham, *The Indian Sub-Continent in Historical Perspective* (London, 1958).

⁷⁷ The point is made by Moreland, upon whom Moore relies quite heavily, See W. H. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar* (London, 1920), p. 4.

⁷⁸ Morris D. Morris, "Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic History," *Journal of Economic History* (December, 1963), p. 609.

apparent in his treatment of British rule, for by his own analysis the British eliminated at least some of the mechanisms which had prevented the development of a surplus, and the only result, at least according to the author, was the continued growth of parasitic landlordism. It may be true that the overall effect of the British presence and the emergence of Gandhi, was to inhibit the development of either the Japanese or the Chinese alternative, as Moore argues. However, his case depends upon the acceptance of his categories, rather than on the evidence. It can be just as plausibly argued that if British rule had not provided a common focus for nationalist aspirations, and Gandhi had not appeared, the result would have been the complete fragmentation of the subcontinent. (446.)⁷⁹

I am not prepared to judge the efficacy of Nehru's policies. On Moore's own evidence their weakness lies not in the failure of the regime to break the power of the upper classes, but rather on its failure to develop intelligent programs. Moore does not accurately cite a single case study in which reform was blocked by the power structure of the village. He does cite several in which bureaucratic routine and an excessive idealization of traditional village culture resulted in failure. (400-403.)⁸⁰

Interestingly enough, this is the only case study in the volume in which, at various times, ideological commitment as against class interests is explicitly accorded substantial independent causal efficacy. Thus, British reforms in agriculture are laid to the ideology of the British, and Nehru's failures are laid to an idealization of the village and an unwillingness to rely on certain forms of compulsion.

Why does Moore suddenly reverse himself? Perhaps because India is the prime example of the failure of moderate reform. Here men of relatively good will have attempted to avoid various violent and repressive models, and have failed. Hence, Moore drops his neo-Marxism in dealing with India to make a policy point, namely that neither liberalism nor democracy can work in the developing countries. The lesson to be derived from the Indian case is quite

⁷⁹ Moore, in fact, suggests that one of the major reasons for the lack of development of a Hindu variant of Fascism is the fragmentation of the Hindu world along caste class and ethnic lines.

⁸⁰ To prove his case, Moore uses Rene Dumont, *Terres Vivantes* (Paris, 1961); Gough's essay in McKim Marriott, *Village India* (Chicago, 1955), and Alan R. Beals, *Gopalpur* (New York, 1962). None of them directly support his assertion and Beals states almost the opposite on p. 82.

clear. Despite some cautionary statements, Moore believes that the only two alternatives open for India are repression on the Japanese model and violent revolution of the Chinese type. Given his previous assessments of these alternatives, we can guess which he prefers. This brings us to the heart of the assumptions underlying his whole effort.

V. THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

Moore's analysis does not establish either his substantive or his theoretical propositions. All industrialization has not been more or less equally violent and repressive; all ruling classes are not equally exploitive; and Fascism is not the necessary outcome of so called "conservative industrialization." If I have justified my initial assertion that Moore's perspectives were brought to rather than deriving from the materials with which he deals, we may now turn to a direct examination of these perspectives.

Toward the end of *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore states some of his assumptions in fairly clear form. The three paragraphs involved are worth quoting in full:

For a Western scholar to say a good word on behalf of revolutionary radicalism is not easy because it runs counter to deeply grooved mental reflexes. The assumption that gradual and piecemeal reform has demonstrated its superiority over violent revolution as a way to advance human freedom is so pervasive that even to question such an assumption seems strange. In closing this book I should like to draw attention for the last time to what the evidence from the comparative history of modernization may tell us about this issue. As I have reluctantly come to read this evidence, the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more.

Fairness demands recognition of the fact that the way nearly all history has been written imposes an overwhelming bias against revolutionary violence. Indeed the bias becomes horrifying as one comes to realize its depth. To equate the violence of those who resist oppression with the violence of the oppressors would be disleading enough. But there is a great deal more. From the days of Spartacus through Robespierre down to the present day, the use of force by the oppressed against their former masters has been the object of nearly universal condemnation. Meanwhile the day-to-day repression of "normal" society hovers dimly in the background of most history books. Even those radical historians who emphasize the injustices of prerevolutionary epochs generally concentrate on a short time span preceding the immediate outbreak.

In that way, too, they may unwittingly distort the record.

That is one argument against the comforting myth of gradualism. There is an even more important one, the costs of going without a revolution. There have been the tragedies of the victims of fascism and its wars of aggression, the consequence of modernization without a real revolution. In the backward countries today, there continues the suffering of those who have not revolted. In India we have seen that this suffering has been in good measure the price of democratic slowness in the Asian context. . . . There are also positive arguments on behalf of revolution. In the Western democratic countries revolutionary violence (and other forms as well) were part of the whole historical process that made possible subsequent peaceful change. In the communist countries too, revolutionary violence has been part of the break with a repressive past and of the effort to construct a less repressive future. (505-506.)⁸¹

I do not know on what basis Moore arrives at these generalizations about Western scholars. The best historians are quite willing to describe regimes as exploitive when they feel that they are, and do not merely describe their problems on the eve of revolutions, or only condemn the violence of the "oppressed." They are rather less likely than Moore, however, to set up an absolute standard of exploitation. Rather they are inclined to evaluate regimes more or less within the context of the historical period, and with an awareness of both the cultural and technical resources available. Nor do they usually divide the historical actors categorically into oppressors and oppressed. Rather, they have a sense of history as involving tragic encounters among men equally caught up in their own limitations, and, in evaluating the outcome of revolutions, they attempt to balance losses against gains, and to criticize only violence which seems purposeless or unnecessary.

Moore's writing indicates that he is one of that generation of scholars to whom the Soviet Revolution once represented the hope of a radical transformation of mankind. Disillusioned by the results of that Revolution, he has now, with the mellowing of the Soviet regime, been able to

justify his earlier enthusiasm for it by arguing that it has been no more repressive than other alternatives. (31, 506.) And while he is no longer sure that a free non-repressive society can ever be created, he looks to new radical revolutions in the "third world" as embodying hope for the future. (508, and his remarks on China.) Indeed, while he talks of past revolutions in the West as having provided the opportunities for later peaceful change, he seems convinced that Western societies are becoming increasingly irrational, and that change may have to involve the repression of false ideas if we are to move on toward the goal of a compulsionless society. (442.)⁸² However, much he may talk about an objective standard of exploitation which may be used for purposes of historical analysis, it is also clear that his definition of exploitation derives from his conception of a free rational and compulsionless society. By this definition, of course, all historical societies have been exploitive, and his refusal to differentiate degrees of exploitation now makes sense. To a man standing on the moon the differences between mountains and valleys on the earth must seem rather insignificant. By these standards, all socialization is repressive.

In all of this, his neo-Marxism serves a useful function. After all, if men can learn, and if new ideas can change their behavior, then peaceful reform is possible. If, on the other hand, class interests deriving from the economic substructure of the society and acquisitive drives are the basic motivations in all historical systems, then change must be apocalyptic. Further, if history is the product of clashes between human beings who are caught up in cultural limitations, and who fight and die for ideas sincerely held, it is

⁸² Moore is very ambivalent on this question. See his essay in Robert Paul Wolff *et al.*, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston, 1965). He is ambivalent on a number of other issues as well. On the one hand he feels that men are capable of discovering scientific truths which will enable them to create a more humane society. On the other he is not sure that enough men can learn quickly enough to avoid the necessity for revolution even in advanced countries. He is not clear as to whether it is their class position, their general selfishness or their ignorance (or stupidity) which is the key variable here. In *Origins* he gives not a single instance of men learning from past mistakes in such a way as to act more humanely for the general welfare, and yet the implication of his chapter on India is that its leaders can learn a limited truth, i.e., the need for some form of compulsion if India is to industrialize.

⁸¹ Moore loves to cite such great "truths" as: "A policy of law and order favors those who already have privileges, including some whose privileges are not very large." (*Origins*, 354). To which I might reply: "A policy of violence and disorder favors those who are both aggressive and strong, including those who are just a little more aggressive than the vast majority of the people."

far more difficult to dismiss their suffering than if they are merely "exploiters" and "oppressors." The image overwhelmingly conveyed by the volume is that of a Manichean struggle between Good and Evil.

And yet Moore's neo-Marxism also has disadvantages. Aside from the difficulties of applying the analysis to his material, difficulties which I have tried to outline in this paper, the approach limits his ability to draw moral lessons from history. What moral guide to action can we draw from the Japanese experience? As Moore describes it, the actors moved inevitably to a predetermined end.

Moore uses his categories as a rhetorical de-

vice, discarding them when they do not serve rhetorical purposes. Thus to demonstrate the impossibility of liberal or moderate reforms, he sometimes treats liberal or reformist ideas and the men who held them as free agents, who apply their ideology because they mistakenly believe in it rather than because of exploitive class interests.

It may be that violent national Communist revolutions are necessary if a good many of the developing nations are to modernize, and that the costs of such revolutions would be less than the costs of not having them. However, Moore has not made a case for this proposition. I find his position intellectually and morally untenable.

REPLY TO ROTHMAN

BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.

Harvard University

Stanley Rothman is laboring under a series of misapprehensions. What appears to give them some minimal coherence is evidently the curious conviction that in criticizing *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* he must cope with the work of a disillusioned former fellow-traveler. In discussing my alleged fundamental assumptions, toward the end of his essay, Rothman asserts:

Moore's writing indicates that he is one of that generation of scholars to whom the Soviet Revolution once represented the hope of a radical transformation of mankind. Disillusioned by the results of that Revolution, he has now, with the mellowing of the Soviet regime, been able to justify his earlier enthusiasm for it by arguing that it has been no more repressive than other alternatives. (31,506.)¹

Upon reflection I think I am entitled to take this as a compliment to my efforts at critical detachment. In my books on the Soviet Union I must have restrained my hostility to the point where my critic could succeed in discovering what he takes to be evidence of enthusiasm. At any rate, his discovery is a completely original one!

After this discovery Rothman goes on to at-

¹ With a sense of amused astonishment I reread pages 31 and 506 in *Social Origins*, which Rothman cited as specific evidence for his claims. On page 31 in footnote 65 I was *describing* a type of disillusionment that took place in England as the French Revolution entered its radical phase and comparing that disillusionment with American reactions to communist expansion after 1945. In so doing I said: "There is the same ambiguity about the character of the revolutionary enemy, the same exploitation of this ambiguity by the dominant elements in society, *the same disillusionment and dismay among its original supporters as the revolution abroad deceived their hopes.*" (Italics added) How Rothman could so misread my remarks as to attribute this type of disillusionment to me personally I cannot understand. On page 506 there is no hint at all of my alleged shift of views. Perhaps what Rothman meant to cite was page 505 where I said: "As I have reluctantly come to read this evidence, the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more."

tribute ideas to me that he probably got from reading the works of my very good friend, Herbert Marcuse. For example, so far as I remember, I have never used the expression "non-repressive society," which has become in a way Professor's Marcuse's trade-mark. ("Less repressive" is quite another expression, which I do use.) Nor did I use the expression "free non-repressive society," preferring to say "free and rational society," on the page cited by Rothman in this same paragraph. Indeed, to continue examining this passage as an example of Rothman's criticism, I have never been sanguine about "revolutions in the third world as embodying hope for the future" of mankind, much as such revolutions against American attempts to prop up various forms of political landlordism do seem to me justified. But perhaps Rothman is simply mixed up, because I doubt very much that either Marcuse or I would ever speak about "the goal of a compulsionless society!"

By this point it may already be apparent that the basis of Rothman's critique is so comic I wonder whether he deserves a serious reply. I have decided to say something, however, because there may be a number of readers of this journal seriously interested in the issues who have not read *Social Origins*. It is also quite possible that he and his helpers have found some factual errors.²

² That I misuse my sources Rothman asserts more than once. Sometimes he means that my interpretation of an author's data leads me to a conclusion different from that of the author, as in the case of my use of the evidence in Mary Wright's *Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism*. That is a valid difference, I believe, and one that Rothman also uses when, for example, he draws different conclusions from those of E. P. Thompson (footnote 32), but its validity rests, of course, on the evidence offered for the change.

What appears to be a more damaging accusation is the kind of flat statement Rothman makes about my alleged inability to cite properly. For example, in referring to my discussion of the Community Development Program in India, he says: "Moore does not accurately cite a single case study in which reform is blocked by the power structure of the village." (p. 00) In the accompanying footnote, he cites only three of my many sources, declaring: "None of them directly support

This, however, is a matter I must now leave to specialists, since my work for the past five years has been on other problems. On the other hand, Rothman's treatment of my text raises serious doubts about his scholarly craftsmanship.

As a result of Rothman's technique of twisting arguments in *Social Origins* and then attacking these caricatures, the author finds it impossible to recognize his own views. *Social Origins* is mainly about different forms of social structure, their varying origins and political consequences. In its essentials, this central aspect escapes Rothman's vision. Thus he can assert that "Moore denies that the Chinese gentry differed in kind from other aristocracies," and can put the rhetorical question: "If, as he argues, Chinese and Japanese landlords were equally exploitive (*sic*) in intention, and neither contributed in any way to such [economic] growth, wherein lies the difference between the two societies?" After the pains to which I went to describe the differences—in respect to internal organization, relationships to the peasantry, to the government, and to the commercial classes—Rothman's comments show that he chose

his assertion and Beals [*Gopalpur*] states almost the opposite on p. 82."

In the first place, it is simply not true that the three sources (and others cited earlier and later) do not "directly support" my statements, which consist mainly of close paraphrases from the sources cited. Now, as to Beals' stating "almost the opposite" of my general view that the wealthy landlords blocked reform when it threatened their interests or control over the village, I see not the slightest contradiction on p. 82 of Beals' study. There Beals credits the wealthy Gopalpur landlords, who are the "kingpin of the social structure of the villages they control," with being "the innovators who introduce new agricultural techniques," as well as other improvements in the village in many cases. But unlike Beals, Rothman does not ask the simple question: "For whose benefit are these innovations or reforms?" Beals had already given his explicit answer on p. 80, where he pointed out that some wealthy landowners introduced new and costly fertilizer, equipment, crops and techniques—but they did this only on their own large acreage farms. Many of these innovations were not suitable for farms of small acreage, as is true elsewhere in the world, of course. Small farmers, then, remained dependent for seed and credit on the wealthy landlord. Furthermore, as Beals adds, on p. 82 but not cited by Rothman, "If those who now serve as laborers are converted into farmers, there will be no one to do the weeding and harvesting." The landlord's stake in the *status quo* is, I think, clear.

to sweep these crucial considerations under the nearest rug.

Somewhat earlier in his essay there is an even more glaring example. About my discussion of the American Civil War, Rothman says: "The assumption that Northern businessmen would have deferred to the leadership of Southern 'Junkers' to produce a 'German' solution to industrialization if the Civil War had not occurred is absurd." (p. 72) Here, as in many other instances, Rothman attributes to me views that are the precise opposite of those I expressed. My point was *not* that the Civil War prevented this form of coalition. Rather it was that the Civil War happened in large measure because the conditions necessary for this type of reactionary coalition were weak or absent.

Also typical is Rothman's habit of selecting part of an argument that seems to support his charges and omitting material that shows his claims to be false or ridiculous. For example, in my general discussion on moderate reform and revolutionary radicalism (pp. 505–506), Rothman chooses to quote *only* the three paragraphs that deal with the costs of revolutionary violence. The fourth paragraph, without which the whole discussion loses its focus, begins:

The gradualist argument seems shattered. But precisely at this point the revolutionary argument also collapses. It is clear beyond all shadow of doubt that the claims of existing socialist states to represent a higher form of freedom than Western democratic capitalism rest on promise not performance. There is no denying the patent fact that the Bolshevik Revolution did not bring liberation to the people of Russia. At most it may have brought the possibility of liberation. Stalinist Russia was one of the bloodiest tyrannies the world has yet seen.

In the same vein I went on to say that "The range and depth of Stalinist repression and terror were far too great to find explanation, let alone justification, through some conception of revolutionary necessity." For this terror, I pointed out, there were deep institutional roots, an issue discussed in other writings of mine. "In general," this passage concludes, "one of the most revolting features of revolutionary dictatorships has been their use of terror against little people who were as much victims of the old order as were the revolutionaries themselves, often more so."

On the whole, for all its scholarly façade, Rothman's critique has much of the air of a Congressional inquiry. Throughout, but especially toward the end, it has the characteristic ring of orthodoxy under threat and engaged in unmasking presumably dangerous intellectual in-

tentions. If there is a danger somewhere—and there probably is to important values that Rothman may possibly share with me—that danger resides primarily in a set of social facts and trends. *Social Origins* did not create the facts, and Rothman's earnest efforts will not make the facts go away.

As part of such attempts, he calls my views "neo-Marxist" or "vulgar Marxism." Now, my general view of Marxism is that it is often superb for the insights it gives into the behavior of the upper classes, but that it is nearly worthless for the understanding of the behavior of the lower classes. To be just a trifle more specific, the ways in which dominant classes pump an economic surplus out of the lower classes does, in my judgment, constitute a major key to the understanding of any specific social structure. Political levers, traditional customs and even values, all play their part—often one more crucial than the mode of production itself, in this process of extracting the surplus.³ On the other hand, the Marxist tradition is of little help, I find, in understanding those aspects of social structure among the lower classes that lead at times to resistance and revolution against the prevailing order or at other times to docile acceptance. If that is "neo-Marxism" ac-

³ As to my being anti-Weber, I can only say that I regret that Rothman can read *Social Origins* as constituting in any substantial sense an attack on Max Weber, whom I greatly respect and whose pessimistic views on Western civilization I share.

cording to *Social Origins*, so be it. I find only sheer caricature in Rothman's effort to restate my assumptions in the opening portion of his critique, with its remarks about the mode of production determining ideology, or on exploitation as a "primary goal" of ruling classes, or on the survival of Hinduism and the caste system "only because they served the interests of the ruling strata," or on the Meiji Restoration as "based entirely on the self-interest of a particular segment of the ruling class," or on past revolutions as "inevitable" (something patently unprovable). His restatement is a caricature of the *conclusions* I reached after much puzzling and re-thinking—and does not even dimly reflect the assumptions with which I began. In any case, the issue is not whether *Social Origins* is neo-Marxist or not—but whether it is correct.

It would be possible, though fruitless, to go on at much greater length and in greater detail—especially fruitless since "explicit disclaimers" do not constitute legitimate evidence to my critic. The book itself really has to stand as the most valid answer to Rothman's kind of criticism. It is safe to anticipate that my critic can and will find even more ideas in *Social Origins* and in my reply that he can misrepresent. Yet the ambiguity of his last paragraph gives me reason to think that the book carried some persuasion, even for him. Therefore I hope that even he may wish to reread it in a calmer spirit some years hence.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For further comments by Professor Rothman, see the Communications section of this issue.)

A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF ROUSSEAU'S GENERAL WILL¹

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A "general will" is a philosophical and psychological contradiction in terms; will is a conception understandable, if at all, only in terms of individual actions. The problem cannot be

N. B.: For the convenience of American readers, reference has been made whenever possible to a standard English translation of Rousseau. All translations from French editions are my own.

¹ This title was adopted not out of modesty, but simply because this article makes certain assumptions which are not universally agreed on. Most importantly, it holds that Rousseau understood "will" not only as a psychological attribute but also as a moral faculty; that there is an implicit metaphysical dimension in Rousseau without which a concept such as "willing" would be incomplete. By treating the concept of volition in psychological rather than in metaphysical terms, however, Mrs. J. N. Shklar, in her persuasive *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1969) is able to make the general will both internally consistent and closely related to Rousseau's individual psychology. That is, by treating individual will as a defense-mechanism, and the general will as a collective defense-mechanism (used largely as a weapon against inequality, whose effects for Shklar are mainly psychologically destructive), she is able to make the general will conceptually plausible. This reading, however, seems to involve a weakening of those (admittedly few) passages in which Rousseau speaks, in a traditional way, of volition as a moral faculty whose endorsement is the source of all moral legitimacy, e.g., "to deprive your will of all freedom is to deprive your actions of all morality" (*Contrat Social*, chapter IV). This idea is clearly the foundation of Rousseau's attack on paternalism and on the equation of right and force. It is certainly possible to conceive the "general will one has as a citizen" in a psychological and metaphorical sense, if one imagines this "generality" in terms of factors wholly congruent with psychology: education, public spectacles and games, the authority of the legislator. But this can never show how a will in anything but a psychological sense can be general, simply because the education and authority congruent with psychology are not congruent with a concept of free will and of moral choice. A psychological treatment of volition does in fact hold out the best prospect of a consistent treatment of Rousseau; but it also involves a weakening of the voluntarist and contractarian elements of his philosophy.

glossed over by attempting to reduce the general will—as did T. H. Green—to a "common ego," or to an analogical forerunner of Kant's pure practical reason.² Why, then, did Rousseau make so unviable an idea the center of his political theory,³ and why has that idea continued to receive serious attention?

The general will has continued to be taken seriously because it is an attempted (though not explicit) amalgam of two extremely important traditions of political thought, which may be called, roughly, ancient "cohesiveness" and modern "voluntarism." Political thought since the 17th century has been characterized, among other things, by voluntarism, by an emphasis on the assent of individuals as the standard of political legitimacy.⁴ One certainly finds this in many of the most important thinkers between Hobbes and Kant; and even Hegel, while scarcely an "atomistic individualist" or a contractarian, explicitly argued that while "in the states of antiquity the subjective end simply coincided with the state's will," in modern times "we make claims for private judgment, private willing, and private conscience." When a political decision is to be made, Hegel continued, "an 'I will' must be pronounced by man himself." This "I will," he thought, must have an "appropriate objective existence" in the person of a monarch; "in a well-organized monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to law alone, and the monarch's part is merely to set to the law the subjective 'I will'."⁵ If even Hegel allows this voluntarist turn in his own non-contractarian theory, it goes without saying that all of social contract theory can be seen as the supreme example

² Green, T. H., *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*. (Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1941), pp. 82 ff.

³ Barth, Hans, "Volonté Générale et Volonté Particulière chez J.-J. Rousseau," in *Rousseau et la Philosophie Politique*, Annales de Philosophie Politique No. 5, (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1965), pp. 44 ff.

⁴ Chapman, John, "Political Theory: Logical Structure and Enduring Types," in *L'Idée de Philosophie Politique*, Annales de Philosophie Politique No. 6, (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1965), pp. 65-69.

⁵ Hegel, G. W. F., *Philosophy of Right*, translated T. M. Knox, Oxford University Press, London, 1942, pp. 280, 288-289.

of voluntaristic ideas. No theory, then, escaped the enthronement of will—quite literally, in Hegel's case—at some point in the political scheme. Why voluntarism, political legitimacy through authorization by individual wills, came to hold such an important place in Western thought, requires a book to itself, a history of political will.⁶ What is probable is that ancient quasi-aesthetic theories of the best regime and the proper end of man gave way, with the introduction of Christianity, to thinking about politics after the model of “good acts”: just as good acts required both knowledge of the good and the will to do good, politics now required moral assent, the implication of the individual in politics through his own volition. The freedom to conform voluntarily to absolute standards had always been important in Christian doctrine; the Reformation doubtless strengthened the element of individual choice in moral thinking, while downplaying the role of moral authority. And it was natural enough that the Protestant view of individual moral autonomy and responsibility should spill over from metaphysics into politics, forming the intellectual basis of contract theory. The mere excellence of a social institution would no longer be enough; it would now require rational assent. However voluntarism and contract theory arose, what is certain is that ideas of the “good” state increasingly gave way to ideas of the merely “legitimate” state.⁷ And this legitimacy, after the 17th century, was often taken to rest on will.

But while voluntarism took care of legitimacy, it could say nothing about the intrinsic goodness of what is willed. It is, of course, possible to assert that whatever is willed is right simply because it is willed.⁸ But this was not enough for Rousseau; and it was precisely here that he made a stand for a particular kind of will. He wanted will to take a particular form;

he wanted voluntarism to legitimize what he conceived to be the unity and cohesiveness—the generality—of ancient polity, particularly of Sparta and Rome. Indeed his political ideal was the ancient polity, now willed by moderns who were as concerned with reasons for obligation as with perfect forms of government. Against the alleged atomism of earlier contract theory, Rousseau wanted the generality—the non-individualism, or rather the pre-individualism—of antiquity to be legitimized by consent. Here of course he got himself into the paradox of insisting on the willing of the essentially non-voluntaristic politics characteristic of antiquity. He got himself, that is, into a philosophical paradox of willed non-voluntarism; but if this paradoxical concept, the general will, a will which is the corporate “will” of a whole society, a will to stop being willful, cannot be philosophically defended, it can at least be unravelled with interesting implications for all voluntaristic and perfectionist theories—not to mention democratic theories, which are always hard-pressed to fuse what is wanted with what is intrinsically good. And this treatment helps to clear up some of the usually insoluble paradoxes in Rousseau, and to make his thought clearer, if not less problematical.

I

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a severe critic of modern political life—of its lack of a common morality and virtue, of its lack of patriotism and civic religion, of its indulgence in “base” philosophy and morally unconstructive arts.⁹ At the same time, he was a great admirer of the more highly unified political systems of antiquity, in which, as he thought, morality, civic religion, patriotism, and a simple way of life had made men “one,” wholly socialized and truly political.¹⁰ And he thought that modern political

⁶ Plamenatz, John, “Equality of Opportunity,” in *Aspects of Human Equality*, edited L. Bryson, (Harper and Bros., New York, 1957), pp. 79–107.

⁷ Jouvenel, Bertrand de, *Sovereignty*, translated by J. Huntington, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957), various passages.

⁸ Leibniz accused Hobbes and Pufendorf of adhering to this view. “To say *stat pro ratione voluntas*, my will takes the place of reason,” Leibniz observed, “is properly the motto of a tyrant.” He traced this line of thought back to Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, and urged that Hobbes, “who is noted for his paradoxes, wanted to maintain nearly the same thing as Thrasymachus.” See Leibniz, G. W., *Méditation sur la Notion Commune de la Justice*, edited G. Mollat, Verlag J. H. Robolsky, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 56 ff.

⁹ See particularly Rousseau, J.-J., *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, translated G. D. H. Cole, (E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1950), pp. 172–174; Rousseau, J.-J., *Gouvernement de Pologne* in *Political Writings*, edited C. E. Vaughan, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1962), Vol. II, pp. 430, 437–438; Rousseau, J.-J., *Dissertation on Inequality*, translated G. D. H. Cole, (E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1950), pp. 247 ff., 266 ff.; Rousseau, J.-J., *Lettre à M. d'Alembert*, critical edition of M. Fuchs, (Librairie Droz, Geneva, 1948) (entire).

¹⁰ See particularly Rousseau, *Gouvernement de Pologne*, *op. cit.*, chapters II and III; Rousseau, *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–158; Rousseau, J.-J., *Economie Politique* in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 253–254; Rousseau, J.-J., *Rome et Sparte*, in

life divided man against himself, leaving him, with all his merely private and anti-social interests, half in and half out of political society, enjoying neither the amoral independence of nature nor the moral elevation afforded by true socialization.¹¹

Why Rousseau thought the unified ancient political systems preferable to modern ones is not too hard to understand. He conceived the difference between natural man and political man in very sharp terms; while for most contract theory political life was merely non-natural (and this largely to do away with arguments for natural political authority), for Rousseau it was positively unnatural, or anti-natural, a complete transformation of the natural man. The political man must be deprived of his natural powers and given others, "which are foreign to him and which he cannot use without the help of others"; politics reaches a peak of perfection when natural powers are completely dead and extinguished, and man is given a "partial and corporate existence."¹² The defect of modern politics, in Rousseau's view, was that it was insufficiently political; it compromised between the utter artificiality and communality of political life and the naturalness and independence of pre-political life, and in so doing caused the greatest misfortunes of modern man: self-division, conflict between private will and the common good, a sense of being neither in one condition nor another. "What makes human misery," Rousseau said in *Le Bonheur Public*, "is the contradiction which exists between our situation and our desires, between our duties and our inclinations, between nature and social institutions, between man and citizen."¹³ To make man one, to make him as happy as he can be, "give him entirely to the state, or leave him entirely to himself . . . but if you divide his heart, you will rip him apart; and do not imagine that the state can be happy, when all its members suffer."¹⁴

Above all, the imperfect socialization of modern man, in Rousseau's view, allowed private persons and corporate interests to control other private persons, leading to extreme inequality and personal dependence; only generality of laws based on an idea of common good, he thought, could abolish all private dependence, which was for him, perhaps, the supreme social evil. What he wanted was that socialized men might be "perfectly independent of all the rest, and extremely dependent on the city,"¹⁵ for only the power of the state, and the generality of its laws, "constitutes the liberty of its members."¹⁶

Ancient polities such as Sparta, Rousseau thought, with their simplicity, morality (or politics) of the common good, civic religion, moral use of fine and military arts, and lack of extreme individualism and private interest, had been political societies in the proper sense: in them man was "part of a larger whole" from which he "in a sense receives his life and being."¹⁷ Modern "prejudices," "base philosophy," and "passions of petty self-interest," on the other hand, assure that "we moderns can no longer find in ourselves anything of that spiritual vigor which was inspired in the ancients by everything they did" (*Gouvernement de Pologne*).¹⁸ And this spiritual vigor may be taken to mean the avoidance (through identity with a "greater whole") of "that dangerous disposition which gives rise to all our vices,"¹⁹ self-love. Political education in an extremely unified state will "lead us out of ourselves" before the human ego "has acquired that contemptible activity which absorbs all virtue and constitutes the life and being of little minds" (*Économie Politique*).²⁰ It follows that the best social institutions "are those best able to denature man, to take away his absolute existence and to give him a relative one, and to carry the *moi* into the common unity" (*Émile*).²¹ These social institutions, in ideal ancient polities, were always for Rousseau the creation of a great legislator, a Numa or a Moses: they did not develop and perfect themselves in political

Political Writings, edited Vaughan, op. cit., Vol. I pp. 314-318; Shklar, J. N., "Rousseau's Two Models: Sparta and the Age of Gold," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXXI (March 1966), 25-51.

¹¹ Rousseau, J.-J., *Le Bonheur Public*, in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, op. cit., vol. I pp. 325-326.

¹² Rousseau, J.-J., *Le Contrat Social*, translated F. Watkins, in *Political Writings*, (Thomas Nelson and Sons, Edinburgh, 1953), p. 42 (hereafter cited as CS).

¹³ Rousseau, *Le Bonheur Public*, op. cit., p. 326.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Rousseau, CS, op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁸ Rousseau, J.-J., *Gouvernement de Pologne*, translated F. Watkins, in *Political Writings*, op. cit., pp. 166-167 (hereafter cited as *Pologne*).

¹⁹ Rousseau, J.-J., *Économie Politique*, translated G. D. H. Cole, (E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1950), p. 308 (hereafter cited as *Éc. Pol.*).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Rousseau, J.-J., *Émile* (excerpt), in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, vol. II p. 145.

experience, but were "handed down" by the law-giver.²²

But if Rousseau thought highly unified ancient polity, and its political morality of common good, superior to modern fragmented politics, and its political morality of self-interest, at the same time he shared with modern individualist thought the conviction that all political life was conventional and could be made obligatory only through individual consent. He very definitely thought that he had based political obligation and rightful political authority on convention: "civil association is the most voluntary act in the world; since every individual is born free and his own master, no one is able, on any pretext whatsoever, to subject him without his consent."²³ Indeed, the first four chapters of the *Contrat Social* are devoted to refutations of erroneous theories of obligation and right (paternal authority, the "right of the strongest," and obligation derived from slavery). "Since no man," Rousseau concluded, "has natural authority over his fellow men, and since might in no sense makes right, convention remains as the basis of all legitimate authority among men."²⁴

And yet Rousseau was also clear that contract theory provides, in itself, little more than a mere theory of political obligation. In the *Lettres de la Montagne* (VI), speaking of contract and consent, he said that a state is made one by the union of its members; that this union is the consequence of obligation; and that obligation can follow only from convention. He admitted that the foundation of obligation had divided political theorists: "according to some, it is force; according to others, paternal authority; according to others, the will of God."²⁵ All theorists, he said, establish their own principle of obligation and attack that of others. "I myself have not done otherwise," Rousseau declared, "and, following the soundest element of those who have discussed these matters, I have settled on, as the foundation of the body politic, the contract of its members." And he concluded by asking, "what more certain foundation can obligation among men have, than the free agreement of him who obliges himself?"²⁶

One may suspect that for Rousseau, contract theory was more a way of destroying wrong theories of obligation and authority, than of creating a comprehensive theory of what is

politically right. While for Hobbes and Locke the theory of obligation by consent is of central importance, for Rousseau it is not a complete political theory. Any political system "which confines itself to mere obedience will find difficulty in getting itself obeyed. If it is good to know how to deal with men as they are, it is much better to make them what there is need that they should be" (*Économie Politique*).²⁷ That, in a word, was Rousseau's criticism of all contract theory: it dealt too much with the form of obligation, with will as it is, and not enough with what one ought to be obligated to, and with will as it might be.

His criticism of Hobbes is based on this point. Hobbes had, indeed, established rightful political authority on consent, rejecting paternal authority and obligation based on either natural or divine law; he had made law (and therefore morality) the command of an artificial "representative person" to whom subjects were "formerly obliged" through transfer of natural rights (save self-defense) by consent.²⁸ But Hobbes had done nothing to cure the essential wrongness (in Rousseau's view) of modern politics; private interest was rampant, and indeed paramount, in Hobbes' system (could one not decide whether or not to risk one's life for the Hobbesian state?). The essential error of Hobbes, Rousseau thought, was to have read back into the state of nature all the human vices which half-socialization had created, and thus to see culturally-produced depravities as "natural" and Hobbesian absolutism, rather than the creation of a feeling of a common good, as the remedy for these depravities. "The error of Hobbes and of the philosophers," Rousseau declared, "is to confound natural man with the men they have before their eyes, and to carry into one system a being who can subsist only in another" (*L'État de Guerre*).²⁹ Rousseau, who thought that a perfectly socialized state (like Sparta) could elevate men, and turn them from "stupid and limited animals" into moral and intelligent beings,³⁰ must have thought Hobbesian politics incomplete, one "which confines itself to mere obedience," one which did not attempt to make men "what there is need that they should be," but which, through a system of mere mu-

²⁷ Rousseau, *Éc. Pol.*, p. 297.

²⁸ Oakshott, Michael, *Rationalism in Politics*, (Methuen and Co., London, 1962), pp. 258 ff.; Oakshott, Michael, Introduction to Hobbes' *Leviathan*, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1957), pp. XXXV-L.

²⁹ Rousseau, J.-J., *L'État de Guerre*, in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, vol. I p. 306.

³⁰ Rousseau, CS, p. 20.

²² Rousseau, *Pologne*, pp. 163-165.

²³ Rousseau, CS, p. 117.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁵ Rousseau, J.-J. *Lettres de la Montagne*, in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, vol. II pp. 199-200.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

tual forbearance,³¹ did not undertake any improvement in political life. "Let it be asked," said Rousseau, "why morality is corrupted in proportion as minds are enlightened";³² Hobbes might well have an enlightened view of obligation (to the extent that he based it on consent), but he did nothing about the moral corruption caused by "private interest" and "individual will."

Rousseau, then, held in his mind, at once, both the idea that the closely unified political systems of antiquity (as he idealized them) were the most perfect kinds of polity, and the notion that all political society is the conventional creation of individual wills through a social contract. Holding both these ideas created problems, for while the need for consent to fundamental principles of political society, for creation of a mere political construct through "will and artifice," are doctrines characteristic of what Michael Oakshott has called the "idiom of individuality,"³³ the ancient conception of a highly unified and collective politics was dependent not only on a morality of the common good quite foreign to any insistence on individual will as the creator of society and as the basis of obligation (and Rousseau sometimes recognized this, particularly in the *Économie Politique*), but was also dependent on a view of political life as the highest, most all-embracing end of man, and was, moreover, considered both natural, and prior, ontologically if not chronologically, to the independent existence of self-sufficient men. Given the ancient view of the morality of the common good and the supreme importance and naturalness of political life, ancient thought had not had to create theories of political obligation (which are needed only when the duty to obey is in doubt); politics being the highest end of man, obligation was not a real problem, and the task of the great legislator was not to show why men ought to obey, but merely in what way—under which kind of regime—they should do so. Legislation was the task of giving the most perfect form to an intrinsically valuable activity.

Rousseau, not being a systematic philosopher (as he often pointed out), never really reconciled the tensions between his theory of obligation, and his model of political perfection. If one wants to make Rousseau more consistent than he cared to be, one must admit that his ancient ideal model, as the creation, not of a contractual relation of individual wills, but of a great legislator working with political education and a

common good morality, is not "obligatory" on citizens, is not founded in right. It is true that Rousseau sometimes spoke as though ancient systems were constructed by mutual individual consent; but he did not usually speak in those terms. Even though, for him, all political society, ancient or modern, is artificial in the sense that it is not the original condition of man, contract theory comprehends an additional element of artifice, namely the notion that a society must be created by the will of all its members. Rousseau rarely spoke as though ancient polity had been artificial in this sense; he usually said that ancient systems were created, not by contract, but by the genius of legislators like Moses and Lycurgus. Moses, for example, "had the audacity to create a body politic" out of "a swarm of wretched fugitives"; he "gave them customs and usages."³⁴ Lycurgus "undertook to give institutions" to Sparta; he "imposed on them an iron yoke" (*Gouvernement de Pologne*).³⁵ It is, really, only in the *Contrat Social* that Rousseau makes much reference to consent or contract in ancient politics; the usual emphasis (as in the *Économie Politique* and *Gouvernement de Pologne*) is on great men, political education, and the absence of a highly developed individual will.³⁶

One can say, moreover, if one wants to juxtapose parts of Rousseau's thought to each other, that he made fundamental errors in analyzing the unified spirit of ancient politics, by recognizing the desirable effects of a morality of the common good, without recognizing that the very absence of a notion of individual will as supreme had made that morality (and thereby that unity) possible. But, after all these things have been pointed out, it remains to be said that Rousseau was consistently clear that modern calamities caused by self-interest must be avoided, and that the political systems created by ancient legislators were better than any modern ones. Although it did not always occur to Rousseau that both the merely self-interested will which he hated, and the will necessary for consent to conventional society, were part of the same idiom of modern political thought, and perhaps inseparable, he always thought that mere will, as such, could never create a proper political society. For him, then (whatever the confusions over naturalness, will, or the presence or absence of either or both in any political idiom), the problem of political theory, above all in the *Contrat Social*, became that of reconciling the requirements of consent (which obligates) and

³¹ Oakshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, p. 261.

³² Rousseau, *L'État de Guerre*, p. 307.

³³ Oakshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, pp. 249-251.

³⁴ Rousseau, *Pologne*, pp. 163-165.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Rousseau, *Ec. Pol.*, pp. 293-311.

perfect socialization (which makes men "one"); men must somehow choose the politically perfect, somehow will that complete socialization which will preclude self-division. Will, though the basis of consent, cannot be left as it is in traditional contract theory, with no proper object. If it is true that it is the source of obligation, it is also true that merely self-interested will is the cause of everything Rousseau hated in modern civilization.³⁷ And perfect political forms, whatever Rousseau might have said about their being "given," must now (in the *Contrat Social*) be willed.

Setting all the contradictions and vacillations aside, then, there are two important elements in the two views that Rousseau held simultaneously: first, that the importance of ancient polity had to do with its unity and its common morality, and not with its relation, or lack of it, to contract theory; second, that individual consent (whatever this might do to the "legitimacy" of Sparta) is needed for obligation, which is needed because the state is conventional. It is impossible to make every element of Rousseau both consistent and true to the political principle that he tried to establish: that will is not enough, that perfect polity alone is not enough, that will must be united to perfection, and that perfection must be the standard of what is willed. And this, perhaps, is the source of that odd idea, *general will*: a fusion of the generality (unity, communality) of antiquity with the will (consent, contract) of modernity. What makes Rousseau, without doubt, the most utopian of all great political theorists, is his insistence that even a perfect political system be willed by all subject to it. "Undoubtedly," he said, "there is a universal justice derived from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be mutual . . . conventions and laws are necessary, therefore, to unite rights with duties, and to accomplish the purposes of justice."³⁸ Though "that which is good and conformable to order is such by the nature of things, independent of human conventions,"³⁹ those conventions are yet required.

Rousseau's political thought is a noble attempt to unite the best elements of contract theory, of individual consent, with his perfect, unified ancient models, which, being founded on a morality of common good, had no private wills to "reconcile" to the common interest (which was natural), and thus no need of consent, no need of contract. It is this (perhaps unconscious and certainly unsystematic) attempt to fuse two

modes of political thought, to have common good *and* individual will, which gives Rousseau's political thought that strange cast which some have thought contradictory; a vacillation between "individualism" and "collectivism," but which was not merely that. The problem for Rousseau was more specific and more subtle: how one can obey only his own free will, the source of obligation, in society; how it is possible to purify this will of mere private interest and selfishness, which create inequality, destroy virtue, and divide man against himself; how it is possible to insure that this individual will will want only what the common good—preferably a common good like that of ancient politics—requires. It is really a problem of retaining will, but of making it more than mere will, so that society will have a common good and a general interest, *as if it enjoyed a morality of the common good*—a morality which Rousseau sometimes recognized as the real foundation of ancient unity.

Looked at from this point of view, all of the paradoxes and "problems" in Rousseau's theory become comprehensible: why will must be retained, and why it must be made "general"; how general laws will promote the common good, but why not law, but legislative will, is final; why a great legislator can suggest perfect political forms, and why he cannot merely impose them. Above all, it is clear that this point of view helps to explain the greatest paradox in all of Rousseau—that is, the paradox created by the fact that, in the original contractual situation, the motives needed by individuals to relinquish particular will and self-interest, and to embrace a "general" will and the common good, cannot exist at the time the compact is made, and can only be the *result* of the socialization and common morality that society alone can create.⁴⁰ It is certain that if either an ideal of social perfection (Sparta), or a notion of conventional society created by mere will, were enough for Rousseau, he never would have insisted on a combination of will and perfect socialization, on a general will. There would, in fact, be no paradox at all, if perfection were only a formal question, if the state were founded on a morality of the common good and obligation were not a central problem. A great legislator, like Moses or Lycurgus, could create the best forms, and obedience would be only a question of correspondence to a system naturally and rationally right. But Rousseau said that a new-born people must, in order to will good laws, be able to "appreciate sound political prin-

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 307-309.

³⁸ Rousseau, CS, pp. 37-38.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 44. Cf. Rousseau, J.-J., *Des Loix*, in *Political Writings*, edited. Vaughan, vol. I p. 331.

ciples";⁴¹ these cannot be merely given to them, but must be willed. Why is it that "the social consciousness to be created by the new institutions would have to preside over the establishment of those same institutions,"⁴² unless, somehow, the people must understand and will the system? There would be no paradox of cause and effect (the central problem of sound politics) in Rousseau if men did not have both to will, and to will a perfection which presupposes (on Rousseau's own terms) a transcendence of mere will, and the attainment of all the advantages of a morality of the common good, without actually having that morality, which would destroy obligation.

It remains to show that the attempted fusion of individual will and common-good morality is comprehended in the notion of the general will.

II

Rousseau begins the *Contrat Social*, not with the conception of general will, but with a fairly traditional contractarian view of the origin of society. Men being naturally (if not by nature)⁴³ perfectly independent and society made necessary only by the introduction of property (and the consequences of this introduction), men unite by contract to preserve themselves and their property. In this conventional society, there is an area of common interest, "for if the opposition of private interests made the establishment of societies necessary, it is the agreement of these same interests that made it possible."⁴⁴ It is "what these several interests have in common," says Rousseau, "that constitutes the social bond." It is only on the "basis of this common interest that society must be governed."⁴⁵

Rousseau does not talk in these rationalistic, contractarian terms for very long. Soon enough it turns out that society's "common interest" is not merely what a lot of private interests have in common: society, when it is perfect, is a complete transformation of these private interests; it is only when "each citizen is nothing, and can do nothing, without all the rest," that

society "may be said to have reached the highest attainable peak of perfection."⁴⁶ It is only, in other words (keeping in mind which societies had attained peaks of perfection), when society is much like highly unified ancient society, that "perfection" is reached; it is only "in so far as several men conjoined consider themselves as a single body"⁴⁷ that a general will can operate.

This transformed society must be governed on the basis of common interest (which has become something more than traditional common "interest"); only general laws, the creation of a general will (sovereignty), can govern the common interest.⁴⁸ Laws must be perfectly general, because the general will which makes them "loses its natural rectitude when directed toward any individual and determinate object."⁴⁹ The sovereign (the people when "active," when willing fundamental law) must, of course, make such law: "the people subject to the laws should be their author; only those who are forming an association have the right to determine the conditions of that society."⁵⁰ But, if fundamental law is the creation of a general will, how does such a will come about? It cannot be the sum of individual wills, for "the particular will tends by its nature to partiality,"⁵¹ and this, clearly, has been the source of modern "calamities." Law must be willed by those subject to it, for will is the source of obligation. Yet mere wills can never yield generality, and law must be perfectly general, which can happen only "when the whole people legislates for the whole people."⁵² If general laws alone, composed with a view to the common good, were enough, there would be no problem; but even the most general laws must be willed. How can a self-interested multitude "by itself execute so great and difficult a project as a system of legislation?"⁵³ How can a genuine general will, which will create general "conditions" for society, arise?

It is on this point that Rousseau is weak, uncharacteristically weak; he is always able to say what a general will must *exclude*, but he cannot say what it is. And this should come as no surprise. For, strictly speaking, the idea of general will is an impossibility; the ideas of generality, and of will, are mutually exclusive. Will, whatever its crudity as a psychological construct, is characteristically a concept of individuality, of

⁴¹ *Ibid.* (CS).

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Since, for Rousseau, the pre-social man is a "stupid and limited animal," and becomes a moral and intelligent being only in society, there is a sense in which man's highest nature (rather than original nature) is social. Cf. Rousseau, J.-J., *Lettre à M. Philopolis*, in *Political Writings*, edited by Vaughan, vol. I, p. 223.

⁴⁴ Rousseau, CS, p. 25.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 29-30, 38-40.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

particularity, and it is only metaphorically that one can speak of will as "general." No act of philosophic imagination can conjure up anything but a personal will. What can be imagined (and what, in any case, Rousseau admired in ancient society), is not really a "general" will, but a political morality of common good, in which individual will is, to be sure, not suppressed, but simply does not appear in contradistinction to, or with claims or rights against, society. What gave ancient polity (particularly in theory) its unity was not the concurrence of many wills on central points of common interest; rather a moral idiom in which extreme socialization was natural, and in which there was little notion of "will and artifice," gave rise to this unity.

There are a number of revealing passages in which Rousseau observes that something like a political morality of common good, rather than a general will, is necessary for the unity and communality which he desires—for example, at the end of Book II of the *Contrat Social*, where he discusses "the most important of all" laws, "which preserves the people in the spirit of its original institutions," that is, "manners, morals, customs and, above all, public opinion . . . a factor with which the great legislator is secretly concerned when he seems to be thinking only of particular regulations."⁵⁴ Here Rousseau does not, of course, speak of consent or will, but of a kind of political education which will promote a common good.

And he gave other indications that he knew that unity was the consequence of thinking about political relations in terms of a common good, rather than in terms of "cancelling out" of private wills "all the mutually destructive pluses and minuses," so that a "general will remains as the sum of the differences."⁵⁵ Indeed, in the *Économie Politique* he said that if men "were early accustomed to regard their individuality only in its relation to the body of the state, and to be aware, so to speak, of their own existence merely as a part of that of the state, they might at length come to identify themselves in some degree with this greater whole. . . ."⁵⁶ If children are educated in state laws which promote only a common good and a common morality, "they will learn to cherish one another mutually as brothers, to will nothing contrary to the will of society."⁵⁷ There are similar passages in the *Gouvernement de Pologne*, and in the *Projet pour la Corse*, in which the idea of a morality of the common good, reinforced by political educa-

tion and legislation, is set forth, with little or no reference to consent or to will.⁵⁸

But, much of the time, and particularly in the *Contrat Social*, Rousseau speaks not in the idiom of the common good, but of a tension between particular will and general will, and of *reconciling* these wills.⁵⁹ Indeed, the whole concept of political virtue is entirely tied up with this reconciliation of wills, as Rousseau demonstrates in the *Économie Politique*. There he says that the "first and most important rule of legitimate or popular government" is "to follow in everything the general will," but that, in order to follow the general will it must be known, and clearly distinguished from individual or particular will, and that "this distinction is always very difficult to make, and only the most sublime virtue can afford sufficient illumination for it."⁶⁰ A few pages later, he says that "if you would have the general will accomplished, bring all particular wills into conformity with it; in other words, as virtue is nothing more than the conformity of the particular wills with the general will, establish the reign of virtue."⁶¹ Is it not clear that the argument is circular?—that conformity of particular to general will creates virtue, and that virtue is necessary to bring particular will into conformity with general will? This circularity is not due to the fact that Rousseau had no clear conception of virtue; on the contrary, ancient politics were models of virtue, as he described them.⁶² The circularity is caused by trying to make virtue *as* unity, *as* communality, dependent on reconciliation of particular to general will, whereas in fact (and as Rousseau recognizes on adjoining pages of the same treatise), virtue *as* conformity to a common good morality is the creation of great legislation and political education. Vacillation on the true source of ancient unity and communality (reconciliation of wills, or absence of will), is the cause of the circularity of the concept of virtue in Rousseau; moreover, this circularity reflects the same kind of cause-effect paradox as that referred to at the end of part I. In both cases, Rousseau knows perfectly well what he admires: the virtue of ancient society, and the perfection of laws in ancient society. It is only when, in both cases, he tries to describe the possibility of these attrib-

⁵⁸ Rousseau, *Pologne*, chapters II-IV; Rousseau, J.-J. *Projet pour la Corse*, translated F. Watkins, in *Political Writings*, p. 300.

⁵⁹ Rousseau, CS, pp. 40-41.

⁶⁰ Rousseau, *Éc. Pol.*, p. 293.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

⁶² Rousseau, *Pologne*, chapters II-III; Rousseau, *Rome et Sparte*, in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, vol. I pp. 314-320.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁵⁶ Rousseau, *Éc. Pol.*, pp. 307-308.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

utes in terms of reconciled will that he falls down. Nor is this surprising; for, as has been noted, he did, sometimes, recognize that the absence of the very notion that caused all his problems—will as supreme—had constituted the greatness of antiquity. All the paradoxes, circularities and vacillations in Rousseau are caused by the attempted fusion of moral-political idioms which are incompatible on fundamental points.

A clear illustration of just this point is Rousseau's treatment of Brutus in the *Histoire des Moeurs*; in that fragment Rousseau, observing that "it will always be great and difficult to submit the dearest affections of nature to country and virtue,"⁶³ cites Brutus' execution of his treasonous sons as an example of this "submission," not ever mentioning that this was no case of "submitting" particular will to a general will, but (more likely) a case of a common-good morality (coupled with the rights of the Roman *pater familias*) at work. Yet in other works written at about the same time, he makes no reference to submission of will in Roman society, and talks only of legislation and political education.⁶⁴

Nonetheless (and despite these vacillations), it is easy to see why a fusion of political idioms was attempted. For even though perfect socialization was Rousseau's ultimate ideal, consent and will, as the source of obligation, were too important to be summarily discarded. Thus the general will, though an impossibility, was a necessity.

"Actually," said Rousseau, "each individual may, as a man, have a private will contrary to, or divergent from, the general will he has as a citizen" (*Contrat Social*).⁶⁵ This could not, of course, be the case in a state with a common-good morality reinforced by legislation and education (the system sketched in the *Économie Politique*). The passage cited from the *Contrat Social* shows that in that work, the most "contractarian" of Rousseau's writings, and the closest thing he had to a systematic political theory, neither mere will nor perfection wins out alone. For in the *Contrat Social*, there is the possibility that a private person (already a concept of modern individualism) may regard "the artificial person of the state as a fictitious being," and that this "may make him envisage his debt to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution."⁶⁶ It seems clear that if Rousseau were not

trying (however unsystematically) to reconcile will and perfect socialization, these problems could not exist: the new state could not be considered a fictitious being (for it would educate men to think something different); one would not think of his political role as a "contribution" (because one would be naturally part of a greater whole); and there would be no conflict between man and citizen (because the distinction would not exist). Is not the paradox that a man must be "forced to be free"⁶⁷ if his particular will does not conform to the general will an indication that Rousseau tried to gain the advantages of a common-good morality (particularly in the *Contrat Social*) through reconciliation of wills, and this only because will is necessary to obligation?

There is, finally, in Rousseau's most systematic political work (the *Contrat Social*), no postulation of a political morality of the common good as the source of the much-desired unity. Rather, there is a constant attempt to bring particular will into conformity with general will through the efforts of a "great legislator." What the great legislator, in his wisdom, knows to be good, supplies the absence of a common-good morality. Now, the difference between the great legislator of ancient politics and Rousseau's ideal legislator, corresponds exactly to the difference between giving a presupposed unity (without strong will) a perfect form (antiquity), and making people *will* perfect forms (modernity). "All" in the contractual period "stand equally in need of guidance."⁶⁸ Individuals "must be obliged to bring their wills into conformity with their reason," that is, they must will that which is, in itself, rationally best. The combination of individual consent and the legislator's guidance "will effect a union of understanding and will within the social body."⁶⁹ And what is rationally best (to avoid that self-division caused by half-socialization) is the perfectly united and communal polity of antiquity. The legislator, who effects the bringing of will into conformity with reason (not by force, but through persuasion and religious devices), supplies the defect of common-good morality, and simply gets each individual to will something like the laws which *would have* resulted from such a morality. What Rousseau ultimately has, then, is not a "general will" (which is inconceivable), but a "will to the general," which is conceivable if one recalls that political perfection requires both truly general laws and consent to them. Rousseau did not, could not, abolish will—but he prescribed the

⁶³ Rousseau, J.-J., *Histoire des Moeurs*, in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, vol. I p. 337.

⁶⁴ Rousseau, *Éc. Pol.*, pp. 302-310.

⁶⁵ Rousseau, CS, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

form that it must take, and this form is clearly derived from the generality and unity of ancient polity (as Rousseau saw it)—but without a morality of common good, which would have destroyed obligation.

Moreover, not only the form of laws (generality) is derived from ancient models; the *conditions* under which good laws (and indeed good states) are possible, are little more than idealizations of ancient political circumstances. A people is "fit for legislation," according to Rousseau, if it has no old laws, if it is free from threats of invasion and can resist its neighbors, if it is small enough that its "individual members can all know one another," if it can get along without other peoples, if it is "neither very rich nor very poor," and can be self-sufficient, and if it is one which "combines the firmness of an old people with the docility of a new one."⁷⁰ Clearly most of these conditions of the possibility for good polity are abstracted from Rousseau's idealized version of ancient city-states, particularly Sparta. Not only the form of a good political system, then, but also the empirical conditions which could make such a system possible, are derived from Rousseau's models of perfection.

What has been said thus far may be summarized in this way: 1) a perfect state (that is, a perfectly socialized, united and communal state) would have perfectly general laws (that is, laws dealing only with Rousseau's vision of a common good); 2) but laws, especially the most general laws, must be willed by everyone subject to those laws, in order to be obligatory—and they must be made obligatory, for society is merely conventional; 3) therefore, will must take the form of general laws; 4) but will tends to the particular, and law, though the creation of will, must somehow be general; 5) moreover, for particular wills to appreciate the necessity of general laws, effect would have to become cause; 6) therefore, a great legislator, whose instruction can supply the defect of a morality of the common good—the only morality which would *naturally* produce general laws—is necessary; 7) but this legislator is impossibly rare, and, in addition, he cannot create laws, however general and good, for sovereignty is inalienable; 8) thus the legislator must have recourse to religion, and use it to gain the consent of individuals to the general will; 9) but now "consent" is something less than real consent, since an irrational device has been used; 10) finally, the whole system is saved for individual will by the fact that "a people always has a right to change its laws, even the best,"⁷¹ that legislative

will, rather than law itself, is supreme, and that the entire social system can be abolished by will, for "there is not, and cannot be, any sort of fundamental law binding on the body of the people, not even the social contract."⁷²

The theory of Rousseau, then, ultimately reduces itself to two elements: the need for a great legislator to create a "general will," and the extreme limitations put on this legislator by the fact that this general will, though (of course) general, is still will, and must be will. Both elements are the consequence of attempting to unite all the requirements of will with all the advantages of perfect socialization. The legislator may formulate and propose general laws which will produce perfect socialization, and he can get them "willed" through religious devices; but the sovereign cannot be permanently bound, even by perfect laws, and can change these laws and even dissolve society. Thus neither perfection nor will has all the claims in Rousseau; but will can finally be, even if only in a destructive way, triumphant, for if a people "is pleased to do itself harm, who has a right to prevent it from doing so?"⁷³

It is not meant, by analyzing Rousseau in this way, that he was always perfectly consistent in desiring that particular wills should consent to that which an ancient morality of common good would require; indeed, he vacillated on several points, notably in his treatment of civil religion, in which he allowed any tolerant sect to exist, so long as it did not claim exclusive truth or refuse to subscribe to the basic articles of civic religious policy.⁷⁴ Above all, though, Rousseau insisted that each socialized man should somehow "obey no one but himself," and thought he had found a solution to this problem in making the conditions of society (laws) perfectly general and equally applicable to all, so that, the conditions being equal for all, and willed by all, "it is in the interest of no one to make [social requirements] burdensome to the rest,"⁷⁵ and that, since the society cannot wish to hurt all its members by enacting bad general laws, society need offer its members no guarantees.⁷⁶ But this system is essentially modified by the fact that a will to general laws absolutely cannot be attained with mere wills as they are (the cause-effect problem again), but only through the influence of a great legislator: by Rousseau's assertion that there is no real limit to the extent of undertakings possi-

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 152–155.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 53–54.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

ble between the sovereign and its members;⁷⁷ by the idea that the sovereign is the sole judge of how many "powers" of individuals must be socialized;⁷⁸ and by the notion that an ideal society should be very highly socialized indeed. It is modified above all by part IV, chapter II of the *Contrat Social*, which shows, perhaps more clearly than anything in Rousseau, that consent is no longer to be a question of mere volition, and that the general will is something like a modified common-good morality.

The constant will of all the members of the state is the general will; that is what makes them citizens and free. When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what the voters are being asked is not precisely whether they do or do not approve of the proposal, but whether or not it is in conformity with the general will, which is their own. Each, when casting his vote, gives his opinion on this question; and the declaration of the general will is found by counting the ballots. Thus when an opinion contrary to my own prevails, this proves nothing more than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not.⁷⁹

The meaning of this (usually confusing) passage can be understood if "common good" be substituted for "general will"; then it can be seen how general will is *constant* will, and how citizens are not being asked whether they approve a proposal, but whether it is in conformity with a common good.

With all of these modifications in mind, it is clear that, while Rousseau's theory of society and law really is, as he insisted, an attempt to preserve liberty, that liberty is conceived in an odd way: it is "obedience to self-imposed law"⁸⁰ (which must, of course, be general law). Liberty, then, comes down to freeing the individual of all private dependence by making him "very dependent on the city" and its general and equally-applied laws. But, though liberty is obedience to self-imposed law, proper law cannot be created without modification of will by a great legislator, and thus the very idea of liberty is, like other elements of Rousseau, a fusion of the idioms of individual will and of highly unified society. It is because of these modifications that Rousseau's political theory cannot be so easily assimilated to traditional constitutionalism, or to Kant's theory of law, as

some have imagined.⁸¹ For legislative will, and not law itself, is supreme in Rousseau. Nor can Rousseau be easily assimilated to the German "romantic" tradition of the early 19th century, because he would never have replaced general will with the historical evolution of national spirits; he was clear that history, in itself, cannot "justify" anything.⁸² This non-assimilability to other traditions proves that those who view Rousseau as a unique and isolated figure are probably correct; he was, in his own words, one of those few "moderns who had an ancient soul."⁸³

III

The only object of this study has been to elucidate the concept of the general will, and to clear up some of the paradoxes in the *Contrat Social*, by analyzing what Rousseau thought about will and contract, on the one hand, and about perfect political systems, on the other. It has not been a central object to attack Rousseau as unsystematic, to reproach him for not adequately reconciling two modes of political thought, or to "improve" his ideas by making them more consistent. No series of conceptual ambiguities can detract anything from Rousseau's status as the greatest of political psychologists and the most eloquent critic of the psychological destruction wrought by inequality. Nonetheless, it is evident that there is an insurmountable conceptual problem in Rousseau's political thought, and it is this: voluntarist theories are usually composed of two parts, a theory of will as a moral agency, and a theoretical standard of right to which will ought to conform (arbitrary willfulness usually being rejected as a standard of right). In Locke or in Kant, the standard of right to which will must conform (natural law in the first case, universal rational law in the second) does not contradict voluntarism (once one gets around the problem of reconciling free will and absolute standards: in itself a problem which defeated a Leibniz and reduced Kant to hypotheses). But in Rousseau the standard to which will must conform (ancient perfection, or its equivalent) is itself non-voluntaristic; and therefore will and the standard to which it must conform are contradictory. The standard which gives will its object is the very

⁸¹ Cassirer, Ernst, *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe*, translated Gutmann, Kristeller and Randall, (Harper Torchbacks, New York, 1963), pp. 30 ff.

⁸² Rousseau, J.-J., *Première Version du Contrat Social*, in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, vol. I p. 462.

⁸³ Rousseau, J.-J., *Jugement sur la Polysynodie*, in *Political Writings*, edited Vaughan, vol. I p. 421.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

negation of voluntarism. And it is for this reason that Rousseau's political system is somewhat paradoxical. The idea of general will, the paradox of cause and effect in the contractual situation, the circularity of the concept of virtue—all these are due to an attempt to fuse the advantages of a politics founded on will, and of one founded on reason and perfection. One must, in Rousseau, will the kind of society in which one lives, because "to deprive your will of all freedom is to deprive your actions of all morality,"⁸⁴ and this deprivation destroys the obligation one has to obey. Yet mere will can yield only particularity and inequality, and will never produce rational perfection. To retain the moral attributes of will, but to do away with will's particularity and selfishness—that is the problem of Rousseau's political thought. It is a problem which reflects the difficulty which Rousseau found in making free-will and rational authority co-exist in his moral and political thinking. Freedom of the will is as important to the morality of actions for Rousseau as for any traditional voluntarist; but he was suspicious of the very faculty, the only faculty, which could moralize. And that is why he urged, in the *Économie Politique*, that "the most absolute authority is that which penetrates into a man's inmost being, and concerns itself no less with his will than with his actions."⁸⁵ Can the will be both morally autonomous and subject to the rationalizing influence of authority? That was the point which Rousseau never settled altogether. Even Émile, the best-educated of men, chooses to continue to accept the guidance of his

teacher.⁸⁶ How much more, then, do ordinary men need the guidance of a great legislator when they embark on the setting up of a system which will not only aid and defend, but also *moralize* them! The relation of volition to authority is one of the most difficult and one of the most inscrutable problems in Rousseau; the general will is dependent on "a union of will and understanding within the social body,"⁸⁷ but that understanding, which is provided by authority, weakens the idea of will as an autonomous authorizing faculty.

To project the question on a grander scale, one can see in Rousseau's political thought an intuitive attempt to reconcile the two greatest traditions of Western political philosophy, that of "will and artifice" and that of "reason and nature." (Oakeshott) For general will is surely rationalized will. And yet it is not self-rationalized will in a Kantian sense, but will rationalized by the standards and conditions of idealized ancient polity.

Whatever Rousseau's means, in undertaking a fusion of two great modes of political thinking, and however unsuccessful the attempt to make general will a viable conception, one must always, while analyzing and even criticizing the result, grant the grandeur and importance of the effort. For if one could succeed in having the best of both idioms, one would have a political philosophy which would synthesize almost everything valued in the history of Western political thought.

⁸⁶ Rousseau, J.-J., *Emile*, translated B. Foxley, (Everyman's Library, J. M. Dent and Sons, London 1911), p. 444.

⁸⁷ Rousseau, CS, p. 41.

⁸⁴ Rousseau, CS, p. 9.

⁸⁵ Rousseau, *Éc. Pol.*, p. 297.

INTERNATIONAL SUBSYSTEMS: STABILITY AND POLARITY

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I. BIPOLAR OR MULTIPOLAR STABILITY?

One of the current controversies within international relations deals with the "stability" of bipolar as opposed to multipolar stratifications of world power. Morton Kaplan, in codifying the views of classical balance of power theorists,¹ advances the view that multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems.² Kenneth Waltz, sagely pointing to the relatively peaceful international arena since World War II, argues that a bipolar distribution of power can guarantee world stability.³ Many a priori arguments have been presented to buttress the Kaplan and Waltz hypotheses.⁴ In one of the most

¹For statements of classical "balance of power" theory, see R. W. Mowat, *The European States System* (London: Oxford University Press, 1929); Carl J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making* (New York: Norton, 1938); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (4th ed.; New York: Knopf, 1967), Part IV; Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics* (6th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 70-72, 275-78, 577-79, 591-92; Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946). See also Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?" *World Politics*, V (July, 1953), 442-77.

²Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957), Ch. II, V, VI; Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources," *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, ed. James N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 92-121. For other codifications, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Knopf, 1962), pp. 11-93; Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955); George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 187-202; Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 117-32.

³Kenneth N. Waltz, "Stability of the Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, XCIII (Summer, 1964), 881-909.

⁴Among the advocates of multipolarity we may count Roger D. Masters, "A Multi-Bloc Model of the International System," this REVIEW, LV (December, 1961), 780-98. Bipolarity is favored by Raymond Aron, "The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs," *Contemporary Theory in Inter-*

elaborate such formulations, the "interaction opportunity" hypothesis of Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, the presence of stabilizing cross-cutting alliances is postulated to be most likely within multipolar systems, which in turn are a function of the number of major powers and members of a system.⁵ In an attempt to bring the two opposing strands of theory into a larger framework, Richard Rosecrance more recently has suggested that bipolarity and multipolarity may each have their peculiar costs and benefits.⁶ Bipolarity, according to Rosecrance, is distinguished by (1) an absence of "peripheries," such as areas for colonial expansion or neutral powers to woo; (2) all international behavior is highly politicized; (3) there are many crises; (4) changes in power confrontations are either significant or trivial, with no intervening shades of gray; (5) each pole is dominated by major powers highly motivated to expand their domains, willing even to incur brinksmanship situations and hostility spirals; (6) no detente is possible. Multipolarity, on the other hand, is hypothesized to have (1) more interaction opportunities and thus less preoccupation (or obsession) with any one set of states; (2) fewer arms races; (3) more international conflicts; (4) the outcomes of international conflicts are harder to predict in advance; (5) changes in power confrontations have ambiguous consequences for the overall distribution of power. Rosecrance, therefore, urges a "bi-multipolar" arrangement that would combine the best features of both alternatives. The empirical questions and intriguing hypotheses so eloquently raised by Kaplan, Waltz, Deutsch, Singer, and Rosecrance have remained largely unexamined, however.

To date only two efforts have been made to

national Relations, ed. Stanley Hoffmann (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 79-91; Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1965), pp. 69-70. See, however, William E. Griffith, "Eppur Se Muove," *Daedalus*, XCIII (Summer, 1964), 916-19.

⁵Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVI (April, 1964), 390-406.

⁶Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (September, 1966), 314-27.

assemble data for a test of the proposition that international stability is related to the stratification of power in international systems. In one study, Rosecrance establishes nine historical "international systems" between 1740 and 1960 in terms of differing power configurations.⁷ After delineating a number of qualitative categories for describing an international system, he supplies codings for each of the nine systems and proceeds to conduct a necessary and sufficient condition analysis of preconditions to *stability*, which he defines as the ability of a regulator to cope with disturbances threatening to undermine an existing power distribution (where the ratio of regulator strength/level of disturbance is high). With respect to power distribution, the lone unipolar system in his sample is fairly stable, but multipolarity is as Kaplan predicts clearly more stable than bipolarity. Considering "resources" either as areas ripe for colonial and imperial expansion or as new states that may be targets for ideological or political proselytization, Rosecrance's codings reveal that the availability of unappropriated resources makes for stability; scarcity, for instability. The existence of contending or non-status quo ideologies means that conflict will be intense, but a divergence in ethos between elites is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for instability, thus confirming Waltz' suspicion concerning the insignificance of ideological aspects of the contemporary bipolar world. Insecurity of domestic elite tenure at home is always associated with instability abroad. But the drawing of boundaries such that allegiances are nationalist rather than dynastic has not resulted in a more benign international arena; in fact, unstable systems have been encountered more frequently since the rise of nationalism and the use of citizen forces. The increasing world level in economic development is associated with a higher level of disturbance and fails to be channelled to augment the power of regulators of international systems. And no single regulator, whether balance of power, concert of great powers, alliance

system, or international organization, has been able to maintain stability in all of the cases: the record of the concert is better, but the breakdowns of 1848 and 1914 were too extraordinary for an informal practice of summit conferences to avert or to resolve. Whenever the disturbance level is high, regulators have proved inadequate.

In a second study, J. David Singer and Melvin Small pay closer attention to alliance patterns. Starting with the hypothesis that the onset of war is associated with an increase in alliance commitments between countries, they assemble an impressive array of data on wars and alliances in order to test balance of power theory empirically.⁸ For the years between 1815 and 1945 they collect statistical indicators for each member of the family of nations, and slice international systems in a manner not dissimilar to Rosecrance, for they analyze four subsamples of international systems—a "central system" composed of mostly European countries for two eras, 1815–1899 and 1900–1945, and a "total system" of central and peripheral countries for the same two eras. Although intercorrelations between number of alliances and number of wars are mostly positive across all years for the total and central systems, when results for the nineteenth century are compared with twentieth century findings, the two eras exhibit opposite patterns. For the 1900–1945 period most correlations are positive, demonstrating that modern wars have been preceded by the formation of many alliances; between 1815 and 1899, in contrast, correlations are mainly negative, revealing that alliance involvement may have served as a deterrent to the expression of international conflict by military means in the nineteenth century.

The two studies, however, were not originally designed to permit a comprehensive, systematic test of the relationship between power distribution and international stability. If we define a *pole* as a militarily significant cluster of units within an international arena, and *stability*⁹ in terms of rates of incidence of warfare within the arena, we soon discover that the analytical procedures followed by Rosecrance, Singer and Small need to be clarified and tightened considerably,

⁷ Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). For some critiques, see George Liska, "Continuity and Change in International Systems," *World Politics*, XVI (October, 1963), 118–36; James N. Rosenau, "The Functioning of International Systems," *Background*, VII (November, 1963), 111–18; Dina A. Zinnes, "The Requisites for International Stability," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (September, 1964), 301–305; J. David Singer, "The Global System and Its Sub-Systems: A Developmental View," *Linkage Politics*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 21–43.

⁸ J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815–1945," *Quantitative International Politics*, ed. Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 247–86.

⁹ "Stability" is most customarily defined as behavioral change over time, such as in Michael Haas, "Types of Asymmetry Within Social and Political Systems," *General Systems*, XII (1967), 69–79. Rosecrance's definition deals with the extent of regulatory potency in coping with instability.

especially with respect to the criteria for selecting "international systems." One question to pose is *geographic*—whether Rosecrance's nine and Singer's and Small's four systems are international or in actuality are regional in scope. Rosecrance makes occasional references to events taking place in North America and Japan, but most of his attention is directed to European interstate politics; Singer and Small explicitly acknowledge that their "central" systems are European in composition. A second problem is the *dating* of separate eras. Rosecrance finds nine eras between 1740 and 1960, while Singer and Small arbitrarily divide the data into two sets, 1815-1899 and 1900-1945. Further discussion of these analytical problems seems warranted before undertaking a comparative test of the relationship between stability and polarity.

Accordingly, the design of the research presented below will consist of an interweaving of analytical and empirical operations. Initially, the concept of "international subsystem" will be defined in such a way that analytical criteria can be used to detect subsystem arenas and members therein. For each of these entities, or units of analysis, it will be necessary to assemble indicators of the independent variable—stratification—and the dependent variable—stability. *Stratification* may be defined as the distribution of resources within a subsystem, including such elements as the number of members, their relative power, alliance ties between members, and an aggregate judgment as to the number of power centers on military-strategic questions. Analytical criteria determine the nature of the entities, so some variables will record the intuitive ratings upon which the study is based. Data on alliances have been provided by Singer and Small, and judgmental assessments by Rosecrance will be used in order to discover with which phenomena they are most closely associated. *Instability* of subsystems is empirically defined as the number of wars of various types. The total number of variables is 68, so to achieve an overview of the data multivariate procedures will be applied. First of all, the independent and dependent variables will be separately factor analyzed to ascertain the empirical structure for each set of measures; through this means we will know whether there are distinct types of stratification and instability, thus broadening the scope of the original bivariate question of a relationship between stratification and instability into a task of determining which kinds of stratification are related to what kinds of instability. Secondly, the dependent and independent variables will be analyzed together in order to discover whether the power structure of an international subsystem in fact is a concomi-

tant of one or another type of instability in the behavior of members of the subsystem. The cross-running of dependent and independent variables will be handled by factor analysis, smallest space analysis, and cluster analysis. All three of these techniques are taxonomic in character, inasmuch as they describe clusterings of data; none actually "test" hypotheses in the classic manner prescribed by textbooks on inferential statistics, but they have the virtue of identifying close associations between variables which remain when all other variables are being held constant and, therefore, are among the most powerful tools of descriptive statistics.

II. IDENTIFYING INTERNATIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

An *international system* may be defined as an aggregation of all politically autonomous and semiautonomous societal systems; any subset of such entities, thus, constitutes an *international subsystem*.¹⁰ As James Rosenau has suggested, however, there can be as many systems as "issue areas."¹¹ In testing the stability-polarity hypothesis, hence, we are not interested in just any system; our attention is directed toward systems containing *military-strategic* confrontations between poles of actors. To regard Ecuador-Ethiopia as a relevant subsystem would be as much a potpourri choice as to select all national actors for the year 453, whether they knew of each other's existence or not; we need precise criteria for determining membership in an international subsystem which are phrased in terms of how member states relate to one another militarily.

Harold Lasswell's notion of *arena*, accordingly, will be utilized in order to locate groups of states that interact with each other on strategic and political matters.¹² When there was little

¹⁰ A common semantic trap is to say that a "system" exists only when it reaches some sort of threshold level in frequency of social interactions. Certainly it is more consistent with general systems analysis to define a *system* as any set of parts that are related in some way; and a classification of all types of relations would clearly be incomplete without the category "interacting," for which one could assemble data to differentiate systems interacting at high and low levels. Entities, in short, are to be described with reference to conceptual variables, instead of being defined mystically in terms of thresholds. Such an approach is consistent with the "constructivist" systems approach advocated by David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 30-34.

¹¹ Rosenau, *op. cit.*

¹² Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan,

interaction of any kind between states in China, Europe, India, and among tribal groups in Africa and the Americas, international arenas relevant to military-strategic issues were isolated from each other and more easily identifiable.¹³ Today penetration by thermonuclear giants into the affairs of miniscule states seems to be taken for granted. Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that Africa has had little impact upon international politics among European states; moreover, only a few European countries ventured into Asia to establish a military presence, and such countries as France and the United States were able to entertain similar policies toward the Hawaiian Islands while in sharp disagreement on relations with Mexico in the 1860's. Such considerations lead to the conclusion that actors within military-strategic arenas in Europe, Asia, Africa and other regions of the globe are by no means identical. Within international regions, power distributions and configurations may differ both over time and from one part of the globe to another. The network of all military-strategic interactions among militarily autonomous units, hence, would have a number of subclusters at any one time point, and the denser parts of the network would constitute *international military-strategic subsystems*. But we need guidelines for determining which subclusters may qualify as international military-strategic subsystems.

Following a set of criteria developed by Michael Brecher for locating boundaries between regional clusters of states,¹⁴ we may identify international subsystems in terms of three elements:

- I. Scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region.
- II. There are at least two actors.
- III. There is a relatively self-contained network of political interactions between the members, involving such activities as goal attain-

ment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration, and dealing with power relations and military interactions.

These criteria are to be applied in section III of this paper to the extraction of 21 subsystems from Europe, Asia, and Hawaii, although many more subsystems are possible. The best approach would be to analyze communication networks relevant to conflict. Unfortunately relevant data for mapping military-strategic interactions are not available for long sweeps of time. A second-best approach for determining boundaries between international military-strategic subsystems is to devise specific criteria for sorting members from nonmembers of subsystems, once the subsystems have already been identified in an intuitive manner.

In delineating *members* on the basis of their participation in arenas of military conflict it is important to avoid the legalistic trap of including only so-called sovereign states, especially in an age when contests involving such entities as the Vietcong guerrillas could ultimately threaten the very survival of the human race. Adapting Singer's and Small's suggestions for selecting members,¹⁵ the following criteria for determining membership in an international political-strategic subsystem would seem provisionally useful:

- I. A member must interact more or less continuously in a manner relevant to political-military goal attainment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration.
 - (a) The existence of diplomatic interaction neither confers nor denies membership per se, but when an actor displays considerable diplomatic interaction with another actor, the two are members of the same subsystem.
 - (b) An entity entering into an alliance gains membership in the same subsystem as the other alliance partners.

Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 78-80, 252-54.

¹³ William McNeill, *A World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

¹⁴ Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, XV (January, 1963), 221-35. For a more complete justification for the criteria, which are three fewer than Brecher's original formulation, see Michael Haas, *International Conflict* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, forthcoming), Ch. IX. The concept of *subordinate* system, which seems to have meaning only when applied to a set of actors that are satellites of some superordinate state, thus is not relevant here.

¹⁵ Singer and Small, *op. cit.*, use two criteria—diplomatic recognition by France or England, and a population of 500,000 or more. These criteria would of course exclude the Vietcong and other actors which, though subnational, are clearly militarily independent and internationally active due to their confrontation with countries outside of the state of which they are supposedly a part. See their "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System," *World Politics*, XVIII (January, 1966), 236-82; Bruce M. Russett, Singer, Small, "National Political Units in the 20th Century: A Standardized List," this *Review*, LXII (September, 1968), 932-51.

- (c) Members must have a minimal level of internal political organization. (A rebel political faction may qualify, but a social group or ethnic community is excluded.)
- II. A member must possess military viability.
 - (a) All units with a population exceeding 500,000 are members, though smaller units may qualify.
 - (b) All sovereign states engaging in war in the relevant region are members.
 - (c) Membership ceases when an actor is absorbed or conquered and occupied.
 - (d) A separatist faction is a member (1) if it is a participant in an initially internal war in which one or more major and middle powers have intervened, or (2) if it eventually succeeds in achieving political autonomy as a separate state.

Either characteristic, if present, would suffice for an entity to qualify as a member of an international military-strategic subsystem. Such criteria would encompass states that have been militarily neutral for centuries, though diplomatically in a particular arena, such as Sweden in Europe; piratical bands would be excluded; and a country like the United States would date its entry into North American subsystems as soon as rebel armies acted independently of Great Britain. International subsystems, thus, consist of sets of entities meeting criterion I or II and interacting with each other in the same military-strategic arena.

Time boundaries for historical eras containing distinct parties and issues in conflict remain to be determined. Power stratification and alliance confrontations hardly remain constant over time, and the impact of certain wars between major powers has often been to transform the stakes of conflict dramatically among countries.¹⁶ Specifically, we may use Rosecrance's notion of *polarity* and Kaplan's concept of the *tightness* or *looseness* of a system¹⁷ to identify a

subsystem transformation when *either* of the following two conditions occurs:

- I. A new system begins if there is a change in the number of poles, such as the following:
 - (a) a major power is demoted through military defeat,
 - (b) one or more middle powers rise to major power status,
 - (c) a major power enters the system anew or exits from the region,
 - (d) new military alliances involving major powers arise,
 - (e) existing military alliances involving major powers collapse or membership reshuffles.
- II. A new system begins when a dramatic event precipitates a trend toward tightening or loosening in power distribution, such as the following:
 - (a) a previously nonaligned power becomes an exclusive ally of another major power,
 - (b) an alliance among major powers develops a schism,
 - (c) many nonmajor powers become attached to, or break off from, bloc arrangements,
 - (d) pluralistic security communities wax or wane.

The demotion of France from the rank of major power in 1871, and Germany's *dénouement* in 1918, hence enable us to fix definite endpoints for old systems and starting points for new subsystem eras, just as the disruption of unity among the major powers of Europe and Hawaii were system-transforming events in 1822 and 1759, respectively.

For the reader who would prefer a quantitative approach to the identification of subsystems, cluster analysis, smallest space analysis, or factor analysis could be performed from a matrix of military-strategic interaction targets for a large number of years. Frank Denton, in undertaking a P-factor analysis of wars since the second decade of the nineteenth century, has, for example, supported Rosecrance's dating of historical subsystems.¹⁸ Had his study failed to

¹⁶ The "stakes of conflict" criterion is proposed by Stanley Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," *World Politics*, XIV (October, 1961), 205-37; cf. Robert L. Rothstein, "Power, Security and the International System," paper presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Convention, Chicago, September, 1967; Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

¹⁷ Kaplan, *op. cit.* For a clarificatory essay, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IX (September, 1965), 299-308.

¹⁸ Frank Denton, "Some Regularities in International Conflict, 1820-1949," *Background*, IX (February, 1966), 283-96. Denton analyzes data on wars collected by Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960). The most exact validation procedure for subsystems defined in terms of poles and looseness would consist of an R-analysis of the number of poles recorded for each year in the years to be studied and a measure of the extent of looseness (or failure to pull all members of a system into one or more of the contending poles). Ordinal data to

TABLE 1. INTERNATIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

Region	Dates	Poles	Tightness	Availability of Resources	Members	Major Powers	Satellites	Regulator Strength	Level of Disturbance
I. Western Europe	1649-1713	2	0	1	26	4	1	1	2
II. Europe	1714-1789	7	0	1	29	7	1	0	1
III. Europe	1790-1814	2	1	0	28	5	16	0	3
IV. Europe	1815-1822	6	1	1	32	6	2	2	1
V. Europe	1823-1847	2	0	0	39	6	2	1	2
VI. Europe	1848-1871	5	0	0	38	5	3	0	3
VII. Europe	1872-1890	1	0	1	19	6	0	2	2
VIII. Europe	1891-1918	2	1	0	33	7	1	0	3
IX. Europe	1919-1945	2	0	0	45	6	13	0	3
X. North Atlantic	1946-1963	2	1	1	32	3	10	2	2
XI. East Asia	1689-1842	1	0	1	7	1	1	0	1
XII. East Asia	1843-1895	2	1	1	15	4	1	1	2
XIII. East Asia	1896-1913	2	0	0	13	3	1	1	3
XIV. East Asia	1914-1945	3	1	1	20	1	2	0	3
XV. East Asia	1946-1954	2	1	0	18	2	3	2	3
XVI. Asia	1955-1963	3	1	1	32	2	4	2	2
XVII. Hawaii	1738-1758	3	0	0	5	3	0	1	1
XVIII. Hawaii	1759-1782	3	1	0	9	3	1	0	3
XIX. Hawaii	1783-1795	2	1	0	8	2	1	0	3
XX. Hawaii	1796-1818	1	1	1	5	1	1	1	1
XXI. Hawaii	1819-1898	1	0	1	4	1	1	0	1

support the intuition of a highly knowledgeable scholar, however, the criteria would not have been changed drastically, for some sort of analytical cuts are always prior to the selection of data for analysis. It is important to justify these cuts theoretically, as we have done, and to obtain precise estimates of the extent to which one's analysis is procrustean, a task to be discussed below in section IV.

III. EUROPEAN, ASIAN AND HAWAIIAN SUBSYSTEMS

Specifying territorial and time boundaries for international subsystems in practice involves a great deal of trial and error experimentation. Whether to decide first upon members or upon years presents a chicken and egg dilemma. The most painless procedure has been to posit "core members" of subsystems, and then to fix an arbitrary starting point in time.

For Europe the most obvious core members are France, England, Spain, Prussia (Germany), and the former Austrian Hapsburg Empire. The date of 1649 could be selected as a starting point because in that year the Peace of Westphalia had concluded the Thirty Years War by redrawing European boundaries. But in order to transcend the parochialism of a completely European sample, additional subsystems are to be

construct such indicators is not easily at hand, and since we have already assigned 0 and 1 codings implicitly in the discussion to follow, an R-analysis of nominal scale codings would doubtless be a trivial exercise.

carved out. China and Japan are central members of any East Asian subsystem. We may begin our analysis in 1689, when China signed its first modern treaty (with Imperial Russia), the effect of which was to slow down Russian expansion in Asia. Until the unification of the Hawaiian Islands by King Kamehameha I in 1810, the various rulers of the islands Hawaii, Oahu, and Maui were at the helm of the most significant members of Hawaiian subsystems. Foreign penetration, which did not occur until the late eighteenth century, was undertaken by France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. A lack of earlier records dictates as an initial year the choice of 1738, when a conference between the kings of Oahu, Maui and Hawaii resulted in a ceasefire of a war that might otherwise have meant the unification of the islands under the joint rule of Alapainui of Hawaii and his brother, Kamehamehanui of Maui.

Many other subsystems could have been chosen—African, American, Middle Eastern, and South Asian, for example. In this preliminary analysis a small sample, 21 subsystems in all, is preferred so that familiarity with each case would be maximized while at the same time there would be enough cases for multivariate manipulation of the data. The subsystems to be analyzed are presented in Table 1, along with a summary of all codings judgmentally assigned in accordance with our criteria for detecting poles and members of subsystems. Figures for number of major powers, members, and satellite states

are based on the Singer-Small lists, as modified by membership criteria presented in section II of this paper. Poles, availability of resources, regulator strength, and level of disturbance codings are taken from Rosecrance for subsystems II-X and supplemented in a manner that seems consistent for the remaining eras.¹⁹ Although detailed descriptions of the eras appear elsewhere,²⁰ a brief summary is presented here to justify the judgmentally assigned codings and to substantiate the analytical cuts (in space and time) for each of our 21 subsystems.

Rosecrance's European subsystems may be capsulized as follows: (I) *Western Europe 1649-1713*, Louis XIV opposed by coalitions on three occasions; (II) *Europe 1714-1789*, evanescent alliances among jockeying major powers; (III) *Europe 1790-1814*, revolutionary France establishes a system of satellite states until finally checked by the Quadruple Alliance; (IV) *Europe 1815-1822*, five major powers maintain a tight

¹⁹ I wish to express my gratitude to Professors Charles Hunter, Werner Levi, and Norman Meller for offering assistance in my analysis of the Asian and Hawaiian materials. The scarcity of scholars able to assess my extraction of subsystems in Asia and Hawaii precluded a Delphi procedure such as the one apparently undertaken by Rosecrance. See Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics*, op. cit., p. x; Olaf Helmer, *Convergence of Expert Consensus Through Feedback* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1964). I have altered the dates of some of Rosecrance's subsystems so as to eliminate overlapping years, thereby enabling a smoother data collection procedure.

²⁰ M. Haas, loc. cit. The European eras are most succinctly described in Mowat, op. cit.; David Jayne Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1914); and Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics*, op. cit. For Asia, see Harold M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times* (6th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959); Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, *Modern Far Eastern International Relations* (2nd ed.; New York: Van Nostrand, 1955). The major sources on Hawaii are Abraham Fornander, *An Account of the Polynesian Race* (vol. II; London: Trubner, 1880); Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, *Hawaii* (rev. ed.; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961); Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1854-1874* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1953); Sylvester K. Stevens, *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898* (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing, 1945). A more monographic presentation would be preferable, so the reader should consult sources cited in these works for more complete accounts.

concert of Europe reign; (V) *Europe 1823-1847*, France-England and Prussia-Russia-Austria maintain separate spheres of influence; (VI) *Europe 1848-1871*, major powers disband the concert and their spheres of influence; (VII) *Europe 1872-1890*, alliance network with nexus at Berlin, France isolated; (VIII) *Europe 1891-1918*, antagonism between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente; (IX) *Europe 1919-1945*, France sets up an alliance framework isolating Germany until Hitler establishes the Axis pole; (X) *North Atlantic 1946-1963*, Soviet and Western blocs engage in a cold war struggle.

Since the Asian and Hawaiian subsystems are not discussed in any previous source, our description is more detailed:

(XI) *East Asia, 1689-1842*. After the abortive Russian Amur Expedition of 1689, the East Asian international subsystem was reaffirmed to be unipolar in character, though in the later years of China's long hegemony in the Far East her supremacy was assumed loosely to exist without a concerted attempt to test her strength. China was the only major power, with Japan and Russia as abdicating middle powers.

(XII) *East Asia, 1843-1895*. The easy victory of England in the Opium War changed the East Asian power situation dramatically. Although capitalist states were interested primarily in trading privileges, decentralization of power throughout China encouraged Western powers to cooperate in a tight bipolar struggle to enlarge "spheres of interest" in China. The Opium War brought France, Great Britain and Russia to major power status. The Netherlands, newly colonizing in the East Indies, and Spain, with control in the Philippines, constituted new middle powers linked to the bipolar struggle of East versus West. And the Western powers began to assume an implicit regulatory role in East Asia.

(XIII) *East Asia, 1896-1913*. When Japan unexpectedly proved victorious in its war with China in 1894-95, France, Germany, and Russia, exercising an explicit regulatory role, compelled Japan to revise the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, thereby creating an independent Korea and reducing the likelihood that Japan might use some clauses of the treaty as a shoehorn to continental domination. Bipolarity resulted. The absorption of Great Britain, Germany and the United States with matters outside East Asia meant a loose, rather than a tight stratification of power. Russia served as the protector of China, and France's European-oriented alliance with Russia constrained any aggressive Asian ambitions the latter might have contemplated. Insofar as Russia's cooperation with China appeared to tip the scales on the side of a future Russian

hegemony in Asia, the British became disturbed and formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, which initially encouraged Japan to tackle Russia in 1904, but the Japanese were content to accept American mediation in 1905 for a settlement restoring a loose bipolarity in East Asia. China and Russia were demoted to middle power status due to their wartime defeats in 1895 and 1905, respectively, and the United States entered the system as a middle power upon unseating Spain from the Philippines in 1898.

(XIV) *East Asia, 1914-1945*. The outbreak of World War I in Europe provided an unparalleled opportunity for Japan to increase its power in the East Asian subsystem without regulatory countermeasures. As of 1917 both Russia and China ceased to be unified entities within the system, and the Western powers were consumed first with the European world war, and with internal economic reconstruction afterwards. Japan agreed at the Washington Conference of 1921 to a distribution of power in which it would be "balanced," but the 5:5:3 ratio in naval strength left Japan as the number one power in East Asia. The Manchurian invasion of 1931 and the subsequent establishment of the puppet state Manchukuo were contested only verbally. Japanese forces moved southward to conquer China in 1936. Aid for the Chinese was provided by Moscow, reinforcing a tripolar constellation composed of Japan, Russia and China, and as yet uncommitted Britain, France, and the United States. After the Pearl Harbor bombing in late 1941, Japan was opposed by nearly every other power in Asia, though there was no joint allied command.

(XV) *East Asia, 1946-1954*. The immediate postwar period consisted of a bipolar contest. The United States established a military presence in Japan and Okinawa, while the increased power of the USSR in Asia became a new factor. Victory by the Chinese Communists over the Kuomintang was finally achieved by 1949, and the system tightened in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War, the American and UN regulatory response to which underscored a policy of containment of Communism.

(XVI) *Asia, 1955-1963*. Seeds of a three-cornered alignment were sown in 1951, when United Nations' forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea over the objections of India. Delhi, a middle power in South Asia, withdrew her support from the United Nations' action and began to proselytize on behalf of a policy of nonalignment. The independence of several states in Southeast Asia, and French withdrawal from Indochina and India by 1954, played into India's hands as the leader of a new grouping of states.

Following Indonesia's acceptance of a neutralist foreign policy and the Bandung Conference of 1955, tripolarity was established on firmer ground. With the Indochinese buffer gone, the East Asian subsystem merged with the formerly separate South Asian international subsystem. A period of peace was guaranteed by the cohesiveness of neutralists, activity of the UN, and parity between the power blocs of East and West. Escalating participation of the United States in Vietnam, possession of thermonuclear weapons by China, the Sino-Indian Border War, Pakistan's estrangement from the American-sponsored SEATO pact, and the rift between Malaysia and Indonesia brought an end by 1963 to the tripolar house of cards constructed by the neutralist bloc.

(XVII) *Hawaii, 1738-1753*. The forces of Alapainui, ruler of the island of Hawaii, nearly succeeded in unifying all of the major Hawaiian Islands in the year 1738. Alongside his brother, who was ruler of Maui, Alapainui's combined military force subdued Molokai and sailed for Oahu, where victory was almost certain but would be contested bitterly by Peleioholani, ruler of Oahu. Rather than pursuing what might be a pyrrhic victory, the three rulers agreed to a cessation of hostilities with Oahu and concluded the Treaty of Naonealaa, establishing an informal "concert," whereby any new war would be halted at the insistence of the third. A relatively peaceful era, with a loose trifurcation of power, followed.

(XVIII) *Hawaii, 1759-1782*. The Kapalipilo Battle between Maui and Hawaii ushered in an era of bellicose leaders, each militantly seeking to unify all of the islands. A Hawaii military expedition invaded Maui, successfully annexing the eastern section of the island. Maui, led by Kahekili, turned its sights on both Oahu and Hawaii, the former for conquest and the latter for revenge. A tight tripolar struggle ensued until 1782, when Maui conquered Oahu. Hawaii, meanwhile, was convulsed with internal discord. The heir to Kalaniopuu threatened to redistribute land in a manner particularly unattractive to the chiefs of the Kona district, who preferred Kamehameha, and a civil war followed for a ten year period.

(XIX) *Hawaii, 1783-1795*. After the victory of Maui over Oahu, Kahekili took up residence on Oahu, creating a power vacuum in the middle of the island chain. Kamehameha secured control of Maui, Molokai, and Lanai in 1790, even before his authority had been solidified on his home island, and the Kahekili-Kamehameha fight was continued up to 1795, when in the Battle of Nuuanu the army of Kamehameha pushed its opponent's forces up to the Pali precipice; those

who escaped plunging to their death did not contest the new hegemony of Kamehameha. All of the islands except Kauai and Niihau fell under the rule of Kamehameha I.

(XX) *Hawaii, 1796-1818.* Though Kamehameha's unipolar preeminence clearly dates from 1796, the existence of a last independent ruler spurred Kamehameha to sail to Kauai. After heavy storms forced his fleet of warships to turn back on two occasions Kamehameha softened the urgency of a victory that seemed inevitable. His patience was rewarded when Kaumaulii, the ruler of Kauai, declared a voluntary surrender in 1810. When a group of Russians, who had been encouraged by Kaumaulii to establish a colony on Kauai in 1796, departed in 1818, Kamehameha I assumed complete dominance.

(XXI) *Hawaii, 1819-1898.* The position of Kamehameha and his successors loosened considerably during the nineteenth century, though unipolar control was maintained. At various times such middle powers as France, Great Britain, and the United States contemplated forcing Hawaii into an imperialistic cockpit. France moved first in 1819, but soon realized that conquest would not be so easy. In 1843 an entente was reached between France and Great Britain, in which it was agreed that Hawaii should remain independent. The American president John Tyler was reluctant to go along with the 1843 agreement for fear that the specter of secret treaties, power politics, American imperialism and foreign "entanglement" would be vilified by the opposition party. In the last half of the century American and Oriental settlers arrived in great numbers, gradually taking over the commercial and economic control of the islands. In 1887 the United States gained a naval leasehold over Pearl Harbor, thus elevating Washington to the status of a major power, and two years later American marines were landed at the request of Kamehameha V in order to insure that the so-called Wilcox Revolt would fizzle. The monarchy fell in 1893 primarily at the instigation of the American settlers; a republic was declared in 1894; and the islands were annexed by joint resolution of Congress in 1898, terminating the autonomy of Hawaiian subsystems.

IV. DATA ON STRATIFICATION AND STABILITY

Our main aim of determining whether types of power distributions are related to the incidence of international conflict, requires that we assemble objective, quantitative data measuring the extent of power stratification as well as the extent of war participation within each of the analytically derived subsystems. We now turn to data on alliances and wars.

Data on international stratification, our independent variable, are available to us in the form of membership and polarity codings and alliance formation statistics. The alliance data, which cover only the period 1815-1945, have been collected principally by Singer and Small.²¹ Table 2 lists 33 variables indexing the power structure of each of our 21 subsystems. Variables 1-5 deal with the number of poles; variable 1 is recoded as a series of dichotomies in variables 2-5. Rosecrance's codings comprise variables 6-8. Membership assignments are presented in variables 9-15. Variables 16-19 represent gross counts of the number of alliances, their size, and the extent to which members of the subsystem are tied together by alliances. Variables 20-23 trace the extensiveness of alliance links between major and minor powers, thus yielding a measure of hierarchy in alliance formation, and variables 24-27 measure the extensiveness of the practice of major power alliances that are made exclusively with each other. Variables 28-33 represent measures of *procrusteanness*. It would be ideal in terms of our criteria to find that alliances are all terminated at the conclusion of a subsystem and new ones are begun as a subsystem starts. But this is not the case. Variables 28-30 measure the degree to which our dating of subsystems fails to coincide with the natural lives of alliances among members of each system. Geography, similarly, may be a source for procrustean slicing of subsystems, so variables 31-33 index the extent to which countries within a particular subsystem enter into alliances beyond the spatial confines of the main continent in which the subsystem is centered.

The variables might appear to be independent observations on the extent of stratification within an international arena. An analysis with 33 independent variables, however, would hardly be parsimonious. If subsets of the variables empirically collapse into highly intercorrelated clusters, our analysis would be simplified. Accordingly, a *factor analysis* of the alliance data is reported in Table 2.²² Unfortunately the data

²¹ Singer and Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815-1945," *loc. cit.* I have supplemented these data with a compilation of alliances between members of the five Hawaiian subsystems based on Fornander, *loc. cit.* Definitions of each variable appear in the Appendix to this paper. Data are available upon request from the author.

²² Since none of the variables depart significantly from normal curve distributions, though they tend to be rectangular in view of the small sample size, product-moment correlations were computed be-

TABLE 2. POLARITY AND ALLIANCE DATA

Source ^a Cases	I ^a	Unrotated Factors									Quartimin Factors ^b									
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	
1. Number of poles	R/H 21 .99	44	-41	-21	(-51)	26	-18	-22	27	-13		04	42	05	-28	29	(96)	24	37	24
2. Unipolarity	R/H 21 .88	-38	-16	-35	24	(-59)	09	30	02	-29		-07	-40	-03	-38	08	-30	-49	(61)	(59)
3. Bipolarity	R/H 21 .94	45	(51)	26	45	07	31	-05	-03	29		41	23	01	(91)	04	(-50)	24	-31	(-55)
4. Tripartite	R/H 21 .79	-40	-13	35	-11	39	-08	08	-32	-24		-38	01	05	(-61)	02	(-03)	23	(-53)	33
5. Multipolarity	R/H 21 .86	-45	-42	-33	-40	11	-21	-24	40	-04		09	26	03	-15	24	(101)	02	(63)	12
6. Availability of resources	R/H 21 .86	-27	-44	-32	40	03	-49	15	01	-25		-16	29	08	(-73)	-39	01	01	37	(51)
7. Tightness of poles	R/H 21 .93	-19	06	-15	29	(85)	22	25	-01	07		-15	29	(-82)	-27	-36	(80)	-05	08	08
8. Strength of relations	R/H 21 .90	33	(-31)	07	36	05	12	(68)	-02	16		20	18	39	-37	25	(-52)	45	-03	-32
9. Number of members	H 21 .92	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
10. Number of major powers	H 21 .93	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
11. Number of major & middle powers	H 21 .94	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
12. Number of satellites	H 21 .94	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
13. Members/major & middle powers	H 21 .96	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
14. Members/middle & minor powers	H 21 .96	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
15. Fully sovereign members/members	H 21 .96	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
16. Number of alliances	H 21 .94	21	28	-28	-12	11	-26	07	-16	-00		03	29	-00	-00	03	29	-04	-34	-01
17. Alligned countries/members	SS/F 15 .91	41	-12	(77)	-09	-34	-28	-04	-01	06		22	12	(91)	22	-19	07	04	-10	-12
18. Alliance partners/alliances	SS/F 15 .87	41	-12	(77)	-09	-34	-28	-04	-01	06		22	12	(91)	22	-19	07	04	-10	-12
19. Alliance partners/alliances/members	SS/F 15 .91	23	-42	(73)	-22	-20	-17	09	05	15		-41	-20	(80)	-17	-13	-02	15	-08	-27
20. Number of alliances between major and minor powers	SS/F 15 .94	(58)	(70)	-03	-12	-23	-13	13	04	-09		(86)	-24	-04	38	-03	14	-07	22	18
21. Minor powers allied to major powers/minor powers	SS/F 15 .98	(87)	29	-24	-09	-18	01	03	07	19		(61)	10	05	44	21	27	-15	-02	-33
22. Partners in alliances including minor & major powers/all such alliances	SS/F 15 .99	(91)	-13	-26	09	18	06	10	07	11		(62)	(58)	05	15	32	21	22	-00	-22
23. Partners in alliances including both minor & major powers/all such alliances/minor powers	SS/F 15 .86	(57)	-17	09	(52)	18	32	-12	23	15		13	(68)	12	(62)	20	-15	40	26	-25
24. Number of alliances exclusively between major powers	SS/F 15 .92	(69)	(50)	09	21	-21	14	-17	-15	-15		(70)	41	03	(65)	08	-12	-21	-09	25
25. Alliances exclusively between major powers/alliances including major powers	SS/F 15 .97	(65)	-33	(53)	06	-17	28	12	-10	-17		28	(54)	(72)	16	43	-20	14	-03	25
26. Partners in exclusive major power alliances/all such alliances	SS/F 15 1.00	(86)	-34	13	-15	04	-02	25	15	-09		(52)	42	(52)	-09	41	31	35	32	15
27. Partners in exclusive major power alliances/all such alliances/major powers	SS/F 15 .99	(67)	-40	48	-16	-03	05	16	27	-09		26	30	(75)	08	36	27	46	(52)	17
28. Alliances starting in earlier era or ending in later era/alliances	SS/F 15 .93	49	(-53)	-27	42	-23	-12	-01	-30	-01		24	(79)	26	-25	02	-14	-40	-44	-02
29. Alliances including both major & minor powers starting in earlier era or ending in later era/alliances including major and minor powers	SS/F 15 .92	(67)	-45	-19	35	19	13	13	-15	-13		33	(92)	11	-18	33	-12	16	-14	19
30. Alliances exclusively between major powers starting in earlier era or ending in later era/alliances exclusively between major powers	SS/F 15 .69	(54)	-08	-02	27	-13	14	-47	17	15		13	(58)	15	(72)	06	21	-16	12	-23
31. Extraregion alliances/all alliances	SS/F 15 .95	(-61)	07	-03	(56)	-04	-42	-09	20	-14		-34	-08	-21	-09	(-72)	-14	08	(64)	38
32. Extraregion alliances including major powers/all alliances including major powers	SS/F 15 .83	-41	06	-18	38	-40	11	18	(51)	11		-18	(-57)	-11	17	-09	-14	02	(130)	36
33. Extraregion alliances including minor powers/all alliances including minor powers	SS/F 15 .99	28	24	39	(64)	30	-08	-31	10	-31		15	(82)	-01	(54)	-34	-16	49	41	(60)

^a Key: R/H = Rosecrance, Haas; H = Haas; SS/T = Singer and Small; Fornander.^b P matrix.Eigenvalues
Per cent total variance
Per cent common variance10.3
31.2
33.65.1
15.4
16.63.6
10.9
11.73.3
10.0
10.72.4
7.3
7.82.1
6.4
6.81.7
5.2
5.51.2
3.6
3.91.0
3.0
3.3

do not condense themselves as much as we could wish, for a total of nine factors emerge, which is quite unusual for so few variables. The first two factors account for about half of the total variance of all of the variables, but the remaining factors taper off so gradually that we must include them in any complete description of the elements of stratification within international subsystems.

The most important factor²³ is clearly a *Size* factor, inasmuch as variables counting the total number of alliances, members, and of major-minor alliances consistently receive high loadings along with numbers of members, major powers, and most other variables given in gross magnitude form. The most significant element of an international subsystem emerging from 33 measures of stratification, then, is whether it has many or few members and alliances, in keeping with the primacy attributed to the variable of size by Deutsch and Singer. European subsystems are large, Asian systems medium, and Hawaiian systems small, and this basic dimension is unrelated to the eight other facets of stratification. The second factor is *Procrusteaness*. Such a large representation of variables 28-33 in this factor indicates that subsystems differ greatly in the extent to which they contain alliances that are a legacy of the past or that will endure despite power reshufflings, as opposed to subsystems with alliances made only specific to the power confrontation of the period, on the one hand, or cosmopolitan members who contract alliances with members in other subsystems versus those subsystems that are insular in

tween the 33 variables. A principle axis factor analysis, with 1.0, was run, and there was a negative eigenvalue on the 14th cycle. An orthogonal (varimax) rotation, after determining the number of factors from the eigenvalue 1.0 criterion, approximated simple structure, so a quartimin rotation was performed, using an oblimin program developed by John Carroll; gamma was set at 0.0, and the solution ran 30 cycles, 13,500 iterations. A bi-quartimin rotation was tested but, in conformity with the observation that varimax was very close to simple structure, factor loadings were so greatly inflated in value as to be meaningless.

²³ Factor number assignments coming from the unrotated solution often do not correspond with oblique solutions; the unrotated factors, which are brought into a clearer form through an orthogonal rotation, denote a succession of factors starting with the most important (in terms of variance explained) and decreasing to the least important. Here we follow the numbering of the quartimin factors, for the sake of clarity in reading the results.

character, on the other hand. The high loadings for number of major and middle powers indicates that activity outside the system is more likely when there are many states potentially competing for topdog status. Some of our cuts made in time and space, in short, were much better than others, and since procrusteaness is an important dimension of the data, we are fortunate in being able to assess the exact extent to which it is related to aspects of foreign conflict delineated in the next section of this paper. Factor III is an *Alliance Saturation* dimension, since it groups together the per cent of countries aligned and the multilaterality of alliances. This dimension can be used in a retest of the hypothesis that alliances sometimes deter wars, and at other times serve as a prelude to wars. The fourth factor refers to *Blocs*, containing as it does high loadings for bipolarity, unavailability of resources, major-minor alliances, as well as a tendency for alliance patterns among the major powers to remain solid from one subsystem era to the next. Waltz' adulation for the success of the contemporary cold war in preventing various disturbances from disrupting the stability of international relations can be examined more carefully with this dimension of stratification, which corresponds closely with Rosecrance's picture of a bipolar world. *Differentiation* emerges as a fifth factor. Subsystems evidently differ significantly in the presence of a layer of middle powers intervening between major and minor powers, and a low number of alliance ties on the part of intrasystem members with countries in other subsystems. A situation in which there is a wide gulf between powerful and weak members is thus related to the geographic isolation of a subsystem; and, conversely, subsystems that are penetrated by outside powers tend to contain almost as many middle and major powers. The fact that *Multipolarity* appears as a sixth factor, however, demonstrates that interaction opportunities are unrelated to the tendency for systems to contain many or few poles. The fact that alliance membership, size, and multipolarity are unrelated undercuts one of the assumptions in the Deutsch-Singer formulation. The per cent of all actors that are satellite states or militarily active subnational groups attracting the attention of outside powers was the basis for calculating a percentage of nonsovereign members, which loads high and negatively on the seventh factor, along with the tightness of a subsystem, and it seems intuitively reasonable to expect fewer amorphous entities in a loosely structured system. Accordingly, we shall refer to this factor as *Tightness*, even though the nonsovereign variable has a somewhat higher loading.

The interfactor correlations among the first seven factors are all below $\pm .50$, so they are not presented in a table here, but some are above $\pm .40$: (1) procrustean systems are seldom bloc systems, though they are tight; (2) blocs are generally tight. Factors VIII and IX, however, collapse almost completely, for they correlate with each other at the $-.85$ level, and they are correlated with factors II, IV and V at the $.70$ level or higher. The much lower percentages of variance explained by the two final factors indicates that they may be tapping some random error in the data.²⁴

Turning to the dependent variable, international stability, it is possible to utilize a number of lists of wars, their duration, casualties, and countries participating in each instance of international violence. Lewis F. Richardson's *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* is the most detailed in coverage, for it includes many subnational entities and internal wars as well as the more traditional case of hostilities between separate, legitimate sovereign states, though there are no data before 1820, after 1950, or concerning the Hawaiian islands. It will be necessary to supplement the list, therefore.²⁵ A second source is Quincy Wright's *A Study of War*, which counts the number of wars with "formal declarations" for a much longer time period, but his compilation tends to ignore subnational participants.²⁶ Because findings could be highly dependent

upon the way in which data are collected in each study, one way of proceeding is to conduct two separate analyses, one for each source. Table 3 contains variables collected from Richardson, and Table 4 lists similar variables from Wright. Independent analysis with the two sets of data will permit replication and thus strengthen the overall conclusions from this study.

In Table 3 the indicators fall into several categories. Variables 34-39 sum war data across all countries; the same types of indicators are next counted for major powers only in variables 40-44. The effect of wars is dealt with in variables 45-47, with *destabilization* defined as victory in a war on the part of the aggressor, which can be determined from the description of each quarrel in Richardson's compilation. Extrasystem warfare is indexed by variables 48-51, and Rosecrance's "level of disturbance" coding is included as variable 52 in order to ascertain what sorts of quantitative data are most applicable. A factor analysis of the data, also reported in Table 3,²⁷ is much less complex in structure than the alliance data. Only 6 factors emerge from the 19 variables, the first two factors accounting for about 60 per cent of the total variance, and the high communality (h^2) estimates reveal that there is little unexplained variance among the variables. The factors are themselves easier to name.

Factor I is a *War Incidence* dimension, with high loadings for many wars and many new wars for both major and all other powers. International subsystems, hence, differ greatly in the amount of violence present, some being much more peaceful than others, but the gross extent of violence is independent of five other dimensions of war. Factor II is a *Multilateral* factor, with high codings for war deaths, Rosecrance's coding for disturbance, and with the tendency for wars to have many rather than few participants. The strength of a regulator, thus, is most taxed in world wars and in major confrontations among several states but is unrelated to the

²⁴ Factor VIII seems to indicate Imperial Expansion; IX, Imperial Decline.

²⁵ Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-111. The supplementary sources are Fornander, *loc. cit.*, and data supplied by Mr. Richard Cady, Bendix Systems Division, Ann Arbor, from a study of low-intensity warfare sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Contract NC0014-66-CO262.

²⁶ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 644-49. In view of his more formal criteria it would not appear consistent to add Hawaii data to his list; for the same reason I have deducted subnational members from the total number of members in norming variable 54, as well as 17 and 19. Two other sources, Singer and Small, and Sorokin, employ restrictive criteria that made their lists less useful for the particular purposes of this study: Singer and Small do not include interventions, and their data pertain only to 1815-1945; Sorokin assembles data only for about 10 countries, though over a very long time period. Singer and Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815-1945," *loc. cit.*; Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Fluctuations of Social Relationships, War and Revolution* (New York: American Book Company, 1937), pp. 547-77.

²⁷ A principal axis factor analysis was performed on the 19×19 correlation matrix with unities in the diagonal. Six factors emerged with eigenvalues over 1.0, and negative eigenvalues were encountered on the ninth cycle. An orthogonal (varimax) rotation was next run, and the subsequent biquartimin solution (30 cycles, 9000 iterations) was virtually identical in higher loadings with the orthogonal solution though much cleaner with regard to intermediate loadings. Accordingly, only the biquartimin P matrix is presented in Table 3. The only high interfactor correlation is $-.60$, between factors I and V.

TABLE 3. RICHARDSON DATA

Variable	Source ^a	Cases	h ²	Unrotated Factors						Biquartimin Factors ^b					
				I	II	III	IV	V	VI	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
34. Number of wars	R/F/B	16	.94	(81)	-35	-15	02	37	09	(89)	15	09	16	10	-06
35. Members at war/members	R/F/B	16	.95	(76)	06	-20	34	-19	-42	14	45	10	(52)	(-56)	-13
36. Participants in wars/members at war	R/F/B	16	.82	(87)	-22	-04	07	-07	-09	46	23	01	48	-15	10
37. Participants in wars/wars	R/F/B	17	.91	(76)	27	26	39	-11	16	12	(76)	14	09	03	36
38. Durations of wars/wars	R/F/B	16	.95	(70)	-04	30	-46	-35	-21	-02	-12	44	(74)	03	20
39. Years with new wars/years in era	R/F/B	18	.96	(76)	17	-30	-47	23	08	(73)	-14	(56)	-02	-01	06
40. Number of wars with major powers	R/F/B	16	.95	(71)	-40	-36	05	35	17	(97)	05	-21	02	-02	-02
41. Wars with major powers/major powers	R/F/B	17	.86	(68)	-12	-31	17	-25	45	(53)	19	-17	-09	-22	(61)
42. Participants in wars with major powers/all such wars	R/F/B	17	.88	(66)	28	33	38	24	-24	-03	(72)	10	08	06	(50)
43. Durations of wars with major powers/all such wars	R/F/B	16	.93	(63)	10	31	-36	-47	27	-02	-02	35	33	14	(68)
44. Years with new wars with major powers/years in era	R/F/B	18	.98	(76)	-01	-46	-37	21	13	(86)	-19	34	-04	-14	08
45. Wars resulting in destabilization/wars	R/F/B	16	.95	(69)	-47	31	-08	07	-38	28	08	-04	(85)	13	-25
46. Wars with major powers resulting in destabilization/wars with major powers	R/F/B	17	.98	38	(-78)	32	02	-31	-17	03	-10	-49	(89)	08	09
47. War deaths/wars	R/F/B	11	1.17	24	48	25	(87)	22	-10	-15	(109)	-01	-20	-02	-15
48. Wars starting in earlier era or ending in later era/wars in era	R/F/B	18	.95	45	(72)	06	-44	02	-17	-01	07	(96)	00	-03	00
49. Wars with major powers starting in earlier era or ending in later era/wars with major powers in era	R/F/B	17	.92	40	(77)	09	-38	10	-11	-00	14	(95)	-12	04	-01
50. Extraregion wars/all wars	R/F/B	14	.99	-10	-15	(84)	-14	22	42	-08	10	-09	-06	(98)	26
51. Extraregion wars with major powers/all wars with major powers	R/F/B	16	.91	-01	-16	(74)	-29	(50)	-06	05	00	14	22	(85)	-31
52. Level of disturbance	R/H	21	.93	(79)	15	17	37	32	-07	42	(72)	15	12	10	-11
Eigenvalues				7.8	3.4	2.8	2.6	1.6	1.2						
Per cent total variance				41.1	17.9	14.7	13.7	8.4	6.3						
Per cent common variance				40.2	17.5	14.4	13.4	8.2	6.2						

^a R/F/B = Richardson, Fornander, Bendix.

R/H = Rosecrance, Haas.

^b P Matrix.

TABLE 4. WRIGHT DATA

Variable	Source ^a	Cases	h ²	Unrotated Factors			
				I	II	III	IV
52. Level of disturbance	R/H	21	.62	37	(52)	45	03
53. Number of wars	W	16	.93	(80)	-21	-38	-19
54. Members at war/members	W	16	.79	(68)	17	47	-13
55. Participants in wars/members at war	W	16	.93	(79)	-38	-20	-07
56. Participants in wars/wars	W	16	.91	(66)	43	(50)	-16
57. Durations of wars/wars	W	16	.93	(62)	-44	10	(58)
58. Years with new wars/years in era	W	16	.77	25	(53)	(-62)	06
59. Number of wars with major powers	W	16	.95	(78)	-33	-31	-28
60. Wars with major powers/major powers	W	16	.83	(68)	(-54)	12	07
61. Participants in wars with major powers/all such wars	W	16	.94	(53)	(58)	(54)	-14
62. Durations of wars with major powers/all such wars	W	16	.91	(66)	-44	04	(59)
63. Years with new wars with major powers/years in era	W	16	.79	(59)	12	-43	-49
64. War deaths/wars	SS/B	12	.92	(68)	43	44	22
65. Wars starting in earlier era or ending in later era/wars	W	16	.88	12	(68)	(-52)	36
66. Wars with major powers starting in earlier era or ending in later era/wars with major powers	W	16	.87	01	(70)	-45	39
67. Extraregion wars/all wars	W	21	.90	(-79)	-28	40	03
68. Extraregion wars with major powers/all wars with major powers	W	21	.91	-44	24	09	-06
Eigenvalues				6.1	3.4	2.7	1.5
Per cent total variance				35.9	20.0	15.9	8.8
Per cent common variance				40.9	22.8	18.1	10.1

^a Key: R/H = Rosecrance, Haas.^b P Matrix

W = Wright.

SS/B = Singer and Small, Bendix.

number of total wars. Theorists who are willing to abide many wars but cannot tolerate large losses of life will be more interested in factor II than factor I in the subsequent analysis. Factor III consists of two main *Extra-Era* variables, and factor V is an *Extra-Region* dimension. Unlike the pileup of procrustean indicators in the case of alliances, the time and space variables appear here on different factors. *Destabilization* appears as factor IV. Evidently long wars are largely capable of achieving the aspirations of aggressive states. The close association between destabilizing wars and subsystems with many war participants evokes an image in which countries gang up on powers that are on the decline, such as the Ottoman Empire in nineteenth century Europe. But the $-.60$ correlation between factors I and IV suggests that wars in eras with destabilization are likely to be infrequent. The final factor contains a cluster of *Major Power Wars*. International subsystems containing many major powers at war, to summarize at this point, are equally likely to have many or few total wars, extrasystem wars, war casualties, stabilization or destabilization as a consequence.

Our next question is whether a similar clustering can be found in Quincy Wright's data, which is exhibited in Table 4. Nearly all of the indicators are identical in form with those collected from Richardson, to facilitate such a replication, but Wright provides no destabilization clues and no figures for war deaths. As a partial substitute, casualty estimates collected by Singer and Small, which correlate $+.79$ with those of Richardson but are based on criteria more similar to Wright than to Richardson, are inserted. Evidently because it was impossible to use supplementary data for destabilization, only five factors are extracted from the 17 Wright variables. The first two factors again account for about 60 per cent of the total variance. Several variables, however, fail to enter into the results, especially Rosecrance's disturbance level.²⁸

Multilaterality is the first factor, with variables pertaining to the number of participants per war receiving higher loadings than war casualties, unlike the corresponding factor for Richardson's data. The fact that "participants in

wars/wars" and "participants in wars/members at war" end up on different factors may seem paradoxical, but evidently belligerents in particular wars are sometimes recidivists and at other times newly play the role of war participant. One cannot predict from the presence of mainly dyadic or multilateral wars whether the subsystem has had many or few total wars. *War Incidence* is factor II for Wright; unlike the same dimension in Richardson's data, there is a stronger linkage with the number of different countries entering war. Some subsystems, in other words, have few wars and few countries at war, while other subsystems are arenas in which nearly every member fights on the battlefield and a new war breaks out in many years of the total life of the era. Few members enter wars outside such turbulent subsystems, perhaps due to the excessive preoccupation with events in the wartorn region. *Extrasystem Wars* are found together on factor III. Although factor V does contain a high loading for *Extraregional Major Power Belligerency*, this final factor is a unique one, is the least important in terms of variance explained; it does not collapse into factor II, with which it is correlated $-.70$. Factor IV is a *Duration* dimension. Richardson's data contained a factor in which variables relating to length of wars also clustered, but we labelled that factor "destabilization" because the two variables loading most significantly were measures of the tendency for aggressors to upset the status quo. Lacking such indicators for the Wright data, we should not be surprised to find this result.

One factor missing from the factor analysis of Wright's war data is the sixth factor from Richardson, namely, *Major Power Wars*. Wright's focus on wars that have formal declarations and sovereign participants does of course weight the sample in the direction of major power wars, in contrast with Richardson's enumeration of wars including such entities as the Portuguese Miguelites and Vietnamese insurgent groups before the independence of the Vietnam republics.

To sum up this section of the discussion, we have collected 68 indicators of international stratification and instability, and factor analyzed the independent and dependent variables separately. Stratification variables are grouped together in seven major clusters: Size, Procrusteaness, Alliance Saturation, Blocs, Differentiation, Multipolarity, and Tightness. (Imperial Expansion and Decline emerge as the final two factors.) To determine relationships between international power stratification and stability these seven to nine factors, hence, must be juxtaposed with Richardson's and Wright's data on

²⁸ The Pearsonian 17×17 matrix input to a principal axis factor analysis with 1.0 in the diagonal. Five factors emerged with eigenvalues over 1.0, and a negative eigenvalue terminated the run on the eleventh cycle. An orthogonal (varimax) rotation was performed and a subsequent biquartimin rotation took 30 cycles, 16469 iterations. The only high interfactor correlation is $-.70$, between factors III and V.

wars. For Richardson the respective dimensions of international stability are War Incidence, Multilaterality, Extra-Era, Destabilization, Extraregionality, and Major Power Wars. Wright's data contain all but the last of these factors, though the clusters are somewhat differently formed and ordered (Multilaterality, War Incidence, Extrasystem Wars, Duration, Extraregional Major Power Belligerency).

V. STABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF POWER STRATIFICATION

With seven to nine dimensions of the independent variable and five to six dimensions of the dependent variable, an inventory of the total findings of this study might fill 50 or so cells of an interfactor correlation matrix, which is hardly a parsimonious prospect, though of course slightly more so than a 68×68 matrix of intervariable correlations. We have elected to pool the variables together, therefore, in order to determine whether some of the original power stratification factors collapse into the major dimensions of international stability.

A factor analysis of the dependent and independent variables together might seem to be the most obvious course available. There are some pitfalls in using factor analysis in hypothesis testing, however. The end product of factor analysis can only be a set of vectors, each of which contains variables whose high intercorrelations remain even when all other variables are held constant; thus, factor analysis is ideal for determining when the null (no-relation) hypothesis is correct, since each factor will be noncorrelated with every other. But even when looking at simple correlations, a high correlation beckons us to be suspicious that the relationship is between two variables that are fundamentally the same anyway, and thus is a trivial one. For the same reason the results of a factor analysis are likely to ferret out only the most obvious sorts of likenesses between dimensions. But, if we seek to test a hypothesis involving variables that are from substantially different theoretical realms, we will want a technique that is intermediate in power between the simple correlation coefficient and the extreme rigor of factor analysis; a technique that scales or sorts out close from weak relations might be better suited for our purposes. Accordingly, smallest space analysis and cluster analysis are to be employed below.²⁹

²⁹ Louis Guttman, "A General Nonmetric Technique for finding the Smallest Coordinate Space for a Configuration of Points," *Psychometrika*, XXXIII (December, 1968), 469-506; Joe H. Ward, Jr., "Hierarchical Grouping to Optimize on Ob-

Richardson's data are examined along with the stratification variables, using both smallest space analysis and factor analysis. Patterns in the latter, as expected, are often difficult to discern, and thus are not presented here.³⁰ Few of the nine dimensions of the independent variable either remain intact or collapse along with one of the six dimensions in Richardson's war data. The first factor, however, does juxtapose Multipolarity with the War Incidence factor. Multipolar systems, thus, have many wars involving major as well as minor powers; there are many new wars per year in a multipolar system, and many different countries enter these wars.

Our attention is directed instead at the results from *smallest space analysis* (Table 5 and Figure 1).³¹ In contrast with the factor analysis, the picture in Figure 1 portrays considerable proximity between variables. Looking more closely at the main independent variables, one sees unipolarity to the far left, tripolarity on the far right, multipolarity at the bottom, and bipolarity embedded in the north-central portion of the configuration. We may infer that each type of power distribution is uniquely associated with

jective Function," *American Statistical Association Journal*, LVIII (March 1963), 236-44. The specific code names are SSA-I for the former, and Cluster IV for the latter.

³⁰ The 52×52 correlation matrix in the diagonal. Twelve factors were extracted with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, and negative eigenvalues appeared on the fourteenth cycle. An orthogonal (varimax) rotation was performed but so many communalities exceeded 1.0 (due to missing data) that it was impossible to obtain a meaningful oblique solution.

³¹ The storage limitation for smallest space analysis on the IBM 7040 at the University of Hawaii Computing Center was 50 variables, so the stratification data (33 variables) were reduced by two variables in the analysis with Richardson's data (19 variables). The excluded variables were number 1 (number of poles), which has emerged on the same factor with multipolarity in every run attempted with factor analysis, and variable 27, which has similarly been so related with another variable (number 26) as to be superfluous in a larger analysis. Isobars in the SSA-I figures are drawn around variables on the basis of loadings $\pm .50$ in the factor analyses reported in Tables 2-4. Lower case Roman numerals refer to the stratification factors; upper case, to Richardson's dimensions in Figure 1, and to Wright's dimension in Figure 2. Labels are not attached to each variable number, since the names given in Tables 2-3 are so lengthy that they would clutter the plot unesthetically.

TABLE 5. TWO-DIMENSIONAL SMALLEST SPACE ANALYSES

Variable Number	Phi Coefficients		Variable Number	Phi Coefficients	
	Run 1	Run 2		Run 1	Run 2
1		.03	35	.02	
2	.03	.02	36	.01	
3	.02	.02	37	.01	
4	.07	.05	38	.01	
5	.02	.03	39	.01	
6	.03	.03	40	.01	
7	.03	.04	41	.03	
8	.03	.02	42	.01	
9	.01	.01	43	.01	
10	.01	.01	44	.01	
11	.01	.01	45	.01	
12	.02	.01	46	.02	
13	.04	.04	47	.04	
14	.03	.03	48	.02	
15	.05	.03	49	.01	
16	.02	.01	50	.01	
17	.03	.04	51	.01	
18	.01	.01	52	.01	.02
19	.05	.04	53		.02
20	.02	.01	54		.02
21	.02	.01	55		.03
22	.01	.01	56		.01
23	.01	.01	57		.01
24	.02	.02	58		.02
25	.01	.01	59		.02
26	.01	.01	60		.04
27		.01	61		.02
28	.01	.01	62		.02
29	.01	.01	63		.02
30	.02	.02	64		.01
31	.03	.02	65		.02
32	.02	.02	66		.03
33	.02	.01	67		.02
34	.01		68		.01
Iterations			37	25	
Normalized Phi			.05	.04	
Coef. Alienation			.30	.28	


some variables, but much less so for other variables; following Rosecrance, we may read the figure in terms of the respective costs for each.

Unipolarity is surrounded mainly by stratification variables, such as resource availability and extraregionality of alliances, which is reminiscent of the Imperial Decline and Expansion factors in the preliminary analysis of the 33 independent variables. If we search for a cost of unipolarity in terms of warfare, the only rele-

vant variables are extraregional wars. *Bipolarity*, though apparently related to a larger number of variables, in view of its centrality in the plot, in actuality is located amid stratification variables. A bipolar system will evidently encourage minor powers to make alliances in other subsystems; there will be many alliances of all types; many satellites and middle and minor powers will be present. The main systemic cost is the tendency for longer wars, which often spill over into adjacent eras, with major powers frequently drawn into military confrontations. *Tripolarity* proves to be very explosive and is associated much more with war than with stratification variables. Tripolar systems will have more countries simultaneously fighting on the battlefield; there will be many ongoing wars and many new wars each year. Clearly the tripolar systems, which in our sample appear in modern Asia and pre-unification Hawaii, are much more eventful and crisis-ridden than bipolar systems. *Multipolarity* is associated most closely with such remaining stratification variables as exclusive major power alliances and indicators of Alliance Saturation. Destabilization and War Incidence are the main costs found in the widest arc around the multipolarity variable that does not intrude completely into the domains of bipolarity and tripolarity.

The dichotomization of types of power distribution into four variables according to number of poles evidently produces a configuration in which each of the four main types of polarities are at opposite ends from one another. With the exception of bipolarity, so few war variables are close to these extremes that alliance variables seem more predictive of international stability. As isobars in Figure 1 reveal, variables loading together at high levels on the respective factor analyses are found in adjacent locations in the smallest space plot. Among the alliance factors there is a tendency for the less important (low eigenvalue) dimensions to be situated on the left of the configuration and to be unrelated to war variables; the 19 Richardson variables are more widely scattered, though mostly on the right hand side. (Partial bounding by an isobar denotes that the other member of the relevant factor loads negatively and therefore is located at the opposite end of the plot.)

Variables indexing system size are located from north to side in the middle of the figure, virtually bisecting factors derived from Richardson's data. On the basis of the closest factors one may infer that a tight subsystem with many alliances, members, and minor powers allied to major powers is very likely to have many powers actively engaged in wars; the wars will be long, often spilling over into adjacent

FIGURE 1. Smallest Space Analysis of Richardson and Stratification Data^a

^a For key to variable numbers, see Tables 1 and 2. Upper case Roman numbers denote oblique factors from Table 3; lower case Roman numbers, oblique factors from Table 2.

eras, with many lives lost. In larger systems, there will be many outbreaks of warfare, especially among major powers, and the wars are likely to result in destabilization, that is, victory for powers trying to upset the status quo. The Deutsch-Singer interaction opportunity hypothesis, in short, is completely inconsistent with the findings of the smallest space analysis: we should look for smaller systems, with less so-called interaction potential, to bring about a more peaceful state of affairs.

Turning to the independent variables, which are bunched together at the south-central portion of the plot, we find that when members of a subsystem contract many alliances, both at home and in other regions, there is a tendency for these systems to have rival blocs. Such arrangements deserve the label *superblobs*, for the alliance tentacles extend to many arenas. The consequence of superblobs is for upsets of the status quo in both home and foreign regions, while War Incidence, Duration and Number of Countries involved in each war are much less distinctly related to the presence of superblobs. Most of the remaining stratification dimensions are more isolated from war variables. Alliance Saturation in a system breeds only Destabilization; Imperial Expansion and Decline are related to Extraregional Wars: a Differentiated system, as defined by a parity in major and middle powers and extraregionality in alliance

partnerships, is unrelated to war variables. These latter two sets of variables merge together into a single Procrustean cluster. Because the characteristics used to define our 21 subsystems in space and time were stratification variables, it is possible to infer that the main patterns discovered in Richardson's war data are unrelated to the procrusteaness of our original analytical cuts on alliance formation patterns. Instead, wars did not fit our temporal and spatial boundaries very well, contrary to Denton's analysis.

Although the dimensions of Richardson's data resemble those of Wright's, the two sources fail to overlap insofar as Richardson's data, even when expanded by the Bendix and Fornander sources, do not pertain to subsystems I-V or XI; Wright's coverage is complete for all but Hawaiian subsystems. A smallest space analysis of the stratification and Wright variables, some 50 in all, promises to unravel any artifacts in the results due to sampling problems. The most prominent feature of the second smallest space analysis³² is a wider amount of scatter among

³² A factors analysis of the 33 stratification and 17 Wright variables once again produced results that were unsatisfactory in technical respects— inflated communalities, failure of an oblique solution to improve simple structure from an orthogonal solution. A principal axis factor analysis was first

the points (Table 5 and Figure 2), but the overall goodness of fit of the two-dimensional solution is almost identical with the Richardson data. The four main war dimensions are found at the extreme right, whereas stratification clusters once again enjoy a much wider ambit. Some stratification variables, hence, are more related to war than others.

The costs and benefits of various types of polarities resemble those found with the Richardson data. *Unipolarity* is considerably isolated from the independent variables in the northwest portion of the figure; the only war variables nearby are extraregional war indices. Members of unipolar systems, in other words, tend to fight outside the region rather than inside, as had been discovered in Figure 1. *Bipolarity*, although once again planted squarely in the middle of the configuration, occupies a point surrounded largely by independent variables, and it is least distant from variables indexing wars with many belligerents. *Tripolarity* is the same distance from the War Multilaterality factor as bipolarity but closer to variables measuring the length and numbers of wars. *Multipolarity*, finally, is adjacent to the Extra-Era wars and somewhat closer to the War Incidence dimension than bipolarity. Unlike Richardson's data, most of the Wright war variables are closer to the polarity codings than to the alliance data. Because of the restrictive sampling criteria employed by Wright, and the consequent overweighting of wars involving major powers, perhaps we should not be surprised to find some of these slight differences from the more inclusive Richardson data.

Some alliance and stratification factors, nevertheless, are highly related to Wright's war data. Size, Multipolarity, and Differentiation box in most of the war dimensions. Subsystem Size is fixed intimately vis-à-vis War Incidence and touches Multilaterality; Extra-Era and Extra-Region variables are near also, but multipolarity is closest to the Extra-Era cluster. Presence of middle powers and absence of neutrals, the two variables loading highest on the Differentiation factor, are most predictive of War In-

cidence; the two points are at opposite ends of the plot by dint of the negative loading of one of the two variables on the Differentiation dimension. Consistent with the Richardson findings, the Size dimension is unquestionably related to the War Incidence and Multilateral factors. Larger subsystems are somewhat more distant from extrasystem wars in the Wright data, undoubtedly because the latter source lists fewer colonial conflicts than Richardson. The propinquity between War Incidence and Differentiation, however, is a new finding entirely. For Wright the presence of a substantial number of middle powers and a lack of extrasystem alliances entails more wars; in Richardson's data the Differentiation variables are stationed closer to War Incidence.


Although findings in the two smallest space analyses converge in general, some incongruities do becloud generalizability. A pooling of all 68 variables seems necessary in order to determine whether the dimensions of Richardson's and Wright's data are so disparate as to warrant a more complex interpretation of results. Alternatively, we did observe considerable resemblance in the variables loading on factors extracted from the preliminary screenings of the 19 and 17 variables, so a combined analysis would seem to hold the prospect for merger of the dependent variable dimensions and hence a more simplified pattern would emerge vis-à-vis the stratification variables.

To replicate the smallest space analysis findings, a *cluster analysis* is performed.³³ The advantage of cluster analysis is that one can decompose a set of variables on a binary basis, such that the most similar pairs of variables are first grouped together and then additional clusters are added to the original atomic dyads in a tree-like fashion. Our four variables pertaining to types of power stratification were coded as 0 or 1, so we are assured that in a cluster analysis four main clusters appropriate to polarity would remain distinct until the very end; we are thus able to determine precisely which alliance and war variables have the greatest affinity for the four types of power distributions. There is another convenient feature of the cluster analysis procedure. Data from Richardson and Wright were collected so as to parallel each other: for each source, we have figures for number of wars, number of major power wars, and so on down the list. If the data are greatly different in some systematic or random manner, for example, then

attempted with 1.0 in the diagonal, nine factors emerging with eigenvalues exceeding 1.0 and a negative root was encountered on the tenth cycle. The varimax findings, however, were somewhat sharper: (1) Multipolarity and Size collapse alone with War Incidence on the first factor; (2) Size and Multilaterality, on factor II; (3) War Incidence and Differentiation load high on factor III, but are inversely related. None of the remaining factors recombine any of the dimensions discovered in the preliminary analysis.

³³Smallest space analysis was precluded because of the 50-variable limit. The data input to the cluster analysis was the 68 × 68 Pearsonian correlation matrix.

FIGURE 2. Smallest Space Analysis of Wright and Stratification Data*



* For key to variable numbers, see Tables 1 and 3. Upper case Roman numbers denote oblique factors from Table 4; lower case Roman numbers, oblique factors from Table 2.

we would expect that variable 34 (Richardson: number of wars) would not emerge on an early cluster with variable 53 (Wright: number of wars), and so forth for the remaining variables. Cluster analysis supplies a precise measure, the coefficient of similarity, for the extent to which any one variable resembles another, thus permitting us to assess which Richardson and Wright variables are most similar or dissimilar.

In examining the results, we find first of all that separate unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar clusters do indeed emerge (Figures 3-6). Unipolarity eventually merges with bipolarity, and the tripolar and multipolar clusters are combined, but only after all other variables have been located on one of the four clusters.³⁴


³⁴ The four main clusters converge as follows: the unipolar and bipolar clusters merge at

Secondly, most of the variables assembled from the Richardson and Wright compilations emerge either on initial dyadic clusters or appear within second-order clusters, so the two sources are fundamentally homogeneous. And, thirdly, the initial dimensions—seven to nine for stratification variables, six and five respectively for the Richardson and Wright sources—are clearly discernible, the war dimensions collapsing into stratification dimensions as anticipated above.³⁵

—92.5356; the tripolar and multipolar clusters collapse at —102.5750; and the entire set of 68 variables come together at a similarity coefficient of —119.9040.

³⁵ A principal axis factor analysis on the 68 × 68 Pearsonian correlation matrix extracted seven factors, with a negative root encountered on the eighth cycle. The orthogonal (varimax) loadings

FIGURE 3. Unipolarity Cluster




There are two subclusters within the cluster containing *unipolarity* (Figure 3). Associated most closely with the existence of a single power center is a tendency for extraregional alliances to be contracted between major and minor powers; a large number of sovereign states enter the subcluster next, followed by an availability of resources-extraregional alliances dyadic cluster. The Imperial Decline and Expansion dimensions are thus located here. Extra-Era and Extraregional wars, factor V for both Richardson and

Wright, constitute the second subcluster, and the fact that they merge with the first subcluster at such a high similarity coefficient level indicates that the two subclusters are relatively homogeneous. Unipolar international subsystems, hence, are likely to be rather dull and pacific arenas: major and even minor powers are likely to contract alliances and to make wars in other locales, though a lack of internal alliances is more intimately a facet of unipolarity than absence of wars. Results are more complex in the *bipolarity* cluster (Figure 4). Bipolar systems evidently nurture exclusive alliances among major powers, involve many minor powers in alliances with major powers, and the scope of these alliances extends beyond the analytical confines of a particular subsystem region. These were the variables loading on the Blocs dimension in the preliminary factor analysis. The next subcluster is composed of Destabilization variables: bipolar wars are very likely to be long and will result in destabilization. The larger subsystems have been bipolar, we find this time, for the third subcluster contains magnitudes in subsystem members (major, middle, minor, and satellite powers) and in alliances of all types. From the magnitude of the similarity coefficients it appears that bipolarity is more responsible for lengthy, destabilizing wars than for subsystem size. Less well connected, but more related to bipolarity than to other power distributions, is a tendency for strong regulators, multilateral alliances, multi-major alliances, and a preference on the part of major powers

were input to a quartimin oblique rotation, which ran 30 cycles, 28500 iterations, a biqurtimin solution having turned up an unacceptable abundance of inflated factor loadings. The findings are similar to those derived from the cluster analysis: (1) Multipolarity and Size collapsed along with War Incidence on factor I; (2) Procrusteaness and subsystem Size are related to Extrasystem Wars; (3) Size is linked to Multilateral Wars; (4) Alliance Saturation and Extra-Era War dimensions are found together; (5) Alliance Saturation is related to Duration and Destabilization on two factors, one for Richardson and the other for Wright. The meaning of the seventh factor is not clear. These results are not presented here because they reinforce previous findings and, thus, would be redundant information; yet another reason, however, is that the polarity codings, our main interest herein, receive no significant loadings. Cluster analysis does not bury the relationships one seeks to discover and is therefore discussed in more detail.

FIGURE 4. Bipolarity Cluster




for alliances only with one another; few isolates are observed within the dense alliance network. Alliance Saturation merges with bipolarity only when the Destabilization and Size dimensions are bound up with bipolarity: Alliance Saturation, thus, is related to destabilizing and lengthy wars in larger subsystems. *Tripolar* subsystems are distinguished by their tightness (lack of neutral powers) and as well for an absence of middle powers (Figure 5). Because some of the tripolar systems are Hawaiian, and hence not reflected in Wright's data, there is some ambiguity and lack of close association between the initial subcluster and the other subclusters sketched in Figure 5. The second cluster contains both Richardson and Wright variables pertaining to the Extra-Era dimensions, but the third subcluster seems only very remotely a part of the total cluster. Since tripolarity joins multipolarity soon after the formation of the third subcluster in Figure 5, we may interpret the variables in the final tripolar subcluster, which come from War Multilaterality dimensions, as reflecting a general pattern common to any subsystem with more than two main poles: nearly every country is at-war, wars tend to be general rather than localized in terms of number of participants, and many soldiers die during these

eras. These findings negate the image of multipolarity as freer from dramatic crises, for the outcome of general wars is much more likely to lead to system transformations than the results of localized conflicts involving the use of force. The initial subclusters within the unipolarity, bipolarity, and tripolarity clusters are similar insofar as variables extracted from Richardson and Wright are not present; war data form distinct subclusters, which later merge with the polarity variables. Such is not the case with *multipolarity* (Figure 6), which is apparently wedded to the appearance of new wars within many years of a subsystem era. The two other subclusters, similarly, contain variables referring to a large number of total wars and warlike states, whether measured in magnitudes or normed by dividing raw figures in such a way as to render the quotients more comparable from one subsystem to the next. The War Incidence dimension, in short, is associated uniquely with multipolarity and with no other stratification variable.

VI. DISCUSSION

Results from the above tests of the relationship between power stratification and international stability challenge much of the existing


FIGURE 5. Tripolarity Cluster



folklore within current system theory in international relations. First of all, the number of poles in a system predicts somewhat less well the amount of violence than do other stratification

elements, such as alliance configurations. Secondly, classical balance of power theory, with its faith in so-called inherently benign operations within multipolar systems, is undermined.

FIGURE 6. Multipolarity Cluster



Thirdly, procrustean alliance patterns are related only to extrasystem wars, so our analytical cuts do not interfere with the generalizability of our findings. Fourthly, results are substantially the same for two distinct data bases: our findings are independent of criteria for determining membership in subsystems.

Unipolar systems are clearly the most pacific; most members prefer to engage in war outside the system if at all. But of course a hierarchical unipolarity in which one state dominates many others is largely an extinct phenomenon historically. *Bipolarity* is associated consistently with longer wars, and countries seeking to upset an existing distribution of resources are most successful in bipolar systems. Rosecrance's hypothesis that bipolar struggles have a definite impact in terms of stabilization or destabilization is hence supported. Consistent with Waltz, major powers in bipolar systems must be content to accept infrequent, localized yet prolonged wars as concomitants of an intense rivalry that erupts in nibbling at the few ambiguous peripheries of super-bloc domains. Tripolarity and multipolarity are more difficult to separate from each other in terms of systemic costs and benefits. They contain the highest rates of war, incidence of war casualties, and most countries in such systems dispatch troops to battlefields. Multilaterality is assigned most frequently to *tripolarity*, and war incidence adheres to *multipolarity*. This finding is consistent with Rosecrance's characterization of multipolarity as most likely to harbor conflict with ambiguous outcomes but negates the Deutsch-Singer formulation.

The choice between bipolar versus multipolar arrangements now seems clear. If a state or group of states is willing to accept long wars that are won by aggressor states, bipolarity provides an escape from the more war-prone, character of historical multipolar subsystems. Multipolarity entails more violence, more countries at war, and more casualties; bipolarity brings fewer but longer wars.

VII. CONCLUSION

Several conditions bound the generalizability of the findings presented herein. Although most of the current theorizing on international system dynamics is based upon European cases, and the present study makes an effort to encompass a wider sample, with only 21 cases of high levels of statistical significance, and a satisfactory representativeness of all possible subsystems cannot be claimed. Missing data, furthermore, undoubtedly precluded consistent findings among the various multivariate techniques applied. But the need to operationalize more of the variables

deemed salient by Rosecrance and Waltz is the most glaring task remaining in order to achieve a richer body of tested propositions, particularly since the key independent variable—polarity—is less precisely measured than the most significant dependent variables.

With such caveats in mind, one might expand the main finding of a negative relation between system stability and number of power centers to congruent situations. Within a domestic political system, for example, it does not seem surprising to expect that strong centralized rule guarantees domestic stability much more than the presence of sectionalism or separatist groups. Supranational integration and national unification, similarly, are achieved more peacefully and effectively if engineered by single strong core states rather than by rival states or achieved in an egalitarian manner.³⁶ The tyrannical aspects of consolidated rule in monoelite systems, however desirable for limiting levels of violence, are not easily mitigated through institutional channels and by formal regulators, however. We are therefore confronted with a Hobson's choice between the pacific virtues of strong authority and the prospect of the evils of license in political systems, whether intranational or international, which permit more liberty to their constituent parts.

DEFINITIONAL APPENDIX

1. *Number of poles*. Sum of significant military power centers, such as unaligned major powers, rival blocs or alliances. (Rosecrance)
2. *Unipolarity*. A subsystem containing one pole with a plurality in military powers without significant opposition.
3. *Bipolarity*. A subsystem with two main military power centers.
4. *Tripolarity*. A subsystem with three main military power centers.
5. *Multipolarity*. A subsystem with four or more military power centers, usually unaligned major powers.
6. *Availability of resources*. The presence of neutral powers, that is, entities not aligned with the main poles; or, the existence of areas ripe for military expansion in view of their unguarded, power-vacuum status (antonym: unavailability). (Rosecrance)
7. *Tightness of poles*. Lack of neutral powers mediating significantly between poles (antonym: looseness). (Kaplan)
8. *Strength of regulator*. Systemic institutional device or practice with an ability to check aggression from one or more poles, such as balance of

³⁶ Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1965).

- power, alliance system, concert of major powers, intergovernmental organization. (Rosecrance)
9. *Number of members*. Sum of entities with military viability that interact more or less continuously within a region in a manner relevant to political-military goal attainment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration.
 10. *Number of major powers*. Sum of members that can be totally defeated in battle by no other single power, but instead by a combination of members (usually including another major power).
 11. *Number of major and middle powers*. Sum of major powers plus members that can be defeated militarily only by single major powers. (NB. A *minor power* is the residual category for the weakest entity of a subsystem.)
 12. *Number of satellites*. Sum of members that remain internally autonomous but have foreign policy decisions made by an outside power.
 13. *Fully sovereign members/members*. Percentage of members retaining sovereign status throughout an entire subsystem era, excluding satellite states and (either abortive or successful) subnational entities in revolt.
 14. *Members/middle and major powers*. See definitions 9 and 11.
 15. *Major powers/major and middle powers*. See definitions 9 and 11.
 16. *Number of alliances*. Sum of nonaggression pacts, defensive pacts, and ententes between entities. (Singer and Small)
 17. *Aligned countries/members*. Percentage of sovereign members of a subsystem entering at least one alliance ("sovereign" at least for one year in the era).
 18. *Alliance partners/alliances*. Mean number of countries in all alliances of a subsystem.
 19. *Alliance partners/alliances/members*. See definitions 17, 18.
 20. *Number of alliances between major and minor powers*. Sum of alliances with major powers and minor powers as members.
 21. *Minor powers allied to major powers/minor powers*. Percentage of minor powers allied with at least one major power.
 22. *Partners in alliances including minor and major powers/all such alliances/minor powers*. Mean number of members in alliances with at least one major and one minor power.
 23. *Partners in alliances including both minor and major powers/all such alliances/minor powers*. See definitions 11 and 22.
 24. *Number of alliances exclusively between major powers*. Sum of alliances contracted between major powers lacking either middle or minor powers as partners.
 25. *Alliances exclusively between major powers/alliances including major powers*. Percentage of alliances containing at least one major power that have neither middle nor minor powers as partners.
 26. *Partners in exclusive major power alliances/all such alliances*. Mean number of members in alliances lacking middle or minor powers as partners.
 27. *Partners in exclusive major power alliances/all such alliances/major powers*. See definitions 10 and 26.
 28. *Alliances starting in earlier era or ending in later era/alliances*. Percentage of alliances either contracted in a previous subsystem era or terminating in a later subsystem era.
 29. *Alliances including both major and minor powers starting in earlier era or ending in later era/alliances including major and minor powers*. See definitions 10, 11, 20, 28.
 30. *Alliances exclusively between major powers starting in earlier era or ending in later era/alliances including major and minor powers*. See definitions 10, 24, 28.
 31. *Extraregion alliances/all alliances*. Percentage of alliances contracted between at least one member of a subsystem region and at least one nonmember of that subsystem region.
 32. *Extraregion alliances including major powers/all alliances*. See definitions 10, 20, 31.
 33. *Extraregion alliances including minor powers/all alliances including minor powers*. See definitions 11, 24, 31.
 34. *Number of wars*. Sum of fatal quarrels involving more than the loss of 314 lives. (Richardson)
 35. *Members at war/members*. Percentage of members fighting in at least one war.
 36. *Participants in wars/members at war*. Sum of all belligerent participants in all wars divided by the sum of members fighting at least one war.
 37. *Participants in wars/wars*. Mean number of members fighting per war.
 38. *Durations of wars/wars*. Mean number of years per war (rounded up).
 39. *Years with new wars/years in era*. Percentage of years in a subsystem era containing an outbreak of at least one new war.
 40. *Number of wars with major powers*. See definitions 10, 34.
 41. *Wars with major powers/major powers*. See definitions 10, 35.
 42. *Participants in wars with major powers/all such wars*. See definitions 10, 37.
 43. *Durations of wars with major powers/all such wars*. See definitions 10, 38.
 44. *Years with new wars with major powers/years in era*. See definitions 10, 39.
 45. *Wars resulting in destabilization/wars*. Percent-

- age of wars won by members resulting in a change in ante bellum conditions, such as redrawing of boundaries or transfer of sovereign control over a population, favoring the aggressor.
46. *Wars with major powers resulting in destabilization/wars with major powers.* See definitions 10, 45.
47. *War deaths/wars.* Mean battle-related casualties for all wars fought in subsystem era.
48. *Wars starting in earlier era or ending in later era/wars.* See definitions 28, 34.
49. *Wars with major powers starting in earlier era or ending in later era/wars with major powers in era.* See definitions 10, 29, 34.
50. *Extraregion wars/all wars.* See definitions 31, 34.
51. *Extraregion wars with major powers/all wars with major powers.* See definitions 10, 32, 34.
52. *Level of disturbance.* Extent of international conflict challenging responses by the regulator to preserve an existing power distribution (Rosecrance).
53. *Number of wars.* Sum of instances of military combat between states involving formal declarations of war. (Wright)
- 54-63. Same conceptual variables and definitions as variables 34-44.
- 64-68. Same conceptual variables and definitions as variables 47-51.

DIRECT LEGISLATION: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF OPEN HOUSING REFERENDA

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Any middle-aged member of the political science guild in a retrospective mood might ponder a question: "What ever happened to direct democracy?" In our halcyon student days the textbooks discussed the direct democracy trinity—initiative, referendum, and recall—described their mechanics and variations, explained their origin in the Progressive Era, told us that the United States, Australia, and Switzerland were leading practitioners of direct democracy, cited a few eccentric referenda, gave the standard pro and con arguments, and essayed some judgments of the relative merits of direct and representative democracy. Latter day collegians may pass through the portals innocent of the existence of the institutions of direct government. Half of the American government texts never mention the subject; the others allocate a paragraph or a page for a casual mention or a barebones explanation of the mechanics.¹

A similar trend has occurred in the literature. Before 1921, every volume of this Review had items on the referendum, five in one volume. Subsequently there have been only seven articles, all but two prior to World War II.² "The Initiative and Referendum in Graustark" has ceased to be a fashionable dissertation topic, only four in the last thirty years.³ All but two of the published monographs antedate World War II.⁴

The diligent students of voting behavior have

neglected referenda—perhaps one does not plough a field which one presumes already has eroded away. However some sociologists, in quest for indicia of alienation and anomie, have stumbled on to some referenda.⁵ Community power studies have made limited use of referenda data.⁶ A handful of studies have effectively employed referenda data for various purposes. Wilson and Banfield calculated the ethnic and income correlates of bond issue voting as indices of public—and private—regardingness.⁷ Referenda data have been used to diagnose the non-success of urban renewal and metropolitan government schemes.⁸ Survey research has been employed to ascertain voting behavior in four case studies, three of open housing referenda, and a bond election in one community.⁹ Scant effort has been made to use survey methods to illuminate the dynamics of referenda, to ascertain the policy consequences of direct legislation, or to appraise its efficacy as a decision-making instrument.

A casual explanation for the demise of direct democracy without the courtesy of an obituary

⁵ Thomas A. F. Plaut, "Analysis of Voting Behavior in a Flouridation Referendum," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 23 (1959), 213-222; William Gamson, "The Flouridation Dialogue," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (1961), 526-537; John Horton and Wayne Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (1962), 485-493; E. L. Dill and J. C. Ridley, "Status, Anomie, Political Alienation and Political Participation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (1962), 205-213; Clarence Stone, "Local Referendums; An Alternative to the Alienated Voter Model," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (1965), 213-22.

⁶ Robert Agger et al, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York, 1964), Robert V. Presthus, *Men at the Top* (New York, 1964), Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, *Four Cities: A Study of Comparative Policy-Making* (Philadelphia, 1963).

⁷ James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness as a Value in Voting Behavior," this Review, 58 (1964), 876-887.

⁸ Richard Watson and John Romani, "Metropolitan Government in Cleveland," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5 (1961), 365-390; John M. Ducey, *Who Killed the Urban Renewal Bond Issue?* (Loyola University Center for Research in Urban Government, 1966).

⁹ Boskoff and Zeigler, *op. cit.* The open housing studies are cited in footnote 16.

*The author is indebted to Mrs. Duane Stranahan and the Bowling Green University Foundation for generous financial assistance.

¹Of a dozen current American government texts examined, four allocate a page to "direct democracy," three a paragraph or two, and five never mention the topic. State and local texts usually give it more attention.

²Listed in the *Cumulative Index of the American Political Science Review, 1908-1963*, p. 87.

³Unpublished doctoral dissertations: Anson Van Eaton, *The Initiative and Referendum in Missouri* (Missouri, 1955), Wallace H. Best, *Initiative and Referendum Politics in California* (So. Calif., 1956), Walter Rosenbaum, *Legislative Participation in California* (Princeton, 1964), Jack Goldsmith, *The Role of the Initiative as a Tactic of Interest Group Politics in California*, (UCLA, 1966).

⁴Joseph G. LaPalombara, *A Study of the Initiative and Referendum in Oregon* (Corvallis, 1950), Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election* (Philadelphia, 1964).

might run something like this. In contrast to the opening years of this century when life was simple and democratic feeling ran high, bubbling with naivete and excessive optimism, in the latter half of the century direct democracy is anachronistic for a polity of two hundred million, whose technical policy questions far exceed the ken of everyman and require a minute division of labor and responsibility, with decision-making assigned to elites, legislative and bureaucratic, with specific competencies. Direct democracy has no place in the age of organization. Although no one noticed, it necessarily went out with the horse and buggy, and the Madisons and Burkes who feared the excesses of democracy may rest in peace.

The presumption that direct democracy is of negligible significance seems exaggerated. Every year I am summoned to be a legislator four, six, or eight times, enacting or rejecting property tax levies, bond issues, nonproperty taxes, public works projects, redistricting the legislature, revising school districts, and assorted amendments of city charter and state constitution. In a recent year there were 1,846 referenda in Ohio.¹⁰ Although direct democracy is almost nonexistent in some states, the national volume of referenda may be ten to fifteen thousand annually.¹¹

Are referenda inconsequential despite the volume—merely perfunctory ratification of trivial matters? Indubitably many are trivial, such as minor technical amendments of a state constitution in a familiar contextual syndrome: proposed by a virtually unanimous legislature, sponsored by a few prestigious organizations, and without organized opposition. But other constitutional referenda are important and contested vigorously. The electorate's decisions are hardly trivial when it simultaneously rejects a legislative apportionment tailored for partisan advantage by a governor and his cohorts and their proposal to establish a state bond commission authorized to finance any state or local function (and leave the bills for successors).¹²

¹⁰ Ohio Election Statistics, 1957-58.

¹¹ A national sample of school referenda reports that the sample of 583 districts had 2,630 referenda in the decade, 1948-1959, which produces an annual national average of 13,000 school referenda for that period. Subsequent consolidation of districts has reduced the number but not the significance of school referenda. A. F. Carter and W. G. Savard, *Influence of Voter Turnout on School Bond and Tax Elections* (Office of Education, 1961), p. 10.

¹² The substance and fate of Ohio State Issues One and Two, May, 1967.

Surely school boards and administrators do not view referenda as empty routine. Of six controversies in Chicago which Banfield selected as the most important in a recent period, the referendum was a factor in three; in each instance proponents of plans chose not to risk a referendum.¹³ A legislature generously offers local units an assortment of "permissive taxes," but permission must also be secured from the local electorate, and the new "authority" remains dormant.¹⁴ The presence or absence of the referendum has been crucial in two areas of public policy: fluoridation and open housing.

Not only is direct democracy slighted by the textbooks, but when mentioned the treatment is likely to be misleading. Generally the brief reference is exclusively to state level I and R, which also has been the focus of most of the literature. Although statewide referenda are frequent in a few states, notoriously California and Louisiana, the national average of state referenda is 70 in odd years and 300 in even years, about two per cent of the volume of local referenda.¹⁵ Consistent with grass roots folklore, it is at the local level that direct democracy flourishes and affords abundant opportunities for study.

I. OPEN HOUSING REFERENDA

Between 1963 and 1968, ten cities and the state of California conducted open housing referenda. All were initiated by opponents who utilized the referendum provisions of city charters or state constitutions in an effort to cancel open housing legislation by vote of the sovereign electorate. In some communities the petition drive was a project of John Birch Society activists. The strategy of nullifying the public policy set by the processes of representative democracy by invoking the machinery of direct democracy worked consistently until 1968. The California statute received only 35% support from the electorate, city ordinances from 25% to 47%. Indeed, until the surprising victory of the Flint ordinance in February, 1968, by a paper-thin margin on a recount, it appeared that open occupancy could never win at the polls.

The voting patterns have been investigated for three of them. The California "Proposition 14" in 1964 and the previous one in Berkeley

¹³ Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, 1961).

¹⁴ Local officialdom is not grateful for the "permissive taxes" recently authorized by the Ohio General Assembly.

¹⁵ Tabulated by Hugh A. Bone, "Easier to Change," *National Civic Review*, 57 (1968), 120.

were analyzed by matching census data with vote tallies by wards and secondary analysis of limited data from a commercial poll.¹⁶ The Toledo referendum, September, 1967, was examined by a city-wide sample of 456 (usable) interviews conducted during the week preceding the referendum and interviews of protagonists.¹⁷

The Toledo survey explored dynamics of voting behavior in referenda. Some of the specific objectives were to measure the degree of interest and involvement among categories of the electorate; to ascertain the electorate's sources of information, advice, and influence; to measure the volume of communication and the voter's evaluation of information sources; to determine the effect of the contemporaneous riots and the amount of "white backlash"; to compare the non-voters with the minority which voted; and to correlate voting with attitudes and socio-economic variables.

The studies of the Berkeley and California referenda focus on voting correlates and description of the struggle. Here our concern is comparison of voting behavior in referenda and national elections and the implications of the open housing referenda for the theory of direct legislation, particularly its efficacy as a decision making process. The focus can be indicated by a few hypotheses: (1) Campaigns in open housing referenda are unlikely to result in much conversion, because we know that presidential campaigns principally reinforce beliefs and activate predispositions; in an open housing vote racial attitudes substitute for party identification as potent predispositions. (2) The existence of such strong predispositions will make ineffective the efforts of community elites to influence the outcome. (3) For the same reason recent riots will have little impact on the outcome. (4) The paramount determinant of turnout in referenda is the significance of the concurrent election (if any) rather than the significance of the issue because of the low salience of local politics. (5)

For that reason and because most referenda are nonpartisan, turnout at local referenda usually will be low, a contradiction of a foundation premise of direct democracy. (6) The rationale of direct legislation as pure democracy also is clouded by the likelihood that those who do vote are somewhat unrepresentative of the populace. Some unrepresentativeness is almost a certainty, because we know that elections normally have some class and racial bias. That factor is likely to make the referendum figures an inaccurate, and possibly even erroneous, reading of public opinion in the jurisdiction. (7) Therefore the accuracy of referenda as measures of opinion for a jurisdiction is maximal when referenda are scheduled concurrently with presidential elections, and have the greatest potential for distortion or miscarriage when scheduled alone or concurrently with an insignificant election. (8) Because of the low salience of politics, the efforts of referenda protagonists to communicate with the electorate in any large jurisdiction will not reach a substantial portion of the populace, even on such extraordinary issues as open housing. (9) Therefore the information level regarding the issue will be rather low for a large portion of the population of any large jurisdiction (and often in small ones), which is inconsistent with the civic man premise of direct democracy and militates against the efficacy of the referendum as a public policy decisional process. (10) But the actual voters in referenda will have distinctly more knowledge than non-voters, as per our knowledge of voters and nonvoters, which improves the rationality of decision making by referendum at the cost of violating its own ethic of universality and augmenting the bias. (11) In a referendum numerous voters actually do not fulfill the legislative role of seeking and weighing all the pertinent data and considerations in a diligent search for the public interest, but instead vote their private preferences.

II. INTEREST, STAKE, AND PARTICIPATION

Voting research has demonstrated that electoral participation is a function of an individual's psychological involvement in politics and has documented abundantly the slight interest of most people in politics.¹⁸ The turnout rates of local elections indicate that psychological involvement usually is less in local than national politics. Although voting rates for local referenda fluctuate considerably, turnout is rarely high and occasionally below 10%.¹⁹ This contra-

¹⁶ T. W. Casstevens, *California's Rumford Act and Proposition 14 and the Defeat of Berkeley's Fair Housing Ordinance*, pamphlets published by Institute of Governmental Studies, Univ. of Calif.; Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 753-769.

¹⁷ Two hundred eight clusters of three housing units were drawn systematically. A randomizing device was used to spot the cluster within each block and another to select the interviewee. Interviews were completed in all but one cluster, two in most, with a completion rate of 76%, exclusive of vacancies and razed areas.

¹⁸ Angus Campbell et al, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), pp. 89-115.

¹⁹ School fiscal issues comprise about three-fourths of all referenda. The mean turnout at

diction of grass roots mythology is clarified by recent investigations of the determinants of voter psychological involvement. It is diminished for referenda by the lower visibility of the objects of local than national politics and by the absence of partisanship. Intensity of party preference is the strongest index of voting in national elections.²⁰ The nonpartisanship of most referenda affects turnout doubly by removing both the strongest internal stimulus and the external stimulus of party organizations. Also referenda may impose additional burdens on the voter by being scheduled as "special elections" or by their abstruseness.

Open housing might be that rare specimen, a referendum which generates psychological involvement equal to or possibly in excess of presidential elections. The issue does not appear complex or remote to most people, intensive campaigns are waged, candidates and parties take positions, and the referendum poses starkly what is perhaps the most fundamental and emotionally charged issue of domestic policy today. The 1964 California referendum appears to support that hypothesis; the turnout was 85% of the registered voters, distinctly higher than other referenda on the ballot, and only 2% below the presidential vote. However the Toledo referendum, a better test because of its separation from a presidential election, furnishes evidence to the contrary.

The paramount determinant of turnout for a referendum is scheduling—the significance of the concurrent election. Open housing indubitably generates more involvement than local politics

school fiscal referenda was 36.3% of eligible voters in the 1948–1959 period. Carter and Savard, *op. cit.*, 12. Turnout rates on four fiscal referenda in upstate New York towns ranged from 7% to 45%. R. V. Presthus, *Men at the Top* (New York, 1964), 259–261.

²⁰ Campbell et al, *loc cit.*

TABLE 1. DEGREE OF INTEREST

	<i>Great</i>	<i>Little</i>	<i>None</i>
Toledo FHO Referendum	46%	37%	17%
SRC National Sample	<i>Very much</i>	<i>Somewhat</i>	<i>Not much</i>
1956 Presidential Campaign*	30%	39%	31%

* Calculated from data in *The American Voter*, 103.

normally. It established a city primary turnout record in Toledo, but 64% of the adult population did not go to the polls and 8% of those voting passed up the proposition. Furthermore, the turnout at the subsequent (nonpartisan) city election sans the housing issue was higher (44%), and much higher at the 1968 presidential election (80%).

The relative inability of referenda to move people to the polls is underscored by comparing the professed level of interest in the Toledo referendum with an SRC national sample's interest in presidential elections. Employing the same yardstick, the professed interest level of the Toledo sample was higher. Here is a pronounced contrast of electoral behavior in national elections and local referenda: corresponding levels of professed interest may not produce comparable voting rates.

Interest and other dimensions of psychological involvement, such as political efficacy, do exert comparable effects on individual decisions to vote or abstain in local referenda and national elections. The pattern of association is the same in both types of elections (Table 2), but the starting plateau is much higher for presidential elections, which attract even a majority of the persons at the bottom of the interest and political efficacy scales. Local referenda, even on open housing, do not approach the magnetism of presidential elections.

The Toledo housing referendum was no exception to the proposition that politics are not salient for the populace. The controversy was rather an

TABLE 2. PSYCHOLOGICAL INVOLVEMENT AND TURNOUT

Degree of Interest	Percent Voting		Sense of Political Efficacy	Percent Voting	
	Toledo FHO Ref.	1956 Pres. Election*		Toledo FHO Ref.	1956 Pres. Election*
Low	19	58	Very low	27	52
			Low	37	60
Medium	30	72	Medium	—	75
High	45	87	High	35	84
			Very high	41	91

* SRC national sample. *The American Voter*, 103, 105.

TABLE 3. PERSONAL STAKE IN FHO BY RACE

"Do you think the outcome of the election will affect you personally . . . a great deal, only slightly, or not at all?"			
	Whites	Negroes	Total
Great deal	14%	25%	16%
Slightly	26	17	24
None	50	44	48
Don't know	10	13	11

academic matter for many respondents; only 40% perceived its outcome as affecting them personally, and only 16% felt a great personal stake in it. More of the Negroes perceived a personal stake, but less than half thought the outcome would affect them personally. One reason for the apathy of Negroes was pessimism. "A lot of Negroes feel it won't pass, and will have little effect if passed."

The Toledo referendum also adhered to another pattern of electoral behavior: lower participation by Negroes. That issue might be expected to produce an exception to the pattern, but it did not. The election day impression was confirmed by an examination of election records which disclosed that 37% of the whites in the sample actually voted but only 28% of the Negroes. Here again the principal determinant is the significance of the concurrent election. There likely was less Negro voting gap in the California referendum concurrent with a presidential election which drew 85% of the registered voters to the polls.²¹

²¹ The Berkeley turnout of registered voters was slightly higher in census tracts with over half Negro residents than in other tracts, but the data furnish no measure of how many Negroes were unregistered. T. W. Cassstevens, *op cit.*, 87. Most Negroes were not registered for the Toledo referendum.

Applying the sample voting ratios to (amazingly accurate) population estimates enables one to estimate the number of Negro and white Voters in the Toledo referendum and to ascertain the responses to the issue by white Voters. Approximately 9,000 votes were cast for open housing by Negroes and 14,000 by whites. It follows that only one-fifth of the white Voters supported the ordinance; the pattern of white voting was 20% for, 70% against, and 10% abstention.

III. THE NONVOTERS

Low participation rates not only are at variance with the premise of direct democracy that the people wish to be legislators, but also vitiates somewhat its claim to be a more authentic expression of the "general will" than the representative body whose decision is being challenged. Therefore, how representative of the views of the populace was the active minority, one-third of Toledo adults, that made the open housing decision? The vote could be unrepresentative in either direction depending upon which side achieved the greater mobilization. The larger volume of nonvoting shows that mobilization was quite incomplete on both sides, but all the data indicate that mobilization of the potential pro vote was less effective.

Table 5 indicates that the nonvoters, as an aggregate, were distinctly more favorable to open housing than the voters. A greater portion of nonvoters was pro and a smaller portion was hostile, in part because Negroes were a larger fraction of the nonvoters than of the voters. The data indicate that among whites opposition was a more intense motivation to get to the polls than a mildly favorable view of the ordinance. The "antis" voted, which corresponds to the findings of some studies of fluoridation referenda²² and to our folklore that voting "agin" is a stronger incentive than voting for.

The unrepresentativeness of the social compo-

²² See items in footnote 5.

TABLE 4. PARTICIPATION BY RACE

	*Est. 1967 Population	×	**% Adult	=	Estimated Adults	×	% Voters in Sample	=	Voters by Race
White	329,986		61.2		201,952		36.9		74,520
Negro	62,567		53.2		33,285		28.4		9,453
	392,553						Calculated		83,973
							Actual		84,074

* City Planning Commission.

** 1960 Census.

TABLE 5. POSITION ON FHO: OFFICIAL VOTE AND SAMPLE*

	Official Vote	%	161 Voters	294 Non- voters
For FHO	22,827	27.2	31.7	39.1
Against FHO	54,518	64.8	63.4	51.0
Not Voting	6,728	8.0	5.0	9.9
	84,074	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Position stated in interview preceding referendum. $.05 > p > .02$.

sition of legislatures is manifest; as Long says, an election is an oligarchical device.²³ Comparison of the voters and nonvoters confirms that direct democracy also has distinct social bias. Because of low turnouts, local referenda are likely to have more class bias than major elections.

In this instance the unrepresentativeness of the effective electorate produced only a distorted reading of public opinion rather than a miscarriage; but referenda have such a potential when the outcome is close and turnout is low. Those conditions appear mutually exclusive to some extent; the closer the outcome, the less nonvoting should occur. These data do not deny such a relationship, but the significance of the concurrent election is a more potent determinant of turnout. It follows that the miscarriage potential of referenda is maximal when scheduled alone or with an insignificant election and minimal when concurrent with a presidential election.

IV. EFFECTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS

What are the effects of the heated, intensive campaigns in open housing referenda? Do they merely neutralize each other, is there any substantial amount of conversion, or is voting a reflex of preexisting attitudes? For presidential elections, the Erie County and subsequent surveys have provided some of the most solid propositions of voting behavior. Presidential campaigns reinforce beliefs and loyalties, active pre-

²³ Norton Long, "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism," 56 (1952), this REVIEW, 56 (1952), 810.

TABLE 6. CLASS AND RACIAL COMPOSITION

	Voters	Nonvoters
LOW edn., income, voc.	33%	49%
HIGH edn., income, voc.	19%	10%
Mean SES index	3.5	2.7
Negro	12%	16%

dispositions, and convert some people; there is much reinforcement and activation but very little conversion.²⁴ A leader of the Right to Sell Committee agreed that its campaign activated rather than converted, but leaders of the Fair Housing committee believed that their campaign achieved quite a bit of conversion. Our interviews confirmed that there was some conversion, but the following data suggest that the volume was modest.

At least half of the voters in the sample had made up their minds before the campaign began. A fourth said they were undecided, but some merely did not wish to reveal their positions. Only a quarter felt they had been influenced by the campaign, which allowed small room for conversion. Eighty-eight respondents indicated the direction of the influence. The limited evidence indicates that the pro-FHO campaign achieved some net gain among the populace, but mostly among non-voters. Among the voters the anti-FHO campaign's activation effort apparently offset any pro-FHO conversions.

The data indicate that most of the voters had made their decisions prior to the campaign, only a fourth were influenced by it, there was little conversion, and hence the principal effects were reinforcement and activation. These inferences are corroborated by the Berkeley and California case studies. In California an upsurge of support for Proposition 14 occurred during the last weeks of the campaign. Wolfinger and Greenstein's analysis shows that it was a matter of increased understanding of the ballot situation, i.e., that yes was a no vote on open housing. The campaign "had the consequence of making clear

²⁴ Paul Lazarsfeld et al, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944), chs. 8-10.

TABLE 7. IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN ON VOTERS (N = 161)

	Decided	Undecided	NA
"Have you decided how to vote on it?"	75%	24%	1%
"Did you make up your mind during the past month, or earlier?"	Past Month 19%	Earlier 50%	Undecided & NA 31%
"Has your viewpoint been influenced by what you read or hear in the campaign?"	Yes 26%	No 71%	DK & NA 3%

TABLE 8. DIRECTION OF INFLUENCE

"Did that make you more for the ordinance or more against it?"			
	Voters	Nonvoters	Total
More For	11%	11%	11%
More Against	14	5	8
No Effect	75	84	81

to voters how to express their attitudes. It did not lead them to change their attitudes."²⁵ In the Berkeley campaign "the major effect was to activate and rationalize the predispositions of the voters."²⁶

The SRC staff's field theory explanation of those effects in presidential elections is appropriate here. In opening housing referenda also "the psychological forces guiding behavior arise before the campaign opens" and three-fourths of the electorate have made their decisions beforehand.²⁷ The forces that generate the strong predispositions of voters in presidential elections usually are much weaker or absent in referenda, although party identification was significant in the Berkeley and California ones, but for an open housing referendum racial attitudes furnish a functional equivalent of even greater potency. Referenda on other policies may afford more scope for campaign impact on outcomes.

V. EFFECTS OF RIOTS

If campaigns have slight effect on outcomes of open housing referenda aside from clarification of the ballot, what about "white backlash" from riots? The 1967 riots in neighboring Detroit and elsewhere coincided with the Toledo referendum. One might surmise that the riots were influential, because the yes vote in Toledo was only 30% compared to 34.6% in California and below that

²⁵ Wolfinger and Greenstein, *op. cit.*, 758.

²⁶ Casstevens, *op. cit.*, 79.

²⁷ Campbell et al, *op. cit.*, 76.

of all but one of the other cities. However, the lower Toledo vote might be a function of differences in the scope of the various propositions and/or differences in turnout rates. The latter furnish a *prima facie* explanation in light of the differences in the attitudes of the voters and non-voters. Table 5 indicates that had the Toledo decision coincided with a presidential election the yes vote would have been 34.5%. It follows that backlash from the riots could have changed a substantial number of votes only if the Toledo populace prior to the riots was distinctly more sympathetic to open housing than the populace of California. I am unaware of any evidence to sustain that implausible assumption; these data indicate that the riots did not change many votes.

The riots did affect the thinking of several respondents and it was decisive for a few, but the riot impact was not unidirectional. A fourth of the respondents said the riots had influenced them negatively, but a sixth was influenced positively, reasoning that the riots were evidence of the need for open housing.

The responses to the attitudinal items of Table 9 are not indicative of strong white backlash. A large portion of the public attributed the riots to agitators rather than to Negroes collectively. Three-fourths did not anticipate that an open housing law would generate disorder, and only a sixth assented to the proposition that the riots justified denying Negroes "equal housing rights." (The question did not require respondents to equate "equal" and "open" and evidently "separate but equal" remains valid in many minds.) The responses to the public policy question of Table 10 also do not suggest much white backlash sentiment.

VI. PUBLIC INTEREST OR PRIVATE PREFERENCE?

The rationale of direct legislation rests on the populist premises that the plebiscite is the purest form of democracy and that the public interest is the will of the majority of those voting. Critics of direct democracy, perhaps not wishing to appear undemocratic, usually do not challenge the democratic theme, which the foregoing

TABLE 9. RIOTS—ATTITUDES

	SA	A	D	SD	DK
"The recent riots show that Negroes should not have equal housing rights."	2%	15%	49%	17%	16%
"If it were not for a few firebrand agitators, we would not have racial unrest and disorders."	15%	52%	19%	4%	10%
"A Fair Housing Ordinance will cause racial trouble in Toledo."	4%	23%	42%	8%	23%

Strongly agree to strongly disagree, DK—don't know.

data indicate is vulnerable, but instead focus their fire on its efficacy as a public policy decisional process, questioning the electorate's capability to legislate wisely because of allegedly inadequate knowledge. Pollock examined this issue by assaying the judgment over time of the Michigan electorate and concluded that it was at least as good as the legislature's.²⁸ However, some recent observations are less sanguine, specifically with respect to open housing referenda,²⁹ and there is no dearth of anecdotes of whimsical incidents, e.g., voting for a new fire department and simultaneously rejecting the implementing tax levy.³⁰

Assaying the record of the electorate's judgments is an extraordinary subjective enterprise, but there may be an alternative approach. Do voters at referenda express their respective judgments of the public interest or their personal preferences? It would seem that when the electorate undertakes to second-guess the legislature it has the same responsibility to search for the public interest. In terms of Simon's efficiency decision-making model, $E_a = O_a/I_a$, a voter is obliged to determine whether the net benefits exceed the costs.³¹ Simon's model is strikingly apropos to fiscal referenda, by far the most numerous species. In a tax levy "election," does the voter ponder in the booth whether the community benefits are commensurate with the cost, or does he weigh his personal benefit against the increment of his property tax?

If voters substitute in Simon's formula their personal values, a plebiscite is logically a sound decisional mechanism only if the majority of private preferences automatically equates with the public interest. That populist premise, also the controverted premise of much interest group literature and some defenses of the rationality of federal budgeting,³² has face validity perhaps for a few referenda, e.g., to legalize colored margarine. Its validity for most referenda is not patent and is demonstrably false for open housing and fiscal issues, because the incidence of costs and benefits is so unevenly distributed. Indeed the disparity is extreme in school referenda, where the paramount beneficiaries are arbitrarily barred from voting and most of the voters incur direct, visible costs and no direct benefits. (Are plebiscites really pure democracy, even sans property qualifications for voting?)

²⁸ James K. Pollock, *The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan* (Ann Arbor, 1940), pp. 66-70.

²⁹ See Wolfinger and Greenstein, *op. cit.*, 768-769.

³⁰ There are some authentic instances in the Ohio archives.

³¹ Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1947), ch. 9.

³² Eg., Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston, 1964).

TABLE 10. JUDGMENT OF FHO AS PUBLIC POLICY

"Do you think the F.H. Ordinance would be good or bad for Toledo?"

	Good	Bad	Good & Bad	Little Effect	Don't Know
Sample	44%	26%	1%	4%	25%
Voters	40%	30%	2%	6%	23%
Nonvoters	47%	25%	1%	4%	24%

Open housing is another situation in which the disparity is pronounced; some persons incur benefits and no costs while others perceive themselves as incurring only costs.

To investigate this possibility, the sample was asked, "How do you think the Ordinance would affect the city? Do you think it would be good for or bad for Toledo?" The distribution of the responses (Table 10), even those of the voters is conspicuously contradictory to the results of the referendum. Evidently many ballots were not public policy judgments but expressions of personal preference, that is, not judgments of the public interest but of private interest. (The data below on voter information are consistent with this analysis.) This phenomenon casts some shadow on the efficacy of the referendum as a policy process.

VII. KNOWLEDGE

Unless one holds that the efficacy of the referendum as a policy making process is irrelevant either because the electorate's decision is ipso facto the public interest or "the people are entitled to make their own mistakes" and "deserve the government they get," the allegation of critics that direct democracy overtaxes the information of the electorate merits investigation. The overburdened-uninformed-voter argument is clinched by citation of the referendum volume in a few states (California averages twenty-two per general election³³); hence an isolated referendum is not an acid test of voter knowledge. Indeed the Toledo case presents an optimal situation for electoral knowledge: a single, local ref-

³³ Joseph P. Harris, *California Politics*, 4th ed. (San Francisco, 1967), p. 112. A recent study of voting patterns on California referenda by examination of absentee ballots furnishes data that reflect voter ignorance (only 53% voted on all propositions and the average abstention rate was 15% per proposition) and some confusion. On two antithetical propositions regarding a state lottery, only 47% voted consistently, 45% voted partially or completely contradictorily. John E. Mueller, "Reason and Caprice: Voting on Propositions" (ms, 1968).

erendum on an extraordinarily vital policy, bitterly contested and highly publicized.

Several survey questions solicited knowledge of the issue and the positions of organizations and candidates. Four-fifths of the sample understood the basic nature of the ordinance, but few knew that it had been enacted by unanimous vote of the council. Only a fourth were aware of the existence of the (less comprehensive) Ohio open housing statute; consequently few people had occasion to wonder, "Is the ordinance superfluous?"

A major gambit of the Fair Housing Committee was solicitation of endorsements by community organizations and publication of the list contrasting its forty endorsements with none for the Right to Sell Committee. That publicity preceded and coincided with the dates of the survey; nevertheless half of the sample could name no organizations which supported or opposed the FHO.

Which organizations were the most visible to the electorate? Followup questions regarding the positions of eight major organizations revealed slightly more knowledge than replies to the free answer question. Most people knew or reasoned that the Council of Churches supported it, indicating that the intensive activity of church people was successful to that extent. If people knew anything about the FHO campaign, it was that the churches were for it.

Half of the sample knew or reasoned that the ordinance was supported by the Board of Community Relations (city civil rights agency) and the AFL-CIO Council. The endorsements of the Council and prominent union officials were heavily publicized and the Council's election flyer to unionists carried its endorsed slate on one side and an appeal for the ordinance on the other side. Rarely have union officials taken as

prominent a stand for a cause beyond the scope of union direct interest, but their voices were not heard by half of the citizenry nor by most union members.³⁴

An interesting aspect of Table 11 is that more respondents identified the Democratic Party as for the ordinance than the Republican Party, although the Republican City Committee's endorsement was reported in the press only a few days before the survey, the ordinance was sponsored by the Republican mayor, and the Democratic mayoralty candidate simultaneously was finding defects in the ordinance and obviously courting the votes of opponents. Evidently very few people actually "knew" that the local parties had endorsed FHO and instead more people inferred Democratic Party endorsement from their impressions of the stance on civil rights of the parties nationally. It also is evident that this instance of bipartisanship had scant weight on the outcome.

The results of the primary and referendum were astonishingly incongruent. Only one anti-FHO candidate survived while the mayor and councilmen who had enacted the ordinance won handily. One explanation of the anomalies is that the electorate had an unusual situation: electors could have their cake and eat it too. The survey data furnish another explanation. The electorate did not associate the issue with candidates, because most of the public did not know the positions of the candidates. Three-fourths of the sample could not name a single

³⁴Only 44% of the membership knew of the UAW union's endorsement despite 15 articles in the union organ. Schley R. Lyons, "Labor in City Politics: The Case of the Toledo United Auto Workers," (paper at 1968 meeting of Ohio Association of Political Scientists).

TABLE 11. POSITIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS-RECOGNITION

"Do you know the positions of any of these organizations, are they neutral, for it, or against it?"

	Actual Position	Pct. Correct Answers		
		Voters	Nonvoters	Total
Toledo Employers Association	For	39	27	31
Toledo AFL-CIO	For	66	44	52
Board of Community Relations	For	68	44	52
Toledo Council of Churches	For	83	64	71
Republican Party	For	40	22	29
Democratic Party	For	48	34	39
The Toledo Blade	Neutral*	11	7	8
League of Women Voters	For	37	22	27

* Blade endorsement, (weak) came after the survey.

council candidate pro-FHO and nine-tenths could name no anti-candidate.³⁵ When queried about the stance of the three mayoralty candidates and six Council candidates, the incumbent mayor who vigorously championed FHO was the only one whose position was visible to the public.³⁶

Manifestly most of the public paid little attention to the campaign. In the final week the electorate's knowledge of significant aspects of the issue, of the candidates, and their positions was meager. About all most adults knew was the existence of the referendum, the basic nature of an open housing ordinance, and that the ordinance was supported by churches and the mayor.

Did knowledge advance materially in the last four or five days? Perhaps, but the Erie County study suggests otherwise; at the peak of that presidential campaign "about half of the population ignored stories on the front page of their newspapers and speeches by the candidates" and persons with low exposure in the early part of the campaign continued to have low exposure throughout.³⁷

Referenda require no qualification of two axioms of voting behavior: that "in the electorate as a whole the level of attention to politics is so low that what the public is exposed to must be highly visible—even stark—if it is to have an impact on opinion,"³⁸ and that voters generally are more informed than nonvoters. The knowledge level of voters in the sample was substantially higher than nonvoters on all measures of information, although one could hardly characterize the aggregate voters as well informed, when a majority did not know the positions on the issue of the political parties, the leading newspaper, and most candidates.

The logic of direct democracy predicates higher levels of knowledge than is required for representative democracy; homo politicus is its postulate. The foregoing data and a simultaneous study of Toledo's largest labor union³⁹ surely do not demonstrate that information levels are higher in referenda than other elections.

³⁵ The electorate's ignorance was partially because the strategy of council candidates, except the anti-FHO ones, was to avoid the issue like a plague.

³⁶ There were parallels between the 1964 California election and the Toledo city election. The Republican mayor that championed FHO was defeated by the Democratic challenger who found technical flaws in the ordinance during the primary and campaigned valiantly against crime in the streets.

³⁷ Lazarsfeld et al, *op. cit.*, ch. 14.

³⁸ Campbell et al, *op. cit.*, 60.

³⁹ Lyons, *op. cit.*

The measurements of the Elmira study are too dissimilar for a good comparison, but the knowledge level in Elmira in that presidential election appears at least equal to this referendum.⁴⁰

There are alternative "explanations" of the failure or refusal of many Toledo citizens to become well informed on the open housing issue (that is, to acquire information available in the mass media regarding the positions of organizations and council candidates and the existence of the state open housing law): in moralistic terms as dereliction of civic duty, in psychological terms as selective attention filtering out information, or in economic terms.

Downs' economic logic, that nonvoting and low information are rational behavior because the costs of acquiring information exceed the stakes of the election for most people, would seem less applicable to an open housing referendum whose consequences are more distinct and significant than most elections.⁴¹ There are, however, elements in this situation that fit the economic theory: 60% of the populace did not view the outcome as affecting them personally, the issue had the appearance of simplicity rather than abstruseness, and the voting decision rested more on attitudes than facts; ergo expenditure of effort to acquire information would be uneconomical. If information-seeking was uneconomical here, would it be otherwise for any statewide or many local referenda? If the Downs' theory is a valid explanation of the rationality of inattention and passivity vis-a-vis elections, its implication for the efficacy of direct legislation is not supportive.

VIII. COMMUNICATION

How much communication is generated by a referendum, what fraction of the populace observes references to the issue in mass media and reads handbills, how much is the issue discussed at meetings and informally, and do organization leaders succeed in communicating with the membership? The open housing issue should generate more communication than most referenda, therefore the measurements below perhaps approach the upper limits of citizen involvement in referenda campaigns.

Again benchmarks are missing; there are no closely comparable measurements of communication in referenda or election campaigns. We have some knowledge of aspects of election campaign communication: that exposure is distinctly a function of interest, education, age, and SES; that interested persons have high exposure

⁴⁰ Bernard Berelson et al, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), ch. 10.

⁴¹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957), pp. 207-276.

TABLE 12. COMMUNICATION: CONVERSATION

(Pct. vertically)				
	Frequency	Voters	Nonvoters	Total
"How many times have you discussed the FHO with members of your <i>family</i> ?"	None	24	44	27
	Few	38	34	35
	Several	35	17	24
	DK or NA	3	5	4
"How many <i>neighbors</i> have you talked to about it?"	None	48	67	60
	Few	29	19	23
	Several	20	11	14
	DK or NA	3	3	4
"How many <i>friends</i> have you talked to about it?"	None	27	46	39
	Few	33	36	34
	Several	38	15	23
	DK or NA	2	3	3

to all the mass media and uninterested persons low; that party identification is somewhat associated with choice of media; and that conversation and personal influence remain important, as opinion leaders provide linkage between mass media and the less active segment of the population.⁴²

Open housing should and did generate a lot of conversation but little organized discussion. Approximately three-fifths of the sample and three-fourths of the voters discussed it with relatives and friends; a hyper-active third of the voters discussed it "several times." There was distinctly less talk with neighbors. Half of the voters and 60% of the nonvoters professed not to know the attitudes of neighbors, but three-fourths of those voters who professed to know reported that their neighbors were opposed to the ordinance, which corresponds to the voting and indicates that the attitudes of neighbors are more consequential than the respondents rated their influence (below). The neighbors of nonvoters were less hostile to the ordinance, another indication that the effective electorate on September 12 was not an unselected sample.⁴³

Organizations were channels of communica-

⁴² Lazarsfeld et al, *op. cit.*, chs. 5. 14; Berelson et al, *op. cit.*, ch. 11.

⁴³ Responses to the query about the attitudes of neighbors were:

		% Voters	% Non- voters
"Are most of your neighbors for the ordinance or against it?"	For	12	11
	Against	35	26
	Both	3	2
	DK	50	61

tion and (less) influence, because 40% of the sample, a slight majority of the voters, and a third of the nonvoters belonged to organizations which they knew had endorsed the ordinance. The relevant affiliations were church and union; for this issue, they and the ad hoc campaign committees were the important political organizations of the city. But communication between leaders and membership was incomplete, particularly in the unions. Despite endorsement by prominent union officials and the AFL-CIO Council, only a quarter of the unionists perceived endorsement by their union.

TABLE 13. COMMUNICATION: MEETINGS AND ORGANIZATIONS

(Pct. Vertically)			
		Voters	Nonvoters
Was the lower frequency of conversation with neighbors than friends and family a function of urban social distance or the nature of the subject?			
"Have you attended any meetings where it was discussed?"	Yes	15	11
	No	84	85
	DK or NA	1	4
"Place or type of meeting?"	Church	7	4
	Union	1	0
	Other	4	1
	Multiple	1	0
"Has any organization to which you belong taken a stand?"	Yes-For	52	33
	Yes-Against	1	0
	No or DK	47	67
"What is that organization?"	Church	42	28
	Union	7	4
	Other	1	1
	Multiple	4	1
		Voters	Nonvoters

TABLE 14. COMMUNICATION: NEWS MEDIA

		Voters	Nonvoters
"Have you seen any advertising for or against?"	Pro advertising	51	37
	Con advertising	30	19
	None	40	54
	DK or NA	9	8
"Have you heard any radio or TV programs or spot announcements?"	Pro programs	66	53
	Con programs	42	36
	None	26	37
	DK or NA	6	8

Mass media and the churches were the principal informational sources.⁴⁴ Sixty percent of the sample heard some radio and TV programs or announcements, about 40% observed newspaper advertisements, and a third reported reading news accounts and feature stories. Meetings were an important but less frequent source. Thirteen percent of the sample reported attending meetings where the FHO was on the agenda—principally church groups. (That figure may be an understatement, because few respondents classified church services as "meetings.")

The sharpest aspect of these measurements of communication is the congruence with the Erie County study findings of the distinctly lower involvement of nonvoters.⁴⁵ The voters belonged to more organizations that endorsed FHO, attended more meetings where it was discussed, observed more references in the mass media, and talked about it much more than the nonvoters. However voting does not correlate fully with campaign exposure in a low turnout election; some of the voters were low on exposure and numerous persons who were aware of the FHO campaign did not vote. These data may indicate the ceiling of communication on a public policy issue in a large jurisdiction. Approximately 40% of Toledo adults were oblivious of all the propaganda issued by the Fair Housing and Right to Sell committees, the churches, unions, and anti-FHO candidates for council and mayor.

IX. INFLUENCE OF ELITES AND THE PRESS

Are some sources of information and advice on referenda distinctly persuasive? "On a matter like the Fair Housing question, whose judgment would you respect and place confidence in? Would you be slightly influenced, greatly influenced, or not influenced at all by each of these?" Seven sources were enumerated: newspaper and TV editorials, the comments of friends and neighbors, and recommendations of

"About 30% of the sample reported receiving handbills.

⁴⁴ Lazarsfeld et al, *op. cit.*, 45-49.

the mayor, one's minister, or union. If the respondents were candid, there were no preeminent molders of opinion. There were only two deviations: a fifth of the unionists ascribed great influence to their union⁴⁶ and a fifth of the sample assigned great influence to their minister on this matter. Although respondents possibly underrated, because the forces of influence are subtle and people prefer the self-image of being an independent thinker, their denials of influence are congruent with the overwhelming defeat of the FHO in the face of its endorsement by the press and community elites.

Rarely are the political behaviors of elites and masses so different as in open housing decisions. The contrast was sharper in Toledo, where the elites maintained at least a facade of united endorsement of FHO, than in California where realtors, some taxpayer groups, and two statewide party organizations opposed it,⁴⁷ but the patterns were the same. The elites were more tolerant, other-regarding, and innovative; the masses were more conservative, less tolerant, and more self-regarding. This is consistent with the findings of analyses of referenda in two other policy areas, fluoridation and bond issues.⁴⁸

The open housing plebiscites demonstrate the limitations of elite power. The Toledo story can be stated tersely, the elites were on one side and the votes on the other. The hypothesis of some community power students that elites are so much our decision makers that outcomes of referenda can be predicted by examination of the alignment and activity of elites manifestly does not hold for open housing referenda.⁴⁹ Nor does it hold for other important policy areas: school levies, state and local bond issues, city annexation, and metropolitan government schemes. In school tax levy "elections," elites characteristically are aligned on the pro side but a substantial portion are defeated.⁵⁰ How many "power

⁴⁶ Lyons' survey of the UAW, whose leaders plumped for FHO in the *Union Journal*, reports that although 44% of the membership were aware of the union's endorsement, only 29% favored FHO. But union influence was visible: 60% of Caucasians scoring high on a pro-union political orientation scale favored FHO but only 28% of the Lows favored it. Lyons, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ T. W. Casstevens, *op. cit.*, 57-62.

⁴⁸ See citations in footnotes 5 and 7.

⁴⁹ Delbert C. Miller, "The Prediction of Issue Outcome in Decision-Making," *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society*, 25 (1957), 117-197; Robert C. Hanson, "Predicting a Community Decision: A Test of the Miller-Form Theory," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (1959), 662-676.

⁵⁰ In Ohio from 1960 to 1968, 48% of school bond

elite" visions of civic monuments, "growth," and metropolitan government have foundered on the rock of rejection at the polls of "progress" by the intransigent masses? The processes of representative democracy often are more useful for elites and the referendum not infrequently is an insuperable barrier to elite goals.⁵¹

Textbooks inform us that newspapers exert great influence in local referenda,⁵² which may be correct, but is unsupported by the limited amount of research to date. Examining the absentee ballots of the 1964 election in Los Angeles, where the press was generous with advice, Mueller found "little effect on the vote on the propositions" by the newspapers.⁵³ Both Toledo newspapers endorsed the FHO, although the Blade hedged its reputation for influence in local elections by predicting defeat of the ordinance. The Blade editors understood the limitations of elite influence in referenda.⁵⁴

X. CONCLUSION

The variations in the votes of the eleven open housing referenda demonstrate that outcomes are affected by differences in the scope of the laws, in timing, and the nature of communities; but the data of the Berkeley, California, and Toledo referenda indicate that the vigorous

proposals and 25% of school operating levies were defeated. Memorandum of Ohio Education Association.

⁵¹ Typical of mass rejection of civic elite aspirations was the simultaneous rejection by the Lansing electorate of a bond issue for a civic center and an ambitious scheme for incorporating the hinterland township, April, 1953. For an account of the repeated defeats at the polls of elite efforts to establish metropolitan government in Cleveland and St. Louis, see Watson and Romani, *op. cit.*, and Scott Greer, *Governing the Metropolis* (New York, 1962). Greer asserts that the fundamental obstacle to rationalizing the political structures of metropolitan areas is Jacksonian notions of self-determination, exemplified and enforced by the referendum.

⁵² Edward D. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York, 1963), p. 324; James M. Burns and Jack W. Peltason, *Government by the People* (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), p. 721.

⁵³ John C. Mueller, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Reo M. Christenson, "The Power of the Press—The Case of the Toledo Blade," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 3 (1959), 227–240. The Blade deviated from its characteristic enthusiasm for civil rights, because its editors perceived that the city elites could not win the referendum. Its aloofness, except for a lame last minute endorsement, was a great blow to the FHO proponents and a self-fulfilling prophecy.

campaigns have slight effect on the results. This parallel of presidential campaigns comes from the same source, the electorate's potent predispositions that are activated but rarely changed by a campaign. By extension, the opportunity for conversion in referenda campaigns is a function of the relevance of the issue to any strong predispositions in the electorate.

In Toledo the predispositions rooted in racial attitudes were so strong that the contemporaneous riots had slight effect on the outcome, and the efforts of community elites in a veritable phalanx were unsuccessful. A characteristic aspect of referenda is that some community elites campaign for a measure, often with no visible opposition from others. Their success is likely to relate to the presence or absence of strong predispositions and their congruency with the elite's objective.

The Toledo data display additional parallels to the findings of voting research of presidential elections. Referenda are no exception to the low salience of politics, which is such a communication barrier that in a large jurisdiction protagonists do not reach a substantial portion of the populace. Referenda voting, i.e., the decision to vote, is a function of the same dimensions of psychological involvement, such as interest and political efficacy, and voting has a similar association with class and race. Each of those consistencies has distinct significance for direct democracy theory: for the validity of its universalist ethic and its homo politicus premise, and for its efficacy as a public policy decisional process.

The most conspicuous divergences of the Toledo data are that the turnout plateau was far below that of a presidential election and, although the electorate's professed level of interest was equal to that of presidential campaigns, the turnout was less than half as much. That is not a baffling anomaly; it is the product of the lower salience of local politics and, in this instance and most referenda, the nonpartisanship. Evidently referenda alone, even on critical issues, will not move most people to the polls.

Consequently turnout is less a function of the issue than of the significance of the concurrent election. I have observed this regularity in fiscal referenda and its frequent bearing on outcomes.⁵⁵ From our knowledge of the class and racial bias in voting and the foregoing data on

⁵⁵ The approval rate of school tax levy and bond referenda in Ohio is higher in general elections than in primaries and specials. Thus a school levy is defeated in May and wins in November. Cf. Byron H. Marlowe, "An Explanation of Voter Behavior in Tax Elections" (paper, 1969 meeting, American Educational Research Association).

the differences between voters and nonvoters in the Toledo case, it follows that the accuracy of the referendum as an index of community opinion is maximized when the plebiscite is concurrent with a presidential election and that an isolated one or one concurrent with an insignificant election is likely to be a distorted reading and possibly erroneous if the vote is close and turnout is low.

Direct democracy, whatever its debits, presumably has the august virtue of assuring majority rule. The repeated defeats of open housing enactments in referenda are incontrovertible evidence that representative democracy produces occasional instances of authentic minority rule. One wonders how many instances would be exposed if the I & R were more widespread. However, direct government itself is governance by a minority, only 22% of the population in the Toledo referendum, and that active minority may be far from a mirror image of the populace; mathematically there is room for minority rule in a low vote plebiscite.

There is a defense for any incongruence of the legal electorate and the actual electorate in a referendum. One might say that it is an automatic adjustment for intensity of policy preferences, a solution of "the intensity problem."⁵⁶ The equality of the ballots ignores intensity and therefore might fail to optimize social utility, so fluctuating turnout provides the adjustment for intensity. Can it be said that turnout operated to maximize social utility in the Toledo referendum when Negro voting was below white because of pessimism, poverty, and status? In view of the class and racial bias of voting, can one expect low turnout to be a corrective for the intensity problem? In fact Wolfinger and Greenstein cite this as a principal defect of plebiscitary decision making. Legislators are responsive to intensity, but voters are less disposed or able to make such calculations and every voter's preference is weighted equally.⁵⁷

The standard assertion that direct democracy is defective because its homo politicus premise is fallacious, i.e., that the populace lacks the presumed interest and requisite information, finds some support in this instance, a referendum in which the conditions for interest and acquisition of knowledge appear to be about optimal. The data suggest a dilemma for plebiscitary theory. If one points to the superior knowledge of the voters in the sample as evidence that the effective electorate is better informed, then one is snagged on the other horn. To the extent that

plebiscitary voting is well informed, it violates its own universalist ethic and vice versa. Of course this is a general dilemma, but surely it is more critical for direct than representative democracy.

Unless one equates a raw majority of private preferences with the public interest, a serious shortcoming of direct legislation is the likelihood that many ballots are tallies of private interest rather than judgments, informed or uninformed, of the public interest. It would seem that when the electorate supercedes the legislature, it also is acting in a representative capacity, being only a minor fraction of the community, and has the concomitant responsibilities of the acquisition of knowledge, consideration of intensities, deliberation, and an earnest quest for the public interest. Those are formidable tasks which many of the Toledo electors did not undertake.

There will be opportunity to take more soundings, because plebiscitary democracy apparently is cherished in those jurisdictions that have it. Responses of the Toledo sample to queries regarding the institution displayed intense populism; the institution was favored by an eight to one margin and four-fifths viewed the FHO as an uncomplicated question and proper for decision by plebiscite rather than city council, although simultaneously most respondents acknowledged a deficiency of information for doing it.⁵⁸ Significantly, the pro-FHO respondents also were favorable to plebiscites. Apparently fifty years later and despite talk about the complexity of public policy, there was little doubting of the Progressive rationale of direct legislation as the instrument for an enlightened citizenry to correct errors of unrepresentative, myopic, or venal legislatures. For students of politics the open housing referenda offer intriguing questions. Is direct democracy a superior instrument for policy making? Who is enlightened or myopic? Would the Progressives be gratified by this use of their nostrum?

⁵⁸ The items were: Attitudes Regarding Referenda

	SA	A	D	SD	DK	NA
"The City Council should decide all local issues instead of having elections on issues."	3	8	53	27	6	2
"If all Council members have voted for an ordinance, the people ought to vote for it too."	6	18	57	10	6	3
"We should not have an election of the Fair Housing because that stirs up passions."	3	18	55	11	10	3
"The FHO is so complicated, it should be decided only by the city council, not by an election."	3	9	55	24	7	3
"I feel that I need more information in order to vote wisely on the Fair Housing questions."	9	45	35	4	4	3

⁵⁶ Cf. Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, "The 'Intensity' Problem and Democratic Theory," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 5-24.

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, 768.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SENATE HOUSE VOTING ON ECONOMIC AND WELFARE POLICY: 1953-1964*

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The manifest purpose of the roll call analysis described in this paper is that of demonstrating the existence of two policy dimensions in Congressional voting: economic and welfare. Support is sought for two propositions:

- I. Each of the two dimensions appears in both the House and the Senate in each of six Congresses, the 83rd through the 88th, 1953-1964;
- II. Roll call voting on the economic policy dimension is more heavily influenced by partisan differences while welfare policy voting is more subject to constituency constraints.

The second proposition is significant as an attempt to distinguish between a policy dimension on which partisan differences appear to be responsible for the greater part of the voting variation, and a policy dimension on which constituency factors have a substantial impact. This bears upon the *more general concern with distinguishing those party differences in voting behavior which are a function of an independent partisan factor from those which may be attributed to any number of factors correlated with partisan affiliation.*¹ This problem will be viewed from different analytic perspectives, including an analysis of the effects of intra-party and inter-party personnel turnover on the policy positions taken by representatives of the same constituency.

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¹See Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Partisanship and Issues in Congressional Voting," Paper delivered at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-7, Washington, D.C. In relation to the differentiation of the impact of constituency and partisan factors see Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963).

Instrumental to the testing of the propositions advanced above, but of independent interest as well, are two analytic themes: (1) the Senate-House comparison, and (2) the longitudinal analysis of legislative voting behavior. The Senate-House comparison is relatively unique in that such comparisons have seldom been undertaken; to our knowledge, none have been published using the type of measures employed in this study.² In the Senate-House comparison, the substantive interest will be foremost, although certainly more advanced comparisons of Senate-House voting will involve methodological issues of some complexity. In contrast, the longitudinal component of the present study involves a heavier methodological investment, including an evaluation of the evidence that the voting dimensions measured in successive Congresses are the same throughout. This evaluation will be conducted according to criteria specified in a model of measurement identity proposed earlier by one of the authors.³ In addition, we shall consider the meaning and the utility of the types of voting measures to be constructed. The latter consideration arises out of a particular orientation to the use of roll call voting data.

I. ORIENTATION

Legislative roll call analysis is commonly identified as the province of the specialist in the study of the legislative process. This can evoke rather tedious discussions about the merits of using roll call analysis to obtain an understanding of the manner in which legislative bodies process demand inputs.

It is our view that roll call analysis is equally, if not more, relevant to the study of public opinion and electoral behavior and other studies which focus upon the relationship between input variables that embrace the political system and output variables, as represented by

²Senate-House comparisons of roll call voting have been made utilizing other methods, e.g., David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959); Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 69-84; H. Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

³Aage R. Clausen, "Measurement Identity in the Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting," *this Review*, 61 (December, 1967), 1020-1035.

roll call voting measures, which are also systemic in scope by virtue of the representational character of the members of a legislative body. This view of the utility of roll call voting analysis is particularly appropriate *if the research strategy is one of developing measures of voting which represent the broader themes of policy cleavage such as economic policy and social welfare*. Such cleavages present the maximum potential for ordering Congressmen and other actors in the political system.

Clearly, there are limitations to this analytic approach. An ordering of legislators on a policy dimension does not give any measure of the magnitude of the legislative output. Secondly, a portion of the legislative output is the product of transient combinations of forces that emerge at different points in the legislative process and is not subsumed under the broader policy dimensions. Thirdly, roll call voting measures, taken as indicators of the total set of activities through which legislators affect policy, are lacking somewhat in reliability and validity.

With respect to the third limitation, it is our view that the weakness of voting measures as indicators of total legislative activity increases with a narrowing of the policy domain. Where the purpose of the voting analysis is to order legislators on broad policy dimensions, encompassing a variety of specific issue questions, the resultant measure is less subject to measurement error. Here we are proposing that the *mean* tendencies for individual legislators' voting acts will correspond to the *mean* tendencies of other legislative activities having to do with the full set of legislative proposals encompassed by the measure of a broad policy dimension.

The strategy of focusing roll call studies upon broad policy dimensions facilitates historical, as well as comparative, research for it enables one to use the policy domain as the comparative base. Thus, in preparation for the statistical analysis of the relations among roll calls, preliminary conceptual definitions of policy domains are used to sort roll calls into broad policy categories. Within each of the categories, the dimensional analysis is then undertaken. In the present study, the first part of which is presented in this paper, five policy domains have been defined: foreign, farm, civil rights and liberties, welfare, and economic policy. Within each of these, an interpretation of the policy content of the emergent dimensions is possible without an undue strain on the imagination. With the issue content fairly clearly defined, the analysis can be extended horizontally, as well as longitudinally.

In contrast, when a correlational analysis, such as cluster or factor analysis, is applied to

the entire set of roll calls in a particular session (or Congress), one is all too often faced with roll call groupings which are a substantive pot-pourri. Granted, an interpretation may be placed on these clusters in terms of the variety of factors which produced alignments on diverse issues that meet the terms of the statistical model used to establish dimensionality. However, comparisons over time, and across legislative bodies, may turn out to be exceedingly difficult because of the substantive complexity of the measures. In addition, there is the possibility that policy voting dimensions, which are conceptually distinct, may converge statistically at given points in time. This is to say that policy dimensions can not always be objectively identified in the statistical relationships between roll call votes.⁴

We wish to reassure our readers that while using preliminary definitions of policy domains, we rely upon objective statistical analyses of the roll call relationships *within* each policy domain to provide the basis for the construction of the measures of the policy dimensions. In addition, we consider the correlations *between* measures constructed in the various domains, in search of policy dimensions extending across policy domains, and between the voting measures and relevant variables. This provides a substantial body of evidence on which to base final interpretations.

II. MEASUREMENT AND IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY DIMENSIONS

As mentioned above, the analysis reported here is confined to two domains: welfare and economic policy. The basis for the distinction between the two domains is provided by an earlier analysis of House voting in the 83rd through the 86th Congress, which was based on a much smaller subset of votes than that in the present study.⁵ The content of the domains will be indicated later.

Clustering and Scoring Formats

Within each of the policy domains, a cluster analysis of the roll calls was performed for both houses in each Congress (across parties). This meant twenty-four independent cluster analyses on roll call subsets ranging in size from 24 to 138 roll calls. Clusters were defined by the criteria that the average Yule's Q correlation among all roll call pairings should be .70 or greater, and

⁴Duncan MacRae, Jr. and Susan Borker Schwartz, "Identifying Congressional Issues by Multidimensional Models," in *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (May, 1968), 181-201.

⁵Clausen, *op. cit.*

that no individual correlation should be less than .60.⁶

The clustering format represents a compromise between two goals: (1) producing clusters, and subsequently measures, which are relatively homogeneous, and (2) producing roll call voting measures which may be statistically differentiated in a subsequent correlation analysis. If the correlation criteria are set too high, a number of clusters may be identified which are so highly correlated that the measures constructed on them can not be differentiated in their relationships to other variables. If the correlation criteria are set too low, homogeneity is reduced and interpretation becomes more difficult.

The cluster analysis provided a check on our definition of policy domains by requiring that objective statistical criteria are met before measures of policy dimensions are constructed. Once the roll call clusters had been defined, the next step was that of constructing the voting measures on which the legislators would be ordered. We used a scoring procedure in which a positive vote was scored 1, a negative vote scored 3, and the absence of a recorded vote or announced position scored a 2. The positive vote, or position, was arbitrarily designated for one roll call in the cluster, with votes on all other roll calls in the same cluster assigned positive and negative positions so as to produce positive correlations among all roll calls. A mean score was computed for each legislator whose position was known on 50 percent or more of the roll calls in a given cluster.⁷ The individual scores vary from 1 to 3 and are indicators of the

⁶ The .70 correlation criterion is approximately equivalent to the standard .90 level of reproducibility used in Guttman scaling. However, it should be noted that the requirement of a minimum of .60 for individual roll call pairings has, in practice, yielded clusters dominated by inter-item correlations of .80 and above. The setting of a minimum correlation of .60 for individual correlations guards against the possibility of an item with an extreme division being included in a cluster despite wildly fluctuating correlations that average out to .70 or better. The exclusion of such items is justified on the grounds that highly variable correlations are poor indications of a common underlying dimension. Actually, this danger had already been minimized by excluding items more extreme in their division than 90-10. For a discussion of the use of Yule's Q in roll call analysis, see Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," this REVIEW, 62 (March, 1968), 909-926.

⁷ The scoring was performed using a program constructed by Keith Billingsley.

relative proportion of positive and negative responses, with a regression toward the score of 2 as a function of absences.⁸

Cluster Analysis Results

The cluster analysis of the welfare and economic policy roll calls in the House and Senate produced a dominant cluster within each domain, in each house, and in each Congress. This "primary" cluster always contained over twice the number of items in the next largest cluster and, on the average, accounted for 65 percent of the roll calls in the domain.

These results provided an early indication of a major policy dimension within each domain that extended across the six Congresses. This was also indicated by the continuity of the legis-

⁸ There are two aspects of this scoring procedure which require explanation in terms of the assumptions made: (1) the scoring of absences, and (2) the simple summation scoring. One alternative to our scoring of absences would be that of excluding absences in the scoring. This assumes that the roll calls on which no absences are observed, with respect to each legislator, are a representative sample of the set of roll calls in the scale. We prefer not to make this assumption, treating the absence instead as partially a function of indifference or abstention. In each case, a middle scoring for the legislator is a reasonable option although more elaborate procedures might be used such as scoring absences according to a mean computed for the entire body on the given roll call.

The second feature of the scoring procedure, the simple summation of values across roll calls, recognizes that individuals occupying the same position on a policy dimension may have somewhat different voting patterns. They are assumed to be alike only in the probabilities of voting Yea and Nay, probabilities which vary between 0 and 1 probabilities assumed by the Guttman scale model. Only across a number of roll calls will the order positions on the dimension become clear as individual idiosyncracies are absorbed into the more general pattern of voting.

Actually, the scoring technique does not produce results which deviate sharply from those obtained by the Guttman scoring method. The scoring procedure does relax the deterministic response criteria of the Guttman model. On the other hand, the requirement of high Yule Q correlations among roll calls places constraints on the variations in the voting patterns of individuals assigned the same score. For a discussion of probability models and the simple summation scoring of monotone items, see Warren S. Torgerson, *Theory and Methods of Scaling* (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1958), pp. 360-402.

lative content of the primary clusters over time. Furthermore, a comparison of the content of the primary clusters in the two bodies shows a high degree of similarity between the House and the Senate.

In the Senate-House comparison, a distinction is made between the content of the roll calls identified with the primary clusters in each domain, and the set of votes associated with all other clusters. The comparison is based on those content categories in which ten or more roll calls were taken some time during the six Congresses in at least one house; in addition, as an aid to interpretation, we have also included all those categories exclusively identified with either the primary or the "other" clusters, in either house (Table 1).

A distinct pattern emerges in the association of content categories with the primary and other clusters in the two houses. This pattern shows the content similarity of the two sets of clusters across the two houses and reflects differences in the two institutions. The pattern is Guttman-scalar in form: (1) there are categories for which the primary cluster is dominant in both houses, (2) categories for which the primary cluster is dominant in the House but not in the Senate, and (3) categories where the primary cluster is dominant in neither house. In only one category, old age pensions and public assistance, is the primary cluster dominant in the Senate but not in the House. Thus, the difference in the cluster structures in the two bodies is that the Senate produces more roll calls in the content categories which are not assigned to the primary cluster.

The institutional differences reflect the fact that the Senate takes more roll calls than the House and entertains a greater variety of amendments. The more detailed consideration of legislation in the Senate increases the possibility of a greater differentiation in the substantive issues which are brought to a vote and correspondingly, a greater complexity in the dimensional structure.

The evidence on the content similarity of the primary clusters within each domain encourages us to propose that there is a policy dimension in each policy domain which is the same in both houses. Central to the hypothesized economic policy dimension are the recurring topics of public power, atomic energy, deficit financing, housing mortgage and interest policy, and public works (including anti-recession public works spending). Topics less frequently voted on but exclusively identified with the economic policy dimension are air and water pollution, anti-trust, sale of government-owned rubber plants, wage-price controls, 160 acre limit on federal ir-

rigation allotment per user, and the transfer of government civilian work to private industry. The issues involved here are most familiar as ones related to the conflict between *liberal, public-oriented economic policy* and *conservative, business-oriented economic policy*: government ownership and regulation of economic enterprise, government spending versus private incentives to economic stability and growth, tight versus easy credit policy, and the private versus the public development of natural resources.

The welfare policy dimension is dominated by legislation on public housing and urban renewal, labor regulation, education, and employment opportunities and rewards. The tight identification of legislation on tidelands oil rights and federal pre-emption of state legislative powers with the welfare dimension may appear somewhat strange. However, there are indications that welfare policy considerations are involved in both cases. Thus, with respect to the pre-emption issue, some Congressmen argued that those who supported states' rights had also been those opposed to federal social welfare legislation.⁹ With regard to the tidelands oil controversy, the desire for federal control of oil revenues for social welfare purposes is evident in proposals to use the revenue for federal aid to education.¹⁰

In general, legislation on the welfare dimension involves a relatively direct intercession of the government on behalf of the individual, cushioning him against the jolts administered by the economy, assisting him in coping with more powerful economic elements, and aiding him in getting the equal chance that the ideal of equal opportunity demands. Economic policy is relatively less direct in its impact upon the individual; it is more concerned with the provisions to be made by the government for maintaining the economy on an even keel, supporting its development in particular areas, and defining the public interest in relation to private economic interests.

The proposition that two dimensions, economic and welfare policy, are being measured by the primary clusters in the two policy domains requires further testing. The criteria to be used are drawn from a *model of measurement identity* proposed by Clausen (see fn. 3). One of the three criteria proposed, that of content similarity in the roll calls included in measures of the same dimension, and differentiation of content across dimensions, has already been considered. The other two criteria involve: (1) the

⁹ *Congress and the Nation: 1945-1964* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), pp. 1398-1399.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1205, 1403-1404.

TABLE 1. ROLL CALL CLUSTER ASSIGNMENTS (83RD-88TH CONGRESS)

A: Economic Policy				
Content Categories	House		Senate	
	Primary	Other	Primary	Other
Water & Air Pollution	10	—	4	—
Sale: Govt. Rubber Plts.	4	—	6	—
Anti-trust, Monopoly	4	—	1	—
Govt. Civ. Work to Pvt. Industry	4	—	1	—
160-acre Limit: Fed. Irrig. Allot.	1	—	1	—
Wage-Price Controls	—	—	6	—
Public Power	14	—	16	1
Atomic Energy	14	3	22	0
Deficit Financing	16	3	13	3
Hous. Mortgage & Interest	4	—	18	2
Pub. Wks. & Anti-Recession Programs	26	2	34	10
Individual Income Taxes	2	—	10	7
Corporation Taxes	1	—	8	5
Investment Taxes: Indiv. & Corp.	2	—	10	17
Excise Taxes	2	—	7	17
Maritime: Subsidy & Regulation	5	1	7	20
Conservation, Parks, Forests	6	—	2	8
Lake Mich. Divers-Ill. Wtwy.	6	1	1	10
Reclamation Projects	13	8	3	5
Commun. Satellite Corp.	—	—	21	15
Oil-Gas Industry: Tax & Regulation	—	3	1	13
St. Lawrence Seaway	—	—	—	3
Anti-trust: Agricultural Coop.	—	—	—	4
Beautification Program	—	—	—	2
Decentralization: U.S. Industry	—	—	—	2
B: Welfare Policy				
Tideland Oil Rights	4	—	13	—
Dept. of Urban Affairs	1	—	1	—
Federal Preempt. State Legis.	7	—	—	—
Pub. Hous., Urban Renewal	19	1	29	1
Fed. Pay & Pension: Lower Civ. Grades	17	—	17	3
Labor Regulation	12	—	44	7
Unemployment Compensation	5	—	15	1
Economic Opportunity Act	5	1	9	1
Minimum Wage	6	2	19	1
Education (incl. Voc. Rehab.)	26	4	50	15
HEW & Labor Dept. Funds	10	—	5	3
Migrant Labor Aid & Regulation	4	1	7	10
Medical Serv., Trng. & Research	6	4	26	10
Public Safety	—	—	—	2
Education: Planning & Research	—	3	—	—
Humane Slaughter	—	—	—	2
Old Age Pensions & Pub. Assistance	2	2	11	2

correlations among the scales measuring the two dimensions, and (2) the correlation of those scales with other variables. We shall apply the first of these two criteria in the next section.

This criterion states that *measures of the same dimension at different points in time should be more highly correlated than measures of different dimensions.*

Inter-scale Correlations

Inspection of the inner-scale correlation matrix shows the degree to which the present data fit the measurement identity criterion for inter-scale correlations (Table 2).¹¹ In the House this criterion is reasonably well-satisfied (remember that small differences in correlations are much more significant among upper range values such as these than they are for lower range values—simply think in terms of r^2 rather than r). The one scale in the House which clearly fails to meet the inter-scale correlation requirement of the measurement identity model is the 84th welfare scale. This scale has consistently higher correlations with economic scales than with welfare scales.

In the Senate, the 83rd welfare, and the 87th and 88th economic scales fall short of expectations. The 88th economic policy scale is most deviant; its correlations with welfare scales are, with one exception, higher than its correlations with economic policy scales.

When the measurement identity criterion for inter-scale correlations was proposed it was recognized that there was one particular difficulty with this criterion. It assumes that legislators will not shift their positions appreciably from one Congress to the next. If such movement does occur, the correlations between measures of the same dimension will be reduced. Concomitantly, correlations between measures of different dimensions may either increase or decrease. This weakness of the criterion becomes most apparent when a distinction is sought in the measurement of two dimensions as highly correlated as in the present case. We shall return to this problem later when we consider the regional-party alignments on the two dimensions. Let us turn now to the remaining test of measurement identity, the correlation of the scales with other variables.

Voting Correlate Analysis

The measurement identity model states that *measures of different dimensions will be different in their correlations with other variables, and that the pattern of correlations will remain constant over a period of time although the magnitudes of the correlations may vary.* Thus the case may be that measures of dimension A are more highly correlated with variable X than measures of dimension B, whereas measures of dimension B are consistently more highly correlated with variable Y. Yet the absolute magnitude of the correlations may vary. Take, for example, the case in which the party lines are gen-

erally more sharply drawn in a particular Congress. This would produce higher correlations of party across all party related dimensions, yet the *relative* magnitudes of the correlations of party with different dimensions would be expected to remain constant. Let us turn now from the hypothetical illustration to consider, first, the correlation of party with the measures of the two dimensions and, second, the relationships of constituency characteristics to the two dimensions.

The relationship of party to welfare and economic policy voting is presented in terms of the proportion of scale variance "explained" by party (Table 3). An entirely consistent pattern emerges with the proportion of scale variance explained by party being higher in each Congress for the economic policy scales.

The distinction between the two dimensions is particularly sharp in the House, with the difference in the "explained" scale variance ranging from .15 to .62, producing a mean difference of .38. In the Senate, though the explained variance differences are less sharp, they are consistent, varying from .07 to .34 with a mean difference of .21.

The consistent difference in the magnitude of the correlations of party with the economic and welfare policy scales support the proposition that two distinct dimensions are being measured by the scales in the two houses across six Congresses. The maintenance of the difference in the party associations, in the face of deviations from the expected inter-scale correlation pattern, suggests a repositioning of members within either one or both of the parties, while the overall relationship between Democrats and Republicans remains relatively constant. Further support for the welfare-economic policy distinction is found in the relationship of constituency characteristics to voting positions.

Two constituency characteristics, urbanization¹² and blue collar percentage of the labor force,¹³ were correlated with economic and

¹² Urbanization measure on Congressional districts is percentage urban minus percentage rural, based on data provided by "Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, No. 5" (February 2, 1962), pp. 156-159. Urban areas contain a central city of 50,000 or larger, including suburban areas containing a city of 100,000 or larger; suburban areas consist of closely settled areas contiguous to central cities; rural areas contain cities smaller than 50,000. The urbanization index for states is a weighted composite of the district indices.

¹³ Percentage blue collar measure on Congressional districts is based on data provided by "Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, No. 29" (July 20, 1956), p. 853. The blue collar definition in-

¹¹ The correlations reported here and in the remainder of the paper are Pearson r 's.

[illegible]

TABLE 3. VARIANCE ON ECONOMIC AND WELFARE SCALES EXPLAINED BY PARTY

Congress	Senate		House		Difference Economic- Welfare	
	Welfare	Economic	Welfare	Economic	Senate	House
83rd	.59	.72	.48	.83	.13	.35
84th	.53	.83	.71	.86	.30	.15
85th	.56	.74	.28	.90	.18	.62
86th	.42	.76	.37	.76	.34	.39
87th	.46	.53	.37	.79	.07	.42
88th	.32	.52	.37	.71	.21	.34
\bar{x}	.48	.68	.43	.81	.21	.38

welfare policy measures for each house and within each party (Table 4). The pattern conforms to the measurement identity model criterion, with the three exceptions noted in the table. It is a pattern in which measures of the welfare policy dimension are more positively correlated with the constituency variables than are measures of the economic policy dimension. This observation encompasses those instances in which "more positive" means "less negative."

An interesting aspect of these data is the strength of the *negative* relationship between urbanization-blue collar and liberal economic policy during the Eisenhower administration among Republican Senators. This relationship also holds among House Republicans, but at a much lower level.

The negative relationship between urbanization-blue collar and liberal economic policy among Republicans during the Eisenhower administration is reminiscent of the urban-rural, East-West, pro-business-anti-business political theme extending back at least as far as the populism of the post-Civil War period of the 19th century. In this view, Republicans from urban areas respond to the dominant financial and business interests in their constituencies while those from more rural areas oppose an economic policy designed to benefit those interests. The strength of this relationship during the Eisenhower administration is understandable to the extent that pro-business sentiments so clearly expressed by Eisenhower served to accentuate this historical cleavage.

Whatever the validity of these interpreta-

cludes craftsmen, foremen, machine operators, private household help, service employees, and all laborers except those who work on farms. The state measure of blue collar is a weighted composite of the district indices.

tions, the evidence is circumstantial. We are more impressed with the implications of the full set of data on both parties for the proposition that *increasing urbanization-industrialization is generally productive of forces that demand a liberal public policy, or what is thought of as liberal policy*.¹⁴ This proposition appears tenable for social welfare when the relevant constituency variables are assumed to be characteristics of the occupational and ecological structures of the constituencies. However, when the policy at issue is economic, the relevant constituency characteristics may be, to a larger extent, the financial and corporate structure of the constituency. The heavier concentration of financial and industrial organizations in the urbanized areas implies a conservative attitude on economic policy, independent of the attitude on welfare policy, which may be much more liberal. Although the influence of these conservative constituency elements would appear to be most effective with respect to Republican legislators, the lower correlation of urbanization-industrialization with economic policy, relative to welfare policy, observed among Democrats is entirely consistent with this viewpoint.

Another perspective on the voting alignments on economic and welfare policy dimensions is provided by a regional-party breakdown. In this breakdown, Democrats and Republicans were sorted into three groups: *Coastal* (Northeast, Middle Atlantic, Far West), *Interior* (North Central, Border, Mountain), and *South*.¹⁵ For each regional-party grouping a weighted mean score was computed for the four Congresses of the Eisenhower administration (83-86) and the two Congresses serving under Kennedy and Johnson (87-88).¹⁶ The results are shown in Figure 1, where the mean scores are represented by the center-most extensions of the bars in a

¹⁴ This proposition is implied at different points in the literature but we have found no author who states it clearly enough to warrant citation.

¹⁵ *Coastal*: Alaska, Hawaii, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, California, Oregon, Washington; *Interior*: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; *South*: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia.

¹⁶ Mean scores computed on the individual Congresses in each set are sufficiently homogeneous to warrant the aggregation for each set.

TABLE 4. CONSTITUENCY AND VOTING

	House ^a											
	Urbanization						Blue Collar					
	All		Rep		Dem		All		Rep		Dem	
	Welf	Econ	Welf	Econ	Welf	Econ	Welf	Econ	Welf	Econ	Welf	Econ
83rd	.33	.12	.19	-.14	.48	.23	.28	.10	.05	-.28	.44	.16
84th	.20	.16	.13	-.12	.31	.35 ^b	.20	.10	.19	-.11	.24	.11
85th	.33	.07	.16	-.12	.47	.17	.25	.02	.23	-.03	.30	-.07
86th	.36	.15	.22	-.07	.48	.35	.30	.14	.21	.18	.38	.20
87th	.40	.24	.15	-.07	.51	.42	.31	.16	.21	.11	.36	.20
Senate												
83rd	-.08	-.15	-.39	-.48	.18	-.15	-.08	-.17	-.48	-.64	.08	-.09
84th	.02	-.11	.02	-.38	.18	.06	.10	-.05	.15	-.40	.09	.05
85th	.03	-.09	.00	-.26	.19	-.02	.00	-.10	.04	-.23	-.04	-.11
86th	.16	.01	.06	-.41	.27	.16	.22	.03	.12	-.61	.19	-.02
87th	.16	.09	.25	.03	.23	.26	.21	.11	.38	.20	.11	.08
88th	.21	.14	.31	.26	.25	.17	.29	.26	.48	.49	.15	.06

^a Data on constituency characteristics for the 88th Congress comparable to that used on preceding Congresses was not available for the large number of new districts formed in the 88th.

^b Denotes instances where urbanization-blue collar measures are more highly correlated with economic policy than with the welfare policy scale for that Congress.

format which shows the conservatism of each group. Both Senate and House voting patterns are shown, with Southern Republicans excluded due to insufficient cases. We can report, however, that Southern Republicans are at least as conservative as Coastal and Interior Republicans on all measures.

There are three sets of observations to be made: (1) the high degree of similarity between the Senate and House voting alignments within each of the Congressional periods, (2) the differences with respect to economic and policy voting alignments, and (3) the differences between the two Congressional periods. It will not always be possible to delineate one set of observations from the other in the presentation.

The similarity between Senate and House voting patterns in the two periods is most striking. It is all the more impressive because the similarity embraces both the differences between the economic and welfare policy alignments and the differences on each dimension observed between the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson Congresses.


The parallel changes in the regional-party voting alignments, from the first to the second

set of Congresses, on each dimension in both houses suggests that *the same set of forces are operative on Senators and Representatives*. This is suggested as well in the preceding analyses of the content of the roll calls associated with the two dimensions in the two Houses and the constituency and party characteristics of the orderings on the two dimensions.

Much of the change in voting patterns between the Republican and Democratic administrations is accounted for by the change in the relationship between the scores of the Coastal Republicans and other members of Congress. On economic policy under the Eisenhower administration, Coastal Republicans are as conservative as Interior Republicans in both Houses, whereas under a Democratic administration, they take a more liberal position. At a lower order of magnitude, Southern Democrats appear to be relatively more conservative during a Democratic administration.

The changes in the mean scores of Southern Democrats and Coastal Republicans is of the same form with respect to welfare policy in both the House and the Senate. However, the changes are more pronounced in the Senate where

FIGURE 1. Regional-party voting



Coastal Republicans actually become more liberal than the Southern Democrats in the 87th and 88th Congresses.

In general, the level of party unity among Coastal Republicans and Southern Democrats is higher on economic than on welfare policy. This difference between the two dimensions is particularly marked in the 83rd through the 86th Congresses.

It is appropriate at this time to return to a consideration of the deviations from the measurement identity model that appeared in the interscale correlations. The greatest deviation occurred with respect to the 87th and 88th Senate economic policy scales which were correlated as high, or more highly with welfare policy scales as with economic policy scales. This deviation now becomes explicable as a result of the behavior of Coastal Republican and Southern Democratic Senators. The change in the positions of these two sets of Senators, from the Republican to the Democratic administrations, produces a convergence between the 87th and 88th economic policy scales and the welfare scales.

However, this level of explanation for the statistical convergence of the economic and welfare scales in the Senate does not suffice to resolve the primary question: Is there a new economic policy dimension that appears in the 87th and 88th Senates, or is there a single dimension in these two Senates which includes welfare and economic policy roll calls, or do we stick to the proposition of bi-dimensional continuity throughout the entire period? We prefer the third alternative for the following reasons:

- (1) The consistency of the other indicators (tests) in support of the original proposition.
- (2) The fact that most of the change that occurred was on the part of a single regional-party grouping, Coastal Republicans, with some change on the part of Southern Democrats, while the other three groups remained fairly constant. If a new dimension had emerged one would have expected more diffusion in the re-ordering of positions.
- (3) The turnover in the occupancy of the White House. This is considered to be more likely to produce changes in the positions taken by selected members of Congress than to alter the basic cognitive and attitudinal structures of the members. Such changes in position have been noted on foreign policy for the Truman-Eisenhower and Eisenhower-Kennedy turnovers.¹⁷

¹⁷ Mark Kesselman, "Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy: A Replication of a Hypothesis," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (November, 1965), 401-406.

While on this issue we would like to comment briefly on the other two deviant scales: 83rd Senate and 84th House welfare. In the first instance, it is again the Coastal Republicans who are primarily responsible, for in this first Congress of the Eisenhower administration, and *only* in this Congress, they took a slightly more conservative position than their land-locked brethren. This then made that particular welfare scale resemble the economic scales in its voting alignment. Perhaps this was an expression of loyalty to the new Republican in the White House. Indeed, the whole pattern of Senate Coastal Republican voting reflects a certain level of sensitivity to the President. In the second instance, the 84th House welfare scale, it is the Southern Democrats who have a brief fling at strong party loyalty on welfare policy, with no discernible prior warning of this turn of events, and certainly no indication of any after-effects.

The evidence in the present case leads us to conclude that there is a welfare policy and an economic policy dimension which extend across the six Congresses and are the same in both houses. This inference is based on the consistently higher correlation of party with the economic policy measures, the higher positive correlations of constituency characteristics with welfare policy scales, the different patterns of regional-party alignments on the two dimensions, and the pattern of inter-scale correlations. Comparability between the House and Senate is further supported by the content of the legislation associated with the two dimensions in the two bodies. The inference of measurement identity and differentiation is instrumental to the following analysis of stability and change with respect to individual constituency positions on the two dimensions.

Stability and Change

An analysis of stability and change in legislative voting behavior has obvious implications for an understanding of the response of a representative legislative system to policy demands. What does past experience indicate to be the means through which change comes about: Is change in the representation provided a constituency effected by partisan turnover, by a change in the personnel without partisan turnover, or can it be observed for individual members serving in successive Congresses? What is the relative importance of these conditions for change from one policy dimension to the next?¹⁸

¹⁸ Previous studies concerned with the impact of personnel turnover include Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *op. cit.*, especially Chapter 8; and Lee Anderson,

There are three conditions to which our analysis of stability and change will direct its attention: (1) the same person serving in successive Congresses, (2) *intra-party* personnel turnover, and (3) *inter-party* personnel turnover.

Before the results of this analysis can be presented we must return once more to problems of measurement. The problem that confronts us is that of achieving scale scores which can be compared over time. It will be recalled that the original set of scale scores consisted of mean scores computed for each individual after a positive response, a negative response, and an absence on each roll call had been scored 1, 3, and 2 respectively. The comparison of such scores between time-1 and time-2 increases in validity as the roll calls included in the respective measures approach a representative sample of the universe of items relevant to a particular dimension. However, the set of roll calls in a given measure may be biased in one direction. Consequently, members whose positions have not changed may appear to have changed if one looks at their scale scores in successive Congresses. For example, if the set of items in Congress A are biased in the liberal direction compared to those in Congress B, members of Congress A are expected to have less liberal scores than members of Congress B, even though their true positions have remained unchanged.

In an attempt to control on this form of bias, the scores of all members in each Congress were adjusted to the mean score of the members who served continuously throughout the twelve-year period. The assumption is that changes in the collective mean score for the continuous members represent the effects of item bias in the

TABLE 5. MEAN CHANGE SCORES

	Senate		House	
	Economic	Welfare	Economic	Welfare
Continuous member (1)	.21	.21	.18	.27
Intra-party turnover (2)	.31	.39	.27	.40
Inter-party turnover (3)	1.23	1.26	1.44	1.08

measures used in the different Congresses. This involves the further assumption that the continuous members, *as a body*, have not shifted their position.

It is granted out of hand that this adjustment of scores falls short of an adequate solution to the problem of creating interval level scales that are invariant across Congresses. All we can say is that it seems more probable that there is sampling error in the item selection than that, in this particular case, 178 members of the House and 41 members of the Senate have moved *collectively* in a conservative or liberal direction. Indeed, the continuous members are as unlikely as any, because of their safe seats, to shift their positions in response to external pressures.

After the raw scores had been adjusted, change scores were computed for each pair of adjacent Congresses on each seat, and a mean change score computed across the five adjacent Congress pairings for each of three conditions: continuous member, intra-party turnover, and inter-party turn-over. The results are presented in Table 5.

The order of change is generally in line with expectations, individuals changing the least and inter-party turnover generating the most change. The change for individual members is little more than a tenth of the total range of scores on the individual scales. The low order of change observed for the intra-party turnover is understandable in that the same party and constituency constraints are operative on the new member as they were on the incumbent. The relationship between the two conditions, continuous member and intra-party turnover, can be represented by a ratio of the change observed for the latter condition to that for the former. This ratio allows for variation in measurement error across dimensions. In terms of this ratio, the level of intra-party change appears very similar across both dimensions and both houses. In three instances the ratio is 1.5; it inches up to 1.9 on the Senate welfare dimension.

Whereas the change associated with intra-party turnover is relatively constant across the two dimensions in the two houses, the inter-party turnover change scores vary substantially,

"Individuality in Congress: A Research Note," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 8 (November, 1964), 425-429. Using a measure based on votes on reciprocal trade legislation, Froman concludes that districts represented by the same individual through several Congresses exhibit more stability than do districts characterized by a substantial turnover in personnel. He does not address the question of what occurs when the partisanship of the districts' representation changes. Anderson tests and confirms Froman's hypothesis, using both foreign involvement and domestic liberalism-conservatism scales. Also, see Clarence N. Stone, "Issue Cleavage Between Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives," *Journal of Public Law*, 14 (1965), 343-358, for a discussion of the impact of change in the partisan representation of a district. Stone suggests that the impact varies substantially among different policy areas.

and they are also of much greater magnitude.¹⁹ Once again, let us consider these in terms of a ratio, inter-party turnover change to continuous member change. The largest ratio value (8.0) is observed on House economic policy, the smallest value (4.0) on House welfare policy, with both the economic and welfare policy ratios in the Senate, 5.8 and 6.0 respectively, falling midway between the two House ratios.

The particular value of longitudinal analyses is that they permit an approximation to experimental design in some instances. In the present case, we are emboldened to say something about the relative influence of partisan and constituency factors on welfare and economic policy voting. The evidence is provided by the change ratios associated with partisan turnover. The analytic design is as follows.

The unit of analysis is the constituency, with the member of Congress viewed as the medium through which partisan and constituency factors are expressed. Constituency factors are assumed to be constant over the time periods for which the change measures are computed. These are four-year time periods, including the last term of the incumbent and the first term of the freshman member for each constituency in which a partisan turnover has occurred. The assumption that constituency factors are constant refers to an objective level of influence exerted by these factors, with the *perceptions* of the constituency factors treated as a source of variation in the behaviors of the individual representatives.

While the constituency influence is held constant, the partisan influence is indicated by the difference in the policy positions taken by the new member of one party and the incumbent of another party. The implication that follows from the assumption of constancy in the constituency pressures is that the stronger those constituency pressures *relative* to partisan pressures (whatever the specific components of either may be), the smaller the change should be when there is a partisan turnover in the representation of a constituency.

The import of the data analyzed thus far is that the relative influence of party is greater with respect to economic policy as constituency factors have a greater impact on welfare policy voting. However, the previous set of data have not been so definitive in this respect that further analysis is redundant. Therefore, let us return to an examination of the party change (or

partisan turnover) ratios presented previously:

House Economic Policy: 8.0 Welfare Policy: 4.0
Senate Economic Policy: 5.8 Welfare Policy: 6.0

The proposition that party is relatively more influential on economic policy voting is supported in the House but not in the Senate; in the House the party change ratio on economic policy is twice that on welfare policy whereas in the Senate the difference is insignificant and contrary to the proposition. However, these institutional differences are so interesting in themselves as to take some of the sting out of the blow administered to the proposition by the Senate.

The low value of the party-change ratio on House welfare policy, compared to the higher ratio value on Senate welfare policy, is consistent with institutional differences. It is understandable that the House member should be more subject to constituency pressures than the Senator in view of the greater level of homogeneity of House constituencies. The House member can respond to relatively clear constituency voting cues. In contrast, the Senator with a more heterogeneous constituency, unable to identify clear constituency instructions concerning his behavior, is less constrained by constituency pressures. In the absence of clear constituency constraints, the higher partisan influence reflected in the party-change score on Senate welfare policy may reflect the necessity of relying more heavily on partisan ideology or partisan positions. Alternatively, in the absence of clear constituency cues, the Senator may feel there is less danger in expressing partisan views as the most appropriate governmental response to constituency demands or needs.

The lower level of the party-change ratio on Senate economic policy, relative to that of the House, may indicate that the Senator is not as tightly bound by partisan influences on a dimension where such influence is uppermost. This is not inconsistent with our observations on welfare policy for we did not suggest there that the Senator was bound tightly by partisan constraints, rather that he had to rely upon them, or had the opportunity to express them, to a greater extent than the House member. Here we are suggesting that the Senator is no more bound by partisan constraints on economic policy than he is by constituency constraints on welfare policy.

House members, on the other hand, may be much less able to withstand partisan pressures on economic policy, or be much less disposed to, in the absence of strong constituency pressures. In the words of Sam Rayburn, the House mem-

¹⁹ With one exception, a Democratic Senator replacing a Republican Senator in Ohio, partisan turnover produces a change in the expected direction: a Democratic legislator more liberal than a Republican.

ber has to "get along" if he wants to move into positions of influence or obtain support for his own legislative requests. Nor does the individual House member possess the opportunity of the individual Senator to build a personal public reputation to compensate for his legislative ineffectiveness.

In general, these findings reflect the common view of the free-wheeling, nationally oriented Senator operating in the smaller, more loosely organized body and the cautious, locally oriented Representative "getting along" in the larger, more tightly organized House. It would appear that the House member is more tightly circumscribed in his behavior. On the dimension where party influence is considered to be the greatest, the House member is more responsive to party influence than his Senate colleague; where constituency is considered to be relatively more important, the House member is relatively more subject to constituency constraints. This does not mean that the Senator is not also affected by these constraints, only that he appears to be less so.

III. SUMMARY

In our opening remarks, the manifest purpose of this roll call analysis was stated to be that of demonstrating the presence of two policy dimensions, economic and welfare policy, in the voting of Senators and Representatives during the 83rd through the 88th Congresses. Evidence in support of this proposition has been presented in accordance with the criteria of a model of measurement identity. It consists of inter-scale correlations in each house, an examination of the content of the roll calls associated with the two dimensions, and correlations of the measures of the two dimensions with constituency characteristics and with party.

It was further proposed that partisan differences would be more relevant to economic than to welfare policy voting. The evidence used here was drawn, in large part, from the evidence used to substantiate the first proposition; this is consistent with the inter-dependence of the two propositions. In addition, a stability and change analysis gave additional support to the proposition in relation to House voting, leaving open the question of its applicability to Senate voting.

Also suggested in the introductory remarks, was the value of utilizing preliminary definitions of roll call policy domains prior to the objective statistical search for voting dimensions. One advantage is that of establishing the bases of longitudinal and comparative analysis in terms of subjectively discriminable policy domains. Our analysis has indicated also that the distinction between highly correlated policy dimen-

sions may become blurred if an objective analysis of roll call interrelations is applied across policy domains. This becomes particularly evident in a longitudinal analysis in which statistical convergence and divergence of policy dimensions have time to appear, so to speak. It is clear that our view of the voting patterns would have been somewhat different if the entire set of welfare and economic policy roll calls in each Congress had been subjected to a common correlational analysis. This is not to claim that the approach we have used is superior; it is to suggest that the choice to be made is neither inconsequential nor self-evident. However, to the individual with an interest in issues, only a moderately high tolerance for abstraction, and some skepticism as to the potential of uncompromising objectivity, the advantages of the policy domain approach may be highly persuasive.

One of the more unique aspects of the present study has been the comparison between Senate and House voting. Firstly, it was observed that House voting is more simply structured than Senate voting. Thus, for both policy domains a larger proportion of the House votes were included within the primary clusters associated with each of the major policy dimensions. This finding was attributed to the greater opportunity for detailed consideration of legislation on the floor of the Senate which, in turn, induces a greater complexity in the dimensional structure of the set of Senatorial voting acts.

Secondly, the analysis has indicated that Senators are less subject to constituency pressures and more independent of partisan constraints. With respect to Coastal Republicans and Southern Democrats, there is also some indication of a higher level of responsiveness to factors associated with a partisan turnover in the White House. This is a particularly interesting area for further analysis because the responsiveness of these two groups to changes in the occupancy of the White House is consistent with the relative absence of mutually reinforcing partisan and constituency referents. In terms of the dominant historical urban-rural, Democratic-Republican parallel, Coastal Republicans and Southern Democrats are political anomalies.

Thirdly, and most importantly, this study has provided substantial evidence of a similarity in the dimensional structure of voting on economic and welfare policy in the Senate and the House. If parallel dimensions emerge in other policy domains, it suggests that Congress may be viewed as a political subsystem in which values are allocated within a common frame of reference. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence that Congress is a subsystem that rapidly socializes its

members with regard to modes of cognition and perception, the finding of parallel dimensions in the two houses suggests that these dimensions penetrate the political strata from which Congressmen are recruited. Thus the new member is already accustomed to viewing specific policy questions in terms of more general policy categories.

More generally, with respect to public opinion, it would be of considerable interest to re-examine studies of public opinion in different political strata to determine the penetration of the economic-welfare policy distinction downward from political elites to the political mass. An earlier study has indicated that the personal attitudes of members of the House can be differentiated with respect to welfare and economic policy.²⁰ What are the limits on the penetration of this policy distinction down through the political strata? Is there sufficient penetration to warrant the conclusion that partisan ideology is involved in the attitudes on economic policy whereas social welfare attitudes have other origins? For example, does the welfare-economic policy distinction carry down through those political strata which include people who are subject to partisan socialization of political attitudes and disappear when that form of political socialization is the weakest? More generally, we are suggesting that studies of legislative voting behavior can be particularly useful in measuring policy dimensions that are relevant for one set of political elites, and possibly relevant for a more inclusive set, with the degree of penetration down through the political strata a matter of theoretical interest, not only in terms of the mechanisms of political socialization, but in terms of the linkages between the electorate and the policymakers.²¹

²⁰ Clausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 1031-1033.

²¹ Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes,

Related to the penetration phenomenon with respect to dimensions of political attitudes is the comparison of Congressional voting with voting in the state legislative bodies, and other national institutions such as the Supreme Court. In the last instance, Guttman scale and factor analysis of Supreme Court decisions has shown the presence of an economic liberalism dimension which appears to be highly similar to the economic policy dimension in Congressional voting.²²

Whatever the cite of the public opinion or voting analysis, there is a case to be made for a high degree of sensitivity to the policy component, as opposed to the alignment component, of the analysis. A policy orientation leading to subjective divisions of items into policy domains provides the basis for comparative and longitudinal studies. In addition, without such considerations of policy content, the analyst is likely to become the victim of his objective procedures. Thus, the dimensional structure which is identified is, in part, a function of the criteria used to define clusters, factors or dimensions. The more stringent these requirements become, the greater the complexity of the dimensional structure. Finally, as we have indicated previously, the totally objective analysis is inadequate to cope with the problems involved in the change of positions by individuals over time; this problem is stated most briefly as that of convergence and divergence among policy dimensions.

"Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), pp. 45-46.

²² Glendon Schubert, "The 1960-1961 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis," this REVIEW, 26 (March, 1962), 90-107; Harold J. Spaeth, "Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The 'B' Scale" in *Judicial Decision Making*, Glendon Schubert (ed.), (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 73-110.

BASES OF SUPPORT FOR MEXICO'S DOMINANT PARTY*

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the bases of support for Mexico's *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*. A model is developed which identifies the major and minor variables affecting changes in *PRI* support in the six elections between 1952 and 1967. Throughout the paper the unit of analysis is the state; the dependent variables are voter turnout and the percentage of the total vote in each state received by the *PRI*.

I. INTRODUCTION

The paucity of empirical works on electoral support for dominant-party regimes seems to indicate difficulties in data collection, not simply a dull topic. The emphasis on institutionalized parties in the works of such scholars as Huntington, Emerson, and Zolberg underlines the need for a better understanding of the roles played by such parties in nations at varying levels of development.¹ Models of electoral support should help us understand the techniques of social control available to elites, to predict changes in the party system, and to assess the effects of governmental outputs. Mexico is particularly interesting because it appears to be contrary to much of the political development literature, which suggests that oppositions are more likely to flourish as politics modernize, though. Yet Mexico is modernizing, the *PRI* so far shows no loss of support. In later sections of this paper I will speculate on the causes of this paradox.

First, however, let me explicate an assumption crucial to this research: that elections in a one-party system are a significant part of the political process. Mexicanists divide on this question, their opinions generally correlating with their estimates of the importance of the governing party in policy-making. Frank Brandenburg, who downgrades the policy influence of

the *PRI*, claims that "Elections, whether internal to the party or external and open to the public, are hardly more than travesties."² Robert Scott, who emphasizes the importance of the *PRI* in policy-making, claims that the *PRI* desires to maximize its vote, that differences in *PRI* percentages may stem from such variables as economic conditions or proximity to the United States, and that vigorous electoral activities, such as registration drives, reflect the party's use of the election as a barometer of public confidence.³ The empirical evidence seems to support Scott's position. Not only is there considerable electoral activity, but in some cases the *PRI* has actually suffered defeats.⁴

A broader answer to the question of theoretical relevance requires a consideration of the constraints on political mobility in Mexico. Since the party is highly centralized, gains in political status for middle-level elites depend on a favorable relationship with higher-level elites. Because the *PRI* dislikes evidence of dissatisfaction among the populace, the availability of a clear test such as an election becomes significant to elites aspiring to higher office. The election provides an opportunity to demonstrate political skill in the same sense that a machine politician in the United States tries to "deliver the vote." Hence elections in Mexico gain significance from the desire of elites to maximize support and from their importance in the recruitment process.

In the remainder of this paper we first consider a theoretical framework linking the vari-

² Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 223-243.

³ Robert Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 223-243.

⁴ In the 1958 election the *PRI* lost nine elections for seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and more recently, the mayoralties of the cities of Hermosillo and Mérida. See Scott, *ibid.*, p. 243. Also see Bo Anderson and James Cockcroft, "Control and Cooptation in Mexican Politics," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, VII, (March, 1966); and William Tuohy and David Ronfeldt, "Political Control and the Recruitment of Middle-level Elites in Mexico: an example from Agrarian Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, 22 (June, 1969).

*I am indebted to Bashirrudin Ahmed, John Ferejohn, Richard Fagen, Robert Packenham, Barry Rundquist, and Richard Winters for advice and comments.

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April, 1965), 385-430; Rupert Emerson, *Political Modernization: The Single Party System*, Monograph No. 1, (Denver: University of Denver, 1963-64); Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

ables in our model. Next, the directions of the relationships between the variables are predicted and the model is empirically tested. In the last sections we assess the validity of the model and attempt to explain the paradoxical nature of *PRI* support.⁵

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

When elections are hotly contested, the meaningful dependent variables are likely to be those identifying the winner or his party and measuring his vote total. Since the winner of a Mexican election is seldom in doubt, and because elections in Mexico usually indicate political skill and regime legitimacy, the number of people turning out on election day may be as interesting as the direction of the vote. Evidence for the importance of "getting out the vote" is provided by Scott in his description of voter registration efforts in the 1958 campaign.⁶ Feverish registration activity (which in the highly competitive Federal District could well have increased the party's percentage as well as total vote) seems to have been a result of the elite's belief that non-participation in the election is equivalent to apathy and non-support, and that apathy threatens the viability of the Revolutionary Ideology. In this sense turnout is both a "means" and an "end." Because turnout affects the *PRI* vote percentage, it is an independent variable; because the *PRI* acts to promote turnout, I also consider it as a dependent variable.

Factors that contribute to the electoral strength of the *PRI* may be divided into two categories: direct and indirect. By direct factors I mean those that the *PRI* or the government itself may manipulate in the period around the

⁵I also assume that the reported voting data are meaningful. A variety of error types is possible. Random error is not too important since it tends to lower correlations. A more significant problem stems from the frequent charges of fraud by opposition leaders. If there are inflationary biases in the vote totals, they could take three forms. Perhaps all *PRI* totals are padded by approximately the same amount. This would have the effect of adding a constant and would not seriously affect correlational measures. If the amount added is directly proportional to the percentage of the vote received by the opposition, gross inter-state differences would be reduced, but the rank order would remain the same. If, however, the amount added is related to some unknown variable not of these two types, my results might be seriously affected. At this stage of the research I have no alternative to using reported data.

⁶Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-226.

election, such as vigorous campaign activity. By indirect factors I mean those that it can affect only over a long period of time or not at all (definitely not in the years between two elections). Because I wish to avoid giving an aura of precision to an inherently arbitrary categorizing process, this definition has been deliberately left vague.

Table 1 identifies some factors likely to influence elections in any political system. Obviously these have varying degrees of applicability and operationality in the Mexican case. In the next section we consider variables of particular relevance to Mexican elections, hypothesize linkages between independent and dependent variables, and describe the operationalization of each variable.

TABLE 1: A NON-EXHAUSTIVE AND PARTIALLY OVERLAPPING LIST OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT FACTORS AFFECTING TURNOUT AND DIRECTION OF THE VOTE

	Direct	Indirect
Turnout	Benefits (e.g., welfare payments)	Border with United States
	Campaign Issues	Climatic Conditions
	Development Projects	Direct Factors in Previous Elections
	Local Leadership	General Economic Conditions
	Monetary Incentives	During Election Period
	Number of Party Members	Historical Nonintegration
	Party Activity	Level of Development
	Registration	Long-term Benefits
	Registration Rules	Long-term Strength of Oppositions
		Turnout in Previous Elections
Direction of Vote	Benefits	Border with United States
	Campaign Issues	Direction of Vote in Previous Election
	Development Projects	General Economic Conditions
	Local Leadership	During Election Period
	Media Support	Historical Nonintegration
	Monetary Incentives	Level of Development
	Number of Party Members	Long-term Benefits
	Party Activity	Long-term Strength of Oppositions
	Turnout	

III. DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Direction of Vote. The major dependent variable in this analysis is the percentage of the total vote received by the *PRI* in six elections between 1952 and 1967. Three of these elections, 1952, 1958, and 1964, were Presidential elections; those of 1955, 1961, and 1967 were Congressional elections. For each state I have averaged the percentages received in the six elections. Since the six elections cannot be regarded as six separate samples, the number of cases is 32—the number of states in Mexico—rather than 192.⁷

⁷Election data sources are as follows: 1952,

Turnout-Direction Linkage. Voting participation has been identified as a dependent variable of significance in Mexico. Turnout is measured here by the percentage of eligibles voting in each election. Assessing the nature of the turnout-direction linkage requires a knowledge of the predispositions of new voters, since higher participation rates usually mean an influx of previously uninvolved individuals. Scholars are divided on the effects of new voters. Zolberg's work on West African one-party states suggests that high participation helps dominant parties:

... the basic notion that uninvolved individuals respond to the most powerful available stimulus, such as the one provided by a leading personality or an apparently powerful organization is perhaps relatively independent of the cultural context.⁸

A reasonable operationalization of Zolberg's point is as follows: the more a political system is dominated by a single personality or organization, the more the effect of additional voters will be an increase in the strength of the dominant personality or organization. Hence, the *PRI* should be helped by high participation.

The direction of this linkage has been challenged in a study of Mexican elections by Pablo Gonzalez-Casanova. He argues that low turnout helps the *PRI*, because those who vote present the least opposition to the regime. Noting that the poorest states in Mexico vote most strongly for the *PRI*, he contends that rural populations are unorganized and inexperienced in politics, and as a result are passive instruments of their leadership. Being poor and illiterate, their voting rates are lower than those of people in more urbanized states.⁹

Gonzalez-Casanova's position is unclear because it depends on the relationship between participation rates and poverty and urbanization. Since the hypotheses relating participation and direction of vote are contradictory, and since at this point we have no other basis for

predicting one way or the other, the turnout-direction linkage will be left open.¹⁰

IV. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Indirect Factors

Level of Development. Chief among the indirect factors of support is what will be called "level of development." There is a considerable literature arguing that oppositions flourish under conditions of high social mobilization, economic development, urbanization, and "modernization." Blanksten has made this argument for Latin America:

It is typical of Latin America that, with the exception of the landowners and the church, few interests arising in the rural areas are capable of making themselves heard in politics. In cities, however, interest groups form more readily and give voice to the demands of urbanized sectors of the population. Similarly, new interests find organized expression in consequence of the processes of restratification, secularization, and commercialization.¹¹

The effect of urbanization on the opportuni-

¹⁰ Turnout has been operationalized as the six-election average of the percentage of eligible voters who actually voted. Mexico does have a registration process, and there are differences between the percentage of the population registered and the percentage actually voting. But registration figures for all elections were unavailable, so registration had to be ignored. Turnout is defined as the percentage of the population legally eligible—irrespective of registration—who voted.

Turnout rates were calculated as follows: the actual number of people who voted in each state was computed from the election results (see footnote 7). The percentage of the population eligible to vote was arithmetically extrapolated from 1950 and 1960 population per state on the basis of each state's growth rate from 1950 to 1960 (these differ widely). For the 1952 election males over 20 were used as the base. In succeeding elections both sexes were used. There are two sources of error: arithmetic rather than geometric progressions, and the assumption of state equality in age distributions. The latter error may be significant but is unavoidable. The population figures come from the *Anuario Estadística de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* (Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadística, Mexico, 1965). (for 1962-63), p. 28.

¹¹ George Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in Almond and Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 477.

1955, 1958, 1961 are from Pablo Gonzales-Casanova, *La Democracia en México* (Ediciones Era, S.A., 1965), pp. 240, 242-243, 241-247, in that order. The election of 1964 is from *Política*, (Sept. 15, 1964), p. xix. The election of 1967 is from *El Universal*, July 11, 1967, p. 9. The last election data are unofficial, but changes were very minor. Objection may be made to the combining of Presidential and Congressional election. While the fit of the model does vary among the elections, the basic model is not seriously affected.

⁸ Zolberg, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁹ Gonzalez-Casanova, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

ties for oppositions has been explored by Ronald Ridker:

Costs to political agitators are lower in the city than in the country. The greater concentration of people, the propinquity to centers of political decision-making, and the greater degree of literacy in cities, also may result in a higher level of aspiration. In addition, urban life generates unrest, particularly for the new immigrant, because of the greater disparity in the ways of life of cities and farms . . . urban populations tend to be very responsive elements for radical propagandists.¹²

This does not mean that only leftist opposition activity is likely. The kind of competing-elites problem discussed by Shils and Eisenstadt increases the chances of opposition from either left or right.¹³ The fact that urban areas have a higher proportion of middle-class residents is emphasized by Lenski, who finds "a reaction to the exercise of power and privilege . . . in the efforts of members of the middle classes to gain control over powers, privileges, and resources traditionally reserved to the elite."¹⁴ That the electoral arena is a natural one for this contest is suggested by D'Antonio and Form's discussion of the most important opposition party, the National Action Party.

. . . its voting support has come from white collar workers, serious churchgoers, some small businessmen, and employees of the PAN activists.¹⁵

Urbanization is usually coupled with economic growth, which in itself can be a source of opposition. Mancur Olson stresses the diverse nature of the dissatisfaction that may arise in conditions of rapid growth:

Both gainers and losers from economic growth can

¹² Ronald Ridker, "Discontent and Economic Growth," *Economic Growth and Economic Change* XI (October, 1962), p. 11. Some of Ridker's argument is certainly debatable, especially in regard to new immigrants, but the essential point seems valid. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," this REVIEW, 63 (Sept. 1969).

¹³ Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States*, (London: Mouton, 1965); and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 12, pp. 345-367.

¹⁴ Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 65.

¹⁵ William D'Antonio and William Form, *Influentials in Two Border Cities*, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), p. 37-38.

be destabilizing forces . . . economic growth increases the number of *nouveaux riches*, who may use their economic power to change the social and political order in their own interest; . . . economic growth may paradoxically also create a surprisingly large number of "*nouveaux pauvres*," who will be much more resentful of their poverty than those who have known nothing else.¹⁶

In addition, particular traditional factors may discourage opposition in less developed areas. L. Vincent Padgett argues that the norms of unanimity in decision-making and suspicion of outsiders combine to cause village Mexicans to protect rather than mobilize against the local boss. He further contends that "The farther from the effects of modernization, including education and transportation, the more dependent the people are upon their *caciques*."¹⁷

The above scholars are generally agreed that conditions in urban areas are more favorable to the development of oppositions.¹⁸ Thus we suggest that the higher the level of development in a state, the lower will be its PRI vote.

The effect of development on turnout is less clear. Daniel Lerner emphasizes urbanization as the prime mover in the process of modernization. He argues that:

. . . increasing urbanization has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media has "gone with" wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting).¹⁹

Lerner's analysis is based on the assumption

¹⁶ Mancur Olson, "Rapid Economic Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, (Dec., 1963), p. 533.

¹⁷ L. Vincent Padgett, *The Mexican Political System*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 83 fn. Padgett's emphasis on the special characteristics of less-developed areas reinforces the notion that absolute levels of development may be more important than the relative positions of two or more states. For example, the difference between the levels of urbanization of Idaho and California, and Tlaxcala and the Federal District (Mexico City) may be equal; what is more relevant is the absolute position of all these places on a traditional-modern continuum.

¹⁸ There is also some inconclusive evidence suggesting a relationship between urbanization and party competition in the United States. For a review of this literature, see Philip Coulter and Glen Gordon, "Urbanization and Party Competition," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXI (June, 1968), 274-288.

¹⁹ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), p. 46.

that the effects of the urbanization process ought to be most visible in the most urban areas, unless these areas have had long-static large populations. A subnational application of Lerner's argument leads us to expect high turnout rates in the more developed areas. Gonzalez-Casanova made essentially the same point in examining Mexican elections, but no supporting data was presented.²⁰

Evidently the association between development and participation is not universal. Steiner found that the norm of unanimity in decision-making, present in Japanese rural socio-economic units (*buraku*), tended to increase voting levels.²¹ And Dupeux found that in France, because of the higher average age of rural voters, the training citizens get in local politics, and various historical reasons, participation was highest in rural areas.²²

Since there is conflict in the literature, the direction of the linkage between level of development and turnout will be left unspecified at this point.

As an indicator of level of development I have used urbanization.²³ It is defined as the

percentage of the population in each state living in communities of more than 2500 people.²⁴

Historical Nonintegration. Certain states in Mexico have traditions of isolation and nonintegration vis-à-vis the national political and economic system. Four states seem particularly separatist. Yucatán has a long tradition of separatism and localism. Until 1950 the Yucatán peninsula had no unbroken land tie with the rest of Mexico, and the inhabitants once declared independence. Yucatán's problems were worsened by the failure of a government sponsored henequen growing cooperative in 1954.²⁵

A second state with a separatist tradition is Oaxaca, where citizens as late as 1952 held mass meetings asserting their desire for local autonomy. Although the situation is now improved, Scott claims that Oaxaca remains one of the least integrated areas in Mexico.²⁶

The Baja California region does not suffer from the poverty of the aforementioned areas, but it is geographically separated from the main land area. The northern part recently became a state, but both it and the territory of Baja California are still rather isolated.²⁷

From the foregoing discussion the direction of linkages between nonintegration and both turnout and direction of vote should be clear. I hypothesize that states (or territories) with such tendencies ought to have lower rates of turnout and lower percentages for the *PRI*.²⁸

Presence on the United States Border. Political systems do not exist in vacuums. A Mexican state is part of a system including other states, the Federal Government, and political actors of

²⁰ Gonzalez-Casanova, *op. cit.*, p. 106-107.

²¹ Kurt Steiner, Stanford University, unpublished paper, 1966. Similar findings about Malaya are presented by Richard Winters, Dartmouth College, in an unpublished paper.

²² Georges Dupeux, "France," *International Social Science Journal*, XII (No. 1, 1969), pp. 46-47.

²³ Objection may be raised to the use of this indicator of level of development. First many scholars cited in the above theoretical section explicitly use urbanization as their variable. Second, as Schnore found, urbanization is highly related to many alternative indicators. He concluded that "Urbanization is an intrinsic part of modernization in general." (See Schnore, "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development," *Land Economics*, 38, 1961. I found, using Mexican data, that a variety of independent variables are all intercorrelated averaging .80.) Third, data for some alternative indicators, like GNP, is unavailable. As to the use of absolute levels rather than rates of change, we rely partly on Raymond Tanter's argument: "Although most of the hypotheses above are stated temporally, implying the need for a change measure of urbanization, empirical research suggests that the level and rate of urbanization operate similarly vis-à-vis other processes such as measures of social mobilization." Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Conflict Behavior in Latin America," (University of Michigan, unpublished paper, 1967), p. 8. Although I believe that the "true" causal variable is a composite of many indicators of level of de-

velopment, the variable will hereafter be specified as "urbanization."

²⁴ James Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 218-219. A square root transformation was performed on the variable.

²⁵ Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁸ Since historical nonintegration has no easily measurable attributes, a rough test of the hypotheses could be made by testing the adequacy of the model without the variable. Such a procedure, however, fails to reveal interactions between this variable and other variables in the model. My procedure instead will be to construct a dichotomous (dummy) variable which will be allowed to enter the equations freely. Hence I coded Oaxaca, Yucatán, Baja California (Norte) and Baja California Territory as "1" and all the other states as "0" for this variable.

other national units. The political environment of states along the United States-Mexico border surely differs from that of states bordering only on Mexican states; hence, it is not surprising that politics in these states should be affected by proximity to the United States.

In their study of the border cities of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, D'Antonio and Form discuss the effects of proximity to a large Texas city. They suggest that:

the long common history of the two cities may have produced an overriding border culture which contained certain structural ambiguities and anomalies not ordinarily found in cities clearly embedded in a distinct culture.²⁹

The effects of living close to the United States are particularly strong on Mexican influentials:

To the Mexican influentials, especially the businessmen, the border represented more than economic opportunity . . . they looked to the United States as a source of values, ideas, and ideals. A majority had studied in American schools, learned English, observed how the American system worked, and made some strong friends in the States.³⁰

The *PRI* faced considerable opposition in Juarez during the 1950's from the *PAN*. The strength of the opposition seemed based on the vigorous associational interest groups dominated by business influentials. Such interest groups paralleled similar groups in El Paso. Businessmen's images of the political and economic system of El Paso may have helped invigorate associational interest groups and legitimize opposition. Therefore I hypothesize that states bordering on the United States will have higher levels of participation and lower levels of *PRI* vote.³¹

Structure of Opposition. It might be argued that the use of *PRI* vote as the dependent variable implies that Mexico has a two-party system; i.e., the *PRI* versus all other parties. Though opposition parties on the left and on the right draw voters from different sectors of the electorate and have different significance for the *PRI* leaders, I suggest that lumping together all oppositions is justified as long as explanations are directed to conditions favorable to high *PRI* votes rather than to conditions favorable to high opposition votes.

²⁹ D'Antonio and Form, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

³¹ Six states border on the United States: Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. Using the same technique as with the previous variable, these states are coded "1", all other states are coded "0".

Although the above position is defensible, at this point certain aspects of the opposition are related to the *PRI* vote. In particular, I am interested in discovering a relationship between the number of parties in opposition to the *PRI* and turnout and direction of vote. In Presidential elections usually only the *PRI* and the *PAN* put up candidates, but in off-year elections there may be as many as four minor parties running candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. Since these parties would probably not put up candidates if there were no potential voters, their presence ought to have the effect of increasing turnout—though perhaps only slightly, since the majority of their voters could be people who are drawn from the established parties.

The effect of oppositions on the direction of the vote is less clear. Splinter parties may attract persons who were previously nonvoters; thereby reducing the *PRI* percentage. But these minor parties might direct attacks against each other rather than against the *PRI*. In addition, the fragmentation of the opposition might confuse potentially anti-*PRI* voters and result in withdrawal. These latter possibilities would increase the *PRI* percentage. Predicting the net effect of these counter-trends is impossible without more information about the parties, so this link will be left unspecified.³²

Other Possible Variables. My selection of variables has been determined partly by theoretical relevance and partly by data availability. There are a variety of other indirect factors of obvious relevance; hence, this discussion is not meant to imply theoretical closure.³³

Direct Factors

Party Activity. The most natural means by which a party can influence an election are the myriad activities falling under the general rubric of "party activity." In Mexico these might include rallies, get-out-the-vote drives, propaganda, canvassing, etc. Unfortunately, none of these variables can be quantified given the present state of knowledge about Mexican poli-

³² This variable has been operationalized by counting all non-*PRI* parties that received any votes in 1955, 1961, and 1967, and summing the three totals. The scores range from three to ten. A square root transformation was performed on this data.

³³ Among other useful measures: economic conditions at the time of the election, especially cost-of-living indices and unemployment rates; climatic conditions on election day; and what some American scholars euphemistically call "Deaths from civil violence;" i.e., dead students. Quantification of these variables requires more data.

tics. Hence, this study has no measures of party activity; the following variable definitely should not be construed as such a measure.

Affiliated Party Members. Rigorous interpretations of party membership are slippery because of the variable nature of formal membership. Although certain groups (like the military) cannot formally organize within the party, anyone may join. In addition, members of certain occupations are automatically counted as *PRI* members. For example, in a study of Xalapa, the capital of Veracruz, William Tuohy found that the *PRI*'s published membership figure was equal to about 75 percent of the adult population. Tuohy explains this exaggeration by noting that all government employees and union members were counted as well as some persons below voting age. Of the reported total, only a few paid dues and actively participated. A sample survey in the same community found that about five percent of the adult population reported being *PRI* members.³⁴

What are the effects of high percentages of the population (inflated or not) affiliated with the *PRI*? Party members may be the basis of party activities; i.e., there may be a high correlation between *PRI* membership in a state and total party activity in the state. *PRI* members may also increase turnout and vote by encouraging non-members to participate. Perhaps their major influence is on their own vote. As a result of being enmeshed in the *PRI* communications network, or because the same predisposition that led to joining the party leads toward a *PRI* vote, members may vote for the *PRI* more often than non-members in similar age and socio-economic groups. Given the level of analysis of our data, accepting any of these competing explanations would risk the ecological fallacy, but we can predict that turnout and *PRI* vote will be higher in states with high percentages of the population affiliated with the *PRI*.³⁵

Benefits and PRI Organization. The suggestion that governments may use their distributive capability to increase popular support is hardly novel. Particularly when the government also has a considerable symbolic capability

(manifested in Mexico, for example, in the association of the party and the Revolutionary Ideology, and disseminated by government-dominated media), it may try to direct affective response to an expenditure such as a new school into a large affirmative vote for the regime. And while such benefits may have long-run destabilizing effects resulting from their contribution to a state's level of development, their short-run effect is likely to be positive for the *PRI*.

To assume, however, that the impact of governmental benefits can be assessed by considering only their effects on the recipients, and to assume that such benefits are both perceived and rewarded by the voters, would be considerable oversimplification. Mediating between the outputs of the national government and the individual citizen is the local or state *PRI* organization. This mediating position stems from two considerations. First, the impact of governmental expenditures may be much greater on the organization than on the citizen, because the party is more likely to be aware of governmental benefits than the citizen, and because the citizen may become aware of the benefits only through the party. Second, an organization so strengthened by the government may be better able to mobilize the electorate in succeeding elections.

The simple benefits-citizens link may have partial validity, but we can suggest a variety of more complicated linkages which include the *PRI* organization as mediator. For example, strong state *PRI* organizations (or state strongmen) may be able to force the national government to supply benefits to the people of a state, who then respond by rewarding the government in national elections and by supporting the state organization electorally, financially, and obediently. The strengthened state organization is then better able to mobilize the electorate, further increasing support, and also to wrest more benefits from the national government. In this case the populace is made aware of the benefits by the state party, which endeavors to present them with a "courtesy of your friendly state *PRI* organization" sign.

The outputs of the national government may be imperceptible to the population but may still have an effect. If their distribution is controlled by the state organization, benefits may be translated into jobs in or dependent upon the party. This strengthens the organization and once again improves its ability to mobilize the population to turn out and support the *PRI*.

In order to frame hypotheses specifying the direction and size of government benefits, we first must consider possible allocation policies for the national government in relation to state *PRI* organizations of differing strength. Here

³⁴ William Tuohy, "Institutionalized Revolution in a Mexican City: Political Decision-Making in Xalapa," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, (August, 1967), p. 27. The sample survey was conducted by Professor Richard Fagen of Stanford University.

³⁵ Gonzalez-Casanova, *op. cit.*, p. 238. A logarithmic transformation was performed. The number of officially reported *PRI* members was available only for 1962. Census data was arithmetically extrapolated to give a population base.

the problem of measuring the strength of the state organization arises. It seems impossible to find any measure that is not based either on the electoral success of the party or on its membership. Electoral success is our dependent variable; the same variable cannot be both the means and the end of our explanation unless we have a time-series analysis. And there are other aspects of organizational strength besides electoral success in a dominant-party system, such as control over participation channels.

In the case of membership, we know that the *PRI* figures are exaggerated; moreover, the number of party members, like electoral success, is not a good indicator of the strength of the organization. (Party membership is utilized as a variable elsewhere in this analysis not as an indicator of party strength but because the number of *PRI* members, regardless of their commitment or activity, ought to affect the *PRI* vote.)

It was finally decided not to consider party strength. In this case it seems better to admit that more research is needed than to use an untrustworthy indicator. Thus in this analysis the reality of the party organization as a mediator between the national government and the population of a state has to be ignored.³⁶

The loss of this variable in this analysis is not devastating, however, because we can still frame hypotheses on the assumption that at least some benefits are perceived by some citizens, and that the *PRI* is interested in maximizing the effects of the simple benefit-voter linkage.

Predicting the direction of the benefit-voter

³⁶ Some speculation on "rational" allocation policies is worthwhile. In a two-party system with high party discipline the members of the executive's party should receive the lion's share of patronage, because there is nothing to gain by helping opposition party members. When party discipline is weaker, as in the United States, influential opposition leaders may be wooed, but opposition members in marginal districts would only be strengthened by receiving government benefits. In a dominant-party system we would expect the strong party organizations to struggle for larger shares of outputs. But the government might find it more rational to help the weaker party organizations in order to strengthen them. The ability of the government to pursue such a strategy depends on the alternatives open to the stronger organizations. Is the national party (and hence the government) dependent on the state organizations; do the state organizations have any plausible sanctions, etc.?

link is not difficult; we expect benefits to lead to higher turnout and higher *PRI* percentages. But because the bulk of our analysis is done not with a time-series but with an average of the six elections, certain cautions are necessary. For example, if we measured benefits and electoral results in the same short time period, and if we discovered empirically that the *PRI* percentage was lower in areas receiving high benefits, it could be argued that the benefits caused disaffection and lower support for the *PRI*, or that the *PRI* is spending in areas where it is weak, but the benefits have not yet had time to be effective. This kind of problem can be solved definitely only by time-series analyses (which are briefly pursued below); it is partially alleviated by selecting a measure of benefits which predates the elections period sufficiently so that the benefits have had time to effect citizen perceptions.

Another problem with the benefit-voter hypothesis is the operationalization of the variable itself. Since we are concerned with the effects of benefits on people and with the ability of a government to manipulate such benefits, we have to consider the parameters governing population response and speculate on "rational" allocation policies for a national government desirous of maximizing its impact on people in different economic environments.

One possible assumption is that an individual's response to a school, water system, or road is directly proportional to his need for such benefits. Aggregated to the state level this means that a poorer state will reward the *PRI* more than a wealthy state for an equal level of benefits. As a rough test of this hypothesis we can compare the percentage of people in each state benefitted by drinkable water programs between 1946 and 1963 to the state's level of poverty.³⁷ If in fact the government spent its money in this manner, I would predict higher levels of turnout and *PRI* vote for states with higher benefit/poverty ratios.

The above hypothesis is based on the precarious assumption that people in all social classes are equally likely to perceive government as personally relevant, and that the only factor affecting their estimation of their needs is their objective living standards. The first assumption is certainly wrong; Almond and Verba, among others, have demonstrated cross-nationally the

³⁷ James Wilkie, *op. cit.*, p. 217, 248. I recognize that among the imperfections of this and the previous measure are the non-coincidence of the time spans. This will be part of the analysis of time-dependent problems.

relationship between high social class and perception of the relevance of government.³⁸ Perhaps poverty is irrelevant as a shaper of demands; everyone wants more government services regardless of his economic level. A "rational" national government might concentrate its benefits in states with larger populations, since (density being equal) more people would perceive the same benefit, and a large state contributes more voters in a national election. To test this reasoning we compare the percentage of the population in each state benefitted by drinkable-water programs to the state's population. If the relationship is positive, then we predict that states with high benefit/population ratios will have higher rates of turnout and larger percentages for the *PRI*.

Thus far we have discussed a hypothesis based on poverty as a response-conditioner and one which assumes that economic condition is irrelevant to response. A third possibility is that wealth may be a stimulus: i.e., that wealthier areas need and/or demand greater government attention and hence might reward the government for benefits. This kind of thinking is common in economics; Frederick Pryor, for example, lists urbanization and industrialization as variables positively affecting demand for public consumption expenditures.³⁹ Many types of benefits, such as elaborate sewage systems, are relevant only in urban areas. Hence the level of urbanization can be used as an index of the need for services, and the percentage of people receiving a benefit, in this case drinkable-water programs, is a measure of supply. If there is a positive relationship between the level of urbanization of a state and the percentage of people benefitted, then we would suggest that the government is following this strategy. The relationship between the measures of need and supply for each state indicates the degree of "favoritism" shown the state. We predict that the more a state has been favored by the *PRI*, the higher will be its turnout and *PRI* percentage.⁴⁰

In summary, the concept of benefits is operationalized by considering possible allocation policies for a government desirous of maximizing its

³⁸ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

³⁹ Frederick Pryor, *Public Expenditure in Communist and Capitalist Nations*, (Homewood: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 54.

⁴⁰ The actual independent variables are the residuals of a regression between urbanization and the percentage of the population benefitting from drinkable-water programs.

impact in terms of electoral support. We cannot choose on "logical" grounds between the three possible expenditure patterns suggested here, because we want to discover what the Mexican government has actually done, not what it would do if its leaders read the *APSR*. Hence the usual procedure in regression studies—throwing all possible hypotheses into the computer and calling the survivors "true" and the fatalities "false"—is inadequate; first, because the theoretical system described here is far from complete; and second, because too many relationships are problematic. Only if we determine in advance what benefit allocation policy the government actually pursued will we be able to make any statements about the effects of benefits on voters.⁴¹

Thus we want to discover which of these three hypotheses—that benefits in Mexico are distributed to states with the highest levels of poverty, to those with the largest populations, or to those with the highest levels of urbanization—most nearly approximates reality. Empirically we can select between them by comparing the strength of the relationship between the measure of benefits; the percentage of the population benefitted by drinkable water programs, and the three possible attributes of states as recipients: level of poverty, population, and level of urbanization.⁴² The results are quite unambiguous. There is no relationship between benefits and the level of population; the relationship between benefits and poverty is moderate and negative, and the relationship between benefits and urbanization is strongly positive. (The Pearson coefficient between urbanization and benefits is .82.)

Hence the *PRI* distributes benefits to states with high levels of urbanization. I predict that the more a state has been favored; i.e., the greater the excess of supply over demands and

⁴¹ Suppose, for example, that of our three hypotheses, one was found to be associated with an increase in *PRI* vote, one had no effect on the vote, and the third was associated with a decrease in vote. The only conclusion we could draw from such a finding is that if the government followed the first policy, its vote might have increased, but if it followed some other policy, its vote either was unaffected or dropped. These hypotheses are mutually exclusive; we cannot conclude that government policy is "a little bit of everything."

⁴² The results are the same if capital spending between 1958 and 1963 is used as the measure of benefits. The actual hypothesis testing was done by comparing the standardized slopes, or Beta coefficients.

needs, the higher will be its turnout and *PRI* vote.

At this point I have predicted relationships between each of the six independent variables and two dependent variables. Table 2 summarizes these predictions:

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

Independent Variables	Effect of Independent Variable on:	
	Turnout	<i>PRI</i> Percentage
Urbanization	unspecified	decrease
Historical	decrease	decrease
Nonintegration		
Presence on USA Border	increase	decrease
Structure of Opposition	increase	unspecified
Party Membership	increase	increase
Benefits	increase	increase
Turnout	—	unspecified

Of course, these variables are not independent of each other, and to begin talking about causality they must be interrelated to separate the inde-

pendent effect of each from those that are purely spurious. A possible schematic representation of the model is shown in Figure 1.⁴³

V. ANALYSIS

We have thus far developed two sets of prediction equations: one in which turnout is the dependent variable, and a second in which turnout is an independent variable and the *PRI* percentage of the vote is the dependent variable. These hypotheses can be evaluated with multiple regression analyses, enabling us to simultaneously assess the contribution to the dependent variable made by each of our independent variables; i.e., the extent to which unit changes in each of the independent variables are related to unit changes in the dependent variables.⁴⁴

⁴³In this diagram all possible arrows are included. The signs refer to the direction of the predicted relationships. Double signs refer to directions that are uncertain. Circled intersections between the direct and non-direct factors indicate that the effect of each direct factor is measured controlling for all non-direct factors.

⁴⁴The correlation matrix refers to the following variables:

1. The percentage of the population living in communities over 2500.

FIGURE 1: A Schematic Representation of the Model




Table 3 presents the standardized regression coefficients associated with each variable in the two models. The coefficients are statistically comparable so that the relative contribution of each variable can be assessed. (For example, if one coefficient is twice the size of another, the first has twice the explanatory "weight" of the second.) The strength of the variables taken together can be measured by the coefficient of determination (R^2), which measures the percentage of the total variance explained by the independent variables.⁴⁵

A number of general substantive conclusions can be drawn from the multiple regression. The model predicting the direction of vote is extremely successful, explaining 75 percent of the variance in the *PRI* percentage. The relatively poor showing of the turnout model is not surprising: it has fewer independent variables, our theoretical underpinning is somewhat shaky, and

2. A history of nonintegration and separatism in a state.
3. Location of state on border with United States.
4. The number of opposition parties in elections for Congress.
5. The percentage of the population affiliated with the *PRI*.
6. The percentage of the population benefitted by drinkable-water programs.
7. The favoritism of a state over its level of demands for benefits.
8. The percentage of probable electors voting in six elections.
9. The percentage of the vote received by the *PRI* in six elections, 1952-67.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	—	-.02	.44	.15	.28	.82	.00**	-.12	-.69
2		—	.02	.01	-.03	.00	.03	.31	-.14
3			—	.02	.13	.46	.17	-.13	-.29
4				—	-.50	.12	.00	-.39	-.53
5					—	.43	.36	.25	-.07
6						—	.57	-.11	-.65
7							—	-.03	-.15
8								—	-.38
9									—

** The lack of correlation between urbanization and the measure of favoritism does not mean that more urban states are not really getting more than rural states, but only that the relationship is linear; i.e., the tendency in favor of urban areas does not increase with urbanization.

⁴⁵ Levels of significance are not being used to test hypotheses in this paper but only to indicate the strength of relationships, because we have a universe of all cases rather than a sample. No relationships are assumed to occur by chance; both weak and strong correlations are theoretically significant. The computational analysis was done on the IBM 360/67 with the Stanford Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.

we lack any reliable measure of party activity. The most significant factor in explaining *PRI* vote is urbanization. Low levels of urbanization are associated with high *PRI* percentage. Evidently Zolberg, Ridker, and Olson, *et al.*, are correct in arguing that oppositions flourish under conditions of high social mobilization; the degree of control exerted by local *caciques* is sufficient to bring out a large *PRI* vote. Figure 2 shows the relationship between urbanization and *PRI* vote for the 32 Mexican states.

The second most important variable is the structure of the opposition. Operationalized as the number of opposition parties, it is associated with low *PRI* vote and also low turnout. Two explanations can be given for each phenomenon. Fragmentation of opposition may occur in areas where the *PRI* vote and turnout are lowest, because potential oppositions perceive a receptive public for their efforts. Fragmentation may also have the effect of causing *PRI* vote and turnout to decline through the kinds of causal chains discussed earlier; i.e., urbanization leading to new oppositions leading to defeats for the *PRI*.


I originally suggested that a large number of opposition parties would increase turnout, because each opposition party would have its own clientele. Perhaps the error in this reasoning was an overestimation of the salience of party to Mexican voters. New splinter parties may have no clientele of their own; they may draw voters from the major parties but appeal very little to non-voters.

TABLE 3: STANDARDIZED MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ASSOCIATED WITH TURNOUT AND DIRECTION OF VOTE

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	
	Turnout	Direction of Vote
Urbanization	-.055	-.579**
Historical Nonintegration	.320**	-.238**
Presence on US Border	-.113	.045
Structure of the Opposition	-.305*	-.418**
Affiliated Members	.161	-.174
Benefits	-.085	-.080
Turnout	—	.276**
Multiple Correlation Coefficient	.531	.880
Coefficient of Determination	.282	.774

* Significant at the .10 level.

** Significant at the .05 level.



Percentage of Votes for the PRI

The two remaining indirect factors were entered as dichotomous variables. The effect of presence on the US border is nil. Since the border states are highly urbanized, it might be thought that the effects of presence on the US border are masked by the more powerful variable of urbanization. However an analysis of residuals (produced from a regression without this variable) shows that four of the six states on the US border have *higher* actual *PRI* vote than would be predicted by their level of urbanization. Thus, although the demonstration effect of the United States may carry over into the border cities, it does not significantly affect the total vote of the state.

I found that a condition of historical nonintegration lowered the *PRI* vote but increased turnout. The first finding was expected, but the latter is surprising. It may be that oppositions based on localist sentiment are more salient to peripheral participants than those based on ideology; and hence oppositions in the separatist areas stimulate turnout while those in integrated areas depress it. Obviously further research is needed here.

The two direct factors proved weak. In the case of party members the best explanation is probably that the method of determining membership is totally unrelated to party activity. In the case of the measure of benefits it is difficult to reach any conclusion. One possibility is that voters punish but do not reward; i.e., if the level of benefits is above their demand level (as measured by urbanization) they either might not notice the bonus, or might consider it as their due, especially because the need for government services in underdeveloped countries seems infinite. A second possibility is that water programs are a bad measure of benefits. This is suggested by the fact that the states of Michoacán, Puebla and Veracruz are all relatively disfavored. These are the home states of Lázaro Cárdenas, Avila Camacho, and both Alemán and Ruiz Cortines, all former Mexican Presidents. Probably a measure of benefits that includes more types of outputs would not show these states as disfavored. A third possibility is that measurement of the effects of such spending requires disaggregation of the six elections. This will be considered in the next section.

Turnout, the measure of participation, was positively and significantly related to *PRI* vote, supporting our contention that newly politicized voters respond to the *PRI* as the most powerful stimulus. Urbanization is unrelated to turnout. This link may be operable through the mediating effects of a valid indicator of party activity, or it may be that both hypothetically causal forces are at work. In the urban areas turnout is

pushed by the kind of spontaneous forces discussed by Lerner. In rural areas, the *PRI* can overcome lack of information and education by working through local *caciques*. Hence the level of turnout could be independent of urbanization even though both forces are operative.⁴⁶

VI. TIME-SERIES ANALYSES

One purpose of this study is to clarify changes in support for the *PRI* during the elections studied. The introduction posed certain questions answerable only with a trend or disaggregated analysis. One concerns the relation between urbanization rates and *PRI* vote over time; another concerns the relationship between benefits and *PRI* vote. However the dependent variable is operationalized several conclusions are relevant.⁴⁷

First, despite the increasing level of urbanization of Mexico, the *PRI* has become more rather than less dominant. Between 1952 and 1967 the percentage *PRI* rose in every state but three. The average increase was more than eleven percent.

Second, those states with the lowest *PRI* vote in 1952 made the largest gains. Whereas in 1952 twelve states voted less than 75 percent for the *PRI*, in 1967 only two states were below this level. The fact that the lowest states increase most is of course partly a statistical phenomenon, since a state with a *PRI* percentage of 97 in 1952 cannot increase by much in 1967.

Third, correlational analysis is not very helpful in explaining the varied increases in states' *PRI* votes. Regardless of which of the possible dependent variables we use, the correlational analysis simply tells us that the more urbanized developed states increased their *PRI* percentage more than the rural states which were always high-*PRI*.

Can we reconcile the levels-of-urbanization hypothesis with the trend in *PRI* vote? We might argue as follows: if there are variables outside the model causing a net gain in *PRI*

⁴⁶ One of the interesting problems to be explored in the future concerns the interrelationships between turnout, opposition voting, and government outcomes from election to election. This problem has been treated in the United States by, among others, Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, LIX (March, 1965), and Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960).

⁴⁷ For example, the percentage gain from 1952 to 1967, the gain from 1955 to 1967, or the algebraic sum of changes in rank order between 1952 and 1967.

vote, those states urbanizing fastest should be gaining relatively less. But in analyzing urbanization rates and changes in *PRI* vote over time, I found no evidence that rapidly urbanizing states are becoming less strong for the *PRI*.

The second time-related problem concerns the causal effects of benefits on *PRI* vote rather than the cross-sectional association. I suggested earlier that benefits were going into low-*PRI* states. This is evident in the following table, which relates *PRI* vote in 1958 (beginning the period covered by benefits data) to the benefit level, 1959-63:⁴⁸

TABLE 4: 1958 *PRI* VOTE IN RELATION TO BENEFITS

	States above mean vote	States below mean vote
Ratio of investment to poverty characteristics in succeeding period		
Above median	7	9
Below median	12	4

Of the thirteen states whose *PRI* vote was below the national mean in 1958, nine received benefits in a ratio above the national median between 1958 and 1964. Table 5 shows the changes in *PRI* percentage in three election periods for these thirteen states. Between the 1958

TABLE 5: CHANGES IN PERCENTAGE *PRI* AMONG STATES WITH *PRI* VOTE BELOW MEAN IN 1958

	Benefits 1959-63	1955-58	1958-64	1964-67
Ratio above median	-6%	+6.4%	-2%	
Ratio below median	-4%	-2.5%	-2%	

and 1964 Presidential elections, the nine of these thirteen states receiving benefits above the national median *increased* their *PRI* vote 6.4 percent. The four states receiving benefits below the median *decreased* 2.5 percent. We can see that even among the below-mean *PRI* states in 1958, those receiving benefits in a high ratio to poverty levels were those who had done most poorly in *PRI* percentage change between 1955 and 1958. Although they made remarkable im-

provements between 1958 and 1964, in the most recent election no differences were evident.

The difficulty with this kind of analysis is obvious. We have little knowledge of the time lag involved in the benefits→votes relationship. The relationships shown here are based on very few cases. The Mexican data is suggestive of a linkage between investment and affective response, but it is definitely not conclusive.

The most significant of these time-dependent problems is the apparent paradox of a model predicting low *PRI* vote in the most modernized states, and the evidence that the greatest *PRI* gains are made in these same states. Such a phenomenon is not uncommon; for example, social mobilization and military intervention are negatively related in Latin America, but in the aggregate, both mobilization and military intervention are rising.

It is also true that variables whose effects cannot be measured here may have a substantial effect on the changes in *PRI* vote over time. One possible variable is migration: the movement of people to urban areas implies a shift of voters with a high likelihood of a *PRI* vote into low-*PRI* areas. Although urban experience might eventually decrease the *PRI* vote of immigrants, their aggregate vote is slightly more strongly *PRI* than that of long-term residents.⁴⁹

Although it is generally beyond the scope of this paper to consider the reason for the *PRI*'s continuing dominance of elections, some speculation is appropriate. One important factor is the economic success of Mexico during this period. The *PRI* is a likely beneficiary in the short run from Mexico's prosperity. A second possibility is the skill of *PRI* leadership in responding to outcries from the citizenry. If one of the major sources of anti-*PRI* movements is the dislike of corrupt and inefficient officials rather than programmatic or ideological disagreements, then the *PRI* would be strengthened by replacing such officials and increasing its use of achievement criteria. Another significant variable may be the character of the opposition, especially their feelings of efficacy in the electoral arena. The demoralizing effects of an inability to achieve even minimal electoral successes may strengthen the *PRI* even while other factors weaken its electoral position.

VII. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

I presented a series of hypotheses concerning the bases of *PRI* support. The data indicate that

⁴⁸ Cornelius, *op. cit.*, found that in 1958, 9 percent of urban-born people in urban areas voted for opposition parties, while only 3 percent of migrants into urban areas did so.

⁴⁹ The median benefit ratio was used because the Federal District (Mexico City) had a score almost five times as high as the next highest unit. Capital spending figures are being used instead of water programs because of correspondence between their time period and the elections.

about 75 percent of the variance in the *PRI* percentage in these six elections can be explained by four variables: level of urbanization, turnout, the structure of the opposition, and historical nonintegration. The original hypotheses now take on the following form:

1. The higher the level of development (as measured by urbanization or other indicators) the less will be the *PRI* percentage. Turnout is unaffected by the level of development.

2. High rates of electoral participation are associated with high *PRI* percentage.

3. A condition of historical nonintegration is associated with lower levels of *PRI* vote and higher levels of turnout.

4. Turnout and vote are unaffected by presence on the US border.

5. The percentage of vote received by the *PRI* and the level of turnout are lower when there are more opposition parties.

6. The percentage of the population affiliated with the *PRI* does not affect either turnout or direction of vote.

7. Federal spending tends to be highest in low-*PRI* states and may increase *PRI* vote levels in the short-run.

To discuss the implications of these findings we must confront the fact that the *PRI* increased its support almost everywhere, while the conclusion flowing naturally from our model is that increasing development in Mexico should lessen dominance of the *PRI*. In fact, the most

developed areas made the greatest gains between 1952 and 1967.

An easy way out of this dilemma would be the argument that the *PRI* may increase its support in the short run but in time will lose its predominant status. There is, however, no support for such a conclusion in these data. In fact, if Mexico continues to enjoy prosperity, and if the *PRI* continues to replace the worst of its officials, it may become even more powerful in the next few elections. Even the gradual shift from a subject-parochial political culture to a subject-participant one will not weaken the *PRI*, since the evidence presented here shows that a kind of "demonstration effect" operates to bring the *PRI* a higher vote when turnout and registration rise.⁵⁰ The dominance of the *PRI* may be threatened by economic recession or insufficient responsive capability, but these developments have certainly not yet occurred.

⁵⁰ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 17-26. A parochial political culture implies a low frequency of orientations toward the political system in such areas as inputs, outputs, participation, the "system" as a general object, etc.: "In a subject political culture, there is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approach zero . . . In a participant culture, members are oriented to both the input and output sides of the system."

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF CANADA*

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The working of the electoral system in Canada is investigated in this paper. The object is to identify the more important factors which go to determine the share of seats in the federal House of Commons won by a political party at a general election. Factors considered are share of vote, distribution of the vote and number of candidates in the field. The responsiveness of share of seats to variations in these factors is estimated by fitting linear equations by least squares to data for the fourteen federal general elections which took place in Canada between 1921 and 1965.

I. THE REPRESENTATION FUNCTION

The single-member-constituency system of election has cast up some rather puzzling results in Canada. Exhibited in Table 1 are shares of seats and shares of vote won by the parties contesting the general elections of 1930 and 1935. Two things stand out from the results. The first is that the electoral system apportions seats among the parties in a far from even-handed way: the party gaining the largest proportion of the vote is generously rewarded with seats at the expense of the other parties. This tendency, it should be said, is not peculiar to Canada but is observed wherever the single-member-constituency system is used.¹ Second, the system seems to suffer from a lack of consistency. Compare the fortunes of the Liberal party in the two elections: in 1935, with a slightly reduced vote, the party won close to double the share of seats it held in 1930. Again, compare the performance of the Progressive party in 1930 with that of the Reconstruction party in 1935. There is little evidence here of a simple relationship between a party's share of seats and its share of vote.

Now there is nothing in the rules of the

* I wish to thank John C. Courtney and Peter C. Dooley for helpful criticism. Some preliminary results of this study were reported in a paper read at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in 1967.

¹ See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London, 1954), esp. pp. 373-4; and Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, 1967).

TABLE 1. RESULTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS
IN CANADA, 1930 AND 1935

Party	Election of 1930		Election of 1935	
	Seats (%)	Vote (%)	Seats (%)	Vote (%)
Liberal	37.1	45.5	70.6	44.9
Conservative	55.9	48.7	16.3	29.6
Progressive	4.9	3.2	—	—
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation	—	—	2.9	8.9
Social Credit	—	—	6.9	4.1
Reconstruction	—	—	0.4	8.7
Other	2.0	2.7	2.9	3.7

Source: Howard A. Scarrow, *Canada Votes*, (New Orleans, 1962), Tables 24 and 28.

single-member-constituency system of election to ensure that a party's share of seats will be related in a predictable way to its share of vote. In a two-party system, a party winning 40 per cent of the vote might win anything from nil to close to 80 per cent of the seats, depending on how the vote is distributed among the constituencies; with more than two parties, the range of possible outcomes is even greater. In fact, however, share of seats does tend to be closely dependent on share of vote in single-member-constituency systems—at least outside Canada. Dahl has fitted linear equations to time-series data for Congressional elections in the United States and found that more than nine-tenths of the variance of share of seats was capable of explanation by the behavior of share of vote.² In Great Britain, the so-called "cube law," which states that the proportion which party A's share of seats bears to party B's will vary as the cube of the proportion of A's share of vote to B's, has yielded quite accurate predictions of election outcomes. The implied relationship between share of seats and share of vote is non-linear. The rationale of the cube law has been investigated by the British statisticians Kendall and Stuart, who discovered that the construct rested on certain conditions governing the distribution of the proportions of vote won by a party in the

² Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 148-9. Dahl regresses Democratic share of *major-party* seats on that party's share of *major-party* vote.

constituencies.³ The conditions were found to be approximately satisfied in Great Britain.

In Canada, neither the linear nor the cube-law hypothesis offers a convincing account of election outcomes. For the major (Liberal and Conservative) parties over the period from 1921 to 1965, no more than about three-quarters of the variance of share of seats can be explained by changes in share of vote, assuming linearity. The cube law, in its original (two-party) form, performs no better.⁴ Considering that Canada is a multi-party system, the inapplicability of the cube law is not surprising. The mechanics of the cube law require, among other things, that the proportion of the vote needed to win a contest be one-half. In a three- or four-party system, a contest can be won with a good deal less than one-half of the vote, and the required proportion generally cannot be specified *a priori*.

There are, of course, many other forms of the relationship between a party's share of vote and its share of seats which might be canvassed. It seems unlikely, however, that the problem of explaining election outcomes in Canada is wholly or even largely one of discovering the correct functional form of a two-variable relationship. What does seem likely is that there are factors other than share of vote which play a part in the determination of election outcomes. To elicit the influence of these factors a multivariate analysis must be undertaken.

We begin by positing the dependence of the i th party's share of seats S_i on its share of vote V_i , K variables X_1, \dots, X_k , and a variable u :

$$S_i = f(V_i; X_1, \dots, X_k; u)$$

It is convenient to have a name for this relation, and "representation function" seems apt. The variables X_1, \dots, X_k are as yet unspecified factors which, along with V_i , exert

systematic influences on S_i . The remaining variable, u , is an error term whose inclusion acknowledges the possibility of inexactness arising from incomplete specification, data errors and random disturbances. The expected value of u is assumed to be zero.

Two kinds of decisions must be made in the course of specifying the representation function. First, the form of the dependence of S_i on the independent variables has to be decided upon. We adopt the assumption of linear form, principally because of its simplicity. (Something more will be said about this assumption later on.) Second, the variables X_1, \dots, X_k must be specified. Variables considered are numbers of candidates placed in the field by the several parties and an aspect of the distribution of the parties' vote among the constituencies. We discuss now the ways in which these variables may be supposed to figure in the representation function.

Number of candidates. The number of candidates presenting themselves for election has varied a great deal in recent Canadian experience. The major parties usually have contested all or almost all constituencies, though in several elections they named no candidates in many. The number of other ("minor-party") candidates has varied from fewer than one hundred to more than five hundred.

The proportion of vote necessary for victory in a constituency can be taken to be dependent in a loose way on the number of candidates in contention. For two candidates, something more than one-half of the vote is required; for three, it might be little more than one-third (though it might be a great deal more); for four, perhaps little more than one-quarter; and so on. A party winning 40 per cent of the national vote might win relatively few seats in a two-party contest. In an election involving four parties, 40 per cent of the national vote might be enough to win a majority of seats.

It is worthwhile to inquire more closely into the way in which variations in the number of candidates affect election outcomes. Suppose there are three parties, A , B , and C ; and suppose further, for the sake of tidiness, that the voting population is fixed from election to election and everyone turns out. Each of the three parties enters a candidate in all n constituencies in election I. In a constituency J , C 's candidate finished a poor third in election I, and C does not name a candidate in J in election II. Imagine now that in the other $n-1$ constituencies the results of election II are identical in every respect with those of election I. The only changes in the system between elections I and II, then, are those following from C 's vacating J .

³ M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, "The Law of the Cubic Proportion in Election Results," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 1 (1950), 183-96.

⁴ T. H. Qualter, in a recent study, puts forward a "modified cube law" for the multi-party case and applies it to Canada. Because of differences in intent and method it is difficult to compare Qualter's results with those presented here. See T. H. Qualter, "Seats and Votes: An Application of the Cube Law to the Canadian Electoral System," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (1968), 336-344. It may be noted that both the two-party cube law and Qualter's "modified cube law" are special cases of the "weak proportionality" function proposed by Theil. See Henri Theil, "The Desired Political Entropy," this *Review*, Vol. LXIII (June, 1969), 521-525.

By abandoning a (by hypothesis) hopeless cause in *J*, party *C* will have augmented the "efficiency" of its vote in the following sense: the party wins the same number of seats as before, but with a smaller share of the total vote. We may be permitted to infer from this that, had it won as large a share of vote in II as in I, *C* could have won more seats in II.⁶ That is, for a given share of vote, a party is predicted to win more seats when the number of constituencies it enters is reduced. There is a good deal of common sense in this prediction, which simply says that a given vote will yield more seats for a party when it is spread over fewer candidates.

Can it be taken for granted that the same reasoning applies when a party *increases* the number of constituencies it enters? There is a certain asymmetry here. It could be supposed that a party would abandon only palpably hopeless causes. One cannot suppose, however, that every new candidature is of the hopeless variety: the facts state otherwise. It remains, however, that the probability of a newcomer's winning a seat is quite small. Further, against the effects of a victory on a party's efficiency might have to be set the effects of perhaps a dozen defeats. The asymmetry must be allowed to stand, but it does not necessarily force a revision of the hypothesis that a party's efficiency will vary inversely with the number of its candidates.

We revert now to the simple model to examine the consequences for *A* and *B* of *C*'s decision not to contest *J*. Now it is clear that, because *C* wins the same number of seats with a smaller share of the vote in election II, *A* and *B* taken together must win the same number of seats with a larger share of the vote. At least one and possibly both of *A* and *B* will suffer a worsening in efficiency.

There is one case in which it can be predicted confidently that the efficiency of both *A* and *B* will be reduced. This case involves the following assumptions: (a) that, as a result of *C*'s vacating *J*, the number of votes going to each of *A* and *B* in *J* is larger; (b) that *C*'s stepping down does not cause the decision in *J* to be different. Assumption (a) seems fairly plausible even though arguable. It amounts to the supposition that, in election II, some of *C*'s ad-

herents from election I days will go over to *A* and some will go over to *B*. Assumption (b) has somewhat less to recommend it. The former adherents of *C* might divide between *A* and *B* in such a way as to alter the decision. Suppose that *A* won *J* in election I but that in election II, with *C*'s candidate absent, *B* emerged the victor. The efficiency of *A*'s vote clearly will have deteriorated: the party wins a larger vote and fewer seats than before. But the effect on the efficiency of *B*, which wins a larger vote as well as more seats, is problematical. Since the assumptions represent sufficient but not necessary conditions, a worsening of *B*'s efficiency cannot be ruled out. Neither, however, can it be predicted with assurance.

In summary, our expectations take the following form. When a party reduces the number of its candidates, other things being equal, its efficiency will be improved; that is, for a given share of vote, the party will win more seats. The efficiency of at least one of its rivals must be reduced and that of all rivals might be. Effects of opposite kind can be anticipated throughout when a party increases the number of constituencies entered.

In the empirical work to follow, the number of candidates placed in the field by the *i*th party is denoted by N_i . For ease of interpretation of the coefficients N_i is expressed on the basis of an electoral system comprising 265 constituencies. (The actual number of seats varied over the 1921-65 period from 235 to 265.)

Distribution of the Vote. The share of seats won by a party will depend critically on the way in which its vote is distributed among the constituencies. The handling of distributional factors in an aggregative analysis is, it must be conceded, an awkward matter. Further, where more than two parties contend, as in Canada, such factors can be highly complex. There is, however, at least one aspect of the distribution of the vote which can be incorporated into the present analysis.

In Canada, at least until the most recent (1966) redistribution, substantial variation in the populations of constituencies has been permitted. Constituency populations have tended, moreover, to vary along a dimension which is relevant to the determination of voters' party preferences. Rural constituencies generally have contained fewer voters than urban constituencies. Because a rural seat contains fewer voters, it can be won with a smaller proportion of the *national* vote than is required to win an urban seat, other things being equal. Thus, the share of vote required to win a given share of seats might be relatively small if the vote is concentrated in small rural constitu-

⁶ The inference would be fully justified if the representation function were continuous and monotonic increasing. Obviously this requirement is not met in fact: the addition of a handful of votes to a party's total will not always result in additional seats won. It is sufficient for present purposes to assume that the probability of a party's winning an additional seat with a modest augmentation of its vote is not zero.

encies. It will be convenient to state the hypothesis in an alternative form: a party will win more (fewer) seats for a given share of vote, other things being equal, the greater its relative strength in small (large) constituencies.

To test this hypothesis it is necessary to devise an index representing the relative strength of a party in size-classes of constituencies. An index, denoted by B_i , was constructed in the following way. Constituencies larger than mean size (according to the number of votes cast) were identified, and the aggregate share of vote cast in favor of the i th party in those constituencies calculated. This large-constituency share was then divided by V_i , the share of the vote received by the party over all constituencies, and the resulting quotient was multiplied by 100. An index of $B_i = 110$, for instance, would connote that the i th party's performance in large constituencies was 10 per cent better, in relative terms, than its performance in all constituencies (e.g., the party might have won 55 per cent of the aggregate vote in large constituencies and 50 per cent of the aggregate vote nationally). A value of 100 would indicate that the party did equally well in large constituencies and all constituencies. The expectation is that the share of seats won by the i th party will vary inversely with B_i , other factors held constant.

II. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES

We turn now to the task of estimating representation functions embodying the hypotheses set out. The representation functions are estimated by fitting linear regression equations to observed values of the relevant variables. The data pertain to the fourteen elections which took place in Canada from 1921 to 1965 and are displayed in an Appendix. Candidates are divided exhaustively into three groups: Conservative, Liberal and "minor-party," the latter group being a conglomerate of all candidates who are neither Conservative nor Liberal. Symbols used to represent the variables and to identify political parties are listed below:

S_i : Share of seats (per cent) won by the i th party;

V_i : Share of vote (per cent) won by the i th party;

N_i : Number of candidates (basis 265 constituencies) placed in the field by the i th party;

B_i : Index of relative performance of the i th party in constituencies larger than mean size;

$i = C$: Subscript identifying Conservative party;

$i = L$: Subscript identifying Liberal party;

$i = M$: Subscript identifying minor parties.

Regression equations. For the Conservative party, S_C initially was regressed on the variables V_C , N_C , B_C , N_L , and N_M . It was found that the coefficient of N_L was effectively zero; seemingly, conservative share of seats has not been sensitive to changes in the number of Liberal candidates. The variable was dropped and the equation fitted again, with the outcome:⁶

$$(1) \quad S_C = 2.897^{**}V_C - 0.241^{**}N_C - 0.819^{*}B_C \\ (0.198) \quad (0.099) \quad (0.277) \\ + 0.0550^{**}N_M + 53.49 \\ (0.0098)$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .964, \quad \text{S.E.E.} = 3.39$$

The results are, on the whole, quite gratifying. Fit is good, all coefficients can be supposed with some confidence to differ from zero, and signs capable of prior prediction are as expected. The Conservative party's share of seats is shown to vary directly with its own share of vote and with the number of minor-party candidates, and inversely with the number of its own candidates and with its relative popularity in larger-than-average constituencies, other things held constant in each case. The standard error of estimate at 3.39 (per cent of total seats) amounts to about nine seats in a 265-seat House of Commons.

A trial fitting of the representation function for the Liberal party turned up one variable (B_L) whose coefficient fell somewhat short of conventional significance levels and another (N_C) whose coefficient was patently insignificant. The latter only was discarded, and the equation became:

$$(2) \quad S_L = 3.217^{**}V_L - 0.356^{*}N_L - 0.821B_L \\ (0.303) \quad (0.146) \quad (0.598) \\ + 0.0656^{**}N_M + 62.85 \\ (0.0129)$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .902, \quad \text{S.E.E.} = 4.97$$

⁶ Shown in parentheses below the sample coefficients are the corresponding standard errors; \bar{R}^2 is the coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom; S.E.E. is the standard error of estimate. Asterisks raised above the coefficients indicate significance level according to a two-tailed t-test, as follows: **significant at the .01 level; *significant at the .05 level. A useful and relatively non-technical introduction to regression analysis is Mordecai Ezekiel and Karl A. Fox, *Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis* (New York, 3rd ed., 1959).

Again, signs are as expected, although the coefficient of B_L is not significant. With \bar{R}^2 of .902 the fit of the equation is somewhat less close than that of the Conservative equation.

A rather different specification was adopted for the minor-party equation. It did not seem appropriate in the case of such a conglomerate to use an index of relative strength in constituencies of different sizes. Also, when V_M , N_M , N_C , and N_L were entered together as explanatory variables, a severe problem of collinearity arose. Minor-party share of vote is highly dependent on the number of candidates placed in the field by the several parties, and the consequent redundancy of information when the variables are entered in each other's presence makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the coefficients.⁷ If an estimate was to be made at all, it seemed necessary to jettison one or more of the variables. Unfortunately, all would appear to belong in the representation function, and dropping variables might be merely to exchange one source of unreliability for another. We might suppose, however, that, whatever other variables are relevant, V_M and N_M ought to figure in the equation.

$$(3) \quad S_M = 1.237^{**}V_M - 0.0360^{**}N_M + 0.99$$

(0.233) (0.0117)

$$\bar{R}^2 = .718, \quad \text{S.E.E.} = 3.47$$

Both coefficients are significant and the \bar{R}^2 is of a respectable order. However, the arbitrariness of this specification becomes evident when N_M is replaced by N_L . The fit of this equation (not shown) is as close as that of (3), and the coefficient of N_L turns out to be highly significant and *negative*. Replacing N_L in turn by N_C , the latter's coefficient also bears a negative sign though it is not significant. The negative signs persist through all configurations of variables. There are indications here that when a major party withdraws from contests the efficiency of the minor-party vote is *improved*, which in turn suggests that commonly such contests are won by minor-party candidates.⁸ The tactics of multi-party politics

⁷ For a succinct discussion of this problem consult H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: the Problem of Multicollinearity", *Social Forces*, Vol. 42 (1963), 233-237.

⁸ It seems clear that the minor parties have, on the whole, performed better when they were unopposed by one of the major parties, though the results are mixed. In the election of 1921, for example, the Liberal party did not name candidates in 33 constituencies, and in 28 of them minor-party candidates were successful; the Con-

servative party passed up 27 seats, of which only five were won by minor-party candidates.

no doubt figure in this phenomenon. A major party might withdraw from a contest with the hope of delivering the constituency into minor-party hands and thwarting the ambitions of the other major party; or, recognizing that a minor-party candidate will win in any case, the major party might withdraw as a gesture of appeasement. The matter is, perhaps, of more historical than current interest, since in the last half-dozen elections the major parties have fielded complete slates of candidates with only a few exceptions.

The empirical estimates establish the importance of several factors in the working of the electoral system in Canada. In the case of the Conservative party, as many as four variables are shown to contribute significantly to the explanation of share of seats won; in the case of the Liberals, three. As noted, share of vote alone is able to account for only about three-quarters of the variance of share of seats won by a major party. The addition of numbers-of-candidates variables and an index representing one aspect of the distribution of the vote raises the proportion of variance explained to nine-tenths or higher. For the minor parties, the relevance of at least one variable besides share of vote is suggested, though because of collinearity the precise identity of the other variable or variables remains in doubt.

Some features of the system. From the coefficients estimated in equations (1)-(3) can be elicited a good deal of information concerning the working of the electoral system in Canada. We confine attention here to a few of the more important and interesting results.

The relationship which perhaps is of most interest is that between a party's share of seats and its share of vote when other factors are held constant. For the major parties, according to the coefficients of V_C and V_L in (1) and (2), a change in share of vote of one percentage point is transformed into a change in share of seats of about three percentage points in the same direction. Thus, in a House of Commons of 265 seats, an additional percentage point of vote won by a party would gain about eight seats. It is interesting that the estimated "incremental transformation rate" of 3.0 or thereabouts is quite close to the rate yielded by the cube law in Great Britain and to that estimated for Congressional elections in the United States.⁹ That three systems should exhibit a

servative party passed up 27 seats, of which only five were won by minor-party candidates.

⁹ The cube law implies a non-linear relationship between share of seats and share of vote, i.e., the incremental transformation rate is not a con-

regularity of this kind is indeed remarkable in view of the lack of formal restrictions on the transformation rate under the single-member-constituency method of election.

The transformation rate for the minor parties is substantially lower than the major-party rate. In fact, the coefficient of V_M in (3) is less than half those of V_C in (1) and V_L in (2). The minor parties are at a relative disadvantage, the most plausible explanation of which is the generally lower level of the minor-party vote.

This, however, raises a question concerning the form of the relationship between share of seats and share of vote. If, in general, the transformation rate varies with share of vote, the linearity assumption relied on thus far might not be suitable. Several rough-and-ready tests for non-linearity were carried out, and in none was its presence indicated. On the other hand, experimentation with disaggregated data, in which share of vote varied over a wide range, did turn up strong evidence of non-linearity. The following tentative explanation is offered: the underlying relationship between a party's share of seats and its share of vote is in fact non-linear; but over the limited range in which share of vote is observed in the present samples, the relationship can be closely approximated by a straight line.

When the number of minor-party candidates is increased, the share of seats won by a major party for a given own share of vote is augmented. According to equation (1), the increase in Conservative share of seats when an additional minor-party candidate enters the field is .055 per cent (of the seats in the House); equation (2) offers an estimate of .066 per cent in respect of the Liberals. There is no necessity for the two coefficients to be equal: changes in minor-party activity could have quite different effects on the two major parties. However, the two sample coefficients here are within one standard error of each other, and the inference of no difference would seem to be called for.

The dependence of major-party share of seats on the number of minor-party candidates

stant but rather varies with share of vote. However, James G. March reports that for shares of vote ranging from 40 per cent to 60 per cent the cube law can be approximated closely by a linear equation which fixes the transformation rate at about 2.8. See James G. March, "Party Legislative Representation as a Function of Election Results," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. XXI (1957/58), 521-542. Dahl (*op. cit.*, pp. 148-149) elicited transformation rates for the Democratic party of 2.50 in House of Representatives elections and 3.02 in Senate elections.




FIGURE 1

explains the ability of parties to win majorities in the House of Commons with much less than a majority of the vote cast in their favor. Figure 1 provides an illustration, using the coefficients for the Conservative party estimated in equation (1). Measured along the horizontal axis is V_C , and along the vertical axis N_M . The slanted lines ("equal-representation lines") trace out combinations of V_C and N_M which yield stated levels of S_o .¹⁰ (It is assumed that the Conservatives contest all seats and perform equally well in large and small constituencies, i.e. $N_C=265$ and $B_C=100$). With 100 minor-party candidates in the field the Conservatives are estimated to require 47.2 per cent of the vote to win 50 per cent of the seats. Setting N_M at 200, some 45.3 per cent of the vote is needed by the major party to win 50 per cent of the seats; at 500, only 39.6 per cent. In contrast, 39.6 per cent of the vote is indicated to yield only about 28 per cent of the seats when there are as few as 100 minor-party candidates in the field.

Since the independent variables in an equation are related to a common variable S_i , they can be brought into relation with each other to answer questions of this sort: By what amount must one independent variable be changed to compensate for the effect on S_i of a given change in another independent variable?

¹⁰ The slanted (equal-representation) lines are truncated at $N_M=100$ and $N_M=500$ to remain well within the range of observed values of the variable in the sample.

TABLE 2. STANDARD REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (BETA WEIGHTS)

Equation	V_C	V_L	V_M	N_C	N_L	N_M	B_C	B_L
(1)	1.37			-0.18		0.47	-0.22	
(2)		1.01			-0.31	0.64		-0.13
(3)			1.47			-0.85		

Source: Calculated from coefficients of Equations (1)-(3) and standard deviations of variables.

Of special interest is the way in which variations in the "other" factors compensate for gains and losses in a party's voting support.

In this connection, the slope of the equal-representation lines in Figure 1 can be given a useful interpretation. The slope indicates the rate at which V_C must be substituted for N_M to maintain constant S_C . Holding N_C and B_C constant, we can write, from equation (1),

$$\Delta S_C = 2.897 \Delta V_C + 0.055 \Delta N_M$$

where Δ stands for "change in." Along a given equal-representation line, $\Delta S_C = 0$; hence,

$$0 = 2.897 \Delta V_C + 0.055 \Delta N_M,$$

and the slope of the equal-representation line is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Delta N_M}{\Delta V_C} &= - \frac{2.897}{0.055} \\ &= -52.7 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, an increase of about 53 in the number of minor-party candidates will have an effect on Conservative share of seats which just compensates for the effect of a decrease in its (the Conservative party's) share of vote of one percentage point. Put otherwise, the Conservatives can give up one per cent of the vote for every 53 additional minor-party candidates in the field and maintain a given share of seats, other factors held constant.

Substitution rates can be calculated in a similar way for V_C in substitution with the other independent variables. Taking B_C ,

$$\frac{\Delta B_C}{\Delta V_C} = 3.5$$

If there were a shift in the party's base of support towards small constituencies such that B_C fell by 3.5 (e.g., from 100 to 96.5) the party could win a given share of seats with a share of vote one percentage point smaller. Finally, for N_C ,

$$\frac{\Delta N_C}{\Delta V_C} = 12.0$$

Withdrawing 12 Conservative candidates from the field has the same effect on S_C for given V_C as an increase in V_C of one percentage point.

Substitution rates for the Liberal party, calculated from the coefficients in equation (2), are fairly similar throughout.

It would be useful, finally, to know something about the relative importance of the several independent variables in producing changes in election outcomes. As they stand, the regression coefficients do not offer a reliable basis for judging the relative importance of the variables: the size of a coefficient will reflect the (often arbitrarily-selected) units in which the independent variable is measured. For comparison to be meaningful, some standardization procedure is needed. Here we may make use of standard regression coefficients, often called Beta-weights, which show the change in the dependent variable, in own-standard deviation units, when an independent variable is changed by one own-standard deviation.¹¹ Beta-weights for the variables in equations (1)-(3) are shown in Table 2.

On the basis of the absolute values of the Beta-weights, own share of vote is the independent variable to which share of seats is most responsive in all three cases: a not unexpected result. Ranking next in importance throughout is number of minor-party candidates. We may conjecture that the seemingly eccentric changes in party standings which occur from time to time in Canadian elections are due largely to changes in the number of minor-party candidates. Reverting to the data of Table 1, it is doubtless significant that fewer than 100 minor-party candidates contested the election of 1930 while more than 400 contested that of 1935. The very substantial increase in minor-party participation in 1935 led to a correspondingly substantial increase in the efficiency of the Liberal vote.

Qualifications and a test. The empirical estimates are subject to several qualifications which ought to be recorded. First, certain specification problems which affect the interpretation of the coefficients are left unresolved. In the case of the minor parties, several formulations produced equally good fits; the major-

¹¹ See H. M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960), p. 345.

party equations, fortunately, yielded less ambiguous results. The difficulties with the minor-party equation may be in part the result of lumping together all "other" candidates. Disaggregation would be desirable, but it would mean reducing the size of an already very small sample (no one third party's life spans the sample period). Second, it is possible that the estimated coefficients are biased because of the omission of relevant variables. The only way to guard against such biases is to bring all likely variables within the compass of the analysis. A few other variables were tried, but none appeared to add anything. It may be worth reporting that attempts to uncover possible effects of the periodic re-drawing of constituency boundaries (the effects assumed to be in favor of the party in power) turned up nothing. The results may reflect the method, which was distinctly unrefined. Third, a doubt concerning one of the variables must be confessed to. The index B_i is constructed from data which are subject to the influence of other explanatory variables, and its independence is open to question. The index is moderately correlated in the sample with several other variables (see correlation matrix, Appendix).

The general election which took place in Canada in 1968 offers a limited but valuable opportunity to test the capabilities of the equations. The relevant data (recorded in the Appendix) were inserted into equations (1)–(3) to produce the estimates shown in Table 3. For the Liberals and the minor parties, the equations perform very well; the estimate for the

Conservatives is not so close to the mark. The results are as good as or better than one might have expected on the basis of the standard errors of estimate in the sample period.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The most general conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that the determination of election outcomes in Canada is a complex process in which the influences of several factors combine. By the use of regression analysis it has been possible to tentatively identify several—hopefully, the most important—variables which figure in the process. For the major parties, the variables shown to be relevant are own share of vote, number of own candidates, number of minor-party candidates and (in one case) relative strength of the major party in size-classes of constituencies. Certain problems stood in the way of a satisfactory account of minor-party share of seats, but the importance of at least one variable besides share of vote is indicated.

For the specifications adopted, the variable ranking next in importance to own share of vote is number of minor-party candidates. The greater the number of minor-party candidates in the field, the smaller the share of vote needed by a major party to attain a given share of seats, other things remaining constant. The regression coefficients provide a quantitative measure of the effect on the efficiency of the major-party vote of changes in the level of minor-party activity.

It is estimated that, for the major parties, an increase in share of vote of one percentage point will bring about an increase in share of seats of about three percentage points. This is similar to rates calculated for the two-party systems of Great Britain and the United States, but much larger than the rate estimated here for the minor parties in Canada.

In respect of method, the study offers some evidence of the potentialities of multiple regression analysis in the investigation of electoral systems. There can be few electoral systems so innocent of complexity that their working can be adequately described in a relationship between two variables, share of seats and share of vote. Other factors can—in Canada, at least, do—affect election outcomes.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL SHARES OF SEATS, ELECTION OF 1968

Party	Estimated Share of Seats (%)	Actual Share of Seats (%)	Error (%)
Conservative	31.5	27.3	+4.2
Liberal	57.3	58.7	−1.4
Minor Parties	13.6	14.0	−0.4

Source: Estimated share of seats obtained by inserting values of independent variables (see Appendix) into equations (1), (2) and (3).

APPENDIX
DATA AND SOURCES

Data:

Election	S_L	S_C	S_M	V_L	V_C	V_M	N_L	N_C	N_M	B_L	B_C
1921	49.4	21.3	29.4	40.7	30.3	29.0	228	235	254	96	97
1925	40.4	47.3	12.2	39.8	46.5	13.8	232	253	141	96	110
1926	52.2	37.1	10.6	46.1	45.3	8.7	238	252	83	98	106
1930	37.1	55.9	6.9	45.5	48.7	5.9	253	252	85	101	101
1935	70.6	16.3	13.1	44.9	29.6	25.4	263	251	450	97	100
1940	73.9	16.3	9.8	51.5	30.7	17.9	263	230	228	98	101
1945	51.0	27.3	21.6	41.1	27.4	31.5	262	221	545	100	101
1949	73.7	15.6	10.7	49.5	29.7	20.8	263	252	342	98	102
1953	64.5	19.2	16.3	48.9	31.0	20.1	265	248	384	95	102
1957	39.6	42.3	18.1	40.9	38.9	20.1	265	257	339	97	104
1958	18.5	78.5	3.0	33.6	53.6	12.8	265	265	301	97	101
1962	37.7	43.8	18.5	37.2	37.3	25.6	264	265	486	101	95
1963	48.7	35.8	15.5	41.7	32.8	25.4	265	265	492	104	93
1965	49.4	36.6	14.0	40.2	32.4	27.4	265	265	481	101	93
1968*	58.7	27.3	14.0	45.5	31.4	23.1	264	264	443	106	90

Sources: S_i , V_i , 1921-1958: H. A. Scarrow, *Canada Votes* (New Orleans, 1962); 1962-1968: *Report of the Chief Electoral Officer* (Ottawa) 25th-28th general elections; N_i , B_i computed from data in above sources, as follows:

$$N_i = \frac{265n_i}{n}$$

where n_i is the number of candidates entered by the i th party and n is the total number of seats in the (forthcoming) House of Commons;

$$B_i = 100 \left(\frac{\sum v_{ij}}{\sum v_j} + V_i \right), \quad v_j > \bar{v},$$

where v_{ij} is the number of votes won by the i th party in the j th constituency and \bar{v} the mean number of votes cast in the n constituencies. Where not all constituencies were entered by the i th party, data for uncontested constituencies were deleted in the computation of the index.

Data used differ slightly in some instances from those contained in the recent compilation by J. M. Beck in *Pendulum of Power* (Scarborough, 1968), which came to my attention too late to permit use here. The differences are small, and cannot be supposed to affect the argument.

* Not used in the calculation of regression coefficients.

CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

	V_L	V_C	V_M	N_L	N_C	N_M	B_L	B_C
V_L	1	-.43	-.17	.06	-.43	-.25	-.16	.22
V_C		1	-.81	-.27	.47	-.63	-.07	.42
V_M			1	.25	-.24	.85	.18	-.60
N_L				1	.24	.66	.35	-.42
N_C					1	.08	.29	-.24
N_M						1	.37	-.64
B_L							1	-.65
B_C								1

A NOTE ON OVERSEAS CHINESE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN URBAN MALAYA*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The object of this note is to demonstrate that generalizations about political participation may be invalid when applied to "developing" or "transitional" societies. Specifically, the relationship between rates of voter turnout and levels of education for urban Chinese in Malaya is not consistent with results reported for Western societies.

A geographical classification of bibliographic entries in Lester Milbrath's *Political Participation*¹ discloses a very interesting statistic: only 3 of the 288 listed entries concern the transitional societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The lack of data on developing areas may, in large measure, explain the emphasis placed on studies of political participation in North America and Western Europe. Although there is more research on transitional societies today, most studies still focus on advanced industrial societies. The validity of the generalizations presented in *Political Participation*, therefore, is restricted to North America and Western Europe.

Using data collected in Malaya (1957), I examine four of Milbrath's hypotheses. These include:

- (1) higher education increases participation (p. 122);
- (2) middle-aged persons participate more than young or old persons (p. 134);
- (3) men are more likely to participate than women (p. 133); and
- (4) religion affects participation (p. 137).

II. METHOD

The dependent variable in each of these hypothesized relationships is participation, measured by percentage voter turnout among the population. With the exception of religion, measurement procedures need little discussion. Sex, age and education are evident. The different religions in Malaya are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity.

The data which I present were collected by

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¹(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965).

Survey Research Malaysia during February-March 1967 in Kuala Lumpur and Penang, Malaya. A two-stage sample survey was designed to select 500 households in which adults could be enumerated and selected for interview against a list of qualifying numbers. The field work produced 374 successful adult interviews in Penang and 359 in Kuala Lumpur, the two largest and commercially most important cities in Malaya. The results describe only reported Chinese voting behavior at the 1964 Parliamentary or State Legislative Assembly elections (the most recent general elections preceding the date of the survey); the number of Indians and Malays interviewed is too small to permit meaningful quantitative analysis.²


III. RESULTS

Neither sex nor religion discriminate respondents' rates of voting. The hypothesized relationship between age and participation was confirmed, i.e., voting rates increase until the middle-age category and decline thereafter. How-

² The ethnic composition of respondents in Kuala Lumpur and Penang compared with census distributions, by percentages, is displayed below. One can readily observe that Chinese predominate numerically in both cities. The number of Malays and Indians in each educational category is too small to permit a meaningful reporting of voter turnout rates for those categories.

Kuala Lumpur		
Ethnic Group	(N=359) Sample	(N=314,000) Census (1957)
Malays	13.3	15.0
Chinese	74.9	62.0
Indians	8.9	16.9
Penang		
Ethnic Group	(N=374) Sample	(N=234,000) Census (1957)
Malays	16.8	11.4
Chinese	67.4	72.9
Indians	13.9	13.6

FIGURE 1. Proportion of Voter Turnout by Level of Education



ever, when education is plotted against rates of voter turnout among Chinese in urban Malaya, an unexpected result occurs. Figure 1 reveals this surprising outcome. Figure 1 shows that participation generally declines, and significantly so, as level of education increases. This result for 261 Chinese in Kuala Lumpur and 241 in Penang is not consistent with the hypothesized relationship presented in Milbrath. That the result appears for both cities, although slightly more pronounced in Kuala Lumpur, suggests that this decreasing relationship is not due to the uniqueness of a given Malayan city, but is generally applicable to urban Chinese voting behavior in Malaya.

IV. DISCUSSION

The use of data collected in a transitional Asian society shows that the relationship between education and level of voter turnout differs from relationships previously reported in North American and Western European countries. One plausible explanation offered here is that increased levels of education among Chinese in urban Malaya lead to an awareness that one's vote is meaningless. I show elsewhere³

that Malayan Chinese have been systematically discriminated against, disfranchised or otherwise reduced to a low level of political efficacy. Briefly, that article shows that Malay members of Parliament passed a constitutional amendment which potentially increases Malay representation by reducing rural constituency size to half that of urban constituencies. This is significant because Malays comprise a majority of the rural population while the Chinese are the majority of the urban population. As a result, the Chinese are at a comparative disadvantage in State and Parliamentary elections. Furthermore, non-Malay opposition political power was eliminated by the suspension of several important Chinese controlled municipal councils on charges of malpractice by Malay dominated State governments. This argument suggests that the better educated Chinese is more likely to realize his electoral powerlessness and, hence, he is less likely to vote.

In the business of writing lawlike generalizations, one lesson is clear. Comparisons limited only to advanced industrial societies in the "West" may provide somewhat misleading conclusions. Efforts should be made to generalize on a generic phenomenon such as participation using a broader range of geographical data.

³ See "The Manipulation of Ethnic Politics in Malaya," *Polity*, forthcoming (March, 1970).

VOTING, OR A PRICE SYSTEM IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET STRUCTURE

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In this brief note it is demonstrated that if all the conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium are satisfied, then simple majority voting to determine the distribution of goods may be less efficient than a price system.

The argument here may be somewhat cryptic for those not familiar with the work of Anthony Downs.¹ A considerably more discursive presentation of the background material is given in "A Two Party System, General Equilibrium and the Voters' Paradox."² The tax and public goods aspect of the voting problem have been discussed elsewhere in "Notes on the Taxonomy of Problems Concerning Public Goods."³ The result presented here, nevertheless, stands by itself, hence is presented in this brief form.

¹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

² Martin Shubik, "A Two Party System, General Equilibrium and the Voters' Paradox," *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, 28 (1968), 341-354.

³ Martin Shubik, "Notes on the Taxonomy of Problems Concerning Public Goods," (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 208).

The political system is modeled at its simplest. We assume the existence of two players called "political parties." The goal of each player is to win an election by as large a vote as possible. A strategy for each player is to name a policy that it will carry out if it is elected. A policy is any point in the set of feasible distributions of final product. It follows immediately that, although any policy may be considered as a strategy, any non-Pareto optimal policies are dominated by some policy that is optimal. A discussion of the reasons for modeling a party in this simple manner is given in detail elsewhere. It is assumed that all voters are passive or "mechanistic," i.e., they do not form groups but merely vote individually, selecting optimally between the two policies offered.

Consider a three-person symmetric market. The three traders have initial endowments of $(a, 0, 0)$, $(0, a, 0)$ and $(0, 0, a)$. Each has the same differentiable utility function $\phi_1 = \phi_2 = \phi_3 = \phi(x, y, z)$. It is easy to check that in this case the unique price system will be $(1, 1, 1)$ and the final imputation to each will be $(a/3, a/3, a/3)$. The worth of this imputation is shown as the point E in Figure 1.




FIGURE 1

Suppose that instead of using a price system the society decided to adopt a simple majority voting procedure for the distribution of all goods. We must specify a condition concerning the protection of property rights of the minority. For simplicity we can either assume that any taxation up to confiscation of all possessions is sanctioned, or that any redistribution must satisfy conditions of individual rationality as defined by preferences and the distribution at the *status quo ante* the vote. For the purpose of the example we assume that any taxation is possible, hence an individual can end up with nothing. As is pointed out later, the result does not depend on this.

In Figure I, s_1 , s_2 , or s_3 could be obtained by a majority. They are not preferred to each other, yet one of them is preferred to any other policy that can be named. For example, suppose that the parties limited themselves to seven programs consisting of the three policies noted and the following four others E and $((e,f,g), (g,e,f), (f,g,e)), ((f,g,e), (e,f,g), (g,e,f)), ((g,e,f), (f,g,e), (e,f,g))$ where $e+f+g=a$. Suppose that $e>f>g>0$ and $f>a/3$. The resulting 7×7 matrix game is shown below (where 1 indicates a win by one vote, 0 a tie, and -1 a loss by one vote).⁴

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	0	0	0	-1	-1	1	1
2	0	0	0	-1	1	-1	1
3	0	0	0	1	-1	-1	1
4	1	1	-1	0	1	-1	1
5	1	-1	1	-1	0	1	1
6	-1	1	1	1	-1	0	1
7	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0

This game has a mixed strategy solution of $(0,0,0,1/3,1/3,1/3,0)$ for each party. As is to be expected, each names the same (mixed) strategy and each stands the same chance of winning the election.

A possible interpretation of the mixed

⁴ Two models can be considered, the first in which a party's goal is to win by as large a vote as possible, the second where its goal is just to win. In this example, the latter assumption appears to be the more reasonable.

strategy is that the majority rule emphasizes the diversity of interests—any majority wants to benefit by taxing the minority. As this situation is symmetric, the parties wish to appear to be all things to all men at the same time; hence, they mix their strategies over different nonsymmetric outcomes favoring different interest groups.⁵

The individual consumer obtains $1/3(\phi(e,f,g) + \phi(g,e,f) + \phi(f,g,e))$ from this policy. However, if he is risk-neutral or risk-averse, then from the assumption that he has a convex set of preferences $\phi(a/3, a/3, a/3) \geq 1/3(\phi(e,f,g) + \phi(g,e,f) + \phi(f,g,e))$. This is shown as the point F in Fig. 1. If his preference set is strictly convex, then the midpoint solution that is the outcome of the competitive market is strictly preferred to the outcome obtained through the voting procedure.

Had there been a limitation on taxation, the same result would hold with the modification that some of the more extreme policies which discriminate against minorities would be limited.

The result did not depend upon selecting a finite number of policies for the two parties to offer. If all points on the optimal surface are available, then the strategic problem of the parties becomes equivalent to that of a continuous Blotto game, which has been solved by Gross and Wagner.⁶ All of the solutions place a zero probability density on the center.

It might be thought that the result depends strictly upon the symmetry of the preferences of the voters. This is not the case. If they are risk-neutral or risk-averse, then whenever the "political noncooperative game" has no pure strategy solution, the result will not be Pareto optimal. Depending on the degree of symmetry and the level of risk aversion, the competitive

⁵ Kenneth Arrow has pointed out that one must distinguish between the two cases where (1) the parties announce their (mixed) strategies to the public, or (2) randomize first and announce the results of the randomization as their policies to the public. If we adopt the first interpretation, we may view the mixed strategy as being a "degree of belief" in the mind of the voter. He perceives some of the contradictions in the statements of the parties; hence he has only a tentative view of what their actions will be. In the second instance we assume that the parties polarize the issues for the voters. In the first case we must assume a cardinal utility scale for the voters who evaluate uncertain outcomes.

⁶ O. Gross and R. Wagner, *A Continuous Blotto Game* (The RAND Corporation, RM-408, June 17, 1950).

equilibrium point will lie above the expected value of the vote in a zone of the Pareto optimal surface such that everyone is better off at the competitive equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 2. V is the expected value of the outcome obtained by voting and E the competitive equilibrium. As long as E lies between V^I and V^{II} the result is true. This diagram was drawn for ease of exposition in two dimensions where P_1 and P_2 are the evaluations of Voters 1 and 2. The picture is basically the same for higher dimensions.

A possible interpretation of the general result is that if in some sense the original distribution of resources is regarded by the voters as more or less equitable or symmetric, the economic process keeps this property; whereas the political process introduces the possibility of considerable asymmetry as the majority takes from the minority. Without special laws to protect the minority and since anyone could be in the minority, all participants evaluate the expected worth of the mix of outcomes offered by the voting process as worse than the economic outcome.

In the continuous case the policies which are not used are those which give a single individual more than two-thirds of all of the gain. A coalition of the remaining two can always be effective against such an extreme division. The midpoint or even split is also ruled out because any two players can improve their lot by taking from the third.

This model is obviously highly unrealistic and restrictive. Nevertheless, the result is possibly instructive and has a useful interpreta-




FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3

tion. The outcome is Pareto optimal, but the expected outcome is not. The loss of efficiency appears to be related to the power struggle and the inherent favoring of a nonsymmetric solution by the majority in a political situation. The economic mechanism, *given* the initial distribution of resources is anonymous and egalitarian.

It must be stressed that usually a reason for using a voting system is that no price system exists. This is almost always the case when the production of public goods is called for.

APPENDIX

One of the solutions given by Gross and Wagner is:

Colonel Blotto might do the following: He plays a continuous density function p over the regular hexagon (of Fig. 3), i.e. if $d\sigma$ denotes an element of area at point x within this hexagon, the probability that he chooses a point within $d\sigma$ is given by $p(x)d\sigma$. The density function p is determined as follows: p is constant* on the perimeter of the hexagon, zero at the center, and linear along any straight line segment joining the center with an arbitrary point on the perimeter.

* Normalization reveals the value of this constant to be $9/4\sqrt{3}$.

COMMUNICATIONS.

TO THE EDITOR:

Barrington Moore, so the editor informed me, was to be provided with the opportunity to respond to my critique with an essay up to two thirds the length of my original article. He chose to limit his comments to slightly more than seven typewritten pages and to discuss only three (four?) of the many substantive issues raised, while taking considerable space to attack my brief concluding comments as to the possible underlying assumptions of his book. The editor has allowed me 700 to 800 words to conclude this exchange. While I know that I can rely upon his generosity, I will be as succinct as possible.

Moore is disturbed by my characterization of his intellectual development. I did assume that the remarks he quotes were autobiographical. I did not, however, call him a "fellow traveller," nor did I neglect to point out that his view of the Soviet experience was as negative as his view of gradualism. (I think he ascribes the use of the term "fellow traveller" to me for quite specific reasons, which I shall return to later.) I still think my interpretation is correct, for it reinforces my memory of classes of his which I attended in the early 1950's, in which he indicated what his sympathies had been earlier. (His remarks about books of his published in the 1950's are, therefore, without relevance.) However, the point is a very, very minor one and I shall not belabor it.

Moore rejects the appellation "neo-Marxist." I define what I mean by the term as applied to him quite precisely in terms of two propositions which I think underlie his analysis. If he does not like the term I will call him anything he wishes. I still think that I am correct, despite his "explicit disclaimers." The reader will have to judge for himself. Moore also denies that he used the expression "non-repressive society." I never asserted that he did. I did argue that his analysis, since he fails to distinguish among degrees of exploitation in the societies which he examines, and since he strongly implies that socialization into all past societies has been uniformly brutal (see the citations and quotes in my paper), only make sense if one assumes that this is his assumption. If I am wrong then many of the more pithy phrases he uses are mere rhetoric, and the book is a far less substantial work than I thought it was.

Moore also denies that he is critical of Max Weber. I never said that he was critical of all of Max Weber's work. I did assert that he was critical of Weber's belief in the autochthonous

causal efficacy of values, especially of religious values, and of Weber's emphasis on the role played by religious ideas in the development of European capitalism. Moore's sharp disagreement with this view and the view of those scholars (such as Robert Bellah) who start from a similar perspective is quite obvious in the book as a whole and on the pages I cite.

As to the substantive points: Moore claims that he never asserted that the Civil War was necessary if a coalition of northern business and southern Junkers was to be avoided. I refer readers to the chapter itself and to the whole thrust of the book, but let me quote some passages on the pages I cite, lest the issue be in doubt:

German experience suggests that, if the conflict between North and South had been compromised, the compromise would have been at the expense of the subsequent democratic development in the United States. (p. 115)

Such an alignment would have been of Northern industrialists and Southern planters against slaves, small farmers and industrial workers. This is no abstract phantasy. Quite a few forces pushed in this direction before the Civil War . . . any peaceful solution, any victory of moderation, good sense and the democratic process, would have had to be a reactionary solution. (pp. 131-132)

In the United States plantation slavery was an important aspect of capitalist growth. On the other hand, to put it mildly, this was an institution unfavorable to democracy. The Civil War overcame this obstacle, though only partially. (p. 421)

Second, Moore argues that our differing interpretations of Mary Wright's book are merely differing interpretations. Not so. It is perfectly proper for a scholar to draw supporting evidence from a book with a thesis contrary to his own. It is *not* legitimate for him to cite the book as supporting his thesis. Moore cites Wright as supporting his contention that, during the Restoration period, reform was blocked entirely by class interests. While Wright certainly does say that class interests played a role, she emphasizes cultural variables, as, for example: "Third, and most important, Restoration leaders did not spend much time thinking about commerce, not even about its evils. . . . Commerce was not worthy of systematic attention." (Wright, p. 170). Time and time again, Moore draws implications which are not legitimate from his sources. Indeed, in my essay, I did not cite all the instances which could be cited.

The adequacy of Moore's comparison of the role of the Chinese and Japanese gentry and my

critique readers will have to judge for themselves. His comment is too general and the issues too complex for an extended discussion here. I do stand corrected on one point. The word is "exploitative" not "exploitive." I shall never forgive my "helpers" for missing that one.

Moore's use of Beals (along with others) is designed to prove that large landlords in India exploit to the limits of their ability and are opposed to innovation. He rejects my citation as not to the point, and argues that, on the very same page I cite, Beals supports him. Let me quote in detail from the pages in question.

Landlords are the educated men of their villages, the innovators who introduce new agricultural techniques, the protectors who alone are capable of dealing with police officials and settling conflicts. . . Many villages have irrigation reservoirs, wells, schools, and other improvements because the landlords were able to influence government officials. Although people in Gopalpur would be delighted at an opportunity to divide their Gauda's property among themselves, the prospect of their being no Gauda whatsoever fills most people with dismay.

The desire of government officials to raise the status of jatis which have been condemned to follow the more menial and less remunerative occupations occasions even more doubts. A farmer cannot weed and harvest his crop without labor. If those who now serve as laborers are converted into farmers there will be no one to do the weeding and harvesting. . . . People in Gopalpur are told that they must stop discriminating against people in low-ranking jatis, but they are not told what to do in order to obtain the services formerly performed by them. (Beals, pp. 82-83)

As is quite clear from this quotation and a reading of Beal's book as a whole, not only do large landowners (Gaudas) perform services which are not simply in their self interest narrowly defined, but the views ascribed to large landowners by Moore are actually ascribed by Beals to "people in Gopalpur," i.e., the small farmers and shepherds who make up the bulk of the population.

Both Beals and I are for land reform and a shift in the structure of power. Neither of us (for I accept his analysis) believes that large landowners act purely or even primarily out of altruism. Indeed on page 78 Beals does point out that large landowners have no incentive to lend new brands of seed to those who borrow from them because they will gain no advantage from this and will be blamed if the seed fails.

This, however, is not the point. The point is that nowhere does Beals ever imply that the large landlords are merely interested in maxi-

mizing exploitation, or that the problems faced by India are merely or even primarily the result of exploitation. Rather, as he notes, the problems faced by Gopalpur and the difficulties of reform stem from the fact that: "The culture of Gopalpur is an organic whole; its religion and its social organization are adapted to the economic tasks traditionally carried out in the village." (Beals, p. 83).

One final point. I have, in the course of my academic writing, criticized other scholars in much the same vein that I have dealt with Moore's book. Some have responded, as does Moore, by questioning my craftsmanship (a legitimate ploy), but none has attacked my motives by implying that I was a member of the establishment attempting to stifle dissent by conducting what amounts to a "Congressional inquiry" masked by a "scholarly facade." This is an effort to dismiss a critic by accusation, because the expected academic reaction is one of horror and contempt. Thus it serves much the same function in the academic world that accusing a person of being a Communist did for segments of the non-academic world in the 1950's. This kind of "left-wing McCarthyism," to use I. F. Stone's phrase, has become increasingly common of late, and threatens to reduce the possibility of reasoned intellectual discourse.

It is hard to know how others will interpret the words one puts on paper. While I was sharply critical of Moore, I do not think that I suggested he was someone else's man or motivated by some secret destructive purpose. In short, I assumed his intellectual integrity. I regret that he has not been able to respond in kind.

Smith College

STANLEY ROTHMAN

TO THE EDITOR:

Simply to keep the record straight, I should like to comment on a minor (to most readers no doubt trivial) point in Professor Wolin's "Political Theory as a Vocation" (this REVIEW, December, 1969, pp. 1062-1082).

Professor Wolin remarks: "It is excusable that a decade ago a political scientist could contend that only a 'fanatic' would want to 'maximize' political equality and popular sovereignty at the expense of other values, such as leisure, privacy, consensus, stability, and status." Presumably because this egregious assertion is "excusable," Professor Wolin generously displayed forbearance in not citing the source, which is my *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956), pp. 50-51.

Because the needs of condensation and forceful prose have produced a one-sentence summary

that may cause many readers to misinterpret my argument—as quite possibly Professor Wolin himself has—I take the liberty of appending the fuller text. What I intended to say, and so far as I can read my own words accurately, what I did say, was that no one, except perhaps a fanatic, would *completely* sacrifice *all* other values to any two political goals, even two goals as lofty as political equality and popular sovereignty. In the interval since I wrote that book I have changed my mind about a great many things, but not about this. I cannot believe that Professor Wolin means to imply that he would himself sacrifice *all* other values to gain these two ends. For my part, happily, I have never run into anyone who by the testimony of his own life and activity demonstrated that he really meant to do so, and I am quite sure this applies to Professor Wolin also. Were I to encounter such a person, I think I would be justified in regarding him as a political fanatic, or at any rate as a person with an exceedingly narrow vision of the good society.

That some people sometimes write as if they would act in this way is to me only further evidence that political rhetoric invariably outruns political commitment.

Yale University

ROBERT A. DAHL

TO THE EDITOR:

My reason for not attributing the paraphrase to Professor Dahl was the one which he hints at. I was aware of recent statements which represent a change in his viewpoint, but I was not certain about the extent of the modifications. As the context makes clear, I thought it typified a widespread opinion. If he has been offended, I sincerely apologize.

The remainder of his letter raises issues which cannot be dealt with thoroughly in this forum. Perhaps a few observations are appropriate. First, although it is awkward to dispute claims based upon personal experience, which is why it is considered bad scientific and philosophic form to argue in this manner, Professor Dahl's formulation, that he has never encountered anyone who would sacrifice "*all* other values" to gain the values of political equality and popular sovereignty, leaves me puzzled on other grounds. Does "*completely* sacrifice" mean to destroy or wholly surrender something for something else so that the thing destroyed can never be sought as long as the preferred thing is still preferred? If so, then, of course, the fanatic does not exist who would "*completely* sacrifice all other values to any two political goals," because, at the very least, he would retain the value of life, i.e., he would devote time to eating and sleeping. Such a concept of a fanatic has been best described by

Professor Dahl's language: it "tells us nothing about the real world. From it we can predict no behavior whatsoever." (*Preface*, p. 51.) I doubt, therefore, that the concept is of much help in detecting the hypocrisy alleged to exist between "political rhetoric" and "political commitments." Perhaps this explains why, for the most part, Professor Dahl's fanatic in the *Preface* appears more pliant than the fanatic in his present communication. The latter seems rigid and obsessive ("*completely* sacrifice *all* other values"), the former more accommodating, unwilling to sacrifice completely, preferring to maximize, to calculate costs, and to accept incremental gains.

Perhaps Professor Dahl
has changed his mind after all.

Second, what interested me about the passage as a whole (*Preface*, pp. 50-51) was not the relative merits of fanatics and marginalists, but the way in which the problem was formulated and what was selected for contrast. It seemed revealing to me that the word "fanatic" should come to mind in the course of a contrast between two strongly political values (political equality and popular sovereignty) and an assortment of values associated primarily with social, private, or material matters ("leisure, privacy, consensus, stability, income, security, progress, status. . ."). There is a certain bland and unprovocative quality about each of these items and it requires some effort to imagine any of them arousing the passion associated with the dictionary definition of fanatic, "too great enthusiasm." A world may be congealed in the choice of a word. Accordingly, the formulation seemed to me to belong to the same family of assumptions which support a pluralistic, bargaining conception of society and to explain in some measure why many political scientists have not been particularly alarmed at the apathy of the American citizenry. It is the nature of "us marginalists" to characterize all political enthusiasts as fanatics or deviants.

Perhaps, as Professor Dahl notes, "most of us are marginalists" and perhaps "it is an observable fact that almost no one regards political equality and popular sovereignty as worth an unlimited sacrifice of these other goals," but it is also an observable fact that over the past decade a significant number of black leaders, draft resisters, and politically active students have acted, not as marginalists, but as marginal men determined to challenge the dominant assumption which identifies rationality with privacy, etc. and fanaticism with equality, etc. The Latin root of fanatic also means "inspired by a deity."

SHELDON S. WOLIN

*Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences*

TO THE EDITOR:

Let me add a third point of view to the two discussions of my book *Public Policymaking Reexamined* (this *Review*, September, 1969, pp. 915-921).

My basic disagreement with both reviewers concerns their frame of appreciation, which is "normal" political science. (I am using the terms "normal," "paradigm," and "scientific revolution" as proposed in *The Nature of Scientific Revolution* by Thomas S. Kuhn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.) My major endeavor is to try and work out a new paradigm of "policy sciences" to help face the major crisis of irrelevance for acute human concerns facing contemporary political science. The main concept expressing the essential concern of my book is *meta policy*, that is policy on how to make policy. My main claim is that meta policy is a critical variable in determining the quality of concrete policies, that meta policy can be studied, that meta policy can and must be improved, and that the study and improvement of meta policy should serve as the foci of a new interdisciplinary of policy sciences, based in part on a transformed political science. To accept the analogy used by the second reviewer, though not his conclusion, I think we must improve the "engine" of policymaking as such. Without minimizing the need for other approaches, I do think that a "policy science" paradigm is essential for increasing the contributions of knowledge and science to human affairs, and I try in my book to explore some of the new frameworks, concepts and theory needed for that purpose.

It is a pity that the reviewers did not squarely face my efforts in that direction. They take up implications of my approach rather than the approach itself. For instance, I agree that detailed application of my ideas to concrete policy areas will be necessary, but exploration and explication of new basic concepts and general theory must come first. For my purposes most available empiric studies of policymaking (however valuable from the point of view of "normal" political science) are indeed too narrow and lack a comprehensive theoretic foundation. (I am sorry, but I think the bibliographic essay at the end of the book, however selective and by now outdated, precludes the defense of "lack of familiarity" kindly suggested by the first reviewer.) To sharpen the differences between the first reviewer and myself: I reject the criterion whether my "proposals fit into the empirical literature . . . and prescribe a set of goals that are consistent with existing knowledge" (p. 916). The correct test of my approach should be whether it opens up promising vistas

for novel knowledge and action. To illustrate: From my reading of the new emerging paradigm of policy sciences, the "normal" conception of basic different roles of the academic and the practitioner (put forth by the first reviewer on p. 918) is unacceptable; instead, we must develop a new type of policy oriented scientific role, to be fulfilled by a new class of academics and based on innovative knowledge.

Evaluation by "normal science" is at least legitimate (by definition), though inappropriate, missing the main thrust of my book and failing to face issues of dominant importance for the future of political science and politics. What is completely unacceptable, even by the tenets of "normal political sciences," are failures to understand the elements of the book and misquotations in discussing them—as done by the second reviewer. To illustrate:

1. A major part of my book is devoted to evaluation and presents a set of operational secondary criteria correlated with net output and therefore helpful for evaluating policymaking and policymaking-improvement in terms of impacts on reality—indirectly, but in a useful and the only feasible way. The second reviewer fails to understand this structure, quoting three of the involved logical steps (on page 920), but ignoring the fourth and critical one: While net output can almost never be evaluated directly, *it can and should be reliably evaluated through an explicit set of secondary criteria.*

2. I agree that the title headings of some of my improvement suggestions are not exciting (not having been written for a mass audience newspaper). But each one of these titles opens a discussion of concrete proposals, with substantive contents, ignored by the reviewer. Typically, the one improvement suggestion regarded favorably by the second reviewer, namely redundancy, is presented by him as unprovable. This is a mistake, as the "fail safe" functions of redundancy can be proven even mathematically, as explained in the book (page 211 and note 11 there).

Let me conclude by presenting a scheme for the evaluation of book reviews, illustrating the distinction between primary and secondary criteria. It is up to the reader to judge, after examining my book, whether my parameters are correct.

YEHEZKEL DROR*

The RAND Corporation

* Any views expressed in this communication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

SIMPLIFIED SCHEME FOR EVALUATION OF BOOK REVIEWS
(Applied to the reviews of *Public Policymaking Reexamined*)

PRIMARY CRITERION	<i>Review One</i>	<i>Review Two</i>
Extent of help to reader in deciding whether to read a book and how to read a book; extent of help to author to improve his thinking	Note: This primary criterion is difficult to use. Therefore, a set of secondary criteria must also be used, which should satisfy two conditions: (1) They are correlated with the primary criterion; (2) They are operational.	
SECONDARY CRITERIA	<i>Review One</i>	<i>Review Two</i>
Book has been closely studied by reviewer	Yes, with exception of Bibliographic Essay	Doubtful
Book evaluated in terms of normal science or (when applicable) new paradigms	Normal Science	Normal Science
Review shows understanding of the book and its main argumentation	Narrow Understanding	Parts Yes Parts No
Review provides correct summary of main ideas	Partly	No
Review deals with overall <i>Gestalt</i> of the book, in addition to particular elements	No	No
Review provides intelligent discussion of particular elements of book	Yes, within a conservative frame of appreciation	No
Review avoids mala fides and personal hostility	Yes	Yes
Review avoids misleading and out-of-context quotations	Yes	No
Review avoids misleading side remarks and innuendos	No	Yes
Review avoids main preoccupation with the reviewer's own pet subjects	Yes	Yes
Overall evaluation in terms of cluster of secondary criteria	Fair, within the framework of a traditional approach; fails to consider challenge of new paradigms	Sub-standard

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS

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BOOK REVIEWS

Politicheskaiia nauka v SShA: Kritika burzhuannykh kontsepsii vlasti. (Political Science in the USA: A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of Power). BY VALERII GEORGIEVICH KALENSKII. (Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia literatura, 1969. Pp. 103.)

When Soviet scholars began to conduct empirical sociological research at the beginning of the 1960's (for the first time in three decades), they devoted their first monographs to criticism of Western "bourgeois" sociology.¹ Now in 1969, when the birthpangs of political science are being felt (simultaneously with the founding of the section for the study of social-political phenomena at the new Institute of Concrete Sociological Research in Moscow), there has appeared in print the first serious Soviet study of American political science. Like his predecessors in sociology, Kalenskii aims not only at providing information about areas of inquiry and methodologies current in the West, but also at helping to legitimate the new area of study in the U.S.S.R. by demonstrating its potential contribution to the ideological struggle with the West.

In a relatively short survey Kalenskii succeeds in communicating a great deal about American political research today and about its intellectual origins. He combines both focus and breadth in his pithy restatements of the main ideas and findings of the literature he discusses. Given the difficulty in obtaining Western publications in the Soviet Union, I find impressive Kalenskii's choice of important and representative examples of the ideas he discusses.

The book consists of three long chapters and a conclusion—one chapter on the origins and history of American political science, especially the growth of behavioralism; a second chapter on the concept of power, interest group theory, pluralism and elites; and a third chapter on political socialization and participation, political culture, legitimacy and alienation. A list of authors whose works are discussed in detail includes: Merriam, Lasswell, Easton, Bentley,

Truman, Schattschneider, Hunter, Dahl, Mills, Lane, Kornhauser, Lipset, Almond, Verba, Mathews, and Murphy.

In the tradition of the sociology of knowledge Kalenskii explains the rise of political behavioralism in terms of changes in the social environment. Like Western analysts (e.g. Eckstein) Kalenskii asserts that the disintegration of European democracies into fascist regimes and the consequent development of elitist political theories stimulated empirical study of American democracy (p. 9); also, that the replacement of "traditional American isolationism" by "the unprecedented foreign policy expansion of American imperialism, actively interfering in international political life" (p. 20) (it might have been put more delicately) stimulated sociological analysis of the international political situation and the political systems of foreign countries.

A sociology of knowledge approach also influences Kalenskii's critique of American political science. Usually, he judges the underlying value biases or normative assumptions of the social scientist, as evidenced in his research or in his reaction to the results of his research. Rarely does Kalenskii consider a work on its own grounds, by examining the accuracy of the research or the appropriateness of the conclusions. (The main internal criticisms deal with semantic or conceptual problems, such as Easton's blurring of the difference between social and political power (p. 27) and Lipset's somewhat strained attempt to distinguish between political science and political sociology (p. 14)). In short, the critique is primarily ideological.

Ideological critique is often useful in delving behind research and providing a larger perspective from which to view it. When exaggerated, however, such critique leads to simplicity, dogmatism and distortion. Kalenskii's ideological critique of American political science consists both of the constructive and the exaggerated varieties. For example, the author rightly points to the primary concern of Almond and Verba (in *The Civic Culture*) (p. 82) and of David Truman (in *The Governmental Process*) (p. 35) for the stability of the democratic polity; to the general bias of functional analysis in this direction; and to the classic approval of political apathy by Berelson *et al.* in one of the early voting studies. (p. 67). Yet, after describing in detail Donald Mathews' *U.S. Senators and Their World*, "a very serious positivistic analysis of the problem of leadership," Kalenskii condemns the author for failing to criticize his finding of a predominance in the Senate of men from middle

¹ See G. N. Osipov, *Sovremennaia burzhuannaia sotsiologiia—kriticheskii ocherk* (Moscow, 1964); G. M. Andreeva, *Sovremennaia burzhuannaia empiricheskaiia sotsiologiia—kriticheskii ocherk* (Moscow, 1965); I. S. Kon, *Positivizm v sotsiologii; istoricheskii ocherk* (Leningrad, 1964); F. M. Reshetnikov, *Sovremennaia amerikanskaia kriminologiia* (Moscow, 1965); Iu. Zamoshkin, *Krizis burzhuanzno individualizma i lichnosti; sotsiologicheskii analiz nekotorykh tendentsii v obshchestvennoi psikhologii SShA* (Moscow, 1966).

or upper middle class origin. (p. 59). In the case of Richard Merelman's article on the use of symbols in political legitimation, Kalenskii sees only dangerous manipulation; "this recommendation of speculation on democratic slogans is a clear illustration of an approach to problems of political life so characteristic of contemporary positivistic American political science, which pretends at objectivity and ideological neutrality. The narrow class basis and apologetic nature of such recommendations is completely obvious." (p. 79).

Fixation on ideological critique leads at best to a valid but narrow kind of criticism which omits such important evaluative considerations as the fit with reality, so appropriate in dealing with *empirical* theory. In the Soviet context, however, critique of this kind has the advantage that by focusing on the researcher rather than the research itself, it leaves open the possibility of similar research being carried out in the USSR, albeit in a different spirit! And indeed, the research least scathed by Kalenskii is the highly empirical work (e.g. Matthews, Lipset, Murphy) most akin to research presently feasible in the U.S.S.R. Just as empirical research without accompanying middle level propositions has been characteristic of the first decade of "concrete sociological research,"² so the first genuine political science research is highly empirical. Typical is the research conducted recently by the sociological laboratory of the Institute of State and Law on the activities of deputies to local soviets.³ In the near future one may expect other studies of relatively powerless institutions, those whose concerns are with primarily symbolic functions or local regulatory ones; and perhaps, studies of leadership or decision-making in social and economic institutions.

In his study Valerii Georgievich all but explicitly welcomes political research in the Soviet Union. It is not accidental that he stresses the role of the "natural process of integration and differentiation characteristic in the development of science" in the emergence of political research in the USA and then draws an analogy with two fields of social science which have only recently been established in the USSR, criminology and management science. (p. 4) In addition, Kalen-

sii emphasizes the usefulness of political science research to American political leaders (p. 61); by implication it could help Soviet leaders as well. Furthermore, Kalenskii states that "many facts of political reality brought to light in the course of empirical research can and must be used by Marxist scholars studying the political organization of capitalist society." (p. 98).

From a Western point of view Kalenskii has offered no original criticisms—his most valid and interesting ones Western scholars have offered before. Appropriately, Valerii Georgievich ends the book by citing the perceptive critical articles of Christian Bay and Jack Walker which appeared on the pages of this journal (APSR, March 1965 and June 1966) (p. 101). He has succeeded, however, in providing the Soviet reader with a clear picture of the range of American political science and of its main issues and ideas, at least in the area of democratic politics. This is no mean accomplishment.

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Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy. BY DAVID EASTON AND JACK DENNIS. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. Pp. 440. \$9.75.)

This is the second major volume to come out of the "Chicago" study of political socialization among elementary school children. The first volume (Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, noted in this *Review*, December, 1968) was written more from the point of view of the psychology of child development. In the present volume Easton and Dennis analyze the same data from a political science perspective, and particularly from the viewpoint of systems analysis.

The empirical base for the book is over 12,000 questionnaires filled out by children in grades 2-8 in eight cities across the United States. The analysis is limited by the inclusion of only white, urban children and by the single time period covered. These limitations are undoubtedly excusable in an initial study, however, and while not avoiding generalizations, the authors extend their findings with considerable care.

The focus of the book is exclusively on children's views of political authority—primarily the President and policeman, but also including less obvious personalities (the average Senator), institutions (Congress and the Supreme Court) and more abstract objects (government). These objects are studied for their visibility and salience to children, and for the children's cognitive and affective images of them. The chief findings

² See especially the critique of early sociological studies by V. A. Iadov, "Rol metodologii v opredelenii metodov i tekhniki konkretnogo sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia," *Voprosy filosofii*, 1966, No. 10.

³ "Effektivnost deputatskoi deiatelnosti (Opyt konkretnogo sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia na materialakh Armianskoi SSR)," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1969, No. 1.

are conveniently summed up by the authors under four headings (pp. 391-2): politicization, personalization, idealization, and institutionalization. Politicization refers to the fact that young children learn to distinguish between family authority and a power external to and superior to the family. Personalization means that children become aware of political authority first and most easily via contacts with individuals. This leads to the "head and tail" effect, wherein youngsters learn first about the extremes of President and policeman. Idealization of authority occurs early in life, as political figures are viewed as extraordinarily benign. This halo, of course, wears off as children progress through the elementary grades. Finally, institutionalization refers to the process of shifting one's attention and affection from individuals to political institutions.

For each of these features of early socialization, Easton and Dennis discuss in detail the implications for the political system. It is interesting in this connection that they conclude that three of the four fundamental processes are probably universal among "persistent" (carefully distinguished from "stable") political systems. Politicization, personalization, and institutionalization are features of socialization nearly everywhere, but "hostilization" may occur when the government is not perceived as benevolent.

Most of the book is concerned with aggregate response patterns and changes over the grade school years. In two chapters, however, an interesting but mostly unsuccessful attempt is made to find predictors of the children's images of authority. A multivariate analysis in Chapter 17 shows grade, city, partisanship, and religion to be among the best predictors of children's feelings. But in all cases the relationships are very weak. Some minimal support is also found for the psychoanalytic hypothesis that ratings of political authorities are transferred from comparable ratings of the father. The reason for their limited findings is not at all obvious, but one wonders whether it is in large part due to the fairly low stability of children's responses (reported in Hess and Torney, pp. 238-40).

The book's chief virtue lies in relating the findings about early socialization to the persistence and stability of political systems. That this is done expertly, there can be little doubt. However, whether the work contributes to the enhancement of political theory, as the authors wish, is partly dependent on how one judges systems analysis. Regardless of one's view of that approach, a positive feature is the emphasis on change as well as stability of political systems. This is done not only by arguing that systems

analysis is not bound to the status quo. Rather, adult ratings of policemen are specifically introduced to show at what age individuals are most likely to contribute to change in the political system. (The findings point to the early adult years.) In addition, the term "hostilization" is coined in order to emphasize the non-universal nature of American children's positive views of authority and to stress the possible impact of alternative affective images.

Another positive feature of the book is that the authors avoid the notable pitfalls of the Hess and Torney volume. It is made clear, for example, that however much change takes place during the elementary school years, socialization continues on into the adult life-span. In fact, for some orientations, socialization may just be beginning at adolescence. Similarly, the unwarranted judgment of the primacy of the school is absent in the Easton-Dennis work. However, perhaps to avoid this problem, teacher's responses are often left out, even though with careful interpretation they can be quite useful.

A possible defect is the book's narrow focus on "system politics," which prohibits the inclusion of data on participation, partisanship, party differences, voting, etc. Ordinarily this defect might be more critical. Here it means that the Hess and Torney volume must be looked at as complementary. In particular, the material in Chapter 4 of that book helps expand on the subject matter of the present work. Moreover, on the basis of Hess and Torney's findings in their Chapter 7, it would be interesting to see the results of Easton and Dennis' multivariate analysis on topics other than images of the President and policeman.

Another unavoidable drawback of the book is that much of the data now seems redundant. After reading Hess and Torney, Greenstein, and various articles by Easton and Hess, the findings will not surprise anyone. Perhaps because of this, the book seems overly long in many places. For a similar reason, particularly the overlap with Easton's other writings, the first hundred pages seem excessively drawn out. The book is at its best in the later chapters when data on adult views of authority are added, the multivariate analysis is undertaken, and "cross-system" implications are considered.

An omission which might have added some freshness to the analysis is to see whether some children are ignorant and/or alienated about most objects of political authority while others are knowledgeable or positive about nearly all objects. It is argued in Chapter 13 that there are multiple "open doors" through which children can become aware of and supportive of po-

litical authority. But nowhere is it seen whether children's views of one political authority are correlated with perceptions of other political figures. This could happen, of course, even when the aggregate responses about authorities are rather different. Along the same lines, the relationship between cognitive and affective images could be explored empirically. The aggregate development suggests that the more knowledgeable students become about politics, the less ideally they picture it. Does this occur at an individual level within each grade? Or do greater knowledge and less idealization covary simply because they are both functions of age and experience?

In spite of these criticisms, the Easton-Dennis book helps round out the reporting of the Chicago study by tying in the findings on early socialization to the development of support for political authority. In doing so, it has gone further than most studies in discussing the implications of empirical work for the functioning of political systems.

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Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. EDITED BY HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM AND TED ROBERT GURR. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. 2 vols. Pp. 644. \$1.25 each.)

This Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence contains twenty-three papers on various aspects of violence by historians, humanists, and social scientists. The papers are grouped under nine general topics, including historical and comparative accounts of violence in Europe and America; the effects of immigration, the frontier, class, and race as factors contributing to violence in America; characteristics of crime in the United States; patterns of domestic and international strife; the process of rebellion; and ecological and anthropological perspectives. Two basic conclusions emerge: first, violence is a common recurring condition in all parts of the world, during all periods of history, at all stages of social development; and second, no coherent analytic framework exists within which the causes, processes, or consequences of violence can be understood or even systematically described.

The belief that violence is a pathology has a profound hold upon us. Biblical prophecies of a harmonious golden age; the Platonic ideal of a strife-free Republic; the myth of an idyllic state of nature; utopian visions of co-operative communities; the Marxian prophecy of a society

without coercion—all attest to a deep repudiation of violence as a form of behavior. Yet a major theme throughout this Report is that violence has been endemic in human history: the past is ridden with violence; we are surrounded by violence in the present; and the future holds promise of even greater violence. As Charles Tilly puts it: "The nature of violence and the nature of society are intimately related. Collective violence is normal."

We also view violence through a selective historical memory which distorts our understanding. There is a widespread tendency to deny the occurrence of violence, to suppress our knowledge of it. The past appears more peaceful than it was and present acts of violence seem ever surprising. To quote Tilly again: "The collective memory machine has a tremendous capacity for destruction of the facts." No less than moral repudiation of violence this distorted perception impedes attempts to study and explain violence.

Granted that resort to violence is a central fact of human history, what have been its overall effects or consequences? Several authors struggle valiantly with this question. They conclude that violence can have both good and bad effects; its consequences have been both positive and negative. In the words of historian Richard Maxwell Brown: negative violence is "in no direct way connected with any socially or historically constructive development," while positive violence is associated with "popular and constructive movement." But how can we tell positive violence from negative? Unfortunately, there is no clear basis upon which to distinguish the positive effects of violence from the negative. Brown himself includes urban riots as negative violence and agrarian uprisings as positive: surely too much depends on how one understands and appraises the particular causes at issue and the outcomes. This difficulty in evaluating types of violence confounds all who try to make such judgments. It seems easy to concede that violence can have positive effects—after all, the nation itself was born in revolution—but it is impossible to find a basis for evaluating the acts of violence around us.

Although the authors of the Report agree that resort to violence is a pervasive fact of social life, they show far less agreement on how violence should be studied. Differences in analytical approach are not simply a reflection of different disciplines: the approaches are more varied than disciplinary divisions would suggest. Even definitions of the subject vary. Some authors consider in their analysis only actions that inflict death or injury, while others include acts of "turmoil," such as strikes, demonstrations, and

other peaceful collective behavior. Beyond these definitional differences, the studies also differ in other basic ways: in the levels of generality at which they approach the subject; the types of variables they stress as critical; the time-spans they adopt; and the kinds of evidence upon which they rely.

Levels of generality range from a medical psychiatrist's universal propositions about human nature to historians' accounts of episodes on the American frontier. The most convincing studies approach violence as a social condition which can be explained in general terms but which is at the same time related to particular circumstances. Two especially successful examples of this mingling of general and particular factors are sociologist Charles Tilly's "Collective Violence in European Perspective" and historian Sheldon Hackney's "Southern Violence." Tilly shows how different forms of violence accompany transitional and modern social and political conditions in Europe. Hackney attempts to explain the exceptionally high levels of violence in the South with several socio-economic variables, and concludes that psycho-cultural factors peculiar to that region must be taken into account.

A large section of the Report is devoted to two studies, one by Ted Gurr and the other by Ivo Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend and Betty Nesvold. Both chapters are based on cross-national aggregate data analysis of the recent past. Gurr's study offers a general description of violence in the world from 1961 to 1965 and then turns to correlational analysis of the conditions of violence. Gurr faces serious difficulty in converting available quantitative data into convincing indicators of the theoretical variables he hopes to relate to violence.

One unavoidable conclusion is that we must have better measures of numerous independent variables before we begin accepting or rejecting hypotheses. As in his earlier work, Gurr's handling of quantitative material and analysis is sophisticated and insightful.

Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold face all Gurr's data problems plus those associated with a longer time period, 1948 to 1965, and overtime analysis. They recognize that most of the interesting hypotheses about violence are dynamic and require overtime data for testing or description. Although change variables are utilized, the analytic framework remains cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. It is clear that more refined data for longer periods of time are needed to do justice to the middle range theorizing we already have. Without such data it is hard to see how present theory about violence will be improved.

Other political scientists who contributed to the Report are Raymond Tanter, James Davies, and Edward Gude. Tanter investigates the relationship between escalation in Vietnam and forms of domestic violence and turmoil in the United States. He concludes that no relationship between the two conditions can be found for the period 1965-68. Davies attempts to account for instances of rebellion and revolution in terms of the frustration that accompanies rising expectations and decreasing gratifications. Gude examines factors associated with violence under Batista and Betancourt.

The Report is intended as background analysis for recommendations on national policies to prevent violence. Ordinarily we would not ask with respect to a collection of scholarly papers, Are they useful to policy-makers and advisors? But in this case the question seems more appropriate, even though the authors appear not to have become particularly concerned about the policy relevance and implications of their analysis. What can a policy-advisor draw on from the Report?

The policy-advisor can stress, first, that violence is a common condition in all types of societies, including modern industrialized societies. Second, although the incidence and forms of violence are related to general social conditions, distinctive factors in American history and society make us as a nation especially prone to individual and collective violence. Third, the effects of violence are not always negative, but no clear basis exists for determining what the effects of given acts of violence will be. Fourth, no widely-accepted explanation for the causes and patterns of violence is yet available, although several studies in the Report indicate that progress along these lines is possible. So far as the United States is concerned, the Report supports these propositions: given the social, economic and political conditions in the United States severe violence such as revolution and internal war is extremely unlikely; moreover, given these same conditions, even the relatively mild riots and demonstrations of the 1960's must be regarded as unexpected. Actually, much of the Report is deviant case analysis of regions of the United States and of particular forms of violence. All of which adds up, no doubt, to a plea for more research—a comforting conclusion perhaps for the scholar but less satisfactory for the policy-maker.

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Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean. BY GORDON K. LEWIS. (London: Merlin Press, 1964. Pp. 622. \$10.00.)

Modernization of Puerto Rico: A Political Study of Changing Values and Institutions. By HENRY WELLS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 440. \$9.95.)

Puerto Rico has quite correctly attracted the attention of these two sensitive and erudite scholars to explain its political peculiarities. The Puerto Rican experience has special relevance for the Caribbean in particular, and for students of Comparative Politics generally.

All aspects of the island's political life are usually considered as unique or peculiar: its constitutional status, its culture, and the pattern of political leadership and organisation. These apparent peculiarities have not surprisingly led to two separate and widely differing interpretations in the volumes under review. Henry Wells presents us with a case study which is sympathetic to the efforts of the United States to transform a turgid Spanish-American culture into a dynamic Anglo-Saxon polity. Gordon Lewis, by contrast, is wary of this Americanization and explains Puerto Rico's difficulties as being directly a by-product of American control.

For Caribbean scholars, the Puerto Rican phenomenon has always proved somewhat puzzling, and these two case studies will go a long way in providing some of the answers. To begin with, they tell us a great deal about the efforts of the Puerto Ricans to transform their society. However, for those Caribbean states which have glibly assumed that the Puerto Rican experience can be easily emulated, these studies should raise some serious doubts about the desirability or the possibility of adopting the Puerto Rican model. Lewis and others have pointed out clearly some of the political consequences of following the pattern of what New World economists like Lloyd Best have called "industrialization by invitation." These studies indicate that this pattern may not necessarily be a solution for the twin problems of economic development and political stability.

Henry Wells, following the recent literature on political modernization, has attempted to look at the Puerto Rican experience as a case study in modernization. Some of us, and particularly those of us living in Third World countries, have raised some doubts about the use of this category, especially the normative content implicit in the doctrine as used by the apostles of modernization. Inkeles and Weiner in particular have not convinced us that modernization is not just another word for Americanization. With Gordon Lewis, we must query whether these analytical categories, especially the distinction between traditional and modern societies is indeed valid.

Apart from considerations of the theoretical

validity of this concept in general, Puerto Rico, in common with other Caribbean societies, does not possess the characteristics which we normally associate with the traditionalist societies of Asia and Africa. Morse in another context has raised the whole question of whether New World societies do not present us with a special case that requires new analytical categories. Those of us in the area, especially the New World economists, have found it much more fruitful to use such concepts as the plantation system as the point of departure rather than the categories of traditional or transitional systems. Wells, unfortunately, has applied somewhat naively the notions of traditional society from the students of Afro-Asian politics, and has not taken account of the very special conditions that have created the Latin-American and Caribbean plantation societies.

Silvert, along with Morse, have long warned us of the dangers of including Latin America in the body of theory that has been built up about underdeveloped areas. It may be that Wells would have done better if he had left the theoretical baggage of structure-functional theory at home before he looked at the political experience of Puerto Rico.

One of the major dilemmas that both Lewis and Wells attempt to come to terms with is what the effects of this experiment have had on the Puerto Rican male personality. Wells is optimistic about the stability of the Puerto Rican personality, concluding that there has been a transformation from a submissive personality to a more rational one. Lewis, on the other hand, sees the continuance of docility and submissiveness, which is a cover for rage and anger. Elsewhere I have commented on the nature of the colonial personality, especially in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Superficially, we appear to have a special problem in that the Puerto Rican is neither a colonial nor a free man. He seems to live in a perpetual world of ambivalence, which places him in a special love/hate relationship with the United States. However, if Gordon Lewis is correct in his assessment of the Puerto Rican personality structure, it is very close indeed to that of the formally colonized individual which is also characterized by a high degree of authoritarianism.

It was Munoz Marin who fully understood this phenomenon. This remarkable political personality still awaits a good biographer. He is within the tradition of Caribbean political leaders who fully appreciate the function of a colonial leader as a bargainer or rather as a middle man between his masters and his people. Robert Anderson in his book "Party Politics in Puerto Rico" has already described for us in full detail

his remarkable capacity to manipulate the electoral system and thus maintain political control for a decade. Anderson demonstrated how Munoz institutionalized his power base, transformed his party organization and related his party to government; thus offering us a structural explanation for the rise and the continued existence of the whole Munoz regime. He avoided the easy psychological explanations offered by Wells and at the same time also avoided Gordon Lewis' aversion to everything American.

The usual question that is asked by those who study politics dominated by a single personality is "after Munoz, what or who"? Munoz was certainly unsuccessful in trying to create a personality to take over where he left off. However, the real question is not "after Munoz, what or who"? but rather the capacity of a system to decrease its dependence on a single leader and simultaneously the capacity of a party system to adapt itself to the new situation. The capacity for a political system to guarantee a successful transfer of power is what is normally associated with the term stability. Since Anderson examined the question in its structural setting he has come closer than the others in predicting the outcome of the most recent developments in Puerto Rican politics.

Puerto Rico may well be entering a new stage in its politics that may prove to be quite similar to what has taken place or is beginning to emerge in other parts of the Caribbean. One detects the emergence of a new kind of politics in the area where personalism may be giving way to the political managers who are capable of controlling the electoral machine either through gerrymandering and/or creating a party oligarchy. Concomitantly, however, when machine politics of this variety develops, and at the same time the basic economic problems of the society do not improve for large numbers of the populace, there is growing disenchantment of the youth and the unemployed with bureaucratic politics, and a growing cynicism towards the political system. However, as the political system has become more entrenched the elites become increasingly tense about the maintenance of the system and thus respond in a repressive way.

There appears to be a growing feeling in the region that political independence has not secured psychological decolonization and that this will not be achieved until there is economic independence and structural reform of the economic system.

These two recent works have contributed considerably to our understanding of some of the Puerto Rican "peculiarities." The time may be

soon approaching when a more systematic comparative study of Caribbean politics will be forthcoming. This prospect appears more assured now that we have a number of case studies appearing with some regularity. It is only comparison with other Caribbean states with similar economies and social structures that will tell us whether the Puerto Rican experience has been unique. I don't think so.

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The Study of Policy Formation. EDITED BY RAYMOND A. BAUER AND KENNETH J. GERGEN. (New York: The Free Press, 1968. Pp. 392. \$9.95.)

This is a landmark book in the study of public policymaking in the United States. Bringing together nine papers on the study of policymaking, the book surveys available knowledge, presents normative models, explores research methods, poses missions for the future, and provides concrete policy cases.

In the first chapter, the senior editor presents a general framework for the study of policymaking, and for the book. "Policy" being defined as "strategic moves that direct an organization's critical resources toward perceived opportunities in a changing environment" (p. 2), the study of policymaking should be concerned simultaneously with: (1) intellectual "decision-making" activities; (2) social-organizational policy-implementation processes; and (3) the dynamics of feedback and environmental change leading to policy revisions. Recognizing the limitations of available behavioral and normative models, Bauer proposes to study policy formation by fusing a social process view with a decisionmaking orientation, and puts forth a multi-dimensional research strategy, moving from systems survey and leverage points mapping to intense study of individual senior decision-making.

The next three chapters are devoted to surveys of available knowledge. Richard Zeckhauser and Elmer Shaefer provide a concise, inclusive and readable discussion of normative economic theory applications to public policy. The survey is innovative, for instance, in explicating its value assumptions, in discussing the costs of information and of flexibility, and in dealing with redistribution benefits in addition to efficiency benefits. Joseph L. Bower presents an excellent discussion of organizational and group decision theory, with an original emphasis on the ability to improve performance rather than achieve a rigorous behavioral theory. Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle (the only political scientist among the ten authors) concludes the state-of-

the-art surveys with an analysis of political science contributions, which is somewhat outdated—probably because of technical reasons.

The next two chapters by Kenneth J. Gergen deal with policymaking study methodologies. First, Gergen provides a three-dimensional model for the identification of leverage points, to be mapped by issue relevance, personal efficiency, and policy sub-phase. With the help of a variety of survey techniques, individuals are to be classified in terms of this model—individuals being regarded by Gergen (who is a psychologist) as the most important sub-unit of the policymaking system. The second methodological chapter provides an elementary discussion of basic research methods, which is perhaps out of place in the book as a whole, but which includes some important observations on the highly neglected study of individual high-leverage decisionmakers.

The case studies concluding the book deal with urban mass transportation (by Lewis M. Schneider), with technology transfer from NASA to the civil economy (by Edward E. Furash) and with decisionmaking on foreign aid (by Theodore Geiger and Roger D. Hansen). Quite interesting by themselves and rounding out the book as a reflection of the contemporary study of policymaking, there is nevertheless little internal relation between these descriptive chapters and the rest of the book: The theoretic concepts and methodological recommendations of the first six chapters are not really utilized in the case studies, and the data presented in the last chapters is not relied upon in the first part of the book. This is a weakness; but I think this weakness serves to illuminate the state of study of policymaking till very recently.

I started this review by calling this book a landmark. It is indeed a landmark in presenting most of what is known now and in indicating some of the needs for the future. Most of the book's weaknesses are faults of the contemporary study of policymaking—which cannot but break through despite the efforts of the editors. Two such main weaknesses are the tendency towards micro research and reductionism; and ambivalence on the relations between behavioral and normative approaches.

(1) Most parts of the book follow micro and reductionistic approaches to the study of policymaking, in which main emphasis is put on instances of incremental policymaking within a slowly changing situation. Social movements, aggressive ideologies, radical changes in conditions, survival issues, needs for far-going innovations—all these phenomena, which by now are no longer strangers to the United States, cannot be perceived, analyzed and dealt with by the

frameworks, models and methods available in the present study of policymaking as reflected in the book. Especially surprising in 1968, and nevertheless typical, is the statement by Schoettl that “dramatic breaks with the past such as the atomic bomb, or the space program . . . can be treated as *random disturbances* in the otherwise stable and incremental policy-making process, only *momentarily* producing a fluctuation in the old patterns of policymaking which quickly reassert themselves” (p. 119, emphasis added). It is such jumps which shape the whole policy-space and should be among the foci for study and improvement. But in order to deal with such happenings, policymaking must be regarded as a complex systems phenomena, with emphasis on the study and evaluation of the policymaking system as a whole and development of models for the improvement of meta-policy (that is, policies on how to make policies), including policymaking system redesign. And such an approach needs more than empiric study of micro situations, incrementalism and economic model building.

(2) The strong desire of Bauer and some of the contributors to help in meeting the urgent needs of policymaking improvement are chained by the above mentioned limits of contemporary behavioral research methods on one hand and the narrow domain of available normative models on the other hand. Bauer, seeing this dilemma, expresses high hopes for long-range improvements of practice while recognizing that all that the practitioners at best can get out from available knowledge “is . . . to deepen his comprehension of the range of problems with which he is accustomed to deal and thereby to help him to invent better solutions of his own” (p. 5). How to change our behavioral study of policymaking and how to develop new normative models for improving policymaking—these are questions posed by Bauer but not taken up in the other chapters of the book. Indeed, even some of the already available more relevant ideas—such as policy impact evaluation, explicit post factum and real time social experimentation, sequential decision models, alternatives futures construction and strategic analysis methods—are not mentioned in the book, neither as theoretic frameworks for innovative behavioral research nor as approaches to policymaking and metapolicymaking improvement.

Even though there is only one political scientist among the ten authors (or, a cynic may say, because of that fact), this book should be carefully studied by the increasing number of political scientists worrying about how little our discipline has to contribute to better policymaking. Learning from the richness of what is included

and its inadequacies, we still stand a chance of building up policy sciences—if we are ready to make the necessary jumps in our own concepts, methods and traditions. This book indicates that if political scientists lag behind, there is reason to hope that the necessary job may nevertheless be done by others.

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The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization. By HARRY HOLLOWAY. (New York: Random House, 1969. Pp. 374. \$8.95.)

Professor Holloway departs from the tradition of V. O. Key, Jr. and Prothro and Matthews in this study of Southern politics. The *Politics of the Southern Negro* is a straightforward narrative account of the politics of the region, and includes not a single chart or table. And though the book is replete with insightful observations about politics in the South, its methodological shortcomings, lack of an explicit comparative framework, and inadequate conception of political change, greatly restrict its value for the serious student of the Negro and politics in the South.

The author is well aware of the limitations of his work. At the outset, for example, he concedes that his method of gathering data for the study was inadequate. The primary source of data for the *Politics of the Southern Negro* was interviews which the author held with 200 Southerners, black and white, in the communities he studied. As a Northern white, in an alien setting, he found that his "main problems were interview bias and inaccurate or hazy factual information." We should not exaggerate our eyebrow raising about Holloway's procedure, however; for we recall that, in 1964, when much of the data for the book was gathered, even the Survey Research Center at Michigan had only recently become aware of the dubious validity of white-to-black interviews.

The essential problem that Holloway is dealing with in this study is how to account for political change and development among Negroes in the South, though he does not state the problem this way. His approach to the problem is to conceptualize the South as a "modernizing traditional society," and, within this framework, to analyze the political behavior of blacks on a continuum from the extremely traditional soci-

ety (e.g., Mississippi) to the modern society (e.g., Atlanta). At the same time, he attempts to apply the ethnic group formulations of Lane and Dahl to the political behavior of blacks in these communities. (His conclusion about the applicability of these formulations to the black experience is not unambiguous. Nevertheless, he does seem to feel that the black situation cannot be analyzed in traditional ethnic group terms because "no other group has come from such low status and had to battle so hard to win even a modicum of the rights taken for granted by other Americans.")

Professor Holloway offers us no explanation as to why he chose to investigate the eight communities he did, although the study for the most part vindicates his intuitive judgment as to what is "traditional" and what is "modern." Another methodological difficulty presented by the study is the fact that the political units of analysis are not comparable. In Mississippi he deals with the state; in Macon County, Alabama, Fayette County, Tennessee, and Marion County, Texas, he deals with counties; and in Birmingham, Houston, Atlanta, and Memphis, he deals with cities. There may have been sound reasons for this, but Professor Holloway does not set them forth in the book.

But the most serious shortcoming of the study, from my point of view, is the absence of a genuine comparative framework to guide the research and the analysis. The study would be much more useful had the author taken systematic account of the effects of (correlation between) such variables as: the formal rules and structures of each of the systems; their environmental characteristics; the political cultures and decision-making structures; the role of personality; and the impact of the non-systemic forces (e.g., the Federal Government) on black political behavior in the eight communities. This is not to say that he does not deal with these factors, but to say only that they are not built into his analytical framework. As a consequence, it is almost impossible to know what the major dynamics of change are, and why communities next to each other on the traditional-to-modern continuum differ so much. Having said this, however, I must add that the Federal Government emerges from this study as one of the major modernizing forces in the South.

Professor Holloway found that black politics differs from community to community, even within the so-called modern or developed systems. Blacks in Houston tended to team up with the Latins, labor, and liberal white Democrats. The author does not feel this coalition is necessarily to the advantage of the blacks. In Atlanta, they allied themselves with the white pa-

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

tricians. Holloway does not find anything wrong with this coalition, but he is skeptical about whether it is the best of all possible arrangements for blacks. (He correctly predicts the breakdown of the coalition.) His ideal seems to be Memphis where, since Crump, blacks have developed a hard-nosed, non-ideological attitude toward political alliances, and have tended to enter them on the basis of pragmatic considerations from election to election. Memphis seems to be an interesting city, insofar as the political development of blacks is concerned; and it would repay much more careful and systematic investigation. Holloway's work suggests a curvilinear relationship between education, income, and political sophistication as between the better educated and higher income population of blacks in Atlanta and Houston, and the lesser educated, lower income blacks population of Memphis. It is astounding that the number of blacks registered to vote in Memphis rose from 7,000 in 1951 to 93,000 in 1964! This is 75% of the black population. (By comparison, for example, there are only 80,000 blacks registered in Atlanta as of September, 1969—and the black population there exceeds that of Memphis by about 50,000. Percentage-wise, black registered voters in Memphis outnumber those in Atlanta by almost a 2-1 margin.)

In my opinion, one of the strong points about Professor Holloway's study is the fact that he makes his value judgments openly rather than covertly. After reading the ubiquitous assessments of the black experience by such political scientists as those at the Harvard-MIT Joint Center, it is a pleasure to find at least one white political scientist concluding that "The black American need not defer to the accomplishment of any other Americans, whatever their origins and talents."

TOBE JOHNSON

Morehouse College

Political Leadership in India: An Analysis of Elite Attitudes. By MICHAEL BRECHER. (New York: Frederick Praeger, in cooperation with the Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 1969. Pp. 193. \$12.50.)

Of the non-Western areas, India is certainly one of the most written about and studied by political scientists. Although there have been several background type analyses of various Indian elites, there has not been a serious examination of how the Indian national elite perceives its role and how it interprets the political system in which it operates. Michael Brecher's *Political Leadership in India* meets this need. The book does not, and it should be pointed out that this was not the author's principal goal, tell us

very much about the Indian elite structure in general nor does it add very much, except as a source book, to our understanding of comparative elites.

In March of 1967 Brecher sought the cooperation of eighty-two Indian political leaders in New Delhi for the purpose of administering a questionnaire. Eighty agreed. This group consisted of 63 politicians, 6 academics, and 11 journalists. All the respondents, excepting two of the journalists, were Indian. The questionnaire, which Brecher includes in an appendix, was administered in all but one instance by the author and most interviews lasted a little more than an hour. With only a few exceptions, the author reported good rapport and cooperation from the interviewers. The questions were highly specific and were designed to elicit replies in three areas: the reasons for the Congress decline in the 1967 elections, the qualities of leadership and the ranking of Congress leaders, and the contest for the Prime Ministership in 1967.

The resulting work makes a major contribution to our understanding of contemporary Indian elite perceptions in these three areas. Each of the 32 questions is analyzed separately, with a nearly complete breakdown of the responses by elite category. Perhaps the most interesting finding concerning the elite's perception of the Congress reverses is the strength of the focus on political institutions rather than on public policy. About forty percent of the Congress M.P.s perceived no connection between any government policy and the Congress reverses. Of the remainder, devaluation was mentioned as a contributing factor by about 53 percent of the Congress M.P.s. The other elite groups shared this same emphasis. Institutional factors such as Congress factionalism and a more united opposition tended to dominate the interpretations of the results. Brecher suggests that, in Almond and Verba's terms, the elite perceives the mass as a "subject" clientele. We should not fall into the fallacy of misplaced significance here: perhaps elites everywhere give a similar weight to organizational over substantive factors. In any event, the unresponsiveness that this attitude suggests would appear to be unfortunate in the Indian context.

The same theme reappears in the discussion of qualities of leadership. The emphasis here among the Congress elite was on qualities associated with maintaining organizational effectiveness, not on policy effectiveness. Thus, Morarji Desai was the Congress elite's second choice, despite the fact that he ranked highest in qualities associated with making successful economic policy. He was, in the Congress elite's eyes, inferior to Mrs. Gandhi in organizational skills, and so

was less attractive, over all, as a Prime Minister.

Brecher has as keen an ear for what is not said as for what is. He notes in this chapter that not one member of the elite, official or non-official, Congress or non-Congress, considered skill in foreign policy to be necessary to a Prime Minister. Another notable "non-effect" was that Mrs. Gandhi's charismatic link to her father, in the opinion of most respondents, was of no or only marginal utility to the Congress.

Of course, Brecher says a great deal more, and briefly relates his findings, at the end of the book, to Aptor's reconciliation/mobilization typology. The only major methodological addition this reviewer would have liked to have seen would have been the computation of the four-fold *phi* at several places. Hopefully, the material upon which the analysis rests will be made machine-readable and offered to the scholarly community.

The disappointing aspect of the book is the author's substantial failure to relate his findings to the large body of elite studies that have been made. Although there have been some notable exceptions such as Russett's *World Handbook* and Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture*, progress in comparative politics has not been realized through studies with an explicitly comparative focus, but rather the same topic has been approached in different ways in different countries in different time periods. Eventually a body of work develops, and, despite a great many minor irregularities, common themes become evident. A notable example of this in the field of elite studies, as Samuel Patterson has pointed out, is the trend toward occupational democratization in the membership of parliaments as a function of time.

This method of building a science of comparative politics may be awkward and may often slip into trivia and bad political history, but given the country-focused interest of most comparativists and the organization of the academic environment, it is likely to remain the way it must be done for some time. It is therefore incumbent upon a scholar, when he has written a work dealing with some topic in his country of interest, to relate his findings systematically with the body of work in other polities. Comparative political studies has, like art, illuminated its subject matter by presenting the universal in terms of the particular. Consequently, an author should not let the more general (and thus analytically more important) significance of his work remain obscure, hoping that some other scholar will relate it to the sub-discipline as a whole.

In this regard, Brecher states that "There is

no body of literature which deals systematically with elite images of one's own political system." Although this reviewer can not recall another work that follows Brecher's closely, there are certainly a substantial number that are relevant to it. These would certainly include, for example, Deutsch *et al.*, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics*, Seligman's *Leadership in a New Nation*, and, taking a different approach, Cnudde and McCrone's "The Linkage between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior." There is also a major body of work dealing with Indian politics *per se* that would have illuminated *Political Leadership in India*.

Unfortunately, Brecher makes very little reference to this literature. Only five scholars are cited in the entire work, and they very briefly. One citation of W. H. Morris-Jones simply identifies him as the Director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, but does not refer to the relevant work. On the same page, a reference to the "consequences of the election results for India's political system" is footnoted as "By various American and Indian scholars." A plurality of the citations in the volume, which number fewer than twenty, cite the author himself. There is no bibliography.

Even given the difference in approach toward explicitly relating one's work to the work of others in the British and the American traditions in scholarship, Brecher does very little in this regard. However, it should be remembered that this is a criticism of what Brecher did not do. What he did do he did quite well, and it is much needed.

ROBERT SIDWAR ROBINS

Tulane University

Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities. By ROBERT R. ALFORD. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969. Pp. 224. \$6.50.)

Since the time in the late 1950's and early 1960's when Edward C. Banfield, Robert A. Dahl, and others restored by their work intellectual vitality to the study of urban politics, political scientists have been groping for new directions to take in a field that has now, with the student and popular interest in cities, become a matter of general concern. The methodological debate over how to study the distribution of power is not settled, but increasingly it seems sterile and, one suspects, perhaps irrelevant. How power is in fact distributed is hardly irrelevant, but finding a theoretical approach by which to assess the consequences of that distribution seems more important.

One possibility is to study the policy outcomes of local political arrangements, but measuring those outcomes for any large number of cities has not proved as easy as some at first hoped. Another is to conceive of American urban politics in terms of the concepts of political modernization. Doing this in a way that produces more than merely the substitution of one set of labels for another ("modern" or "mobilized" in lieu of "professionalized council-manager systems" and "traditional" in lieu of "political machine systems") is harder than it first appears; in addition, concepts that seem to work for backward nations about which we know relatively little seem inadequate for cities about which we are a good deal better informed. A third approach might be to look at the relationship between the enduring features of a city—its economic base and its population characteristics—and its political behavior, indicating thereby the constraints within which power can be exercised and perhaps also the sources of change in the distribution of that power, but even if successful such a view does not make any easier answering the question of how political arrangements intervene between socio-economic factors and public policy.

Robert R. Alford, a sociologist at the University of Wisconsin, has bravely tried, in a slim but rich book, to explore all three conceptual positions, linking them into a more or less coherent theoretical structure and illuminating that structure with data drawn from four Wisconsin cities—Madison, Racine, Kenosha, and Green Bay. He begins with the differences in the economic bases of the communities as a way of understanding why each has a different political culture, defined in terms of two variables: the degree of bureaucracy and the level of participation. The highly bureaucratized, participatory system he terms "modern," the unbureaucratized, non-participatory system he calls "traditional." A trading center (Green Bay) is more likely to have a traditional political culture, a professional center (Madison) is more likely to have a modern culture, and cities with a manufacturing base are likely to be mixed cases depending on whether the economic leadership of the community is inactive and drawn from absentee-owned large corporations (as in Kenosha) or energetic and civic-minded because of the special character of locally-owned firms (as in Racine).

Each political culture has a set of distinctive "public norms": in a modern city, the police are highly professionalized (and thus issue a lot of traffic tickets and arrest a lot of juveniles), the courts are busy with a great deal of litigation, the political system provides many opportuni-

ties for women, and the zoning officials tend to apply their ordinances strictly and consistently. In the traditional city, the police are less zealous, the courts less busy, the female politicians notable for their absence, and the zoning officials more inclined to accommodate special requests. These public norms—the universalistic ones of the modern city, the particularistic ones of the traditional one—are in turn productive of different kinds of public decisions. Madison has several heavily-funded poverty programs; Green Bay has only one program with token funding. Madison was a leader in getting an urban renewal program underway, Green Bay was much slower and the other two cities have yet to start. And of course Madison was among the first cities in the state to fluoridate its water supply.

These "political cultures," it turns out, are properties of the structure, functioning, and history of local government, *not*, so far as Alford could tell, of the attributes of citizens. He found no distinctive orientation or ethos among voters that was associated with residence in one or the other city; religion and social class explain, in the usual manner, the attitudes of the citizens. In the modern city, college-educated persons get to be leaders who, whether liberals or conservatives, tend to be cosmopolitans; in the traditional city, less-well-educated persons occupy leadership positions and take a more parochial or localistic view of matters. In short, differences in attitudes are real but they seem not to be the product or a predictor of local political arrangements; on the other hand, differences in political structures tend to persist in part because they recruit different kinds of persons into leadership positions.

Obviously, this is a stimulating and in many places quite original work. It is a major effort to provide a new and coherent intellectual direction to the study of urban politics, and thus deserves wide attention. But it also raises as many questions as it settles. The measures of bureaucracy and participation leave a good deal to be desired: it is hard to distinguish "bureaucracy" (the multiplication of offices and specialization of function) from "professionalization" (the emergence of administrators with "professional" norms and reference groups). Thus, Madison's innovativeness may be less a function of bureaucracy than of a special kind of bureaucracy—one with strong professional orientations. Similarly with "participation"—Alford's data refers primarily to *organized* forms of participation (active political parties, intensive campaigns many civic groups, high voting turnout) and thus he concludes that Green Bay is not "participatory." Yet in the account of Green Bay poli-

tics, we are told that almost all Green Bay leaders went "to great lengths to insure consensus before they acted" and the mayor in particular "makes concessions, negotiates, and feels out the ground before making a move." (p. 49). I would bet that one reason why so little happens in Green Bay is precisely because it is so participatory in an informal way—if anybody has any strong objections to anything, the proposal is blocked.

Given these conceptual problems, and noting that the mixed cases (Kenosha and Racine) never turn out to be very interesting, I would suggest that a simpler way of defining these political cultures that is consistent at least with the Wisconsin data is the *level of organization* of public life. Madison is highly organized publicly (in bureaucrats and parties) and privately (in civic groups); Green Bay is less organized. To go beyond the Wisconsin cases, I suspect one would have to distinguish among *kinds* or *modes* of organization, whether particularistic and person-regarding (as with a political machine or fraternal lodge) or universalistic and community-regarding (as with a Good Citizens' League or Housing and Planning Council). But this is all speculation, not criticism, and indicates that Professor Alford has opened up some fresh perspectives and provided some new directions in the study of urban politics.

JAMES Q. WILSON

Harvard University

Peace Among The Willows: The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon. BY HOWARD B. WHITE. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. Pp. 266. Guilders 33.)

Professor White has brought to fruition his vast knowledge of the political writings of Francis Bacon in a work that is at once scholarly, systematic, and engaging. The author's sometimes astonishing interpretive and synthesizing abilities combine to make this perhaps the most novel and thorough account of Bacon's scattered thoughts on politics, morality, and science. At a time when political philosophy is struggling to gain its bearings and relate itself to the social science enterprise, it is helpful to reconsider Bacon's contribution in the context of White's very divergent and perhaps equally unsatisfactory position.

White's identification and discussion of Bacon's two societies, his utopia where science rules, and the society which was a condition necessary for constructing the former, leads him to divide his attention between Bacon's provisional morality and politics and his definitive

morality and politics. The account of Bacon's provisional morality and politics is gleaned and constructed from a great range of disparate sources. White argues that Bacon attempted to reconcile scientific advance with political conservatism and tried to overcome the obstacles of despair by preparing men's minds to hope. In discrediting the old ways symbolized by Aristotle and superstition, Bacon hopes to inculcate the virtues of charity, political pliance, and a high regard for external goodness and fortune. Bacon prefers a monarchical government of cautious imperialistic dispositions to stimulate science, civic peace, commerce, and religious toleration. White believes that Bacon saw Britain as the ship that would take mankind to the New Atlantis.

Bacon's utopia, the New Atlantis, is, like Bacon's natural philosophy, still futuristic and not yet complete. It is, however, a place where science conquers chance and determines change, where royal power diminishes, commerce withers, and the rule of humane and compassionate scientists prevails over statemanship and war. This ancient christian society glories in the beneficence of scientific invention guided and controlled by philosophy. Rational hedonism characterized by sober luxury, beauty, health and longevity is made everlastingly pleasant and stable by the reconciliation between patriarchal society and a young, vigorous, and progressive science.

White's purpose is not only to explicate Bacon's political thought but to expose the sterility and danger of political faith, the distinctive characteristic of utopian thought. It is said that the prevailing faith in a beneficent science, in experts, and in the ultimate solution of political problems is a debt that we uncomfortably owe to Bacon. Now White has many useful comments on the question of utopian thought however questionable it is to discard Plato and More as utopians because to them nature is something that is fixed. (Although sometimes they are said to be simply pre-modern utopians). It is disconcerting to discover that the remedy advanced by White to combat an unregulated and dangerous utopian faith in science is nothing less than a political philosophy with an element of faith in no smaller proportions or pervasiveness. The only hope is for a political philosophy which can know the good, what man is, what the best political community looks like, the nature of the soul and even the cosmos. White surely equals Bacon in the scope and unconstructed character of that which we are asked to believe. There is little justification for this new faith. Few reasons are offered to show how it is less blind, less dan-

gerous, and more qualified to guide practical decisions and to ordain the proper paths of scientific invention and use. It is in confronting science with his view of political philosophy that White is most disappointing. There is little here that is either novel or penetrating. The old Straussian denunciation of science as ill-suited to determine values, or judge what is a healthy society or what is just provides a less than compelling or systematic treatment of the question. Nor does White entertain the possibility that the fruits of science, especially a thoughtful social science, might be of some assistance in the development of a political philosophy.

White's mode of analysis is no less Straussian and no less demanding of faith, however insightful and productive it appears to be. White does not suppose that a great writer "would make contradictions, flagrant contradictions, absent mindedness. . . ." (12) and so by ingenious interpretation of Bacon's use of words, fables, myths, numbers and colours, he exposes the "secret teaching" on a subject matter which is at once "hard to know" and "unfit to utter," a teaching addressed to the "legitimate and best minds" (110). White's impressive scholarly interpretation loses some of its force insofar as the code is never clearly explicated, the criteria in terms of which certain meanings are selected and evaluated is never precisely outlined. This procedure may be inescapable in making sense out of Bacon, but the result is clearly White's Bacon. Consider the ingenious detection of Bacon's meaning in his presentation of the chief scientist clad in peach coloured shoes, a white gown and a black cloak. We learn that "when built on eros or standing on eros, that which receives all (material cause) may be covered by that which receives nothing (final cause)." (196) This proceeds from White's use of ancient and contemporary sources, the ancient ones being those "with which Bacon *must* have been familiar and which *may* have had some meaning for him." (175)

White contends that modern man, whether liberal or socialist, is "essentially Baconian," that it was Bacon who stole fire from the gods and led us into the labyrinth of modernity. We are said to be bound by the world created by modern thought "particularly the thought of Francis Bacon." It is surely paradoxical that a secret teaching of such devious and hidden meaning, not accurately exposed before White's subtle examination, should have enjoyed such a direct and pervasive influence. Perhaps the factors that influence the course of events are more hidden than even Bacon or White imagined or possibly they are much more evident and

straightforward.

R. A. MELVIN

University of Western Ontario

Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics. BY GERALD M. POMPER. (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1968. Pp. 297. \$3.95.)

Pomper declares his purpose in his preface: "As a citizen, I have been disturbed by an apparent public cynicism about elections in the United States and the consequent disdain for the political process . . . This book is a deliberate effort to show that elections do have significance." (pp. ix-x) To accomplish such a purpose Pomper seeks to do three things: (1) to review, categorize, and synthesize the writings of political theorists concerning elections; (2) to briefly summarize and interpret the existing literature dealing with American political processes and institutions; and (3) to present the findings of four of his own research undertakings.

For his theoretical review Pomper fits together quotations from Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau, Madison, Hamilton, Calhoun, and Mill; his own personal contribution is an attempted distinction between the direct and indirect effects of elections. "We will concentrate on two broad alternative effects—direct and indirect results of popular elections. Direct voter control would be evidenced by elections in which the choice of men also clearly indicated popular preferences on policy issues . . . In the absence of such mandates elections may have indirect significance. The actions of politicians might not be controlled in detail by ballots, but they might act in anticipation of voter reactions." (pp. 12-13) "Theorists generally have evaluated elections unfavorably when they have focused on elections as direct choices of wise men or wise policies. In contrast, they have been well-disposed to the democratic process when they have considered the indirect effects of popular choice." (pp. 32-33) "To provide criteria for evaluating the ballot, we have focused on elements of the 'traditional theory of democracy.' Our analysis suggests that this theory has been misunderstood and, consequently, that many modern criticisms of elections are misplaced . . . The advantages of elections have been seen in their indirect effects, particularly to protection of the voters, not in the wisdom of their decisions. To test the worth of elections, we should focus on their reputed benefits . . . It was Plato, after all, not Mill who measured the quality of a government by the wisdom of its rulers and the absolute truth of its decisions." (pp. 38-39)

The distinction between direct and indirect effects—which, once made, is used recurrently throughout the book—does not appear as useful to me as it does to the author. The difficulty is that both direct and indirect effects are premised upon the same ultimate claim: that voters are competent to differentiate candidates whose policies are favorable to their interests from those who are not. The only difference between the two cases in reality seems to lie in the actions of party managers and candidates rather than voters. In the one case by correctly foreseeing voter reactions and adjusting their policy proposals accordingly they guarantee that elections can have only indirect effects; in the other case the direct effect of the election upon policy is created by the actions of one or both party leaderships in misreading voter reactions and offering sharply divergent platforms. The underlying problem rests in Pomper's conception of linkage. He is presumably interested in the interrelationship between public preferences and public policies, but prejudices the question of where the linkage between the two must take place. In the preface he tells us that "Elections provide the linkage between the behavior of the voter and the actions of government . . ." (p. ix) and later: "In most castes, the voters can affect policy only through the election of politicians who will take actions desired by the majority of citizens." (p. 12) Most analyses of the linkage between public opinion and public policy avoid such narrow definitions of focus and the resulting confusion is evident in Pomper's quotations which intermix judgments concerning the wisdom of choosing policies on the basis of mass preferences with evaluations of the effects of elections in shaping policies.

The two descriptive chapters that follow manifest Pomper's awareness of other types of linkage and are among the strongest parts of the book. Chapter 4 on "Voters in America" is particularly outstanding and is the best succinct summary of the current knowledge regarding American voting behavior that has come to my attention. To those already familiar with this literature, however, Pomper's four attempts at addition will be of greater interest. The first of these—based in large part upon an article published in 1967 in the *Journal of Politics*—surveys party voting in presidential elections from 1828 to 1964 and seeks "to locate the historical occasions of party changes in presidential elections and to assess the policy effects of these changes." (p. 99) Fundamentally the essay is a classification of presidential elections by type, based upon Key's notion of the critical election as elaborated in the Survey Research Center's threefold definition of terms. In translating

these concepts to match his electoral data, however, Pomper distorts them in two serious ways. In place of Key's conception of a critical election as defined by its persisting effects Pomper substitutes a notion of critical change as sharp deviation from the past. Thus 1960 and 1964 both become critical elections—in Pomper's terminology, "converting elections"—without any demonstration of their impact upon later electoral patterns. Pomper also replaces the original assumptions of continuity and change in the electorate with correlation coefficients for the state-by-state presidential vote. The convenience in terms of available data sources is obvious, but the result is to make it impossible to evaluate Pomper's rejection of the conventional view that 1936 was a critical election of major import since his statistical techniques prohibit him from capturing intra-state party changes defined in class terms. Most seriously in terms of the book's larger purpose these voting changes are related to governmental activity only through the citation of a few commonplace historical sources, and the reader is left in doubt whether the election returns made any difference or—as Pomper neatly puts it—"Social trends were preparing a new political order." (p. 113)

Pomper then turns to the comparative study of American State politics for evidence. His topic is an interesting one: the relationship between elections for governor and state fiscal policies. In other work Hinckley has demonstrated that incumbent governors are far more vulnerable electorally than incumbent congressmen or Senators (or Presidents) while Sharkansky has spread out in his *Spending in the American States* a table of changing expenditure levels by states that can be read as a roster of the strong governors produced by the 20th century. Pomper's contribution is to relate two variables measuring the electoral success of the governor's party to five measures of tax increases and five measures of spending increases. His general conclusion is that no significant relationships exist and that it is mistaken wisdom to assume that increasing taxes contribute to a governor's rejection by the voters although suggestive yet inconclusive variations appear between Democratic and Republican governors and more competitive and less competitive states. As Pomper rightly notes: "In a science of politics, disproving hypotheses is as important as their confirmation" (p. 129), but in terms of his overall purpose of demonstrating the significant impact of elections the findings must be counted as negative.

Evidence far more convincing to the case is provided by the third analysis, undoubtedly the most interesting section of the book. In two chap-

ters—parts of which have previously appeared in the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*—Pomper exposes the Democratic and Republican party platforms of 1944, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1964, to sentence-by-sentence content analysis and then compares the promises made with the promises kept. He demonstrates that campaign platforms are far less matters of empty rhetoric than often supposed, and that they consist in significant part of intelligible, specific pledges of future action. In all he finds 1,399 pledges which together constitute 27 per cent of all sentence statements in the 12 platforms. His central finding is that where both parties have made identical promises some 85% of the pledges have been substantially fulfilled; that the victorious party has carried out 79% of the promises idiosyncratic to its own platform; and that even the defeated party has succeeded in effectuating 53% of its pledges. As these figures suggest, Pomper also finds that the distinctive platform promises of the two parties are not usually in conflict, but reflect instead the differential campaign strategies of the two parties with the Republican platform emphasizing such nondistributive issues as defense and general government and the Democrats stressing particularistic gains for identifiable groups in matters of labor and welfare policy. For the limited range of issues on which the two party platforms do contain directly conflicting pledges Pomper provides overwhelming evidence of the effects of election outcomes in policy outputs, with 80% of the actions finally taken consistent with the promises of the winning party.

At minimum it can be said that Pomper has demonstrated that elections are occasions for policy-makers to summarize the policies they plan to pursue; at maximum it can be asserted that Pomper has proven that within certain areas of policy the victory of one party in the election has determined the programs that will be enacted. This by no means exhausts the content of the chapters, however, for the tables—though not strikingly easy to read—contain materials for many other conclusions, some but not all of which are discussed by Pomper. His detailed analysis of platform content is particularly instructive as to variations in campaign strategy between the parties, over time, and among policy areas, and his analysis of pledge fulfillment shows that promises are most often kept in respect to defense, agricultural, and resource policy, and least often in matters of civil rights and labor.

The subject of civil rights provides the material for Pomper's final analysis, the most controversial, difficult, but important test for his proposition. He seeks to prove that the protection of

Negro rights derives at least in part from possession of the ballot. Using the standard sources he summarizes the history of Negro political activity during Reconstruction and after and concludes: "It is an indication of the importance of the vote alone that black interests continued to be considered even after white supremacists returned to power." (p. 213) Although he may well be right Pomper is in fact unable from his data to disentangle the effect of the possession of the ballot from other influences affecting the position of the Negro at the time. Pomper's personal addition to the existent literature on the period is a series of tabulations of lynchings, public school enrollments, etc., intended to demonstrate that the vote was a determining element. He argues, for example, that disfranchisement removed one of the restraints on lynching since "political power was no longer even a possible defense, and the increase in violence evidenced the change." (p. 217) The relationship must remain speculative, however, when so many other uncontrolled variables are blatantly at work. It is simply not true to say, as Pomper does, that: "We cannot prove causation, but an association of lynching and disfranchisement would indicate the influence of the ballot." (p. 217) If the correlation is, in fact, spurious, and both variables depend upon some further unspecified variable the term "influence" is clearly inapplicable. The tabulations for lynchings and capital punishment are still further flawed by the failure to convert them to the per capita terms that would make them meaningful. In sum it seems likely that Pomper's argument will not convince anyone who begins reading with the prior conviction that black advances have been the result of other forces than the vote. The paradox runs deep, of course: if Negroes are permitted the vote when they pose no threat and denied it when they do, does this prove that the vote is a powerful influence? or a powerful symbol?

One final comment should be made concerning style. In his preface the author warns: "... (A)s a teacher, I have been upset, and ultimately bored, by quarrels over methodology. Tenaciously, but intolerably, opposing dogmatists insist that meaningful research can only be conducted through their prized techniques. In this work, I have deliberately been eclectic in the use of methods." (p. x) His editor, David Fellman, agrees and tells us: "... (I)t is refreshing to read a competent book which cheerfully makes use of various methodologies without being enslaved to any one and without making a fuss about it." (p. viii) I must disagree. An author can be enslaved by eclecticism as much as by any other methodology. Like most

political scientists Pomper does some things better than others and the effort to do a little of everything throws the book out of balance. Some chapters read like a well-done supplementary textbook; others like a well-done research monograph; others like a not-so-well-done research monograph; and one like an effort to include a chapter on theory to prove a point. At times eclecticism carries the author into subjects of which he knows too little. "(T)he British House of Lords agreed to its own loss of power after the voters supported the reformist Liberal party in 1910, and the U.S. Supreme Court ended its opposition to the New Deal after Franklin Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1936." (p. 66). And so on. The book would be the better for fewer "methodologies" and more concentration on the subjects that Pomper handles well and on which he has much to say.

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The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision Making. BY JERRY F. HOUGH. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 416. \$12.50.)

Only recently have books on aspects of the Soviet political system made use of theories and models from the social science disciplines for purposes of either explication or verification. Instead, the tendency has been to engage in a detailed presentation of data and information that the author thought pertinent to his subject matter. Although some very good studies have been written this way, the study of Soviet government has tended to constitute a distinct enclave within the discipline of political science. Of course, this phenomenon is and will continue to be unavoidable to some degree, if only because the study of Soviet politics obviously carries with it several difficulties not present in study of the United States polity.

One reason this book is to be noted favorably is that it utilizes theoretical constructs in the examination and elucidation of the Soviet political process being studied, namely the nature of the involvement of the organs of the Communist Party at the *oblast'* and comparable levels in industrial management, planning, and decision-making in general. This is combined with the lucid presentation of the results of detailed research which clarifies and increases our knowledge of the people in the local organs of the Party, the work they do, and the ways in which they do it.

The main constructs put to use by Hough are those of Barrington Moore's "rational-technical society" and the conventional "monistic" conception of Max Weber's model of organization.

These are critically examined in the context of Soviet industrial decision-making to ascertain both to what degree they explain the political processes operative there and to what extent they are realistic models for the conduct of industrial administration and development administration in the U.S.S.R. and elsewhere.

The author states that Soviet society must . . . continue to deviate from the "rational-technical" model in at least three significant ways: the existence of illegal administrative practices, the participation of local Party organs in the making of industrial decisions, and the execution of political power functions by local Party organs. In addition, Hough criticizes the model for not taking into account deviations which must exist in any society and for neglecting certain important political phenomena. As for the Weberian view of organization, Hough argues, as have Simon and several other scholars, that deviations from its specifications are necessitated by the demands of an effectively functioning organization, and not only for the service of special interests, e.g., the power needs of the Communist Party. These arguments lead to another, more specific, thesis: area coordination by the local Party organs is a vital necessity for effective development administration (the Soviet state has long been engaged in a variant of development administration through the rapid and large-scale advancement and expansion of industry). The argument tying together these theses is that economic development and the expansion of industrial capacity and production is a nonroutinized process in which the values of precision, predictability, legality, and orderliness are outweighed by those of "creativity, initiative, and discretion." (p. 296)

This argument is derived from a realistic analysis of the actual ways in which the Party's local-level organs function vis-à-vis industry. Hough convincingly argues that the existing deep Party involvement in industrial matters is necessary for industry to function as intended, particularly in matters such as timely delivery of supplies and other aspects of cooperation among plants and organizations, e.g., the enforcement of contracts. The author contends that these operations on the part of the local Party organs are not capricious or excessive, but are limited, in effect, by conventions which became established as early as the 1920's and also by various objective factors, e.g., lack of time in relation to the Party organs' many other responsibilities, and the relative imbalance of knowledge and experience between the Party "coordinator" and the managers he supervises. Thus, the Party's "marginal and adjusting" (pp. 254-5) work in indus-

try is a regularized and "normal component" of its "executive responsibilities" (p. 171) which is objectively "useful" for the production process and also for the protection of regional interests (p. 270).

Hough's position is correct within the framework and perspectives he has adopted. However, if these were replaced by others which are also pertinent, the conclusions would not be so favorable to the Party's role. I agree that the "invisible hand" is not allowed to operate anywhere at present (p. 196) but does even the most effective functioning of industry justify the regulation of industrial life by a single organization which monopolizes the political power of the system. The local Party organs often function to realize the main goals of industry, but at a great, almost disabling effort and at a high cost in the initiative of the managers and the functioning of the formal organizations of industry, problems the present economic reform has not eliminated. Also, the acquisition of supplies in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is indeed at times worked out informally, but there are political differences between the systems which outweigh these and other similarities in the operation of the economies. In other words, although the C.P.S.U. often aids in the effective functioning of industry, it is not exercising a benign influence throughout society or in all aspects of industry. Some of the major difficulties of the Soviet economy and society are systemic in nature and cannot be eradicated by this institution with its political stake in the system as it is. The author's arguments thus constitute an explanation and justification of only one aspect of the Party's role.

However, the book performs a real service in its effective destruction of many of the prevalent simplistic views of the Communist Party and its role in the economy. Hough shows that the meaning of the word "Party" varies with territorial level, function, and even situation. Also, he clarifies the meaning of the term "Party apparatus" used so indiscriminately and shows the apparatus to be a variegated group in terms of education and experience. In addition, he clarifies the role of the local Party organs in industry and their relationship with state agencies. The appendices dealing with the membership of Party committees and bureaus at the republic and *oblast'* levels and the listing of 170 major plants are an important bonus. The value of the book is enhanced by the results of interviews conducted in the U.S.S.R. and data gleaned there from some local newspapers which cannot be exported.

The Soviet Prefects is an up-to-date, well re-

searched, and thought-provoking addition to the few excellent books on the Soviet political system.

KARL W. RYAVEC

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How Communist China Negotiates. By ARTHUR LALL. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1968. Pp. 284. \$7.95.)

Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967. By KENNETH T. YOUNG. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968. Pp. 443. \$10.95.)

A reader of this review will benefit from a brief score card. Kenneth Young is a former U.S. official and diplomat who negotiated with the Chinese at Panmunjon and is now president of the Asia Society. Arthur Lall is a former Indian diplomat who represented that country at the 1963 Geneva Conference on Laos and is now teaching at Columbia. The writer is a former U.S. Government official, now at the Brookings Institution.

None of us can, and indeed, in this particular case none tries, to escape our backgrounds. Lall's book is much more a memoir of the 1962 Laos conference than a general discussion of Chinese negotiating strategy. Young's study reflects not only his own experience, but also that of his colleagues in the Department of State, and largely reports on the bilateral ambassadorial talks between the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China. Thus, despite the general titles, the two books focus largely on specific aspects of the Chinese diplomatic experience, although they raise issues even beyond that of the question of Chinese negotiating style and strategy.

Much of each of the two books is devoted to a careful reporting of public and private events. A reader who wished to know what was said by representatives of the United States and China and the other participants in the Laos conference, or what the two countries said at the ambassadorial talks will find no better sources. Each book is based on inside information. Lall, as the Indian representative at the Geneva Conference, is able to report much detail not available from other sources. Young's study is equally rich. He claims that the book is based on press leaks and other published material. However, there is apparently more to it than that. At one point, for example, he notes that the press stories were inaccurate, and there is no doubt that this study reflects a knowledge of the U.S. government records of the conference.

Unfortunately, the books offer little that is

useful beyond the descriptions of events, although both authors do present brief discussions of general Chinese attitudes towards negotiations. What they offer is not particularly helpful in explaining Chinese behavior even at the meeting they discuss, or in predicting how the Chinese are likely to behave at future conferences. Lall, for example, tells us that the Chinese demonstrate flexibility based on their belief in inherent contradictions and are prepared to compromise in the short run because of their focus on long-run objectives. Young also reports that the Chinese have a long historical perspective. He notes that they view negotiation as an adversary process and that they place little value on the dignity of man. Such generalizations do not carry us very far.

Two larger questions are raised and at least implicitly dealt with in the two books. The first concerns the role of diplomatic negotiations in affecting the behavior of nations beyond the conference table. The second concerns the evolution of U.S.-Chinese relations since the establishment of the Chinese Peoples' Republic in 1949.

Anyone who spends any large part of his life engaged in a particular activity comes to believe in its importance in influencing the course of events; and authors need to feel that their subject is critical and self contained. Lall and Young are no exceptions. Having sat through the 1962 Laos conference, Lall clearly believes that it affected events in important ways, and Young is equally convinced of the valuable role played by the bilateral ambassadorial talks in shaping U.S.-Chinese relations. Lall also assumes that negotiations should lead to agreements. He leaves the reader in little doubt that their job is to carry negotiations to a successful conclusion. But, how important was this "successful" negotiations in affecting behavior?

The critical decisions regarding Laos had been made by the American government prior to the opening of the conference. President Kennedy had apparently concluded that he would not commit U.S. groundtroops to Laos to prevent its being overrun by North Vietnamese troops. He then charged Harriman with, in effect, negotiating the best arrangement that could be worked out, which hopefully would have the effect of discouraging a North Vietnamese attack. On the other side of the table, the Russians apparently were prepared to exercise some pressure on the North Vietnamese because of their concern that the Laotian situation would adversely affect the general trend of Soviet-American relations. China was not anxious for a military clash near its borders at this time. The conference painstakingly worked out an international agree-

ment on the neutrality of Laos to go along with the political sentiment among the Laotians themselves, which was negotiated separately. The details of the agreement may well have been influenced by the skill of the negotiators, and it of course is possible that the negotiations would have failed if not for the determination and energy of Lall and others in constantly bringing the parties together. Nevertheless, the basic story concerns the internal politics of Laos and the calculations in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, both of which fall beyond the scope of his narrative, as Lall has defined it. Lall also does not concern himself with the implementation of the decisions of the conference and the future evolution of Laos. It is clear beyond a doubt that the North Vietnamese almost completely ignored the agreement to withdraw all foreign troops from Laos, and that within a few years the United States was also in violation of the agreement. A tripartite government ratified at the conference came into existence only on paper, and Laos very quickly fell into a situation of *de facto* partition.

How the situation on the ground in Laos would have differed, if at all, if the conference had not been held or it is ended unsuccessfully, is an interesting and important question with which Lall does not deal. Nor does he consider how Chinese behavior on other questions or the attitude of the United States towards China was affected by the results of the conference. If international negotiations of this kind are important, they are so only if they affect what actually occurs in the territory negotiated about, or the perceptions of the leaders of major countries about the likely behavior of other countries in the future. The Laos conference of 1962 did not have any major consequences. Nor, in fact, does Lall argue that it did.

Young explicitly tries to make a case for the central importance of these bilateral talks in shaping U.S.-Chinese relations. In particular, he seems them playing a critical role in the offshore islands crisis of 1968. Here again, however, the self-imposed limitations reduce the value of the work. Mr. Young does deal briefly with the general crisis situation, relying primarily on secondary sources, and then reports in detail what was discussed in Warsaw. However, since he does not consider the other moves being made by the parties, he falls into the trap of greatly overestimating the role of the talks. He also misses what I believe to be the key point; namely, that the Chinese asked for the talks as a way of reducing the likelihood that the U.S. would overreact to its probe by attacking the mainland, and that the U.S. agreed to talk, be-

cause given the intensive domestic opposition to the U.S. involvement, it had no choice.

On the broader question of U.S.-Chinese relations, Mr. Lall has little to say, and Young's treatment is handicapped by an attitude common to semi-official discussions of such issues—the assumption of moral rectitude. Implicitly, and at times explicitly, he proceeds as if the United States was seeking to improve relations, was acting from noble purposes, and was negotiating “sincerely.” At the same time, Young points out Chinese acts of duplicity, the unreasonableness of Chinese behavior, and their constant efforts to use the talks for their own ends. At one point, in discussing the period 1954–55, when the Chinese were seeking limited steps to improve relations, and the United States was resisting them, Young does allow that the United States may not have acted as forthrightly as it might have in seeking improved relations. In writing from this perspective, Young gives an accurate picture of the attitude with which bureaucracies approach their relations with other countries. Most outside observers would argue that a major chance to improve relations was deliberately passed over.

Bureaucrats assume that the objectives of their nation are consistent with a higher good, and that the other side's sincerity is open to question. More important, they resist analyzing the other side's behavior, taking into account that its bureaucrats believe just the opposite.

But Young's framework is distorting. The U.S. and China alternated in seeing the talks as useful and in favoring limited steps to increase contact. For both governments these were decisions taken in the context of their overall objectives and were basically tactical. During most of the period covered in Young's book, the United States was at least hoping for the overthrow of the PRC and was negotiating mutual security treaties with China's neighbors; it was through-

out supporting a rival government on Taiwan and building up its military strength in the Far East because of a widely shared belief in the U.S. Government that the Chinese leaders were aggressive and expansionist. The Chinese leaders, fearful of an American attack, were supporting the North Vietnamese and, in general, seeking to reduce U.S. influence in Asia.

Given the interests and suspicions of the leaders in Washington and Peking, there was in fact little that could be negotiated, and it is difficult to believe that small steps could have made a big difference unless they led both governments to substantial changes in their images or policies. We still do not know enough about the internal debates within China about foreign policy to know whether a different U.S. posture at Warsaw would have affected Chinese behavior regarding control of nuclear weapons, support for the Vietnamese insurgency, or relations with her neighbors, but one may doubt that any of these would have changed. On the American side, one needs to refer only to Eisenhower's warning to Kennedy that he would denounce him if he moved toward recognition of “red China,” to doubt that a different scenario at Warsaw would have had any real significance. Whether negotiations of a different kind, or on different subjects, or the small steps which might have come from them could have changed the misperceptions which lay behind at least some of the presumed conflict is difficult to predict.

In short, the two books provide useful data, either for a diplomatic historian's reporting on Chinese relations with the outside world, or for speculation about how negotiations affect the behavior of nations; but in and of themselves, they provide little real insight into the effect of negotiations on the events that they are about, or into U.S.-Chinese relations.

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BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy. By MARVIN ZETTERBAUM. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. Pp. 185. \$5.75.)

Few books on the subject of American or modern democracy can rival the youthful Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* in profundity and comprehensiveness. So preoccupied with lesser matters are political science and education today, however, that the bulk of the work is rarely read. Zetterbaum's book, along with recent studies by

Richter, Drescher, Lively and others, should help make such ignorance less pervasive. Showing first that Tocqueville's central theoretical problem is the problem of democracy, it then reconstructs his reasonings, relates them to the problems and themes of classical and modern political philosophy, and finally evaluates them.

Zetterbaum's initial task is to penetrate beneath Tocqueville's apparent refusal either to announce in favor of democracy or to weigh democracy and

aristocracy against each other. The democratic tide is called inevitable, long-prepared, divinely-inspired. But Zetterbaum marshals impressive evidence, especially from Tocqueville's private writings, to show that he does not seriously believe in historical inevitability. He suggests that Tocqueville uses this idea to conceal his own partisanship while moderating both the democratic will to destroy and the aristocratic will to resist as they raged in bitter struggle around him. In fact, the core of Tocqueville's political philosophy lies beneath his superficial impartiality, and consists in his assessment of these two opposing regimes. Ultimately, as Zetterbaum argues, it is because he favors democracy over aristocracy in crucial respects that he can encourage his contemporaries to accept its tide as inevitable. And it is his appreciation of aristocracy that permits him to understand the nature and limits of democracy and to encourage those forces more apt to preserve and elevate it.

Zetterbaum is able to demonstrate that Tocqueville follows certain moderns in his view of the natural equality of men and in considering the active consent of the governed, or democracy, essential to the protection of the natural rights of all. As for aristocracy, Tocqueville seems in the end, but for reasons not made perfectly clear, to identify it with actual caste or inequality based on birth rather than with the theoretical rule of the best as such, and therefore rejects its oligarchic character: only democracy is capable of pursuing the common good or the good of most. Yet the heights of political and human greatness are to be found in aristocracies, not democracies, and Tocqueville reveals a fuller or more open appreciation of this greatness perhaps than any modern before him. Nevertheless, Zetterbaum tells us, he did not hope to engraft the virtues of aristocracy onto the fundamental justice and humanity of democracy. Instead, the problem as he saw it was to draw from the democratic ethos itself those qualities and correctives that might increase democracy's stature and alleviate its ills.

What Tocqueville had in mind was modern democracy, which appears, at first, to be unequivocally superior to its ancient counterpart. Without slavery it has become more just, and with larger territory and population (using representative government) it has become more stable. On the side of the ancients, however, remains their political virtue or patriotism—an "instinctive" love of country and readiness to sacrifice for it. This admirable dedication Tocqueville tries to simulate through the modern "principle of self-interest rightly understood"—*i.e.*, through enlightened selfishness.

The crux of modern democracy Tocqueville considers to be equality even more than liberty—both

of them principles already discerned in ancient democracy by Aristotle. He also apparently places a somewhat novel stress on "social condition" as the determinant of a country's politics. Equality is the social condition of modern democracy: the relation of man to man in fact as well as norm precludes fixed hierarchical arrangements, and an egalitarian political life is but one element within a more general egalitarian fabric.

In Tocqueville's portrayal, a democratic society of independent equals engenders the separateness and isolation of individuals and families, encourages each in a competitive quest for material well-being, and—while spreading compassion—drowns heroic conceptions and conduct in mediocrity. The extreme individualism of modern democracy, urging every man to examine and judge his own beliefs, Tocqueville seems to trace to the modern philosophical revolution begun by Bacon and Descartes. He fails to note, however, that the peculiar commercial or capitalistic spirit characteristic of modern democracy also has its root in modern natural and political philosophy rather than in democracy *per se*.

The problem of democracy derives from its essential egalitarianism and individualism. Because of them, democracy threatens to destroy greatness and social cohesion, and since the power of egalitarianism is ultimately greater than the power of individualism and liberty, democracy can turn into despotism, and may even do so without appearing to. Not only does the influence of public opinion dominate both masses and educated alike, but the tendency of democracy is increasingly to make the state, viewed as a popular instrument, the main provider of equality, and well-being for all the people, especially for the poor majority. If we may interpolate, the coming of what today is called the "welfare state" will mean the extinction of independence in the electorate and hence of real freedom.

To offset these existing and prospective ills, Tocqueville wanted to find a place within democracy "... for liberty, for human excellence, for a renaissance of public virtue, and for the possibility of greatness." Zetterbaum's analysis of the way these emerge from the democratic ethos is fascinating. Thus, equality gives rise to the desire to rule oneself and hence to the necessity of cooperating with others in democratic self-rule, whether through local government or a variety of political and non-political associations. The self-care of each, properly understood, makes each man realize he best cares for himself by caring for the public good; it issues in a kind of rational or calculated patriotism. And religion, also interpreted as involving each man's concern for his own (eternal) well-being, helps restrain vulgar selfishness and provide a sense of futurity and of higher devo-

tions. Even commerce extends the self-care of the individual in such a way as to bring forth not only the solid virtues of bourgeois society but a kind of independence and energy as well.

In his last chapter Zetterbaum wonders whether Tocqueville's solutions are successful and whether even he fully believed in them. Can "self-interest rightly understood" serve as the underpinning, however far removed, of freedom, patriotism, morality and greatness? Can a nation long endure on its basis? Tocqueville had his doubts, as Zetterbaum indicates, and was partly of the opinion that freedom, the nation and virtue need, and deserve, to be loved for themselves. The reader, then, must either assume, along with most of our profession, that the proper political and extra-political institutions obviate the necessity for any high moral and intellectual qualities among the leaders and people of a democracy; or he must conclude that democracy requires an admixture of virtue in the old and strict sense, and cannot succeed without having at its foundation and in periodic renewal certain aristocratic elements (especially education) to overcome the inherent defects of the modern principle of self-interest.

In this book Zetterbaum has brought us face to face with Tocqueville's central problem only after penetrating beneath certain forms of concealment. He has not permitted himself to be distracted by lesser issues, biographical or historical; he is properly reluctant to charge Tocqueville with the sort of error only lesser minds are likely to commit; and he never presumes that he possesses, in present social science, a superior vantage point. The result is a major advance in Tocqueville scholarship. Nevertheless, one has the impression by the end of the book that certain relevant issues are left unsettled or unexplored. In part because no strict definition of "social condition" is essayed, Zetterbaum's attempts to compare Tocqueville's understanding of the relation between political and social matters with that of the ancients and other moderns remain unclear. And if Tocqueville really believes in the primacy of politics, as Zetterbaum contends, does he not damage the prospects for political greatness by the weight of his stress on social condition? It would also have been helpful if Zetterbaum had more systematically distinguished between what Tocqueville says about democracy (meaning modern democracy) and what can be said, or had earlier been said, about democracy per se. Finally, some additional attention to Tocqueville's conception of virtue, and to his overall relation to ancient and modern political philosophy is necessary before the reader can judge the claim that "... despite its novel elements, Tocqueville's program probably would not have struck even a classical political philosopher as unique. . . ."

Despite this incompleteness, Zetterbaum has gone a long way toward vindicating Tocqueville's reputation as a modern master, and thereby, we may add, toward raising the current level of discussion in American and comparative politics to within hailing distance of what it was more than a century ago. For if democracy needed a Tocqueville to explore its problems then, it is certainly in greater need of one now, and a political science incapable of sensing this has lost precisely the perspective that Tocqueville, among the moderns, is most capable of supplying.—DAVID LOWENTHAL, *Boston College*.

The Democratic Experience: Past and Prospects.

By REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND PAUL E. SIGMUND.
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 191.
\$5.95.)

In an early essay "On the Interpretation of *Weltanschauung*" Karl Mannheim distinguishes among three levels or dimensions of meaning in terms of which a cultural artifact can be interpreted: the "objective," the "expressive," and the "documentary." Interpretations of the first sort require us to refer the artifact to the standards and criteria of the *genre* to which it manifestly belongs; "expressive" interpretation involves an account of motives and intentions; and "documentary" interpretation sees the artifact in relation to more general patterns of social and cultural developments, it proceeds, in short, in the way that historians normally proceed with documents—as evidence about the way the world was at a time and in a place. There is a strong presumption that a review in a scholarly journal will operate at the first level of meaning: appropriate canons of theoretical adequacy will govern the interpretation and assessment of a book. That presumption cannot be overridden, I would imagine, in favor of the second level. If there is nothing worth discussing about a book except the intentions of the author and the personal needs satisfied in writing it, the book does not merit review. But some books are most interesting as documents and it will happen that discussion of some books can best contribute to critical self-awareness within our discipline if it pursues that interest.

The book under consideration here falls into this latter class. There are three parts of unequal length. In the first part, Reinhold Niebuhr interprets "The Democratic Experience in Western History"; in the second part, Paul E. Sigmund canvasses "The Prospects for Democracy in the Developing Areas" (within the span of eighty pages, there are chapters on Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia); and the last brief section contains a sketchy bibliographical essay in which Sigmund cites parallels to the basic contentions in the text in the writings of Robert Dahl,

Edward Shils, Seymour Martin Lipset, Harry Eckstein, and a few others. The basic contentions of the book can be quickly summarized. Speaking of the anti-Utopian proponent of democratic government, Niebuhr says:

His approach to the political order is characterized by a mature empiricism and realism. He knows that there are many forms of power, not merely one. He knows that there must be an equilibrium of social power as a basis of justice and he has developed a highly complex political organism with many forms of countervailing power. He also knows that the political authority which must establish the order of the community must be one, but that he must triumph over many forms of subnational communities to achieve this wholeness of authority and be able to speak for the whole community. (13)

The democratic experience, according to Niebuhr, involves three basic accomplishments: the creation of national units, the social and ideological constitution of "responsible individuals," and the attainment of some sort of social equilibrium. Developments in states not viewed as participants in that experience are assessed in terms of prospects for success in these regards. The perspective offered has a certain plausibility and the essays as written occasionally contain provocative suggestions, but it remains a thankless job to attempt a theoretical assessment of the argument (or to proceed at the "objective" level).

It is hard enough in any case to find agreement upon objective standards to which an interpretative essay can be held. But some guides are available. There must be a certain integrity of language. Niebuhr inveighs constantly against "Utopian" ideologies and perspectives, but constantly proclaims the "triumphs" which constitute the Western experience. Some would consider a history punctuated by triumphs as pretty Utopian indeed. The crucial term "equilibrium" is used so flexibly that there is no kind of relationship between forces which is not somewhere so designated. And so on.

A second demand often accepted as a general guide to interpretive writing is that it "orient" us to our situation, that it enable us to make the kinds of distinctions which we feel called upon to make in the course of our practical life, that it call attention to facts and forces which impinge upon us. This is a standard to which the authors appeal, I believe; but it is not a standard which can be applied without great disappointment. We get no help with the conflicts which mark contemporary prosperous nations; we get no help with their wars (it would be instructive, for example, to hear Niebuhr try to put his vigorous opposition to the war in Vietnam into the language of his essay); and we get very curious accounts of past and recent history in Germany, Katanga, and elsewhere. An attempt to encounter the book at an "objective" level involves a thankless falling

through open doors. The argument simply cannot be taken seriously in this way.

The book must be seen as a document of the time when American social science enlisted without much opposition or discomfort as an instrument of cold war policy. The genesis of the document is instructive: Sigmund had but recently completed a tour of duty with an intelligence agency when he and Niebuhr gave a joint course at Harvard almost ten years ago; Kenneth Thompson of the Rockefeller Foundation fostered a publication built upon that course; and Praeger published it. The circumstances and cast of characters are almost ideal-typical. There are nice questions about publication of this old manuscript at this time; but they are matters for speculation. The point is not any moralistic impugning of motives, but identification of a historical complex which helps us to understand the document and which is in turn further illuminated by it. Niebuhr writes:

Forswearing a utopian interpretation of our cause has the advantage of preventing disillusion and hysteria if, in the worldwide struggle, some of the nations allied with us do not reveal the resources necessary for the achievement of a healthy democracy. We will not be too disturbed by evidences of inadequate solutions to the problems of the responsible exercise of power. We will know that dictatorships are dangerous and that all irresponsible power creates abuses. But we will also know that in a world of change, governmental experiments are reversible if they are not controlled by a tight dogmatic system. (14)

It is not necessary to question the sincerity with which Niebuhr goes on to hope for a time when Communist dogmatism will give way to pragmatism and of his opposition to a crusading war; but we must note that the perspective sees only one conflict as ultimate reality and sets out to attack only that "hysteria" which could undermine the morale and unity of "our" side. The commitment expressed in such an enlistment may be defensible on rational moral grounds, as an act of responsibility. But the politics of that political and social inquiry are not longer persuasive to many and they certainly are not inherent in objective and empirical social research as such. The book is a document useful to the development of our discipline because it can be usefully studied as we proceed to clarify the relationships between ideology and theory.—DAVID KETTLER, *The Ohio State University*.

The Political Theory of John Dewey. By A. H. SOMMER. (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968. Pp. 208, \$7.50.)

John Dewey addressed himself to many of the same problems which still preoccupy us: the role of science in studying and evaluating public policy and politics, the dimensions and purposes of planning, the nature and validity of democracy, the

manner in which we identify and assess the hitherto unexpected but consequential effects of policy, and the relationship between political activity and psychological growth. Dewey can be considered a systems-builder and analyst who moved away from the black box and facile feedback loops that purport to explain causality. Insistent that we focus on the consequences of public policy, Dewey advanced into the uncertain world of multicausality, deferred effects, and uneven impact. The problems and challenges of Dewey's theory lie at this complex level.

While Dewey failed to provide a manageable set of standards for the evaluation of public policy, he promoted a temperament and method which is still relevant to political scientists. For Dewey, political analysis was more than just the advancement and study of values or the scientific examination of behavior and policy: they were hopefully to be synthesized in an effort to make the study of political phenomena both empirically based and socially relevant.

Professor Somjee in *The Political Theory of John Dewey* has undertaken the important task of examining Dewey's concepts of experience and common inquiry and relating them to democracy and planning. The author also seeks to examine the roots of Dewey's political theory and spends considerable time with several European theorists of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But Somjee, while providing several helpful insights, does not capture the dynamic quality of Dewey's thought. Somjee, who is expanding his doctoral dissertation written under Michael Oakeshott, examines the logical consistency of Dewey's theories and their relationship to both other theorists and the philosophy of science.

The section comparing Dewey with other writers contains several new interpretations, particularly the discussion on Dewey and Kant, but the author fails to draw a new perspective after he offers a corrective to earlier studies. Somjee often introduces stimulating themes without developing them. For example, he correctly recognizes that although Dewey owes a heavy debt to James, he was not simply an extension of James. However, Somjee based his conclusions on a few critical letters by Dewey and "his studious avoidance of James's principal ideas." (p. 57) It would have been informative to have explored the differences between these two American writers in a more systematic manner.

Dewey envisioned a scientific approach to comprehensive political planning. He distinguished between the application of the scientific method in the social sciences, which would lead to the expansion of knowledge, and the wholesale borrowing of scientific concepts appropriate to one field as necessarily applicable to all others, which would only

lead to a "form of absolutist logic" as the social Darwinists had earlier demonstrated. Although Somjee accepts Dewey's distinctions, he nevertheless insists that the scientific method is applicable to the study of public policy only when incremental reforms are undertaken. Comprehensive planning cannot be sufficiently "cautions, well-thought-out, and manageable," and "the harm done by any errors may . . . be irremedial." (p. 155) There are many reasons for preferring marginal change to major reorganization, but the alleged scientific integrity of the former over the latter is not substantiated here. In some situations, if only "trial-and-error" reforms are introduced, dysfunctional factors may intensify beyond a threshold where even more sweeping proposals are demanded. In other words, Somjee's "trial-and-error" reforms may lead to "irremedial" conditions.

Because of his preference for stability, Somjee offers some arresting notions about science and government. We are told that science requires a stable political system and that Dewey's program would produce an untenable milieu for the scientist. (p. 159) Part of Somjee's problem is that he does not distinguish between possible levels and areas of planning, simply juxtaposing his penchant for stability against Dewey's more comprehensive programs for change. But there are different magnitudes of change, and Somjee would have performed a substantial service had he focused on the relationship between instability and growth instead of offering postulates about political order and scientific advancement. Indeed, many of Somjee's problems stem from his decision to ignore one of the essential elements in Dewey's thought-growth. Dewey saw that what might contribute to growth at one period may endanger it at a later time. Furthermore, change entailed possible disadvantages as well as opportunities for certain types of growth, but so did the maintenance of existing arrangements. Choices between the present arrangement and other options could only be made after an exhaustive study, according to Dewey.

The task for political theorists, according to Dewey, is neither to find the totally painless way to a better society, which being an impossible enterprise means we never move, nor simply to identify the ideal polity and rush to achieve it, which means we move without any consideration of the risks or costs involved. Rather, the task is to specify the democratic values we seek to promote and the effects of programs on individuals in terms of these values. However, these problems are beyond the scope of *The Political Theory of John Dewey* and await exposition and analysis elsewhere. Professor Somjee's book can be recommended both to those who wish to find suggestive comparisons between Dewey and several of his European contem-

pories and to those who are unfamiliar with Dewey's epistemology and its relationship to Dewey's concepts of democracy.—RONALD J. TERCHEK, *University of Maryland*.

Progress and Disillusion; The Dialectics of Modern Society. By RAYMOND ARON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 230. \$5.50.)

In this book, Raymond Aron identifies and examines the major forces which he sees at work in the modern world. His analytical method is dialectical, in the sense that he confronts various ideals with various aspects of reality, a method which he had employed before, particularly in *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, in which he assessed marxist ideology in the light of the conditions of industrial society, and in *Espoir et Peur du Siècle*, in which he performed the same operation for the elements of conservative ideology.

The ideals which Aron discusses, and which he regards as inseparable from modern civilization, are equality, personality (or individuality) and universality. The first two ideals are familiar; universality is less so. He seems to regard universality as the organization of humanity into a single society, "the unification of mankind on a planetary scale" (p. 165), although it is not entirely clear whether he is thinking of a common political system or of the kind of economic equality among nations which would make possible a common mode of existence.

Some of the realities against which he sets these ideals spring from what Aron calls "the Promethean ambition—the urge, to borrow a Cartesian expression, to become the *masters and possessors* of nature" (p. 216), and to which he thinks the ideals may be subordinate. This ambition has produced the science, technology, industry, wealth and bombs which condition the national and international social orders in which men struggle to attain their ideals. But hardware are not the only social facts, and the realities with which Aron confronts the ideals also include social elements which are not directly related to the Promethean urge, such as family, school, culture, race and nation.

The book is divided into three parts. Part One, entitled "The Dialectic of Equality," explores aspirations toward equality within the context of the various forms of inequalities which characterize modern societies as the result of class stratification, oligarchic aspects of the distribution of political power, racism and ethnic conflicts.

Part Two, entitled "The Contradictions of Socialization," discusses the drive for personal fulfillment in the light of the constraints imposed by socializing agents: family, school and mass media, as well as the constraints of hierarchy and discipline imposed by economic systems which are im-

pelled either by a gospel of production or the goad of competition. The theme of the second part mixes with that of the first, as Aron discusses the impact of industrialization on the family itself.

Part Three, called "The Dialectic of Universality," contrasts the unifying forces of transportation and communication, the growth of English as the lingua franca of the planet, and the common application of science and technology with local indifference to distant concerns, the jealous assertion of national sovereignties, unequal rates of economic development, and ideological conflicts both among marxist-inspired nations and between them and the democracies.

The book has a broad sweep. In an attempt to define the distinguishing features of modern society, Aron has produced a sort of inventory of the forces making for conflict and unity both within and between nations. One great merit of the work is its effort to see modern society whole, to avoid partiality of analysis. Aron's sensitivity to all the currents at work in modern society is sufficiently great to have produced this statement, written before the French revolt of May-June 1968: "The indifference which so many citizens show toward their state and their rulers in countries where there is representative government . . . probably attests to a latent uneasiness which might suddenly explode in a crisis of wild passions" (p. 128).

But the price of comprehensiveness (within a comparatively short book) is that some matters must be dealt with too briefly. I feel that this is true, in particular, of Aron's treatment of the impact of mass media on social and political behavior. Is it correct to say that even though it is now possible to convey information rapidly about distant places and events, "none of this . . . affects the average viewer or reader as much as a quarrel with a neighbor or a colleague at the office, or the fluctuations of his own personal fortune" (p. 138)? This seems to me to understate the significance of the mass media with respect to such diverse matters as the nationalization of French politics and the evolution of American attitudes toward the Vietnam war.

But for each point which one may doubt, there are many more which impress. Aron has more ideas to the chapter than most people place in a book, and there is a concreteness and a problem orientation to the book that keeps it close to our current preoccupations at the same time as it places them within the three central analytical categories which provide the framework for the book.—ROY PIERCE, *University of Michigan*.

Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism. By ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER. (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969. Pp. 276. \$3.00.)

Most studies on Soviet views toward Africa have revealed more knowledge about the Soviet Union than the new African states. This book is no exception. In it, the author summarizes Soviet ideological writings about African socialism between 1955 and 1964. He focuses on the ideas mainly of the late dean of Soviet Africanists, Ivan Potekhin, and on the West African states of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The work makes several contributions. Professor Klinghoffer has a comprehensive knowledge of Russian language sources. He points out the significance of the Cuban revolution. At least for some Soviet ideologues, the Castro take-over in 1959 seemed to foreshadow other territories in the Third World becoming Marxist-Leninist states. In his concluding chapter, the author emphasizes the ambivalent, fluid, and pragmatic perspective taken toward African socialism. Soviet support for some ideas of African socialism stemmed from African opposition to capitalism and Western colonialism. Yet, the Russian realized that most Africans refused to identify socialism with "scientific socialism," Marxism-Leninism, or the Soviet interpretations. In foreign policy matters, African leaders did not always support the USSR's position. Domestically, no African states were ruled by a highly organized, centrally disciplined Leninist party. Like many Americans, the Russians often seemed confused about the fluid African situation. They lavished most attention on Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, presumably the states most sympathetic to the Soviet position. Yet their views toward Nkrumah, Touré, and Keita changed between 1955 and 1964. Professor Klinghoffer concludes that the Soviet position toward specific African states depended mainly on African foreign policy stands, not so much on internal social structure or domestic economic policies. If African socialists supported the Soviet foreign policies, then the Russian perspective tended to be more favorable. However, the Soviet writers definitely did not show a monolithic stand. Divergencies of opinion existed between those writers expressing sympathy for the incumbent African leaders and those revealing greater hostility.

The main weakness of this study lies in its wholly descriptive nature. There is a need for more explanation, analysis, and interpretation. The book is too much a repetitious description of different views toward African socialism. Professor Klinghoffer also exaggerates the effect of Soviet ideology on African economic policies and political party structure. He over-estimates the control exercised by the single party in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Although citing the writings of Soviet specialist Zbigniew Brzezinski, he never mentions the revisionist work of Aristide Zolberg on African political parties. If the author had consulted Zol-

berg, Henry Bienen, or Clement Moore, he would never have implied (p. 38) that "the African socialist regimes may be sowing the seeds of totalitarianism." Lacking a comprehensive knowledge of the internal socio-political structures of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, the author has confused ideological reality with the existential scope of power. When the "socialist regimes" can be easily overthrown by a military coup, as happened in Ghana in 1966 and Mali in 1968, then we have to assume that the single party lacks total control either to maintain the leaders in power or to initiate policies which would change social conditions. The main Soviet influence seems verbal, not organizational. Soviet and African interpretations of socialism use similar phrases. In actuality, the dominant Marxist influence came through the French Communist party and the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, not directly through the Soviet Union. Not Soviet economists but rather French economists with Marxist views have influenced some of the economic policies formulated by Guinean and Malian leaders. Greater attention to this source of influence, mainly found in former French West Africa, would have clarified the Soviet effects on Africa.

Professor Klinghoffer also does not take a too analytic view of African socialism. He tends to make misleading dichotomies about the ideas expressed by African socialists. For example, he distinguishes "parliamentary vs. revolutionary" socialists, moderate vs. radical socialists, nationalism vs. communism, and class vs. ethnic appeals. Yet these distinctions confuse more than clarify. The distinction between parliamentary and revolutionary socialists had some relevance to European states between the two world wars. Now even in Europe the revolutionaries have become part of the parliamentary system. Especially in West and East Africa there have been few real "revolutionaries" in the Soviet sense, largely because the French and British reluctantly agreed to yield political power to the African nationalist movements. Except in Algeria and in southern Africa, independence came largely through non-violent means. Moreover, the African legislatures have never possessed the power exercised by European parliaments. African power resides in the top executive leaders, the civil service, and the military. The author also does not seem to sense the relationship between class and ethnic group. He labels as ridiculous the Soviet interpretation that particular economic classes dominated the Nigerian and Kenyan states. Yet non-Soviet American scholars have made exactly this point. Relative to other states in West and East Africa, Nigeria and Kenya are rather economically well developed. Here class and ethnic ties reinforce each other; that is, particular ethnic groups have gained eco-

economic dominance and control of the government. The tensions between economic and primordial loyalties have partly accounted for the civil war in Nigeria. In short, the class and ethnic group explanations are complementary, not necessarily opposed. The same point can be made about nationalism and communism. A leader can be a nationalist as well as a communist, depending on the meaning attributed to communism. In one section (p. 175), Klinghoffer asserts that nationalism may be "a viable alternative to the development of communism in the African nations." In the conclusion, however, he implies that Guinea is headed toward some form of "national communism" (p. 247). Both assumptions depend on the definition of communism. Does he define communism economically (public ownership of the means of production), politically (total control by a Leninist party), or in reference to foreign policy matters, i.e., adherence to the Soviet foreign policy line or Soviet control of African nations through military and economic means? The meaning is not clear.

Besides the need to present a deeper analysis of the Soviet effects on African socialist policy, Professor Klinghoffer should have provided some complete explanations for the views taken by different Soviet specialists. He could have contributed greater background information about the scholarly institutes where Soviet Africanists carry out their research. Finally, the author offers no explicit explanations for the changes in Soviet perspectives toward African leaders. Presumably these changes reflect the current foreign policy line of the USSR, the changing distribution of power within the Soviet Union, the situation in the First World, and the fluid African conditions. The author mentions all these factors, but he needs to link them more explicitly to the Soviet ideological views. This information, as well as a more realistic assessment of the effect of Soviet ideas on African leaders, would have helped in transforming this descriptive account into an explanatory work.—CHARLES F. ANDRAIN, *San Diego State College*.

Political Theory: A Conceptual Analysis. By JOSEPH S. MURPHY. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968. Pp. xii, 267. \$7.35.)

This book "is written from the viewpoint of analytical philosophy; and it construes political theory as an activity whose purpose is the clarification and explication of political concepts" (p. vii). The author seeks to analyze critically "the central and pervasive issues of political theory." This approach, it is claimed, differs from, and is preferable to, "conventional treatments," which are chronological or which focus on the institutional contexts in which political ideas arise. Dr.

Murphy is "concerned with asking if a theory is true and adequate or false and deficient," and with stating reasons for his conclusions. The issues discussed are the meaning of the term "political theory," the ethical theory of natural law, the concept of the state, the concept of freedom, the relation between natural and social science, and the problem of values.

The author notes that "theory" in the study of politics has had a variety of meanings, including theory as metaphysics, theory as a science of behavior, theory as the methods and techniques of political manipulation, and theory as ideology. He suggests that due to an absence of agreed upon criteria of meaning, political theory has been more like philosophy or literature than like physics.

Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Margaret Mead, Jacques Maritain and Leo Strauss are considered as exponents of theories of natural law. Some trenchant criticisms of natural law theories are presented. For example, demands justified by natural law—e.g. for equality and for freedom—may not be fully compatible, but natural law does not provide us with criteria for resolving a dispute where such demands are in conflict. Murphy is also critical of attempts to support theories of natural law by reference to alleged cultural uniformities.

Throughout his book, Murphy offers criticisms based on logic and linguistic analysis. Occasionally his objections are trivial. For example, he cites St. Paul's dictum that every man in his heart knows "the law of God, which forbids man to sin, and commands him to do what is right." He then objects that "the logic of the words 'sin' and 'doing right' is such that it seems redundant to say that sin is forbidden." (p. 55). There may indeed be redundancy, but such an observation does not take us far toward an evaluation of natural law based on theology.

Cicero, Grotius and other exponents of natural law have described the *law of nature* as a dictate of *right reason*. Reason is thought to be man's defining characteristic and the foundation of his natural rights as a human being. But Murphy notes that reason in the narrow sense of the ability to abstract and generalize by the use of symbols varies greatly among men. Why, then, does the natural law theorist not conclude that the rights of men vary as their ability to symbolize varies? On the other hand, if reason is used in its broader sense to include expressions of intelligence not based on abstractions, it is no longer an exclusive attribute of human beings. Finally, Murphy points out that nature itself "does not and cannot provide us with standards or ideals" (p. 68). The author's discussion of the ethical theory of natural law is probably the strongest section of his book.

The author devotes two chapters each to an ex-

amination of conceptions of the state and conceptions of freedom. A contrast is drawn between holistic and individualistic theories of the state. The problem of determinism is considered, as well as positive and negative conceptions of freedom. Murphy also discusses the problem of explanation in the social sciences and concludes that "the scientific method appropriate to social inquiry is not significantly different on logical grounds from the methodology appropriate to the physical sciences" (p. 242).

In the final section of the book, the author returns to the problem of the ground of values. He asserts that "we must" find a "middle way" between "complete relativism and subjectivism" and an objectivism based on doctrines "metaphysical or theological in character." Dr. Murphy cites Stephen Toulmin in support of his "middle way," which involves emphasis on human reason. Murphy maintains that "what is best may be justified by an appeal to reason and found satisfactory if it is in accordance with the facts and if it is not at variance with the rules of logic" (p. 262). The position advanced remains sketchy, however. Problems, such as what happens when two conflicting alternatives each appear rational, and the possibility that individuals may have different concep-

tions of what is rational, are not dealt with.

Faced with the admittedly difficult task of evaluating major political and ethical concepts, the author too often merely summarizes what others have said and makes some minor points of logic, while leaving the important questions unresolved. This applies particularly to his chapters on the state and on freedom. In addition to expressing his own ideas more forcefully, Dr. Murphy might have relied less on lengthy quotations and improved the clarity and organization of the book.

This book unfortunately contains numerous errors in editing or printing including misspellings, word omissions and misplaced words. There is reason to believe such errors have been made on the following pages: 86 footnote, 87 footnote, 88, 98, 101, 105, 146, 147, 176, 177—three errors, 178, 261. The footnoting on p. 67 is inadequate.

The author has demonstrated considerable ability for critical analysis. He does not offer many original ideas, fresh answers or resolutions of the problems discussed. The book, nevertheless, will be of value for graduate and undergraduate students who wish a review of the issues and ideas which concern philosophically-oriented political theorists. —MICHAEL C. STRATFORD, *Central Michigan University*.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision. By ROBERT L. CRAIN, ELIHU KATZ AND DONALD B. ROSENTHAL. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969. Pp. 269. \$3.95.)

This book is billed as an advanced study in sociology, but Crain, Katz and Rosenthal present a political explanation of fluoridation decisions rather than a sociological one. The study uses statistical analysis of a large number (1,181) of fluoridation case studies, reconstructed from mail questionnaires distributed to city clerks, public health officers and newspapers editors in all American cities between 10,000 and 500,000 in population. Its authors have skillfully exploited their data to present a thorough examination of fluoridation decisions and to suggest some more general hypotheses about community decision making.

The point of departure in this study is the familiar alienation hypothesis: the assertion that local referenda, fluoridation referenda in particular, are defeated so frequently because citizens use referendum opportunities to express their alienation from the local political process. Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal take a larger view, arguing instead that the choice of decision making method in a community is a more important determinant of

the decision outcome. When decisions are made administratively, they demonstrate, a "yes" decision is more likely than when the process of choice involves a referendum.

But referenda are uncommon decision devices even at the local level, so the authors next determine why some decisions are made by referendum and other are not. They show that the explanation is to be found primarily in the timidity of elected city officials. Fearful of incurring the wrath of any vocal minority, or unable to reach agreement among themselves, many local officials fail to make an early administrative decision that would foreclose the opportunity for a referendum.

Fluoridation, the authors argue, is a complex and confusing issue to voters. Thus when a fluoridation decision does reach the public debate and referendum stage it is often defeated because voters react against an unclear scheme with uncertain risks and benefits, especially if elected officials do not take a strong stand in its favor. Finally the authors suggest that there is a city type—the "participative community"—where this sequence of events is most likely to occur. Such cities are identifiable primarily by their formal governmental structure, town meeting and nonpartisan mayor-council systems being most susceptible.

Multiple authorship may account for the one serious fault of this book, its confusing shifts in explanatory focus. For most of the book the alienation hypothesis is the target of criticism; suddenly in the last chapter it is supplanted by Kornhauser's mass society theory. But the research reported here is not really a direct test of Kornhauser's thesis. First it does not deal with national level systems, as Kornhauser does, but with limited function local governments. Second, it does not examine what happens under the conditions Kornhauser posits for a mass society; rather it challenges the validity of his assumptions about accessible elites and available masses. The author's point, that the timidity of political leaders has important consequences for the operation of a political system, is weakened by centering the discussion around Kornhauser.

The authors seem to have discovered part way through their research that they were investigating a phenomenon more general than fluoridation decisions. They begin with the decision outcome as their dependent variable, but this is soon replaced by the method of decision—administrative adoption, referendum, or “no action.” Finally in the last chapter the former dependent variable, tendency toward referenda, becomes the independent variable and the explanation shifts from an analytic one to the construction of a plausibility argument for the concept of the “participative community.”

Thus Crain, Katz and Rosenthal never directly confront the alienation hypothesis in the sense that they never attempt to predict passage or failure of fluoridation on the basis of political structure. Rather they show that passage or failure is strongly related to the kind of “track” that the decision gets onto, and then that the tracking of fluoridation decisions can be explained by looking at a city's political style and structure. It is still a matter for the reader's conjecture whether the tables running decision track against other variables are not hiding relevant variations because the “track” categories are not cleanly related to fluoridation success or failure. They do demonstrate, however, that mayoral support is important for success on both the administrative and referendum tracks.

One can also be skeptical about the feasibility of the research design because of the difficulties involved in getting the appropriate outcome data. Over half of the cities in the study fall into a category labelled “no action.” In reality, this category encompasses several situations that it would be very useful to distinguish. It includes cases where a fluoridation proposal was never really articulated, cases of “non-decision” where proposals were never acted upon by the community's power structure, and cases of explicit administrative “no” decisions. These distinctions would be quite inter-

esting to examine in light of the authors' theoretical explanations, but unfortunately the data were not available.

These criticisms aside, *The Politics of Community Conflict* is generally a persuasive and appealing book. Its authors' notion that city political leaders are expected to play a legitimizing role in important community decisions is a promising piece of theorizing which deserves to be explored further. As they are aware, of course, such a study needs other kinds of data, especially the role expectations that citizens have for their elected political leaders and for other community influentials.

The book's greatest value, however, lies in its perceptive treatment of the widespread phenomenon of the fluoridation controversy. If the assertion is correct that fluoridation decisions are merely extreme cases of a wide class of local political decisions, then the authors will have done social science a valuable service by looking beyond the issue-specific features of fluoridation politics to a more general understanding of community decision making. In any case they have presented a useful critique of the individual alienation paradigm, especially as it has been used to explain behavior, and they have reaffirmed the value of system level explanations for system level phenomena such as community decision outcomes.—ROBERT EYESTONE, *University of Minnesota*.

Representatives and Roll Calls: A Computer Simulation of Voting in the Eighty-eighth Congress.

By CLEO H. CHERRYHOLMES AND MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969. Pp. 196. \$7.50.)

A large number of propositions concerning the antecedents of legislative votes are brought together in this book and converted into a computer program for generating simulated congressional votes. At least 84 per cent of the resulting simulated votes agree with the actual votes cast, on 21 roll calls concerning the federal role, and 27 concerning foreign affairs, in the House of Representatives in 1963–64.

The simulation program consists of two major parts. In the *predisposition phase*, each representative is assigned a voting predisposition (toward yea or nay) on the basis of his party, state, region, constituency, committees, and positions taken by the President, signers of minority reports, etc. Those representatives whose predispositions fall outside certain limits are assigned yea or nay votes, while the rest then enter the *communication phase*. Each representative who enters this phase is assigned “conversation partners,” including the President, legislative leaders, and the congressional rank and file. These assignments in-

clude a random element. As result of each simulated conversation, the predisposition of each representative who entered this phase is altered toward the predisposition of the partner. After all the "conversations," positive predispositions are converted to simulated yeas, and negative predispositions to nays.

To carry out the simulation, the investigator must code each roll call as to the types of support it is expected to receive, such as that from party, region, and constituency types. These judgments, while subject to error, are a necessary part of any such prediction; and as long as they are not based on the roll-call votes being predicted, they are not subject to fundamental criticism. But in the simulation, the investigator must apparently also estimate numerical values of several dozen parameters—contributions of numerous variables to the predisposition, or probabilities of conversation with various types of partners—and the procedure by which these estimates (or guesses) were made seems less clearly justifiable.

The assignment of values to these parameters seems a major weakness of this study, and indeed, of all simulation studies of its type, if they are alleged to be tests of hypotheses. Perhaps this difficulty can be made clearer if we compare the procedure with that of multiple regression. The predisposition phase might be compared with a regression prediction in which constituency, state, region, and leadership variables were the predictors. The communications phase might be compared with a regression in which the votes of a subset of the legislators with intermediate predispositions were predicted from the average predispositions of other sets of legislators whose votes had previously been determined, such as those in a particular party, party leaders, committee members, or state delegations.

The central point of this criticism is that methods like regression analysis (including probit analysis) permit a new estimate of the contribution of each predictor for the data at hand, or a new test whether the previously estimated contribution of a variable holds for these data. Even if methods of this type should be impracticable for a given model, it still seems incumbent on the authors of such a model to ask whether the parameters assumed are the best, or whether in fact the variables introduced are all really necessary. A hint of this difficulty is given by the results of the "just party" model, presented by the authors: for the federal role and foreign affairs votes studied, the proportion of votes accounted for correctly was 78 and 83 per cent respectively. The authors do show that certain features of the model make positive, negligible, or negative contributions, but these are gross features; these demonstrations do not provide new estimates of the numerical values of doz-

ens of individual parameters, or tests as to whether these parameters are necessary.

While the cumulation of plausible hypotheses from the literature, together with plausible values of parameters, may give the simulator a feeling that he has approximated the complex reality of congressional decision making, it violates important canons of scientific research. It risks the perpetuation of partial or qualified findings that have appeared in the literature—including, in this case, some of my own findings that will not bear the weight placed on them. It foregoes the opportunity to test and reject such earlier findings, which may not hold under new conditions. It proliferates variables that may overlap and duplicate one another (though the authors have revealed a few instances of this type themselves). An alternative would be a model with fewer contributory variables but with a possibility of testing the contribution of each one; such summary variables might result from a preliminary combination of detailed variables, using methods such as principal component analysis.

The main value of a simulation model of this sort seems to be that it *generates* hypotheses involving fewer variables than the entire model, hypotheses that may then be tested on a more restricted scale with appropriate controls. One realm in which such hypotheses may be tested is the intractable one of "power." The process by which this model separates those congressmen presumed to have made up their minds, from those presumably influenced by their conversation partners, may provide useful clues to the measurement of power and influence. A shortcoming of some power measures based on roll-call statistics is that they have treated each legislator equally as giver and receiver of influence, and have failed to separate his predisposition from his final vote. Conceivably an extension of the reasoning in this model could measure the influence given and received by particular legislators, and provide measures of power that could be validated independently.

Thus, while this type of simulation model may provide some insights as to the implications of previous findings, it provides no rigorous replicative test of these findings and cannot therefore be regarded as a tested scientific hypothesis. It is a cumulation of particular speculative hypotheses, most of which are untested on the data at hand. It may well be a source of further testable hypotheses; but its scientific value lies in this future possibility far more than in the accomplishments presented in his book. An incidental virtue of the book, however, is that it presents extensive and organized bibliographies on simulation and on legislative behavior.—DUNCAN MACRAE, Jr., *The University of Chicago*.

Selective Service and a Changing America. By GARY L. WAMSLEY. (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 259. \$2.95, paper)

This study has two dominant themes which, to be fair to reader and author, should be reviewed separately. First, Wamsley provides us an excellent case study of administrative politics; he simultaneously informs regarding the Selective Service System and instructs regarding politics in semi-invisible administrative agencies. Second, the study is an exploration of the hypothesis that the survival of an institution is dependent on how it adapts to the political culture. In short, the book has a topical theme, the Selective Service under fire, and a theoretical focus, the necessity for social structures to be consonant with cultural values. About the theoretical issue we will have more to say shortly, but first a few remarks about the book as a case study of the Selective Service System.

Wamsley has drawn a precise and informative picture, but not overdrawn it. Although his own preferences and judgments are clear—despite frequent disclaimers—they do not much interfere with the presentation. Social scientists ignorant of the workings of the selective service system, as I was prior to reading Wamsley's study, will be rewarded by the few hours it takes to read it. And, of course, there is more than just descriptive information about a governmental agency. To briefly note just two of the points I found the most interesting. The book makes clear what criteria are used by draft boards to establish, in effect, a national manpower policy. "Board decisions rest upon middle class values, a legionnaire outlook, and upon diffuse and particularistic interaction with the registrant or his file." (p. 154). Elsewhere the author points out that the potential draftee with scientific and technical skills is most likely to avoid military service. On balance, what we learn from this investigation of selection criteria is something about the priorities of a group of men who control a particularly interesting governmental agency. The Selective Service System is rivaled only by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in its ability to cut through the protective layers between citizen and government to directly affect lives. That the decision rules of this agency have seldom been subjected to public scrutiny can only astound. A study of these decision-rules tells us much about the implicit values which the U.S. lives by. (In fact, such a study may well tell us more about the "political culture" than attitude surveys.)

Another, and related, series of observations in the study puts it firmly in the tradition of the many "demythologizing" books presently being published by American social scientists. The Selec-

tive Service System has lived by its myths (voluntarism, civilian control of the military, decentralization of decisions, an intimacy between citizen and state). First political and now scholarly attacks on these myths, coupled with a more realistic account of the actual operation of the System, have begun to make vulnerable what has for decades been one of the most invulnerable administrative agencies. The book contains much that is relevant to an understanding of an institution under attack.

However, even as a case study the book is flawed in one important regard. The struggle to explain the decline of support for the Selective Service would have been eased had the author more systematically placed the mounting attack on the draft in the context of an unpopular war. There is an air of unreality about the book, as if what is happening regarding the draft is not completely a part of what is happening in civilian-military relations in this country. In fact, if anything, the inequities of the draft spearheaded the changing mood toward the military-industrial complex. Somehow this is slighted. To be sure, the author is not ignorant of what is happening. For instance, he clearly notes how a surplus labor pool combined with increasing callups underscored the arbitrariness of the manpower policy being followed by local boards. What is missing in the book is an integration of this fact into the general analysis. But this is to anticipate the second part of the review, which is about the "general analysis."

Wamsley did not just want to write a case study. He also wanted to write about institutions and culture. To do so he commits several of the worst social science sins. He reifies, he fails to operationalize, he uses theoretical constructs as if they were empirical variables, he introduces and then ignores requisite analysis, and so forth. One quotation will provide some flavor: "It is suggested that societal imperatives can be more clearly understood if characterized as political culture. Therefore, a conscription system must always seek an equilibrium between efficiently procuring manpower to defend the society and society's demands that the procurement be done in accordance with norms and values of political culture." (15) There are many, many sentences of this type—all, to the reviewer at least, somewhat bewildering. What the author is asserting throughout is that American political culture is changing. Thus, an institution which earlier was consonant with that culture, but which has not been altered, is now in conflict with cultural values and consequently is politically vulnerable. One thing only needs to be said about this type of social analysis. "Political culture" if it be a variable at all, is a global, diffuse, and macro one. It cannot be forced to do the work of an independent variable in what

is finally a causal theory. Such an attempt can only lead to reification and sentences which grow more abstract with each phrase. About political culture as an independent variable one is tempted to say, "that which explains all, explains nothing."

If one cuts through the language about "the institution's ability to achieve acceptance by relating its structure and processes to American political values," I think what the reader finds is a telling point about contemporary politics. It is a point which in its theoretical implications is more in the tradition of political sociology, with its emphasis on power and social class, than structural functional analysis, with its emphasis on societal requisites and political cultures. The Selective Service has long been under the control of the middle-class activists who control most local agencies—city councils, school boards, etc. The Selective Service therefore has been organized around the values dear to this part of the citizenry; it has allocated benefits and penalties in such a manner as to generally reward some social classes and racial groups more than others. This particular fact has become clearer to many citizens at a moment when political organization is increasing among previously disorganized citizens and when disenchantment with military policy is peaking. In short, the invisible Selective Service System managed by the paternal figure of Lt. General Hershey is now visible, thus politically vulnerable, and Hershey can no longer hide himself and his policies behind the protective shield of the invincible military. If there is a theoretical lesson to be learned about American political culture, it is not found in the obfuscating language about "structural-cultural consonance" but in the clear empirical finding that a mistake of the dimensions of Vietnam is bubbling up and will continue to do so throughout American institutions. It is this contagion effect which is the theoretically potent, if implicit, finding in Wamsley's study.—KENNETH PREWITT, *University of Chicago*.

Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community. EDITED BY LOUIS H. MASOTTI AND DON R. BOWEN (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1968. Pp. 459. \$8.50.)

This volume contains a collection of 25 articles, about half of which originally appeared in the March-April, 1968 special issue of the *American Behavioral Scientist* edited by the authors. The essays are of uneven quality and the haste of preparation often is painfully evident both in the analyses and the editorial work. However, there are some important questions raised here about the causes and consequences of the recent disturbances in our cities.

It is difficult to piece together an accurate account of the actual events of the last few summers

and especially difficult to make an acceptable *post hoc* evaluation of the motives of the participants, even when they are available for interviews. As Alan Grimshaw points out in his piece on "Three Views of Urban Violence: Civil Disturbance, Racial Revolt, Class Assault," no simple explanation will do. Whatever complex of forces stimulated the events and whatever the varied motives of the participants, both moderate and militant blacks now subscribe to the racial revolt thesis and there is evidence, as Grimshaw points out, of "a growing increase in the strength of the previously attenuated solidarity between Negro middle and lower classes."

If we accept, as do the editors of this volume and most of the authors, a notion that these were primarily revolts against the system (or as Masotti and Bowen call them, examples of "civil violence . . . characterized by attacks on symbols of the political order *because* they are symbolic of that order—though in this case spontaneous and not attempts to seize state power"), then it is not much of an explanation of say that participants and their sympathizers are relatively deprived, dissatisfied or alienated. We need to know more about the nature of the deprivation and commitment to these tactics among blacks (versus more "legitimate" political behavior or even organized rebellion), so that the factors can be identified which will alleviate, cool down, or exacerbate the situation leading to unrest.

A great deal of work remains to be done on the issue of deprivation. The concept of relative deprivation assumes the existence of a reference group or base line which serves as a meaningful standard for the individual. In most studies of civil violence it is either measured very indirectly (Gurr, for example uses indices of "short-term" and "persisting" deprivation) or by means of such devices as the Cantril Self-anchoring Scale which indicates the discrepancy between an individual's definition of the best possible life for him and his actual and/or expected situation. In the latter case, the base line is clearly the person's own standards which may be determined by a host of factors such as class or race models, or expectations created by the media. If psychological deprivation plays the role assigned it by many theorists, we not only have to understand the processes which determine the mode of its political expression, but also its genesis. Both the nature of the relevant reference group and the way a person learns that he is deprived should be important determinants of the intensity and expression of deprivation. Successful revolutionary elites, in fact, recognize this fact and devote a great deal of effort to characterizing (and provoking) the enemy and members of the "oppressed" group in a way that creates and/or intensifies a sense of deprivation and guides behavior. Tactics, reference groups, so-

cial conditions, and communications networks are interacting elements in this process.

Previous research, summarized by Leonard Berkowitz in this volume, indicates that a sudden decline after steady improvement or a growing gap between rapid improvement and even more rapidly increasing expectations sets the stage for upheaval, but Berkowitz correctly points out that "a complete understanding of the violence (in America's cities), and especially the contagious spread from one city to another, requires consideration of a multiplicity of causes, all operating together." We are now beginning to accumulate good time-series psychological data which should help in refining the complex models necessary to understanding the sources (and consequences) of civil violence.

Granted that much has to be done, an indication of the possible payoff of developing complex models can be found in the chapter by Ted Gurr. The article in Masotti and Bowen's collection is an abbreviated version of Gurr's work reported in recent issues of *World Politics* and this *Review* which interested students should consult for a full explication of his position. Seven independent variables are employed to explain the magnitude of turmoil ("relatively spontaneous, unstructured, mass strife, including demonstrations, political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions") in 114 nations from 1961-1965. Gurr uses partial correlations derived from a multiple regression using all predictors to sketch a model of the sequential causes of turmoil. He finds that

if coercive forces are large and loyal, if few facilitative conditions are present [extremist organizations, good terrain, etc.] and most important if there is no tradition of civil violence, short-term deprivation is unlikely to lead to violence. If these intervening conditions are substantially different, however, even mild deprivation is likely to result in turmoil. [In addition,] high legitimacy is an important and independent source of low turmoil.

Applying these findings to the American situation, Gurr believes that our tradition of violence, the growth of extremist organizations, and the increasing number of black Americans who seem to regard the political system as illegitimate all suggest that "turmoil will be chronic in the near future." In addition, if racial discrimination (an element of the measure of long-term deprivation) persists, then, according to Gurr, the country is likely to experience violence regardless of the state of the intervening conditions cited above since long-term deprivation has "a major direct effect on the magnitude of turmoil." If one assumes that most blacks' psychological reaction to discrimination has changed radically—they no longer see it as inevitable and will not stand for it—and that discrimination is not about to disappear, then the implications are discouraging for the near

future. If Gurr's model is basically correct, inaction should have severe long-run consequences. The political problem, of course, is that positive governmental programs often create short-term problems and have a mixed effect on legitimacy since they anger many whites because of perceived governmental favoritism toward blacks and at the same time raise expectations in the black community well beyond achievements. Faced with the prospects of competitive mobilization within the two racial communities, leaders are tempted to do nothing during their own tenure or play to the sentiments of the large minority of angry whites.

It is very important to stress the fact that Gurr's findings have implications for whites as well as blacks. Many whites, for a variety of reasons, are also questioning the legitimacy of the government, feel that they are being deprived, and are part of our culture in which violence has been fairly commonplace. One problem which political scientists interested in public policy must examine further is that the very policies which are designed to aid blacks not only foster at least short-run discontent in the black community, but stimulate backlash among whites. The tenor of this backlash is ultimately the crucial factor in today's profound crisis in American politics.—JOEL D. ABERBACH, *The University of Michigan*.

Government Without Passing Laws: Congress' Nonstatutory Techniques for Appropriations Control. By MICHAEL W. KIRST (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969, pp. 167 \$5.00)

Encompassed by the constraints of developments which have recognized the need for administrative flexibility and rules which prohibit legislation in appropriations bills, how can appropriations committees and Congress nonetheless control the activities of administrative agencies? Michael Kirst has found that they have come to rely on nonstatutory techniques, primarily appropriations hearings, reports accompanying bills, and debates on the bills.

In this study Kirst raised a number of questions: 1) what are proper areas of committee control, 2) how and under what conditions are non-statutory devices effective control techniques, 3) why are they employed, 4) are there any "dangers" inherent in their use, and 5) does the use of these devices assure the committees' meeting their proper roles? The questions constitute a mixture of normative (1, 4, 5) and explanatory (2, 3) concerns toward a particular policy.

In a somewhat syllogistic style of analysis Kirst finds it proper for appropriations committees to be involved in both broad substantive policy and administrative details of that policy. For one, they are already affecting policy by setting agency fund

levels and conditions for spending. Further, legislative committees have failed, through disinterest or inability, to exercise close control over policy. Because some Congressional group must assume responsibility, it is proper that appropriations committees step in. It necessarily follows that control over administrative details is necessary to control broad policy. Committees are thus free to utilize nonstatutory techniques to control both policy and administrative detail, and any evaluation of these techniques must be in the context of their contribution to these ends. At all times, however, the committees' use of these techniques must be under the ultimate control of the parent house. This is a practical justification where one easily gains the impression that the purpose of the argument is to establish the legitimacy of an unrestricted study of the techniques, rather than a legal/constitutional inquiry. Otherwise we would expect Kirst to address himself to a development which he mentions on the next to last page of the book—that legislative committees are indeed demonstrating greater interest in oversight of policy through the requirement of annual authorizations (over 35 percent of the money in the President's 1967 budget was subject to annual authorization). Does this development reduce or eliminate the propriety of appropriations committees' involvement in substantive policy?

Kirst attempts to answer the remaining questions by drawing on earlier writers (e.g., MacMahon, Wallace, Huzar), by analyzing the printed Congressional documents relating to appropriations bills (hearings, reports, and *Congressional Record* debates), and from interviews with some committee members (6) and clerks and departmental budget officers.

In a style similar to Wildavsky's and Fenno's studies of appropriations politics (eclectically utilizing quotes from the printed record to illustrate or establish his point) Kirst demonstrates the delicateness and subtleties involved in nonstatutory control, both during hearings and in reports, where carefully developed language serves as a code guide to agency behavior. Agencies must learn this code and calculate the risks in failing to adhere.

Committees assure congruence between their language and agency behavior by asking questions at next year's hearing, investigating, inserting legal restrictions in the bill, and cutting budgets. The effectiveness of these sanctions depends upon internal agreement among subcommittee members, the political clout of the subcommittee, agreement by other Congressional sets, and whether the control attempt conflicts with broad administration policy.

Appropriations committees resort to nonstatutory techniques to overcome and satisfy the constraints cited at the outset of the review. Because

they are not legally binding it affords the committee the opportunity to express its wrath while making it possible for the agency to disregard the message if later circumstances justify. Mutual accommodation harms no one. The devices also make possible committee initiative in policy areas without incurring points of order and questions during floor debates. Does all this not serve to allow appropriations committees to operate unchecked? No, for the entire appropriations process serves to confirm or dilute a control attempt made at one point. An "instruction" by the house committee, if not repeated by the Senate or conference report, or if countered by sufficient commentary during floor debate, could lose its mandatory character in the eyes of the agency (if not in the eyes of the originator). Kirst's overall evaluation is that the legislative body has the opportunity and has demonstrated both the willingness and capacity to control its committee. In light of this guarantee Kirst concludes that nonstatutory techniques should not be surrendered as long as they continue to serve to meet the proper role of the committee.

The principal problem of the book is that Kirst attempted to simultaneously serve both evaluative and explanatory objectives in a brief space using a broad general descriptive research and reporting approach that served neither objective adequately nor sufficiently. We are not provided with a systematic empirically arrived basis for his evaluations. More hard data are necessary to support conclusions from which policy evaluations can be made. First steps must be taken, and the problem of the book is also its virtue. Kirst has taken a successful first step in this area. Our understanding of the use of nonstatutory techniques has been deepened by this study.

To this reviewer then, the contribution of the book rests not in its normative treatment for Kirst's policy analysis is not very powerful nor convincing, but in those chapters where he describes the processes and behavior related to the use of the techniques. It is here where students of the appropriations process and executive-legislative relations will find a useful addition to the literature. Further, while Kirst appears to eschew systematic analysis of quantified data himself (the only table in the book and his commentary may provide evidence why), the possibilities for pursuing interesting theoretical and policy questions related to nonstatutory techniques in such a manner are evident. It is hoped that a number of readers will peruse this volume to explore the comparative research possibilities latent within. Following such research an evaluative study of the nonstatutory techniques policy could be more convincing to political scientists.

The reader should also be alerted to some dis-

quieting features of the book resulting in part from editing carelessness in updating and expanding a dissertation for publication, and in a tendency to repeat points and footnotes which creates a "deja vu" feeling. This tendency can be attributed to the organization of the book rather than to any attempt to stretch the research input.—JAMES E. JERNBERG, *University of Minnesota*.

The Negro in Third Party Politics, By HANES WALTON, JR. (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 1969. Pp. 123. \$4.50.)

Professor Walton's study of *The Negro in Third Party Politics* fills a very significant and irritating void in the literature of American political parties. Although, as he readily admits, there have been two books published in the general area, neither of these go beyond the Negro and the Communist Party.

The Negro in Third Party Politics is a brief but fact-filled historical account of third-party activities affecting the status of the American Negro. It is divided into two major periods—pre- and post-Civil War—with major emphasis upon the post-Civil War period since it was only after the Civil War that the potential "Negro vote" began to appeal to the major and minor parties. In his discussions of the pre-Civil War period, Professor Walton concentrates on the slavery policies of the parties and attempts to assess the impact of these parties upon the abolition of slavery. The anti-slavery parties, (the Liberty Party, the Free Soil, the National Liberty Party, the Political Abolition Party), he concludes, aided in the eventual abolition of slavery by publicizing the evils of slavery. The pro-slavery parties (the Nullification Party, Southern Rights Party, the Native American Party, the Know-Nothing Party, the Constitutional Union Party) inadvertently aided the anti-slavery forces by making slavery "a primary political issue . . ." and thereby sharpening "the factional rivalry in both major parties over it."

The post-Civil War section is devoted to the policies of third parties as they relate to the achievement of "full citizenship" by Negroes. The theme which seems to emerge from this section is that the Negro vote, particularly since the end of the Civil War, has been almost constantly misused. It is not clear whether the author intended to project this theme. Nevertheless, the data offered clearly demonstrate that all too often the Negro has been used as a pawn in the game of power politics.

Many examples of the misuse of the Negro's voting strength occurred during the period following the Civil War when Republicans, because of fear of the consequences of restoring home rule to the South, guided the Negro vote. As the author points out, "many devices were used by northern

soldiers, agents of the Freedman's Bureau, and the Union League, to see that the Negro voted properly, i.e., for the Republican Party."

A more recent example of attempts to misuse the Negro can be taken from the experiences of the Union Party of the 1930's which "was a coalition of Father Charles Coughlin's 'Social Justice' followers, and the followers of Senator Huey Long's 'Share the Wealth' movement. . . ." Prior to the 1936 elections the Union Party openly sought the support of Negro voters by calling for an end to discrimination against anyone because of color. It was obvious that the Union Party was attempting to deceive Negro voters. The attempted deception was so obvious, as Professor Walton points out, that the "N.A.A.C.P., in an editorial, urged Negroes to 'beware of Coughlin and anyone he supports.'" In case after case the data suggest that in many instances third parties, like the major parties, have used the Negro vote for their own selfish gains without regard for the welfare of Negroes.

In addition to providing an excellent history of the Negro and third party politics, Professor Walton has assembled an admirable political history of the American Negro in that he has gone beyond merely stating the various positions of the minor parties as these affect America's most oppressed minority. He has additionally recounted in some detail many political episodes directly affecting the Negro. One example of these political episodes is Professor Walton's interesting discussion of Theodore Roosevelt and the question of seating Negro delegates from the North and the South at the 1912 National Convention of the Progressive Party.

In spite of the many positive features of this study, it does suffer from one major shortcoming—the apparent lack of information about contemporary "all-Black" third parties. It may well be that these parties will become the vehicles through which the Negro will make felt his newly-found political power. In view of this possibility, any study of the Negro and third party politics should place considerable emphasis upon "all-Black" third parties.

The Negro in Third Party Politics is a very readable study of a most interesting topic. Every serious student of American political parties must become acquainted with this work.—EDWARD JACKSON, *Southern University*.

Planning and Politics in the Metropolis. By DAVID C. RANNEY. (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1969. Pp. 179. \$2.25.)

David Ranney has done students of urban politics a service by synthesizing much of what we know about the relationships between physical

planning and city politics. His book converts much of the best knowledge garnered from modern political science and planning theory, at both the city and metropolitan levels, into an integrated text. That the task has been done by a planner and not a political scientist is auspicious since up to the present, concern for the politics of planning by planners themselves has been rare.

Ranney discusses the variables current research indicates are critically relevant to planning action, in terms of Banfield and Wilson's notion of the city as having service and conflict management functions. What the planner recommends is categorized as the "service" aspect of planning policy decisions. This is effected by the attitudes of the planner, the type of planning agency a city has, the nature of federal policies and metropolitan jurisdictional divisions (only the Department of Housing and Urban Development loves the metropolitan planner); and the kind of political system the planner confronts. How the political system reacts to the planner's proposals (the "conflict management" aspect of planning) depends on the kinds of planning policies pursued, the values the community holds about the functions of government, the role of the planner, the distribution of power among various segments of the community (less important in the long run than is generally believed), and the socio-economic characteristics of the city.

Ranney also describes what planners normally do and touches base on new developments in the planning profession which are occurring as it begins to lose confidence in its ability to make the environment better for urban dwellers. He traces the movement from urban physical to social and policy planning and more recently, to advocacy planning.

There is more specificity about factors affecting planning than about the outcome whose variation is examined. This is because a thesis central to the book is that planning is not an end state but a process. While Ranney describes the activities in which planners engage, he believes it is incorrect to regard planning as producing a master plan or capital improvement program. Planning is instead the series of actions and reactions occurring from the time a planner makes a set of recommendations to the time when political actors determine what to do about these, plus feedback.

Ranney offers hypotheses about how each category of independent variables affects the service and political functioning of planning. The weakest discussion is that on the impact of socio-economic factors. Ranney says environment influences planning but is unable to specify how. Is this because of a dearth of studies? Or is it that planning actually does operate in a partial environmental vacuum? Other categories are richer, and simulta-

neously, more open to challenge. For example, Ranney says that great political participation in planning means a less cheerful prospect for the original plan. This reflects the notion that the more citizens participate in local affairs, the greater the chance of conflict and hence the lower the level of performance. And, Ranney adds that if a community is made up of groups which subscribe to a "public-regarding" ethos, planning activities will have a better chance of achieving their aims than where "private-regarding" views dominate. This reflects the view that planning serves a middle class definition of the public interest. Recent research indicates that neither of the hypothesized relationships holds without qualification in other policy areas: indeed, the more groups and actors participating in current decisions, the higher the level of outputs sometimes observed.

The possibilities for argument over explicit hypotheses are an indication of the strengths of the text. It is where such argument is foreclosed that its weaknesses lie. Ranney gives us statements about relationships within categories of variables but among categories he has given up the good fight. Yet it is in the interaction among the variables that the most compelling issues now lie. If a primary resource of the planner is his technical expertise and expertise needs to be linked to action, what costs are incurred when the technician plays politician? Given that planning in different territorial subsystems is a different process, in which is role more important than organization, and in which is community type most significant in predicting outcomes? And, is there any combination of variables which allows us to link city planning to changes in the quality of urban society in the current era of community revolution?

In part it is Ranney's conviction that planning is a process and not an output measurable by expenditure indicators and completed plans, in part his sensitivity to the diversity of communities engaged in planning, and in part the state of the source literature, that makes him hesitant to weight variables or enumerate interaction rules. This position is certainly intellectually respectable. But I for one would like to know how Ranney, who has read all there is to read about city planning and its politics, guesses particular causes act in producing particular consequences, and evaluates the work on planning that has been done.

It is useful to have the variables affecting city planning enumerated and explored. But the effort runs the risk of committing that great crime—irrelevance—when it stops short of discriminating among variables or asking if existing definitions of and research on planning are not marginal to the conditions of urban life in 1970. Of course, the writer who walks out on a limb well beyond exist-

ing studies runs the risk of being called irresponsible. The dilemma is Ranney's, but hardly his alone.—FRANCINE N. RABINOVITZ, *University of California, Los Angeles*.

Education and Politics: The Developing Relationship Between Elementary-Secondary and Higher Education. By MICHAEL D. USDAN, DAVID W. MINAR, AND EMANUEL HURWITZ, JR., (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1969. Pp. 190. \$6.50.)

Educational goods and services are one of the more socially significant as well as expensive outputs of the political systems of modern societies. But until very recently the politics of education was a virtually unknown domain of political scholarship and research. As a result, we now know relatively little about the politics of education in a period of history when the political significance of education is rapidly expanding. Happily, a growing number of political scientists as well as professional educators are now turning their attention to the study of educational politics. In a few cases this is a collaborative effort that blends the particular interests and skills of the educator and political scientists. Such is the case with *Education and State Politics* by Michael Usdan, David Minar and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr. Minar is a political scientist with a long-time scholarly interest, as well as some practical experience, in the politics of education. Usdan and Hurwitz are professional educators who combine an experience in several kinds of educational roles with considerable background in the academic study of politics. The result of this collaboration is a short book which should prove useful to both the educational politicians and the academic scholar seeking to understand changing character of the politics of American education.

The book, as its sub-title indicates, focuses upon the relationship between elementary and secondary education on the one hand and higher education on the other. It begins by noting that historically the American education system as a system through which "the country's resources are allocated and organized for education" has been highly fragmented. Not only has the system been fragmented across levels of government and between different units at each level, it is also fragmented in the division that historically has separated elementary-secondary and higher education. This boundary, which was once accepted as so natural as to warrant little comment, is now being eroded as a result of a variety of socio-cultural changes, including the expanding cost of education, growing skepticism about the effectiveness of many established educational forms and procedures including the traditional divisions between grade levels, and the growth of demands for new

educational services such as programs in vocational and adult education that overlap the traditional provinces of the schools and the universities and colleges. There is now emerging, the authors argue, a slowly integrating overall educational system in which the traditionally separate and partially isolated levels of American education are becoming components of a single system in which traditional relationships of mutual isolation between the schools and higher education are giving way to relationships of collaboration and conflict. This book is an effort to describe and to evaluate these emergent relationships in order to develop answers to three general categories of questions: (1) What forms are the changing relationships between elementary-secondary and higher education assuming? (2) What processes are affecting the relationships? (3) Why do these forms and processes differ as they do from state to state?

The authors attempt to develop answers to these questions by doing two things. First, using data obtained from interviews with relevant decision-makers, the analysis of documents, and reading of press accounts, they construct "profiles" of the relationship of elementary-secondary and higher education in twelve selected states. These descriptive profiles, which evidence an admirable degree of comparability, seek to describe in abbreviated form the organization of education in each of the twelve states, the critical issues involved in inter-level relationships, and projections about the future of these relationships.

Secondly, using these profiles and the larger sets of data from which the profiles were constructed the authors develop a comparative analysis of what they term to be "some major elements" in interrelationships of pre-collegiate and collegiate education. This analysis is focussed upon patterns of inter-level conflict and cooperation. Cross-state differences are noted and analyzed in terms of a range of factors which might partially account for or explain variable patterns of conflict and collaboration. These include the changing structure or character of major interests in educational politics, e.g., the growth of militant teacher organizations; the formal structure of educational government, e.g., elected vs. appointed state board and/or superintendents; the structure of state political systems; the character of the issues involved in inter-level relationships; and the socio-economic environment of state educational systems.

The book concludes with a brief outline of policy recommendations. Given the fact that the schools on the one hand and universities and colleges on the other are no longer isolated organizations but rather components within a single system of educational politics, the future of inter-level relations is one of either intensified conflict over scarce resources and alternative educational

policies or one of expanded inter-level cooperation. The authors note that while they are by no means committed to an ideology of conflict-free politics, on the whole they are "pushed toward the conclusion that inter-level coordination in education is a desirable, if not essential, step" if the states are to develop a capacity for rational planning congruent with the educational needs of the times. They argue that expanded cooperation is not likely to come about as a result of "natural" accommodation among traditional interest groups in education, nor are governors or legislatures currently equipped to bring it about. There is a need, they argue, for the creation of "new overall coordinating mechanisms."

In conclusion it should be noted, as the authors freely acknowledge, that *Education and State Politics* is not a complete study, but rather, as they put it, a "pilot study," an attempt at "analysis of a subject that deserves much more attention." This is true, but the work is nonetheless a very valuable contribution to the gradually expanding literature on the politics of education. Beyond this, it is an example of scholarship that seeks to use social science in order to describe, analyze, and evaluate a significant social problem and then present the resulting product in a literate way.—LEE F. ANDERSON, *Northwestern University*.

The President and the Management of National Security. EDITED BY KEITH C. CLARK AND LAURENCE J. LEGERE (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. A Report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. Pp. 274. \$6.95.)

Scarcely two decades have passed since the Congress expressed its intent, in the National Security Act of 1947, "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; [and] to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security. . . ." Both the internal and the external settings have changed enormously, but in the wake of that change, three key creations of the Act, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, have come to play significant roles in the decision-making process related to national security.

The present study, sponsored by the Institute for Defense Analyses, omits the background history and developments leading up to the National Security Act of 1947. It concentrates on the National Security Council, proceeding directly from a premise that "if there were now no NSC, something very much like it would have to be created." Far from focusing exclusively on organizational structure and mechanisms, however, it ranges over the broader ramifications of the deliberate effort

to create arrangements for policy planning. A major effort is made to point out options, within existing legislation and institutions, that might improve the national security process.

Because each President has used the NSC in his own way, its actual role and responsibilities have varied widely. Nevertheless, a clearly discernable contrast between the "formalized-codification" approach of the Eisenhower administration and the pragmatic or *ad hoc* approach of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations provides the underlying theme throughout the report. Since neither administration adopted one process to the exclusion of the other, and since outward appearances can be most deceiving, the several authors attempt to get behind the more obvious differences in presidential style by drawing on interviews (not cited directly) with nearly one hundred government officials who hold or once held, key positions in the White House or in main departments and agencies involved in national security affairs. A conscious effort is made *not* to evaluate substantive performance. Instead, national security policy is treated as something like a management tool; concentration falls on the "process implications" and the relative effectiveness of each method.

Probably the most authoritative and comprehensive discussion of the national security process yet printed—and certainly the most up-to-date—this is a timely study in a number of respects. At the beginning of any new administration there is always a good deal of speculation as to the direction it may take and the dominant forces that may emerge within it. During his presidential campaign, Mr. Nixon stated that he intended to restore the NSC to its preeminent role in national security planning. He also attributed "most of our serious reverses abroad" to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' "inability or disinclination" to make effective use of President Eisenhower's National Security Council format. President Nixon's frequent references to meetings of the NSC (and the apparent frequency of the meetings themselves), his sanction for assembling the largest and most elaborately structured NSC staff in history, and his appointment of Henry M. Kissinger as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs all indicate a significant role for the NSC, at least for the next three years. Is this an explicit reversal of the Kennedy-Johnson approach to policy formation? Is it something more than a reversion to Eisenhower's techniques? Does it represent, through rescinding NSAM 341, a rejection of the former's effort to strengthen the policy role of the State Department? What is the future of interdepartmental operations characterized by the Johnson administration's Senior Interdepartmental Group and the subordinate Interdepartmental Regional Groups (SIG/IRG)?

Answers to these and similar questions will fascinate students of national security policy formation for years to come. Mr. Nixon was very firm in stating, during his campaign: "This [National Security] Council was established by law to integrate our diplomatic, military and economic policies. It was our assurance that America would not aimlessly drift in world affairs but would control and direct their course." Reviving or redirecting the influence of the NSC, however, is but a beginning step. There has been speculation that Mr. Kissinger may be more a staff assistant and less a policy maker than his two predecessors, Bundy and Rostow. It has been reported that Mr. Nixon will reestablish the NSC's Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), and that he will reemphasize the extension of planning through the State Department's almost moribund Policy Planning Council. While it seems likely that there will be less emphasis on the "proliferation of papers" that characterized the Eisenhower years, and less of the free-wheeling decision-making by White House assistants, the Report draws attention to more fundamental "pressure points" which must also be considered: the general eclipse of the State Department and implications of a White House-centered system for national security; the changes in the Department of Defense and the impact of the "McNamara Revolution"; and the constant search for basic policy guidelines that will not unduly circumscribe the president's flexibility of action. In the last analysis, it will be the interplay of personalities and mechanisms that determines the over-all character of the Nixon administration's approach to national security matters, and in this context, the authors' caveat bears repeating: "The force of personality of the President and his principal advisers will have a more important influence on how major decisions are reached than will the organizational procedures that have been set forth."

In the IDA Report, we are given a valuable framework within which to consider the trend toward a national security system. Unlike many efforts involving a number of authors, the quality and style of the various sections is of consistently high calibre. The effort to achieve objectivity has created certain minor problems: discussing the subject as an abstraction (without getting into substantive matters) has produced a sense of bland detachment; too many issues are resolved into apparent dichotomies and then bridged by a catch-all "middle range of choices" category; finally, the text suffers from a certain homogenized quality—it is a sober, methodical presentation which leaves one longing in vain for an element of strong conviction, approval, outrage, or even subtle humor. At any rate, the issues are presented with clarity and precision. The elegance

and style can be found among the references cited in the excellent bibliography.—HERBERT F. STEEPER, *University of Massachusetts*.

Traffic and the Police: Variations in Law-Enforcement Policy. BY JOHN A. GARDINER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 176. \$6.00.)

Social scientists are beginning to give systematic attention to the police as critical actors in the distribution of values. After years of lamentable oversight, many social scientists seem to be following the lead of journalists, novelists, civil liberties attorneys, and assorted others who have worried over the importance of the police in the urban world. It may be that the various presidential commissions have acted as important catalysts for this new, or at least greatly expanded inquiry. In commissioning papers, hiring consultants, and so on, the presidential commissions may have turned some academic priorities around, even if they have failed to turn the nation's priorities around. Perhaps one should take what comfort one can.

While much of the recent literature by political scientists, about police, has been theoretical speculation, often concerning critical policy issues, empirical research is beginning to appear. One early product of this newer scholarly interest in the police (not apparently related to any presidential commission incentive) is John A. Gardiner's *Traffic and the Police*. This valuable little book is an intensive examination of police traffic-ticketing behavior in four middle size Massachusetts cities, supplemented with a survey of state and national data which presents corroborating evidence. The study has the principal objective of accounting for the widely varying patterns of enforcement of traffic laws. In particular, Gardiner tries to examine the degree to which police ticketing practices are explained by police departmental variation (policy of chiefs, existence of traffic divisions, departmental norms and incentives to write tickets, etc.), and the degree to which they are explained by demographic, political, or judicial characteristics of the city (court disposition of tickets, local accident rates, standard demographic measures). Gardiner's evidence, substantial but perhaps incomplete, is that police departmental variation, and particularly the priorities of the police chief, are much more important than anything else, in accounting for the variation in enforcement.

Writing this review in Chicago, it is superficially easy to short-change a study of police traffic ticketing behavior as of relatively minor importance, compared to other researchable questions about the police a political scientist might examine. Gardiner's research appendix acknowledges the importance of data availability in the choice of his subject, and he sticks quite close to his data. Yet, police ticketing behavior may be a clue to other po-

lice behavior, as the author notes. Surely in efforts to understand the parameters of police discretion and the nature of street corner justice, research into police norms generally, and the responsiveness of policemen to central direction, is critical. But many of the useful insights in the book must be mined, for the author did not elaborate on such questions himself. Gardiner's analysis of the inability of public reaction to influence policy, due to a total lack of public knowledge about what police traffic enforcement policy might be, plus his discussion of the inequalities in traffic law enforcement, is of substantial importance.

The combination of intensive description of police behavior in four cities, with a supplemental survey analysis, is no longer unique in its combination, but it is still notable, both as a multiple method enrichment of the findings, and as a more broadly enlightening format for presenting a case. The particular combination effort in this book is not without problems. The four Massachusetts cities intensively studied are Cambridge, Waltham, Lynn, and Malden. Cambridge and Waltham are the highest ticketing cities in the Boston area, while Lynn and Malden are the lowest. This is a useful finding, incidentally, for traveling academics. Critical to the whole analysis is a presumption that the incidence of traffic violations is a constant, across cities, so that variation in ticketing is a product of varying police behavior. This presumption, as Gardiner describes it, seems plausible, despite conventional wisdom (1) about who commit traffic violations (the young), and (2) who disproportionately live in the high ticket university towns of Cambridge and Waltham (the young). Gardiner rests his presumption on the substantial variation in traffic law enforcement within cities, over time. This is plausible, but the presumption is not substantially tested, even though indirect indicators of incidence seem possible. One can agree that wide variation in traffic tickets per thousand motor vehicles clearly shows that ticketing practices are not *solely* a reflection of variance in the commission of traffic offenses, but still suspect that it may be partially such a reflection.

A difficulty with the study, not entirely handled, is the perennial problem of generalizing from a small, non-randomly selected set of cases—four Massachusetts middle size cities—to a wider population. The analysis of state and nation-wide questionnaire returns, plus the secondary analysis of other national data, does buttress the case findings. But some of the key traffic ticket practices in Massachusetts seem so exotic and unlike practices in most areas of the United States that they seem likely to be the product of a particular state or regional political culture. I doubt if the semi-legitimate, and near universal "fixing" of tickets by Massachusetts police chiefs has many parallels.

The benefits of doing comparative study within a single state—accessibility, similarity of formal organization, similar traffic laws, etc.—still leave problems in this study. Note that the survey data were not used to test hypotheses originally generated from the comparative study of four cities. The hypotheses were tested in the four cities, and this analysis was partially broadened and reexamined in the survey analysis. So the problem of the generality of the four city findings is important.

The relative ease of access to police chiefs and policemen, plus the high response of the national survey of police chiefs to a mail questionnaire (75%), indicates that social research into police activities is quite possible. The secondary use of state and national traffic data also suggests that such sources can provide much of use for social science endeavors to measure and account for police behavior.

Gardiner has marked out important questions, and provided valuable leads. His conclusions seem tenuous and rather narrow. With the obvious centrality of the police to the contemporary urban crisis, I hope the author, and many others, will pursue these matters.—H. PAUL FRIESEMA, *Northwestern University*.

Employer-Employee Relations in Council-Manager Cities. By WINSTON W. CROUCH. (Washington: The International City Managers' Association, 1968. Pp. 137.)

Work slowdowns, mass sick calls and strikes by public employees are now occurring with a frequency thought impossible a few years ago. Sanitation workers, firemen, policemen, teachers, transit workers, nurses and social workers have all recently articulated grievances through direct action. Less publicized but more important over the long run is the organization of public employees into voluntary associations and unions. Winston Crouch has examined the present development of and attitudes toward municipal employee organizations in a selected group of council-manager cities.

Most of the data presented in the study were collected through a mail-back questionnaire sent to the total universe of city managers serving cities of 10,000 or more people ($N = 914$). Replies from 623 city managers (68%) were included in the analysis. The questionnaire was designed to elicit information about the following: (1) an inventory of unions and local associations; (2) the city manager's perception of community attitudes toward the organization of municipal employees; (3) officially expressed local policies regarding city employees' political and organizational activities; (4) city management practices relative to employee organizations; and (5) the

manager's opinions about employee organizations.

Analysis revealed that metropolitan cities, rather than suburbs and independent cities, and the New England and East North Central areas were the mostly heavily organized. The International Association of Fire Fighters, the Fraternal Order of Police, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees were the associations that enjoyed the greatest success in organizing municipal employees. Only 5% of the cities had more than three associations organizing their work force while 39% of the cities had no employee organizations at all.

Two major impressions conveyed to the reader by the book are that employer-employee relations have not been an issue of major importance in the past and municipal officials have reserved judgment about the role and contributions of employee organizations. Crouch reported that two-thirds of the council-manager cities had no formal policy regarding employees joining employee organizations. In one-fourth of the cities having employee organizations no organizational spokesman was involved in discussing with management such basic matters as wages and salaries, only 17% maintained signed agreements with employee organizations, paid professionals functioned as representatives in 10% of the cities, the union shop was accepted in 5%, and arbitration was used sparingly.

City councilmen, city managers and the community at-large were for the most part neutral in their attitudes toward employee organizations. City managers in over 50% of the cities reported that councilmen had given no clear indication of attitude toward employee associations. The managers had no unified attitude toward employee groups or to their role in the administrative process. Aside from organized labor relatively few community groups seemed to speak consistently (pro or con) on the subject.

The major observations made by Crouch were: relatively little organization had taken place among municipal employees aside from police and firemen; council-manager cities had done little to regularize procedures for dealing with employee groups; few cities have had serious work disrup-

tions but the number was rising; community interest groups, other than organized labor, had shown general indifference to employee organizations; and city councils and city managers had not formed a definite judgment about employee organizations.

However, the research strategy that produced these findings should be viewed critically. Even though city managers are centrally located in the administrative process, asking them to report on the attitudes of councilmen and community organizations has some serious shortcomings. The spate of community power structure studies over the past decade and a half certainly demonstrates that to whom you address your question largely predetermines your answer. Would the same observations about employer-employee relations have resulted if councilmen, labor leaders, and community activists had been included in the survey? Certainly it is not surprising to find city managers opting for neutral type responses when asked to comment on the opinions and attitudes of others.

A few other minor points should be noted about the study. First, in several sections of the book relationships were referred to as being statistically significant. However, the reader is not informed as to the statistical treatment afforded the data nor the probability level accepted as representing significance. The reader is also due an explanation as to the reason any test of significance is used since the data were drawn from the total universe of council-manager cities and not from a sample. Second, the absence of a summary chapter in the book is unfortunate. The various lines of inquiry pursued were not woven together in any kind of final summing-up, thus necessitating the reader to do some of the author's work.

Overall, the monograph makes a needed addition to our knowledge of an issue-area of local government that will most assuredly grow in importance. As other researchers initiate new inquiries into municipal employer-employee relations this study will inevitably become a base point against which new insights and findings can be measured and compared.—SCHLEY R. LYONS, *The University of North Carolina at Charlotte*.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century. By CHANDLER MORSE, DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD, FREDERICK T. BENT, WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND, JOHN W. LEWIS, DAVID B. MACKLIN. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 426. \$11.50.)

A volume promising cross-disciplinary studies

by representatives from several social sciences on a common topic such as modernization is typically a euphemism for another loose-jointed non-book, something one sees all too often. This collection is decidedly not of that class. It represents an important effort on the part of scholars from the fields of political science, sociology, economics, and so-

cial psychology to focus on problems of the modernization process facing "late modernizers," i.e., twentieth century efforts by new nations to "... augment their wealth-creating power . . ." Of course, the product is not as uniform or consistent as the work of a single author might be, but the results clearly justify the hazards of cross-disciplinary work.

Four areas of interest to political scientists and political development specialists are touched on. First, the essays provide useful discussions of bodies of literature relevant to the study of modernization, some familiar and others relatively unexplored. Specifically, the essays examine social parameters restraining leadership in the modernization process, attitude change, institutional change in terms of role proliferation and differentiation, the role of public administration, interaction analysis, and the relationship between economic and social analysis. Second, the chapters illustrate the utility of working at all levels of social analysis. Ashford treats the individual unit of analysis focusing on how individuals come to perceive new values and relate them to institutional change. Macklin, building an interaction model joining the individual and social levels of analysis, argues cogently that modernization entails significant changes in institutions, but that these changes depend in turn on changes in the psychological dimension. Freidland traces the role proliferation and increasing formalization of institutional arrangements that occur as modernization progresses. Lewis stresses the importance of leadership, but in terms of the constraints imposed by the social forces which structure, at least in part, the responses open to modernizing political elites. Morse, after a perceptive critical review of classical and neoclassical approaches to economic growth, argues (and I believe him correct) that "... economics as we know it in the West is not concerned with the problems of basic institutional change and has nothing to say about them." He begins the task of rectifying this omission by relating economics to all possible aspects of institutional and revolutionary change. Third, as promised in the introduction, the essays are concerned substantively with the crucial distinguishing characteristics of premodern and modern societies and the ways in which premodern societies were transformed into modern societies. Finally, the authors are not content with theoretical discussions, each chapter includes a section on the policy relevance of their perspective for development strategy worth serious consideration from foundation and government people concerned with development.

Although a reading of any or all of the essays would be very productive, the long chapter by Morse stands out as an extraordinary model of creative yet systematic and precise writing in the

nexus between economics and the rest of social science. Morse accomplishes this by being rigorous when possible and open-ended when the situation calls for it. For instance, he critically presents aspects of "replicative" (premodern), classical, neoclassical, and progressive economic growth as they relate to basic institutional change (the heart of modernization for Morse) in a succinct but elegant manner using symbolic notation where useful. Next, he examines institutional change in general viewing institutions as "... ideas, concepts, symbols, rules, statuses, relationships, and so on . . ." Essentially, institutions may be considered the parameters of social action. He examines the modernization implications of institutional change at the cultural, the organizational, and individual psychological levels. Radical or revolutionary internal change emerges as the crucial determinant for successful modernization. Simply put, any social scientist concerned with modernization should read this essay.

The authors, particularly Lewis and Morse, ignore implications of their own analytic sections when making their development strategy remarks. The evidence accumulated by the authors points to the massive structural difficulties facing elites attempting to modernize now. Lewis identifies the problem as that of diverting leadership structures in modernizing countries from their initial highly ideological thrust to more "rational" involvement in productive processes associated with economic growth. Lewis observes that ideology provides an initial substitute for social cohesion but should be subsequently moderated so that leaders can "think contextually" in order to engage successfully in the development process. Lewis correctly identifies the dangers of ideological emphasis for the long term development process. However, the weight ideology must bear as a substitute for social cohesion may be of a higher order than Lewis admits. Lewis implies that the Chinese Communist leadership may be faulted for not softening their ideological thrust and thus may be blamed for the large internal disruptions in the 1960's. Yet it may well be all the Chinese elites can do to keep the ideological network, the substitute for social cohesion, and hence the social system in being given the social structural stresses brought about by the impact of modernization. Morse argues the case for sustained revolutionary leadership to bring about the institutional change necessary for successful modernization. Again, his own analysis equally implies that cycles of political leadership instability will proliferate as men ineffectually grapple with social forces beyond their control. Of course, this question involves theoretical assumptions about the role of political leadership and few of us are willing to argue that social forces such as those accurately described in this volume render

men impotent. However, evidence continues to mount that the intensity which telescopes factors associated with the modernization process provides current political leaders with difficulties of a much greater scope than we have been thus far willing to admit.—ROGER W. BENJAMIN, *University of Minnesota*.

Partiti politici e strutture sociali in Italia. EDITED BY MATTEI DOGAN AND ORAZIO MARIA PETRACCA. With a preface by Alberto Spreafico. (Milano: Edizioni di Comunità, 1968. Pp. 660. L. 5,800.)

An increasing interest in Italian politics is reflected in a number of excellent publications in English ranging from John Cammett's study of Gramsci through various studies of political behavior—Barnes, Blackmer, Di Renzo, Evans, La Palombara, Tarrow—to works dealing with communities in the process of change—Cornelisen, Lopreato, Paulson.

Two major themes emerge from these writings. On the one hand the theme of underdevelopment and development as played out in Gramsci's central concern with the *Mezzogiorno*, in Tarrow's focus upon level of development and party strategy, and in Lopreato's attention to the transformation of Southern Italy from a peasant to an urban society.

The second theme, reflecting perhaps an American over-concern with left-wing parties has been the emphasis given to the study of Italian communism.

It is against the background of these overriding themes, development and communism, that the present work rings its changes. While the book suffers from the same kind of eclecticism that characterized an earlier monumental study by Spreafico and La Palombara, *Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia*, it does provide the student of Italian politics with a series of detailed studies which compliment the work done by non-Italian scholars. In this sense it should be considered alongside other studies such as the publications of the *Istituto Carlo Cattaneo* dealing with political participation in Italy. (Cf. Vittorio Capocchi et al., *Il comportamento elettorale in Italia*. This REVIEW, 63 (June 1969) 589-590.)

The point of departure of the present study of political parties and social structure is the general election of 1963, though the intended focus is to explore the relationships between political behavior (almost exclusively expressed here through electoral data) and social structure. Spreafico, in the preface, concedes that the work does not present an organic synthesis but rather a problem orientation reflecting various methods and approaches.

The work is divided into six sections—Prolegomena, Influences, Migrations, Dynamics, Eco-

logy, and Elites—and perhaps the most useful service this reviewer might be able to perform for the interested student of Italian politics is to summarize the hypotheses and conclusions of some of these rather uneven articles.

Perhaps the most interesting sections in this collection are those dealing with "Migrations" and "Dynamics." The former consists of a review by Gian Franco Ciaurro of the fourth phase of Italian emigration and more specifically the continental European character of this emigration. Thus between 1960-61 almost 1½ million Italians migrated to the Common Market countries, to Switzerland and Britain, while the transoceanic migration during the same period consisted of only 260 thousand. Equally impressive is the fact that 300 thousand of the Europe-bound migrants returned to Italy in 1963 to cast their votes in the national election. (An interesting sidelight here might be the use of "unobtrusive measures," i.e. increase in railway travel during electoral periods, to study migratory politics). The second aspect of the "new migration" is of course the internal migration which Ciaurro discusses in the light of the social and political integration of the Southern migrant. It is here that the study by Domenico De Masi and Giuseppe Pranzo analyzing demographic shifts in Milan as a center of immigration is particularly useful. After an imaginative and careful analysis involving such variables as demography, electoral results 1946-63, electoral dynamics of the individual parties, distribution of the parties in various zones of Milan, geographical origin of voters, socio-economic conditions prevalent in various zones of Milan, etc., the authors conclude that it is impossible to draw unequivocal causal relations about immigration and political behavior in Milan. They grudgingly acknowledge that the Southern workers seem to vote Communist because they are workers rather than because they are Southerners. A socio-economic analysis becomes more important than a cultural one. In a similar vein Ciaurro concludes that "Neither from the electoral data, nor from other elements does it seem possible to derive a precise correlation between migratory phenomena and the voting trends of political forces other than the PCI." (351)

Under the heading of "Dynamics" the articles by Corrado Barberis and Guido Corazziari, "Economic structures and electoral dynamics" and that by Mattei Dogan, "A phenomenon of political ataxia" furnish detailed material for the further exploration of the Benjamin and Kautsky hypothesis. The fundamental question raised is to what extent do electoral shifts result from economic change and how does one explain the gains made by the PCI. Dogan's conclusion: "In Italy, the needle of economic development continues to be pointed to the North star. While the migratory

movement goes north, communism goes south, while the country becomes urbanized communism becomes ruralized. It thus goes against the current. Society moves in one direction, communism in the other. We are thus face to face with a phenomenon which one might call "social ataxia" borrowing from biology a concept which means the pathological non-coordination of body movements." (478) It is only regrettable that the discussion of economic development and political change is not placed into the context of the earlier writings of Lipset, Cutright, and Marsh.

The first section of the collection consists of an historical overview and the essay of Paolo Ungari, "From Center-Left to Center-Right: 1958-1963," comprises essentially a historical narrative of Italian domestic politics. The author's conclusion that: "the fundamental problem of political equilibrium had almost been solved, the task now was to demonstrate the capacity for effective constitutional politics" (46) seems in the light of recent Italian events somewhat premature. Orazio Maria Petracca, "Tactic and Strategy of electoral programs" addresses itself to an analysis of the party programs as they express the aggregating functions of Italian political parties. The author's conclusions are not surprising: the party programs of 1963 tend to assume a common physiognomy which cuts across class lines, they are in the author's words "dream books." Thus the intrinsic usefulness of this particular analysis is placed into doubt by the author himself when he concludes with a sceptical quote by Benedetto Croce placing into question the meaningfulness of party programs. The article by Alberto Spreafico on "Electoral Forecasts" seems somewhat out of place in this first historical section and might more appropriately have been incorporated in the section on Pressure Groups. This is particularly so since of the four polls cited only one comes even close to following the canons of sample survey research. Two polls are in effect competitions organized by *L'Espresso* and *Paese Sera* respectively transforming electoral prediction into a kind of *Totocalcio* game. Only the CISER poll taps voter preference, the DOXA and newspaper polls are indicative of potential electors' predictions of the coming election. Therefore, Spreafico's analysis is more concerned with perception of party configurations than with electoral behavior. In predicting or expressing preferences as to the outcome of the 1963 election the overall pattern was that the estimates of DC, PSI, and Monarchist votes were overvalued, whereas the results for Communists and Liberals were often grossly underestimated.

A second section of the work, gathering together "influences" upon the 1963 election, consists of a series of articles by Prandi on the intervention of the church hierarchy, by Bechelloni on trade

union influences and by La Palombara and Gloria Pirzio Ammassari on the electoral activities of the Italian Confederation of Industry. All three essays are essentially historical in character. Prandi bases his findings on selected pastoral letters, Bechelloni eschews a sociological analysis because he claims that the necessary empirical data are missing, La Palombara and Ammassari focus on Confindustria media. Of the three interest groups, Confindustria seems to be the most enlightened reflecting an increased neo-capitalist position which recognizes, within limits, the economic and social functions of the state. In contrast the church hierarchy in no way reflects the internal evolution to the left of DC. As for the trade unions the fact that the new tendencies which emerged between 1961 and 1963 were not institutionalized, prevents the Italian unions from achieving autonomy from the parties, from the government, or from the owners.

The section on "Ecology" contains a sophisticated article by P. A. Allum on the political ecology of Naples as well as a more historically oriented article by Luciano Cavalli on social and political alignments in Genoa. It is particularly Allum's article which deserves greater attention than is possible here. A final section on elites contains articles by Giovanni Di Capua on choice of candidates and an article by Alberto Spreafico on the political composition and the social stratification of the Senate.

It is clearly impossible to do justice to fifteen articles within the compass of one review. It is regrettable that the editors did not see fit to attempt to relate the various analyses to each other and there is a frustrating lack of the authors speaking to each other. Nevertheless the work will be particularly useful to those interested in economic development and migration, as well as to that small, and passionate, band of Italophiles.—LUCIAN C. MARQUIS, *Pitzer College and Claremont Graduate School*.

Opposition in a Dominant-Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh, The Praja Socialist Party and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, India. BY ANGELA S. BURGER. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 306 \$8.50.)

Thanks to the Ford Foundation, the Fulbright program, the American Institute of Indian Studies, the openness of Indian society and the accessibility of Indian political processes, the first generation of scholarly output of India addressed itself substantially to all-India perspectives and affairs. The second generation, equally well endowed, would seem to consist largely of monographs dealing with state and local politics. The second generation work under review supplements the Brass analysis of Congress dominance in Uttar Pradesh (1965) by focusing its attention on the problems

of building and maintaining opposition parties in a dominant party system. Mrs. Burger's book is in many ways superior to the earlier work and yet it suffers from certain similar weaknesses in approach.

The book is divided into four parts. Part one elaborates nine working hypotheses and provides context by giving a brief political history of the state. These hypotheses to be confirmed, modified or rejected fall into two sectors: those dealing with the building and maintenance of opposition parties on state and national levels and those pertinent only to the local constituency level. Mrs. Burger's most salient observations derive from her study of the latter.

An analysis of the socio-economic background and career patterns of 46 out of 48 Jan Sangh MLA's, 33 out of 38 Praja Socialist MLA's, and 22 Lohia Socialist MLA's makes up part two of the book. Parts three and four consist of six richly detailed constituency studies from which the author has abstracted her most interesting conclusions.

Though the author conducted her study from 1963 to 1964, the Indian electoral experience of the last two years seems to confirm her conclusion that opposition parties confront many of the same problems as Congress has experienced in maintaining successful local parties. "Frustration and disenchantment seem to be directed against whichever party is victorious on the local level." (275) The candidate's continued victory is in jeopardy either because local candidates cannot always alleviate the basic sources of discontent or because constituency party leadership eventually ossifies to the point that newly mobilized groups can find political expression only in yet newer—or even older—parties within the constituency or paradoxically because other candidates often seem more attractive even when incumbent candidates have not failed to obtain material benefits for the constituency.

Complicating the task of maintaining party electoral support is the problem of maintaining intraparty cohesion. The difficulties created by ideological differences, by ambiguous vertical relationships between local and state units with no fixed focal point, by the lack of a socio-economic mainstay in an extremely diverse political entity, and by the arbitrary timing of elections every five years are only partly offset by the absence of an invariable party commitment, the existence of a universal franchise, and the consequent potential for mobilizing new participants.

The problems of party and electoral maintenance are common to all political parties, but in underdeveloped countries the need for opposition has been questioned by a whole generation of nationalist leaders as being dysfunctional. Mrs. Burger argues persuasively that opposition parties in

fact assist the dominant party in the basic modernizing tasks of political socialization, recruitment, interest articulation, and aggregation, thus increasing the rate of mobilization and permitting "discontent, divergent interests, and antagonisms between groups to be publicly registered, to be directed against the dominant party and against governmental activities without being directed against the system." (283)

Accurate as the data concerning the six constituencies studied may be, sound as these arguments may be on the constituency level, intriguing as it all may be on the theoretical level, the claim for general applicability is never substantiated. On the basis of these six constituencies, which are not even necessarily representative of the whole state of Uttar Pradesh, we are informed that the observations are not only applicable to all of India but to all dominant party systems. Yet if this is truly a substantial comparative study rather than an area study one wonders why the constituencies were not chosen to be reasonably representative of the state (which in itself is peculiarly complex) if not the country, or why, at the very least, the author appears to have conducted her study in a vacuum, ignoring the work of people like Nayar or Wallace in Punjab, Sisson and Shrader on Rajasthan, and a number of excellent studies done on other states. In the same way, many of the author's other conclusions (the tendency for newly mobilized groups to reject opposition parties in favor of identification with the governing party and to be welcomed therein as a means of maintaining dominance, for instance) might also have been confirmed and strengthened by reference to a number of studies including those mentioned above. Some modest reference to complementary work in the field of Indian politics (if not world politics) might have gone far in solving the problem of the great inductive leap from specific to universal.

Unfulfilled pretensions aside, however—and I stress the point only because the temptation of grandiosity is now so seldom resisted, this book is an excellent study of an important subject. It suggests a great deal about the problems of party building and maintenance in underdeveloped areas and it seems quite authoritative in so far as it concerns six constituencies in Uttar Pradesh.—STANLEY A. KOCHANEK, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

L'Abstentionisme électoral en France. BY ALAIN LANCELOT. (Paris: Armand Colin, Cahiers de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques 162, 1968. Pp. 229.)

After the 1960 American elections, so the story goes, a small group of political hucksters undertook to peddle an aspiring Presidential candidate

for 1964 with the claim that he would attract to the polls a tidal wave of alienated citizens who had been so dissatisfied with the "me-tooism" of previous candidates that they had refused to vote at all. They supported this claim by comparing the valid votes cast for President in 1960 with the size of the voting-age population and by assuming wishfully that the difference represented a politically-homogeneous mass sympathetic silently to their candidate. The electoral disaster they produced is only the most conspicuous testament to the lack of information about and understanding of the non-voter. Political scientists have been no less remiss than practical politicians in perpetrating idle myths about non-voters.

Alain Lancelot's exhaustive study of non-voting in France comes as a welcome and illuminating departure from the usual conjecture and prejudice. Professor Lancelot has left unturned very few stones, substantive or methodological. Going back to 1815, he estimates the volume of non-voting in France and subjects to rigorous analysis the many slippery problems that arise in defining, measuring, and evaluating electoral abstention. Then, in the distinguished French tradition of Siegfried and Goguel, he spreads his hatch marks across the hexagon and discovers that with non-voting—as with nearly everything else—France is two countries, split somewhere near the Loire.

In that section of his study, he makes a statistical calculation that offers an easy opportunity for someone to check out the marginal value of computers for political science. He seeks to learn the extent to which the changes in the volume of abstentions across time (1876–1965) varied among *départements* and admits that the obvious method for determining this would be to "calculate a coefficient of linear correlation between each consultation." But, he "recoiled before the number of computations that would have required." Instead, he calculated the comparative rankings of the *départements* for the periods 1876–1914, 1919–1936, and 1945–1962. Colleagues who are more friendly with computers than I am tell me that the operation he rejected as too gruelling could be performed quickly and easily by computer. One wonders if M. Lancelot's study would have been more exact if it had been computerized.

Following his general study of the relationship of geography to abstentions, M. Lancelot makes detailed studies of the 1936 and 1946 elections and the 1958 and 1962 referenda. Then, he analyzes the effect of "political" factors on non-voting, both the political context of the consultation and the political attitudes of the abstainers. Next, he examines the relationship of various biological, economic, educational, occupational, residential, and religious characteristics of eligible voters to their tendency

to abstain. Finally, he attempts to determine the extent to which the non-voting part of the electorate is stable. Are most non-voters consistently in that category or do they bob in and out, responding to highly individualized stimuli?

As one reads the Lancelot study, one is continuously impressed by the large number of interesting questions about non-voting that deserve serious examination. Who are the non-voters and why? How do they affect the operation of political systems? How do they affect the balance of political power? Furthermore, even a rudimentary knowledge of research resources suggests that non-voting should be at least as easy to study as voting. Most election rolls are open for public examination and indicate clearly who failed to vote. Often, they also provide such information as address, occupation, age, date and location of previous residence, party registration, etc. With very little effort, the serious student of electoral behavior could analyze these data to discover correlations. Also, he could identify non-voters and interview them to learn their motivations, level of information, etc. As non-voters in most elections are much less numerous than voters, his task would be less formidable than if he were studying the voters.

Yet, Lancelot's study is the first general work on the topic. Why have so few scholars been interested in the topic seriously? One hopes that interest hasn't been lacking because of a too-facile willingness on the part of many political scientists to accept the old myths about "apathetic" and "alienated" voters. In fact, field study has shown repeatedly that official sources (at least in the United States) tend to exaggerate the number of non-voters. (An excellent recent example is Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, *Voting and Non-Voting*, Blaisdell, Waltham, pp. 73–80.)

Indeed, the most striking conclusion to be drawn from the Lancelot study is that non-voting is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. His research indicates that categories of voters who are well integrated in society tend to abstain less than those who are poorly integrated, but poor integration may be no more than residence in a high Alpine valley from a decent road and farther still from the polling place. He identifies an equally large category of abstainers who are prevented from voting by factors at or beyond the limits of their control, i.e., illness, travel. Finally, he shows clearly that the character of the election affects turnout appreciably. Even these generalizations conceal great variations and contradictions. No category of the electorate that he sets up is wholly exempt from abstentionism and the differences between categories are usually quite marginal.

The student of voting behavior will find much

valuable information in the Lancelot study, though he should be very cautious in using it to support generalizations that purport to explain non-voting. Also, his data are very questionable when he moves outside France, especially with respect to the United States. That, however, is not his fault, but the fault of American political science for not doing for the United States what M. Lancelot has done for France.—WILLIAM G. ANDREWS, *State University of New York, Brockport*.

Political Change in Contemporary France: the Politics of an Industrial Democracy. By HARVEY WATERMAN. (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co. 1969. Pp. 256. \$2.50.)

As a frame of reference for his analysis of French politics, Harvey Waterman draws upon existing theoretic statements offering explanations of the dynamic of industrialized western nations. Having quite adequately summarized the basic conclusions of the literature, he synthesizes and sets forth the following thesis: with industrialization comes affluence, a breakdown in class distinctions, a lessening of traditional cleavages and a decline of ideological dogmatism and conflict. In sum, industrialization and affluence are said to induce inevitably a decline of ideology and a consequent growth of political consensus and stability.

In spite of occasional contradictions and too heavy reliance on impressions, Waterman's rapid review of French political ideologies, style, partisanship, participation and protest affords him the following set of conclusions: There is today an openmindedness in French politics and a willingness of organized groups to cooperate with one another. There has been a decline in ideological rigidity in France with fewer people seeing in political parties, a comprehensive view of society. Dogmatism and exclusiveness within the society have declined and with them political cleavages have dissipated. Fewer people are voting on the basis of the religious categories of the past, but rather on the basis of increased knowledge heightened by an ever growing interest in politics. With this has come an increased tendency to discuss particular issues and to accept compromise in preference to either stalemate or conflict. The people of France are no longer demonstrating an intolerance of governmental institutions, even those of the Fifth republic. There has been a tendency on their part to view government as providing legitimate mechanisms for incremental change and the realization of economic and social goals. Consequently, the political maturity and stability of an industrialized France is asserted.

Waterman runs into difficulties on two levels: first, his argumentation tends to be spotty, uneven and often weak; second, his methodology seems to have caused an over-idealization, and perhaps an

oversimplification of the current state of French politics.

A large part of the case built by Waterman is set forth in his discussion of the decline of traditional political ideologies: Marxism; Socialism; Liberalism; "Political Catholicism" (he should have said Catholicisms); "Radicalism and Gaullism" (both in one page); "The Extreme Right: Ultracisme (sic) Algerie Francaise, Nationalism"; Nationalism; "Europe." The problem is that he is not dealing with "Ideology" but with political movements. At the outset, Waterman indicated that the "decline of ideology" must be viewed in terms of a movement along a continuum from one extreme, that of the profusion and adherence of many to comprehensive, articulated world views, toward the other, that of less formalized yet coherent value structures which guide behavior influencing orientations, perceptions and evaluations. But in the main body of the book it is not the doctrine but rather the political movements which are discussed. It is the feeling of the reviewers, for example, that the ideology of the French communists can not be understood simply by recounting the shifts and moves of the Communist party. The fact that Duclos did not advocate communism in the last presidential campaign is no more convincing a demonstration of the decline of ideology than Thorez's *main tendue* to the Catholics twenty years ago. And Guy Mollet's zig-zags (together with so many others) on the issue of laïcité neither proves nor disproves anything at all. In the same sense the chapter on Political Partisanship is quite disappointing. Except for the period of the Resistance and that immediately following the liberation, a period when there were but three parties each paying lip service to the slogans and ideas of the "left," an extremely "ideological period," we doubt that the French would have shown any commitment to their political parties at any time in their republican history in spite of what Waterman might suggest. Aside from this the author misses the point by giving less than a page to the political clubs and but a bit more than a page to the PSU.

The explanation for what we perceive to be an over-simplification of French politics, is to be found in the author's somewhat uncritical application of the "decline of ideology" theory. Having indicated in his second chapter that most "generalizations about behavior are based on studies made in the United States," he goes on to accept *in toto* their applicability with the assumption that "all such nations [industrialized, western nations] are in many respects very similar" and that the researcher might therefore "use whatever scholarship comes to hand." But Waterman is not alone in his failure to foresee the violent uprisings of May-June 1968. What is interesting is that

he felt compelled to write an apologia in the form of an Epilogue. It was not necessary. Nobody expected a movement of violent revolt to occur. But because the traditional ideologies of the 19th century were on the decline there is no reason and there was no reason to believe that the end of Ideology had come.

In the interstices of our industrial society, big, complex and rich (but not so easy), men and women continue to search for the basic value systems that will satisfy them. In so doing, they not only abandon and reject the ideologies of the past (which are indeed on the decline) but seek new values that are expressed in new forms, even if they appear to us to be apolitical, that inevitably shape behavior. This is not a mass phenomenon; it is not a political one; it cannot be easily reflected in surveys. It is initiated by a small group of intellectuals and students (Waterman discovers in his Epilogue a student subculture). Perhaps the time has come for the Clerks to atone for their Treason!—ROY C. MACRIDIS AND THEODORE SCHELL, *Brandeis University*.

Responsible Government in Ontario. BY F. F. SCHINDELER. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. Pp. 295. \$3.50.)

Although a case study in the sense that it concerns only the government of a single Canadian province, this book is addressed to the more general problem of how British-model parliamentary institutions can be maintained in modern industrial society. Specifically the author is concerned with the threat posed to the continued viability of parliamentary institutions by a current imbalance of power that favors the executive over the legislature. Schindeler's study of Ontario government during 1945-65 is not an historical one, but of necessity, part of the book is given over to a description of the development of responsible government in the province and to a delineation of other relevant political institutions. The work, it should be noted, also is comparative and theory-relevant and has the additional merit of being lucidly written.

In Schindeler's view, two features are especially important in understanding the Executive's domination of Parliament in Ontario: the short legislative sessions and the tendency toward one-party dominance. Having diagnosed the situation, he suggests a cure, or, rather, a number of "reforms" that are likely to have an ameliorative effect. Not unexpectedly, these include the provision of more research assistance for back benchers and committees, adequate office and secretarial services for members, access to information stored with the bureaucracy, greater opportunity for legislators to participate in the policy initiation and evaluation processes, and more effective employment of

current procedures such as the question period. He also suggests lengthening the legislative sessions and re-organizing legislative business so that more effective use can be made of the House's time at the beginning of a legislative session.

Schindeler claims that his suggested reforms and innovations would "completely change the style of government that currently holds sway in Ontario." (p. 271). Through them the Government would be made "responsible for its actions, not necessarily to the legislature . . . but to the people who would at least be given some basis for assessing the performance of the Government before casting their votes." (pp. 271-272). Given the low level of interest in politics and the lack of political information that generally characterize Western democracies, and the fact that recent empirical studies suggest that Canada is even a less politicized society than the United States, such a claim may reflect wishful thinking rather than the real world of Canadian politics. In part, the author recognizes this in that he realizes his suggested reforms and innovations constitute a necessary, albeit, not a sufficient condition for achieving truly responsible government. This is, however, a very minor short-coming in a very good and careful analysis of an important problem. Schindeler's study will be especially welcomed by students of federalism and of comparative politics since it is one of the few systematic studies extant to legislative institutions at the sub-national level.—ALLAN KORNBERG, *Duke University*.

The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour. BY JOHN GOLDTHORPE, DAVID LOCKWARD, FRANK BECHHOFFER AND JENNIFER PLATT. (Cambridge, Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. 95. \$5.50.)

The background to this study is the fall in the vote for the British Labour party in the 1950s. People interested in the fact that Labour lost three successive elections tried to account for it in a variety of ways. Some suggested that manual workers who had traditionally been voters, were now dropping their loyalty to Labour because of increasing wealth. It was, as we shall see, a vague theory although the problem for the Labour party was real enough.

At the beginning of their study the authors declare "The main objective of this study was to test the widely accepted thesis of working class embourgeoisement: that is, the thesis that as manual workers and their families achieve relatively high incomes and living standards they assume a way of life which is more characteristically middle class and become, in fact, progressively assimilated into working class society" (page 1). The volume under review deals with specifically political aspects of this hypothesis namely the at-

titude of affluent workers to the Labour party. They conclude "We find that a large and stable majority of our workers are supporters of the Labour party, even though there are signs that in many cases this support is of a rather 'instrumental' kind. This leads us to a discussion of the view that affluence is a factor leading to the decline in Labour loyalties among the working class. . . . Finding little evidence in support of this idea, we then turn to consider two other possible sources of influence on the voting behaviour of the affluent worker . . . a worker's white collar affiliation and trade union membership. Both these variables are associated with our workers propensity to vote Labour." (p. 1). So much for the statement of aims and their summary of their findings.

An immense amount of work has gone into this study of which we are promised four volumes. The question is whether they were studying a real problem and whether they went about it in the correct way. I believe that the answer to both these questions is, no. I shall take them in turn.

The authors study a group of 'affluent workers' in Luton in order to test whether *embourgeoisement* has taken place. Although the general idea of this process may be fairly clear any research worker must define it somewhat closely before he can claim to have confirmed or disconfirmed it. My first complaint is that this is precisely what the authors have failed to do. They admit to this. "Our study does not allow us to make as thorough an investigation of affluence as would be desirable to test the affluence thesis decisively. We have noted that this thesis itself in some respects imprecise and would need clarification and refinement in order to be tested in any definitive way. However, since we ourselves do not embrace it we shall leave the task to those who do." (p. 46). But four volumes and a half a dozen papers seems an excessive mileage to get out of something which does not even claim to be definitive test. How can the authors claim to have tested a proposition in any sense when by their own admission they do not know what they are testing.

The one hard finding which they seem to have is that Labour support among the affluent working class in Luton is extremely high. Somehow this seems to be a disconfirmation of the "affluence hypothesis." So it may be but only when it is related in some way with a measure of Labour support among manual workers who are not affluent. We are not offered this type of comparison. Instead within the group in Luton those earning more than £18 a week are compared with those who are making less. This is really not very satisfactory since we are told at the beginning of the volume that they are all "affluent." In any case the effect of social context and community might very well be such as to make even the more poorly paid dif-

ferent from groups of equivalent income in other less affluent locations.

The authors do not, however, stop at this in their study of the possible effects of greater affluence. They ask a series of questions, which are supposed to divide middle and working class respondents. In three of the four questions the response of the majority of manual workers is the same as the response of the majority of a white collar control group. In the fourth question the manual workers are very evenly balanced. The authors admit that this constitutes some evidence for the *embourgeoisement* hypothesis but once again the only way in which this data could have been made really meaningful would have been in comparison with a sample of workers who were not affluent. Again the authors find that their affluent workers have what they call an "instrumental" attitude towards the Labour party. By this they mean that when asked why they support Labour a large percentage answers in terms of the Labour party giving a better deal for the working man. Is this really a test of an instrumental approach? The fact that a worker verbalises his reason for supporting the Labour party in terms of its use to his class really has to be supported by other sorts of evidence. "The party of the working class" is at least as much a symbolic statement about Labour as an expression of self interest.

In the long run they conclude, as we have seen, that affluence is not important in determining loyalty to the Labour party. White collar affiliation and trade union membership are much better predictors of Labour or non Labour voting. This is shown quite clearly but on the other hand this does not prove that affluence is unimportant. It is fairly widely accepted that white collar affiliation is an important cross pressure for the working class. Indeed the authors could profitably have gone into it in more detail. Its full theoretical implications, which are extremely important, are not spelled out. Their data about the relationship of white collar affiliation and trade union membership is used to prove that when they are taken into account the relationship with affluence disappears. But in pages 57 to 59 where they try to prove that the effect of affluence disappears when other factors are taken into account, they control on the wrong variable.

I now turn to some final statistical criticisms of the study. In the first place the authors use what they call a critical sample. This device is thought to form the basis of a test such that "if, in the case studied, a process of *embourgeoisement* was shown not to be in evidence, then it can be regarded as extremely unlikely that such a process was occurring to any significant extent in British society as a whole." (Page 2). They argue that Luton constituted just such a case. Here for var-

ious reasons which they outline was the "affluent" town. But how can we say that Luton is the perfect test case for the embourgeoisement hypothesis when it is by now clear that no one has quite defined what this hypothesis is. We are given some rather vague information about Luton but nothing which compares it with other areas. Above all there is simply not enough argument in favour of this unusual research strategy of "the critical sample" to make it sound even vaguely convincing. How are we to know that some distorting factors may not be at work in Luton. At least with a more widely selected sample we might have been able to allow for "community effect." But worse is to come.

The authors agree (page 84) that their is not a random sample of the electorate. It is therefore not possible to generalise even to the population of Luton. It deals only with certain occupational groups within three firms and among these it only deals with men (not women) who are married and who are between 21 and 46. As a sample of any kind of the working class population this is beginning to look extremely odd. Of this sample, however, no less than 19.6% refused to be interviewed (page 5). What effect this might have upon the analysis can only be guessed. The authors make it even more difficult to guess by giving us no idea of who these refusals were. Indeed the whole methodological description, apart from the somewhat tendentious discussion of "the critical sample" is so brief as to be almost useless. They do not even publish their questionnaire. One is led to suggest that their data is in rather a bad state or at any rate there is little evidence to give us confidence in it.

One last comment is in order. Throughout the entire book not one statistical test is used. Given the fact that they were not using a probability sample it is understandable that they find simple measures of association inappropriate. On the other hand multivariate statistics would certainly have been in order to look at the relation between the various dimensions. The fact that they have not been used is a sad comment on the extent to which British sociologists are able to cope with the tools which are readily available.—JOHN BRAND, *University of Strathclyde*.

Guatemala, la Violencia. COMPILED BY ALEJANDRO DEL CORRO. (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, CIDOC, 1968. Vol. I, PP. 114; Vol. II, Pp. 135; Vol. III, Po. 435. Obtainable by subscription to the CIDOC Dossiers.)

What makes a political order breakdown into widespread violence and civil war? To answer this classic question, political scientists are currently turning to comparative quantitative analysis, but

the detailed studies of individual cases are also needed. One of the most interesting, but tragic, recent cases has occurred in Guatemala where internal dissension and violence ascended to a peak in 1967 and 1968 of a virtual war of all against all, without, however, having the attention-gathering result of an overt U.S. intervention or a communist takeover. Neither U.S. scholars nor press have fully reported the situation, let alone analyzed it, but the Intercultural Center of Documentation in Cuernavaca, Mexico, has advanced the study immensely with the publication of three volumes of bibliography and documents. To my knowledge, no similar collection has been published on any other case of civil war, revolution, or widespread violence.

The shorter first two volumes contain bibliography and reprints from Guatemalan newspapers, principally *Prensa Libre*, *Impacto*, *El Grafico*, and *La Hora*. The third and longest volume contains a bibliography and the reproduction of documents "of difficult acquisition." Included are statements by Guatemalan groups of every ideological orientation. Many of the pieces were originally only mimeographed and circulated clandestinely. Others were circulated publicly as handbills. One item is a thorough and detailed history of the rebellion to 1965 by an unnamed foreign source.

None of the documents presents a sufficiently complete description of the events to allow an assessment of the severity of the Guatemalan violence in comparison with other contemporary breakdowns in public order. However, enough material is given to indicate that insecurity was complete in all the non Indian communities of the country. In these areas, no one of any class or occupation, official or unofficial, was safe from assassination and mutilation, seizure and torture, or blackmail. Strangely, the most oppressed group, the 60 per cent of the population composed of unassimilated Indians, refused to become involved. No lines between organized fighting forces were drawn. The rebels machine gunned police or shot up "traitors" in the center of Guatemala City. In retaliation the "anti-communist" unofficial groups or the secret police dragged persons from their homes, tortured them, and left their bodies in the countryside. At the same time guerrilla bands roamed the country and were pursued by the army who struck against anyone who might have collaborated.

Many different perspectives of the violence are found in the documents. The rebels, the moderate political parties, the governments, the army, and the rightwing groups have different descriptions of the facts, and varying interpretations of the causes of the violence. The total impression of the different pictures together is baffling, but it may give a better representation of the reality than would

any single "objective" interpretation. The collection certainly precludes any simplistic or one-sided interpretation of the events.

To add to the confusion, groups continued to change their views over the years in which the violence occurred. The communist party, *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo*, for instance, began by opposing the rebellion and accusing the participants of being ultra-radicals and irresponsible "provocateurs," but it ended by giving its wholehearted support to the guerrillas and encouraging their partisans to renewed efforts after the tide had turned against the rebellion. The original rebel forces split, and one of the original leaders, Luis Turcios, accused his former comrades of Trotskyism. The Catholic Church went from a rigorous anticommunist position to opposition to all violence but in favor of social change. The intense anti-communist propaganda and terroristic campaign of the right wing groups, MANO, NOA, MNL, CEDEG, came into being only after the elected government of the *Partido Revolucionario* assumed office in 1966 and sought some sort of accommodation.

These volumes could be well used as readings for students with ability in Spanish instead of the bland statements so often used. They provide enough material for numerous political analyses at all levels of scholarship. Most important, they contribute to a more profound understanding of one of the most critical issues of all times, the breakdown of public order. The contents deserve to be far more widely disseminated than is possible under the subscription system of CIDOC dosiers.—JOHN F. McCAMANT, *University of Denver*.

Technocracy. BY JEAN MEYNAUD. Translated by Paul Barnes. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 315. \$12.95.)

Ever since the dawn of industrial society, students of politics have been concerned with the question of the relationship of technical expertise and democracy. But although the problem of the expert is as ancient as Plato, it is only in modern times that the technical specialist's claims to superior insight have been generally accepted. In recent decades the difficulty of reconciling the knowledge of the minority and the power of the majority has become so intensified by the growth of science and technology as to give birth to what is virtually a new field within political science, the study of the interrelations of science and politics.

France has long been a polity in which a centralized state has made maximum use of technical expertise, and there has been a widespread tendency to refer to the Gaullist regime as "technocratic." Therefore a book on technocracy by one of France's most distinguished political scientists inevitably holds out the promise of shedding new

light on a central problem of modern politics—the impact of science upon democratic government in advanced industrial societies.

For these reasons Professor Meynaud's book is a special disappointment. Part of the fault lies in its basic conception. Its title conceals the fact that in French usage *technique* is a term of such wide connotation as to be virtually useless for analytical purposes, as Jacques Ellul's *The Technological Society* exemplified some years ago. For the French generally, all expertise is "technological" and, following this logic, Meynaud is as much if not more concerned with the role of military and financial experts as he is with scientists in the American sense. He therefore has been forced to tackle a subject so vast as to be almost unmanageable. Focusing on a small part of it, he concentrates on the political role of the technically trained bureaucrats—typically the products of the *Grandes Ecoles*. As a result, his book will be of interest primarily to the student of comparative bureaucracy rather than to one concerned with the larger interrelationships of science, technology and politics. *Technocracy* is also (and here the author is perhaps reflecting a general weakness of French political science) an extremely parochial book and assumes much detailed background in French government and administration, including minor ideological and political conflicts. Reference to British and American experience is marginal, confusing and occasionally fantastic. For example, re the American presidency, Meynaud comments: "We need simply to notice that over the last few decades (especially after the reforms of 1939, following from the report of a three-man commission, which specially recommended the piecemeal development of a 'fourth branch' with no direct responsibility to anyone) the President's immediate staff has continually increased." (P. 277) This is unfortunately only an extreme example of a confused text rendered doubly unfathomable by inadequate documentation.

Though Meynaud has many ideas and insights to contribute to the general discussion of bureaucracy, they are obscured by generally bad writing made more impenetrable by a bad translation. His style is extremely discursive, though rarely graceful, and it is often difficult to tell whether he is expressing his own ideas or reporting those of others; thus his position remains obscure. In addition, *technocracy* is dated. The original French edition was copyrighted in 1964, though apparently some footnotes were hastily added to the British edition of 1965 which is what the Free Press is reprinting here. Nor are the added footnotes of much use; they are frequently incomplete and in some instances completely incorrect; e.g., p. 102 where a textual reference to a book by Fred J. Cook is footnoted by the incomplete citation of a work by

(Maxwell) Taylor.

Mores the pity. For Professor Meynaud is an eminently humane and sane observer of the phenomena he discusses. He recognizes that the role of the expert cannot be treated in abstraction from general political and economic systems and that at present in France—and elsewhere one might add—bowing to the expert means not only or even perhaps primarily yielding to informed reason but also means the enhancement of the power of the existing capitalist elite, pace James Burnham and his followers, whom Meynaud refutes at length. He also realizes that science is not a menace as such and that, although technology opens up new possibilities of the diminution of human freedom, they will only become actualized if the electorate and political leadership of democracies permit them to be. Science presents potentialities, but politics is paramount in determining the future. Deeply concerned that men learn to master the new technical elite which threatens to make formal democracy meaningless, he attempts briefly to prescribe how this might be done. But his suggested methods of strengthening control by the people—"Redistribution of authority within the Executive"; "Reevaluation of parliamentary influence"; and "Modernization of political forces"—manifest the same weaknesses as the book as a whole in being simultaneously too general, too specific, and too narrowly French in context.

Thus Meynaud's *Technocracy* is a more sound but less interesting book than his countryman Elul's influential polemic. But it is simply not in the same class with the work of Robert Gilpin on France or with that of men such as Don Price and Donald S. Greenberg on the general problems of the relationship of science and politics. A revised and tightened edition of *Technocracy* might have been of some use to American social scientists, but the present publication is a disservice to the reputation of the author and the publisher alike.—VICTOR C. FERKISS, *Georgetown University*.

The Soviet Police System. EDITED BY ROBERT CONQUEST. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 103. \$5.00.)

Justice and the Legal System in the USSR. EDITED BY ROBERT CONQUEST. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 152. \$5.00.)

The two studies appear without assigning their preparation to any specific person or persons. In the preface credit is given by the editor to Messrs. Murray, Friedman and A. Alekseyenko for collaboration in preparing the volume on police, and to Messrs. Alekseyenko and Murray for cooperation in the study on *Justice and the Legal System in the USSR*.

These two slim volumes are useful as systematic

organizations of material and information on the role of police and of the law and courts in Soviet society. They cover the life of law and of the police from the beginning of the Soviet regime in Russia including the latest phase following the post-Stalin reforms. Indeed these reforms provide a focus for the inquiry which the editor and his collaborators have outlined: What is the meaning of the reform which followed the demise of Stalin? What is the practical significance of the rejection of Stalinism, and of the quest for the socialist legality?

The result of the review of the history and of the present condition of the Soviet polity together with its legal and political institutions, leads the editor to conclude that in its fundamentals the regime changed but little. The Soviet state was still a Stalinist state, and whenever it felt that the interests of its policy required it, had not respected its own laws. And "... so long as the Soviet state maintains its rights to override not merely in extreme emergencies, but in all cases where its interests are involved, the letter and spirit of its own laws, advances towards general legality, have no guarantee of permanence."

The same applies to the workings of the police apparatus, which still continues to operate in a basically Stalinist manner:

"For there has been no abandonment of the police machine's role as an institution for controlling population in the interest of leadership ... regardless of law and public opinion."

The editor and his collaborators have relied primarily on the original material and Soviet writings, and have disregarded—with few exceptions—Western literature on the subject. While this is a practice followed much too frequently by other scholars in the field of legal studies, in the case of the two studies edited by Mr. Conquest, this practice is grievously wrong, and detracts seriously from the value of the two books. The impression these two volumes will create is that they are the first efforts in the field, which is quite untrue. Those who would start the study of Soviet institutions by using the studies under review were given no guidelines where to seek additional information, in the works of authors who have been working with significant results in the field.

Not only are individual authors active in the study of Soviet law and institutions not mentioned, but there is no information regarding the periodical literature, translations of laws of the books and Soviet studies into the Western European languages published in this country, Germany, Holland, France, England, Austria and Belgium.

The omission is even more serious, owing to the slimness of the volumes under review and the span of time of the development of Soviet legal

institutions involved. Frequently coverage of key issues is quite inadequate, and some of the institutions are altogether omitted. It is not suggested that the format of the books as such rules out their usefulness for the study of Soviet legal

institutions, but that absence of reference to additional literature available in English and other Western European languages has highly limited their usefulness.—KAZIMIERZ GRZBOWSKI, *Duke University*.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The Politics of Peace-Keeping. BY ALAN JAMES. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Institute of Strategic Studies, 1969. Pp. 452 \$11.00.)

For very nearly a quarter of a century, the United Nations has expended words—by the billions—and deeds—far more than memory easily retains—to maintain both local and general peace. Merely to outline the ceaseless activity of the world organization represents a huge effort of bringing together the records of meetings and field expeditions and the more fugitive evidence of negotiations, deals and pressures. To produce from this vast mass of material a comprehensive account in a well-organized framework is a real accomplishment. Alan James, Senior Lecturer at the London School of Economics and sometime Rockefeller Research Fellow in International Organization at Columbia University, has done precisely this in *The Politics of Peace-Keeping*.

This tightly-written volume includes every effort under United Nations auspices to deal with active conflicts that get attention at the international level, except for those involving collective security in a closely-defined sense. James concerns himself with the goals of individual states as they interact and with their maneuvers to protect or advance their interests as they define them. From these maneuvers emerge the conflicts that come into the purview of the United Nations. The organization produces influences of its own, which are directed towards, and sometimes achieve, changes in state behavior. James does not seek and expose the causes of state behavior within the domestic polity. Nor does he project state behavior on the broad background of a theoretical system. His explanations and rhetoric hew closely to those of the diplomatic historian, although his analytical framework does not tie his study to a time scheme. His explorations of diplomatic alternatives available to governments involved in conflicts, either directly or through the United Nations, are sensitive and ingenious.

James employs a wide definition of peace-keeping, so broad as to revise drastically the conventional conception of this form of United Nations work. It encompasses all of the usual modes of peaceful settlement of disputes, such as negotiation, mediation, enquiry, etc., as well as the more recent organizational innovations in the form of non-violent employment of military forces which

have been dubbed "peace-keeping" since Dag Hammarskjöld and his associates discovered Chapter Six-and-one-half of the United Nations Charter. Any national effort to which the United Nations responds as a proximate or distant threat to the peace falls within the definition. Aggression and response to it by enforcement action involving Security Council decisions of binding legal effect and invoking the combined might of the great powers if excluded. Not much in what the United Nations calls the political field, as well as in the treatment of colonial problems, falls outside of this definition. James concentrates on overt, perceived disputes and conflicts; this excludes by implication those methods of promoting peace by such means as general arms control systems or raising the level of general welfare which, some assume, reduce international conflict.

In order to deal with incidents that range in size and notoriety from the Buraimi Oasis dispute to the Congo, James devises an intelligent and reasonably precise set of three main categories and 10 sub-categories. He assigns incidents to the categories on the basis of goals expressed in United Nations resolutions, modulated by the contents of debates and governmental statements and his own estimates of intentions. Inevitably an affair as complicated as, for example, the long-enduring Palestine case changes in the course of treatment by the United Nations and must therefore be split among the sections of the book. Useful cross-references restore some unity to the resulting fragments.

In James' scheme, the first category, "Patching Up," includes efforts in the United Nations to bring about the settlement of disputes or at least reduction of conflict to a tolerable level. Cases are analyzed within four sub-categories of activity—impartial investigation; mediation; supervision, which covers United Nations assistance in carrying out an agreement between disputants; and administration, which includes short-term or longer international rule.

The second and third categories, "Prophylaxis" and "Proselytism," are more novel in conception and content than the first. The sub-categories of prophylaxis, intended to keep a dispute from getting any worse without settling it include accusation, or the use of reporting to discourage objectionable behavior; sedation, or calming efforts

among which are negotiations and "cooling activity at the military level," (p. 260) as in the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization; obstruction, or the placing of a force, such as the United Nations Emergency Force, between the contenders; and refrigeration, or the exercise by the United Nations of governmental functions in a contentious zone without agreement on the eventual outcome, as was proposed for the former Italian colonies.

"Proselytism" encompasses efforts to "... upset certain aspects of the established order. . . ." (p. 9) by means of invalidation, or the use of reporting and investigation to show "that a regime has lost all moral right to continue its rule," (p. 372), a procedure employed continuously by the Committee of 24 on colonialism. Proselytism also includes coercion (but not of the collective security type) as used in Rhodesia and in the Congolese province of Katanga.

On the basis of this subtle differentiation of various forms of peace-keeping, James attaches to the consideration of each a cautious estimate of the likelihood of its future use, always calling attention to the national policies and power alignments required as preconditions. "Certainly," he generalizes, "UN peacekeeping seems to be firmly established as one of the processes to which states can resort for the furthering of their international purposes." (p. 439) Again and again, he emphasizes his belief that the use and success of peace-keeping efforts depends ultimately on the attitudes of the governments concerned and, for the naive, remarks that United Nations peace-keeping neither ends politics nor raises its moral tone. Rather it offers a means for obtaining stability, a goal which he asserts underlies the bulk of peace-keeping.

It is a source of cohesiveness and consistency in this study that its author clings so tenaciously to his vantage point at the level of state policy. Yet this prevents him from commenting on the development and future of the United Nations as an international institution that is something more than its individual members and something less than a government. Implicitly his work recognizes the United Nations as an apparatus of this character, as he writes, for instance, about attempts by the organization to send a group of observers, or as having a defined point of view, but he nowhere makes explicit his estimate of the influence the institution has on international politics generally.

In as meticulous a book as this one, it is regrettable to find the Dominican Republic always called "Dominica," a minor Caribbean island with a British colonial background. Insertion of a chart of cases, using James' analytical scheme, would have improved this already very useful study.—LEON GORDENKER, *Princeton University*.

Neutralization and World Politics. By CYRIL E. BLACK, RICHARD A. FALK, KLAUS KNORR AND ORAN R. YOUNG. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. 165. \$7.50.)

In the spring of 1966, four members of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University undertook, at the invitation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a study of the applicability of neutralization to the problems of conflict in Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam. Out of this experience grew the present, more general, study. Meant as a contribution to contemporary International Relations literature, it is a clear, well-organized though preliminary exploration of the principal issues involved in the concept of neutralization, its risks and its advantages. The authors have produced a coherent argument and a craftsmanlike review of historical precedents and practical problems. Individual contributions are not identified and have been well integrated. But this unity of result has also been achieved at the price of a certain blandness and lack of individuality reminiscent of committee-negotiated government documents.

In the tradition of international law, the writers see neutralization as "a formal status of permanent neutrality" suitable or potentially attractive "only for relatively minor states." They define it more technically as "a special international status designed to restrict the intrusion of specified state actions in a specified area" and distinguish it from demilitarization and neutralism. The state actions referred to are mostly the activities of Great Powers: non-interference in domestic affairs and various types of military activity with respect to a particular territory. They see the establishment of a neutralized status to rest upon prior conditions of balance, both of power and of the objectives of the major states involved: a military stalemate and an equilibrium of resolve. A negotiated neutralization agreement translates the condition of military stalemate into that of political stalemate.

While the initial agreement to neutralize thus rests upon a stalemate between the Great Powers, the viability and the maintenance of neutralization is posited upon the strength of national institutions in the particular area. Local stability also removes from the neutralized state the odium of inferior or protected status. The vitality of Swiss neutrality rests upon indigenous resources of organizational capacity; but these have been lacking in Laos and have jeopardized the settlement negotiated there in 1962, and they are those found most wanting in Southeast Asia in general. Yet, as the authors recall, neutralization need not necessarily offer solutions for eternity. If it is a formula that succeeds in organizing and maintaining the settlement of a conflict for a period of

twenty to fifty years, it may be said to have achieved its purpose.

With regard to Vietnam, the book presents some caveats and few solutions; "there is, of course, no point in drawing an overly optimistic picture of the prospects of achieving a neutralization agreement for South Vietnam." The principal consequence of such an agreement would be to provide a "framework within which a process of political shakedown" including "violence of substantial proportions" "could take place without endangering international peace and security." "The outcome would constitute the closest approximation to self-determination that South Vietnam is likely to achieve in the near future." While the Paris talks, begun since the completion of this volume, crucially revolve around the question of troop withdrawals, the concept of neutralization as such does not appear to have become a negotiating objective of either side.

The dominant note of this study is caution, even modesty, in advancing the merits of neutralization. "Neutralization is a concept of limited applicability" reads the opening page of the preface and the feeling prevails that the authors are conscious of addressing a sceptical, if not critical, audience; they seem to be trying hard to be reasonable, pragmatic and sensitive to the 'realities of world politics.' This is particularly apparent in their discussion of the applicability of neutralization to larger states or to more important areas such as Europe. With all this caution they may have taken the attractiveness out of a promising idea which should be of theoretical interest to all students of International Relations. For if neutralization is indeed a method for resolving conflict between the Great Powers, arrived at by way of stalemate, it could have wider applicability: potentially, to all areas of the global system.

The 'world politics' which the authors accept as the unquestioned framework of their analysis is only one particular type among possible world orders. It is a type of world politics characterized by a high incidence of major wars, and the preeminence of Great Powers deriving from their role in wars and their settlement. True neutralization is incompatible with this system because the conditions of war and Great Power control undermine the viability and diversity of domestic institutions in the lesser states, on which lasting neutralization must rest. Conversely, a situation of global stalemate of power and resolve might conceivably create conditions in which the neutralization of large areas based upon the absence of war and upon indigenous strength would prove a plausible alternative to the contemporary system of Great Power politics.—GEORGE MODELSKI, *University of Washington*.

Supranationalism and International Adjudication.

By FOREST L. GRIEVES. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. 266. \$10.00.)

Those interested in evolving international institutions and in burgeoning "world law" will find in Forest Grievess' comparisons of five international courts (the Central American Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice [ICJ], the Court of the European Communities [CEC], and the European Court of Human Rights) a useful handbook and a compact analysis. The author devotes one chapter to each court, introduces them all with a chapter on "Sovereignty and Supranationalism," and follows them with his "Summary and Conclusions," eight appendices (57 pages of selected articles from the constituent instruments and a table of CEC cases), and sixteen pages of bibliography.

Grievess' introduction points out that *supranationalism* is a new political term, having been used privately only as far back as the 1940's and in international public law for the first time as recently as 1951 in the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. By reminding us of these facts, Grievess demonstrates both how contemporary and how important his subject is. After discussing the ambiguity that inevitably surrounds so new a word, he joins Werner Feld in defining the term to mean "that signatory states have transferred to an international institution certain limited decisionmaking powers normally exercised only by the governmental organs of a sovereign state, powers which include the capability of issuing, under certain specified conditions, binding norms to the states or to their inhabitants" (p. 14). By this criterion, only the CEC qualifies as supranational, and Grievess makes his point sharply by singling out the case of *M. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L.* (1964), where the CEC successfully upheld a Community norm in the face of a decision by the Italian Constitutional Court that ignored the Treaty of Rome. Grievess discusses individual cases only when they bear directly on supranationalism, but his lists and tabulations of contentious cases that have come before each of the courts makes his book a helpful compendium of the courts' jurisprudence.

Grievess measures the courts' supranationalism by examining their constitutional bases and their practice, which seems reasonable enough. But he also looks at the courts in terms of the expectations of statesmen instrumental in bringing them into being, hoping (p. 16) that the "supranational views of leading statesmen during the *travaux préparatoires* . . . are relatively indicative of the milieu within which an international tribunal was founded." In this view, he cannot be challenged,

but it is puzzling that, while admitting that expectations are "not always a particularly reliable indicator of a court's power," he persists in classifying expectations as a measure of power. Because state-men's hopes are interesting and important, they could certainly stand on their own as a contrast to later realities. Treating them just as background material would have been far more legitimate and would, moreover, have made Grieves' presentations less mechanical than they now seem. The rigid parallelism of his five central chapters facilitates comparisons, no doubt, but it is a rather primitive mold into which to press his study. A profusion of subheads and numbered or lettered sections heighten one's feeling that one is reading an outline rather than a completed work. The pedestrian handling of the much-vexed problem of sovereignty with which the book opens is no adornment either and emphasizes the book's more routine aspects. One is also put off by Grieves' leaning somewhat heavily on John Herz's "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State" without taking account of his later "The Territorial State Revisited."

If, however, Grieves starts out by over-stressing the state's decline, his strict focus on supranationalism and adjudication keeps him in one instance from doing full justice to the courts' impact on the nation-state system. He fails to point out, in discussing access to the ICJ (pp. 91-92), that UN organs and specialized agencies authorized by the General Assembly may request advisory opinions of the ICJ. This omission is all the more unfortunate because he has earlier (p. 9) referred to the Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations to show that "international organizations . . . have assumed a juridical personality." Later (p. 137), too, he gives full marks to the CEC for permitting entities other than states to appear before it and cites its capacity to "render advisory opinions in connection with the treaties" defining the European Community. Advisory Opinions are not, of course, *adjudication*, and *adjudication* is this book's subject. Technically speaking, therefore, Dr. Grieves cannot be faulted. But there is an inconsistency here, and access to the ICJ for advisory opinions does cast light on supranationalism.

Grieves has worked with original materials and, where necessary, translated them, though not always felicitously. At times his attention to our linguistic needs seems a bit fussy, too, as when he writes (p. 14) of the constituents of Pierre Pescatore's definition of *supranationality*: "common interests (*intérêts communs*) . . . real powers (*pouvoirs réels*) . . . and autonomy of this power (*autonomie de ce pouvoir*)." He is also carried away one page earlier, where he burdens us with

"Fig. 1 Spectrum of Interstate Bonds (*Staatenverbindungen*)," as if the German word added anything.

Despite these gratuitous displays of erudition, Professor Grieves does us a service by emphasizing the need for political and social consensus if international adjudication is to succeed and in demonstrating by an extreme negative example (the Central American Court) and an extreme positive example (CEC) how important spirit and practice are in contrast to expectations and constitutional documents. His comments on judicial impartiality and on our inability to measure it adequately are provocative, and his endorsements of the CEC practice in not using *ad hoc* judges and in keeping its votes secret are both modest and apposite. He would like to see the ICJ adopt the same procedures, but he realizes full well the difficulties standing in the way of such changes.

Grieves quotes (p. 174), endorses, and confirms Hersch Lauterpacht's view that "there are few rules of modern international law . . . more widely acknowledged than the rule that the jurisdiction of international tribunals is derived from the will of the parties," and he shows us again that, by and large, states are still unwilling to preside over their own demise.—RICHARD N. SWIFT, *New York University*.

Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914-1965. BY MICHAEL R. GORDON. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. Pp. 333. \$8.95.)

Political scientists from a number of specializations will find Gordon's book rewarding. It will be welcomed by those who are concerned with the discovery of identifiable constants of political behavior over a long period of time; it will provide a useful case study for those who seek evidence of the relationship between ideology and attitudes on foreign policy; scholars specializing in political parties will find a gold mine of evidence concerning factional strife as a component of the democratically-structured party; those oriented toward the study of political leadership will be interested by the author's clear description of the interaction between the Labour Party elite and its challengers within the Party. All will admire, I think, Gordon's capacity for reducing a substantial body of intractable material to a systematic formulation of principles and problems.

On this latter point Gordon is quite clear. He is concerned with accounting for the nature of the conflicts that have divided the Labour Party in the area of foreign policy and with identifying the causes of their persistence. He stays always within the strict limits that he has set for himself, using the history of the Party's foreign affairs controversies since 1914 primarily for analytical purposes.

The first problem approached is the analysis of socialist foreign policy as perceived by Labour partisans. Relying on a four-fold classification derived from Richard Rose, the author proceeds to dissect Labour's loyalty to the principles of internationalism, international working-class solidarity, anti-capitalism, and anti-militarism (conceived as antipathy to power politics and accompanied by varying degrees of pacifism). The description of these four tenets of socialist foreign policy could hardly be improved upon for accuracy or comprehensiveness. This exposition is important because it reveals unequivocally the distance separating the ideological slogans themselves from the content which the slogans have concealed. Indeed, it has been one of the most disconcerting characteristics of the Labour Party that it can claim, after the event, to have formulated a clear-cut policy when an investigation of its actual position at the time will often reveal a good deal of ambiguity. The Party's real talent in the area of foreign affairs often lies in its ability to manipulate principles that have clearly perceived symbolic appeal.

The book is divided into two parts, the years between the two world wars and the post-World War II period, with a brief connecting chapter on "Socialist Foreign Policy and World War II." The section dealing with the years 1920-1939 brings out clearly the Party's difficulties over a League of Nations-oriented policy of collective security. These years were crucial, as the author points out, for they provided the laboratory in which Labour could have tested its fundamental assumptions about the nature of interstate relations and might have adjusted in a responsible way to the world of reality. Eventually adjustments were made, but only at the approach of World War II and with the agonizing and protesting Party being dragged along by the inexorable march of events. Collective security meant, until two years before the war, disarmament, arbitration, and the mobilization of an anti-war public opinion. Indeed, Labour's attachment to Socialist principles leads Gordon to conclude that "to most Labour partisans disarmament and collective security were at bottom one and the same thing." Even after Ernest Bevin forced the Party to revise its stand on armaments, there was still the puzzling opposition to the introduction of conscription in the spring of 1939. Even though war did come, there was no serious attempt in the Party to re-evaluate socialist principles in the light of the international event of the interwar years. "Right up to the end of hostilities," writes Gordon, "the thrust of party utterances fostered the widely diffused belief that socialist foreign policy was as intellectually sound and morally compelling as ever. . . ."

After 1945, however, a startling change occurred. When the Soviet Union unleashed her cold war pol-

icy against Great Britain, the Party leadership responded in kind. With Bevin at the Foreign Office, the Labour leadership maneuvered the application of a traditional foreign policy based on the availability of armed forces as a deterrent, the need for alliances, and the admission that the most far-reaching national rivalries did in fact exist. Attempts were sometimes made by the leadership to identify the newly-accepted realism with the long-standing socialist principles, but the depth of the change was nonetheless unmistakable. The sniping of the socialist purists (or "fundamentalists") gradually subsided and by 1950 a near-consensus had been maneuvered by a Party leadership skilled in the techniques of educating the rank and file in the principles of realism.

The Korean War, however, shattered, irretrievably as it turned out, the process of adaptation. The re-emergence of a strong current of socialist orthodoxy, eventually marshaled by Aneurin Bevan against the Party leaders, was the signal for the eruption of anti-Americanism, neutralist currents, renewed pacifism—in short, the re-appearance of bitter doctrinal disputes which still plague the Party. One of Gordon's more startling findings is that for the past several years the two forces, orthodox and revisionist, have been almost evenly balanced. That, in itself, would account for the policy of drift of the Wilson Government. In spite of the well-known powers of the British Cabinet, it is difficult to apply any consistent foreign policy when the party in power is so divided by principles that neither faction can impose its will on the other.

Still, there remains the marked disparity in treatment given to the periods before and after 1945. More than half a century is the time span indicated by the title, and yet nearly three-fourths of the book is devoted to the last twenty five years of the period covered. That this approach can be justified in terms of relevance to today's international scene is doubtful. For while the years before 1922 are dealt with in the briefest fashion, the post-1951 period is given an almost equally sketchy treatment. In reality, the heart of the work is the admittedly important era of adaptation to power realities, 1945-1951.

In his truncated account of the period 1920-1939, Gordon says little about Labour's hostility toward the peace treaties, particularly to their territorial provisions. In reality, the Party's rejection of any military props to collective security in Europe was not due solely to its socialist ideology; it was indissolubly linked to the fear that arms might be used to reinforce territorial boundaries that were thought to be intrinsically unjust. Labour propaganda on that score was unmistakably similar to the claims of German nationalists and militarists and yet neither MacDon-

ald nor Henderson, aware as they were of the real situation inside Germany, made any meaningful effort to reorient the Party away from its pro-German bias. Nor does the author take into account the persistently anti-French posture of Labour. The ultimate importance of this attitude can be debated, and yet neither the impact of Anglo-French differences on the crumbling of the post-war order nor the Labour Party's contribution to the debacle can be ignored.

The author's omissions or near-omissions along these lines probably stem from his arbitrary division between the "progress" years of the 1920's and the "crisis" years of the 1930's. Gordon believes that Labour's "socialist policy fared well enough in the earlier but not in the later decade." But did it fare well in the earlier decade? To say that the crisis of the thirties was due to "circumstances" or to "a fateful turn" of events is to deny the essential unity of German nationalist goals during both decades. Gordon attributes too much perhaps to the influence of socialist ideology and too little to specific aspects of Labour attitudes that were sometimes more "liberal" than socialist.

In spite of these reservations, we can be grateful for a work that applies admirable scholarship to the exploration of an intriguing subject.—WILLIAM R. TUCKER, *Lamar State College of Technology*.

The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967. By ARTHUR LALL. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 322. \$10.00.)

This work is essentially an account of negotiations within the United Nations and a catalog of UN actions relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict during a six-month period in 1967. The author prepared his study while serving as Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University. His sources are official UN records and information supplied by the principal actors at UN headquarters. His access to the latter was facilitated by personal contacts dating from the time when he was Indian Ambassador to the UN. Although his work abounds with citations from official documents (its *Appendix* alone contains the text of twenty-five resolutions that were proposed during 1967, ten of which were adopted by the Security Council or the General Assembly), there are virtually no footnotes indicating sources for information gleaned from his extensive interviews and conferences.

The author explores no hypotheses, and he advances no general theories. Nevertheless, it is clear that he regards peace in the Middle East, together with safeguarding the territorial integrity of all states in the region, as desirable goals for the international community. Equally clear is his conviction that the United Nations and particularly the security Council, which he deems much bet-

ter suited for such purposes than the General Assembly, should be effective instruments for achieving such goals.

In providing the reader with a detailed and impartial account of proceedings before the UN, Ambassador Lall displays admirable objectivity. His impartiality is particularly noteworthy because the kind of experience that he has had in Middle East affairs often produces an anti-Israeli bias. For more than two years he served as India's representative on the General Assembly's Advisory Committee which was charged with assisting the Secretary-General in directing the work of the United Nations Emergency Force. Israel's refusal to permit such forces on her territory (in contrast to Egypt's affirmative response over a period of ten years) is duly noted, but the author's ascription of even larger obligations on Egypt's part offers no support for simplistic defenses of the latter's decision to order the withdrawal of UNEF in May, 1967.

This study would be of greater value to the average reader if it contained even a brief account of the roots of the conflict, and it would be much enriched by the inclusion of analyses of the interests and goals that lay behind the positions taken by the parties to the dispute and by the other principal actors at the UN. Equally regrettable is the absence of any attempt to evaluate the disputants' charges and countercharges concerning breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. However, those interested in bargaining or in the utility of international organization will be grateful for Ambassador Lall's identification of lost opportunities for peaceful settlement and his catalog of institutional failures, such as the Advisory Committee's failure to call the General Assembly into special session when Egypt ordered the withdrawal of UNEF prior to the "six-day war." Moreover, his legal-political analysis of the status and the withdrawal of UNEF (Chapter II) is one of the most valuable parts of the book.

Ambassador Lall's study provides many other insights into the essentially legal aspects of UN procedure. Some examples are noteworthy: (1) the continuing and, to Lall, untenable claims of "belligerent rights" by all parties to the conflict *vs.* obligations under the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force; (2) the alleged legal incapacity of the UN to "condemn" states as aggressors, a limitation vigorously defended by the author in his critique of certain clauses of anti-Israeli resolutions proposed by the Soviet Union and other "pro-Arab" states; and (3) the ease with which the organization sometimes functions without regard to legal technicalities. In regard to the latter point, it appears that the special session of the General Assembly was called by the Secretary-General in June, 1967, without regard to es-

established procedures but simply on request of the Soviet Union. In accordance with Soviet intent, moreover, the Assembly proceeded to consider draft resolutions (two of which were eventually passed) without regard to Article 12 of the Charter, which bars Assembly recommendations concerning disputes that are being considered by the Security Council. As Ambassador Lall observes, there are several precedents for this deviation from the Charter. With regard to Security Council voting procedure, however, the Middle East crisis produced real innovations. During a time of alleged cease-fire violations, and while the Council was deadlocked in debate over draft resolutions concerning the substance of the entire dispute, the President of the Council proclaimed "consensus" in favor of stationing UN Military Observers in the Suez Canal sector. There was no objection, and he declared that the consensus was accepted. Shortly thereafter (again without objection) he referred to this consensus as "the *decision* which we have just adopted." (See p. 202.) More innovation, however, occurred during a similar impasse later in the year when another President of the Council consulted with his colleagues and proclaimed a decision in their name. Ambassador Lall sums up this development as follows:

This was the first time in the Council's history that a substantive decision was taken by a consensus arrived at without a formal meeting being called. By doing without a meeting the Council both avoided contention and saved face for certain of its members. (P. 268.)

This decision authorized the Secretary-General to enlarge the number of observers in the Suez Canal region and to arrange for additional technical material and means of transportation.

During the last six months of 1967, the General Assembly passed two resolutions dealing with rather limited aspects of the Middle East crisis, while the Security Council produced seven resolutions (one of which, on November 22, addressed itself to all the issues in dispute and provided an "authoritative" outline of basic principles for a general settlement). These actions were in addition to its two other "decisions" arrived at by "consensus." Two years later, however, the substantive terms of all these recommendations and directives remain unimplemented, in spite of the passage of many subsequent resolutions reaffirming the UN's previous actions. In defiance of the UN, Jerusalem has been incorporated into the Republic of Israel, no captured territory has been evacuated, ceasefire violations occur daily and *de facto* warfare is recurrent, there is no settlement of the refugee problem, freedom of navigation on international waterways remains to be established, and both sides in the conflict claim the rights of belligerents. The gap between success in negotiating the passage of resolutions and securing

their implementation continues to widen, and the attempts at quiet mediation by the UN's skilled Special Representative to the Middle East have been unavailing.

In this reviewer's opinion, the fundamental conflict between Arab nationalism and Israel's assessment of her own basic security requirements makes clear that the only peace that is possible would be one enforced by a Soviet-American consensus, whether imposed under UN auspices or otherwise. Since both states lack the will to impose a settlement—even when agreeing on one, as they did in 1967 (see pp. 211, 263, 309)—the Middle East will continue indefinitely to be an arena of armed conflict in which minor powers have the means to involve the great powers in a "war by proxy" or in direct conflict. Even an imposed settlement, however, might entail prohibitive risks and costs. This gloomy forecast, it should be noted, is in sharp contrast with the position taken by Ambassador Lall following passage of the Security Council's comprehensive resolution of November 22, 1967. In his view,

Never was the prospect of peace in the Middle East brighter than at the beginning of 1968. The chances of moving forward from the armistice regime instituted nineteen years previously were good and solid. Only grave errors on the part of the international community could fail to convert this opportunity into a reality. (P. 279.)

Such conclusions seemed unwarranted even in their original context, since Ambassador Lall accurately underscored the resolution's ambiguities and also reported that none of the parties to the conflict committed itself to carry out the resolutions provisions. In the case of Israel, for example, Foreign Minister Eban declared: "My Government will determine its attitude to the Security Council's resolution in the light of its own policy . . ." (Quoted, p. 264.)—H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY, *Washington State University*.

German Foreign Policy in Transition: Bonn Between East and West. BY KARL KAISER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 153. \$1.95.)

The reader may well expect an enriching reading experience when he first takes this slender volume in hand. The author, a German political scientist who has taught at Harvard, the Johns Hopkins Center at Bologna and the University of Bonn, is a widely published and deservedly respected student of European and German politics. The publisher is a university press of the first rank, and the book was issued under the joint auspices of several prestigious scholarly institutions. However, while the essay contains some useful descriptions of and insights into the roots and implications of recent shifts in Bonn's *Deutschlandpolitik*, such virtues are regrettably buried

beneath the verbiage of what is a very poorly written book. Indeed, after three close readings, I am not certain that the values of those scattered paragraphs are commensurate with the chore of wading through such an inconsistently edited, logically flawed and generally disappointing volume.

While the title indicates a rather broad scope, the author demurs: "This study is not a history of German foreign policy of the post-war period, but only an essay. It deliberately focuses on certain themes and does not discuss in detail a number of dimensions . . ." (p. 4). The themes Kaiser has selected are restricted almost entirely to the Federal Republic's policies regarding the division of Germany and to the interplay between those policies and their domestic and systemic environments. He attributes the growth of Bonn's attachment to the West in the years after the war, the development of the Hallstein Doctrine (intended to impose a diplomatic quarantine on the East German regime) and the assumption of the "policy of strength" to a convergence of Western (one could generally read "American") strategic ends and the efforts of West German politicians to cope with their endemic problems of insecurity.

This post-war posture did not manifest potential for bringing reunification closer. The mutually reinforcing (or exacerbating) relationship between the division of Germany on the one hand and the division of Europe and the Cold War confrontation on the other led to an impasse familiar to all observers of the world scene: a *détente* between the blocs was viewed to be a prerequisite for the resolution of the "German problem," and German reunification appeared impossible without a prior relaxation of Cold War tensions. Bonn's stance remained essentially unchanged until its western allies signalled a shift toward *détente*, though many West Germans had recognized that progress toward reunification could not be made through such policies.

Movement away from the rigid post-war posture was slow and difficult, especially until the advent of the Great Coalition, in 1966, because *Ostpolitik* in general and *Deutschlandpolitik* in particular had become highly politicized in the Federal Republic. Further, as Kaiser points out, the unresolved German question translates many German phenomena into significant inputs into the European and global systems. It also magnifies the impact of many external developments on politics inside the Federal Republic.

Since Kaiser is generally thorough in his treatment of environmental factors, his one omission stands out: he fails to take adequate note of the import of the primacy of concern that has come to characterize America's extra-European involvement during the very years that Bonn's reorientation has taken place. While it was the Kennedy

administration's move toward the policy of *détente* that gave initial impetus to Bonn's shift, it was America's deepening involvement in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 that provided the enhanced freedom of action for the Federal Republic that made the policy changes possible. The opening to the East clearly bears a German imprint—and it was contrary to the American style of "alliance leadership" prior to the escalation of the war in Asia to yield that much initiative to its partners.

Kaiser refrains from attempting to resolve the dilemmas borne by Germany's division and unique world position. He does conclude on a reasonably positive note, however:

West Germany's adaptation to the division and her attempt to enter into a peaceful working relationship with East Germany, though not a solution to the German problem, may still be a net gain. There are no *feasible* alternatives (p. 139).

While in his descriptions of the evolution of Bonn's policies the author has made a valuable contribution to the body of "current historical" knowledge, his analysis in general is marred by logical lapses, extremely distracting language and occasional manifestations of conceptual indifference. Two or three illustrations of each of these problems should suffice here.

On page 54 Professor Kaiser presents four tables, in order to demonstrate that

a reunified Germany would not . . . simply be the sum of two existing states. She would occupy an entirely new category—that of a nation whose power fell short of the two super-powers but considerably ahead (except for the possession of nuclear weapons) of Europe's traditional great powers like Britain and France (p. 55).

Yet, the elaborate tables demonstrate no such thing! In each the Federal Republic's rank is the same as the rank that a reunited Germany would occupy—and in each the Federal Republic already surpasses the standing of all European powers! On page 48 Kaiser writes that,

as German critics of past Bonn policies have often pointed out, governments are not pawns in the hands of their public but can influence public opinion through courageous and convincing leadership. *To do so requires, however, that a majority of those are convinced of the wisdom of the move [italics added].*

To move public opinion in the direction of supporting governmental policy does not, of course, require the conviction of 51% of "those in key positions"—or, for that matter, of any specific number or proportion. That task can be achieved by one individual in some circumstances—or the whole leadership can fail in attempting it.

Throughout the text such terms as *nation* and *interaction* are used without particular regard for their established conceptual meanings. Such usage could be viewed as simply another manifestation of Kaiser's monumental language problem were it not for his effort to develop what is a provocative

and potentially fascinating analytic line. Kaiser asserts that the two Germanies

are two parts of one nation and, therefore, taken together, from a domestic national context with its own habits of thought and action, quite different from those characteristic of relations between other nations in opposing international systems (p. 28).

In order to use this notion it is imperative to distinguish this view of the domestic context from the more orthodox one—or at least to restrict usage to the former. This is not done; and the term is used in both senses indiscriminately. Second, the concept of nation requires specification if it is to serve purpose to which the author wishes to put it. In spite of the recurring bald assertion that "Germany is still one nation" (at pp. 21, 28f., chap. 8 and elsewhere), the determinants and boundaries of the concept are never made clear.

The most distressing aspect of this book is the language. The syntax is a jumbled mixture of English and German. Very few sentences flow smoothly, and graceful construction is not manifested at all. Subordinate clauses frequently dangle in grotesque ways. The vocabulary is extremely narrow, leading to banal formulations of good thoughts and to a general sense of *déjà vu*. It is this last characteristic that makes the book read long. Finally, some uncorrected grammatical errors remain in the text. Perhaps Kaiser should have written in his native language and then had the work translated.—MARTIN O. HEISLER, *University of Maryland*.

Eleven Against War, BY SONDR A. HERMAN.
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969. Pp. 264. \$2.95, paper.)

Eleven Against War is an impressive study of the extension of American reform sentiment into the arena of foreign affairs. The author wishes to generate a deeper understanding of the resulting international idealism which, she believes, received too hasty a burial by realistic thinkers (Kennan, Morgenthau, Nieburh) in the Cold War Era. To accomplish her purpose, Herman explores the views of eleven American reformers: Woodrow Wilson, Elihu Root, Nicholas M. Butler, Hamilton Holt, Theodore Marburg, A. Lawrence Lowell, John Bates Clark, Franklin H. Giddings, Josiah Royce, Jane Addams, and Thorstein Veblen. All were dedicated to changing the relationships of nation states with the avowed aim of preventing future wars. The life experiences of the reformers, their basic philosophical assumptions, social and political theories, and international conceptions are lucidly presented and interrelated. Each chapter is rich in information and skillful in synthesis.

The major thesis of the book is that American internationalism in the early twentieth century contained a sharp division between the "men of

the polity" and the "communalists." The former (Wilson, Root, Butler, Holt, Marburg, Lowell, Clark, Giddings) extended their atomistic, competitive view of American society into the international arena. A natural harmony of interests was assumed to exist between the advanced nation states. Free competition among these nations would be beneficent if protected and tamed by the rule of international law. The "men of the polity" tended to be international Spencerians, expecting Anglo-American influence to dominate, not by force, but by the persuasion of a superior economic and legal system. Accordingly, their proposals for international peace stressed legal and judicial mechanisms for maintaining non-violent trade rivalries. Within this consensus, they differed among themselves concerning the nature of sanctions to be applied when a nation refused to respect international procedures.

The "communists" (Royce, Addams, and Veblen) flatly rejected competitive individualism as a sound guide for national or international society. They believed that peace could only be achieved by creating an organic community embracing all the peoples of the world. Their proposals emphasized schemes of economic and social cooperation which they hoped would gradually corrode the very spirit of competitive nationalism. The author is generally convincing in demonstrating the connection between the domestic and international views of the individuals considered. The exception is Hamilton Holt who emerges as a strange hybrid when placed in the author's conceptual framework.

Herman credits the "communalists" with recognizing that no natural harmony of interests existed between the advanced nations, and that the nation state system itself created conditions injurious to harmony. The major shortcoming of these thinkers, she contends, was their remoteness from the large organizations which could influence and execute public policy. Jane Addams, although an able leader of a minority protest movement (The Women's Peace Party), never held a public office higher than garbage inspector for the nineteenth ward of Chicago until late in her career. Herman's treatment of Veblen reinforces his image as a lone wolf howling bitterly and brilliantly at the moon. Royce was also detached from large influential organizations.

Herman concludes that the two branches of international idealism failed to recognize their supplementary character. By arguing in nationalistic terms, "men of the polity" made no attempt to educate the public to the possibility of cooperation within a world community. "Communalists," on the other hand, failed to recognize that new cooperative departures could not be made without the participation of large, influential, and established organizations. The responsibility for the de-

cline of internationalism, therefore, rests fundamentally with the internationalists themselves for "cherishing their differences."

The author's conclusion lacks persuasiveness because it does not come to terms with the vast practical problems which faced both the "men of the polity" and the "communalists" in their search for world peace. She wisely prefaces her book with the remark that it is essentially a study of ideas which touches only briefly on why, in the end, the internationalists failed. Judged in the light of its primary objective, *Eleven Against War* succeeds admirably.—EDWARD N. KEARNY, *Western Kentucky University*.

How Nations Behave. BY LOUIS HENKIN. (published for the Council on Foreign Relations) (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968. Pp. 324. \$7.50.)

Louis Henkin, a competent and respected international lawyer, seeks to explain the relevance of international law to contemporary world events. To this end, he undertakes to answer the question: "in what ways does international law determine or govern or modify, the policies of governments and how nations behave toward each other." Henkin reserves the right to engage in occasional skirmishes with other international law writers. However, the book is primarily addressed to the general reader who is interested in international relations but who underestimates or is unaware of the influence of international law in international political behavior.

This is a worthwhile enterprise. Unfortunately, the author does not do justice to the subject and the book falls short of its goal. The book fails because the central issue of the influence of international law on "international behavior" is not adequately met. Arguments, extrapolations from other legal systems, and speculation about the content and causes of international behavior are presented in a way that fails, in my view, to support persuasively the contention that "international law does far better than its reputation." This is a pity, since the contention is probably true. Indeed, most of Henkin's contentions are plausible and acceptable to those who are familiar with the subject. But the object of the book is to educate and persuade those who are less familiar with or skeptical of international law. This requires more thorough argumentation and evidence, as well as more penetrating scholarship, than is reflected in *How Nations Behave*.

For example, Henkin states that, "A government contemplating action usually asks what the law has been, independently of what it proposes to do." This is quite possibly true. But little evidence is offered in support of this contention. Moreover, there is no adequate investigation of

the possibility that, even if the contention is valid, its significance is not as favorable to Henkin's defense of international law as he seems to assume. Thus, the search for relevant international law within the policy process may be made primarily in order to anticipate and neutralize legal obstacles. Or the search for law may be a search for legal justifications for doing things that the government intends to do in any event. Percy Corbett pursued these themes in devastating detail in *LAW IN DIPLOMACY* (Princeton University Press, 1959) and Corbett was a friend and practitioner of international law. Surely the uninitiated and the skeptics may be expected to think of them and it may be questioned whether they will be convinced by Henkin's optimistic treatment of the subject.

Henkin attempts to protect himself from the charge of superficiality by stating at the outset that his exploration of the subject "must be *a priori* and speculative, less scientific than impressionistic . . . The examples cited are few, and many of them come from the United States." Fair enough, but even by his own standards it appears that Henkin does not provide convincing evidence to support his position and to win over the readers to whom the book is directed.

Specifically, three attempts to make a case for international law fail for lack of evidence. First, the valid and familiar point is made that much of the influence of international law within governmental processes is unknown and, in many cases, unknowable, to the outside world. Granted the problems of access to evidence of such influence, confidentiality and classification, a scholar of Henkin's stature should be able to provide numerous concrete examples of international law at work. They could be taken from memoirs and biographies of statesmen, diplomatic history, and from the author's personal experience as well as the experiences of professional colleagues. Instead, Henkin gives a few *hypothetical* examples of international law being applied. This is not even an "impressionistic" sampling of behavior. It is no sampling. The reader is apparently expected to take Henkin's word that international law influences decision-making in a way analogous to that described in the hypothetical examples. Henkin may be substantially right but his book is about *how* nations *behave* and this portion of the book is not likely to persuade readers that the author's hypotheses correspond to reality.

Second, Henkin attempts to rebut the claim that adherence to international law is largely limited to occasions when national interests coincide with legal prescription. To accomplish this he takes two very curious examples: loyalty to alliance commitments at the outbreak of World War I and within NATO. In each case Henkin points

out that performance of legal obligations has at times required the doing or contemplation of things that would not appear to be in the national interests of some of the allies. No allusion is made to the political, economic, and military factors—particularly as packaged in long-range contingency plans—which may have been more important by far than legal obligations in determining the behavior of the alliance members. Henkin follows these two examples with a third concerning reaction to Hitler's invasion of Poland. It seems to me that the examples chosen fail sufficiently to meet the challenge taken up, namely of proving that law can prevail over national interests.

Henkin also attempts something that is quite important, namely analysis of "the law's other influences." By this he means the subtle role that

legal concepts may play, along with many others, in decision-making. His example is excellent, the U.S. handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. But his analysis is disappointing. Thus, in arguing against the possible justification of anticipatory self-defense he supports his negative reaction to this concept with one footnote to an article by Quincy Wright and with a full page quotation of himself, surely a most unusual practice, supplemented by some more footnotes to his own writing. On this highly relevant and controversial subject, in a book designed to impress general readers, such short-cuts detract from the legitimate points made and from the authority of the writer.

In short, the much-needed book which Professor Henkin set out to write is still to be written.—
WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, *Georgetown University*.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

ADDRESS FOR NEW MANUSCRIPTS AFTER JUNE 1, 1970

Beginning June 1, 1970, the REVIEW's Managing Editor Elect, Professor Nelson W. Polsby, will assume all responsibility for referring and making decisions on all newly submitted manuscripts and for deciding on manuscripts referred but not decided on prior to June 1. Accordingly, after June 1, 1970 all new manuscripts and all correspondence concerning manuscripts not then decided upon should be sent to:

Professor Nelson W. Polsby, Managing Editor Elect
American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720

Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 200 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

THE SELECTION OF NELSON W. POLSBY AS THE NEW MANAGING EDITOR

On November 14, 1969, the present Managing Editor submitted his resignation to President Karl W. Deutsch. The letter said, in part, "A word seems in order about the timing of [the resignation]. In my discussions with then-President David Truman I agreed to undertake the editorship for a period of three to five years. The transition period began in July, 1965, and the first issue published under my direction was that of March, 1966. Accordingly, I am currently in my fifth year of service and feel that I have fulfilled my agreement with Dave. Quite aside from this, however, it has always seemed to me that a fairly frequent rotation of editors is healthy for the journal (and the editors) and that five years is a reasonable maximum tenure."

The Constitution of the Association (Article VI, section 1) provides: "The . . . Managing Editor of *The American Political Science Review* shall be appointed by the Council, after it hears the recommendation of the President. [He] shall have [a term] to be fixed in each case by the Council; and [he] shall be eligible for reappointment."

At its meeting of December 4-5, the Council established a Search and Screening Committee to assist President Deutsch in considering candidates for the new Managing Editor. The Council stipulated that the Committee be composed of the President as Chairman, President Elect, Managing Editor, three members of the Council, and one member of the current Editorial Board. To the four appointive positions President Deutsch named Herbert McClosky, University of California, Berkeley; Joseph L. Noguee, University of Houston; Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa; and Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan.

On December 8 the Executive Director sent a letter to all department chairmen advising them of the vacancy and asking for their suggestions and nominations for filling it. A total of twenty-two replies were received in time to be considered by the Committee. The Council directed the President to recommend a person for the editorship at its next meeting.

Six of the seven Committee members met in Cambridge, Mass. on December 23. Professor Ward was unable to attend but communicated

his views to the President in advance of the meeting. At the meeting the Committee reviewed all the persons—some ninety-four names in all—who had been suggested to them. Several names were eliminated from further consideration because of information, gained from informal soundings, of their wishes not to be considered.

For evaluating those remaining, the Committee agreed upon the following main criteria. First and foremost, the new Managing Editor should be committed to encouraging the best work done by all of the different approaches to political analysis now used or emerging in the discipline; he or she should not be dedicated in any way to promoting any particular approach over the others. The new editor should be a scholar of established reputation. He or she should have editorial talent for evaluating and improving manuscripts as well as administrative talent for managing the journal's office and communications. The editor should already have demonstrated his or her possession of these talents in some way—e.g., by having edited another journal or a volume of essays, or by having acted as editorial advisor for a publisher. The editor should have shown ability both to apply high standards impartially in deciding what to publish and to help authors to present their work in the clearest and most readable form. The editor should be widely familiar with the profession's active scholars, both those older and established and those younger and rising, in all the nation's regions. He or she should be knowledgeable in American Government and Political Theory, since

a majority of the manuscripts submitted are in these fields; but it would be highly desirable for the editor also to have some competence in Comparative Politics and International Politics. And it would also be desirable for the editor to have some competence in related disciplines and some experience in interdisciplinary research and writing.

After agreeing on the foregoing criteria, the Committee proceeded to consider the ninety-odd remaining nominees. After much discussion the number was reduced to a "short list" of six. On a secret ballot each Committee member then ranked the six names in his order of preference. The preferences on the six ballots were combined into a composite ranking, and the Committee agreed that the intervals among the top names were sufficiently large to request the President to present the first name to the Council for its approval.

At the meeting of the Council in Cambridge on January 14 President Deutsch explained the Committee's criteria and procedures and expressed the members' regret that only one of so many excellent nominees could be chosen. He then presented the Committee's first choice: Professor Nelson W. Polsby of the University of California, Berkeley. After some discussion the Council unanimously approved the President's recommendation and Professor Polsby was named the next Managing Editor of the *REVIEW*. He has since accepted the appointment, and will assume its full duties in 1971.

ERRATA

The Officers' Page of the December, 1969 issue incorrectly listed the institutional affiliation of Council Member Allan P. Sindler as the State University of New York, Stony Brook. Professor Sindler's correct affiliation is the University of California, Berkeley.

Also in the December, 1969 issue, the second

sentence of the first paragraph on p. 1216 of Jeff Fishel's article on "Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger" should read: "Of 432 non-incumbents running in that election, 70 percent completed and returned the questionnaire, a response rate sufficiently high to justify the analysis undertaken here."

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

June, 1970

Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan"

Steven J. Brams, New York University, and

* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Michael O'Leary, Syracuse University, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies"

Steven R. Brown and John D. Ellithorp, Kent State University, "Emotional Experiences in Political Groups: The Case of the McCarthy Phenomenon"

Walter Dean Burnham and John D. Sprague, Washington University, St. Louis, "Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe: The Case of Pennsylvania, 1960-1968"

William R. Caspary, Washington University, St. Louis, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy"

Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society"

Ada W. Finifter, Michigan State University, "Dimensions of Political Alienation"

Bryan R. Fry and Richard Winters, Stanford University, "The Politics of Redistribution"

M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, and L. Harmon Zeigler, University of Oregon, "The Salience of American State Politics"

Norman N. Miller, Michigan State University, "The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania"

Paul E. Peterson, University of Chicago, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program"

David E. Powell and Paul Shoup, University of Virginia, "The Emergence of Political Science in Communist Countries"

John Duncan Powell, Harvard University, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics"

September, 1970

Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing"

Gordon S. Black, University of Rochester, "Some Notes on the Process of Professionalization in Politics"

Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin, "Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public"

John P. Diggins, University of California, Irvine, "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion?"

Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation"

Barbara Hinckley, University of Massachusetts, "Incumbency and the Presidential Vote in Senate Elections: Defining Parameters of Sub-presidential Voting"

Raymond F. Hopkins, Swarthmore College, "The Role of the M.P. in Tanzania"

Chong Lim Kim, University of Iowa, "Political Attitudes of Defeated Candidates in American State Elections"

Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "Cross-National Dimensions of Political Competence"

Donald Rothchild, University of California, Davis, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity"

John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, Florida State University, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the Democratic National Convention"

Gilbert R. Winham, McMaster University, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Tests of a Causal Model"

December, 1970

Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology"

Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., University of North Carolina, "A Causal Approach to Nonrandom Measurement Errors"

Giuseppe Di Palma and Herbert McClosky, University of California, Berkeley, "Personality and Conformity to Political and Social Attitudes"

Harlan Hahn, University of California, Riverside, "Correlates of Public Sentiments on War: The Vietnam Referendums"

Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii, "Creating Political Reality"

Robert Melson, Michigan State University, and Howard Wolpe, Western Michigan University, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective"

Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support"

Eric Nordlinger, Brandeis University, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic Change in the Non-western States"

Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics"

Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan, and Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation"

Jerzy J. Wiatr, University of Warsaw, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland"

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE APPOINTMENTS

For Selection of Officers of the American Political Science Association For 1971-72

Officers to be selected: President-Elect, three Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, eight Members of the Council for two-year terms. All members of the Association are invited to submit suggestions to the Chairman or other members of the Nominating Committee.

J. David Singer, University of Michigan, Chairman
Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina
Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago
John C. Wahlke, University of Iowa
Sheldon S. Wolin, University of California, Berkeley

TRAVEL GRANTS IPSA WORLD CONGRESS

Munich, Germany
August 31 to September 5, 1970

The Association has received a grant of \$10,000 from the National Science Foundation to assist American political scientists in travel to the International Political Science Association Congress in Munich, Germany, August 31 to September 5, 1970. Grants are limited to travel costs.

Application forms are available from the Association office. The deadline for receipt of applications will be June 1, 1970. An Association committee will make the grants and notify individuals soon after that date.

Write to: Travel Grants, IPSA Congress
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

EUROPEAN FLIGHTS

TRAVEL - STUDY OPPORTUNITIES

For the eleventh successive summer, the Association is arranging two flights to Europe in 1970. Flight A will leave New York June 10 for London, and return September 7. The A Flight will be by Pan American and will cost \$245.00. Flight B will leave New York for Paris August 1 on Pan American, and will return September 7. The cost for Flight B will be \$270.00.

Reservations are being accepted on a "first come, first served" basis. These flights are open only to members of the Association and their immediate families. Contact the Association for further information.

Director, Summer Flight Program
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8th World Congress, August 31 to September 5th, 1970

Munich, Germany

Members of the American Political Science Association are invited to participate in a group flight to Munich, Germany leaving JFK International Airport in New York August 22 and returning September 7, 1970. The fare will be \$245.00 on Lufthansa German Airlines.

Persons wishing to make reservations now may write directly to the Association, in care of the Director, Summer Flight Programs, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

GROUP FLIGHTS TO LOS ANGELES

for 1970 APSA Annual Meeting

September 8-12

The association has arranged group flights from several cities to Los Angeles for the APSA Annual Meeting, September 8-12, 1970. The group fares are the same as excursion fares, but the regulations will permit individuals to return any day of the week and in less than seven days.

The fares for these flights are based on a minimum of 25 participants on regularly scheduled airlines:

New York-Los Angeles	September 7 (Evening)	\$238.35
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Boston-Los Angeles	September 8	\$248.85
Washington-Los Angeles	September 8	\$226.80
Chicago-Los Angeles	September 8	\$170.55
Atlanta-Los Angeles	September 8	\$193.20
Seattle-Los Angeles	September 8	\$109.20

Each group is required to depart together, but passengers may return individually according to their own wishes. The only requirement is that they reserve a direct flight back on the same airline. These flights are open only to members of the Association and their immediate families. For more information and application forms, write to:

Director, Group Flights to Los Angeles

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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Although many books and journal articles are cited in this study, this is not a bibliography. Each chapter refers to the more important "classics" in each field, and each contributor presents a description of the type of literary output and its uses in a field of specialization. This volume includes not only works incorporating substantive contributions, but also those discussing methodological questions. Each contributor has been free to add sections on popularized works in his fields and special items of interest in the literature of his specialty.


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
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EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES IN POLITICAL GROUPS: THE CASE OF THE McCARTHY PHENOMENON*

STEVEN R. BROWN AND JOHN D. ELLITHORP

Kent State University

In many ways the study of political groups from a theoretical point of view can be said not to have progressed much beyond the conceptions of Arthur F. Bentley.¹ There have been countless studies of political groups, to be sure, but it seems most have been little more than the collection and presentation of *ad hoc* facts obtained from the testing of *ad hoc* hypotheses, the concepts of "group" and of "group behavior" having been little altered in the process.

Much of the difficulty no doubt stems from Bentley's strict empiricism and the interpretation given his position by most social scientists who have aspired to translate him. When Bentley said that we know nothing of ideas and feelings but only of activity, he was merely reminding the social scientist to remain close to the operations of the phenomena he was studying. Activity, or behavior, can be worked with and studied directly, but it is questionable whether or not the same can be said of ideas and feelings. Scientific progress, Bentley would say, can be made only if one deals with what is visible and replicable. Critics as well as followers of Bentley, however, have interpreted him to mean that such matters as subjectivity are outside the pale of science, since subjectivity is presumed to be private, idiosyncratic, and nonreplicable.

Although Bentley was no friend to subjectivist psychology, all he really required was that there be operations of some kind for one's concepts. If the concept was a subjective one but there were at the same time verifiable operations for it, Bentley would have asked for no more.

* An earlier version of this paper was read at the meeting of the Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists, Columbus, March, 1969.

¹ Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908).

But when he denied the scientific validity of nonoperational-subjectivist notions, social scientists assumed him to be opposed to subjectivity *per se*. *The Process of Government* preceded the development of the operational philosophy in science, but Bentley's thinking was in this tradition.² To him, the question was not whether the data were public or private in origin, but whether or not they could be expressed in terms of verifiable operations. Only the operations needed to be public and replicable.

However, most social scientists have missed this distinction and have therefore proceeded emphasizing only the public, manifest aspects of group life, leaving to the psychoanalysts to speculate, in ways quite unacceptable to Bentley, about the equally important emotional aspects. Contemporary group theorists usually acknowledge an emotional ingredient in group life, but few attempts are made to study these aspects for themselves, largely because such matters are so intangible. Typically, studies are designed with the assumption, erroneous according to Greenstein,³ that these effects can be regarded as random, i.e., as having cancelled out one another so as not to have influenced the results. Despite disclaimers to the contrary, political and social scientists—apart from a handful, such as Robert Lane and Harold Lasswell—remain

² P. W. Bridgman is generally regarded as the father of the operational philosophy, and his intellectual indebtedness to Bentley is reflected in Bridgman, "Error, Quantum Theory, and the Observer," in Richard W. Taylor (ed.), *Life, Language, Law: Essays in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley* (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1957), pp. 125-131.

³ Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), pp. 35-36.

basically disinclined to take subjectivity seriously.

I. BION'S THEORY OF GROUP EMOTIONALITY

It has been suggested by some theorists that individual behavior is phenomenally different from group behavior, but in his study of neurotic psychotherapeutic groups, Bion⁴ contends that the psychoanalytic (individual) and group approaches are merely two different facets of the same phenomenon. This is because group behavior is dual in nature: there is the manifest *work* function for which the group ostensibly is constituted, and there is the *emotional* behavior of the group which co-exists (co-behaves) alongside the work group, following its own independent laws and occasionally interacting with the sophisticated work group.

The work function in group context is analogous to the ego in individual psychology: the sophisticated work group, through its members, is in contact with reality and makes decisions which take reality into consideration; therefore, the work group is interested in learning and development, and in its essentials provides the basis for science. The emotional group, as is the case with the nonrational components of individual psychology, is interested in satisfaction rather than development.

On the emotional plane, individuals wish to contribute anonymously to the group, and if the group has so structured itself as to allow such contributions, it has provided a means for individual evasion and denial of personal responsibility. The *group mentality* is the pool into which these anonymous contributions are made and through which desires and impulses implicit in these contributions are gratified. Thus does one have the individual and his desires on the one hand, and the group mentality on the other in what Kantor calls an interbehavioral field.⁵

⁴ W. R. Bion, *Experiences in Groups* (London: Tavistock, 1961). Essays in this volume previously were published in the following locations: *Human Relations*, 1 (1948), 314-320; *ibid.*, 487-496; *ibid.*, 2 (1949), 13-22; *ibid.*, 295-304; *ibid.*, 3 (1950), 3-14; *ibid.*, 395-402; *ibid.*, 4 (1951), 221-228; *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 33 (1952), 235-247. A summary of Bion's theoretical position can be found in Marshall Edelson, *Ego Psychology, Group Dynamics, and the Therapeutic Community* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1964), pp. 31-40.

⁵ J. R. Kantor, "Feelings and Emotions as Scien-

The group places requirements and restrictions on the individual, thereby frustrating him. The behavior which results from the interplay between individual needs and group mentality is called *group culture*. Man is a group animal, but this aspect of his psychology frequently is not apparent until he is observed in a group situation—just as the transference phenomena is not obvious until analyst and analyzed are together, although the analyzed always has the capacity for transference. However, in order to produce certain aspects of group phenomena it is not necessary to place individuals physically in a group. In fact, as Bion says, "... no individual, however isolated in time and space, should be regarded as outside a group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology."⁶ An actual group merely brings into prominence certain behavioral phenomena not readily obvious in the absence of the group. Of group cultures, Bion says there are three basically different kinds, each culture distinguished from the others according to the basic assumption which appears to govern it.

The Basic Assumption of Dependence. The first basic assumption Bion discusses is that of dependence in which group members on an emotional level depend on someone (e.g., the leader) or something (e.g., tradition, the group bible, etc.). The group's behavior is made more understandable if it is assumed "that the group is met in order to be sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and spiritual, and protection."⁷

This is a rather immature emotional situation, similar to the infant's egocentric relationship to the parent,⁸ resulting in great inefficiency in

tific Events," *Psychological Record*, 16 (October, 1966), 377-404.

⁶ Bion, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁸ "Egocentric," that is, in the sense in which it is used by Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Free Press, 1965), to refer to that stage in which the child unilaterally defers to the generalized Elder. Under certain conditions, this respect for parents is transferred to other authority figures, such as political leaders, as has been described by D. Wilfred Abse and Lucie Jessner, "The Psychodynamic Aspects of Leadership," in Stephen R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (eds.), *Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 76-93.

group relationships. The leader-follower relationship is direct and personal as far as the follower is concerned, with little gratification obtained from group relations. Each individual desires the leader's complete attention (just as the child wishes to dominate parental attention) and all members of the group combined therefore tend to frustrate any given member. Such a situation is frequently accompanied by resentment at being placed in a dependent position; by guilt about having been greedy; by insecurity, frustration, and a consequent desire to avoid the group situation itself; and by anger and jealousy. In his hospital groups of this type, Bion observed that one individual is typically elevated to the position of leader, and if left to its own devices the group, in search of someone congruent with the basic assumption of dependency, will select from its midst its most psychologically-ill member, the "psychiatric winner." This phenomenon occurs in this type of group because that individual who wishes to be depended upon is most apt to find his needs complemented by a group with members who in turn are looking for someone upon whom to depend. That person with greatest need to be sustained and nourished by the group (i.e., who depends on the group) typically is not the group's strongest member; indeed, from a characterological standpoint, he is frequently its weakest.

Devereux has suggested that such dynamics operate in political groups as well:

... power, infantilism and dependency always occur together. Some charismatic leaders were infantile and dependent long before they rose to eminence, and were actually elevated to social leadership because their behavior fitted the childish expectations of their potential followers. In other instances initially reasonably normal persons gradually become infantile and dependent as a result of having had power foisted on them.⁹

Under these conditions, Lord Acton's principle

⁹ George Devereux, "Charismatic Leadership and Crisis," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, 4 (1955), 150-151. This group search for a suitable leader is a matter of elite recruitment, and whereas the political scientist is more accustomed to thinking of an elite controlling and manipulating the mass, roles are reversed in this case: the leader is manipulated by the group, being forced in a sense to play the lead role in the common group fantasy. See Bion, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

can be rephrased to read: power infantilizes, and absolute power infantilizes absolutely.

In this dependent group, all interaction is leader-member oriented: member-member interactions are minimized for there is a feeling on the part of the individual that the group can be of little help to him; all reliance is placed on the leader. It is this kind of leadership which typically is described by the psychoanalyst turned political analyst, largely as a function of the kinds of persons and groups with which the analyst is accustomed to dealing.

The Basic Assumptions of Pairing. The psychoanalytic social theorists, in emphasizing dependency, have tended to overlook other group-leadership possibilities, but Bion has described a second basic assumption group, which he calls the pairing group, wherein the group's behavior can be best understood if it is assumed that the group comes together in order to break down into smaller groups, i.e., to pair off. While in the dependent group the leader is typically visible and very real, a characteristic of the pairing group is that the leader—who is looked upon as a hero, genius, or Messiah—is unborn, i.e., is not physically present. Accompanying the pairing group, in which paired subgroups virtually ignore the larger group, is a feeling of hopeful expectation and optimistic anticipation, usually expressed in statements to the effect that conditions will improve or problems will be solved with the coming of some future event—a change in the season, a new group, a new leader, a new idea, etc. Pairing has overtones of sexuality, and the spirit of messianic hope is both a part of sexuality and a precursor of it.

Bion indicates that the optimism serves as a rationalization for guilt which derives from pleasantries characteristic of pairing behavior; however, such pleasantries are tolerated because of the importance of the ultimate goal, whatever it may be. Unlike the dependent leader, the leader of the pairing group cannot present himself and must always remain unfulfilled; otherwise, the hope characteristic of this group could not be sustained and feelings of hatred, destructiveness, and despair avoided. Optimism is therefore a defense against despair, on the one hand, and hostility, on the other (i.e., a group defense against individual tension), which points up the dynamic relationships among the various basic assumption groups.¹⁰ Since the leader of

¹⁰ Bion, *op. cit.*, p. 151. Optimism as a rationalization is an attempt to effect a time displacement.

the pairing group is absent, all interaction in the group is member-member oriented.

The Basic Assumption of Fight-Flight. The third basic assumption group delineated by Bion is that of fight-flight in which the group, almost indifferently, gathers together either to fight a common enemy or to run away from one. The leader is that individual who facilitates aggression (hostility) or evasion (avoidance, withdrawal, irrelevancy, etc.), depending on the occasion. Under these conditions, group members regard methods of dealing with a problem other than by fighting or fleeing as either nonexistent or contrary to the best interests of the group. Bion observes that the group dominated by the fight assumption typically will select for its leader that member with most marked paranoid tendencies since if members of the group cannot see the enemy, the next best thing is to choose as leader someone who apparently can.

Group members need not necessarily manifest their aggression or evasion in physical acts. Should a problem present itself, a group governed by the flight assumption, for example, might flee from the problem by denying its existence (denial), underplaying its importance (rationalization), or over-emphasizing reason in dealing with the problem (intellectualization). Lapsing into silence and refusing to talk is a way of avoiding a problem, changing the subject is another, and not showing up to meetings of the group is still another evasive technique.¹¹ All such are examples of individual efforts to flee from the problem at hand, to avoid a confrontation. Suicide, of course, is the ultimate in flight behavior.

Intragroup and Intergroup Dynamics. It is important to note that these three emotional group cultures are not necessarily opposed to one another: cultures can alternate within the

same group of people, sometimes rapidly and sometimes very slowly. Frequently different emotional strategies are used unknowingly by group members to protect the group. As an example, a group may be operating initially according to the dependent assumption. If the leader, however, attempts to democratize the group—e.g., by dispersing power and decision-making—and if group members do not wish to take on responsibilities for their own futures (preferring instead to leave this to the leader), then the group may switch to a flight stance in order to protect itself—e.g., by “pretending” not to understand the leader and what he is trying to do. Bion found patients in some groups so unwilling to be cured as to band together in silence as if to deprive him of the information necessary to effect their cures—an example of a group fighting a common enemy, the therapist, who was the shared source of individual anxiety.

Alternatively, a group may take evasive pairing action in order to isolate a threat—e.g., by talking amongst themselves and ignoring the leader. The group, as an organic whole, in this sense is capable of strategically changing the basic assumption upon which the membership has operated in order to adjust to changing circumstances. It is not unusual to see members of a group isolate a stranger in their midst, particularly if he is threatening, by suddenly turning their backs on him, even if only symbolically, and talking amongst themselves. In this way the group protects the purity of its membership by adopting the pairing assumption. (It was this tendency to maintain the “purity of its membership” which led Bion to suggest an aristocratic bias in the pairing group.)

What has been described thus far is strictly the emotional side of the coin. Groups have their sophisticated, or work, functions which are reality oriented and which can therefore, from an analytic point of view, be treated quite separately from the emotional behavior, although the two kinds of behavior are dynamically related and have analogous components. For example, work groups stress *cooperation* which is characteristically voluntary, rational, and dependent to a certain degree on the mental and motor development and experience of the individual involved. The equivalent basic-assumption term is *valency*, a term Bion borrowed from physics “to express a capacity for instantaneous involuntary combination of one individual with another for sharing and acting on a basic assumption.”¹² So while cooperation is voluntary, rational, and learned, valency is involun-

the rationalization thereby producing a futuristic outlook. The rationalization, however, is a defense against a present (not future) threat. Any immediate behavior, therefore, must contain what Ezriel calls a “because clause”: a person adopts one course of futuristic behavior and avoids another *because* he fears the consequences of the latter, and not because he is genuinely interested in the possibilities of the former. See Henry Ezriel, “Notes on Psychoanalytic Group Therapy: II. Interpretation and Research,” *Psychiatry*, 15 (1952), 119-126.


¹¹ Absence as flight behavior is illustrated in Eléonore L. Herbert and E. L. Trist, “The Institution of an Absent Leader by a Students’ Discussion Group,” *Human Relations*, 6 (1953), 215-248.

¹² Bion *op. cit.*, p. 153.

tary, inevitable, and purely automatic, an expression of the gregariousness in man's personality and the prime determinant of the extent of an individual's interaction on the basic assumption level. Just as individuals differ with regard to the amount of cooperation which they are willing to contribute to a task situation, so individuals differ in the amount and kind of valency which they are capable of expressing in particular basic assumptions situations. The emotional group leader frequently holds his position by virtue of his valency; i.e., because he is the personification of the group's basic assumption.¹³

Bion suggests that certain groups are set aside for specialized functions in a society, each group demanding and functioning best with a certain kind of leadership congruent with the basic assumption of the group: the church places a premium on dependency valency, and members can combine with one another almost instantaneously to form a dependency structure on an emotional level; the aristocracy, Bion presumes, is endowed with pairing valency, able to protect the purity of its strain and to obtain gratification from the sexual symbolization of the pairing group; and the military, of course, draws a disproportionate number of individuals prepared to augment the fight assumption.

Again, two kinds of behavior are progressing simultaneously within the same group of individuals and operating according to quite different laws of behavior: the work group follows one set of reality-bound laws and is devoted to development through time; the emotional group follows another set of laws unrelated to reality or time—more properly, bounded by its own sense of reality and time. Bion's methodology can be compared to the different ways of looking at this cube: looked at one way corner AB



¹³ Cecil A. Gibb ("The Principles and Traits of Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 2 (July, 1947), 267-284) earlier pointed to the relationship between an individual's being a leader and his ability to embody many of the qualities of his followers.

is closest, while looked at another way CD is closest. Similarly, as Bion notes "in a group, the total of what is taking place remains the same, but a change of perspective can bring out quite different phenomena."¹⁴

It may seem like a big jump from the small therapy groups with which Bion dealt to the large-scale groups with which political scientists are expected to deal, but Bion's contention is that all groups—indeed, whole cultures—will behave according to one of these three basic assumptions. He suggests, for example, that the Egypt of the Pharaohs exemplified an entire civilization geared to implement the basic assumption of dependency, with all human energy devoted to obedience toward, and the coddling of, a central figure. The childishness of the Roman Emperor Caligula might also be pointed to as the pattern of behavior consistent with that which might be expected under conditions of dependency. More recently, wartime Germany would seem to illustrate a society dominated primarily by the fight assumption, and Adolph Hitler's oft-mentioned paranoia coincides with that expected to characterize the leader under these conditions.

Accepting Bion's theory as tentative—and Bion recognizes this tentativeness—we should be able to find some evidence supportive of his contentions with any group whatever, political or otherwise. In principle, it should not matter whether the group under immediate scrutiny is a political party, pressure group, street-corner gang, professional gathering of Ph.Ds, or whatever—i.e., since the theory presumably applies to the emotional behavior of groups, we should be able to select any group irrespective of its rational task so long as it is structured in such a way as to permit emotional expression. Modern political science has been prone to study the work functions of various groups, and much of the technological development associated with the behavioral persuasion has been in support of this important but limited interest. However, Bion warns that "since work-group functions are always pervaded by basic-assumption phenomena it is clear that techniques that ignore

¹⁴ Bion, *op. cit.*, p. 87. One might also make an analogy to the focussing of a camera lens: if one focusses on the foreground, the background becomes blurred; if, on the other hand, one focusses far away, objects close by will become blurred. This does not mean that the objects close by do not exist, only that attention has been directed elsewhere. Similarly, the study of emotional group behavior does not deny the existence of task-oriented behavior.

Main Effects	Levels			N	df
A. Basic assumption	(a) Dependence	(b) Pairing	(c) Fight	3	2
B. Expressive valence	(d) Positive	(e) Negative		2	1

$m = 10$ statements per combination, $mAB = (10)(3)(2) = 60$ items

FIG. 1. Factorial Design of Bion's Theory

the latter will give misleading impressions of the former."¹⁵

The following is an illustration of how Bion's theory might be applied to political groups, in this instance involving the followers of Senator Eugene McCarthy during his 1968 bid for the Democratic party's nomination for President.

II. DESIGN OF THE STUDY.

For instrumental purposes, Bion's theory can be reduced in its essentials to a completely randomized design with two main effects in factorial arrangement,¹⁶ as indicated in Figure 1. In this instance, there are $3 \times 2 = 6$ combinations of the two main effects: *ad* Dependency, *ae* Counterdependency, *bd* Pairing, *be* Counterpairing, *cd* Flight, and *ce* Flight.

In early autumn, 1968, members of a graduate seminar in political behavior sought out and interviewed in depth supporters and former supporters of Senator McCarthy. The statements of opinion by the respondents—along with statements from another source¹⁷ rewritten specifically for this study, as well as some items which were invented by the authors—provided us with a population of approximately 250 statements covering the McCarthy phenomenon domain, including statements about group experiences. From this population were sampled 60 statements, 10 theoretically representing each of the six combinations in Figure 1. The following are illustrative:

I think that a man like McCarthy, even though he had failed, would have made the country proud. He was a man I could follow. (*ad* Dependency)
I did not like McCarthy as a person, but I liked his ideas. (*ae* Counterdependency)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

¹⁶ See Roger E. Kirk. *Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences* (Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1968), pp. 171-229.

¹⁷ Dorothy Stock and Herbert A. Thelen, *Emotional Dynamics and Group Culture* (New York: New York University Press, 1958). The statements, the factorial combinations they represent, and their factor scores (to be discussed subsequently) can be obtained from the authors.

The McCarthy phenomenon has allowed me to hope that changes will be made. I am confident that by 1972 someone will emerge to provide the leadership we need. (*bd* Pairing)

I didn't have much time for those who were interested in McCarthy because it was "the thing" to do. It wasn't supposed to be fun. (*be* Counterpairing)

Maybe we weren't defeated after all. Maybe McCarthy did his job: He got rid of L.B.J. didn't he? Besides, it's not over yet by any means. (*cd* Flight)

I don't think about McCarthy anymore. I was shocked by the result of the convention, and now I have no intention of participating further. (*ce* Flight)

For purposes of this study, the items and the factorial design they represent are theoretical matters. The design is used to aid in the generation of what Brunswik calls a representative stimulus situation: by following the structure represented in the design, we insure situational comprehensiveness on theoretical grounds.¹⁸ Rather than scale scores, which are the raw data of scaling methodology, our basic datum is what the respondent does with the items, i.e., we are interested in the subjects' operations as they manipulate the statements. Any meanings or significances to be attributed to these behavioral operations come after the respondent has behaved rather than before.

The operations are provided in the context of *Q* technique, a modified ranking procedure described by Stephenson.¹⁹ The 60 statements are

¹⁸ Egon Brunswik, *Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956). More appropriate for the methodology employed here, see Steven R. Brown, "On the Use of Variance Designs in *Q* Methodology," *Psychological Record*, in press; and S. R. Brown and Thomas D. Unga, "'Representativeness' in the Study of Political Behavior," forthcoming.

¹⁹ William Stephenson, *The Study of Behavior: *Q*-technique and Its Methodology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). A guide to literature on this technique is to be found in S. R. Brown,

randomly numbered, typed on cards, and presented to the respondent who is asked to provide his viewpoint. To facilitate this task, he is presented with an opinion-continuum from +5 (most agree) to -5 (most disagree), with 0 (neutral, ambiguous, etc.) in the center, as follows:

Score	(most disagree)				(most agree)						
	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Frequency	4	5	5	6	6	8	6	6	5	5	4

Rather than responding to each item singly, as in a questionnaire, respondents individually display all items along the continuum with a given number being required to be placed beneath each category to implement comparability of response.

The respondents themselves were obtained in a manner similar to the way in which statements were obtained, i.e., by design, as in Figure 2. It was presumed that McCarthy activists would have had differing group experiences compared to those who wore McCarthy buttons only; similarly, it was expected that women might have reacted to McCarthy differently from men.²⁰ All respondents therefore were Mc-

Carthy supporters, but an activist was the kind of person who contributed heavily of his time: Most had attended the Democratic National Convention or traveled to the various state primaries. The sample was small— $N = 34$ respondents—but quite sufficient for exploratory purposes, as will be indicated.

Data-gathering took place during a period of time just prior to the November, 1968, general election. Each respondent in the study provided his ranking of the statements (from "most agree" to "most disagree") and all 34 Q sorts were intercorrelated, providing a 34×34 matrix, and the correlation matrix was factor analyzed. Five principal axis factors resulted and were rotated to a position in simple structure, as shown in Table 1. This means that of the 34 separate Q sorts provided by the respondents, the statements were distributed in only five basically different ways. At this point it is possible to identify those individuals who cluster together—i.e., those who organized the statements in a similar fashion and therefore, from Bion's perspective, demonstrate common valency—and construct one Q sort from a weighted average of all their separate Q sorts. This then reduces the data to five Q sorts, representing five different points of view about the McCarthy experience, and these can be looked at separately and comparatively for any implications that might be derived in terms of Bion's theory.²¹

III. THE FACTORS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

Factor 1—Dependence. The first factor is composed of respondents 1-6 (Table 1) and

"Bibliography on Q Technique and Its Methodology," *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 26 (April, 1968), 587-613. The Q -sorting session in this instance becomes an experimental situation (similar to the psychoanalytic session described by Ezriel, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123), which allows the respondent to enter into the object relationships in a dynamic way as they are represented in the Q -sample structure. If Bion's theory is correct, some respondents will resonate to some items, will become defensive toward others, and so forth, and in a systematic way.

²⁰The importance of sex differences in political orientations has not been stressed often enough. Men and women are reared under different sets of contingencies, and as a consequence each sex develops a prior readiness to perceive certain events to which the other is oblivious, as subsequent results indicate. See Irving E. Sigel, "Rationale for Separate Analyses of Male and Female Samples on Cognitive Tasks," *Psychological Record*, 15 (July, 1965), 369-376.

²¹Most factor work proceeds by correlating tests across a sample of persons. Inverted factor work, of which this study is an example, proceeds by correlating persons across a sample of tests, where "tests" in this case are Q statements. Correlation under these conditions indicates the extent that respondents did or did not rank the statements in essentially the same pattern, providing us with

Main Effects	Levels		N	df
A. Degree of involvement	(a) Activist	(b) "Button-wearer"	2	1
B. Sex	(c) Male	(d) Female	2	1

FIG. 2. Person-Set for McCarthy R s

TABLE 1.—FACTOR MATRIX FOR MCCARTHY STUDY

R	Sex	Characteristics			Factor Loadings				
		Age	A/BW*	Education	1	2	3	4	5
1	F	24	BW	19 years	68	02	-10	18	30
2	F	28	BW	18 years	67	12	19	09	07
3	F	23	BW	M.A.	60	10	19	23	17
4	M	24	BW	15 years	58	08	17	-10	15
5	F	39	A	M.S.	57	15	14	36	20
6	M	20	BW	13 years	46	-18	24	27	07
7	F	21	A	15 years	10	77	-05	11	14
8	M	22	BW	M.A.	37	55	38	27	16
9	M	28	A	M.A.	09	44	19	23	21
10	F	22	BW	15 years	37	24	18	07	16
11	M	40	A	Ph.D.	33	11	55	03	34
12	M	21	BW	14 years	36	15	48	01	24
13	M	17	A	13 years	22	13	46	-10	07
14	M	50	BW	Ph.D.	26	26	43	24	01
15	M	21	BW	15 years	03	-22	41	21	03
16	M	23	BW	M.A.	-10	28	-14	70	27
17	F	38	BW	16 years	10	-04	02	63	-07
18	M	29	BW	M.A.	02	12	16	55	-10
19	M	30	A	Ph.D.	27	31	36	55	12
20	M	27	BW	18 years	13	13	38	47	37
21	M	32	A	Ph.D.	34	10	21	-06	72
22	F	22	BW	16 years	28	-01	10	10	63
23	M	26	BW	14 years	32	24	07	-10	60
24	F	21	BW	16 years	-01	29	08	27	40
25	F	26	BW	16 years	61	18	45	-10	31
26	F	21	BW	16 years	58	60	08	07	10
27	M	29	BW	16 years	56	18	51	08	31
28	M	25	BW	M.A.	45	23	65	-03	26
29	F	21	BW	- - - -	43	36	52	-18	21
30	F	21	A	15 years	05	51	55	18	07
31	F	23	BW	M.A.	39	42	26	61	-10
32	F	18	A	12 years	11	07	53	44	38
33	M	23	BW	M.A.	17	-04	-18	22	-14
34	M	25	BW	15 years	32	29	25	15	33

* A = Activist BW = "Button-wearer"

Decimals have been omitted. Respondents' saturations exceeding ± 40 are significant ($p < .01$).

can be best described as dependent in nature, not just because it gives some of the dependent statements high marks, but because the marks

an indication as to how the audience was segmented relative to the phenomenon. Factors now represent clusters of likeminded persons, not clusters of traits. (See Stephenson, *loc. cit.*, for the differences between *Q* and *R* factor analysis.) Further, the factors in this study are inductive, such that individual membership in a factor is

given other statements as well betray what is called here a dependent stance. The factor is proud of the leader, Senator McCarthy, and

nonarbitrary: Respondents 1-6 in Table 1 are members of factor 1 because they organized the statements in essentially the same way. The factor array is simply their six *Q* sorts, which are already similar, averaged together. The factors then are nonarbitrary types, or classes (operants), in Skinnerian terminology. (See B. F. Skinner, *Contin-*

defends him, as indicated by the scores given the statements which follow:²²

8. I did not like McCarthy as a person, but I liked his ideas. (−5)

16. I think that a man like McCarthy, even though he had failed, would have made the country proud. He was a man I could follow. (+5)

35. McCarthy was too stubborn, too idealistic. He should have compromised more. (−5)

42. Until McCarthy announced, I was getting kind of unsure of the future. I must say, I really felt relieved to have someone like him stand up for what I believed. (+4)

53. McCarthy was not a serious candidate because he was never emotionally involved in the race. Had I been in his place, I would have been more aggressive. (−5)

Characteristic of the dependent group, as described by Bion, is the orientation of the member to the leader and the relative dissociation of the member from other group members. It is not surprising therefore to find factor 1 disavowing any pleasures were derived from group activity:

2. I found I could always speak intimately with other McCarthy people. In fact, the whole movement was intimate. (−3)

6. Although I supported McCarthy as a candidate, I didn't bother to take the time to become deeply involved with other McCarthyites. (+4)

13. As I look back on it, the best times were when we would campaign in groups of two or three—door-to-door, over coffee, at social gatherings. (−2)

gencies of Reinforcement (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 127-132.) Much typological work, on the other hand, is arbitrary with respondents assigned to a type or not as a function of operations performed by the investigator: For example, whether a person is typed as a moron, nincompoop, or genius depends on the magnitude of his IQ relative to the arbitrary cut-off point imposed by the test-giver. In the present study, however, respondents classify themselves by behaving or not behaving alike as manifested in the intercorrelations based on their independent card sortings.

²² Scores for statements in each factor range from +5 (most agree) to −5 (most disagree) with the same frequency as in the forced distribution above. Each factor at this point can be regarded as an operant possibility, i.e., in principle an individual exists who would provide this arrangement of the statements to represent his own viewpoint. When factors are referred to as if they were persons, therefore, reference is to the operant possibility of which those loaded on a factor are approximations.

Instead, factor 1 stresses the impersonal, intellectual, and philosophical aspects of the movement:

27. I was oriented more toward the McCarthy movement as a whole than toward particular individuals in it. (+4)

50. During the primaries, I always preferred to discuss the issues in intellectual rather than personal terms. (+4)

55. I was primarily interested in the philosophical implications behind the McCarthy movement. (+5)

Such behavior would suggest that flight behavior was employed to protect a basically dependent orientation, and there is good evidence the factor withdrew from threatening or competitive situations:

3. Frankly, I'm tired of the whole mess—Republicans, Democrats, even McCarthy and politics in general. When these things come up, I would just as soon change the subject. (+3)

4. I have strong views, and whenever I got together with other McCarthy people, I always contributed my 2-cents worth. (−3)

20. I really feel as though I played an active, influential role in the McCarthy movement—at least as far as one individual could. (−5)

28. During the primaries, if I heard anyone say anything against McCarthy, I was immediately prepared to debate. (−4)

Although the factor declares an interest in the intellectual aspects (nos. 50, 55), elsewhere it seems to betray a wish that the entire situation would vanish (no. 3)—hardly an intellectual posture. Indeed, there is evidence the factor is unwilling to face the realities of the leader's defeat, a characteristic of the dependent syndrome mentioned by Bion and substantiated by reaction to this statement:²³

29. When McCarthy lost the nomination, I felt as though I had lost, too. After him, I felt there was no one left I could look up to. (0) [Factors 2, 3, 4, and 5 scored this item +3, +3, −5, and +4, respectively.]

Only factor 1 fails to react strongly to this statement, one way or the other, indicating only factor 1 has failed to come to grips with what is implied.

In light of these observations, it is of considerable interest to find in Table 1 that the largest number of persons associated with factor 1 are women: female respondents, 1, 2, 3, and 5 are

²³ Bion, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121. In Bion's psychoanalytic framework, the failure of the dependent type to react to such a statement would reflect an unwillingness to accept the symbolic death of the leader.

all pure for the factor. Women as a class do not typically become involved in direct political action, and upon becoming active some might therefore be expected initially to experience a feeling of incompetence, perhaps followed by withdrawal and a façade of pseudo-intellectuality. Further, women more than men tend to be socialized into being submissive to authority figures (fathers, husbands, bosses, etc.), and political novices finding no other criteria upon which to rely for the evaluation of an immediate and complicated political phenomenon might easily regress to earlier internalized infantile reaction patterns.²⁴ When in a situation of conflict, individuals select that framework for dealing with the situation which they have relied upon before. If the nearest framework happens to be that which was learned early in one's life space, lacking other alternatives it will just have to suffice.

Factor 2—Pairing. This factor comes closest to following the behavior described by Bion as pairing, as indicated by the scores assigned the following statements:

9. I was sometimes reluctant to go to rallies and work meetings. I didn't like to get all worked up emotionally, even about McCarthy. I was for him, and that was enough. (—2)
11. I suppose I was fairly unresponsive to friendly gestures from other persons in the McCarthy group, but I was generally too involved with the "cause" to waste time socializing. (—4)
19. I had a tendency to remain somewhat detached from the rest of the McCarthy people—they always impressed me as being rather cliquish. (—3)
21. I didn't have much time for those who were interested in McCarthy because it was "the thing" to do. It wasn't supposed to be fun. (—4)
26. McCarthy was an intellectual. The average person did not understand him. To understand him

²⁴ See footnote 20. Wiebe found the same phenomenon in the reaction of women to Senator Joseph McCarthy during the televised Army-McCarthy hearings of the 1950s. See G. D. Wiebe, "The Army-McCarthy Hearings and the Public Conscience," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22 (Winter 1958-1959), 490-502; Wiebe, "Social Values and Ego Ideal: Recollections of the Army-McCarthy Hearings," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, 5 (1958), 164-186. The 1968 McCarthy phenomenon lent itself to emotional expression since a large number of his followers were novices who brought with them no previous political experiences upon which to draw. The mass character of the movement is illustrated in William P. McDonald and Jerry G. Smoke, *The Peasants' Revolt: McCarthy 1968* (Mt. Vernon, Ohio: Noe-Bixby, 1969).

- you have to be educated—above average. (+3)
44. Even at the Democratic convention, right up through the voting of the states, I hoped and prayed that McCarthy would get the nomination. (+5)
48. The McCarthy phenomenon has allowed me to hope that changes will be made. I am confident that by 1972 someone will emerge to provide the leadership we need. (+5)
52. The McCarthy movement could have attracted more support if its members hadn't of acted like they were part of an exclusive club. (—5)

The aristocratic bias of the pairing viewpoint, as suggested previously, is emphasized at least indirectly by such statements as no. 26 (which implies that the respondent is above average), while the accusation that the movement was in fact exclusive (no. 52) is strongly denied. Highly characteristic and distinguishing for this factor is the feeling of hope which Bion said would be associated with the pairing attitude as defense against despair. Statements 44 and 48 are particularly indicative of this messianic posture. Bion also postulated a kind of sexuality to accompany pairing, and although the factor 2 type may tend to display a kind of exclusiveness toward out-group members, statements such as nos. 9, 11, 19 and 21 would indicate a feeling of intimacy, affection, and playfulness toward those inside the group. As an aside, it is interesting (and theoretically comforting) that the female respondent with the highest saturation on this factor was not only the vice president of a local group supporting McCarthy, but also the steady girlfriend of the president of the same organization.

Despite its natural tendency to display warmth, the pairing factor also has the capacity to become aggressive:

28. During the primaries, if I heard anyone say anything against McCarthy, I was immediately prepared to debate. (+4)
46. Whenever McCarthy or his followers were attacked, I tended to defend them. (+4)

This acceptance of fight behavior on the part of the pairing group was also found by Stock and Thelen,²⁵ and while it appears incongruent with the friendliness presumably characteristic of this factor, apparently no one is more surprised at this than is factor 2 itself, as witnessed by the following response:

45. During the McCarthy days, I was sometimes surprised at my own willingness to get involved in intense arguments. (+4) [Factors 1, 3, 4, and 5 scored this item —1, —4, +3, and +2, respectively.]

²⁵ Stock and Thelen, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

As can be seen from differential scores assigned this statement, being surprised at one's own aggressiveness is not characteristic of factor 3, to which we now turn.

Factor 3—Fight. This factor is geared for the expression of aggression, and while the dependent factor 1 was primarily female in membership, factor 3 is masculine: no female has a pure saturation on this factor. (See Table 1.) The fight posture is indicated by the following statements and their accompanying factor scores:

12. McCarthy not only talked as others did, but came out and demonstrated. He knew it was difficult to go against the Johnson Machine, but he was not afraid to try. (+4)
18. McCarthy himself was not really that important. "The Movement" was looking for him and accepted him, but it also preceded him. (+4)
25. Maybe we weren't defeated after all. Maybe McCarthy did his job: He got rid of L.B.J. didn't he? Besides, it's not over yet by any means. (+5)
31. I was glad McCarthy didn't endorse anyone at the convention. I figured, if he was going to buck the system, he should go all the way. (+5)
41. I supported McCarthy because he bucked the political system. He knew the strength of the Johnson Machine, but chose to go ahead regardless of the consequences. (+5)
60. I liked McCarthy's attitude after the convention. Humphrey acted like it was a kid's game where everyone shakes hands after it's over. McCarthy realized it wasn't a game, that the issues still existed. (+5)

The kind of person who would give the factor 3 statement ranking as his own would be a person prepared for political battle. The main enemy for factor 3 is President Johnson, and Senator McCarthy is admired and supported for opposing the President. Any suggestion of withdrawal or retreat—in short, of *flight*—is incongruent with the prevailing basic assumption and therefore is rejected:

3. Frankly, I'm tired of the whole mess—Republicans, Democrats, even McCarthy and politics in general. When these things come up, I would just as soon change the subject. (—5)
17. When McCarthy endorsed Humphrey, it was his recognition that you can't beat the system. I don't blame him I think he's probably right. (—4)
22. I don't think about McCarthy anymore. I was shocked by the result of the convention, and now I have no intention of participating further. (—5)

Bion's concept of valency is well illustrated in the case of the fight-oriented factor 3, particularly when compared, as in Table 2, with the

TABLE 2.—VALENCY IN THE FIGHT FACTOR

Statement no. 58	Factor Scores		
	Dependence	Pairing	Fight
I tend to be impulsive in expressing my feelings about "the system," the War—the whole bit. And I think the McCarthy movement brought this out in me more than ever.	—3	—4	+2

other factors thus far considered in the score-assigned statement 58. Factor 3 to some extent recognizes in itself an aggressive tendency and following Bion, is cognizant of the fact that the McCarthy movement was probably more catalytic than causal as far as the expression of this aggression is concerned; the score assigned statement 18 (*supra*) also supports this. Bion therefore seems to be on the right lines: "... the accepted leader of a group in this [fight-flight] state is one whose demands on the group are felt to afford opportunity for flight or aggression and if he makes demands that do not do so, he is ignored."²⁶ McCarthy's continued opposition to Hubert Humphrey, even after the Democratic party had made its convention decision, was perhaps an attempt to retain the loyalty of the factor 3 type, i.e., implicit recognition by McCarthy that if he did not afford the opportunity for opposition that he might indeed be ignored by a large and effective segment of his following.²⁷

²⁶ Bion, *op. cit.*, p. 152. The fight orientation, as is the case with the other basic assumptions, can have a persistent quality. In a speech before a 1969 graduating class, McCarthy reportedly received his biggest ovation for the following statement: "You may be called upon to cross the Red Sea knowing it will close on you—and, having made the passage, realize that you may be called upon to make the passage again." See Susan Brownmiller, "Eleven Months After Chicago: Gene McCarthy Is Waiting for a Sign," *New York Times Magazine*, July 20, 1969, p. 25. Upon the same occasion, a McCarthy supporter is also reported to have said, "Really like old times. Even the Boston Globe said he was welcomed like a returning hero. . . . A lot of us are prepared to go the route with him again." It would be difficult to find a clearer expression of the leader-follower relationship in the fight context.

²⁷ McCarthy's implicit recognition of his followers' wants frequently borders on the explicit. As he was again reported to have said (in Brownmiller, *ibid.*, p. 18), "Last year I was more outspoken than anybody. I fought the fight where it should have been fought. What is it that people

TABLE 3.—STATEMENTS DISTINGUISHING
FACTOR 4

Statements	Factor Scores				
	1	2	3	4	5
4. I have strong views, and whenever I got together with other McCarthy people, I always contributed my 2-cents worth.	-3	3	-1	5	3
15. Although I was part of the McCarthy movement, I wasn't always in agreement with McCarthy himself, and I often said so.	2	1	2	5	0
29. When McCarthy lost the nomination, I felt as though I had lost, too. After him, I felt there was no one left I could look up to.	0	3	3	-5	4
33. It's hard for me to express what it was about McCarthy that attracted me, but as far as I'm concerned, he would have been the difference between the President and my President.	2	5	-1	-3	2
37. Most of McCarthy's followers will probably disagree with me, but I didn't think he was as graceful in defeat as he was in victory.	-1	1	-5	5	-2
57. While McCarthy was still in the running, I was deeply interested in this year's race, but when he didn't make it, I didn't much care who won.	1	-1	-1	-5	2

Factors 4 and 5. These two factors are of interest because they appear to be specific to this particular political phenomenon: they probably would not have emerged had the data been collected prior to the Democratic Convention. Factor 4 in a sense represents the other side of the emotional coin to the dependent factor 1 and may be characterized as "counterdependent." This is not to say factor 4 was opposed to McCarthy for all respondents in this study were or had been McCarthy supporters. Factor 4 was just not as much taken by the movement, appears a bit disgusted with Senator McCarthy's intransigence, looks at matters in a more emotionally-detached manner compared to the other factors, and in its present stage comes closest to Bion's concept of the work group, as indicated by the scores assigned the statements in Table 3. Factor 4 persons appear not as committed to McCarthy *per se* but, in contrast to the other factors, more goal-oriented. These were probably the loyal Democrats who made up factor 4, and when McCarthy lost the nomination, they were prepared to move in behind the winner.

Stock and Thelen mention that counterdependency is characterized by high work orientation, rejection of hostility, and rejection of flight of the irrelevancy type,²⁸ and factor 4 appears to

would have me do now? . . . What is it that people want from me?"

²⁸Stock and Thelen, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

fit this description. The factor appears willing to discuss the political issues on a rational, but not on an emotional, level. Useless hostility (fight) is rejected as is an attitude of "dropping out," i.e., irrelevant flight. It is worthy of note that this factor, as was the case with factor 3, is primarily male in composition and in its attitude toward the group leader is most opposite to the supportive attitude expressed by factor 1, which was primarily female.

Factor 5 also appears to be an attitude existing as a function of events surrounding the Democratic Convention. Respondents from this factor probably would have been associated with the bitter-enders of factor 3 prior to the Convention, but while factor 3 continues an uncompromising fight stance, factor 5 has surrendered and might therefore, as a first approximation, be labeled "defeatist." The statements in Table 4 would tend to indicate factor 5 was highly committed to McCarthy on a personal basis, but in the face of defeat is prepared to give up, when compared to the readiness of the other factors, at least to give up on the political system as it presently exists. Factor 5 wanted only McCarthy and when he lost, the loss was personal and total.²⁹ Factor 5 sees the course of

TABLE 4.—STATEMENTS DISTINGUISHING
FACTOR 5

Statements	Factor Scores				
	1	2	3	4	5
17. When McCarthy endorsed Humphrey, it was his recognition that you can't beat the system. I don't blame him—I think he's probably right.	-4	-2	-4	-2	1
18. McCarthy himself was not really that important. "The Movement" was looking for him and accepted him, but it also preceded him.	2	4	4	3	-1
22. I don't think about McCarthy anymore. I was shocked by the result of the convention, and now I have no intention of participating further.	-4	-2	-5	-5	1
25. Maybe we weren't defeated after all. Maybe McCarthy did his job: He got rid of L.B.J. didn't he? Besides, it's not over yet by any means.	-1	-1	5	0	-3
40. A minority of people felt the way McCarthy did and they knew he would lose, but what endeared him to his supporters was that he would be glorious in defeat.	1	2	0	1	-4
48. The McCarthy phenomenon has allowed me to hope that changes will be made. I am confident that by 1972 someone will emerge to provide the leadership we need.	3	5	4	2	-4

²⁹For example, respondent 21, with the highest factor loading on factor 5 (Table 1), attended the Convention and reported being so angered at McCarthy's loss that he refused to return to

events as being immediately crucial: the McCarthy defeat indicates the system cannot be beaten (nos. 17, 48), at least from within. And while factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 intend to continue participating, factor 5 is uncertain (no. 22) and generally appears to be in the process of withdrawal.

This factor comes closest to flight behavior, but not enough to be so labeled at this point. One might speculate that genuine flight would have occurred had the leader publicly lead at least a symbolic retreat—e.g., by urging his followers to become apathetic and to withdraw from participation. If such had occurred there is little doubt that factors 3 and 5, who were most involved in the attack, would have been disproportionately represented in the retreat. Such polar behavior is to be expected from the fight-flight syndrome.

IV. GROUP EMOTIONALITY AND ANXIETY

Despite the fact that the respondents tended to segment into five relatively independent

TABLE 5.—RELIEF FROM UNCERTAINTY
AS CONSENSUS

Statement no. 42	Factor Scores*				
	1	2	3	4	5
Until McCarthy announced, I was getting kind of unsure of the future. I must say, I really felt relieved to have someone like him stand up for what I believed.	1.05 +4	0.65 +2	1.08 +3	0.78 +2	1.27 +4

* Normalized factor scores are also shown to help make finer distinctions than are obvious with the rounded scores.

the floor of the Convention even to listen to the acceptance speech of the Democratic vice-presidential candidate, Senator Edmund Muskie, and refused to vote for any presidential candidate in the general election. Bion has suggested (personal communication) that factor 5 may represent an attitude of hatred toward thoughtful observation itself, a kind of fight-flight behavior. If so, he speculates the depression characteristic of the factor could have two contradictory roots: Failure of the liberal-scientific attitude to prevail and failure to destroy the liberal-scientific attitude. Such duality has been expressed as well in pure science in what Beveridge, interestingly enough, has chosen to call the "attack-escape" reaction to new ideas. The premature ridicule heaped on new ideas in science is the very antithesis of the scientific attitude, and although the scientific attitude, as a consequence, does not prevail, neither is it destroyed. See W. I. B. Beveridge, *The Art of Scientific Investigation* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951), pp. 105-106.

points of view regarding their experiences in the McCarthy movement, there are certain matters about which there was consensus. One such revolves around the function played by McCarthy's entrance into national politics, and the factor scores for statement 42 (Table 5) would seem to indicate all factors experienced a positive feeling of relief that a person of his stature and who shared their beliefs was willing to speak out. Bion, following Freud, hypothesizes anxiety as an important aspect of group formation and behavior. This isolated observation, of course, does not prove Bion's theory in any sense; however, it does support it.

One must be careful however not to assume that just because individuals are agreeing or disagreeing with some manifestly specific point of view that they are doing so for the same reasons. Bion provides a warning on this point:

Emotions associated with basic assumptions may be described by the usual terms, anxiety, fear, hate, love, and the like. But the emotions common to any basic assumption are subtly affected by each other as if they were held in a combination peculiar to the active basic assumption. That is to say, anxiety in the dependent group has a different quality from anxiety evident in the pairing group, and so on with other feelings.³⁰

Feelings and emotions are qualitatively modified according to the kind of "cement," in Bion's terms, which holds them together. Anxiety in the dependent group takes on a peculiar coloration because of the guilt and depression dominant in that emotional group; anxiety in the pairing group is influenced by the predominance of messianic hope; and anxiety in the fight-flight group is modified by feelings of anger, hate, and fearfulness which characterize that group. It is an interesting but not so revealing fact that all five factors expressed a feeling of relief at McCarthy's political appearance. The real explanation of the phenomena underlying the existence of these factors however goes beyond any manifest evidence of anxiety into the sources and dynamics of these various anxieties. While anxiety may be a verifiable fact for each of the emotionality groups, the primary problem of explanation, as Sartre would say, is not to treat the mere fact, but to suggest its *signification*.³¹

Bion states that anxieties underlie the various basic assumptions of dependence, pairing, and fight-flight. In the pairing group, to provide an illustration, anxiety on the part of an individual may compel him to seek allies—ally-seeking as a

³⁰ Bion, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.

³¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, trans. by P. Mairet (London: Methuen, 1962), pp. 26-27.

defense against anxiety—which manifests itself in the form of pairing behavior. When questioned about his overt behavior however, the individual may provide statements with the kind of sexually-symbolic content noticed by Bion and given a certain degree of confirmation in this study. But Bion suggests that such “sexual explanations” of pairing behavior may be only *rationalizations*—i.e., the anxiety exists and creates a drive which is relieved through a strategy of ally-seeking (pairing), and while the individual gives a plausible accounting for his immediate behavior, the real reason for the behavior lies elsewhere. As Ezriel was able to see (footnote 10), immediate behavior may be used deceptively—including self-deception—to avoid confronting reality.

How similar these dynamics are to those described by Lasswell in his developmental formula for political man,³² namely, *Political Man* = $p \} d \} r$, where p represents the private motive (the source of anxiety), d represents the displacement of affect into the public arena (through projection), and r represents the rationalization of the resulting behavior in terms of a broader interest (e.g., the future well-being of the country, returning the Democratic party to “the people,” making the Presidency more respectable, etc.). $\}$ means “transformed into.” So long as the respondent keeps the conversation focussed on whatever is represented by r , there will be no examination of the less-defensible p . This is not a conscious deception, however, as indicated by d .

The function expressed by Lasswell's d in Bion's schema is based on a concept discussed in an earlier paper by Melanie Klein³³ wherein the leader is incorporated into the group to the extent that he is seen to be compatible with the group's basic assumption. The leader does not create the group through manipulation of his special organization skills; he is the recipient of individually-projected desires and characteristics with which the follower in turn identifies in a subtle process of *projective identification*.

Under different titles, the Kleinian concept of projective identification has been noticed in various realms of human endeavor. In theology, for example, Feuerbach made note of the uniquely

human capacity for putting oneself in another's place, and he therefore was able to account for the image of the Deity as a projection of the individual's highest feelings of self: “God, as he is an object of religious sentiment, is nothing else than a product of the imagination.”³⁴ Such projections appear to obtain an independent status, and the individual identifies with his projections as if they were separate from him, providing the essentials for alienation. The varying projections are dependent upon the human condition which in turn depends on the existing social relationships, as Marx intimated. For Feuerbach, the sublimity of the religious vision was in inverse relation to the hopelessness of the human situation: The more abject the situation, the more glorious the vision.³⁵

Other patterns of behavior discussed elsewhere in the social sciences are also related to this dynamic. In the present study, for example, McCarthy can be regarded in psycho-linguistic terms as a *key symbol*, the presence of which provides a cue for those whose perspectives were similarly standardized during the formative stages of individual development.³⁶ For example, those persons reared under the influence of contingencies supportive of dependency behavior will develop similar perspectives; therefore, McCarthy becomes a unifying experience for them since what he symbolizes is common to all their experiences.

But going further, McCarthy's symbolic comprehensiveness was apparently sufficient for him to serve as key symbol for persons with differing

³⁴Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 317.

³⁵See J. L. Talmon, *Political Messianism* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 209. As a propositional matter, Klein (*op. cit.*, pp. 303-304) postulates just the reverse, i.e., that there is a direct rather than inverse relationship between the projection and the individual's situation: “For instance, the projection of a predominantly hostile inner world which is ruled by persecutory fears leads to the introjection—a taking back—of a hostile external world; and *vice versa*, the introjection of a distorted and hostile external world reinforces the projection of a hostile inner world.” The relationship of such dynamics to alienation are discussed in a symposium, “Alienation and the Search for Identity,” *American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 21 (1961), entire issue.

³⁶Harold D. Lasswell, “Key Symbols, Signs and Icons,” in Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, R. M. MacIver, and Richard McKeon (eds.), *Symbols and Values: An Initial Study*, 13th Symposium, Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 200.

³²Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, Compass Books (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 75-76.

³³Melanie Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms,” in Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, Susan Isaacs, and Joan Riviere (eds.), *Developments in Psycho-Analysis* (London: Hogarth Press, 1952), pp. 292-320. (Originally published: *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 27 (1946), 99-110.)

patterned preferences and, as such, he fell into the category of what Edelman calls a *condensation symbol*—the recipient of diverse and simultaneous projections.³⁷ At this point the phenomenon becomes truly multiplex as persons with diverse perspectives resonate to the same stimulus object (McCarthy), but for different reasons as developed through different experiences. The ambiguity of the object, coupled with its remoteness, provides a target for what Blumer has chosen to call *convergent selectivity*,³⁸ a process by which members of a mass converge on a common object because of an idiosyncratic attraction by each of them to selected characteristics of the object. Their common convergence produces the impression of homogeneous mass behavior—previously mistaken for a herd instinct—with the further, but erroneous, assumption of homogeneous motivation.

What is suggested here, however, is that the homogeneous flocking to McCarthy really had its roots in enduring but heterogeneous motivations, and that the link between the motivations and common overt behavior is bridged by Klein's notion of projective identification. The physical remoteness of McCarthy from most of his followers provided a gap which was spanned by individual projection onto him of characteristics the individual wanted or needed to find in a leader, wants and needs being contingent on previous interpersonal relations.³⁹

³⁷ Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, Illini Books (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 6-7.

³⁸ Herbert Blumer, "The Crowd, the Public, and the Mass," in Wilbur Schramm (ed.), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954), pp. 363-379.

³⁹ As a symbol, McCarthy represented something or somebody many of his followers had experienced before in their separate life spaces. As Laing states, "behavior is a function of experience; and both experience and behavior are always in relation to someone or something other than self." See R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 9-10. The concept of projective identification has been used retrospectively to account for the facts, and this is apt to bother some investigators concerned with confirmation. The concept need not remain this inferential, however, but can be put to test. In the context of the present study, for example, statements could be obtained relative to presumed characteristics of McCarthy's character: (1) a kind person; (2) warm and friendly; (3) dependable and conscientious; (4) wary of other politicians; (5) distrustful of our present policies and policy-makers; (6) cautious of attempts to trick or ensnare him; and so forth. A sample of,

But if all five factors in this study have a tendency to express relief at McCarthy's having entered the political race, factor 2 (pairing) seems least inclined from an examination of the normalized factor scores for statement 42 (Table 5). While this relative lack of anxiety is not statistically significant, it is still in keeping with findings reported elsewhere. According to Josephine Klein, for example, the emotional group cultures are in a kind of hierarchy based on progressive security, with the dependent group least secure and the work group most secure. Somewhere between the two extremes is the pairing group. Being more secure than the other two major emotional groups, members of the pairing group are more opposed to withdrawal (flight), a phenomenon observed as well by Stock and Thelen.⁴⁰ All of this suggests a developing sense of self-efficacy on the part of the pairing individual, and although his gregarious and social orientation toward the McCarthy movement might be considered superficial by the more "serious" and dedicated of the McCarthy followers, still it is only factor 2 apparently who emerges from the political fray with a strong positive self-regard and a feeling of having accomplished something. (See Table 6.)

Experiences during the campaign differed, of course: The noncompromising attitudes of fact—say, 40-some attribute-statements could be presented to respondents, such as those in the above study, who would then be asked to rank the items from "most like what I think McCarthy is like" to "most unlike what I think McCarthy is like." If, as Bion suspects, the dependent person seeks out a father-figure type of leader, then factor-1 persons will give high scores to items like 1-3 above, reflecting their *projection* onto McCarthy of father-figure characteristics (kind, warm, dependable, and so on). The important matter, of course, is that McCarthy objectively might be none of these. The private motives of the fight-oriented individual leads to a need for a leader with paranoid tendencies and a consequent projection onto McCarthy of these kinds of traits. This is reflected instrumentally by the giving of high scores to statements like 4-6 above, indicating McCarthy to be wary, distrustful, cautious, etc. The differential rankings could then be correlated and factored as before, different factors indicating differing perceptions of the same stimulus object. The concept of projective identification then can be held constant for steady inspection in terms of factor loadings and factor scores, all subject to standard error formulae and statistical evaluation.

⁴⁰ Josephine Klein, *The Study of Groups* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 184; Stock and Thelen, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

TABLE 6.—PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE
IN THE MOVEMENT

Statement no. 20	Factor Scores				
	1	2	3	4	5
I really feel as though I played an active, influential role in the McCarthy movement—at least as far as one individual could.	-5	4	-3	1	-3

tors 3 and 5, however, almost precluded a psychological win except under conditions of total victory. And one must keep in mind the tendency on the part of the pairing factor 2 to rationalize for the pleasantries of the pairing attitude, which might help account for the high score given by this factor to statement 20. But aside from these possibilities, by their own report factors 3 (fight) and 5 (despair) fare very poorly as far as feelings of influence are concerned; dependent factor 1 feels least influential of all; pairing factor 2 feels very influential. Counterdependent factor 4 never placed its self-esteem on the line in the first place and so had nothing to lose.

V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

What has been illustrated manifestly is that the McCarthy movement of 1968 was not homogeneous and that the perceptions of those involved differed. This much is factual as expressed in factor-analytic terms.⁴¹ Explanation

"The genuineness of the phenomenon in a technical sense is supported by a replication study by Professor Brij B. Khare (California State College, San Bernardino) who with only 14 respondents and the same McCarthy Q sample has shown some of the same responses (factors) emerge again. This tends to substantiate this small-sample approach, and we are grateful to Professor Khare for his assistance. No claim, of course, can be made on the basis of a study like this regarding the percentage of this or that factor type, but the inclusion of another 1000 respondents will do little more than fill up the factor space and, perhaps, add another factor or two. However, additional factors would in no way detract from the ones we have found. This study was designed to illustrate the different ways in which the McCarthy audience was segmented, and this can be done without recourse to large numbers of cases. See S. R. Brown, *Small-Sample Behavioral Research: Procedures for Employing Q Technique in Political Science* (Kent, Ohio: Institute for Government Research and Service, Kent State University, 1970), in press.

of these differing perceptions reach into human subjectivities which are shown systematically to follow themes of group behavior suggested by Bion. Underlying all experiences is an assumption of individual tension manifested in common group action; the link between individual and group is explained in terms of projective identification, a concept encountered under various labels in psychoanalysis, linguistics, political science, theology, and sociology.

The pressures of modern society lead to various degrees of individual frustration and anxiety. Individuals, if they have anxieties, develop certain reactions to, as well as strategies for, dealing with those anxieties. And, as theory goes, individuals leave neither their anxieties nor their reaction patterns nor their strategies behind when they join groups, but bring these to the group situation. These reactions produce certain needs which the individual in concert with others in group context tries to satisfy. Bion has observed these individual-group interactions in small therapy sessions and has found them to vary about three major themes: dependency, pairing, and fight-flight. Our investigation of a political movement indicates these themes to be of more general applicability, as Bion intimated, with dynamics summarized as follows:

Dependence (factor 1). The reaction to anxiety is one of depression, and the need which develops is one for reassurance and sympathetic attention. The individual's strategy is to manipulate the group situation so as to produce a nurturant relationship. The group leader necessary for these purposes is a father-figure type, a person with an image of strength, stability, and capability for providing the needed reassurance. In a situation, as in this study, in which the leader is remote, the desired leadership traits are projected onto him.

Pairing (factor 2). The reaction to anxiety is one of a displacement in time, to a future time when the source of anxiety is in the past, and the need which develops is one for optimism and affiliation with other optimists to prevent a return in time. The leader is not present, his arrival representing that future event about which the group expresses its optimism and hopefulness. The leader is a conversation piece, and the group's hopeful anticipation makes it necessary that the leader be endowed (again through projection) with extraordinary characteristics, as if he were a genius or messiah. The greatness of the group leader and the selective affiliation of the group members provides an aristocratic aura to the group.

Fight (factor 3). The reaction to anxiety is one of anger and hate, and the need which develops is one for the expression of aggression and, consequently,

a need for a suitable target for that aggression. The individual's strategy is to manipulate the group into an aggressive force, and the most appropriate leader is one who sees the enemy most clearly, usually an individual with paranoid tendencies. McCarthy, being remote, has such tendencies projected onto him by individuals managing tension in this fashion.

Two minor themes also emerged in this study:

Counterdependence (factor 4). Members of this factor-type are not in conflict with the McCarthy phenomenon for they have at the time of this study rejected McCarthy. Being closest, by our interpretation, to Bion's work group, this factor reacts rationally, its needs are goal-determined, and as a consequence it identifies with a leader who is a realist. McCarthy is abandoned because he is perceived as being unrealistic.

Defeatist (factor 5). This factor is frustrated by events surrounding the 1968 Democratic Convention and is characterized by both depression (as in dependency) and anger (as in fight). This leads to both uncertainty and aggressiveness, and these cross-pressures lead to an apparent withdrawal.

The one theme suggested by Bion which did not emerge clearly was the basic assumption of flight. The following explanation would account for this absence: the flight-oriented individual's reaction to anxiety is fearfulness which leads to a need for escape. The leader-type facilitating such behavior would be epitomized by the alarmist, the person who would see at every turn a threat from which to flee—a worried paranoid as opposed to an angry one. McCarthy's calm exterior did not lend itself readily to these kinds of projections.

The results of this study justify closer attention to Bion's theory and speculation as to its broader implications. As Bion notes, it is important to understand emotional behavior for it can influence a group's attempt to accomplish a rational task. When group members actually try to act on a basic assumption—thereby allowing the nonrational to obtrude and influence reality-based behavior—unwanted effects may result. Pairing behavior on an emotional level, for example, may be the most appropriate strategy for dealing with individual stress at a particular point in time; however, if the hallucinatory gratifications of pairing are allowed to govern reality-bound behavior, the work group may split apart. Pairing on an emotional level, if allowed to operate openly, may appear as schismatic behavior on the work level.

An actual example is provided by Ezriel who discusses an incident in therapy in which group members colluded on an emotional level to create a situation all deplored: patient X needed to

be the group's *central figure* at a time the group needed a leader whom it could attack; therefore, X satisfied his needs by offering himself as leader, and this satisfied the group's need for a target to attack. The emotional group then proceeded to render ineffectual the work group: members found themselves driven, by force—beyond their rational control, into wasting the entire therapeutic session.⁴² This not only illustrates how under certain conditions a person will offer himself as leader at the expense of unpopularity, but also how he may succeed in attaining that position despite sufficient opposition to defeat him.

One need not go far in politics to find examples of unconscious collusion. Beradt, for example, shows that many of those subjugated in Nazi Germany voluntarily indulged in behavior which placed them under greater subjugation—i.e., they colluded with their oppressors in their own oppression, the reverse of their rational intentions.⁴³ Much of the liberal-conservative debate might be looked at in the same way: the right adheres to tradition (the group bible) and opposes developmental change whereas the left supports the new idea but, in the process, becomes so exacting in its demands as to cease recruiting itself. Therefore, schism and clash on an emotional level provide the illusion of group differences, whereas Bion suggests both groups may be colluding to avoid the painful synthesizing of old and new which is the essence of developmental conflict.⁴⁴

⁴² Ezriel, *op. cit.*, p. 125. The idea of a central figure was first put forward by Fritz Redl, "Group Emotions and Leadership," *Psychiatry*, 5 (1942), 573-596. (Reprinted: Robert Endleman (ed.), *Personality and Social Life* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 527-537.)

⁴³ Charlotte Beradt, *The Third Reich of Dreams*, trans. by Adriane Gottwald (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). See also the discussion of "transpersonal system of collusion" by R. D. Laing, *The Politics of the Family* (Toronto: CBC Publications, 1969), p. 29.

⁴⁴ Bion, *op. cit.*, p. 159. Since absence of developmental process is a characteristic of the basic-assumption mentality, much interesting research could proceed by assuming from the outset that both left and right, despite what they say, are committed to no change, and then looking for the subtle ways in which this is accomplished. It is not infrequently the case that on the eve of victory, radicals make new demands which render impossible a settlement or perform acts which cause them to lose the very support necessary for the legitimate majority for which they verbally appeal.

Bion's observation that groups can switch emotional strategies as a defense against threat also has implications. Insanity used to be regarded as a kind of meaningless behavior indulged in by persons who had "gone over the edge." More recently, it has been recognized that "insanity" is a lawful and systematic game played by persons who have not been able to win by sticking to the rules of "normality," a kind of purposive behavior whereby a person plays at being insane in order to avoid (flight) having his actions judged by rational criteria. One wonders somberly if some of the more extreme forms of "socio-political insanity" we witness daily are not also playful, in this sense, and governed by motivations analogous to the desire to avoid evaluation by rational criteria. This is not a criticism of the lunatic, for there may be good reasons for his acting crazy. But that his insanity is a kind of game, under the joint control of the actor and certain environmental contingencies, and not a mental illness in any physiological sense, is becoming clearer. Likewise, recognition of the non-rational basis of rioting, burning, and other "socio-political insanities" is not to be mistaken for criticism, for economic and social conditions may make such behavior patterns inevitable.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ See Thomas S. Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961). Even lunatics begin to quit acting insane, apparently of their own volition, when given the power and respect denied them in the game of reality. Playing normal is therefore to some extent contingent upon power and respect which reinforce a particular behavior pattern. Evidence of this is to be found in Robert Rubenstein and Harold D. Lasswell, *The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), and Rubenstein, "The Study of Political Processes in Psychiatric Illness and Treatment," in Arnold A. Rogow (ed.), *Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell*

However, the political scientist, as is the case with the psychiatrist, must exercise care when dealing with the actors he is studying, for since they are members of both a work and emotional group, it is not always obvious whether their verbalizations are an accurate description of the phenomenon or merely another manifestation of it.

So in conclusion, we would again emphasize the importance of subjectivity in a complete theory of political action. Rogow recently has suggested that the relationship between psychiatry and political science is like one "of those long engagements that somehow never eventuate in marriage."⁴⁶ Although the two disciplines are no closer to marriage now than they ever were, they still have an active interest in one another. No one has ever seriously denied the importance to political theory of the emotional ingredient in which the psychiatrists have always been interested. In the past, such matters have been neglected largely for lack of developed theory (which tells us where to look) and lack of techniques able to capture the dynamic aspects which inevitably accompany emotional behavior. As a consequence, most such available theories, such as Bion's, are nonpolitical and most techniques are insensitive to subjective behavior. The study reported here admittedly is a long way from untangling the vexing problems of political-group emotionality, but we hope that it has served to indicate how one might go about beginning an investigation of such matters.

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 147-154.

⁴⁶ Arnold A. Rogow, "Psychiatry, History, and Political Science: Notes on an Emergent Synthesis," in Judd Marmor (ed.), *Modern Psychoanalysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 663. See also, Fred I. Greenstein, "Private Disorder and the Public Order: A Proposal for Collaboration Between Psychoanalysts and Political Scientists," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 32 (1968), 261-281.

THE MEANINGS OF BLACK POWER: A COMPARISON OF WHITE AND BLACK INTERPRETATIONS OF A POLITICAL SLOGAN*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Angry protests against racial discrimination were a prominent part of American public life during the 1960's. The decade opened with the sit-ins and freedom rides, continued through Birmingham, Selma, and the March on Washington, and closed with protests in hundreds of American cities, often punctuated by rioting and violence. During this troubled decade the rhetoric of protest became increasingly demanding, blanket charges of pervasive white racism and hostility were more common, and some blacks began to actively discourage whites from participating either in protest demonstrations or civil rights organizations. Nothing better symbolized the changing mood and style of black protest in America than recent changes in the movement's dominant symbols. Demonstrators who once shouted "freedom" as their rallying cry now were shouting "black power"—a much more provocative, challenging slogan.

The larger and more diverse a political movement's constituency, the more vague and imprecise its unifying symbols and rallying cries are likely to be. A slogan like black power has no sharply defined meaning; it may excite many different emotions and may motivate individuals to express their loyalty or take action for almost contradictory reasons. As soon as Adam Clayton Powell and Stokely Carmichael began to use the phrase in 1966 it set off an acrimonious debate among black leaders over its true meaning. Initially it was a blunt and threatening battle cry meant to symbolize a break with the past tactics of the civil rights movement. As Stokely Carmichael put it in one of his early speeches:

The only way we gonna stop the white men from whippin' us is to take over. . .

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We've been saying freedom for six years and we ain't got nothing'. What we gonna start saying now is black power, . . . from now on when they ask you what you want, you know to tell them: black power, black power, black power!'

Speeches of this kind not only were a challenge to the white community; they also were attacks on the currently established black civil rights leaders, especially those who had employed more accommodating appeals or had used conventional political and legal channels to carry on their struggle. Carmichael's speeches brought a swift, negative response from Roy Wilkins:

No matter how endlessly they try to explain it, the term black power means anti-white power . . . It has to mean going it alone. It has to mean separatism. Now separatism . . . offers a disadvantaged minority little except a chance to shrivel and die. . . . It is a reverse Mississippi, a reverse Hitler, a reverse Ku Klux Klan. . . . We of the NAACP will have none of this. We have fought it too long.²

Although not so adamant and uncompromising as Wilkins, Martin Luther King expressed the doubts of many moderate leaders when he said:

It's absolutely necessary for the Negro to gain power, but the term "black power" is unfortunate because it tends to give the impression of black nationalism. . . . We must never seek power exclusively for the Negro, but the sharing of power with the white people. Any other course is exchanging one form of tyranny for another. Black supremacy would be equally evil as white supremacy. My problem with SNCC is not their militancy. I think you can be militantly non-violent. It's what I see as a pattern of violence emerging and their use of the cry "black power," which whether they mean it or not, falls on the ear as racism in reverse.³

This disagreement over the implications of the black power slogan was caused partly by a clash:

¹ William J. Brink and Louis Harris, *Black and White* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 50.

² *New York Times*, July 6, 1966, p. 14.

³ *Ibid*, July 6, 1966, p. 15, and July 9, 1966, p. 8.

of personalities and ambitions, but it was also the result of fundamental differences over the proper role of a black minority in a society dominated by white men. Should the ultimate goal be complete assimilation and the development of an essentially "color blind" society, or should blacks strive to build a cohesive, autonomous community, unified along racial lines, which would be in a stronger position to demand concessions and basic social changes from the whites? For American Negroes, who bear the brutal legacy of slavery and are cut off from their African heritage, this is a terribly difficult choice. As James Baldwin said when he compared himself with the lonely, poverty-stricken African students he met in Paris: "The African . . . has endured privation, injustice, medieval cruelty; but the African has not yet endured the utter alienation of himself from his people and his past. His mother did not sing 'Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child,' and he has not, all his life long, ached for acceptance in a culture which pronounced straight hair and white skin the only acceptable beauty."⁴ The slogan black power raises all the agonizing dilemmas of personal and national identity which have plagued black Americans since the end of slavery; the current dispute over its meaning is echoed in the speeches of Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. DuBois, and Marcus Garvey.

Those, like Harold Cruse,⁵ interested in a comprehensive social theory to guide black development in the United States are not particularly impressed with the term black power because:

it is open to just as many diverse and conflicting interpretations [as the former abstractions Justice and Liberation]. While it tries to give more clarity to what forms Freedom will assume in America as the end-product of a new program, the Black Power dialogue does not close the conceptual gap between shadow and substance any more than it plots a course for the program dynamic.⁶

Cruse hopes for the development of a synthetic political ideology in the classic sense

⁴ James Baldwin *Notes of a Native Son* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), p. 122.

⁵ Cruse, for example, in his provocative series of essays, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* (New York: William Morrow, 1967), p. 557, says that "the radical wing of the Negro movement in America sorely needs a social theory based on the living ingredients of Afro-American history. Without such a theory all talk of Black Power is meaningless."

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 545.

which brings together economic, cultural and political factors; black power, at this point in time, is a label for a series of ideas which fall far short of this goal.

Whatever interpretation may be given it, black power is a provocative slogan which causes excitement and elicits strong responses from people. Even though, as Charles Hamilton says, "in this highly charged atmosphere it is virtually impossible to come up with a single definition satisfactory to all,"⁷ the definition an individual selects may tell us a great deal about how he defines himself politically in a society torn by racial strife. His definition is a way for him to bring together his views on leaders and events in the environment. If he agrees with Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, he sees black power as "a call for black people in this country to unite, to recognize their heritage, to build a sense of community."⁸ He may also see it as a call for anything from "premeditated acts of violence to destroy the political and economic institutions of this country" to "the use of pressure-group tactics in the accepted tradition of the American political process."⁹

We know that community leaders have strong reactions to the black power slogan, but little is known of its impact on ordinary citizens, both black and white. As we shall demonstrate, for the white citizen the slogan usually provokes images of black domination or contemporary unrest which he cannot understand or tolerate. For the black citizen, it is more likely to raise subtle issues of tactics and emphasis in the racial struggle. In this essay we will examine how blacks and whites in a large urban center define black power, why they define it as they do, and whether their view of the slogan is part of a coherent set of interpretations and evaluations, a racial ideology, which they used to define the role of blacks as political and social actors in our society.

⁷ Charles Hamilton, "An Advocate of Black Power Defines It," *New York Times Magazine*, April 14, 1968, pp. 22-23, 79-83, reprinted in full in Robert L. Scott and Wayne Brockriede, eds., *The Rhetoric of Black Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 178-194. This statement is found on p. 179.

⁸ Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 44.

⁹ Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 179. For a view of the concept from a broader perspective see, Locksley Edmondson, "The Internationalization of Black Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives," *Mawazo* (December, 1968), pp. 16-30.

II. THE DATA

Our analysis is based on data gathered in a survey of Detroit, Michigan, completed in the fall of 1967. A total of 855 respondents were interviewed (394 whites and 461 blacks). In all cases whites were interviewed by whites, blacks by blacks. The total N came from a community random sample of 539 (344 whites and 195 blacks) and a special random supplement of 316 (50 whites and 266 blacks) drawn from the areas where rioting took place in July, 1967.¹⁰ Since there are few meaningful differences between the distributions or the relationships of interest in the random and riot-supplement samples, we have employed the total N in the analysis so that a larger number of cases are available when controls are instituted.

III. A PROFILE OF COMMUNITY OPINION

Since there is such confusion and uncertainty over the meaning of black power among the writers, spokesmen and political leaders of both races, we might wonder if the slogan has had any impact at all on average citizens. The first questions we must ask are simply: do our respondents recognize the term, have they formed an elaborate reaction to it, and if so, what meaning do they give it?

Because of the lack of consensus among community leaders about the precise meaning of black power or even agreement on a common framework for discussing the slogan, we were reluctant to use a close-ended question to capture our respondents' interpretations of the term. In order to avoid the danger of biasing responses or eliciting a random choice we used a simple, open-ended question: "What do the words 'black power' mean to you?" This has the advantage of permitting people to speak with a minimum of clues, but it also has disadvantages which we recognized. Respondents may not have given the term a great deal of thought and their answers may be unreliable indicators of their opinion (or lack of opinion). Use of the vernacular at times inhibited interpretation of the answers.¹¹ It was sometimes difficult to judge whether a respondent was sympathetic or unsympathetic to black power as he interpreted it. For example, a small number of Negro respondents (N = 3) could only define black power as "rebellion." We can guess their feelings about this word from the context of the interview, but this carries us a step away from their answers.

¹⁰ Riot areas were defined by a location map of fires considered riot-related by the Detroit Fire Department.

¹¹ See our discussion below of "nothing" as a response.

Fortunately, the answers were generally quite comprehensible and when we asked the same open-ended question of a subsample of the original respondents one year later (1968) we received answers consistent with their first response from a majority of the people.¹² In addition, in 1968 we supplemented the question on the meaning of black power with a close-ended item: "Do you approve or disapprove of 'black power'?" This provided a means of checking the criteria we developed in 1967 from the open-ended question for deciding whether respondents had a favorable or unfavorable view of the black power slogan. The correlation between our scoring as favorable or unfavorable of the 1968 respondents' interpretations of black power on the open-ended question and their own assessment, on the close-ended question, of their position was (Gamma) .99 for blacks and .97 for whites.¹³

Table 1 presents a simple profile of Detroit community responses to our question on black power. As noted above, since there were no appreciable differences for either race in the interpretations given by respondents in the riot or non-riot areas, we have included all our respondents in the analysis.¹⁴

Interpretations indicating a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward black power are

¹² The correlation between interpretations of black power on the open-ended question in 1967 and interpretations in 1968 is (Gamma) .54 for blacks and .78 for whites. We will be gathering data from the same respondents once again in September, 1970, and will report our findings in detail after the third round is completed.

¹³ We will present our codings below. A more conservative coefficient for demonstrating the relationship between interpretations of black power on the open-ended question and approval or disapproval on the close-ended question would be Kendall's tau-beta. See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* (December, 1954). The tau-beta correlations are .86 for blacks and .60 for whites. The lower coefficient in the white case reflects the relatively large percentage of whites who give favorable interpretations of black power but disapprove of the slogan. This will be discussed in more detail in the text.

¹⁴ For the blacks, the riot area respondents gave a greater emphasis to black unity as opposed to fair share interpretations of black power, but the differences are not great. Non-riot area respondents actually were slightly more favorable to black power if we consider unity and fair share responses as indicators of positive feelings.

TABLE 1.—BLACK POWER INTERPRETATIONS,
BY RACE

(Question: What do the words "black power" mean to you?)		
Interpretation	Blacks	Whites
Unfavorable		
Blacks Rule Whites	8.5%	38.6%
Racism	3.9	7.3
Trouble, Rioting, Civil Disorder	4.1	11.9
"Nothing"	22.3	5.3
Negative Imprecise Comments (ridicule, obscenity, abhorrence)	6.5	11.7
Other*	4.3	5.9
	49.6	80.7
Favorable		
Fair Share for Black People	19.6	5.1
Racial (Black) Unity	22.6	5.6
	42.2	10.7
Don't Know, Can't Say		
	8.2	8.6
	100%	100%
	(N = 461)	(N = 394)

* "Other" responses were scattered and inconsistent, although generally negative. They include references to black power as communism, radicalism, a return to segregation and a sophisticated failure to define the concept because of a perception that it has contradictory meanings. The latter answer was given by one black and five white respondents.

marked off for the convenience of the reader. As we go through the various categories the reasons for our designations will be explained in detail.

Almost 40 percent of the whites believe black power means black rule over whites, while only 9 percent of the black respondents hold this view. This attitude of the whites is clearly *not* a function of a rational projection that the increasing black population in the city of Detroit (now about 40 percent) will soon elect a black mayor, but is an almost hysterical response to the symbolism of the slogan. White people in this category usually refer to blacks taking over the entire country or even the world.¹⁵

¹⁵ The quotes presented here are typical examples of black power definitions coded in each

(white, male, 47, 12 grades) Nasty word! That the blacks won't be satisfied until they get complete control of our country by force if necessary.

(white, male, 24, 12 grades plus) Black takeover—Take over the world because that is what they want to do and they will. There's no doubt about it. Why should they care? I'm working and supporting their kids. In time they'll take over—look at how many there are in Congress. It's there—when they get to voting age, we'll be discriminated upon.

(white, female, 28, 12 grades plus) The colored are going to take over and be our leaders and we're to be their servants. Yes, that's exactly what it means.

(white, female, 28, 12 grades) They want the situation reversed. They want to rule everything.

(white, male, 32, 11 grades) The Negro wants to enslave the white man like he was enslaved 100 years ago. They want to take everything away from us. There will be no middle class, no advancement. He is saying, "If I can't have it neither can you." Everything will be taken away from us. We'll all be poor.

(white, female, 40, 12 grades) I don't like the sound of it. Sounds like something coming to take you over.

Most of our black respondents *do not* interpret black power in this way. Blacks who were coded in this category were usually also hostile to black power. For example:

(black, male, 28, 12 grades plus) It means dominating black rule—to dominate, to rule over like Hitlerism.

(black, female, 38, 11 grades plus) It means something I don't like. It means like white power is now—taking over completely.

(black, male, 29, no answer on education) It means to me that Negroes are trying to take over and don't know how.

A few others gave this answer because they have very vague ideas about the concept:

(black, female, 50, 9 grades) Sounds like they want to take over control.

category. Respondents are identified by race, sex, age and educational attainment for the benefit of the reader. In cases where the respondent has some specialized training, he is coded with a "plus" after his grade level.

There were only seven people in this group of 37 blacks who saw black domination over whites as the definition of black power and whose answers could possibly be interpreted as approval of this goal.

A small number of whites and blacks simply defined black power as racism or race hatred. The comments of blacks holding this view were especially scathing:

(black, female, 57, 11 grades) It's like the Ku Klux Klan and I don't like it.

(black, female, 38, 12 grades) It means something very detrimental to the race as a whole. This is the same tactic the whites use in discriminating.

The black power definitions of about 12 percent of the white population and 4 percent of the blacks sampled were directly influenced by the violence of the 1967 Detroit disorders. Terms like "trouble" and "rioting" were commonly used by these individuals, especially blacks in the riot areas and whites outside of it. Clearly, however, the vast majority of black people sampled do not see black power as a synonym for violence and destruction, racism or even black rule over whites, while 57.2 percent of the whites do.

Two views of black power predominate among our black respondents. One represents a poorly articulated negativism or opposition to the term and the other a positive or approving interpretation of the concept and its meaning. Roughly 23 percent of the black respondents indicated that the term meant "nothing" to them. This category was coded separately from the "Don't Know," "Can't Say," and "No Answer" responses because the word "nothing" is generally used as a term of derision, especially in the black community. Some examples of extended responses give the proper flavor:

(black female, 39, 10 grades) Nothing! (Interviewer probe) Not a damn thing. (further probe) Well, it's just a word used by people from the hate school so it don't mean nothing to me.

(black, male, 52, 12 grades plus) It means nothing! (probe) A word coined by some nut. (further probe) There is only one power and that is God.

(black, female, 60, 5 grades) It doesn't mean nothing. (probe) Biggest joke in the 20th century.

It is, of course, possible that some people use "nothing" as a synonym for "I don't know." We have two major pieces of evidence which indicate that this is not so for the major proportion of blacks giving the response: (1) while direct expressions of ignorance ("don't know," "can't

say," etc.) are a function of educational level, "nothing" is used in the same proportion by blacks no matter what their academic accomplishments; (2) blacks use the expression more than four times as often as whites (22 percent to 5 percent) in trying to express what black power means to them; and (3) almost 90 percent of the respondents who interpreted black power in this way in 1968 also expressed disapproval of the term on our close-ended question.¹⁶

There are other individuals who give less ambiguous, clearly negative interpretations of the term. A small proportion of our respondents (1.3 percent of the blacks and 0.7 percent of the whites) found profanity indispensable as the sole expression of their definition. Others (5.2 percent of the blacks and 11.0 percent of the whites) were slightly more articulate in their condemnation, although their definitions were still imprecise. Often, especially for the whites, they reflect a general abhorrence of power in any form:

(white, female, 52, 12 grades) I hate the expression because I don't like power. It's very domineering and possessive and (they) have only themselves in mind.

(white, male, 54, 4 grades) No more than the words white power mean. They should cut that word out.

(black, female, 37, 9 grades) Black power and white power means the same to me which is no good. Man should be treated as a man.

(white, female, 55, 12 grades) Disaster! You know what you can do with your black power.

(white, female, 53, 12 grades) Scare! Why should there be black power any more than white power? Don't the blacks agree that all races are equal?

The last remaining major category of answers clearly distinguishes the black from the white community in its views of black power. In their statements 42.2 percent of our black respondents as compared to 10.7 percent of the whites emphasized a "fair share for black people" or "black unity." We coded all those answers which stressed blacks getting their share of the honors and fruits of production in society, exercising equal rights, bettering their living conditions or gaining greater political power into our "fair share" categories. Definitions stressing black

¹⁶ All of the few whites who interpreted black power as "nothing" in 1968 were negative about the slogan.

unity or racial pride were coded separately.¹⁷ Since only 7 blacks and 2 whites mentioned racial pride specifically, we will refer in the text to "black unity" or "racial unity" only. We felt that a definition of black power in terms of black people gaining political power in areas where blacks are in the majority fell under our fair share concept, but there were only two statements of this type. This definition may be implicit in the statements made (or in some of our black unity interpretations), but virtually all references are to justice and equity rather than exclusive control of a geographical area.

Fair share answers were given by almost twenty percent of our black respondents. People whose responses fall into this category see the black power slogan as another statement of traditional Negro goals of freedom, equality and opportunity. Respondents often take pains to reject notions of blacks taking advantage of others:

(black female, 47, 12 grades plus) That we should have blacks represent us in government—not take over, but represent us.

(black, male, 40, 9 grades plus) Negroes getting the same opportunities as whites when qualified.

(black, male, 24, 12 grades) Negroes should get more power to do the same things which whites do.

(black, female, 52, 12 grades plus) Give us an equal chance.

(black, male, 41, 0 grades) To me it means an open door into integration.

(black male, 39, 12 grades) Equal rights to any human being.

(black, female, 54, 7 grades) That America is going to have a new power structure so black people can have a share.

(black, male, 23, 10 grades) Getting in possession of something—like jobs and security.

(black, male, 55, 12 grades) It means equal opportunities for both races. What's good for one is good for the other.

About 23 percent of our black respondents gave "black unity" responses.¹⁸ These were

¹⁷ In a few cases (N = 20) respondents stressed black unity in order to achieve a fair share. We are considering first mentions here and in our analysis, but will probe this in detail when we have more time.

¹⁸ We will combine black unity definitions with the few racial pride references for purposes of analysis.

more militant in tone than the fair share definitions, sometimes extremely nationalistic, but always (as in the fair share answers) concerned with bettering the situation of the black man and not putting down the white man. In fact, the data suggest to us that blacks who are most favorably disposed towards black power simply do not see the political world as one where blacks can gain something only at the expense of whites and vice versa. As we have seen, however, large numbers of whites do see things this way. For them one group or the other must tend to "take over."

The major difference between the "fair share" and "black unity" groups is that the former places heavy stress on blacks as equal participants in the total society, while the latter emphasizes black togetherness and achievement without the same attention to the traditional symbols of Negro advancement. We know from extended answers to our black power question and others that individuals giving black unity responses want equality and a just share of America's goods, but "thinking black" and speaking militantly and with pride are given primacy when talking about black power.¹⁹ It is not that they are against white people; they are simply for black people and deeply committed to the idea of black people working together:

(black, male, 35, 9 grades) People getting together to accomplish things for the group.

(black, male, 36, 12 grades plus) Negroes have never been together on anything. Now with the new movement we gain strength.

(black male, 24, 12 grades) We people getting together, agreeing on issues and attempting to reach a common goal.

(black, male, 28, 12 grades) Sounds frightening, but really is what whites, Jews, Arabs and people the world over do—divided we fall united we stand.

(black, female, 41, 12 grades plus) Togetherness among Negroes; but it means you can get along with others.

¹⁹ See footnote 17. About 20 percent of the black respondents mentioning racial unity saw it as a means of achieving equality. For example:

(black, male, 42, 12 grades) Negroes getting together and forcing whites to realize our importance—our worth to the United States. Gaining respect and equality.

The more articulate members of the black unity group are concerned with ends as well as means. See Carmichael and Hamilton, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

(black, female, 37, 10 grades) It means being true to yourself and recognize yourself as a black American who can accomplish good things in life.

(black, female, 57, 10 grades) The white man separated us when he brought us here and we been that way ever since. We are just trying to do what everybody else has—stick together.

As we have noted, the number of whites giving either the fair share or black unity response is small—just over 10 percent of the white sample. To most whites, even those who think of themselves as liberals, the concept of black power is forbidding. The 1967 riot is certainly one factor that might account for this, but we found little evidence of it. Only 5 whites in the entire sample (one percent) gave answers like the following:

(white, female, 23 college) It's gotten (away) from the original meaning. Means violence to me now.

In addition, as we shall see, even whites who have very sympathetic views about the causes of the disturbances can hardly be described as favorable to black power. The negative presentations of black power in the mass media may be responsible, but Detroit Negroes are also attentive to the same media and their views are quite different. The evidence presented in Table 1 points strongly towards a simple conclusion—the overwhelming majority of whites are frightened and bewildered by the words black power. Some of this seems rooted in abhorrence of stark words like power, but the term *black power* is obviously intolerable. The words conjure up racial stereotypes and suspicions deeply ingrained in the minds of white Americans. The slogan presents an unmistakable challenge to the country's prevailing racial customs and social norms; for precisely this reason it seems exciting and attractive to many blacks.

In summary, the vast majority of white people are hostile to the notion of black power. The most common interpretation is that it symbolizes a black desire to take over the country, or somehow deprive the white man. Blacks, on the other hand, are almost evenly divided in their interpretations with 42.2 percent clearly favorable to black power and 49.6 percent defining it in an unfavorable way. Those blacks who are favorable to black power see it as another call for a fair share for blacks or as a rallying cry for black unity, while those who are negatively inclined tend to see it as empty and meaningless (our "nothing" category, for example). Blacks certainly do not interpret the term the way the whites do. They do not see it as meaning racism,

a general black takeover, or violence, and those few blacks who do define the term in this way are negative about such meanings. It is evident that "black power" is a potent slogan which arouses contradictory feelings in large numbers of people. Interpretations of the term may differ, but the slogan clearly stimulates intense feelings and may be exciting enough to move men to purposeful action.

Although these data invite many different forms of analysis, we have decided that an attempt to understand the sources of favorable reactions to the black power slogan is of primary importance. We have, accordingly, conducted a detailed investigation of factors which predispose an individual to give a "fair share" or "black unity" response to our question on the meaning of black power. In the case of blacks, we are confident that all such definitions indicate a favorable attitude and for whites we know that they usually represent a positive attitude and always indicate at least a grudging respect or admiration. Certainly, as indicated above, we will miss a few black people who are favorable to black power if we follow this procedure, but the number is very small. In most cases, in order to keep the tables and text from becoming inordinately complex, we will combine the fair share and black unity categories and speak of individuals favorably interpreting black power, but where differences between respondents giving these two answers are of great importance we will consider them separately.

IV. THE APPEAL OF BLACK POWER: SOCIAL CHANGE, SOCIALIZATION AND DEPRIVATION

Many social scientists in recent years have been struggling to understand the increasing militancy within the black community and the concurrent rise in popularity of slogans like black power. To date, most systematic social science research in this area has centered on the "conventional militancy" of the early 1960's²⁰ or

²⁰The best example of work in this area is Gary T. Marx, *Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Marx defined "conventional militancy" by the standards of civil rights activists and organizations at the time of his study (1964). All were (pp. 40-41) "urgently aware of the extensiveness of discrimination faced by the American black man. All called for an end to discrimination and segregation and demanded the admission of the Negro to the economic and political mainstream of American life. And they wanted these changes quickly—'Freedom Now.' In pursuit of this end, participation in peaceful demonstrations was encouraged."

the backgrounds and attitudes of rioters and those who sympathize with them.²¹ The civil disturbances of the mid-1960's were clearly watershed in American racial history, but most scholars concentrating on the riots would agree that there is more to the current upheaval in the black community—symbolized by the slogan black power—than violence. Recent calls for racial pride, black unity and black self-esteem, and programs to promote these ends, are meant to reach members of the community and help them to become a constructive force in their own behalf.

This section is devoted to a discussion of the factors which predispose an individual to interpret black power favorably. The major emphasis in our analysis will be on our black respondents; but at times we will compare them to whites in order to highlight certain points. The relative lack of support for black power among white respondents prevents a more elaborate analysis of their views in this section stressing favorable versus unfavorable interpretations of the term.

It is probably best to begin by laying to rest the so-called "riffraff" theory, which has been the favorite target of many riot researchers, as a possible explanation for the appeal of the black power slogan. The riffraff theory, drawn from the report of the McCone Commission on

the Watts riots of 1964,²² holds that urban unrest is a product of a deprived underclass of recent unassimilated migrants to the cities. We will discuss the issue of migration below, but neither education (Gamma = $-.02$)²³ nor income (Gamma = $-.06$) nor occupation (Gamma = $.00$) is a very potent predictor of favorable interpretations of black power for blacks. For whites, on the other hand, education (Gamma = $.32$), income (Gamma = $.23$) and occupation (Gamma = $.48$) are associated with positive views of black power, but here it is the upper status elements who interpret the slogan favorably.²⁴ It is clear that any notion that black power appeals strictly to the less privileged in the black community is without foundation.

Some scholars, and many journalists and politicians, have adopted the clash between generations as a principal explanation of the growing popularity of the black power slogan.²⁵ The riots

²² *Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning? A Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots* (Los Angeles: McCone Commission Report, 1965).

²³ In the calculations which follow, unless otherwise noted, the black power variable is dichotomized with a favorable interpretation ("fair share" or "racial unity") scored *one* and unfavorable interpretations scored *zero*. Respondents with "don't know" or "no answer" responses were not used in the analysis. In this association, for example, those with low educational achievement were slightly less likely to approve of black power (give the "fair share" or "racial unity" interpretations) than those with substantial educational achievement.

²⁴ We do not think that this is simply because their higher level of education makes them more aware of the content of the actual debate over black power. Relative youth, education, and support of integration are all intertwined and each of these factors is related to a favorable interpretation of black power.

²⁵ See Jerome H. Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 162, and *The U. S. Riot Commission Report, op. cit.*, especially p. 93 where "a new mood among Negroes, particularly among the young" is described. "Self-esteem and enhanced racial pride are replacing apathy and submission to 'the system.' Moreover, Negro youth, who make up over half of the ghetto population, share the growing sense of alienation felt by many white youth in our country. Thus, their role in recent civil disorders reflects not only a shared sense of deprivation and victimization by white society but

²¹ Riot research is widespread. See, especially, David O. Sears and John B. McConahay, "Riot Participation," and Raymond J. Murphy and James M. Watson, "The Structure of Discontent: Grievance and Support for the Los Angeles Riot," *Los Angeles Riot Study* (Los Angeles: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, 1967); Nathan S. Caplan and Jefferey M. Paige, "A Study of Ghetto Rioters," *Scientific American* (August, 1968), pp. 15-21, also reported in the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The U. S. Riot Commission Report)*. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968); *Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), especially Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, *Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities*, Chapters 5-6 and Robert M. Fogelson and Robert B. Hill, *Who Riots: A Study of Participation in the 1967 Riots*; and Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen, eds., *Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1968). Studies which emphasize aggregate data can be found in Ted R. Gurr and Hugh D. Davis, eds., *The History of Violence in America* (New York: Bantam Press, 1969).

in Detroit and Los Angeles are seen as only one manifestation of a worldwide revolt of youth against the established order. The young are said to be more impatient and less willing to accept marginal gains than their elders.

When we divided our respondents according to age, however, we did not find great differences over the interpretation of black power within either racial group, although age was a better predictor for whites ($\text{Gamma} = -.26$) than for blacks ($\text{Gamma} = -.11$). Among blacks, 51 percent of those in their twenties gave the racial unity or fair share interpretations, but almost the same percentage of thirty, forty and fifty-year-olds gave similar responses. Approval of black power drops off among sixty and seventy-year-old blacks, but they constitute a small percentage of our sample. As noted above, age is a better predictor for whites with individuals forty and older somewhat less likely to offer an approving interpretation of black power than those under forty.

A. Social Change and Socialization: Breaking the Traditional Mold

One might assume after examining this relationship that the much discussed "generation gap" is not very wide, especially in the black community. But that conclusion would be unwarranted. Differences among blacks exist, not between youth and age, but between those who grew up in Michigan and those who were born and grew up in the South. Blacks who were born in Michigan are much more likely to give the racial unity or fair share interpretation of black power than those born in the South ($\text{Gamma} = .33$).²⁶ When we related age and attitudes to-

also the rising incidence of disruptive conduct by a segment of American youth throughout the society."

²⁶ We have defined the South as the 11 states of the Confederacy ($N = 255$) and the border states of Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and West Virginia ($N = 49$). Blacks born in border states were actually less likely to interpret black power in fair share or black unity terms than those born in the former states of the Confederacy, although the differences are small. One hundred and seven of our black respondents were born in Michigan (coded *one*). This accounts for only 412 respondents. Of those remaining, 43 were born in the United States, but outside of Michigan and the South, 1 in Canada, 1 in the West Indies and 1 in Puerto Rico. We lack information on 3 individuals. The 43 respondents born in the U.S., but not in Michigan or in the South, come from a

TABLE 2.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS
FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER*
ACCORDING TO THEIR AGES AND
REGIONS OF BIRTH

Present Age (In Ten's)	Southern Born (Arrived in Michigan after age 21)	Southern Born (Arrived in Michigan before age 21)	Born in Michigan
10's	**	33% (6)	67% (12)
20's	39% (13)	46% (26)	59% (41)
30's	21% (19)	44% (45)	58% (24)
40's	52% (25)	64% (31)	55% (20)
50's	35% (20)	63% (19)	**
60's	17% (12)	33% (12)	**
70's	33% (12)	**	**
	(Gamma = $-.02$)	(Gamma = $.15$)	(Gamma = $-.12$)

* For economy of presentation and because of the complexity of our black power code, we display only the percentages of respondents favorably interpreting black power, that is, those who gave fair share or black unity interpretations of black power.

** Percentages are not displayed if N is less than 5.

ward black power with regional background controlled (Table 2), we found that the background factors clearly predominated. Those in our sample who were born in Michigan are much younger, on the average, than the rest of our respondents (78 percent are under 40 years old and 98 percent are under 50), but definitions of black power are almost invariable for this group between age categories. There is also very little variance between age categories for those who were born in the South and came to Michigan after they were 21 years old, although, of course, there is much less approval for black power in this group. In both cases, it is regional background and not age which is the most powerful explanatory factor. Further confirmation of this conclusion comes when we examine those respondents who were born in the South, but arrived in Michigan before they were 21.

Within this group we find that the percentage of those voicing approval of black power actually *increases* along with age from the teens to the fifties, and then decreases again for the small number who are in their sixties.

wide variety of places. They are more favorably disposed toward black power than the Southerners but less so than the Michigan-born.

It might be thought that regional differences mask a more fundamental difference between blacks who were born in cities and those raised in rural areas. This is not the case. Thirty-nine percent of Southern-born Negroes who grew up on farms and in small towns favored black power; the percentage giving fair share or black unity interpretations is only 4.3 percent higher (43.3 percent) for respondents raised in the large Southern towns and cities (Gamma = .03).

This evidence leads us to conclude that, for all but the very old, it is primarily the experience of life in Michigan and not the respondent's age which helps determine his reaction to black power.²⁷ A great migration began during World War II which brought thousands of black workers to the auto plants and foundries of Detroit. Their children are coming of age in the 1960's. It is not their youth, however, which leads them to see black power as a call for racial unity or a fair share for their race; it is their experience with the culture of the urban North. It seems that the further one is from life in the South, and the sooner one experiences life in a city like Detroit, the more likely one is to approve of black power.

Life in the Northern city brings to bear on a black person forces which lead him to reject the traditional, subservient attitudes of Southern Negroes, particularly if these forces represent his major socializing experience. Away from the parochial, oppressive atmosphere of the South, he is born into or slowly appropriates the more cosmopolitan, secularized culture of the North. The new life in the promised lands of Detroit, New York and Chicago is exciting and disillusioning at the same time. It brings new hopes and the promise of a better life, and disappointments when achievements do not live up to expectations.

The Southern migrant arrived in the "promised land" to find bigotry, filth, and a more sophisticated form of degradation. With time, he grasps sufficient information about the urban

²⁷ Other bodies of data and our own show that almost all riot participants are young and that age does have an impact on favorable attitudes toward violence, especially for young men. This is not surprising in light of the physical attributes helpful to a participant in a disturbance and the bravado of the young. However, age is unrelated to more general notions of whether riots helped or hurt the black cause (Murphy and Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 82) as well as to attitudes toward black power. It is clear that age is an important variable in the study of our recent strife, but by itself it does not explain contemporary militancy or even sympathy for those who participate in civil disturbances.

TABLE 3.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS
FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER
BY CHURCH AFFILIATION WITH
BIRTHPLACE CONTROLLED

Affiliation	Place of Birth	
	South	Michigan
Church Member	33% (143)	39% (58)
Non-Member	48% (107)	67% (33)
	(Gamma = -.32)	(Gamma = -.52)

paradise. Traditional attitudes of deference and political passivity fade as a militant social and political stance gains approval in the community.²⁸ This is the atmosphere for the emerging popularity of fair share and racial unity interpretations of slogans like black power.

Just as the trip North represented an attempt to find deliverance, so the Negro church was another traditional avenue of entry into the "promised land." Most blacks who break with the church are more likely to define black power in fair share or unity terms.²⁹ This relationship holds even with region controlled (Table 3). In

²⁸ See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 280-283 for a discussion of the potential for "political radicalism" of second generation slumdweller. Claude Brown makes the same points in the graphic Foreword to his autobiography, *Manchild in the Promised Land* (New York: Macmillan, 1965). We will make some distinctions between the effects of dissatisfaction on lower and upper status groups in the section on deprivation below.

²⁹ The sample was divided into church (coded one), non-members (coded zero) and members of groups, usually action groups, connected with a church (not included in the analysis). People in the latter category (N = 25) chose to emphasize their group above their church affiliation in answering our open-ended question on membership in "church or church-connected groups." They were about as likely as the non-members to approve of black power and should be the subject of intensive study because of their pivotal position in the black community.

For a detailed discussion of the similar influence of religion on conventional militancy among blacks, including consideration of denomination and religiosity, see: Gary T. Marx, "Religion: Opiate or Inspiration of Civil Rights Militancy Among Negroes," *American Sociological Review* (1967), pp. 64-72.

fact, membership and place of birth exert an independent effect. Michigan-born church members are about mid-way between Southern-born church members and Southern non-members in their approval of black power. Retention of a church affiliation acts as a brake on the effects of being raised in the Northern urban environment. It represents a strong tie to the traditional Negro culture.³⁰

Another aspect of traditional Negro culture is the unique measure of esteem granted the federal government and its personnel. Through the years the federal government, for all its shortcomings, has been the black man's special friend in an otherwise hostile environment. It won him his freedom, gave him the best treatment he received in his worst days in the South, provided relief in the Depression and in the difficult periods which have followed, and has done the most to secure his rights and protect him during his struggle for equality.³¹ In addition, it has been the symbol of his intense identification with and "faith in the American Dream."³² Evaluation of local government in the North has been less positive, but still higher than evaluation of local government in the South.

Systematic research on political trust is rather recent, but what does exist indicates that blacks have always had at least the same distribution as whites on answers to political trust questions focused on the federal government.³³ In fact, when one takes into account the extraordinary amount of interpersonal distrust present in the black community,³⁴ the level of trust in the fed-

eral government has always been remarkable. Our data indicate that this pattern is now breaking down, at least in cities like Detroit. Using the Standard University of Michigan Survey Research Center political trust questions, we found blacks less trusting of both the federal and Detroit governments than whites.³⁵ These differences in levels of political trust are not a function of education, income or other non-racial status discrepancies.

Let us assume that the black power slogan strikes a most responsive chord in the minds of black people who want to break their traditional ties with paternalistic friends and allies. For them, expressing distrust of government, especially the federal government, is in fact a rejection of dependency—an assertion of self-worth and non-utopian thinking about the realities in the United States.³⁶ As we can see in Table 4, expressions of political trust and approval of black power are indeed inversely related. The higher a person's score on the various trust indices, the less likely he is to favorably interpret black power. This relationship is especially strong for trust in the federal government which has traditionally been granted unique esteem in the black community.

When we consider all three indicators of traditionalism together—place of socialization, church affiliation and level of political trust—we see that each is important in its own right (Table 5). The combined explanatory power of these variables is substantial. Only 20 percent of the Southern-born church members who exhibit high levels of trust give approving interpretations of black power compared to 77 percent of the Northern-born non-members who are distrustful of government. Michigan-born church members are a particularly interesting group for further study in that church membership significantly depresses the effects of political trust. Our future research will emphasize the impact of socialization into the secular polit-

³⁰ The impact of region as a variable will surely diminish over time as the effects of national black leadership and the messages of the media and relatives are diffused throughout the nation. However, church affiliation is likely to remain important.

³¹ For example, see William Brink and Louis Harris, *The Negro Revolution in America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 131 and 232-233 on black attitudes towards various political institutions and figures.

³² See Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 250, and also Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Row, 1944), pp. 3-5, 880 and 1007 on blacks as "exaggerated Americans."

³³ Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," in Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell, (eds.), *Ethics and Bigness* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 61-73 and Joel D. Aberbach, *Alienation and Race* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1967), pp. 119-126.

³⁴ Lee Rainwater's "Crucible of Identity—The

Negro Lower-Class Family" in *DAEDALUS* (1966), especially pp. 204-205 and 215 is very insightful on this point, but this distrust is not confined to lower class ghetto dwellers. See Aberbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-114 for a detailed discussion.

³⁵ For a detailed discussion of our findings and a critique of the existing literature on Political Trust see Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," a paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, especially pp. 2-7. A revised version will appear in this REVIEW (December, 1970).

³⁶ Political trust has complex roots. See *ibid.*, pp. 7-13 for an analysis of its origins.

TABLE 4.—GAMMA CORRELATIONS FOR BLACKS
BETWEEN MEASURES OF POLITICAL TRUST
AND FAVORABLE INTERPRETATIONS
OF BLACK POWER

	Trust Detroit Govern- ment**	Trust Federal Govern- ment***	General (Combined) Measure of Political Trust****
Black power interpretation*	-.22	-.52	-.39

* A negative coefficient indicates that the higher a person's score on the various trust indices (high score equals high trust), the less likely he is to favorably interpret black power.

** The Trust Detroit Government measure is a simple additive index of answers to the following questions:

1. How much do you think we can trust the government in Detroit to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?
2. How much do you feel having elections makes the government in Detroit pay attention to what the people think: a good deal, some, or not very much?

*** The Trust Federal Government measure is a simple additive index of answers to the following questions:

1. How much do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?
2. Would you say that the government in Washington is pretty much run for the benefit of a few big interests or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
3. How much do you feel that having elections makes the government in Washington pay attention to what the people think: a good deal, some, or not very much?

**** The General Political Trust Measure runs from 0 to 4 and equally weights the Trust Detroit Government and Trust Washington Government answers.

ical culture of the Northern black communities, with special attention to the development of more refined indicators which will help us to understand better this acculturation process.

B. Deprivation: Dissatisfaction and Discrimination

We asked our respondents to tell us about "the life you would most like to lead, the most perfect life as you see it." Once they had de-

scribed this kind of life they were shown a picture of a ladder with ten rungs and asked to imagine that their ideal lives were at the top of the ladder, on rung number ten. They were then asked to rank, in comparison with their ideal, their present lives, their lives five years ago, and what they expected their lives to be five years in the future.³⁷ Answers are therefore based on standards meaningful to the individual, with no simple objective indicator of achievement such as education, income or occupation serving as a substitute for his subjectively defined goals.³⁸

³⁷ This is the famous Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale which indicates the discrepancy between an individual's definition of the "best possible life" for him and his past, present, or future situation. See Hadley C. Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965). Our respondents were given the following set of questions:

Now could you briefly tell me what would be the best possible life for you? In other words, how would you describe the life you would most like to lead, the most perfect life as you see it? (Show R card with a Ladder)

Now suppose that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, the one you just described, and the bottom represents the worst possible life for you.

"Present Life" A. Where on the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?

"Past Life" B. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago?

"Future Life" C. Where on the ladder do you think you will be five years from now?

³⁸ In the black community sample, for example, level of education is correlated (Gamma) .06 with scores on the past life ladder, .09 with the present life ladder and .29 with the future life ladder. Education is, therefore, only important as a predictor of assessments of future prospects and even here other factors are obviously at work. Income and occupation work much the same way. It is

TABLE 5.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER
ACCORDING TO CHURCH AFFILIATION, PLACE OF BIRTH, AND LEVELS OF
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

Level of Trust in Government*	Place of Birth:		South		Michigan	
	Church Membership:		Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member
High (2-4)			20% (76)	29% (65)	38% (16)	58% (26)
Low (0-1)			55% (40)	66% (73)	44% (16)	77% (31)

* The General Political Trust measure was employed in this table.

This question revealed a great deal of current dissatisfaction in the black community, but also substantial optimism about the future. When asked to rank their lives five years ago only 13 percent of our black respondents put themselves in the top four categories (7, 8, 9 and 10); when asked to rank their present lives 23 percent place themselves within the top four ranks; but 64 percent chose the top four categories to describe their lives as they expected them to be five years in the future.

As Table 6 indicates, both current dissatisfaction and, to a greater extent, pessimism about the future are strongly related to approval of black power in the zero-order case. When we control for level of education, however, the relationship only holds for the lower education group. The same general trend holds true for reports of experiences of discrimination. However, the differences are less pronounced. Experience of discrimination is a more powerful predictor of fair share or racial unity interpretations of black power for the lower than the upper education group, but it still has a noticeable effect for the upper education group.³⁹

These data fit a general pattern which we have discussed in detail elsewhere.⁴⁰ For lower education blacks, approval of black power is strongly influenced by dissatisfaction with one's current lot and pessimism about the future as well as by reported experiences of discrimination. For blacks with higher levels of educational attainment, however, personal dissatisfaction with present achievements or prospects for the future do not help us to understand favorable interpretations of black power. Even reported personal experiences of discrimination are only moderately related to approval of the slogan. The views on black power of this higher education group are more strongly influenced by their identification with others in the community—their feelings for the group.

Upper status blacks who have broken free from traditional moorings become a part of a *black political community* which includes persons from all social classes. The responses of these upper status blacks to questions about the interpretation of significant events and the evaluation of leaders are most strongly affected by their sense of empathy and identification with

clear that people's evaluations of their achievements vary more within than between objectively defined status groupings.

³⁹Reported experiences of discrimination are unrelated to education (Gamma = .01).

⁴⁰Aberbach and Walker, *op. cit.*, (1969), especially pp. 11-16.

TABLE 6.—CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) FOR BLACKS BETWEEN LADDER POSITIONS ON THE SELF-ANCHORING SCALES, EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION, AND APPROVAL OF BLACK POWER, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

Scales	Zero-Order	Low Education*	High Education*
Present Life**	-.27	-.34	.06
Future Life**	-.40	-.47	-.05
Reported Experiences of Discrimination***	.30	.34	.20

* Respondents in the low education group (N=322) include all those who have completed high school (but had no additional training), while those in the high education group (N=122) have, at minimum gone beyond high school to either specialized training or college. We chose education as a status indicator and dichotomized the sample so as to preserve the maximum number of cases for the analysis.

** The ladders were trichotomized as follows: 1-3 = 0; 4-7 = 1, 8-10 = 2. Therefore, a negative coefficient means that the higher a person's score on the ladder the *less* likely he is to give a fair share or racial unity interpretation of black power.

*** This is a simple additive index of reports of personal experiences of discrimination in Detroit in obtaining housing, in the schools, from a landlord, or in obtaining, holding or advancing on a job.

their racial community than by their feelings of achievement or even their personal expectations about the future. They share a set of beliefs and a mood of protest about racial issues with those lower status segments of the black community who have also assimilated the secular culture typical of the urban North.⁴¹ The major difference between the two groups is that dissatisfaction with one's current lot and prospects for the future interact with church membership, region of socialization and political trust in determining interpretations of black power for the lower education group, but not for the upper education group.

V. THE BLACK POWER IDEOLOGY

So far our attention has been concentrated on the demographic and attitudinal correlates of approval of black power. Some scholars have ar-

Black Power by	Low Education	High Education
Church Membership	-.38	-.42
Place of Birth	.31	.34
Political Trust	-.39	-.37

⁴¹ The correlations (Gamma) between church membership, place of birth and approval of black power are actually slightly higher in the upper education than in the lower education group:

gued that interpretations of this kind of slogan stem from a more comprehensive belief system, a "riot ideology," which is said to be developing within the black community.⁴² We found that knowledge of the black power slogan has diffused widely through the black community of Detroit. There are many different interpretations of the slogan, but only about 8 percent of the population were unable to respond when asked about its meaning. The question remains whether an individual's reaction to black power, be it positive or negative, is related in any logical way to his attitudes about other issues of racial policy, his interpretation of significant events, and his choice of leaders or representatives. In order to investigate this question, we turned to our data in search of evidence of a coherent or constrained belief system on racial matters within Detroit's black community; something we might justifiably call a racial ideology.

Anyone acquainted with recent research on public opinion might doubt the existence of a set of ideas resembling a racial ideology among any but a small activist fringe in the black community. Public attitudes about political leaders or questions of public policy are usually fragmentary and contradictory. Citizens readily express opinions about public issues, but these beliefs seldom hang together in a coherent system; knowing an individual's position on one issue does not allow one to predict his positions on other, related issues. The classical liberal or conservative ideologies may often be employed by political activists or leaders as a guide to policy making, but most citizens seem to use as a guide some form of group identification or other considerations of self interest when formulating their attitudes toward political questions.⁴³

Converse argues that the degree of constraint

⁴² T. M. Tomlinson, "The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes," *American Behavioral Scientist* (1968), pp. 27-31.

⁴³ The best single statement is Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-262. For a brief review of this literature see: Lester W. Mibrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this *Review* (1964), 361-382. For some recent work see: Robert Axelrod, "The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1967), 49-60; and Norman R. Luttbeg, "The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1968), 398-410.

in a belief system is determined most directly by the amount of information the individual has acquired about the issues involved. Levels of information, in turn, are usually affected by the relative centrality or importance of the issues to the individual. The more deeply concerned the individual becomes about a subject, the more likely he is to seek information about it, and, as time passes, to form consistent or comprehensive beliefs about the issues involved. Converse, of course, has dealt most often with liberalism and conservatism in their American incarnations. Comprehensive belief systems of this sort generally "rest upon the kinds of broad or abstract contextual information about currents of ideas, people, or society that educated people come to take for granted as initial ingredients of thought."⁴⁴ This form of contextual or background information is usually accumulated after extensive, formal education, a factor which seems to be a prerequisite to ideological thinking, in most cases. Since only a small minority of the public possesses this important educational prerequisite, ideological thinking is said to be rare.

Since our respondents share the educational limitations of average Americans, and do not have any special access to political information, we would not expect them to be capable of broadly ideological thinking. As Converse suggests at several points, however, it would be unwarranted to infer from this fact that average citizens are incapable of consistent thinking about all areas of public affairs. Even without a grasp of classical liberalism or conservatism and with a minimum of formal education, respondents might have consistent belief systems concerning subjects which they found to be of inescapable personal importance, and which also involved the social groupings with which they most strongly identify.

Bearing in mind the possibility that considerable structure might be uncovered in the social and political thought of our respondents if the proper issues could be identified, we asked open-ended questions at several points in our interview about topics we thought might be salient for our respondents. Using these methods we discovered clear indications that a coherent belief system dealing with racial matters has developed within Detroit's black community. This belief system seems well organized and serves as a guide for most of our respondents in formulating their answers to our questions about racial problems. The high degree of constraint existing among the elements of this belief system is displayed in Table 7 where we present a matrix of

⁴⁴ Converse, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

TABLE 7.—CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) AMONG RESPONSES TO RACIAL ISSUES BY BLACK RESPONDENTS, BY EDUCATION*

		<i>High Education (N = 122)</i>				
		1. Approval of Black Power	2. Word to Describe Riot	3. Sympathy for the Rioters	4. Reasons for the Riot	5. Leader Who Represents You
<i>Low Education (N = 322)</i>	1. Approval of Black Power**	X	.34	.46	.32	.29
	2. Word to Describe Riot**	.36	X	.40	.58	.22
	3. Sympathy for the Rioters**	.45	.30	X	.62	.49
	4. Reasons for the Riot**	.64	.37	.48	X	.41
	5. Leader Who Represents You**	.41	.29	.32	.35	X

* Respondents in the low education group include all individuals who have completed high school (but had no additional training), while those in the high education group have, at minimum, gone beyond high school. Correlations for the high education group are recorded above the diagonal, and those for the low education group are below the diagonal.

** The following items make up this table:

1. What do the words "black power" mean to you? For this table only the signs on the black power code are reversed so that all coefficients are positive.
2. What would you call the events that occurred in Detroit between July 23 and July 28? What word would you use? Open-end question coded as follows: 1) Insurrection; 2) Riot; 3) Disturbance; 4) Lawlessness.
3. Do you sympathize with the people who took part in the (Respondent's term for the event)? 1) yes; 2) somewhat; 3) no.
4. Which of the following comes closest to explaining why the (Respondent's term for the event) took place?: 1) people were being treated badly; 2) criminals did it; 3) people wanted to take things.
5. What single national or local leader best expresses your views on relations between the races? Open-ended question coded as follows: 1) Militant Black Leaders; 2) Other Black Leaders, excluding Martin Luther King; 3) Martin Luther King; 4) White Leaders, excluding Robert F. Kennedy.

A militant is defined here as someone who unequivocally endorsed black power before the time of our interviewing (September, 1967). Persons identifying Robert F. Kennedy were not considered in the calculation of coefficients for this question because of the special nature of his partisans. See below (footnotes to Table.11) for a discussion of this.

correlations of answers by our black respondents to five questions concerning racial issues.⁴⁵ The coefficients appearing below the diagonal are for all those with a high school education, or less, while above the diagonal are findings for those

who have, at minimum, progressed beyond high school to either specialized training or college. The relatively high correlations in this table make us feel justified in referring to this set of opinions as a racial ideology.

One of the most significant aspects of Table 7 is the attitudinal consistency existing among those with lower educational achievements. A careful examination of the table shows that the

⁴⁵ To judge the relative strength of these relationships, see a similar matrix for a national cross-section sample in Converse, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

two educational groups display almost the same levels of constraint. Associations among the upper education group are slightly higher, as earlier research on ideology might lead one to expect, but only by .02, on the average. Further, as we shall establish, respondents in our sample are not only capable of consistency, but display, as well, an impressive amount of knowledge about these questions, and demonstrate the capacity to make several subtle distinctions among leaders and political symbols.

The results of Table 7 are even more significant in view of the fact that three of the five items in the matrix were completely open-ended questions. We have already discussed our open question on the meaning of black power and the way in which we constructed our code and identified favorable and unfavorable responses. The question on the word used by the respondents to describe the riot was also open-ended. At the beginning of each interview respondents were asked what word they would use to describe the events "that occurred in Detroit between July 23rd and July 28th" of 1967, and that word was used by the interviewers throughout the interview. Although some responses were quite unorthodox (one young woman called it a "steal-in" and an older woman called it "God's vengeance on man"), we found it possible to code most of the answers into four categories: revolt, riot, disturbance, and lawlessness, which roughly form a dimension from an understanding of the events as an expression of political demands, to a belief that they were an anomic, lawless outburst. We also asked our respondents, without supplying any cues, to name "the single national or local leader who best expresses your views on relations between the races." The list of leaders mentioned were then arranged according to their publicly stated views on black power. This arrangement was made on the basis of our knowledge of these leaders and their public statements.⁴⁶

Open questions require respondents to formulate their own answers, a formidable challenge to those with limited powers of expression. Some error may be introduced by interviewers when recording answers to open questions, and once they have been recorded, they must be coded. It is extremely difficult, both to construct comprehensive codes for responses of this kind,

and to complete the coding process without introducing even further error. In view of all these difficulties, the relatively strong associations we have found among the items in Table 7 are strong evidence of the existence of a racial ideology. We believe that the success of these techniques and the high degree of consistency in our respondents' opinions was due to their intense interest and concern with racial issues. It would seem that the relative salience of an issue for an individual, or his interest in a subject, is more important than his educational level or his ability to manipulate abstractions in determining the coherence of his beliefs.⁴⁷ Our findings confirm the proposition that where issues of sufficient personal importance are concerned, even the poorly educated are capable of developing relatively sophisticated, inter-related, ideological belief systems.

A. Black Power Ideology and Integration

Some of our respondents may not have an advanced understanding of the justifications for their views, but we are certain that the questions in our matrix require a choice among legitimate alternatives; they are not being translated by our black respondents into simple tests of racial loyalty. An inspection of our questions will show that we are not asking merely if they are sympathetic or unsympathetic toward the aspirations of blacks in America. Our respondents are being called upon to identify and evaluate political leaders as representatives, interpret the causes of the Detroit riot, and define the meaning of a controversial political slogan. One can be closely identified with his racial group and greatly concerned for its welfare, and yet be either *positive* or passionately *negative* about black power, the riot, or many black political leaders. Our black respondents are prevented from employing some simple form of racial chauvinism as a guide for answering our questions because of the necessity of choosing sides in fundamental disputes over the role of blacks in American society which have traditionally divided their racial community.

Some symbols and ideas, of course, seem to be accepted by virtually all members of the black community. Had questions concerning these topics been included in our matrix we would not

⁴⁶ The two remaining questions in the matrix were close-ended and provided respondents with a set of alternative answers from which to choose. See the footnotes of Table 7 for their exact wording.

⁴⁷ See Converse, *op. cit.*; and Roy T. Bowles and James T. Richardson, "Sources of Consistency of Political Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* (1969), who argue on p. 683, that "interest in politics is a more powerful predictor of both ideological conceptualization and consistency of opinion than is ability to use abstract ideas."

have such strong evidence of a racial ideology, because our responses could then be interpreted as mere expressions of support for the black community. This would have been true, for example, of any questions dealing directly with racial integration. In order to find how both racial groups felt about this issue, each of our respondents was asked whether he favored "racial integration, total separation of the races, or something in between." In response to this question, 27 percent of our white respondents endorsed integration, 17 percent favored total separation, and 54 percent chose "something in between." Even the most sympathetic whites overwhelmingly disapprove of black power, but as we can see in Table 8, approving interpretations of black power came most often from those whites who endorsed integration. The relationship was matched by a separate finding that whites who reported having friends among blacks were somewhat more approving of black power, although blacks who reported having white friends did not differ appreciably from others in their interpretation of the slogan. All of the aversion of whites toward black power cannot be attributed to an aversion toward blacks; some of it grows out of a fear and dislike of the general use of power to achieve social ends, and an unease and resentment of all forms of protest. Nevertheless, it is our impression that when most whites are asked about symbols like black power and integration, they are less likely to respond directly to the complicated issues being raised, but are tempted to translate the questions into the much simpler issue of whether they are favorable or unfavorable toward black people.⁴⁸

When our black respondents were asked the same question about racial integration, 86 percent endorsed integration, while only 1 percent chose separation. Years of struggle against institutionalized segregation and great efforts by opinion leaders in both racial communities for almost a century have made integration a potent, positive symbol for blacks. Asking for an endorsement of this idea is almost akin to asking for an expression of loyalty to the black community. Since we recognized the emotional connotation of these terms we substituted the word "separation" for "segregation" in our questions, but even in this form the positive attraction of integration proved overwhelming. The consensus on the desirability of integration

⁴⁸ The issue of the nature of racial ideology among whites will be explored in Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, *Race and the Urban Political Community* (Boston: Little, Brown, forthcoming).

TABLE 8.—PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER, BY RACE, ACCORDING TO ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION

Form of Race Relations Preferred	Percent Favorably Interpreting Black Power	
	Whites	Blacks
Integration	25% (96)	46% (36+)
Something in Between	8% (197)	46% (54)
Separation	5% (65)	*
	Gamma = -.57	Gamma = .01

* N is less than 5.

includes most black writers and intellectual leaders as well as the average citizens. Debate over the idea has remained sharp and vigorous, but it has primarily concerned the question of whether integration ultimately should result in virtual assimilation, or in some form of social pluralism.⁴⁹

In view of the special status of integration as a symbol within the black community, it is not surprising that we should find conclusive evidence that approval for black power among blacks *does not* imply approval of racial separation. In Table 8 there are no appreciable differences in approval for black power between black respondents who endorse integration and those who do not.

The racial ideology we have identified, even though not merely an expression of racial loyalty, may still have social rather than purely in-

⁴⁹ Strong advocates of black power are almost uniformly in favor of social pluralism and reject cultural assimilation as resting on the demeaning "assumption that there is nothing of value in the black community." (Carmichael and Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 53). However, they do not endorse separatism holding that black power is "ultimately not separatist or isolationist." (Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 193). The basic idea is that after the black man develops "a sense of pride and self-respect . . . if integration comes, it will deal with people who are psychologically and mentally healthy, with people who have a sense of their history and of themselves as whole human beings." (Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 182) Detailed discussion on the meanings of assimilation can be found in Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

TABLE 9.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS
FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER
ACCORDING TO WHEN THEY BELIEVE
INTEGRATION WILL OCCUR

Time for Integration	Favorable Interpretations of Black Power		
	Fair Share	+ Black Unity	= Total
Near Future	18%	16%	34% (140)
Distant Future	22%	33%	55% (206)

tellectual origins. An individual's status or the role he plays in the economy may prompt him to adopt the beliefs of the leaders of his social group because he is convinced that this is a way to advance his own interests. This form of intellectual emulation would be most likely among those, like many of our respondents, who have little education or experience with abstract thinking, and also have a strong sense of group identification. Several beliefs may be appropriated by an individual under these circumstances which may appear to him as natural collections of interdependent ideas, even if he does not have the intellectual capacity to make a similar synthesis of his own. In other words, he may know that several different elements of his belief system naturally go together, and he may also know that certain kinds of responses are considered appropriate for certain kinds of questions, without having any notion of why.⁵⁰

Our respondents' racial ideologies may have originated through this process of social diffusion and group mobilization, but we find enough subtlety in the responses to conclude that many individuals have developed a surprisingly elaborate understanding of the applicability and meaning of the beliefs they hold. For ex-

⁵⁰ Converse discusses this possibility in a section called "Social Sources of Constraint." Converse, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-213. For other treatments of the origins of ideology, see William H. Form and Joan Rytina, "Ideological Beliefs on the Distribution of Power in the United States," *American Sociological Review* (1969), pp. 19-30; Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict," *Journal of Politics* (1966), 513-530; Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," this *Review* (1969), 750-767; Everett C. Ladd, Jr., *Ideology in America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 341-350; and Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 213-439.

ample, although virtual unanimity exists within the black community about the desirability of integration as an ultimate goal, there is considerable disagreement over how soon it might occur. As we can see in Table 9, those who believe that realization of the goal is in the distant future are more likely to approve of black power than those who believe it will soon appear. In analyzing our data we have found that the perception of obstacles to racial progress, or the actual experience of some form of discrimination, is related to approval of black power. Table 9 demonstrates that the more pessimistic respondents are also more likely to interpret black power as an appeal for racial unity rather than a call for a fair share or an equal opportunity. There is evidence in this table, and in others we shall present, that the capacity for subtle shifts of emphasis and interpretation is not merely confined to the community's activist minority, but instead is widely diffused among a large segment of Detroit's black population.

B. Black Power Ideology and the Detroit Riot

The Detroit riot of July, 1967 caused fear and anxiety among almost all the citizens of the city, both black and white. Immediate reactions to the event ranged from those who believed it was a sign that the Negro citizens of the city were

TABLE 10.—PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS
FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER, BY
RACE, ACCORDING TO WORD THEY
USE TO DESCRIBE THE RIOT

a. Total Sample			
Word Used to Describe Riot	Percent Favorably Inter- preting Black Power		
	Whites	Blacks	
Revolt	32% (28)	62% (51)	
Riot	10% (212)	50% (194)	
Disturbance	0% (19)	33% (42)	
Lawlessness	8% (25)	27% (33)	
b. Black Respondents Only			
Word Used to Describe Riot	Interpretation of Black Power		
	Fair Share	+ Racial Unity	= Total
Revolt	25%	37%	62% (51)
Riot	23%	27%	50% (194)
Disturbance	19%	14%	33% (42)
Lawlessness	21%	6%	27% (33)

rising up in revolt against discrimination and injustice to those who saw it as an uncivilized expression of lawlessness and hooliganism. If, as we have suggested, responses to black power are a part of an individual's basic orientation toward race relations, there should be a strong relationship between his response to this slogan and his evaluation of the causes and consequences of the riot.

In Table 10a we can see that in both races those who use the word "revolt" to describe the events were much more likely to express approval for black power. In Table 10b where the black respondents are divided according to whether they gave racial unity or fair share responses we find that racial unity interpretations clearly predominate among those who see the riot as a protest against injustice. This is another demonstration of the shift in emphasis that occurs among those who are most aware and resentful of discrimination and inequality. The more convinced our black respondents are of the existence of injustice, the more they begin to interpret black power as a call for racial solidarity.

C. Black Power Ideology and the Choice of Leaders

Our respondents were asked to name "the single national or local leader who best expresses your views on relations between the races." This question, like the one on black power, was completely open ended. Table 11 displays the relationship for Negroes between the selection of various leaders and fair share or black unity interpretations of black power.

The list of leaders is arranged so that the percentage totals of respondents favoring black power are in descending order. The table seems to us to indicate the validity of our measure since respondents identifying with militant black leaders are the most favorably disposed towards black power while those choosing white leaders are least positive. In addition, the assumptions we made earlier about the meaning of the "black take-over" and "nothing" responses also seem warranted as individuals who identify with the least militant leaders most often give responses of this kind.

There are some more subtle differences revealed in this table. Negroes who felt best represented by black leaders other than the late Martin Luther King favored racial unity over fair share definitions of black power by a ratio of two to one. Dr. King's partisans, however, heavily emphasized fair share definitions. In addition, the likelihood of a favorable definition of black power is a direct function of the type of

TABLE 11.—PERCENTAGE OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER ACCORDING TO THEIR SELECTION OF A LEADER BEST REPRESENTING THEIR VIEWS ON RACE RELATIONS

Leader Best Representing Respondent*	Black Power Interpretation		
	Fair Share	+ Racial Unity	= Total
Militant Black Leaders (N=59)	26%	50%	76%
Robert F. Kennedy (N=17)	12%	47%	59%
Other Black Leaders, excluding Martin Luther King (N=107)	17%	34%	51%
"No One" (N=20)	10%	30%	40%
Martin Luther King (N=150)	28%	10%	38%
White leaders, excluding Robert F. Kennedy (N=30)	11%	13%	24%

* Question: What single national or local leader best expresses your views on relations between the races?

N's in parentheses are the bases for the calculation of percentages, i.e., persons giving don't know or no answer responses to the black power question were not used in the table.

Total N's for the categories on leadership are given in the explanations of the leader classifications below:

A *militant black leader* (N=61) is defined here as someone who unequivocally endorsed black power before the time of our interviewing (September, 1967). They include: Muhammed Ali (N=3); H. Rap Brown (N=9); Stokely Carmichael (N=15); State Senator James Del Rio (N=13); Dick Gregory (N=6); Floyd McKissick (N=3); Adam Clayton Powell (N=8); and Rev. Albert Cleage (N=4). Del Rio and Cleage are local figures.

Robert F. Kennedy (N=21).

Other black leaders, excluding Martin Luther King (N=111) mentioned were: Senator Edward Brooke (N=16); Ralph Bunche (N=3); U. S. Representative John Conyers (N=31); U. S. Representative Charles Diggs (N=17); Detroit Common Councilman Nicholas Hood (N=10); Detroit Urban League Head Francis Kornegay (N=1); Judge Thurgood Marshall (N=4); Carl Rowan (N=1); Roy Wilkins (N=17); State Senator Coleman Young (N=1); Whitney Young (N=5). Hood, Kornegay and C. Young are local figures.

"No One" (N=21).

Martin Luther King (N=165).

White Leaders, excluding Robert F. Kennedy (N=33), mentioned were: Senator Dirksen (N=1); President Eisenhower (N=1); TV Commentator Lou Gordon (N=1); Vice President Humphrey (N=1); President Johnson (N=14); President Kennedy (N=9); Walter Reuther (N=3); Governor Romney (N=3). Gordon is a local figure.

The total N=412. Of the remaining 49 individuals in our black sample, 27 could not answer the question and 22 mentioned their minister (no name given), coach or assorted persons (including themselves) we could not categorize with confidence on a leadership spectrum.

black leader selected. As a general rule, the more militant the leader who represents the respondent, the greater the chance of a positive orientation toward black power.

Over seventy-five percent of our Negro respondents chose a black leader who best represented their views, but there were white leaders selected as well and instances where the interviewee could make no selection. The number of respondents who could not name a leader is

small and we have divided them into two groups. "No one" is a category for individuals who decisively stated that they had no representative. This tiny group was often cynical about black power (and everything else) with over one-third saying that black power meant "nothing" to them. When they did define the slogan, however, black unity was the dominant theme. Another small group ($N = 25$) simply could not think of any person who represented them and they were also unlikely to answer the question about black power (i.e., they were coded in the don't know or no answer category on black power). These individuals were not visibly cynical about racial leaders or approaches; they were simply uninformed.

Thirty-one respondents identified with white leaders other than the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy. They were generally negative about black power, showing no meaningful preference for either positive interpretation. Over fifty percent of the black respondents who selected Senator Kennedy, however, gave favorable definitions of black power and they were disposed towards racial unity definitions of the term by a ratio of four to one. While the number of people who named Senator Kennedy is small, his importance as a link with the more militant elements in the black community should not be underestimated. The severing of this connection between the white and black worlds is a major tragedy. In the next phase of our research we will explore the impact of the deaths of both Kennedy and King on the beliefs of their followers.

D. Black Power Ideology: An Overview

Black power has no direct, generally accepted meaning, but the slogan still provokes strong responses from both blacks and whites. The power of all effective political slogans lies in "the emotional charges or valences they carry, the very elements that make cognitions dissonant or consonant," and in "their associative meanings, the very ambiguities that permit them, like Rorschach ink blots, to suggest to each person just what he wants to see in them."⁵¹ In their efforts to shape a meaning for black power, our black respondents have fallen back upon fundamental sets of beliefs which have spread throughout all sectors of their racial community. Many of those who share these beliefs may be unaware of their most profound implications, but the beliefs are consistently organized in the minds of our respondents primarily because they are securely focused on the issue of racial injustice in Amer-

ica, a problem faced by most blacks in one form or another virtually every day of their lives.

When Converse speaks of ideological thinking, of course, he usually refers to "belief systems that have relatively wide ranges and that allow some centrality to political objects."⁵² The racial ideology we have identified has a much narrower range. Given the limitations of our data, we cannot be sure that individuals holding a consistent racial ideology would also have consistent opinions about federal aid to education, or governmental measures designed to ensure full employment. Those with a racial ideology might be able to think in coherent ways only about questions of public policy which bear some relationship to the status of blacks in American society, but not about the general relationship between government and private business, or about America's relations with foreign countries.

The ideology of black power is not a wide ranging, highly elaborated, political world view. Nevertheless, the tone and quality of American political life in the latter 1960's was profoundly altered by the development of this belief system and its exceptionally wide diffusion among black Americans. In its radical form, as it is developing among our more disillusioned black respondents, the belief system includes doubts about the possibilities of realizing the goal of integration in the near future, sympathetic explanations of the July, 1967 disturbances in Detroit and a revolutionary label for them, selection of a militant leader as a spokesman, skepticism about improvements in the quality of life in the future, and a definition of black power which stresses the need for greater racial solidarity. This system of beliefs does not arm many of our respondents with concrete programs of social and economic reform, but in spite of its limited scope, its existence is of great potential significance. Its impressively wide diffusion is a striking indication of the growing mobilization and increasing sense of group identification within the black community.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Black power is a potent, meaningful slogan for most of our respondents. Some react with fear, others with cynicism, many with warm approval or strong disapproval, but in most cases reactions are intense and interpretations of the idea's meaning are related to an individual's basic orientation toward social and political problems. Whites have an overwhelmingly negative reaction to black power. The slogan is seen by most whites as an illegitimate, revengeful challenge. Among blacks, however, about forty-two

⁵¹ Robert E. Lane, *Political Thinking and Consciousness* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 316.

⁵² Converse, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-209.

percent of our sample see the term either as a call for equal treatment and a fair share for Negroes, or as an appeal for racial solidarity in the struggle against discrimination.

The partisans of black power among Negroes are somewhat younger than the rest of the black community, but neither their age nor other standard demographic factors, such as income, occupation, and education, are very helpful in explaining the distributions we have found. Sharp divisions exist within the Detroit black community, but they are not merely the result of a clash between young and old; instead, they represent a clash between those who have appropriated the cosmopolitan, secularized culture typical of the North and those whose social outlook and political attitudes are rooted in the paternalistic culture of the South. Approval for black power, as our analysis has shown, comes most often from those who were born or grew up in Detroit, are not members of churches, and have begun to doubt the trustworthiness of government in both Detroit and Washington.

Black power is the rallying cry of a generation of blacks whose fathers fled from the South to seek a new life in the "promised lands" of Detroit, New York, or Chicago. The move from the grinding poverty and overt oppression of the South to the cities of the North was seen as a great step forward by the original pioneers. But most of their children cannot be satisfied by these changes. In the words of Claude Brown:

The children of these disillusioned colored pioneers inherited the total lot of their parents—the disappointments, the anger. To add to their misery, they had little hope of deliverance. For where does one run to when he's already in the promised land?⁵³

This modern generation finds little compensation or hope in the evangelical, "old time religion" of their parents, nor do they share the traditional faith of Southern Negroes in the ultimate benevolence of white men. Many are distrustful of government, unimpressed with most of the civic notables and established political leaders of both the black and white communities, and increasingly pessimistic about their chances to achieve a satisfactory life in this country. They have not surrendered the ultimate aim of social equality and racial integration, but they have begun to doubt that the goal will be reached in the foreseeable future.

We encountered few racist, anti-white interpretations of black power among our black respondents and most of those came from respondents who were *not* sympathetic to black power.

There was chauvinism and some glorification of blackness, especially among those who interpret black power as a call for racial unity or solidarity, but most were pro-black rather than anti-white. Black unity definitions of black power are not disguised appeals for separation from American society; at least, not at the present moment. If insufficient progress toward racial accommodation is made in the future and tensions continue to mount, separatist sentiments might begin to spread within the black community. Today, we find, instead, a deep concern with the rights of and desires for respect within the American black community. These feelings are most eloquently expressed in the interpretation of black power given by one of our young respondents:

(black, male, 19, 12 grades) It means mostly equality. You know, to have power to go up to a person, you know, no matter what his skin color is and be accepted on the same level, you know, and it doesn't necessarily have to mean that you gotta take over everything and be a revolutionary and all this; just as long as people are going to respect you, you know, for what you are as a person and not, you know, what your skin color has to do with the thing.

Restraining ties with the traditional culture of the South are being steadily eroded as the percentage of blacks who were born and grew up in the North increases, the influence of the church wanes, and faith in the benevolence of paternalistic friends and allies weakens. The children born in Detroit since World War Two are coming of age politically in the midst of a social revolution. Events as diverse as the Detroit riot, the dominance of black athletes in every major American spectator sport, the collapse of colonial empires in Asia and Africa, the total integration of the American armed forces, and the murders of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy are all accelerating the break with traditional modes of thought and accommodation. The reservoir of potential supporters for black power is bound to grow.

The social revolution now in progress has resulted in a more unified, more highly mobilized black political community. Franklin Frazier's accommodating, apolitical "black bourgeoisie"⁵⁴ is rapidly disappearing as the sense of empathy and racial identification among the black middle class grows stronger. This developing racial community is profoundly restless and is searching for new forms of political expression and participation. The result of this search is likely

⁵⁴ E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: Free Press, 1957).

⁵³ Claude Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

TABLE 12.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS
FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER
ACCORDING TO THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
TAKE PART IN A RIOT

Would You Riot*	Percent Favorably Interpreting Black Power
No:	35% (262)
Yes:	57% (60)
Maybe:	69% (93)

* Question: Can you imagine any situation in which you would take part in a _____ (respondent's term for the events of July, 1967)?

to be increased activity of all kinds, both conventional and unconventional. Our data indicate a willingness to participate in political campaigns and elections on the part of even the most militant advocates of black power. Their involvement in this activity, however, would not preclude their taking part in other, more flamboyant, forms of protest.

No single, dominant tactical stance is likely to evolve among blacks; questions about the feasibility and utility of tactics are major sources of disagreement within the black community. Most of our black respondents, for example, believe the Detroit riots of 1967 were an understandable reaction to social injustice, and there is some sympathy for the individuals who actually did the rioting, but there is almost no approval of the sniping and fire bombing that took place. Extreme violence of this kind is presently thought of as a legitimate or useful expression of grievances by only a tiny minority of blacks in Detroit, but many others express considerable ambivalence about the utility of violent protests. For example, when we asked our black respondents, "Can you imagine any situation in which you would take part in a _____ (respondent's term for the events of July, 1967)?" a majority said no, but, as we can see in Table 12, respondents who expressed ambiva-

lence were even more supportive of black power than those who said they definitely would participate. This undecided group is a substantial proportion of our sample, they have made the sharpest break with traditional forms of social thought, they are the most sympathetic toward the black power ideology, and they are wavering.

The outcome of this search by blacks for acceptable modes of political expression will depend primarily on the behavior of whites, both those who control all the public and private institutions that matter, and the average citizens who must adjust to changes in prevailing customs. If Detroit's future is to be peaceful, ways must be found to pull down the barriers to equal opportunity which now exist, and there must be radical improvement in the prospects for personal advancement of the city's black population. Although success in these efforts depends, in large measure, on the flexibility and compassion of the whites, it also depends on the capacity of many public and private governmental institutions to mobilize the resources necessary to create a decent, livable, urban environment.

Some of the most important decisions about Detroit's future will not be made in the city, but in Washington, in suburban city halls, or in the state capitol in Lansing; the policies adopted by labor unions, businesses and manufacturers in the city will probably be more important than anything done by the officials of city government. This complex, decentralized system of social choice, with its elaborate checks and balances and its many barriers to radical change, will be faced during the next decade with an insistent challenge from a new generation of black Americans. To successfully meet their demands large efforts will have to be made toward the creation of a truly inter-racial society. Depending on the extent and success of these efforts, this new black generation could either become a persuasive and creative new influence within the democratic system, or a force bent on the violent disruption of American urban life.

DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ALIENATION*

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In recent years there has emerged in this country a radical questioning and rejection of established political institutions unparalleled since the Civil War in its intensity and scope. One objective indicator of this trend since World War II is the marked rise in voluntary renunciation of American citizenship, an act which represents the formal and final estrangement of the individual from his former political ties.¹ Available evidence suggests that estrangement from the polity is also widespread in countries throughout the world as fundamental questions are being raised about the legitimacy of political institutions and political leadership.

Attitudes toward the political system have long been a concern of political scientists. Major orienting theories of the political system suggest that citizen support plays a crucial role in determining the structure and processes of political systems. Almond and Verba, for example, use the concept "civic culture" to refer to a complex mix of attitudes and behaviors considered to be

conducive to democratic government.² Easton underscores the fundamental importance of attitudes for system stability, focusing especially on "diffuse support" as a prerequisite for the integration of political systems. He suggests that "(w)here the input of support falls below [a certain] minimum, the persistence of any kind of system will be endangered. A system will finally succumb unless it adopts measures to cope with the stress."³

The conversion of these general theoretical ideas into systematic empirical theory requires further rigorous and comprehensive analyses of types of citizen support and the development of empirical indicators for this domain.⁴ The concept of alienation, which may be conceived as one end of a continuum whose opposite extreme is defined by the concepts of support or integration, offers a useful vantage point from which to pursue this goal. The long history of intellectual concern with alienation has resulted in a literature rich in concepts and suggestive hypotheses which may provide a valuable perspective from which to develop an empirical theory relating citizen attitudes to the structures and processes of the political system.

I. DIMENSIONALIZING POLITICAL ALIENATION

There have been a number of recent theoretical and empirical efforts to explicate and clarify the concept of alienation.⁵ The most fruitful of

² Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

³ David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 220.

⁴ For an example of Easton's own concern with the operationalization of "support," see David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this REVIEW, LXI (March, 1967), 25-38. References to other empirical studies of support and alienation will be found in the footnotes to the present article; an extensive list of earlier studies is found in f. 4 of Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*

⁵ See, for example, Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), 783-791; Dwight Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 753-758; Lewis S. Feuer, "What Is Alienation:

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¹ While the motivations involved are unknown, renunciation of nationality appears to have strong content validity as a "hard" indicator of political estrangement. Formally recorded renunciations of nationality have increased consistently over the last two decades, from 149 in 1950 to 679 in 1968. (See *Annual Reports*, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice.) This represents almost a quadrupling of the rate, from .15 per 100,000 voting age population in 1950 to .57 per 100,000 voting age population in 1968.

these involve attempts to specify particular *modes* of alienation by identifying the essential meanings of this attitudinal orientation.⁶ This approach seeks to decompose a global concept into its component parts and thus may be referred to as one of *dimensionalization* of the concept. The research reported here utilizes this approach in developing concepts and measures of *political* alienation. In this respect it differs from most past efforts in that its focus is on attitudes which refer specifically to the institutions of government and the political process. Even when concerned with the specification of the mode of alienation, much previous research has been non-specific regarding the particular social institutions toward which such attitudes are directed. Since it has not been established, however, that alienation is normally an attitude which is either generalized over several modes or over a number of different social institutions, it would seem most useful to specify both the *mode* of alienation and the particular institutional *referent* in the operationalization of the concept. In this way, the actual extent of generalization, both as to mode and referent, can be determined by empirical investigation. In a sense, the present research "holds constant" the institutional referent of alienation by dealing only with attitudes toward aspects of the political system; the goal is to specify major modes of alienation directed toward this particular institutional sector.

The Career of a Concept," *New Politics*, 1 (Spring, 1962), 116-134; Arthur G. Neal and Salomon Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-Manual Workers," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (August, 1963), 599-608; Kenneth Keniston, *The Uncommitted* (New York: Dell, 1965), esp. pp. 449-476; and Charles J. Browning, *et al.*, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 780-781.

⁶See, especially, Seeman, *op. cit.*, and Neal and Rettig, *op. cit.* In his stimulating discussion, Keniston uses the term "mode" to express whether alienation is manifest as an attempt to change society (alloplastic) or is, rather, directed inwardly toward change in the individual himself (autoplastic). Keniston, *op. cit.* Although the behavioral expression of alienation is of obvious relevance to a theory of political alienation, it seems to me that it does not need to be made part of the definition of the concept itself but might be treated as a separate variable whose relation to the *attitude* of alienation is conditioned by other variables such as the opportunities for social change present in the system, or certain psychological characteristics of the individual.

It is useful to distinguish at least four different ways in which alienation toward the polity may be expressed.⁷

1) "Political powerlessness" may be defined as an individual's feeling that he cannot affect the actions of the government, that the "authoritative allocation of values for the society," which is at the heart of the political process, is not subject to his influence. Political decisions, which determine to a great extent the conditions under which the individual lives, may appear to be *happening to* individuals who feel powerless, independent of or in spite of their own judgment or wishes. This mode of alienation is closely related (inversely) to the concept of "political efficacy," which has achieved such prominence in studies of voting behavior.⁸

2) "Political meaninglessness" may be said to exist to the extent that political decisions are perceived as being unpredictable. A perceived random pattern of decision making would, of course, prevent an understanding of the political system. This mode of alienation is distinguished from the first in that in the case of powerlessness decisions may be clear and predictable, but are simply not subject to the influence of the individual; in the case of meaninglessness, however, the individual perceives no discernible pattern. This feeling is illustrated by an individual's inability to distinguish any meaningful political choices, and the sense that political choices are themselves meaningless, because one cannot predict their probable outcomes nor, consequently, use them to change social conditions.

3) Following Durkheim's use of "anomie," which denotes a devaluation of social norms regulating individual behavior, "perceived political normlessness" is defined as the individual's perception that the norms or rules intended to

⁷The concepts of "powerlessness," "meaninglessness," and "isolation," used here are based on Seeman's discussion of their generic types; the present discussion specifies how these modes of alienation relate to *political* institutions. The concept of "normlessness" developed here departs from the meaning attached to this term by Seeman. In addition to these four types, Seeman also discusses a type of alienation identified as "self-estrangement." The sense in which this type of alienation can be said to have an institutional referent is unclear.

⁸See especially the work emanating from the University of Michigan studies, most notably Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

govern political relations have broken down, and that departures from prescribed behavior are common. A belief that officials violate legal procedures in dealing with the public or in arriving at policy decisions exemplifies this mode of alienation.

4) "Political isolation" refers to a rejection of political norms and goals that are widely held and shared by other members of a society. It differs from perceived normlessness in which there is implicit *acceptance* of some set of norms from which *others* are perceived to be deviating. Political isolation can be illustrated by a belief that voting or other socially defined political obligations are merely conformist formalities, or, indeed, that public participation is inappropriate in the formulation of public policy. This type of alienation is consistent with Lane's description of alienated individuals as feeling that "the rules of the game are unfair, loaded, illegitimate; the Constitution is, in some sense, fraudulent."⁹ To the extent that social norms are dynamic, however, a state of isolation at one point in time may entail a different attitude set than isolation at another time. Similarly, to the extent that social norms differ from culture to culture, alienation in this mode can only be understood with reference to the prevailing normative patterns of particular societies.

Conceptual dimensionalization of an attitudinal domain implies a set of hypotheses about the relationships among empirical measures of the various dimensions. Although some previous work on alienation has demonstrated separate dimensions empirically,¹⁰ studies using measures with direct *political* relevance frequently *assume* the existence of separate attitudinal dimensions without actually providing evidence to substantiate this assumption.¹¹ The present study pur-

sues this line of inquiry further by exploring the dimensionality of attitudes toward the political system. If the hypothesis that distinct modes of political alienation exist can be substantiated, then it would seem imperative that future discussions of attitudinal support for political systems specify the sense in which "support" or "alienation" is being used, and consider the likelihood that different modes of support or alienation may be differentially related to other theoretically important variables.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF MEASURES

The data used in this study are derived from interviews collected from a nation-wide probability sample in the United States in early 1960. A description of sampling procedures has been published elsewhere.¹² Twenty-six questions, whose manifest content was judged related to the political alienation domain, were examined to determine their dimensionality. These items arranged according to their final allocation to two scales of political alienation, are presented in Table 1.

The matrix of intercorrelations among these questions, arranged in a linked-simplex structure in which the largest correlations appear along the main diagonal, is presented as Table 2. This method of displaying the data has the advantage that "the factorial structure of a matrix may be anticipated quite directly by looking at the arrangement of correlations of variables."¹³

Aberbach reports that factor analysis confirmed the dimensionality of several different measures of alienation, including two measures of political alienation. He does not report the factor loadings, although he describes them as "strong." His data support the utility of considering specific types of political alienation separately. See Joel Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," this REVIEW, LXIII (March, 1969), 86-99. Two recent articles dealing with support for particular political institutions also use factor analytic techniques to dimensionalize attitudes. See Jack Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," this REVIEW, LX (September, 1966), 600-615 and G. R. Boynton, S.C. Patterson and R. D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XI (May, 1968), 163-180.

¹² See Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 519-523. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Neither Professors Almond nor Verba nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

¹³ Edgar F. Borgatta, "On Analyzing Correlation

⁹ Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 162.

¹⁰ See Neal and Rettig, *op. cit.*; the same authors' "On the Multidimensionality of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (February, 1967), 54-64; and Elmer L. Struening and Arthur H. Richardson, "A Factor Analytic Exploration of the Alienation, Anomie and Authoritarianism Domain," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 768-776.

¹¹ See for example, Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *Journal of Politics*, 23 (August, 1961), and Kenneth Janda, "A Comparative Study of Political Alienation and Voting Behavior in Three Suburban Communities," in *Studies in History and the Social Sciences* (Normal: Illinois State University, 1965), pp. 53-68. However, in a recent publication, Aber-

TABLE 1. QUESTIONS USED AS MEASURES OF POLITICAL ALIENATION*

Component I: "Political Powerlessness"

- 13a. If you wanted to discuss political and governmental affairs, are there some people you definitely wouldn't turn to—that is, people with whom you feel it is better not to discuss such topics? About how many people would you say there are with whom you would avoid discussing politics? (*discuss with no one*)
14. Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. In general, do you *agree* or disagree with that?
15. How do you feel about this? Thinking of the important national and international issues facing the country, how well do you think you can understand these issues? (*not at all*)
16. How about local issues in this town or part of the country? How well do you understand them? (*not at all*)
23. If you made an effort to change this regulation, how likely is it that you would succeed? (hypothetical local regulation considered to be "very unjust or harmful") (*not at all likely*)
24. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually try to do something about it? (local regulation) (*not at all likely*)
27. If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed? (hypothetical national law considered to be "very unjust or harmful") (*not at all likely*)
28. If such a case arose, how likely is it you would actually try to do something about it? (national law) (*not at all likely*)
- 31a. Thinking now about the national government in Washington, about how much effect do you think its activities, the laws passed and so on, have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect, or *none*?
- 32a. Now take the local government: about how much effect do you think its activities have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect, or *none*?
- 72f. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. (*Agree-Disagree*)

Component II: "Perceived Political Normlessness"

- 18a. One sometimes hears that some people or groups have so much influence over the way the government is run that the interests of the majority are ignored. Do you *agree* or disagree that there are such groups?
- 31b. On the whole, do the activities of the national government tend to improve conditions in this country, or would we be *better off without them*?
- 32b. On the whole, do the activities of the local government tend to improve conditions in this area, or would we be *better off without them*?
34. Suppose there were some question that you had to take to a government office—for example, a tax question or housing regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment? I mean, would you be treated as well as anyone else? (*No*)
35. If you explained your point of view to the officials, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay only a little attention, or would they *ignore* what you had to say?
- 37a. If you had some trouble with the police—a traffic violation, maybe, or being accused of a minor offense—do you think you would be given equal treatment? That is, would you be treated as well as anyone else? (*No*)
- 37b. If you explained your point of view to the police, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay only a little attention, or would they *ignore* what you had to say?
51. The Republican party now controls the administration in Washington. Do you think that its policies and activities would ever seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this *probably would happen*, that it might happen, or that it probably wouldn't happen?
52. If the Democratic party were to take control of the government, how likely is it that it would seri-

* Question numbers refer to the original interview schedule as reported in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Appendix B. Code categories were arranged to represent assumed ascending degrees of political alienation, the highest point of which is underlined for each question.

TABLE 1 (Continued)

ously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this *would probably happen*, that it might happen, or that it probably wouldn't happen?

72d. All candidates sound good in their speeches, but you can never tell what they will do after they are elected. (*Agree—Disagree*)

Items Omitted

45. Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think? Is it needed or would we be *better off without it*?

46. Do you ever get angry at some of the things that go on in election campaigns? Do you *often* get angry, do you sometimes get angry, or do you never get angry?

47. Do you ever find election campaigns to be pleasant and enjoyable? Do you *often*, do you sometimes, or do you *never* find them pleasant and enjoyable?

48. Do you ever find election campaigns silly or ridiculous? Do you *often*, sometimes, or never find them silly or ridiculous?

72a. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country. (*Agree—Disagree*)

The scales used in this research resulted from an interplay between factor and item analysis techniques which are described here in summary fashion. The matrix of correlation coefficients among alienation measures was analyzed by the principal components method.¹⁴ Eight components with eigenvalues above 1.0 were extracted. The simplex arrangement of the matrix suggested two distinct dimensions.¹⁵ However, in order to allow for the possible emergence of a third component of items with unclear relations to the two dominant clusters, the first three components extracted were retained for rotation by the Varimax criterion. The initial three-component solution was judged to be unacceptable for its poor approximation to simple structure.¹⁶ The pattern of loadings suggested that rotation to two components might yield a clearer solution. This was indeed the case. These results, combined with the item analysis data, isolated

five items which were of questionable relation to these dominant components, and they were eliminated.¹⁷ A second principal-components analysis was performed on the remaining twenty-one items. Seven components with eigenvalues above 1.0 were found; the first two were clearly dominant (4.3 and 2.0) while the remaining values dropped rapidly (1.4, 1.3, 1.2, and 1.0). Because of their clarity and strength, the first two components were retained for rotation, resulting in the pattern displayed in Table 3. This solution was accepted as a satisfactory approximation to simple structure. All of the items are clearly associated with one of the two major components.

The manifest content of the eleven items constituting the first component strongly suggests the "powerlessness" dimension of alienation described above. As stipulated in the a

Matrices: Some New Emphases," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXII (Winter, 1958-59), p. 523.

¹⁴For a comparison of the components and factor models see Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), Chapter 8.

¹⁵Questions 24, 28, 27, 23, 15, 16, 72f and 14 compose one strong cluster, each having a correlation of .3 or higher with at least one other variable in the cluster, and Questions 37b, 35, 34, 37a, 32b, 31b, 51, and 52 form a weaker but identifiable second cluster.

¹⁶See L. L. Thurstone, *Multiple Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 335, and J. P. Guilford, *Psychometric Methods* (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 508.

¹⁷Specifically, the results of the two-component, twenty-six item solution demonstrated that (a) Qs. 45 and 72a had weak loadings on *both* components, and (b) Q. 46 loaded *negatively* on its dominant component. To investigate further the structure of the items, Qs. 46 and 72a were eliminated, and two scales were formed using a cluster scoring procedure. Item analyses (based on response choice-total scale biserial correlations) indicated that Qs. 46, 47, and 48 were only weakly related to the dominant content of their scales. Since all three of these questions concerned attitudes toward election campaigns (as did Q. 45, which was eliminated because of its weak loadings), it seemed reasonable to conclude that the domain tapped by these questions was essentially different from that of the other items and all were eliminated.

TABLE 2.—ARRANGED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR 26 ALIENATION

Q.No.	24	28	27	23	15	16	72f	14	72d	18a	37b	35	34	37a	32b	31b	51
28	53																
27	33	49															
23	47	36	49														
15	34	42	34	29													
16	31	30	19	20	46												
72f	24	27	32	29	29	22											
14	13	15	16	13	37	21	26										
72d	09	13	13	05	19	13	21	22									
18a	-07	-08	-01	-02	-02	-01	09	13	19								
37b	16	12	11	21	14	15	19	17	12	18							
35	14	16	20	20	17	11	23	12	11	11	39						
34	12	09	10	14	10	07	16	08	11	11	27	36					
37a	11	09	05	11	11	14	17	09	07	10	38	19	38				
32b	15	11	13	15	17	14	18	11	08	02	24	19	14	16			
31b	16	13	12	15	18	13	18	14	10	03	18	19	16	15	39		
51	05	09	14	10	09	04	16	07	15	05	13	16	14	14	08	15	
52	06	07	07	05	06	04	15	05	10	06	08	14	07	10	08	09	4
47	17	20	18	18	19	17	17	12	14	02	10	13	05	06	11	09	0
45	11	08	10	11	14	07	19	11	12	03	13	13	04	06	17	14	0
31a	23	24	21	19	29	18	24	14	10	-08	07	13	08	00	11	08	-0
32a	16	16	19	16	23	20	16	14	06	-05	07	08	00	-01	18	11	-0
46	-20	-20	-13	-14	-18	-19	-08	00	-01	18	-01	01	02	-04	00	-03	0
48	01	-05	-06	00	-05	00	-05	06	04	09	11	06	05	07	10	08	0
13a	14	13	10	13	25	21	19	13	10	-01	08	07	03	08	11	07	0
72a	03	-01	00	03	-09	03	02	00	-03	-01	06	03	00	03	08	05	-0

* Decimals have been omitted. N=970. Correlations of .06 are significant at the .05 level; correlations of .05 or less are not significant. Data were coded as the mean of continua or the mode of dichotomies.

priori description of this dimension, the defining items (15, 23, 24, 27, and 28) refer to the individual's ability to understand important national and international issues facing the country, his propensity to do something about either a local regulation or a national law that he thinks unjust, and his subjective assessment of the efficacy of such efforts. Other items (14, 16, and 72f) share similar content, relating to the individual's ability to understand and affect the political process. Two of the items (31a and 32a) tap the respondent's understanding of the multifarious effects of government on the lives of citizens. Question 13a measures a fear or shunning of political discussion, which indicates a feeling of low ability to cope with the political environment. These interpretations support the identification of the first component as "political powerlessness."

The defining items of the second component are 34, 35, 37a, and 37b. These questions refer to the treatment expected by the individual from two different governmental agencies. These questions appear to assume a norm of equal and considerate treatment of citizens by government officials, and may be considered to refer ultimately to the legal norm represented by the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.¹⁸ Lack of congruence between this norm and actual behavior may be considered as an indication of deterioration in the normative structure. Accordingly, the *subjective* assessment of the existence of this state can be interpreted as a condition of "perceived normlessness." That is, the individual who thinks that he would receive unequal treat-

¹⁸ Consistent with this interpretation, Almond and Verba report that these questions were intended to measure the "qualities our respondents imputed to the executive side of government." *Op. cit.*, p. 106. At a different point in their analysis, however (see especially Chapter 8), they use these questions as measures of "administrative competence," which might be construed as a sub-type of *powerlessness*. There is clearly some conceptual overlap here. Although a sense of departure from community norms is being used in the present study to define "perceived normlessness," it is obvious that, when the particular norm in question refers to the role the individual should play in his interactions with political decision-makers, assessments of norm deviations may also reflect feelings of powerlessness. That items 34, 35, 37a, and 37b have quite low loadings on the factor that is here called "powerlessness" increases confidence that their interpretation in terms of role expectations and norm deviations is more adequate than an interpretation using the powerlessness concept.

TABLE 3.—ROTATED COMPONENT STRUCTURE OF TWENTY-ONE ALIENATION ITEMS

Question	Content	Component I	Component II
28	Likelihood of action to change unjust national law	.69	.08
15	Understanding of national and international issues	.68	.13
24	Likelihood of action to change unjust local regulation	.66	.08
27	Perceived efficacy of efforts to change national law	.62	.11
23	Perceived efficacy of efforts to change local regulation	.60	.16
31a	Effect of national government on daily life	.56	-.07
16	Understanding of local issues	.54	.11
32a	Effect of local government on daily life	.49	-.09
72f	People like me have no say about government activities	.47	.34
14	Politics and government are too complicated for average man	.35	.24
13a	Extent of avoidance of political discussions	.34	.08
37b	Consideration to point of view by police	.14	.62
37a	Treatment by police	.03	.59
34	Treatment in government office	.05	.59
35	Consideration of point of view by officials	.18	.57
51	Prudence of Republican party policies	.02	.49
52	Prudence of Democratic party policies	-.01	.42
31b	Benefit deriving from national government activities	.22	.40
18a	Elite vs. majority rule	-.16	.39
32b	Benefit deriving from local government activities	.24	.38
72d	Reliability of candidates for public office	.19	.31

ment is making this judgment with reference to a state of affairs that he thinks *should* exist because it is affirmed by the political culture.

Another pair of questions (51 and 52) that load highly on this second component ask for the respondent's judgment as to the likelihood that the policies of either of the major political parties would endanger the country's welfare when that party is in control of the government. These questions refer to a set of norms about the role of political parties. This role includes the expectation that the parties will act with a degree of patriotism, judgment, and knowledge that will ensure the country's security and well-being. Failure to comply with these expectations would likely be perceived as a normative violation of great magnitude. Similar reasoning may be applied to items 31b and 32b. If the effects of governmental actions are such that the public would be better off without them, norms specifying that such activity be in the national wel-

fare will be perceived as having been violated. The remaining two items of the second component (18a and 72d), which concern the influence of people and groups on government actions and the reliability and trustworthiness of elected officials, can also be taken as measures of cynical feelings regarding compliance with certain widely held ideals and norms of the political culture.

Although we do not have a direct measure of the extent to which the norms referred to here are in fact shared, some measure of their importance is indicated by Almond and Verba's finding that, when respondents were asked to mention the "things about this country that you are most proud of," 85% of Americans mentioned aspects of the political system such as the Constitution, political freedom, or democracy. These sources of pride are all strongly associated with the norms of equality, responsibility, and responsiveness which have been suggested here as providing the point of reference for answers to the questions constituting this component. In no other country studied did even as many as half of the respondents mention political characteristics as a source of pride.¹⁹ Because the main theme shared by these questions appears to be the extent to which political leaders and government officials observe important norms of the political culture, the second component is called "perceived political normlessness." The stipulation of normlessness as "perceived" is meant to indicate that the respondent *himself* does not necessarily feel anomie, but rather that he believes that frequent deviations from accepted norms occur *in the political process*. In this sense, this concept is related to the concept of "political cynicism," since the questions used to measure cynicism all appear to have either a legal or an informal norm as an implied referent against which respondents are asked to judge the behavior of politicians.²⁰ It may be a more fruitful concept in that whereas "cynicism" has no apparent theoretical roots, "perceived normlessness" has theoretical ties in the alienation framework and in the Durkheim-Merton-inspired theories of anomie, in which the term is used to signify a devitalization of social norms.²¹

Each respondent was assigned a score on each of the two dimensions of alienation on the basis of his responses to the questions discussed above. A cluster scoring procedure, in which each item is assigned uniquely to the scale on which it has its highest loading, was used. The internal consistency reliability coefficients of the powerlessness and perceived normlessness scales were .77 and .62 respectively.²² Both measures were approximately normally distributed, with a slight positive skew in the perceived normlessness scale. In the interests of greater reliability, a modification in the original sample was made consisting in the elimination of 102 cases for which there were serious data gaps.²³ All analy-

"perceived political normlessness." Inkeles defines political anomie as the individual's *feeling* that others are not complying with the rules of society, and operationalizes it as "the individual's *perception* of the extent to which politicians and government officials pay attention to the common man, serve the public rather than their own careers, and keep their campaign promises after the election." Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969), p. 1125. Emphasis in original. The content of the first and third of Inkeles' defining questions is essentially the same as Qs. 18a and 72d of the perceived political normlessness scale.

²² The Hoyt method was used. See Cyril J. Hoyt and Clayton L. Stunkard, "Estimation of Test Reliability for Unrestricted Item Scoring Methods," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 12 (1952), 756-758.

²³ Since multivariate techniques assume a constant N, some procedures had to be adopted to eliminate missing data. The entire sample of 970 was used for the component analyses reported above, with "Not Ascertained" or "Don't Know" cases coded the middle position of continuous variables or the modal position of dichotomies. Once scale composition was determined, cases were excluded from the analysis if more than one-third of the questions comprising either of the dependent variables had missing responses or if information was missing on a major socioeconomic status variable, i.e., occupation or income, since these were known to have important effects on alienation (there were no missing data for education, place of birth, or race). The two-thirds present criterion for the dependent variables was somewhat arbitrary. It seemed likely that with more than one-third of the items missing, there would be a relatively high probability of misrepresenting the respondent's true attitude. Conversely, a more stringent criterion would have eliminated a great

¹⁹ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

²⁰ See Agger, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 479, for a list of the questions used.

²¹ See especially Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 131-194. Another related concept inspired by Durkheim's analysis of anomie has recently been discussed by Inkeles, who develops the concept of "political anomie" along lines which are strikingly similar to those defining

ses which follow are based on the refined sample of 868 cases.

The examination of the meanings of each of the questions in the two scales suggests that the scales have content validity as measures of the concepts of political powerlessness and perceived political normlessness. The establishment of these two distinct measures of alienation should aid in future theoretical clarification of the concept and in the development of more specific hypotheses relating alienation to various personal characteristics and social conditions. As a step toward this goal, the relationships between these two scales of alienation and a variety of other variables are explored below. Since the two scales are only weakly related ($r = .26$, indicating only 7% shared variance), we can reasonably expect that the two dimensions of alienation will be *differentially* related to other variables. If the strength or the direction of the relationships between the measures of alienation and various social and psychological variables are significantly different, then the utility of the dimensional approach will be further substantiated.

III. CORRELATES OF TWO DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ALIENATION

The analyses reported below are directed to the question of the sources of political alienation. In previous studies many different variables have been shown to be associated with one or another type of alienation. Most studies, however, have considered only a limited number of variables and thus the literature is replete

many more cases. These procedures resulted in 119 exclusions, accounted for by 102 individuals. An analysis designed to ascertain the effects of excluding these 102 cases on the representativeness of the sample indicated that the revised sample generally corresponded more closely than the original to a number of census distributions. This was because missing data cases tended to have demographic characteristics similar to those which were overrepresented in the original sample. This finding and the great likelihood of unreliability in attempting to score the missing data cases were primary factors in the decision to remove these cases from the analysis. For a more detailed discussion of some problems raised by missing data and a consideration of alternative methods of handling it, as well as a detailed description of the procedures followed in the elimination of cases reported here, see Ada W. Finifter, *Dimensions of Political Alienation: A Multivariate Analysis*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1967, pp. 60-70.

with demonstrations of bivariate relationships between measures of alienation and various personal characteristics. In the present study an attempt is made to consider a wide variety of variables simultaneously, and to evaluate their relative importance in multivariate models. In this way the development of parsimonious theory may be advanced.

Zero-order Pearson correlations among all variables are presented in Table 4.²⁴ For conceptual clarity, the independent variables are arranged in three groups, corresponding to the general concepts of (1) social status, which includes religion, nativity, race, sex, age, education, occupation, and income; (2) social cohesion, which includes marital status, number of children, years of residence in the community where the individual lives, frequency of church attendance, number of organizations to which the respondent belongs, whether the respondent was ever an officer in any of these organizations, an index of political participation, party identification, strength of party identification, and an index of faith in people; and (3) geo-cultural environment, including size of community and region of residence. Codes for all variables are presented in the Appendix.

The zero-order relationships between powerlessness and social status reported here are consistent with the findings of several previous studies which used different indicators of alienation.²⁵ In addition, the Survey Research

²⁴ Bivariate plots between each predictor variable and each alienation scale showed no significant departures from linearity. The relationship between age and powerlessness was the only one which was very slightly curvilinear, with the youngest age group (18-25) having as high a mean powerlessness score as the 41-50 age group, but not nearly as high as that of the oldest group. This result confirms neither previous findings of a linear relationship between these variables, reported by several investigators, nor those findings indicating extreme curvilinearity, with the youngest being more alienated than any other age group. See W. E. Thompson and J. E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces*, 38 (March, 1960), 190-195.

²⁵ For example, see Agger, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 484-487; Russell Middleton, "Alienation, Race, and Education," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (December, 1963), 973-977; John Haer, "Social Stratification in Relation to Attitudes Toward Sources of Power," *Social Forces*, 35 (December, 1956), 137-142; and Richard Quinney, "Political Conservatism, Alienation, and Fatalism," *Sociometry*, 27 (September, 1964), 372-381. My review of previous studies intentionally omits those using Srole's

TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS AMONG DIMENSIONS OF ALIENATION, SOCIAL STATUS, SOCIAL COHESION

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 Powerlessness															
2 Normlessness	.26														
3 Jewish	-.09	-.02													
4 Catholic	.01	-.03	b												
5 Protestant	.02	.03	b	b											
6 Nativity	-.07	.10	-.13	-.20	.26										
7 Race	.14	.22	-.07	-.10	.10	.08									
8 Sex	.12	-.08	-.02	-.01	.06	.03	.00								
9 Age	.12	.01	.02	-.02	.02	-.17	-.09	-.08							
10 Education	-.44	-.16	.12	-.01	-.06	.16	-.18	.07	-.35						
11 Occupation	-.32	-.12	.20	-.03	-.08	.08	-.20	-.03	.03	.48					
12 Income	-.31	-.18	.13	.06	-.09	.03	-.28	-.06	-.21	.42	.31				
13 Marital Status	-.08	-.03	.05	-.02	.03	-.07	-.05	-.08	-.06	-.00	-.03	.25			
14 Number of Children	.07	.04	-.03	-.04	.06	.02	.02	.02	.17	-.23	-.15	-.11	.24		
15 Years Residence	.03	-.01	.02	.04	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.00	.35	-.16	-.05	-.11	-.04	.06	
16 Church Attendance	-.17	-.11	-.10	.17	.15	.08	.03	.10	.03	.06	.03	.01	.03	.04	.05
17 Organizations	-.38	-.13	.09	.01	-.00	.08	-.08	-.18	.06	.34	.34	.30	.02	-.07	.06
18 Officership	-.31	-.13	.06	-.10	.09	.08	-.05	-.02	.05	.27	.24	.20	.08	-.03	.06
19 Pol. Participation	-.64	-.10	.10	-.02	-.03	.06	-.15	-.23	.11	.38	.39	.30	.04	-.03	.01
20 Party ID	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.11	.14	.07	-.07	-.03	.06	.12	.15	.06	-.05	-.07	.01
21 ID Strength	-.10	-.07	-.01	.02	-.06	-.02	.08	.01	-.19	-.02	-.04	.01	.01	.09	.16
22 Faith in People	-.37	-.37	-.01	.03	.02	.01	-.22	.05	-.09	.32	.19	.29	.06	-.05	-.06
23 Community Size	-.01	.05	.20	.17	-.23	-.12	.04	.04	-.15	.15	.09	.21	-.05	-.22	-.08
24 Northeast	-.09	-.06	.15	.24	-.28	-.08	-.06	-.04	-.01	.08	.05	.13	-.03	-.05	.05
25 South	.09	.08	-.09	-.24	.28	.10	.14	.06	-.01	-.15	-.06	-.20	.02	.07	-.05

^a Decimals are omitted. N = 868. Correlations of .06 are significant at the .05 level; correlations of .08 are significant at the .01 level.

^b These dummy variables were constructed from answers to the same item.

Center studies have found consistently that the political efficacy scale (the inverse of powerlessness) is positively related to being male, and to education, income, and occupation.²⁶ Within the cluster of status measures used in the present study, education is by far the single most important predictor of powerlessness, accounting for 19% of the total variance. Because of the important effects of education on job and income opportunities, it is likely that education also has important indirect effects through its influence on occupation and income, each of which is also fairly strongly related to powerlessness. However, since income level of the parental home is an important determinant of the level of education achieved by the respondent, it is difficult to reject the economic determinism hypothesis without more information on socio-economic background than is available in this study. These data do demonstrate, however, that in a contemporaneous prediction of powerlessness, education is a far more important variable than income. Nevertheless, income and occupation each independently explain about 9% of the variance in powerlessness scores. In contrast, income accounts for only about 3% and occupation for about 1% of the variance in normlessness.

Race is another measure of general social status found to be related to indicators of alienation in previous studies.²⁷ In each case, Negroes are more highly alienated than whites. In the present study, although race seems to be of some slight importance in predicting powerlessness ($r = .14$, $r^2 = .02$), its relationship to this form of alienation is essentially a function of education: when educational attainment is

controlled, the strength of the relationship between race and powerlessness drops to less than one-fourth of its initial potency ($r = .067$, $r^2 = .004$). Given similar educational achievement, Negroes apparently feel hardly any more powerlessness concerning the political process than do whites. Moreover, considering that Negroes as a group are less well-educated than whites, that they generally hold lower prestige occupational positions, and that they earn less income, the zero-order correlation between race and powerlessness is perhaps smaller than one would expect.

The low correlation between powerlessness and race contrasts with the stronger effects of race in the case of normlessness. Even when income and education (the two next most powerful status predictors of normlessness) are both held constant, race maintains most of its original explanatory power, with the second order partial reduced only to .175. In contrast, the corresponding second order partial for race and powerlessness is an insignificant .035. This difference means that, given similar achievement status, ascriptive racial status is not important as a cause of political powerlessness, but it does remain an important cause of perceived normlessness. However, since it is obviously more difficult for Negroes to attain that same achieved status, this type of statistical controlling procedure is in danger of being misleading except as it points out possible effects of social change. That is, the implication of these findings is that if opportunities for educational and material advancement were equal, it is likely that Negroes would feel no more powerless than whites. In contrast, race *would* remain the most powerful status variable in determining the perception that public officials commonly violate community norms. Indeed, of all the independent variables considered, race is second in power only to the measure of faith in people for explaining normlessness, and even with this measure of inter-personal trust controlled, race still has a significant effect on normlessness ($r = .16$).

Another ascribed characteristic correlated with perceived normlessness is sex: men perceive norm violations somewhat more frequently than do women. This is the more interesting in view of the fact that women feel more powerless than men. The differential relationship between sex and the two dimensions of alienation indicates the contemporary persistence of the political role traditionally assigned to women. The present findings indicate that many women feel they have little capacity to affect the political system, yet they are less critical of it than are

anomia scale as a measure of alienation. The heavy emphasis on personal life situations in the Srole scale suggests that it may largely measure personal disorganization or maladjustment rather than attitudes toward aspects of social structure. The two may be related, but this is an empirical rather than definitional question, and the indiscriminate use of the Srole scale as a *de facto* measure of "alienation" serves mainly to confuse these concepts. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that anomia and some measures of alienation are independent dimensions. See the articles cited in note 10.

²⁶ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), pp. 190-192; Campbell, et al., *The American Voter*, op. cit., pp. 516-520.

²⁷ See, for example, Middleton, op. cit. and Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, op. cit.

men. This is an important aspect of what has been called the "subject" political orientation.²⁸

Nativity, another ascribed characteristic, also has divergent effects on the two types of alienation. Whereas foreign-born respondents are likely to feel somewhat more powerless than the native-born (and the Southern European feels even more powerless than the northern European), we find that the opposite is true for perceived normlessness. That American birth is associated with lower levels of powerlessness is explicable by the higher educational attainment of native-born citizens, since education decreases feelings of powerlessness. Why then should American birth be associated with *increased* perceptions of normlessness? It will be noted that the nativity ranking orders native-born Americans highest, those born in Northern or Western Europe second, and those born in Southern Europe, or in other areas of the world, lowest.²⁹ This ranking clearly corresponds also to one of similarity of the political system of the country of origin and that of the United States. Similarity of these political systems is likely to be related to greater knowledge of the American system. The reason for the correlation between nativity and perceived normlessness may then lie in the fact that those with greater knowledge of and familiarity with the American political system would be more apt to perceive the norm deviations which do, in fact, occur, than would those to whom the political structure is less familiar.³⁰ Another possible explanation for this finding may lie in the bases from which these judgments are made. The native-born American probably has the highest expectations regarding the behavior of public officials, rooted in an idealized orientation toward government and authority common in public schooling. Violations of this textbook image may thus evoke more negative responses (as in a frustration-aggression reaction). The political culture of the Southern European, to take the other extreme, tends to stress a more realistic and a more cynical image of the workings of government.³¹

²⁸ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapters 1 and 8.

²⁹ The ranking of ethnic prestige follows Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1954), p. 407.

³⁰ Litt found that familiarity with Boston politics (as measured by length of residency in that city) increases political cynicism. Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May 1963), 312-323.

³¹ For descriptions of attitudes toward authority in different political systems see Almond and

Given their lower expectations, persons socialized in this type of political culture might therefore be more tolerant of what they may perceive to be the far less frequent occurrence of norm violations in their adopted country.³²

In summary, then, the relationships between the social status characteristics and each of the two dimensions of political alienation differ in several important respects. In particular, Negroes tend to have higher scores on the measure of perceived normlessness than do whites, while the difference between the races on the measure of powerlessness is of much less importance. Both nativity and sex have opposite effects on the two types of alienation. Women tend to feel more powerless than men but less often perceive norm violations. The native-born, in general, feel less powerless than the foreign-born, but the foreign-born are less critical of the operations of the political system.

It is clear that important differences exist also in the effects of various aspects of social cohesion on the two kinds of political alienation. Political participation has a very high negative correlation with feelings of political powerlessness ($r = -.64$), alone accounting for 41% of its variance.³³ The "faith in people" scale, de-

Verba, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapters 4 and 14; Lawrence Wylie, *Village in the Vauchuse* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), Chapter 10; and David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (1962), 229-246. Easton and Hess comment particularly on the idealization of authority encouraged in American socialization practices.

³² Then, too, it is possible that the foreign-born may be more hesitant to make statements critical of American government to an American interviewer. Since the items in the normlessness scale tend to focus on government officials they may be more threatening in this respect than the items in the powerlessness scale, which may be perceived more in terms of the respondent's own shortcomings.

³³ Although a significant correlation between political participation and powerlessness was expected on theoretical grounds, its magnitude prompted re-examination of the scales to explore the possibility of a spurious effect caused by similarity of some of their questions. Questions 24 and 28 of the powerlessness scale asked for the likelihood that the respondent *would actually try* to do something about a national law or local regulation that he thought unjust. Questions 25 and 29, used in the participation scale, asked if the respondent had actually *ever done* anything to try to influence a national or local decision. The first set is

signed to measure a person's "global attitude toward human nature,"³⁴ also has a strong inverse correlation with feelings of powerlessness ($r = -.37$). Since the faith in people scale is a measure of interpersonal trust in social relations it is understandable that it should be related to

an almost classic operationalization of the definition of an attitude as a predisposition to behavior. Questions 25 and 29, however, ask for reports on *actual behavior*. Thus, the four questions are legitimately placed in their respective scales of *attitude* toward the political system and *actual participation* in it. Nevertheless, in order to avoid any possibility of spuriousness, the powerlessness scale was reconstructed without questions 24 and 28. The reliability of this new scale dropped from .77 to .71 because of the loss of the two items, which had been very highly correlated with the other items of the scale. However, contrary to the spuriousness hypothesis, the correlation between the participation scale and the *new* powerlessness scale dropped only to $-.60$ (from $-.64$). Since the decrease in actual prediction is less than the theoretically possible decrease due to loss of reliability alone, the diminution of the correlation is probably due solely to the decrease in reliability rather than to the omission of these two particular items. If, in contrast, the decrease in correlation had been larger than warranted by the decrease in reliability, the spuriousness hypothesis would have been more plausible. Furthermore, the correlations between these particular items of the two scales were not large enough to have caused the high correlation between the scales themselves, especially in view of the fact that they comprise only 2/7 of the participation scale and 2/11 of the powerlessness scale.

	Powerlessness Questions	
	24	28
	<hr/>	
	25	.36
Participation Questions		
	29	.33

In contrast, the correlation between items 25 and 29 of the participation scale is .47 and between items 24 and 28 of the powerlessness scale .55. This analysis demonstrated that the items contributed far more to the reliability of their respective scales than to any spurious correlation between the scales. On the basis of this evidence the original powerlessness scale was retained because of its higher reliability.

³⁴Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (December, 1956), p. 690. The reliability of this scale in the current project was .58.

the way in which politics, a process involving considerable emphasis on interpersonal activity, is viewed.) A further indicator of social cohesion which has a strong negative relation to powerlessness is the number of organizational memberships the individual reports ($r = -.38$), which is slightly more strongly related to powerlessness than is the experience of having been an officer in these organizations ($r = -.31$). Finally, frequency of church attendance is also negatively related to feelings of powerlessness ($r = -.17$). Considering the relationships *among* this set of variables, the highest correlations exist among organizational memberships, political participation, and faith in people, with church attendance somewhat less strongly related to this cluster. It is perhaps reasonable to postulate the existence of an underlying "community solidarity" factor which operates to reduce feelings of powerlessness. While these activities and attitudes tend to cluster, faith in people, political participation and church attendance have strong independent effects on this type of alienation. However, membership in general voluntary organizations alone, without participation in the political process itself, does not substantially reduce feelings of political powerlessness. The partial correlation between organizational memberships and powerlessness when political participation is controlled reduces to only $-.08$ while the corresponding partial for faith in people is $-.26$ and for church attendance, $-.15$. These results suggest important relationships between political attitudes and the broader context of social interaction.

The participation measures are much less strongly related to perceived normlessness than to powerlessness. For example, neither organizational memberships, nor being an officer, nor political participation (each of which explains between 10% and 41% of the variance in powerlessness) can explain as much as 2% of the variance in the perceived normlessness scores. Thus the pattern of community participation, which tends to decrease feelings of powerlessness with respect to the political process, has practically no effect on whether or not one perceives norm-violating behavior by government officials. Frequent participators appear almost as likely to perceive such behavior as apathetics. Faith in people, however, is equally powerful in predicting both types of political alienation. This variable is, in fact, the most powerful of all independent variables in predicting perceived normlessness, accounting for 15% of the variance.

The "social cohesion" variables present certain problems of conceptual status. They are related to each other in complex ways that must

eventually be explicated if adequate causal models are to be developed. In addition, they are related to the measures of alienation more complexly than the simple independent-dependent variable model of regression analysis used here suggests. For example, participation variables have been treated in the literature as both independent and dependent with respect to political attitudes. Campbell and his associates consider political efficacy as an independent variable in predicting levels of political participation,³⁵ and Horton and Thompson,³⁶ Janda,³⁷ and Aberbach³⁸ consider the effects of political alienation on voting behavior. Agger and associates have shown that their political cynicism measure is related to frequency of political discussion,³⁹ a finding similar to one by Douvan relating "political effectiveness" to political discussion.⁴⁰ On the other hand, analyses by Rose and Almond and Verba are distinguished by their emphasis on organizational affiliations as *preceding* feelings of competence,⁴¹ while competence itself is viewed as a *product* of the diffusion of group values to the members. It has also been suggested that feelings of efficacy and actual participation probably reinforce each other. Some sense of subjective competence may precede participation, but the skills and familiarity with the political process that result from participation are likely, in turn, to increase the subjective sense of ability to influence the system.⁴² It seems clear that a complex feedback process exists among these variables. Development of an

adequate theory of alienation will depend on the success with which these types of variables are incorporated in their dual role as both cause and effect of attitudes. Newly developing techniques for analyzing reciprocal causal models hold promise for reaching this goal.⁴³

This discussion has proceeded with a separate consideration of variables on different levels of analysis. Status variables may be considered as relatively stable (indeed, some are immutable) characteristics of the individual. Community cohesion variables, on the other hand, are dynamic characteristics of the individual as he relates to others in his environment. We may also consider the effect of certain characteristics of the environment itself. Being from either the Northeastern or the Southern region of the country is related to one's level of both powerlessness and perceived normlessness, but the regional characteristics have opposite effects. As compared to Southerners, Northeasterners appear to feel more confident of their ability to understand and influence government decisions and of the normative compliance of political leaders. The correlations between community size and the two types of alienation indicate that this lesser alienation in the Northeast is not due to the higher urbanization in this area. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the correlations between community size and both forms of alienation increase positively when controlled for certain relevant variables. The relationship between region and alienation may be viewed as a reflection of the generally lower socioeconomic status of persons living in the South. When either education or income is controlled, the relationships between being from the South and both of the alienation variables are reduced. However (as in the case of the relationship between race and alienation), one may question the validity of controlling for such variables, since this procedure tends to obscure the historical factors which have made the South a distinctive region.

IV. MULTIVARIATE MODELS

A large number of variables have been considered, and an attempt has been made to identify those whose effects are most important. Obviously, however, there is an extremely large number of ways in which these variables could be

³⁵ Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*, pp. 479-481.

³⁶ John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (1962), pp. 491-492; and W. E. Thompson and J. E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces*, 38 (March, 1960), 190-195.

³⁷ Janda, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Aberbach, *op. cit.*

³⁹ Agger, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 495-497.

⁴⁰ Elizabeth Douvan, "The Sense of Effectiveness and Response to Public Issues," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 47 (1958), 111-126.

⁴¹ Arnold M. Rose, "Attitudinal Correlates of Social Participation," *Social Forces*, 37 (1959), 202-206; by the same author, "Alienation and Participation: A Comparison of Group Leaders and the 'Mass'," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (December, 1962), 834-838; and Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-322.

⁴² Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), Chapter 26.

⁴³ For a pioneering application of methods of analyzing reciprocal causation, see Otis Dudley Duncan, Archibald O. Haller, and Alejandro Portes, "Peer Influences on Aspirations: A Reinterpretation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (September, 1968), 119-137.

combined to form prediction equations. From the enormous number of possible equations it is desirable to be able to select one model on which substantive explanations could be focused. The problem of choosing an explanatory model may be interpreted as one of striking a balance between maximizing explanatory power and minimizing the number of variables included so as to achieve theoretical parsimony. In order to find such an optimal equation, a stepwise correlation program was used.⁴⁴ The criterion adopted for termination of the equation was that the increase in R^2 resulting from the addition of a variable be statistically significant at the .05 level. This criterion increases confidence that an increment in explanatory power of a given size is unlikely to have happened because of sampling or other random error (within the usual confidence limits), and that the variable in question makes a genuine contribution to explanation.

Table 5 presents the regression coefficients for the two equations that meet this criterion. First, it should be noted that the full twenty-three variable equation increases explained variance in powerlessness from 50.7% to only 51.5% and in normlessness from 17.9% to only 18.9%. Thus, it seems clear that, in each case, the stepwise regression procedure has permitted the selection of a relatively small subset of variables (less than one-third of those originally available), whose power is such as to explain 98% and 95%, respectively, of the variance controlled by the full set of variables. In both cases, also, explanation of variance increases only marginally over and above the explanation possible with the one most powerful predictor alone. In the case of powerlessness, explained variance increases from 41% to 51% with the addition of six variables to political participation and for normlessness from 13% to 18% with the addition of six variables to faith in people. While beginning with different initial variables in each case would result in slight changes in these figures, the important point, *normally obscured by successive bivariate analyses*, is that the variables with which we typically work are often sufficiently inter-related so that we do not actually increase explanatory power greatly by con-

TABLE 5.—REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
FOR FINAL EQUATIONS*

Variable	Political Powerlessness	Perceived Political Normlessness
Political Participation	— .55	—
Education	— .14	—
Age	.13	—
Jewish	— .05	—
Faith in People	— .14	— .30
Church Attendance	— .10	— .07
Community Size	.07	.07
Sex	—	— .07
Income	—	— .08
Nativity	—	.10
Race	—	.13
	$R = .712$	$R = .423$
	$R^2 = .507$	$R^2 = .179$

* Standardized coefficients are presented. Dashes indicate that the variable concerned did not have enough independent predictive power for this dependent variable to be included.

tinually increasing the number of predictor variables.⁴⁵ Thus, determination of the most powerful explanatory variables appears to be a rational and useful research strategy.

Considering the powerlessness model first, a comparison of the standardized regression coefficients indicates that political participation is by far the most important predictor. The appearance of community size may seem strange in that, of all variables, this one had the lowest zero-order correlation with the dependent variable. An examination of the stepwise calculations reveals that the major impetus to the rise in the partial correlation between population size and powerlessness was the inclusion of education. With education controlled, this correlation increases (partial $r = .06$), indicating that

⁴⁴ On the other hand, this very inter-relatedness may lead to difficulties in obtaining stable estimates of regression coefficients. As Farrar and Glauber suggest, the problem of multicollinearity is most usefully viewed as one of degree of severity rather than as one of categorical existence. The size of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables in the present study does not appear to constitute a serious problem. See Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 49 (1967), 92-107.

⁴⁴ The particular program used was "BMDO2R, Stepwise Regression." For a description of this program, see W. J. Dixon (ed.), *BMD Biomedical Computer Programs*, revised edition (Los Angeles: Health Sciences Computing Facility, Department of Preventive Medicine and School of Health, School of Medicine, UCLA, September 1, 1965), pp. 233-257.

within educational levels, there is a weak but significant positive relationship between community size and feelings of political powerlessness. Large urban concentrations apparently do contribute to a sense of estrangement between the citizen and his government. This relationship is suppressed at the zero-order level because of the tendency of highly educated individuals to locate in larger cities and the negative relationship between education and powerlessness. The alienating effects of the urban environment do not appear to result from differential social cohesion in rural and urban areas. There are few important correlations between community size and the measures of social cohesion used in the present study and the direction of those which do exist is not consistent with the hypothesis that the reason for higher alienation in larger cities lies in lower social cohesion. If no distinct urban behavior patterns can be implicated in the positive relationship between community size and powerlessness, it is possible that type of political structure may be a useful concept in future investigations of this phenomenon.

The inclusion of age in the final regression equation also merits examination. Significant events accompanying the aging process, such as loss of spouse and enforced retirement from gainful employment, probably increase personal frustration. It may be that these feelings of frustration or helplessness are generalized to the political realm, thereby increasing the sense of political powerlessness. But such a higher level of alienation among the aged is partly obscured at the zero-order level by the *positive* correlation between age and political participation ($r = .11$). The multivariate model points up the importance of higher political participation in keeping political powerlessness among the aged at a lower level than it would otherwise reach. Indeed, as the effects of other integrating variables are held constant, the effect of age becomes increasingly strong and clear. For example, with political participation, education, and faith in people controlled, age is a more powerful predictor of powerlessness than it was at the zero-order level (partial $r = .14$).

Considering now the final equation for predicting perceived *normlessness*, there are several interesting comparisons between the set of predictor variables included here and those included in the equation for powerlessness. Most noteworthy is the absence in this equation of the single most important variable in the powerlessness equation, political participation. Cynicism about the behavior of public officials is evidently sufficiently persistent that participation, even in the political process itself, does not serve to reduce it substantially. Education, age, and being

Jewish, all of which influence the degree of powerlessness, are also absent from the perceived normlessness model. Conversely, three ascribed status characteristics (sex, race, and nativity) which had less important effects on levels of powerlessness and were not included in the final equation for that variable, are relatively important among the predictors of perceived normlessness. Men are more likely to be critical of the political system, as are Negroes and those born in this country. Two separate but related explanations seem necessary to account for these findings. Men, being more attentive to politics than women, may be more aware of norm violations that occur in the political process. This is essentially the argument that was offered above to explain the positive relationship between prestige of birthplace and normlessness. However, Negroes may score higher than whites on this type of alienation precisely because they are the *objects* of the unfair treatment which is an important part of the definition of normlessness.

In contrast to the absence of measures of secular participation in the model for normlessness, religious participation (church attendance) appears in both equations. Population of place of residence is another variable which shows a small but persistent influence on both modes of alienation.

The most important variable in predicting perceived normlessness is faith in people. Since interpersonal confidence was also important for explaining powerlessness, this finding might be read to imply that political alienation is merely a derivative expression of a general personality characteristic that could be expected to have similar manifestations in other spheres. However, studies demonstrating inchoate attitudes toward politics in young children⁴⁶ suggest that the development of these attitudes does not wait on a well-formed structure of attitudes toward social relations in general, but may occur at the same time as more generalized attitudes are formed.⁴⁷ The pattern of intercorrelations

⁴⁶ See, for example, David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 361 (September, 1965), 40-57; Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967).

⁴⁷ Verba suggests that attitudes toward specific political issues may develop *before* more coherent or inclusive ideologies. See Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 41-42.

among faith in people, the alienation scales, and several of the status variables suggests that fundamental attitudes of trust or cynicism with respect to the motives of other people, as well as attitudes toward particular social institutions, may be transmitted as part of class sub-cultures. The correlation between income and normlessness, for example, is higher than would be expected on the basis of a developmental sequence leading from income to faith in people to perceived normlessness (the predicted r is $-.11$; the observed r is $-.18$). On the other hand, the relationship between faith in people and perceived normlessness is far too high to be a spurious product of the correlations between income and faith in people and income and normlessness (the predicted r is $-.05$; the observed r is $-.37$). It seems likely, therefore, that attitudes toward specific social institutions and generalized attitudes toward human nature develop concurrently and in interaction with each other.

V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In recent discussions of alienation a variety of meanings have been distinguished, such as powerlessness, normlessness, meaninglessness, and isolation. The present analysis began by considering the ways in which these modes of alienation may be useful in exploring attitudes toward the political system. Empirical measures of two of these types of political alienation were developed. The high level of prediction achieved using the powerlessness scale as a dependent variable suggests that its use in future research would be worthwhile. An important further step would be to continue the establishment of the predictive validity of the measure by studying the types of political behavior that tend to be associated with varying degrees of powerlessness. For example, some research has demonstrated that it is useful to dimensionalize political participation itself;⁴⁸ we may therefore find that varying levels of powerlessness tend to be associated with different *types* of participation, rather than merely with different *degrees* of participation considered as a global behavior. We will return to this question below. In comparison with the powerlessness results, explanation of variance in the perceived normlessness scale,

while still substantial, is much lower. One reason for this may be the lower reliability of this scale which imposes a lower ceiling on predictability. Increasing the reliability of the scale, perhaps by adding more items, for example, may improve prediction.

An important consideration in improving our understanding of both types of alienation is the need for variables that simply are not measured in the present study. If alienation is at least partially a function of social experience, it is obviously imperative to consider the kinds of experiences people have with the political system and the responses they have received to their own or their peers' efforts to participate. The addition of contextual variables, such as characteristics of local political structures, to the predictive models would also be necessary in order to examine the relationship between political reality and individual attitudes. Of tremendous utility also would be the incorporation of significant political events as natural experimental variables in research programs that permit repeated measurements on the same or related study populations. In these ways an assessment of the effects of political conditions on the development of attitudes of alienation could be approached.

An important finding of this study is that there are some significant differences in the variables that are associated with each type of alienation. (Individuals with high powerlessness scores are unlikely to participate in community activities, whether secular or sacred. They are likely to be older, to have less education, and to have low faith in people.) Conversely, living in smaller communities or being Jewish are characteristics that tend to reduce this type of alienation. High scores on the perceived normlessness scale are most likely for individuals with low faith in people, who are native-born, Negro, male, have low income, live in large cities, or attend church infrequently. Since education and income are related, the fact that education appears in the powerlessness equation and income in the normlessness equation should not be stressed greatly unless additional research confirms this difference. Nevertheless, the difference is theoretically interesting. The sense of injustice of the poor, reflected in their higher scores on perceived normlessness, may be partially mitigated by the fact that it is not the poor *per se* who feel most powerless, but rather the poorly educated. That education and income are not completely overlapping stratification variables (i.e., that the class system is not a caste system) prevents the intensification of the sense of alienation that might otherwise exist in the lower social classes.

There is a group of characteristics, however,

⁴⁸ See W. S. Robinson, "The Motivational Structure of Political Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1952), 151-156 and Bernard M. Finifter, "Styles of Participation in Political Life: Differential Multivariate Prediction with and without Allowance for Interaction Effects," paper presented to the Midwest Society of Multivariate Experimental Psychology, Chicago, May, 1968.

which tend to be associated with *both* types of alienation. These are low faith in people, infrequent church attendance, and large city size. This cluster of variables may be an appropriate indicator of the impersonality of contemporary life which so many analysts have indicted as a major source of all types of alienation. The significant *differences* in predictors of the two types of alienation involve political participation, age, sex, nativity, and race. Results obtained in this study leave little doubt that participation in the political process is far more important in reducing powerlessness than in its effect on normlessness. In fact, there is some suggestion that participation may tend to increase perceptions of normlessness. Although participation and perceived normlessness are negatively related at the zero-order level, the regression coefficient for participation in the complete twenty-three variable equation for normlessness is positive (and tracing this value during the stepwise procedure indicates that it is consistently positive after faith in people is controlled at the second step). This finding is suggestive only, since political participation does not contribute at a statistically significant level to the explanation of perceived normlessness. However, the fact that men and native-born citizens (both of which characteristics are significantly associated with participation) have higher normlessness scores than do women and the foreign-born (who participate less) strengthens the implication that high scores on normlessness are partially a function of knowledge and experience with the political system.⁴⁹

VI. ALIENATION AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Because the dimensional approach to political alienation clarifies and specifies attitudes toward the political system, it may be a useful basis for the development of more specific hypotheses regarding the effects of attitudes on political behavior. The concluding section of this paper is devoted to a brief and admittedly speculative exploration of some types of political engagement which may be associated with different combinations and levels of the dimensions of political alienation. My purpose in this discussion is to illustrate how this approach to developing

concepts and measures can be useful in suggesting research hypotheses that address themselves to the larger theoretical problems of change and stability in political systems.

Alienation is commonly regarded as a threat to the survival of the political system. If we examine the relationships between alienation, political behavior, and the states of political systems more closely, however, it is reasonable to suggest that not all types of alienation need be viewed as necessarily "dysfunctional." To the extent that alienated individuals are non-participants, for example, Berelson has suggested that they serve to soften and blur crippling divisions in the body politic that may result from extreme political conflict.⁵⁰ This suggests the hypothesis of a positive relationship between political participation and debilitating system cleavages, at least above a certain critical level of participation. Thus, in Berelson's view, the contribution of apathy to a political system is to permit the maintenance of its usual decision-making patterns. However, the persistence of a political system, in the sense of a shared normative structure, is not necessarily dependent on the perpetuation of a particular set of existing political institutions. Indeed, conflicts often exist between basic normative patterns and particular political institutions. When such conflicts are recognized, political institutions may be deliberately changed to conform to the basic normative patterns. The recognition of such conflicts between basic norms and particular political institutions is an important source of political change. As Geertz points out, it is in the incongruities between cultural patterns and social organization that "we shall find some of the primary driving forces in change."⁵¹

Applying this culture-structure differentiation to the results of the present research, I have suggested that to those scoring high on perceived normlessness, important aspects of the political culture (such as equality of citizens and responsibility of office holders) appear to be violated by the political structure, that is, by actual behavior of office holders or aspects of the political process itself. Systemic stresses that may be created by the behavior of persons who so perceive the political system (such as protest marches, strikes, etc.) are frequently directed toward reducing the inconsistency between the

⁴⁹ Results of an analysis of interaction effects provide some further support for the suggestion that political participation may increase perceived normlessness. The analysis identified a small but theoretically interesting sub-group ($N = 56$) of white, mobile, college-educated people with high faith in people among whom higher political participation is associated with higher alienation: Ada W. Finifter, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-151.

⁵⁰ Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 316.

⁵¹ Clifford Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change," in N. J. Demerath, III and Richard A. Peterson (eds.), *System, Change, and Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 233.

Fig. 1 Types of Political Behavior Associated With Combinations of Two Types of Political Alienation (Hypothetical)

		Political Powerlessness	
		High	Low
Perceived Political Normlessness	High	<i>Extreme Disengagement</i> Separatist and revolutionary movements Complete withdrawal	<i>Reform Orientation</i> Protest groups working within institutional framework
	Low	<i>Apathy</i> Very low level of political involvement	<i>Political Integration</i> Conformative participation

political culture and the structures by which it is implemented. It is difficult to classify such behavior using the customary language of functionalism. Protest behavior patently does not appear to be "functional." However, insofar as protest can act as a catalyst for needed social change, it is similarly awkward to classify it as "dysfunctional." It is precisely this opposition of "functional" and "dysfunctional" which has contributed to the criticism that the functional mode of analysis has overemphasized the *status quo* and failed to provide any substantial theoretical basis for dealing with social change.⁵² As a partial response to this need, it may be useful to introduce a new typological concept to describe conditions involving system disturbances that may culminate in higher levels of integration in social systems (as, for example, by narrowing gaps between cultural patterns and social organization). The concept "orthofunctional"⁵³ is suggested to describe such conditions. Thus, this concept might be useful to describe systemic stresses that, while initially disruptive, generate increasing system integration by the modification of conditions that violate widely-shared norms or otherwise inhibit intra-system cohesion.

Feelings of powerlessness may be considered

⁵² See, for example, Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 15-31; and Wayne Hield, "The Study of Change in Social Science," *British Journal of Sociology* (March, 1964), 1-11.

⁵³ From the Greek "orthos," to straighten, correct, or make right, as in orthopsychiatry, orthopedics, etc. As an analytic concept, "orthofunctional" is not intended to increase the *explanatory* power of a functional analysis. See A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," this REVIEW, LXII (June, 1968), 425-439.

"functional" in permitting the orderly maintenance of the *status quo*; perceptions of normlessness may be considered "orthofunctional" insofar as they may lead to demands for greater compliance with legal or cultural norms. If this interpretation of normlessness is plausible, it follows that people may perceive a condition of political normlessness precisely because of their *allegiance* to a set of ideals to which the community formally adheres, but which are commonly violated. The civil rights revolution, and the student and Vietnam war protests are based in large part on perceptions of violations of culturally accepted norms and demands on the political system for compliance and rectification. Such demands may be temporarily disruptive, but can be viewed as orthofunctional in that they may lead to adjustment and correction of system deviations from cultural norms.

The possibility that various types of alienation may have different consequences for political systems is a major reason for separately investigating their correlates, but it is also a compelling reason for studying their interrelationships. The findings of the present research indicate a substantial amount of independence between the alienation dimensions of powerlessness and perceived normlessness. This relatively weak relationship suggests a classification combining different levels of these two dimensions. Insofar as political behavior depends on modes and levels of political alienation, a provisional typology combining alienation and types of political engagement can be proposed (see Figure 1). This paradigm is highly tentative, and is intended to suggest some directions and hypotheses for future research on the relationship between alienation and political activation rather than to report on or synthesize research already accomplished.

Of the four cells, the types of political ac-

tion associated with relatively low levels of perceived normlessness (i.e., the lower two quadrants) have been most extensively explored. The heavy reliance on random sampling of the general public in political behavior research has perhaps made this inevitable. These styles of participation are of the conventional "middle class" conformative type, including activities such as voting and attending to the mass media.⁵⁴ These kinds of activities tend to support existing political institutions.

Moving to the upper two quadrants, the probability that normlessness will be orthofunctional is likely to be at its highest when perceptions of norm violations are combined with a low sense of political powerlessness. Many reform-oriented protest group activities, such as those of CORE or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and many domestic agrarian movements, such as the National Farmer's Organization, would fall in this category. The goals of these groups are directed at correcting specific social conditions that impede the integration of certain sub-groups into the system as a whole. In this sense their activities can be thought of as orthofunctional even though they may create serious temporary disturbances in system equilibrium. Individuals who participate in these types of groups feel that the system is at least potentially responsive to their efforts. Those engaging in activities suggested in the upper left quadrant, on the other hand, have probably given up hope that the political system will ever be responsive to their demands. The combination of high perceived normlessness and high levels of political powerlessness seems likely to lead to fundamental, radical rejection of established methods of accomplishing political goals.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ See David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy," in A. W. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 505-559, for this characterization of most activities used by social scientists as measures of political participation. The current "participation revolution" makes this characterization even more telling today than it was in 1950.

⁵⁵ Some substantiating evidence for this hypothesis lies in Ransford's finding that among Negroes in the Watts area, infrequent contact with whites was related to willingness to use violence under the two conditions of a high sense of powerlessness and a high dissatisfaction with treatment received as Negroes. See H. Edward Ransford, "Isolation, Powerlessness, and Violence: A Study of Attitudes and Participation in the Watts Riot," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (March, 1968), 581-591.

Whether this rejection is manifested in total withdrawal from political activities or in revolutionary activity will likely depend on opportunities for political activation or on certain personal characteristics. For example, previous research has demonstrated a moderately strong relationship between ego strength and sense of political efficacy.⁵⁶ Since we would expect low ego strength to conduce to withdrawal rather than to revolutionary activity, the revolutionaries of the upper left quadrant may come from that small minority of individuals who feel highly powerless politically but yet maintain a strong sense of *personal* efficacy. Opportunities for political activity may further limit the behavior of those in this group. Similarly, other variables will affect the behavior suggested for other combinations of alienation, but the activities suggested may be significant trends.

The kinds of political movements suggested as possible consequences of high perceived normlessness are similar to the "value-oriented" (revolutionary) and "norm-oriented" (protest) movements distinguished by Smelser.⁵⁷ Value-oriented movements are concerned with basic changes in the nature of man and society while norm-oriented movements are based on less ambitious desires for the restoration or modification of particular social norms. Thus value-oriented movements are comprehensive in their goals while norm-oriented movements seek to make incremental or adjustive changes only. The typology posited above suggests that value-oriented movements are more likely when individuals not only perceive gross violations of political norms but also feel highly powerless to affect the political system. Where feelings of powerlessness are not so strong, it is hypothesized that norm-oriented movements will dominate attempts at political change.

That the correlation between these two dimensions of alienation is fairly low means that the coincidence of extremely high levels on both is likely to be relatively infrequent. Thus, we would expect that the type of threat to orderly system change represented by revolutionary movements will be correspondingly rare, *unless large numbers of people are drawn from the lower left and upper right quadrants into the upper left*. While the research reported here has investigated some sources of powerlessness and perceived normlessness, the conditions under

⁵⁶ Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, pp. 516-518.

⁵⁷ See Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

which these attitudinal orientations *change* remain to be illuminated.⁵⁵ Although it appears likely that recruits to the high powerlessness, high perceived normlessness quadrant come mainly from those already highly alienated on one dimension, there may be certain conditions which draw even those normally not alienated in either way to this state of extreme disengagement. The nature of the general population sam-

ple used in this research precludes adequate representation of the type of political posture associated with the joint occurrence of high powerlessness and high perceived normlessness. Nevertheless, systematic knowledge about this type of political activity and its associated attitudinal structure is vitally needed. Although it was possible in the present study to operationalize only two of the four proposed modes of political alienation (and further research may uncover additional types as well), the great popular unrest evident throughout the world today indicates that intensive exploration of the entire alienation domain constitutes a challenge of the highest priority for empirical political theory.

⁵⁵ For some interesting ideas on the subject of change in basic political attitudes, see William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), esp. pp. 172-183.

APPENDIX

CODES FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coding</i>
3. Jewish (Q. 84a)	1 = Jewish; 0 = Non-Jewish
4. Catholic (Q. 84a)	1 = Catholic; 0 = Non-Catholic
5. Protestant (Q. 84a)	1 = Protestant; 0 = Non-Protestant
6. Nativity (Q. 1a)	1 = S. Europe; 2 = N. Europe; 3 = United States
7. Race (Q. 91)	1 = Negro; 0 = White
8. Sex (Q. 90)	1 = Female; 0 = Male
9. Age (Q. 85)	Ascending Order, 1 to 7
10. Education (Q. 61)	Ascending Order, 1 to 8
11. Occupation (Q. 74)	Ascending Order of Prestige, 1 to 9
12. Income (Q. 86)	Ascending Order, 1 to 8
13. Marital Status (Q. 4a)	1 = Single, Divorced, Widowed, Separated; 2 = Married
14. Number of Children (Q. 4b)	Ascending Order, 1 to 6
15. Years Residence in Community (Q. 2)	Ascending Order, 1 to 6
16. Frequency of Church Attendance (Q. 84b)	Ascending Order, 1 to 5
17. Number of Organizations (Q. 83)	Ascending Order, 1 to 5
18. Officership (Q. 83c)	1 = Has been an officer; 0 = Has never been an officer
20. Party Identification (Q. 38)	1 = Democrat; 2 = Independent; 3 = Republican
21. Strength of Party Identification	1 = Independent; 2 = Weak; 3 = Strong
23. Population of Community (Q. 88)	Ascending Order, 1 to 6
24. Northeast (Q. 89)	1 = New England or Middle Atlantic States; 0 = Other States
25. South (Q. 89)	1 = South Atlantic and East South Central States; 0 = Other States
19. Political Participation Index*	
11a. Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs?	
12. What about talking about public affairs to other people?	
25. Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision?	
29. Have you ever done anything to try to influence an act of Congress?	
38d. Have you ever been active in a political campaign? That is, have you ever worked for a candidate or party, contributed money, or done any other active work?	
44. What about the campaigning that goes on at the time of a national election: Do you pay much attention to what goes on, just a little, or none at all?	
83d. Are any of the organizations you belong to in any way concerned with governmental, political, or public affairs? For instance, do they take stands on or discuss public issues or try to influence government actions?	

22. Faith in People Index*

- 7. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
- 21. Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?
- 72b. If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. (Agree-Disagree)
- 72e. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative. (Agree-Disagree)
- 72h. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. (Agree-Disagree)

* Codes for individual questions were arranged in ascending order of the concept being measured and were summed for the total score. The Political Participation Index ranged from 0 to 13; the Faith in People Index ranged from 0 to 10.

PEASANT SOCIETY AND CLIENTELIST POLITICS*

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I. ELEMENTS OF THE PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

The basic social relations of peasant life are directly related to an environment characterized by extreme scarcity. The major factor of productive wealth in agriculture is land, to which the peasant has little or no free access. Labor—his own, and that of his family members—is available to the peasant, but this relatively unproductive factor must be applied to land in order to generate wealth. Few other outlets for productive labor employment are available to him. When the peasant is able to combine land and labor in a wealth-generating endeavor, his productivity is likely to be extremely low, due to limiting factors such as technology, capital, marketing information, and credit. All of these life aspects combine to hold down the peasant's income and preclude savings. He is, in a word, poor.

Furthermore, the peasant is powerless against many threats which abound in his environment. There are disease, accident, and death, among the natural threats. There are violence, exploitation, and injustice at the hands of the powerful, among the human threats. The peasant knows that this environmental constellation is dangerous. He also knows that there is relatively little he can do about his situation, and, accordingly, his culture often features themes of vulnerability, calamity, and misfortune.¹ As George Foster has neatly summarized if, the outlook this situation engenders in the peasant is the "Image of

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¹Consider the interesting results of Thematic Apperception Tests given to peasant respondents in Southern Italy, reported in Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958), ch. 6.

the Limited Good." Within this image:

peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes—their total environment—as one in which all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety, *exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply* as far as the peasant is concerned. Not only do these and all other "good things" exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition *there is no way directly within peasant power to increase the available quantities.*²

But there are basic patterns of social relations which develop in peasant societies in order to cope with these realities. They are, in general, anxiety-reduction behaviors by which the peasant attempts to build some security in the face of his perceived environmental threats, or at least to make life more tolerable within a basically threatening context.³ These social arrangements are adaptive means for increasing the peasant's access to the "good things" in life, and, as Foster implies, they are, of necessity, indirect. One basic set of such arrangements is found in the various kinship systems—nuclear families, extended families and clan organizations.⁴ An extension of such arrangements may be found in the fictive kinship relationships present in many peasant societies.⁵ Finally, there are a number of typical peasant social

²George Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good," in *Peasant Society: A Reader* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), edited by Potter, Diaz, and Foster, p. 304. This is a very useful collection of materials.

³On anxiety-reduction as the most powerful organizer of behavior, see Harry Stack Sullivan's *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, as applied by Robert Presthus in *The Organizational Society* (New York: A. Knopf, 1962), esp. ch. 4.

⁴See, among others, C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1959), ch. 6.

⁵*Peasant Society, op. cit.*, contains reprints of several good articles dealing with fictive kinship systems and their effects, including Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood (*Compadrazgo*)," pp. 174–199, and Mary Hollenstainer, "Social Structure and Power in a Philippine Municipality," pp. 200–212.

mechanisms which function to "equalize poverty" by means of individual, group, or even institutional actions—the latter, typically, through rituals of conspicuous consumption.⁶

One of these patterns of cooperative social arrangement I wish to treat in detail: *the extended patron-client relationship, or clientele system*. Such a relationship, involving an interchange of noncomparable goods and services between actors of unequal socio-economic ranks, is of profound importance when extended beyond the confines of the peasant community. An extended patron-client network, or clientele system, is important in two distinct ways: one, in its consequences for the political system in which it concretely manifests itself; and two, as an heuristic device for the understanding of a wide range of political behavior which political scientists, in the main, consider to be either pathological, deviant, or of minor import. I refer to patterns of political behavior such as nepotism, personalism, or favoritism; and political structures such as cliques, factions, machines, and patronage groups, or "followings." A fuller understanding of clientele systems, I believe, will render such phenomena more intelligible and significant.⁷

At the core of the patron-client relationship lie three basic factors which at once define and differentiate it from other power relationships which occur between individuals or groups. First, *the patron-client tie develops between two parties unequal in status, wealth and influence*; hence the most apt description by Pitt-Rivers, who called the patron-client bond a "lopsided friendship."⁸ Second, *the formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services*. Such mutual exchanges involve noncomparable goods and services, however. In a typical transaction, the low-status actor (client) will receive material goods and services intended to reduce or ameliorate his environmental threats; while the high-

status actor (patron) receives less tangible rewards, such as personal services, indications of esteem, deference or loyalty, or services of a directly political nature such as voting. Third, *the development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact between the two parties*; the exchanges encompassed in the relationship, being somewhat intimate and highly particularistic, depend upon such proximity. These three characteristics of the patron-client pattern—unequal status, reciprocity and proximity—hold whether the parties are individuals, which is often the case, or kinship groups, extended kinship groups, informal or formal voluntary groups, or even institutions. *It is important to note that patron-client ties clearly are different from other ties which might bind parties unequal in status and proximate in time and space, but which do not rest on the reciprocal exchange of mutually valued goods and services—such as relationships based on coercion, authority, manipulation, and so forth*. Such elements may be present in the patron-client pattern, but if they come to be dominant, the tie is no longer a patron-client relationship.⁹

Within many rural communities the patron status is highly correlated with land-ownership and the client status with poor cultivators dependent upon the patron's land for their livelihood. Here is how one anthropologist describes such a "traditional" relationship between landlord and sharecropper:

A peasant might approach the landlord to ask a favor, perhaps a loan of money or help in some trouble with the law, or the landlord might offer his aid knowing of a problem. If the favor were granted or accepted, further favors were likely to be asked or offered at some later time. The peasant would reciprocate—at a time and in a context different from that of the acceptance of the favor, in order to de-emphasize the material self-interest of the reciprocative action—by bringing the landlord especially choice offerings from the farm produce, or by sending some member of the peasant family to perform services in the landlord's home, by refraining from cheating the landlord, or merely by speaking well of him in public and professing devotion to him.¹⁰

Silverman also found, in the same Italian

⁶ Foster, "Image of the Limited Good," *op. cit.*, p. 316. Also, see Eric Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," pp. 230-246 in the same volume; and Mehmet Bequiraj, *Peasantry in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell Center for International Studies, 1966).

⁷ Two exceptional treatments of the phenomena in question are found in Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 10 (July 1968), pp. 376-400; and James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *this REVIEW*, LXII (December, 1969), 1142-1158.

⁸ Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra* (New York: Criterion Books, 1954), p. 140.

⁹ For an elegant and fascinating exploration of the varieties of power relationships, see Frederick W. Frey, "Concepts of Development Administration and Strategy Implications for Behavioral Change," unpublished ms, Department of Political Science, MIT.

¹⁰ Sydel Silverman, "The Community-Nation Mediator in Traditional Central Italy," in *Peasant Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

community, that similar patron-client relationships could be established by persons who were not personally linked to a powerful figure through the agricultural system, but were merely lower-status persons who lived in the community: "The potential client would approach one of the *signori* with a request, or he might attempt to establish the relationship first by presenting him with some small gift or by making himself available to run errands or help out in various ways."¹¹ An important aspect of these relationships is that the needs of the client tend to be critical—for example, a peasant may need more land to farm in order to feed his growing family—while the needs of the patron, while important to him, tend to be marginal. Not only can a large landowner get along without the esteem or loyalty of an individual peasant and his family, but there are many more peasant families with needs than there are patrons with assets. The bargaining power of the patron is by definition greater than that of the client.

Several aspects of the patron-client relationship are fixed—such as unequal status, reciprocity and proximity—and some are variable. We should take note of these variables in the relationship before proceeding to the extension of these relationships beyond the confines of the peasant community. The first variable is the origin of the initiative to establish the relationship. Either patron or client may take the initiative. This is less important in enduring relationships than in *ad hoc* or periodic patron-client ties. Duration or persistence over time, then, is a second variable. Third, the scope of the relationship may vary. A patron-client tie may cover the full range of the client's needs, if he is fortunate—from the cradle to the grave, as it were. Other relationships may be defined by the very narrow range of goods and services which are exchanged. Finally, the patron-client tie may vary in its intensity. Affect, feelings of loyalty, obligation, and satisfaction with the benefits of the relationship may be strong or weak. These variables, furthermore, tend to cluster together in distinct patterns. In a "traditional" village—isolated, with few market-network or governmental ties with the outside—patron-client relationships tend to be enduring, extensive and intense. In a more integrated, differentiated village context, patron-client relationships tend to be periodic, defined by special, narrow interests, and casual.

II. LINKAGES WITH THE LARGER SYSTEM

This brings us to a most crucial point in the analysis—the linking of the "little community"

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

with the larger socio-economic system in which it exists. Two underlying processes are largely responsible for the establishment of these linkages: state centralization and market expansion.¹² Each involves differentiation and specialization of roles and the elaboration of networks of interdependent parts, or more simply put, transaction systems. At the boundary of the little community stands the "gatekeeper"—the landed patron.¹³ As the twin processes of state and market penetration of the peasant village occur, the patron becomes transformed into a broker mediating the impact of the larger society on peasant society.

As a result of increased attention to the interpenetration of present-day peasant cultures and national cultures over the past twenty years or so, the anthropological community has become increasingly aware of these brokers, "hinge groups," "mediators" or "buffers," as they have been portrayed in the literature. Eric Wolf's original definition of brokers will serve us nicely:

... they stand guard over the critical junctures and synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole. *Their basic function is to relate community-oriented individuals who want to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security and political connections, with nation-oriented individuals who operate primarily in terms of complex cultural forms standardized as national institutions, but whose success in these operations depends on the size and strength of their personal following.*¹⁴

While they vary in cultural forms, Wolf provides as examples of such brokerage systems the *compadrazgo* system in Latin America, the Chinese *kan-ch'ing*, and the Japanese *oyabun-kobun*; to which I would add *clientela* in Italy and Sicily, the *jajmani* system in India, and the patron-client system in the Philippines.¹⁵

¹² These processes are illuminated and applied with excellent effect by Charles Tilly in *The Vendée* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), especially ch. 2.

¹³ "Gatekeepers," as described by Kenny, "largely dominate the paths linking the local infrastructure of the village to the superstructure of the outside urban world." See his article "Patterns of Patronage in Spain," in the *Anthropological Quarterly*, 33 (January 1960), pp. 14-23.

¹⁴ Eric Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," in *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America* (New York: Random House, 1965), edited by Dwight Heath and Richard Adams, p. 97. (Italics added)

¹⁵ Latin America, China, and Japan cited by Wolf, *ibid.* A full treatment of *clientela* in Italy

would hypothesize that such clientele systems might be encountered in any developing country in which kinship systems are unable to perform linkage functions between persons of low and high status, or between the community and the nation. Where kinship systems can perform these linkage functions at all, as in Greece (and under certain conditions in Italy), they are likely to be responsive to only a limited range of needs, leaving low-status clients to rely on non-kinship clientele systems as well.¹⁶

Of great importance is the manner in which these extended clientele systems change over time. Traditional, land-owning patrons may become brokers, but additional brokers may appear to compete with them for followings on the local level. Power holders on the national level may or may not consolidate and formalize some of these clientele systems, playing off one network of brokers against another in the process. These processes of change, and their significance for political development, will be more understandable if we consider some concrete historic examples.

Sydel Silverman, in "The Community-Nation Mediator in Traditional Central Italy," focusses precisely on such changes over time.¹⁷ According to her, prior to Italian national unification, the patron-client system was almost the exclusive domain of the great landlords, who acted in the main as direct benefactors, but also as links with the larger, Church-dominated society of central Italy. As far as commercial ties were concerned, they too were guarded by the landlords, but extended only to provincial market towns. Following unification in the 1860-1861 period, nation-community contacts grew, and landlords added to their functions as direct benefactors (loans, employment, land-access, dowry gifts, medicines) those of brokerage services. When a peasant client had dealings with bureaucracies—taxes, credits, etc.—or with the

police in the area, the patron acted as broker. The role of broker, in fact, became generalized in peasant dealings with "outsiders," and the "letters of recommendation" became more highly valued in many instances than direct patronage benefits. Such letters were considered imperative when undertaking an arrangement with a distant merchant, or in seeking public employment. As outside relationships became more important over time, says Silverman, "the most valuable patron was neither the wealthiest nor the most generous, but the one with the best connections."¹⁸

In addition to the changes of function of the traditional patrons (the large landowners), which transformed them into brokers, other local people with "outside connections" also began to assume brokerage functions—bourgeois landowners, schoolteachers, physicians and pharmacists, priests, tax collectors and other local officials. Some of these "new" brokers had connections with the marketing system, and some with the political system, but all were intermediate in socio-economic status. They were, in other words, those whom one writer has recently characterized as the "small intellectuals" of society, whose status and role functions place them in the "strategic middle" of the social structure.¹⁹ The Italian case clearly suggests the impact of state centralization in the little community, transforming traditional patrons into brokers, as well as creating a new pool of potential brokers (i.e., governmental agents) on the periphery of the peasant society. Similarly, the penetration of market networks, with its resultant differentiation and specialization of new roles, further enlarged the pool of potential brokers. These twin forces for change may be seen in another historic case, that of Mexico.

Eric Wolf specifically undertook a diachronic analysis of brokerage groups in rural Mexico in his seminal article, "Aspects of Group Relationships in a Complex Society: Mexico."²⁰ First, he traced the entry of the Spaniards into the previously autonomous Indian communities, and the establishment of landed power-holding by representatives of the Crown. This was accomplished through the *encomienda* system, and in agriculture as well as mining, enclaves of primary production were established and linked into a rudi-

is given by Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale, 1967). For India, see Lewis and Barnouw, "Castle and the Jajmani System in a North Indian Village," in *Peasant Society, op. cit.*, pp. 110-134. The Philippine materials are presented by Carl Landé in *Leaders, Factions and Parties—The Structure of Philippine Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1965), Monograph No. 6.

¹⁶ Ernestine Friedl, "The Role of Kinship in the Transmission of National Culture to Rural Villages in Mainland Greece," *American Anthropologist*, 61 (Feb. 1959), 30-38; and Joseph Lopreato, *Peasants No More* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), Part Two.

¹⁷ In *Peasant Society, op. cit.*, pp. 279-293.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

¹⁹ Belden Paulson, "The Role of the Small Intellectual as an Agent of Political Change: Brazil, Italy, and Wisconsin," paper delivered at the American Political Science annual meeting in Chicago, September, 1967.

²⁰ Originally published in the *American Anthropologist*, 58 (December, 1956), 1065-1078.

mentary trade system with the mother country. In addition to the landholdings producing for international trade, landed powerholders, encroaching on the communal lands of the Indians, established autonomous, self-sufficient holdings in the manorial or patrimonial style.²¹ Both types of holding provided bases of manpower and wealth for a highly decentralized system of political power. In time, the struggle by Spain for the recapture of its political power and monopoly in the trading system precipitated the War of Independence by the New World landed elites. During this period of Mexican land history, the same kind of "traditional" patron behavior described for Italy by Silverman, characterized Mexican landlord-peasant relationships, exaggerated by cultural and linguistic differences.

According to Wolf, a byproduct of the trade systems established under the Crown had been a group of "marginals"—small storekeepers, middlemen, casual farmers and specialized workers located in the villages and entrepreneurial communities near mines, *haciendas*, or mills. With the destruction of the ties to Spain, the legal devices which had until that time granted a small measure of protection to the Indian communities were swept aside, and a long period of land-grabbing began. Communal property-holding dissolved into "land as a commodity," and the best remaining Indian lands were taken over by large landlords, or invaded by the upward-striving "marginals." From these processes grew the classic *hacienda* system, the epitome of autonomous, self-sufficient localism.

The Revolution of 1910 had, as one of its major consequences, the recapture of local political power by the central authorities. Violent peasant upheavals eliminated some of the local, landed powerholders, and agents of government were dispatched into the rural areas to foster the business of the "outside" authorities. As in Italy, many of the remaining landowners, more likely to be bourgeois than "aristocratic" in standing, became transformed from direct benefactors (patrons) into brokers. With the greater flow of goods and services into the rural areas which characterized post-revolutionary Mexican governments, not only did local representatives of the national government proliferate and increase in importance as brokers, but the local "small intellectuals" found increasing employment for their specific mediating skills, thereby gaining for themselves a useful channel of socio-economic mobility and influence.

²¹ See Eric Wolf, *Peasants* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), especially "Types of Domains," pp. 50-59.

III. THE CLIENTELIST STATE

Small-scale patrons, we have seen, may become transformed into brokers in the course of state and market centralization. This implies that the patron-client pattern is replicated on a higher level of organization; and indeed this is found to be the case. Thus, in discussing the Thai bureaucracy, Shor observed that:

... The personal clique, based on a feudal-like system of personal obligation, provides the principle focus of bureaucratic loyalty and identification. Bonds of reciprocal obligation, reminiscent of earlier patron-client structures in the traditional social system, informally align a number of dependent subordinates with individual political and administrative leaders in more or less cohesive informal structures.²²

And in commenting on Rustow's study of the Turkish bureaucracy, Guenther Roth points out that there exists "what is imprecisely known as 'corruption': 'connections' count, favoritism prevails, and for the few there is abundant profit in real-estate dealings."²³ There are probably few countries in which such forms of behavior cannot be encountered; the important difference lying in the fact that in some—for example, contemporary South Vietnam—these forms dominate the organization of the polity. What we have then is a variation on Weber's Patrimonial State. As Guenther Roth has said of this variation, "The second type of patrimonialism is personal rulership on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler's unique personal qualifications, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards."²⁴ I propose that we call this model the Clientelist State.

The utility of the clientelist notion is not limited to personalist, primitive polities. As Roth quite rightly points out, "in terms of traditional

²² Edgar Shor, "The Thai Bureaucracy," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 5 (June, 1960), pp. 70, 77, 80, as cited in Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics* 20 (January, 1968), p. 202.

²³ Roth, *ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 196. For vestiges of such behavior in complex societies, see Eric Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies* (New York: Praeger, 1966), edited by Michael Banton, pp. 1-22. An excellent study of clientelist politics in administration is Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers and Social Structures: An Evolutionary Model and Case History," reprinted in Heath & Adams, *Contemporary Cultures*, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-404.

political theory, some of these new states may not be states at all but merely private governments of those powerful enough to rule" . . . but, on the other hand, ". . . personal rulership . . . is an ineradicable component of the public and private bureaucracies of highly industrialized countries."²⁵ I should now like to turn to the impact of clientelist politics in the national electoral process of many developing countries. The client-broker-patron network, we shall find, is of key importance as the electoral process reaches the level of the peasant village. I do not intend to digress for the moment to analyze the historic processes by which peasant voters—usually illiterate—become enfranchised, nor the processes by which elections come to play a central role in the distribution and transfer of political authority. Let us simply acknowledge the observable fact that in many countries today, including Italy, Venezuela, India, Turkey, the Philippines, and others, peasants do vote and elections are determinative. Patron-client patterns of behavior become significant for such countries in the periodic mobilization of peasant voters. At the level of the village, we find competition among brokers and potential brokers for peasant votes which can be delivered to a particular political patron or potential patron. Such competition, which has been described as "factionalism" in village politics, is an essential ingredient in the process of aggregating clienteles into a widespread network, and linking them to vertical patronage structures in the political system.²⁶

National or regional political leaders recruit local political leaders from among the competing

²⁵ Roth, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

²⁶ It would be a mistake, however, to assume that inter-broker competition automatically increases the power of the client in relation to the broker or patron. Individual brokers and/or patrons tend to control different resources, not to have differential control over the same resources. Furthermore, competition may occur in terms of the number of peasant votes, but not necessarily for the votes of the same peasants. Each broker tends to mobilize the votes of the peasants over whom he has some kind of critical leverage. Indeed, inter-broker competition may lead to less bargaining power for the client, rather than more, as for example the case of a peasant who finds himself within the power domain of a landlord, a moneylender, and a storekeeper, all of whom pressure him to vote in accord with their particular preferences. In short, the degree of power asymmetry between patron and client or broker and client is a matter for empirical enquiry; and if there is no asymmetry, the relationship in question is not clientelism.

patrons and brokers. Local brokers and patrons recruit subleaders, or political workers, in turn; and these workers recruit or assemble small followings from among their kin, caste brothers, occupational colleagues, or voluntary group associates. Mayer calls such a cross-cutting electoral aggregate an "action-set," assembled for a particular action fixed in time and space (i.e., an election). In all essential details, it appears to be an aggregation of clienteles:

These workers acted as links between the candidate and the electorate. Sometimes they did this for the advantages they calculated would accrue to them if the candidate were elected; sometimes they were acting because of party loyalty and friendships formed over the years without any thoughts of gain from the election itself; and at yet other times they were discharging specific obligations contracted at earlier times. *In the same way, there was an attempt to reach voters on the basis of a past or future benefit . . . In consequence, a great deal of the electioneering was carried out by workers, who sought to influence those with whom they had some appropriate relationship.*²⁷

The exact nature of the "appropriate" relationship is a significant question. A local political worker may pull together voters on the basis of kinship ties, fictive kinship or caste ties, or through a variety of relationships, including patron-client ties. The worker who pulls such electoral bloclets together assumes the role of broker for that group with a patron group or institution, in this case a political party. Furthermore, there is some evidence which suggests that the "appropriate relationship" for pulling in peasant voters may be distinctly different from one party to another. Table 1 below is a rearrangement of data presented by Ralph Nicholas from his study of factional politics in Govinda-

²⁷ Adrian Mayer, "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, *op. cit.*, p. 103. (emphasis added). Note that at this point we might break down brokers into at least three types, or specialists: one, a grass-roots mobilizer, or "ward-heeler"; two, a pure broker, of the kind found on the floor of a stock exchange; and three, a high level influence peddler. The mobilizer can turn out the bodies for any particular purpose, the influence peddler locates political patrons who desire mass political services, and the pure broker brings them together in the political market place. Note also the cross-class-cutting nature of this process. In a significant sense, it functions to integrate actors high and low in the social hierarchy, thereby serving as a potential buffer to inter-class conflict.

TABLE 1.—FACTIONAL ALIGNMENTS OF ALL POSSIBLE VOTERS IN GOVINDAPUR, WEST BENGAL

Factional Leader No.	Party Affilia- tion of leaders	Basis of membership support (per cent)					Total
		Kinship	Caste	Economic dependence	Neighbor hood Head- man	Mutual enemy	
1 & 2	Congress	13%	7	44	17	19	100%
3 & 4	Independent	28%	33	14	25	0	100%
5-9	Communist	52%	20	7	20	1	100%

Source: Adapted from Ralph Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," in *Political Systems and the Distribution of Power* (New York: Praeger, 1965), edited by Gluckman and Eggan. Table 1, page 42.

pur, West Bengal, in which he analyzed the basis for membership in nine village factions, each with a leader linked to a particular political party.

The data in Table 1 lead me to the following tentative hypothesis. The exact nature of the ties to peasant voters which are activated in mobilizing an electoral turnout depends on two related factors: the particular needs of the client, and the relationship of the potential patron's political party to the government. In this Indian case, all parties tended to succeed in mobilizing followings based on neighborhood ties—the headman worked well for the Congress, the Independents, and the Communists. But the Independents and Communists were heavily dependent on utilizing kinship and caste ties to assemble their clienteles. This suggests that the brokerage functions which they performed for their clients were essentially defensive in nature—insuring that their relatives and caste brothers received equitable treatment at the hands of governmental representatives such as tax collectors, credit and extension agents, and the police. This is the other side of the coin of the functions most likely performed by the Congress party brokerage system which involved preferential treatment. This might include access to and influence in the making and administration of economic programs and policies which affected rural enterprises (and the people dependent on them); and in addition, knowledge of and influence in the judicial and police systems for the purpose of dealing with mutual enemies.

IV. CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

We need now to examine more broadly the impact of clientele politics on political parties; and further, to project our analysis into the realm of national politics. This can be economi-

cally accomplished by comparing two striking cases which have been rather fully documented and analyzed: Italy and Venezuela.²⁸ While many of the elements of clientelist politics—with a peasant mass base—can be encountered in the recent or current political history of India, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Peru, and the Philippines, and to a lesser degree in Indonesia, France, Guatemala, Spain, and Turkey, the cases of Venezuela and Italy are not only well-documented, but seem to represent the upper limits, or fullest development, of which such transaction systems are capable.

Both countries are multiparty electoral democracies in which more than one political party has competed for a peasant base of support through the elaboration of clientele systems. The degree to which the various parties depend on the peasant vote varies, of course, but it is very substantial for the Communist Party (PCI) in Italy, and for the Democratic Action (AD) and Social Christian (COPEI) parties in Venezuela. The Italian Christian Democratic Party (PDC) also receives significant support from peasant constituencies in the south. In both cases, peasant clienteles have been organized into a peasant union movement, which interpenetrates the party system at the local, regional, and national levels. In each country, there has been an extensive agrarian reform program which has provided land and a flow of governmental goods and services downward through the same clientele system which channels votes upward from the peasant base. What we have, in essence, is a transaction system with

²⁸ See Sidney Tarrow, *op. cit.*; and John Duncan Powell, *Peasant Mobilization and Agrarian Reform in Venezuela* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

reciprocal, but unequal, flows of goods and services—votes for agrarian reform benefits. Figure 1 illustrates the Venezuelan system (which I have called the “rural problem-solving system”) from the point of view of the peasant. Working through such a network is one of the few instrumental ways in which the peasant can counter his environmental threats.²⁹ The Italian clientele system, while somewhat more complex, functions in exactly the same manner. An important factor, obviously, is whether or not a particular party is included in a coalition government—and which portfolios or ministries it can influence. In general, the brokerage function is performed by all parties, but those parties outside the government tend to focus on the defense of peasant clients, and the government parties focus on influencing the flow of patronage for their clients. This is a strong tendency, not an absolute distinction.

I wish to emphasize at this point the explicit argument that *peasant clientele systems are built upon, incorporate, and recapitulate the inter-personal patterns of behavior known as clientelism*. Unlike simple patron-client relations, or primitive clientele systems, the Italian and Venezuelan networks have been purposively organized from above, endure in institutionalized form, exchange a wide range of goods and services, and provide quite lengthy chains of linkages—from the peasant to the President or Prime Minister. They are, in a quite specific sense, politically representative. How did such networks come into being, and what effect have they had on national politics in these countries?

In both cases, an urban-based political elite group undertook the organization of the peasantry as a way to mobilize the political capital needed to break into a traditional, elite-dominated inner circle of power in national politics. In Italy, it was the Communist Party which succeeded in organizing the peasantry in the postwar period. In Venezuela, it was the Democratic Action Party (struggling simultaneously to establish a meaningful electoral process and to break the hold of the entrenched, traditional elites on governmental power) which began to organize the peasantry during the 1930's. The responsiveness of the peasantry in both cases rested in part on two factors: a history of bourgeois encroachments on lands formerly available for peasant use; and a recent period of prolonged, serious dislocation of commercial agri-

culture. In Italy the theme of land *irredenta*, according to Tarrow, originated in the massive take-over of Church and State lands by the bourgeoisie following the national unification in 1861. In Venezuela, there were twin strands of peasant land irredentism: broken promises of land for military service in the armies which fought the War of Independence and the Federal Wars of the nineteenth century; and the encroachment of the bourgeoisie on public lands during the extended, personalistic regime of the dictator, Gómez (1908-1935). The encroachments of the bourgeoisie signalled a “commoditization” of the land, and a subsequent reduction in free land use by the peasantry, often drawing them into a tenancy relationship with the new owners.³⁰ Dislocations in both commercial and peasant agriculture occurred during the depression in both countries, and were further exacerbated in Italy by World War II. In short, the peasants' status in the prevailing land tenure situation was precarious to begin with, and grew worse prior to their mobilization.

Both AD and the PCI, then, turned to the organization of a discontented peasantry as a way of mobilizing political capital. In the initial stages, before either was in a position to control a government patronage network, their efforts focussed on direct action at the community level, often involving the invasion of farm properties. This was especially true in the case of Italy, where the land invasions of the early 1950's were closely related to the efforts of the PCI to shape and capitalize on peasant discontent. In Venezuela, AD's opportunity to open up lands to peasant access followed its participation in the *coup d'etat* of October 1945. Dominating the subsequent Revolutionary Government, AD initiated a *de facto* agrarian reform, granting (by decree) access to governmental and private farms to peasant unions organized by the party. The ability to reward followers with land—whether by invasion, as in Italy, or by governmental action, as in Venezuela—quickly expanded the networks of peasant unions, which were actual or aspiring clienteles of the parties.

²⁹ For the proposition that the degree of tenancy correlates positively—and highly—with radical or revolutionary action on the part of the peasantry, see Arthur Stinchcombe, “Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations,” reprinted in *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: Wiley, 1966), edited by Finkle and Gable, pp. 485-497. The same point is made by Bruce Russett in “Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics,” in *World Politics*, 16 (April, 1964), p. 452, when tenancy is combined with a high degree of inequality in landholdings.

³⁰ See John Duncan Powell, “Venezuela: The Peasant Union Movement,” in *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), edited by Henry Landsberger, pp. 62-100.

fell in 1958, and AD was successful in gaining the presidency and dominating a decade of subsequent coalition governments, then the system illustrated in Figure 1 reached fruition, with a well-financed *de jure* agrarian reform program providing a flow of goods and services into the rural areas. In response to AD's successful building of a peasant base of electoral support, the Social Christian (COPEI) party began its own program of organizing peasant unions. For six years, COPEI was included in the coalition government, providing it some direct access to agrarian reform patronage. After leaving the coalition government, the COPEI peasant unions still maintained indirect access to governmental decision-making (though less effectively than before) through their participation in the multipartisan Federation of Venezuelan Peasants.³¹

In Italy, however, the Christian Democrats, and not the Communists, were in control of the government when the *de jure* agrarian reform program was established. As a result, many of the local leaders and peasant clients organized by the PCI for the purpose of obtaining land (by invasions) were drawn into the Christian Democratic peasant-union-party structure when land and other benefits could be had through the agrarian reform program. As Tarrow describes the resulting dilemma of the Communists:

... the Catholic Confederation of Direct Cultivators is really a corporate arm of the government which dispenses patronage to peasants through a complicated system of interlocking directorates with the provincial agricultural syndicates ... The chain of causation is revealing. In leading the struggle for the land, the Communists forced the Agrarian Reform; but in the achievements of the Reform, many peasants became dependents of the Christian Democrats and of the state.³²

With the successful establishment of a state-supported clientele system which provided land, credit, extension services, infrastructure and marketing services to peasant clients, the peasantry became "demobilized" in Tarrow's phrase. That is, land invasions and threats of violence subsided. In an important sense, however, the electoral mobilization of the peasantry was not a phenomenon which faded away, but one which was in fact stabilized and institutionalized

through the same clientele system which provided the agrarian reform benefits. In short, the notion that peasants will lapse into political inactivity once they obtain a piece of land seems to be a myth. A piece of land is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to allow the peasant to escape the world of *la miseria*. He also needs financial, technological, and marketing assistance to significantly improve his standard of living. There is a continuing need for a patron, or patronage system, which can respond to increasingly sophisticated and complex demands, and thus peasant dependency and peasant mobilization become institutionally linked.

Both the Christian Democrats in Italy and Democratic Action in Venezuela have achieved the necessary transactional equilibrium within their peasant clientele systems to stabilize a dependable base of legitimizing electoral support. From the point of view of the party leaders at the national level, a clientele system based on peasants rather than on other societal groups seems to be a sound investment. The peasant is an economical client. His range of needs tends to be narrower and more fixed than that of comparable urban clients. And in meeting the needs of peasants for more land to farm, technological and financial assistance in farm operations, public health and sanitation projects, and finally, marketing assistance, governmental decision-makers are acting in a manner not only compatible with, but prescribed by the logic of economic development. This is not the case in responding to the needs of potential urban client groups, where the costs of improving the quality of the urban environment are high, the gestation periods long, and the returns on capital investment indirect. But the support of such an electorally-legitimizing clientele system has its disadvantages as well as its advantages in the national political arena.

In analyzing the assets and liabilities of a peasant clientele system for a political party in governmental power, I would like to leave aside the Italian case, in which peasant support is relatively marginal to the position of the Christian Democrats, and consider, in addition to Venezuela, the cases of Bolivia and Mexico.³³ In the latter two cases, peasant clientele support is, or has been, of much more critical import than in

³¹ In the December 1968 elections COPEI won the presidency and hence control over the formation of a subsequent coalition government from which AD was excluded. As of this date, therefore, access of the two parties is the reverse of the 1964-1968 situation.

³² Tarrow, *Peasant Communism*, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

³³ See Peter P. Lord, "The Peasantry as an Emerging Political Factor in Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela," (Madison: University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, 1965), Research Paper No. 35 (mimeo.); and Charles Erasmus, "Upper Limits of Peasantry and Agrarian Reform: Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico Compared," in *Ethnology*, 6 (October, 1967), 349-380.

the Italian case. In Bolivia and Mexico, as in the other two countries, the peasantry had lost land to an encroaching bourgeoisie. And both countries had experienced a prolonged period of economic dislocation, which was both a contributing cause and a partial effect of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the Bolivian Revolution of 1952. In neither of these two cases had a political party seeking to break into the ranks of the traditional elites originally organized a political base among the peasantry as a part of that effort. In Mexico and in Bolivia, governmental parties which grew out of the revolution incorporated embryonic peasant organizations and transformed them into a supportive clientele network as part of their consolidation of political power. As in Venezuela and Italy, an agrarian reform program was the patronage vehicle, partly consolidating and ratifying *de facto* changes brought about by peasant land invasions, and partly distributing land and other goods and services throughout the areas of peasant concentration. While the Bolivian, Mexican, and Venezuelan cases differ in detail and circumstances, one can state that governmental parties, supported by peasant clientele systems, successfully governed for extended periods of time—in Bolivia from 1952 through 1964; in Mexico, from the mid-1930's to the present; and in Venezuela from 1958 to at least 1968. There is reason to believe that the government which replaced the original sponsor of the Bolivian Revolution (the MNR) in 1964 has continued to rely on the peasant clientele system established by its predecessor.

One of the salient characteristics of governments based on peasant clientele systems has been their capacity to withstand challenges from groups on both extremes of the political spectrum. In Mexico and Bolivia, where the traditional military establishments were eliminated, worker and peasant militias were used to resist the overthrow of the revolutionary governments by right-wing violence. Obregón, with the help of agrarian unions, successfully defended his government in 1923 against the attack by General de la Huerta. In Bolivia miner and peasant militias were instrumental in resisting the overthrow of the Revolutionary government until 1964. In Venezuela, where the professional armed forces were co-opted into the governmental clientele system rather than destroyed, armed peasant and labor militias were never formed, but mass peasant demonstrations were organized in Caracas on several occasions when the threat of a right-wing or dissident military *coup* seemed imminent, as in 1960. We might characterize such a capacity of resistance as stability against the recapture of political power by

the traditional elites who were earlier displaced by the parties in government.

A peasant clientele base has been effective in meeting destabilizing challenges from the left also. In Bolivia and Mexico, one-party state during the period under consideration, this amounted to resistance by the peasant branch, to a left-wing challenge from the labor branch of the party. In Mexico, in 1940, insurrection within the party by the leader of the left-wing labor sector, Lombardo Toledano, was resisted partly through the intervention of the peasant union. In Bolivia, Juan Lechín, the leader of the miners' unions, made a similar attempt in 1964 to capture his party's presidential nomination, and was resisted by the peasant branch of the party. In Venezuela, the violent opposition of the Communists and left-wing splinter groups, and guerrilla efforts have been unsuccessful partly because of the disinclination of the peasants—who are clients of the government—to join in an attack on the source of their patronage. The characterization of all of these efforts as "left-wing" probably needs some qualification. In all three of these cases, the longer a peasant-based party has remained in governmental power, the more centrist, pragmatic, and moderate its policies have become. In other words, the drift away from earlier doctrinal positions has been toward the "right." Attacks from the "left," therefore, may also be accurately described in many cases as attacks from party loyalists who are unwilling to make compromises for the sake of maintaining governmental legitimacy among other groups in the political system.

Whatever the ideological implications of these events—and perhaps ideological references are more confusing than helpful in this context—rural-based parties have been able to withstand the destabilizing challenges of a number of urban-based, competing elites. As Samuel P. Huntington sees this phenomenon (which he describes as the result of a "ruralizing election"):

... the party which was strong in the countryside normally secured control of the national government and inaugurated a regime characterized by a high degree of political stability. Where no party had a clear base of support in the countryside, some form of instability was the result. In some instances, urban revolts may overturn rural-based governments, but in general governments which are strong in the countryside are able to withstand, if not to reduce or eliminate, the continuing opposition they confront in the cities.³⁴

³⁴Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 437.

The use of peasant clients for purposes of political combat outside of the electoral realm has its limitations, obviously. But a clientelist base of support is also quite advantageous in political struggle and accommodation short of combat. Since the nature of the "contract" struck between the government (patron) and the peasantry (client) is concerned, really, with the flow of a rather mundane range of pay-offs—small amounts of land, credit, technological and marketing assistance—there is little or no ideological or programmatic content in the "contract" which might entangle a political elite with dissidents within or without its own party. As a result, peasant-based parties enjoy an amazing degree of flexibility in questions of policy, doctrine, and dogma. They are able to accommodate many divergent points of view within their own parties, and to deal pragmatically with opposition points of view without stirring up internal resistances. They are "pragmatic parties" *par excellence*.

But these very advantages of clientelist bases of support suggest the limitations of such systems. First, a clientelist base of support tends to erode the ideological coherence and program content with which the leaders of these parties come to power. This is less true in a revolutionary situation, as in Bolivia and Mexico, where the parties which came to power had no ideological coherence to begin with. But Democratic Action, and to an even greater extent, the Italian Christian Democrats, did attach some importance to doctrine and ideology. The Italian case is especially striking, for both the Communists and the Christian Democrats were frustrated by the manner in which their policy and doctrinal preferences were thwarted by the clientelist mentality. The power of the peasant culture in this respect was clearly noted by Tarrow:

... social groups remain chaotic, and political organization normally resides latently in the clientele ties between landholder and agricultural worker, lawyer and client, and bureaucrat and favor seeker. Local and parochial loyalties suffuse politics. Politics has very little ideological content, and popular imagery recognizes only two basic social groups: peasants and non-peasants.³⁵

The result has been internally traumatic for the Italian Communist Party, which operates in a distinctly different milieu in the north. "Party leaders," notes Tarrow, "complain that southern members cluster around dominant personalities and neglect the day-to-day tasks of organization and proselytism," and "critics maintain that the

evidence points to the PCI's being a typical southern party of clientele."³⁶

Ideological erosion in the southern clientelist milieu has equally dismayed the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, despite the fact that electoral support is derived therefrom:

Fanfani called for the *political*, and not simply the economic, development of the South. "Above all," he said, "we must create active and efficient party sections and organizations in southern Italy, if we want to create a politics of facts and ideas instead of a politics of agitation and macaroni" . . . terms that epitomized the traditional tools of southern Italian politics: the generic protest, the patronage appointment, the letter of recommendation, the sack of pasta on election day—in other words, the clientele system.³⁷

In short, one of the limitations of clientelist politics is the strain it places on coherent ideologies. This may manifest itself in several important ways. Ideological parties may find it so difficult to reconcile discrepancies in ideas and reality that they will be either unable to build a clientelist base to begin with, or to maintain one if they do. Therefore, other, more pragmatic, parties may outdo them in competition for the peasant vote. Similarly, within parties, the stretching of ideology to encompass and legitimate clientelism may work in one of two ways: either the majority of the party leadership accepts the erosion of ideology, in which case the ideological purists among the leadership may leave the party; or the leadership majority may resist the erosion of ideology, in which case the peasant clients may leave or be lured away from the party. In either case, the party is weakened.

A second general limitation of clientelist politics is that it seems to be a transitional phenomenon—or, better put, appropriate and successful only under certain conditions, and then for a limited period of time. As Huntington has analyzed this situation in his book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, political modernization involves several alternative cycles of change in urban-rural power and stability.³⁸ The mobilization of a peasant base of support by an urban-based political party is one form of what Huntington calls the "Green Uprising." Eventually, in the course of overall modernization, the growth of the city becomes a destabilizing phenomenon; in some cases, an urban elite group can form an alliance with the peasantry, sur-

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309.

³⁸ Huntington, *op. cit.*, especially the first and last chapters.

³⁶ Tarrow, *Peasant Communism*, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

rounding, as it were, the unstable city with the stable countryside by bringing the two into an interdependent relationship. The resulting period of governmental stability may then be used to perform many of the necessary modernizing tasks of government in the course of development. Success, however, brings with it a decreasing relevance and effectiveness of the original peasant base of support:

If revolution is avoided, in due course the urban middle class changes significantly; it becomes more conservative as it becomes larger. The urban working class also begins to participate in politics, but it is usually either too weak to challenge the middle class or too conservative to want to do so. Thus, as urbanization proceeds, the city comes to play a more effective role in the politics of the country, and the city itself becomes more conservative. The political system and the government come to depend more upon the support of the city than upon that of the countryside. Indeed, it now becomes the turn of the countryside to react against the prospect of domination by the city.³⁹

In terms of a peasant-based clientele system, such as Venezuela's, the end of this cycle is marked by a gradual tapering off of governmental support for the agrarian reform program, as growing urban-based clientele groups exert increasing influence on internal party politics. The budgetary priorities problem may provoke splintering within the party, as brokers in the peasant clientele system find their ability to deliver the goods downward gradually eroded. These party subleaders in many cases demand a "re-radicalization" of the agrarian reform—that is, a resumption of larger flows of land and other agrarian reform benefits—and may even try to reinstate the land invasion tactic. In Venezuela and in Mexico, such internal dissension has resulted in brokerage leaders identified with the peasant branch either leaving the party for a more radical alternative, or being purged; and the occasional establishment of new peasant union splinter movements.

The general pattern, then, seems to be a cyclical one—the rise and fall of peasant-based clientelist politics. Where the political culture is a carrier of patron-client patterns of behavior, the disintegration of peasant clientelist politics does not mark the demise of the generic pattern. To the contrary, urban-based clientelist politics may proliferate. They may be more subtle and complex, but function in essentially the same manner. The agrarian reform, often begun with

an initial burst of distributive activities, is slowed down, or consolidated, into a bureaucratic program of gradually receding importance. It may be succeeded by vast programs in worker's housing construction, or public works projects to improve the nature of life for the urban masses. These and other signs may indicate that the cycle described by Huntington is nearing its end.

V. CONCLUSION

It seems appropriate to conclude this discussion of clientelist politics by placing the concept in perspective: what claims are made for it as an heuristic tool, and what are its limitations? The concept, I believe, helps to illuminate the political behavior of low-status actors, particularly peasants, as they are incorporated, recruited, mobilized, or inducted into the national political process. Inasmuch as the induction of the peasantry into this process has in fact not yet occurred in many of the developing countries, an understanding of clientelist politics may be useful in a predictive sense. And while clientelist behavior may be most visible in the political cultures of Mediterranean extraction, there is much—although scattered—evidence that it can be encountered in political cultures in many parts of the world. This is not a prediction that clientele systems of the type found in Italy or Venezuela are to be anticipated elsewhere, but that clientelist patterns of interpersonal behavior may be a significant factor in the process of peasant politicization everywhere.

Clientele systems clearly differ from other forms of politically representative systems in several ways. In clientelism, there is an almost complete dependency on face-to-face relationships in the building and maintenance of the system. Impersonal communications between persons low and high in the system hierarchy are as ineffective as they are rare.⁴⁰ A low-status participant may, on occasion, personally approach a high-status participant in the same clientele system, but normally he depends on a series of linkages with intermediate brokers. This norm-dependency on personal contact—derives from the nature of the patron-client contract.

The dyadic contract between 'patron and client—or broker and patron—is a private, un-

⁴⁰ In my study of local peasant union leaders in Venezuela, it was found that 79.9% of all contacts between local and state leaders were in the nature of personal visits. Even contacts with national level peasant union leaders were predominantly in the nature of personal visits (33.1%), rather than through correspondence (11.9%) or other means.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

written, informal agreement, and highly personalistic in content. There is no public scrutiny of the terms of such agreements. There is no public entity which functions as an enforcement authority concerning such agreements. There is, in short, no process by which either partner of the agreement can go "outside" the dyadic relationship for enforcement of the contract, or to bring sanctions for noncompliance. Enforcement, compliance, and performance are bound up in, and limited to, the face-to-face relationship between the client and broker, or the broker and patron.

This stands in sharp contrast to the relationship between citizen and representative, or even party member and party leader, in modern systems of political transactions. In essence, the patron-client pattern occurs in the realm of private accountability, the modern pattern in the realm of public accountability. In fact, such a distinction is what makes patron-client ties functional in the first place. As Eric Wolf has put it, in a slightly different context:

The clearest gain from such a relation should therefore appear in situations where public law cannot guarantee adequate protection against breaches of non-kin contracts. This can occur where public law is weak, or where no cultural patterns of cooperation between non-kin exist to guide the required relationship. It can also occur in dealings which border on the illegal or the extra-processual.⁴²

The most obvious difference that the private-public distinction makes is in the degree of power asymmetry between superior and subordinate. Superiors in a clientele system are relatively free to behave in an arbitrary and highly personalistic manner in dealing with their subordinates. Subordinates in a clientele system have relatively little recourse in such a situation. Theoretically, clients could improve their bargaining position relative to patrons through the formation of horizontal organizations, such as peasant unions. In practice, this seems difficult for at least two reasons. First, the power asymmetry between client and broker, or patron, on the local level works against the formation of such independent organizations. Organizers, potential local leaders, and prospective members are all relatively vulnerable to the negative sanctions available to the local broker or patron, who often enjoys the cooperation of other local authorities. Second, clientelist patterns of behavior frequently exist in the relationship be-

tween peasant union leader and follower.⁴³ For both of these reasons, peasant unions tend to be part of a clientele system organized from above, rather than a bargaining organization initiated from below.

The burden of this essay has been to explain the transformation of patron-client ties from a strictly local, landlord-peasant relationship of a traditional kind, into a complex, relatively modernized national transaction system. The main point has been that clientelist patterns of behavior persist in modern organizational form, and that an explanation of interpersonal or institutional behavior will be significantly enhanced by understanding the nature of clientelist politics. The fact that achievement criteria become more important in filling patron and brokerage roles is not inconsistent with the maintenance of traditional values embodied in the ascriptive-oriented traditional forms of clientelism. In fact, just as a relatively high power asymmetry promotes stability within clientele systems, the combination of traditional and modern value orientations in the "new" clientelism may function to perpetuate old forms in a manner quite consistent with modern organizational requirements. Seymour Martin Lipset, in discussing ways in which the Japanese have maintained particularistic and ascriptive traits while at the same time combining universalistic and achievement patterns into the elite recruitment process, illustrates how such a combination can function in a highly successful manner.⁴⁴ The example of Japanese industry, in fact, not only suggests that traditional patterns of behavior can be consistent with the requirements of modern organizational life, but may even enhance the performance of such requirements in a highly competitive environment. The implication which might flow from this would be that peasant-based transaction systems successfully perform in a competitive, modernizing political environment because of, not in spite of, the functionality of traditional practices and values.

The argument can be carried one step further.

⁴² For a concise picture of such relationships in the Brazilian Peasant Leagues, see Benno Galjart, "Class and 'Following' in Rural Brazil," *América Latina*, 7 (July-September, 1964), 3-23.

⁴³ Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 42-44. See also Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers . . ." *op. cit.*, and Charles Wagley, "Luso-Brazilian Kinship Patterns: The Persistence of a Cultural Tradition," in *Politics of Change in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1964), edited by Maier and Weatherhead, pp. 174-189.

⁴⁴ Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

I would submit the proposition that certain traditional elements of the political culture, such as clientelism, become more, not less, important as modernizing changes take place in a peasant-based society. Evidence relevant to this proposition has been turned up repeatedly by social anthropologists studying the adaptation of peasant cultures to the stresses and tensions associated with socio-economic change. As Mintz and Wolf suggest in their analysis of *compadrazgo* (a fictive kinship tie) in Hispanic America:

It is extremely noteworthy that the mechanism of *compadrazgo* has maintained itself here in the face of what appears to be progressively accelerating social change. We wonder whether the elaborations of the mechanism's forms may be part of the community's unconscious effort to answer new problems. It must increasingly face the insecurity of growing incorporation into the national structure and increasing local wage-based, cash crop competition. This may call forth an increased emphasis on techniques for maintaining and strengthening face-to-face relationships.⁴⁶

Further evidence that change increases reliance on certain traditional practices was found by Wolf in Mexico. In his study of the changing intergroup relations of Mexican Indian communities, he took note of the "tendency of new group relationships to contribute to the preservation of traditional cultural forms."⁴⁵ Myron Weiner's findings in India were also consistent with the proposition advanced above. In *The*

"Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, 'An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood (*Compadrazgo*),' in *Peasant Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁴⁵ Eric Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," in *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

Politics of Scarcity, he noted the strong tendency of post-independence political change to bring about marked increases in the activities of traditional community associations of various kinds. These associations were relied on to link village interests with the emerging structures of a modern nation-state.⁴⁶

In short, modernizing transformations in peasant societies may well make the study and analysis of clientelist politics more relevant than ever before.⁴⁷ While scholars generally acknowledge the importance of patrimonial-type behavior in traditional politics, both at the mass and at the elite levels, there may be insufficient appreciation of the fact that such behavior may survive, quite functionally, very late into the developmental process. Much of the evidence presented here has concerned the nature of such behavior in local politics, but I have also tried to demonstrate the importance of clientelist politics as an organizing principle at all levels of developing polities. Whether or not, and to what degree clientelism exists; whether it functions at the level of the village or throughout the polity; and what impact such behavior has on the course and pace of political development are significant, if not critical, empirical questions in the study of politics in peasant-based societies.

⁴⁶ Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), especially pp. 36-72.

⁴⁷ In fact, such a literature seems about to emerge. For example, Professors René Lemarchand and Keith Legg of the University of Florida presented an excellent comparative study, "Clientelism and Politics: A Preliminary Analysis," to the members of the joint Harvard-MIT faculty Seminar on Political Development in February, 1970. The paper is planned for early publication.

AN EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental process of politics is the aggregation of citizens' preferences into a collective—a social—choice. We develop, interpret, and explain non-technically in this expository essay the definitions, assumptions, and theorems of a mathematical model of one aggregative mechanism—the electoral process.¹ This mechanism is conceptualized here as a multidimensional model of spatial competition

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¹ See the following: Otto A. Davis, and Melvin J. Hinich, "A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II*, J. L. Bernd, ed. (Dallas: Arnold Foundation, SMU Press, 1966); "Some Results Related to a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," *Mathematical Applications in Political Science III*, J. L. Bernd, ed. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1967); "On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preference in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," *Public Choice*, 5 (Fall, 1968), 59–72; "Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," forthcoming in *Social Choice*, B. Lieberman, ed. (New York: Gordon and Breach); Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process," *Public Choice*, 7 (Fall, 1969); Social Welfare and Electoral Choice in Democratic Societies," (unpublished, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1969); Peter C. Ordeshook, "Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Electoral Competition, and Implications for the Theory of Responsible Parties," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, (February 1970); *Theory of the Electoral Process* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1969).

in which competition consists of candidates affecting turnout and the electorate's perception of each candidate's positions, and in which the social choice is a policy package which the victorious candidate advocates.

This approach, inaugurated by Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, and falling under the general rubric "spatial models of party competition," has been scrutinized, criticized, and reformulated.² To clarify the accomplishments of this formulation we identify and discuss in section 2 the general democratic problem of ascertaining a social preference. We review critically in section 3 the definitions and assumptions of our model. We consider in sections 4 and 5 the logic of a competitive electoral equilibrium. We assume in section 4 that the electorate's preferences can be summarized and represented by a single function; the analysis in section 5 pertains to competition between two organizational structures or two opposed ideologies (i.e., when two functions are required to summarize and represent the electorate's preference). Finally, we suggest in section 6 a conceptualization of electoral processes which facilitates extending and empirically testing our model.

II. THE DEMOCRATIC PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE

The early literature of spatial theory examines a relatively simple problem, a fundamental assumption of which is that a single dimension describes sufficiently the preferences of citizens. Assuming: (1) that candidates seek to win elections, (2) that all participants in elections (i.e., candidates and citizens) have perfect information, and (3) that the candidate can adopt any position on this single dimension; this literature seeks to ascertain the positions candidates should adopt. Finding such a position, however, requires, first, that it exists—i.e., that some position be dominant, by which

² Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). For additional theoretical developments see: Gerald Garvey: "The Theory of Party Equilibrium," this REVIEW, LX (1966), 29–38; David E. Chapman, "Models of the Working of a Two-Party Electoral System," *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making III* (Fall, 1967), and *Public Choice* (Fall, 1968)

we mean that if a candidate adopts that position then he is guaranteed at least a tie in the election and a positive plurality if his opposition selects some position other than the dominant one. Unfortunately, the existence of such positions cannot be guaranteed generally and additional assumptions are required for it to exist. Consider the following *incomplete* argument purporting to support the proposition that, if all citizens vote, the median preference of the electorate is the dominant position:

Let θ^* (see Fig. 1) represent the median position for the density of "preferences" $f(x)$; thus θ^* divides the density equally. If the first candidate selects the position $\theta_1 = \theta^*$, the second candidate selects the position $\theta_2 < \theta^*$, and everyone votes, the first candidate receives a positive plurality; he is preferred by all citizens to the right of θ^* , which by construction is one half of $f(x)$, and he is preferred by those citizens to the left of θ^* who are nearer to θ^* than to θ_2 (and who provide his margin of victory).

Since dominant positions exert a powerful attraction to candidates, the argument that candidates should converge to the median might appear to be trivial. However, such an argument is incomplete; it requires additional assumptions, one of the most important being that the form of each citizen's preferences is "single peaked". Specifically, the argument that all citizens to the right of θ^* prefer θ_1 with $\theta_2 < \theta_1 = \theta^*$, implicitly assumes the existence of a specific class of orderings of the alternatives on the horizontal axis. If preference is indicated on the vertical axis, the preference orderings in this class are represented by functions which change direction at most once from increasing to decreasing (i.e., are single peaked). If this assumption is not satisfied we may be unable to identify a dominant position so that a paradox of voting is said to exist.

The illustration of this assertion, which is a special case of Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem, is so simple that it bears repeating.³

³ Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Cowles Commission Monograph #12, Wiley, 1951). See also: Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and with R. A. Newing, *Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation* (London: W. Hodge, 1951). A general exposition of the paradox and its implications is given by William H. Riker, "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade," this REVIEW, LV (December, 1961), 900-911.

Consider three citizens whose preferences do not satisfy the single peakedness assumption:

Citizen	Citizen's Preference Ordering
1	$A \rightarrow C \rightarrow B$
2	$C \rightarrow B \rightarrow A$
3	$B \rightarrow A \rightarrow C$

Although each citizen has no difficulty defining a preference ordering among the alternatives— A , B , and C —no alternative is dominant. B defeats A , C defeats B , and A defeats C , so that the social preference ordering— $A \rightarrow C \rightarrow B \rightarrow A$ —is intransitive. Thus, if A , B , and C are the alternative positions for a candidate, he cannot find a strategy which guarantees him at least a tie.

The possibility that such a paradox exists poses a problem for majority decision-making. Although most standard procedures for aggregating individual preferences (e.g., voting) yield a unique social choice, if preferences are not single peaked such choices depend, for example, on the order in which the alternatives are presented.⁴ Thus, if we cannot guarantee the existence of dominant positions in the context of electoral campaigns, the outcome of an election may depend on the temporal order in which candidates select their strategies.

Downs, who was perhaps the first to introduce into the contemporary political literature the problems which the paradox poses, considers only the world of one dimension. A simple example demonstrates, however, that the problems which the paradox introduces are compounded as more dimensions are considered.⁵ Consider Figure 2 in which the vertical and horizontal axes index two relevant dimensions. Assume that the electorate consists of three




FIG. 1

⁴ Duncan Black, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-25.

⁵ Duncan Black and R. A. Newing, *loc. cit.*




FIG. 2

voters, with their preferred positions denoted by v_1 , v_2 , and v_3 , and that there are two candidates (who do not vote). Finally, assume that the concentric circles drawn about v_1 , v_2 , and v_3 represent the indifference contours of each voter's preference function. Thus, a voter is indifferent between two alternatives if they lie on the same contour, and he prefers one alternative to another if it lies on a contour closer to his preferred position—i.e., a contour of a smaller radius. Now let the first candidate adopt any strategy, say θ_1 . Observe that the position θ_2 defeats θ_1 in a majority vote since it lies on indifference contours of smaller radius than θ_1 for the two voters preferring v_1 and v_2 . But voters 2 and 3 prefer θ_1^* to θ_2 for similar reasons while θ_1 defeats θ_1^* , etc. Obviously this cycle continues indefinitely. No dominant position exists, and the position a candidate should adopt depends on the position selected by his opponent.

Although this result may not be inordinately surprising, it demonstrates an important distinction between the unidimensional and multidimensional cases. Consider Figure 2 again but assume that citizens cannot vote on x_1 (i.e., the value of x_1 is fixed). This is equivalent to assuming that only motions on a line parallel to the x_2 axis may be considered. Preferences on this line, by construction, are single peaked so that the value of x_2 preferred by v_2 is the dominant choice. Alternatively, if x_2 is fixed, the value of x_1 preferred by v_3 is the social choice. Thus, even though a dominant position exists for each of the dimensions taken individually, the composite of these dimensions yields an intransitive social preference.

We can easily imagine such a situation whenever citizens are permitted to vote both on the amount of some service to be provided pub-

lically and on the fiscal institutions for funding such a service. If the electorate is provided with the opportunity to vote only for the amount of the service to be provided (with a given fiscal institution) or only for the fiscal institution (with predetermined level of public activity) an unambiguous social choice may be revealed.⁶ Such choices, as the previous illustration demonstrates, are not guaranteed with the composite of these two issues.

Since such a simple example demonstrates that dominant positions, in general, do not exist for a multi-dimensional world, one wonders whether they might exist for some reasonable set of conditions. Tullock, for example, suggests that the paradox occurs with less frequency than we might otherwise anticipate from Arrow's analysis.⁷ Socialization and agreement on basic normative precepts diminish the probabilities of multi-peaked preferences, and certain symmetries of preference reduce the probability of a paradox occurring in a multi-dimensional world. Similarly, the molasses-like variability of political parameters, and the uncertainty and imperfect measuring devices of both practitioners and academics, bring into question the relevance of such precise mathematical analyses as those of Arrow and Black. Stated differently, we do not know the frequency with which the paradox occurs in reality. That the paradox *can* occur, nevertheless, raises an ominous note for democratic theory. Specifically, it decreases the probable parsimony of acceptable models. If social choices depend on the order in which motions are brought forward for a vote, or on the number of motions, or on the number of citizens voting, then those *ceteris paribus* conditions commonly scattered through academic tracts (such as this one) can be of considerable importance. We contend, therefore, that political lore, empirical generalizations, or simple graphic arguments are not satisfactory for understanding the political process. The primitive inquires of Hotelling and Smithies, and the verbal unidimensional elaborations of

⁶ Such situations are examined closely by James M. Buchanan, *Public Finance in Democratic Process* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).

⁷ Gordon Tullock, "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (May, 1967). Richard G. Niemi presents an excellent formal treatment and interpretation of the probability of a paradox occurring in "Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality," this *REVIEW*, LXIII (June, 1969), 488-497.

Downs, are inadequate. We also reject the argument that no generalization is possible, since such an assertion precludes all scientific inquiry. An adequate comprehension of political processes requires rigorous theory which specifies unambiguously the relationships between relevant parameters. We seek, therefore, a model which promises to satisfy eventually our notions of an adequate theory (or which at least is conformable to such a theory). Given this objective, we now consider more rigorously the definitions and assumptions which constitute the foundation of our model.

III. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

A theory which seeks to explain how parties and candidates do act or ought to act is predicated on the citizens' responses to the candidates' strategies. And our preoccupation with the paradox of voting in section 2 suggests that such a theory is central to a spatial analysis of the electoral process. If we assume that parties and candidates waltz annually before a blind audience—that the electorate is neither attentive nor responsive to the candidates' maneuvers—then spatial analysis is not a requisite for understanding this waltz.

We conceptualize each citizen's choices and actions as the outcome of a two-stage sequential decision process. First, we assume that the citizen evaluates both candidates' (or parties') positions in terms of his own preferences; second, that he decides whether to vote or to abstain. If he votes he supports his preferred candidate. The sequential decision process is ordered in this fashion because the model postulates that the decision concerning whether to vote or to abstain depends upon the citizen's comparative evaluation of the candidates.

Every formalization, however, reveals the ambiguities associated with one's initial conceptualization of a problem. Consider, first, the central problem of ascertaining the method citizens use to compare candidates. Downs, as we note earlier, assumes that citizens compare the candidates' ideological closeness to themselves. The inadequacy of this conceptualization is that responses to campaign issues cannot be characterized as necessarily ideological.⁸ Al-

though some elections might involve a single issue, citizens' preferences cannot be ordered unambiguously on a single continuum. Opinion cleavages demonstrate that if spatial models are to retain descriptive and predictive value, they must allow for more than one dimension of conflict and taste.

This requirement first motivated our analysis. Instead of assuming that each citizen prefers one position on a common dimension, we assume that a citizen prefers a position on each of many dimensions. We represent a preferred position by a number, x , on the scale identified with each dimension. Consequently, for the i th citizen and the k th dimension the symbol x_{ik} indicates the position that a citizen, i , most prefers with respect to the dimension, k . We represent the i th citizen's preferred positions for all n dimensions by the vector,

$$(1) \quad x_i = \begin{bmatrix} x_{i1} \\ x_{i2} \\ \vdots \\ x_{in} \end{bmatrix}$$

This approach facilitates an analysis more nearly consonant with empirical evidence. For example, the complexity of modern society, the indeterminate implications of many policies, and the vagueness of political utterances guarantee the inability of even the most educated citizen to obtain a thorough knowledge and understanding of governmental policy and of the candidates' positions on issues. Thus, citizens employ criteria other than issues for evaluating candidates. The established fact that responses not related to issues (e.g., partisan identification, and candidate image) play significant, if not dominant, roles in determining electoral outcomes, however, does not vitiate the rationalistic perspective of voting behavior. Since our model is multi-dimensional, we can incorporate all criteria which we normally associate with a citizen's voting decision process—issues, style, partisan identification, and the like.⁹ The assumption that candidates,

(eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 175–207; Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," this REVIEW, LVII (June, 1963), 368–377.

⁸ V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1963), Ch. 7; Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261; "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in M. Kent Jennings, and L. Harmon Zeigler

⁹ The relative importance of issues, compared to image and partisan bias, as causal determinants of voting behavior remains an open question. Aggregate analyses of cross-sectional survey data demonstrate clearly the predictive dominance of partisan identification. V. O. Key, however, concludes in *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

parties, and public officials manipulate only governmental policy to win elections, therefore, is unnecessary.

Because a multi-dimensional model permits this latitude in the specification of the electorate's criteria for evaluating candidates, Downs' assumption of rational action is rendered less objectionable. Rationality in Downs' analysis ostensibly requires that each citizen has some information about the candidates' positions on issues. This information, however, is not free, and because many regard their votes as inconsequential, they avoid this cost by voting on the basis of the candidates' images or on the basis of socially determined partisan preferences.¹⁰ And since we interpret rational choice simply as choice which conforms to the assumptions of our model, voters are rational even though the candidates' positions on issues are disregarded.¹¹

Our analysis, moreover, is not sensitive to the number of relevant dimensions, or to their labels. The number and nature of issues change from election to election and it is doubtful whether anyone can successfully predict the issues that will be important in some future contest. These are parameters which must be ascertained empirically for each election.

The mathematical exercise of evaluating campaign strategies permits some ambiguity in the empirical referents for each dimension. The specification of the mathematical properties of the x_i 's, though, requires precision before rigorous analysis can proceed, and it is here that we constrain the realism of our model. First, *we assume that each dimension of taste is continuous*. This requires consideration of Stokes' observation that many dimensions are discrete and some are dichotomous (which Stokes terms "valence issues").¹² Conceptually,

1966) that policy counts heavily. Arthur S. Goldberg, moreover, demonstrates "that there is a rational component to party identification rooted in group norms" (p. 21) with the suggestion that these norms are related to issues, in "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," this REVIEW, LXIII (March, 1969), 5-25.

¹⁰ See Goldberg, *ibid.*

¹¹ This interpretation of rationality is equivalent to the *as if* principle of rational behavior as presented by Milton Friedman in "The Methodology of Positive Economics," *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). See also William H. Riker, and William Zavoina, "Rational Behavior in Politics, this REVIEW, LXIV (March, 1970).

¹² *Op. cit.* For a spatial analysis of discrete dimensions see Chapman, *op. cit.*

valence issues present no serious additional problems for the analysis of voting behavior. It is difficult, however, to mix continuous and discrete dimensions in one mathematical model, so we assume continuity simply to facilitate our analysis.

Stokes's observation, nevertheless, is pertinent. If, for example, only two spatial positions (e.g., party identification in a two-party system) are available, the candidates generally are unable to vary their positions. But the candidates may employ alternative means for influencing the electorate, such as varying the saliency of their party identification by stressing their party labels differentially. Although the analysis of strategies which have no spatial location can be conducted within the framework of our model, we focus here on the analysis of spatial strategies only.

Two additional assumptions implicit in our formulation of each citizen's preferred position must also be identified. First, *we assume that citizens act as if they estimate a preferred position for every dimension*. Thus, we ignore the possibility that citizens frequently do not or cannot evaluate alternative proposals for many issues. Second, *we assume that all citizens use the same indices to measure any given policy*. Stated differently, the indices measuring the various policies are common to all voters. Thus, we fail to consider Stokes's suggestion that "we may . . . have as many perceived spaces as there are perceiving actors."¹³

Even with these assumptions we must find a more convenient summary for our information about the electorate's preference before analyzing spatial strategies. Such a summary is obtained by observing that the vectors represented by expression (1) are not simply a collection of numbers; they also define a multi-dimensional coordinate system. Thus, the vector x_i , which represents the i th citizen's preferred position, identifies that citizen with some point in an n -dimensional coordinate system, where the citizen's preference on the k th dimension is measured along the k th axis of the coordinate system.

Assuming now that the preferred positions of all citizens are ascertained, we estimate the probability that a citizen, selected randomly from the electorate, prefers a particular position, say x_0 , by counting citizens preferring x_0 and dividing this number by the total number of citizens. When this calculation is performed for all preferences we plot a multivariate density of preferences, $f(x)$, which characterizes the population in the sense that it represents a summary statement of the preferred positions of all

¹³ *Ibid.*

citizens. We present in Figure 3 a unidimensional example in which a citizen, selected at random from the electorate, prefers x_0 with the probability $f(x_0)$.¹⁴ Figure 4 graphs a two-dimensional example in which a citizen, selected at random from the electorate, prefers x_{01} on the first dimension and x_{02} on the second dimension with the probability $f(x_{01}, x_{02})$.

The positions which a citizen prefers, however, are only a partial identification of the variables relevant for describing his calculus of voting. The act of voting implies a choice among candidates, so we require a representation of such alternatives. Additionally, since we assume that these choices involve a comparison of the alternatives and the citizen's preferred positions, we require that the representation of these alternatives conforms to expression (1). Since vectors characterize the citizen's preferences, and since a citizen's choice involves a comparison between these preferences and his perception of each candidate's position on each dimension, we assume that these positions also can be characterized by a vector. Thus, we let vector,

$$(2) \quad \theta_j = \begin{bmatrix} \theta_{j1} \\ \theta_{j2} \\ \vdots \\ \theta_{jn} \end{bmatrix}$$

represent the citizen's estimate of candidate j 's position on each dimension.

Although we represent the perceived position of each candidate as a vector, we cannot




FIG. 3

¹⁴ The densities illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 are represented as discrete although the scales are assumed to be continuous because electorates are finite populations. Nevertheless, our analysis is facilitated by assuming that $f(x)$ is continuous, which is not a serious distortion of any significance if the electorate is large. Hence, in all subsequent illustrations we represent $f(x)$ as a continuous density.




FIG. 4

assume that we know how citizens form estimates of θ_j . Downs, for example, offers several suggestions, such as estimating a candidate's strategy on the basis of past performance and probable future performance. But, like Downs, we cannot specify which suggestion is more satisfactory. Stated simply, a citizen's cognitive and evaluative processes are not sufficiently understood to permit us to identify the psychological mechanisms by which he forms estimates of θ_j .

But while the behavioral questions pertaining to θ_j remain unanswered, rigorous analysis can proceed only if we specify precisely the assumed mathematical properties of this vector. First, because we assume that θ_j is measured on the same dimensions as x_i , we also assume that θ_j is continuously measurable. Of greater substantive importance, however, is the additional assumption that *all citizens make identical estimates of θ_j* (thus we fail to subscript this vector with i —the citizen's index). Thus we ignore such problems as cognitive balance, imperfect information, and candidates' attempts to have different citizens believe different things about them.¹⁵ Repeatedly, we observe citizens

¹⁵ For a discussion of the role of cognitive balance see: Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," this REVIEW, LX (March, 1966), 19-28; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), ch. 10; Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969). Cognitive balance poses a problem for our theoretical analysis, but it also reduces the validity of much cross-sectional survey research about attitudes and voting behavior. Briefly, the causal link between attitude (i.e., preference) and vote is bidirectional for many issues. Simply regressing attitude on vote does not reveal the importance of an issue for a citizen's choice—a significant

making "rational" decisions (i.e., decisions understandable to the observer) by their failure to perceive the disadvantages of an already preferred candidate and by failing to perceive the advantages of an already not preferred candidate. If, for instance, a voter favors the passage of strong civil rights measures and his preferred candidate does not, he may, nevertheless, believe this candidate favors such measures. The voter, furthermore, may guard against disruptive information by erecting a perceptual screen and filtering out dissonant messages. Party identification is known to bias citizens' perceptions of candidates' platforms, and highly salient issues often perform an equivalent function.

Such psychological possibilities identify an additional assumption of spatial analysis; we assume that the candidates have perfect spatial mobility (i.e., they can adopt any position in the relevant coordinate system). Perceptual distortion and imperfect information, however, frustrate a candidate's campaign objectives where, for example, citizens in a secure Democratic constituency favoring liberal labor legislation remain unconvinced that a Republican candidate is pro-labor—even though it is true. And in a multidimensional world candidates might find it impossible to alter their position on one issue without altering their positions on other issues.

A candidate, of course, prefers to have all citizens believe that he supports each and every preference (i.e., $\theta_i = x_i$ for all i) and if attainment of this ideal is impossible he should adopt the second best solution of approximating this ideal as closely as possible. Our assumptions, nevertheless, exclude this possibility, so the positions associated with a candidate cannot (except in a trivial instance) satisfy all citizens. Thus, to explain the choices citizens make when

regression coefficient may indicate only that the attitude has been made consistent with a predetermined preference because it is unimportant. Multiple regression analysis with many attitudinal variables, moreover, is not a satisfactory solution either. A statistically insignificant regression coefficient may indicate only that that variable is related to some other independent variable in the analysis although it may in fact be an important determinant of candidate preference. Because of such difficulties Gerald Kramer analyzes the relationship between policy preference and voting with variables which are more objectively measurable than attitudes in "An Empirical Analysis of Some Aggregative Hypotheses About U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964," (unpublished, Yale University, 1968).

they regard neither candidate as perfectly satisfactory, we propose a measure of the citizen's evaluation of each candidate's position. Specifically, we provide for the loss in utility any citizen sustains when his preferred position is not supported by the candidates. We accomplish this end by introducing the concept of *individual loss functions*—functions which must satisfy several intuitively desirable properties before they are employed in the model.

First, if $x_i = \theta_j$ the loss citizen i sustains from candidate j 's position, symbolically written $L_i(\theta_j)$, should be at some minimum value or zero, since the candidate's position and the citizen's preference are identical for all dimensions.¹⁶ Consonant with this requirement, if $x_i \neq \theta_j$ (i.e., if at least one element of the vector x_i is not equal to the corresponding element in θ_j) the citizen should sustain a positive loss. Hence, we assume, *ceteris paribus*, that the greater the discrepancy between any element of x_i and the corresponding element in θ_j the greater is the loss citizen i associates with candidate j .

The mathematical formulation of these requirements is rendered difficult because: (1) the set of mathematical functions satisfying these two criteria is infinite, and; (2) the available empirical evidence fails to restrict this set sufficiently. The solution we propose for this problem is to conduct the analysis when only the general form of the loss function is assumed.

Consider the following expression as a potential specification for a citizen's loss function when the number of issues, n , equals 1.

$$(3) \quad a(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2$$

The term $(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2$ is the squared distance be-




FIG. 5

¹⁶ In some of our papers individual loss functions are symbolically represented by the function $\phi(x - \theta)$ to indicate that loss is a function of the difference between x and θ .

tween citizen i 's preferred position and candidate j 's position. If (3) represents a citizen's loss function and if $a > 0$, $a(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2$ increases as x_{i1} and θ_{j1} become more disparate. (The magnitude of a is a function of the scale used to index the issue so we ignore it presently.) Furthermore, if $x_{i1} = \theta_{j1}$, $a(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2 = 0$. Thus, expression (3) satisfies the two conditions which loss functions must satisfy. This function is illustrated in Figure 5.

Expression (3) however is not totally satisfactory since we must consider the possibility that $n > 1$. Suppose, therefore, that, if $n = 2$, we summed two such terms. Thus, another possible specification for the citizen's loss function is

$$(4) \quad a_1(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2 + a_2(x_{i2} - \theta_{j2})^2$$

Observe now that this expression satisfies our first condition which loss functions must satisfy; if $x_{ik} = \theta_{jk}$, for $k = 1, 2$, the expression reduces to zero. Thus, if this expression represents a citizen's loss function, the citizen's loss equals zero whenever $x_i = \theta_j$. This expression, moreover, satisfies our second necessary condition: if a_1 , and $a_2 > 0$, $L_i(\theta_j) > 0$ whenever $\theta_j \neq x_i$. Thus, another reasonable assumption about individual loss functions is that they are represented by expression (4). Figure 6 graphs such a function.

If the election involves more than two issues we might continue adding the necessary terms to (4). But this expression ignores one possibility—that the loss a citizen derives from a candidate's position on one issue is a function of the candidate's positions on other issues. So we add the interaction term $a_{12}(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})(x_{i2}$




FIG. 6

$-\theta_{j2})$ to (4) to account for this possibility. Thus (4) becomes,

$$(5) \quad a_1(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2 + a_2(x_{i2} - \theta_{j2})^2 + a_{12}(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})(x_{i2} - \theta_{j2})$$

If we graph expression (5) it resembles Figure 6—the graph of (4)—except that now it is rotated either to the right or left (depending on the magnitudes of a_1 , a_2 , and a_{12}).

For $n > 2$, expression (5) is easily generalized to,¹⁷

$$(6) \quad \sum_{m=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^n a_{mk}(x_{im} - \theta_{jm})(x_{ik} - \theta_{jk})$$

Thus, expression (6) represents the weighted (where the weights are the a_{km} 's) sum of squared distances (the terms for which $k = m$) plus the interaction terms between each pair of dimensions ($k \neq m$).

It remains, however, for us to interpret more precisely the weights in (6). To do so we return to the case of $n = 2$ —expression (5). If a_2 and a_{12} equal zero we say that only issue 1 is salient for the citizen and expression (5) reduces to (3). Consider a second example: assume that both dimensions are measured in terms of dollars spent on a program so that θ_j reads "candidate j wishes to spend θ_{j1} dollars on the first program, and θ_{j2} dollars on the second program." Assume, furthermore, that,

$$\theta_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \$1 \\ \$1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \theta_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \$3 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad a_{12} = 0$$

¹⁷ In matrix notation, expression (6) becomes

$$(x_i - \theta_j)' A (x_i - \theta_j)$$

where $(x_i - \theta_j)'$ is the transpose of $(x_i - \theta_j)$, i.e.,

$$(x_i - \theta_j) = \begin{bmatrix} (x_{i1} - \theta_{j1}) \\ \vdots \\ (x_{in} - \theta_{jn}) \end{bmatrix},$$

$$(x_i - \theta_j)' = (x_{i1} - \theta_{j1}, \dots, x_{in} - \theta_{jn})$$

and where A is the $n \times n$ matrix of weights, i.e.,

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdot & \cdot \\ \vdots & \vdots & \cdot & \cdot \\ a_{n1} & a_{n2} & \dots & a_{nn} \end{bmatrix}$$

This expression is generally referred to as the quadratic form. We can guarantee that the quadratic form satisfies our requirement that it be greater than zero if $x_i \neq \theta_j$ if we assume that A is an $n \times n$ symmetric (i.e., $a_{km} = a_{mk}$) positive definite matrix. This assumption implies no substantive restrictions on our model since we simply eliminate with it citizens who do not care about any issue (i.e. $A = 0$). For a discussion of quadratic forms see George Hadley, *Linear Algebra* (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1961), 251–263.

and that citizen i prefers spending no money, i.e.,

$$x_i = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Substituting these vectors into (4) (or, equivalently, into (5) since $a_{12}=0$), we get,

$$L_i(\theta_1) = a_1 + a_2$$

$$L_i(\theta_2) = 9a_1$$

Although the first candidate proposes to spend two dollars and the second candidate proposes to spend three dollars, the losses associated with each candidate are identical if $a_1 + a_2 = 9a_1$, or, equivalently, if $a_2 = 8a_1$. Thus, because of the unequal weighting of the issues, the losses a citizen associates with two candidates can be equal even though the candidates adopt dissimilar programs.

With this simple example we might be tempted to conclude that whenever $a_k > a_m$, issue k is "more salient" than issue m . Observe, however, that in this example we assume that the scales of both dimensions can be represented by a common measure, dollars. In general, campaign issues have no commonality of measurement and, additionally, the units of measurement for each dimension may be arbitrary. If, in the previous example, the second dimension is measured in cents, then

$$\theta_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \$1 \\ 100¢ \end{bmatrix} \quad \theta_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \$3 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

and the necessary condition for equality of losses becomes $a_2 = .0008a_1$. Thus, when both dimensions are measured in dollars equal losses requires that $a_2 > a_1$, but when the second dimension is measured in cents equal losses requires that $a_2 < a_1$.

This example reveals an important property of the a 's—their relative magnitudes are dependent on the scales of measurement which are applied to each dimension. And since we do not know either the scales which might measure all conceivable dimensions, the relative importance citizens attach to each dimension, or the prior identification of salient issues, the proof of our theorems should not require knowing the values of the weights.¹⁸ Thus, we at-

tempt to avoid the criticism that it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate these weights in any real campaign by proving theorems which are insensitive to the magnitudes of the a 's.

We note, however, that in our development of a citizen's loss function, the weights are not subscripted by i ; the weights are assumed to be common to all voters. This assumption, which is used in the earliest developments of our basic model, implies that the electorate is homogeneous. In other words, no restrictions are placed upon the preferred positions, so that citizens can desire widely different policies, but the assumption implies that all citizens assign the same relative weight to any dimension. Consider the issue of school desegregation. The model allows some citizens to desire segregated schools and other citizens integrated ones. The assumption that the weights are common to all citizens, however, implies that everyone assigns the same degree of importance to the issue. The model does not allow some citizens to be concerned while others do not care whether or not schools are integrated.¹⁹

Clearly, different citizens may not assign the same degree of importance to any issue. Yet the decision to allow individual loss functions to vary is not easily transferrable into a tractable model. Perhaps a natural method would be to assign different a 's to citizens, but such a step results in a model whose complexity appears to prohibit the realization of meaningful analytical results. Accordingly, we utilize a simpler approach.

We assume that there exists some average level of concern for each issue and, if individual variations are permitted, these variations are represented as deviations from this average. *We assume, additionally, that the patterns of individual variations in level of concern do not correlate with preference.*²⁰ This assumption appears to conflict with the proposition that a citizen is more likely to react intensely about an issue if he prefers an extreme rather than a moderate position. If the proposi-

so that the indifference contours for a citizen's loss function are concentric circles.

¹⁹ The assumption of a common A matrix does not imply an interpersonal comparison of utility. It implies that, when the loss functions for citizens are ascertained independently, there exists a monotonic transformation on each loss function such that all loss functions have a common A matrix in one coordinate system.

²⁰ When nonvoting (which is discussed later) is caused by alienation, we must assume that variations in level of concern are *independent* of preference—a somewhat stronger assumption.

¹⁸ There exists, moreover, a linear transformation on the axes so that any quadratic of the form $(x-\theta)'A(x-\theta)$ can be reduced to $(x-\theta)'(x-\theta)$ without loss of generality (i.e., A becomes the identity matrix I). Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that

$$L_i(\theta_j) = \sum_{k=1}^n (x_{ik} - \theta_{jk})^2$$

tion is correct, however, one should anticipate that relatively large and positive deviations from average concern will be associated with citizens who prefer either extreme on an issue; so there may be a zero correlation, although intensity and preference are not really independent.

If we accept expression (6) as an adequate representation of a citizen's loss function, however, we also accept the assumption of marginally increasing loss (i.e., as the citizen's preference on any dimension and a candidate's position on that dimension become more disparate, the loss which the citizen associates with this candidate increases at an increasing rate). Marginally increasing loss, however, is a hypothesis which may be disconfirmed empirically and which can be an unnecessary assumption. A more general formulation of the loss function is one which permits marginally decreasing, as well as marginally increasing, loss.²¹ Such a formulation permits loss functions similar to the one illustrated in Figure 7 (and since the loss function illustrated in Figure 6 is also consistent with this assumption we employ this weaker assumption whenever possible).

Note now, from Figure 7, that this assump-




FIG 7

²¹ Mathematically, we may assume that $L_i(\theta_j)$ is a function, ϕ , of the quadratic form. Thus

$$L_i(\theta_j) = \phi((x_i - \theta_j)'A(x_i - \theta_j))$$

where ϕ is any monotonically increasing function of its argument. Note that if $A = I$, the citizen's indifference contours remain concentric circles under the transformation ϕ .




FIG. 8

tion allows variations in θ_j to have little impact on $L_i(\theta_j)$ for θ_j significantly different from x_i —the citizen can become indifferent between alternative positions if they are already quite far from his preferences. Citizens with such loss functions might, for example, be those who refuse to distinguish between two candidates if neither is regarded as satisfactory. Alternatively, citizens with loss functions such as the one illustrated in Figure 6 continue to discount heavily the candidate's movement as he proceeds farther and farther away from their preferences. But for neither situation is the citizen's loss permitted to decrease as θ_j and x_i become more disparate.

Thus, we come full circle to our discussion in the previous section of single peakedness and majority decision-making. Consider the following example: assume that citizens are asked to reveal their preferences for alternative tax rates. Some citizens may base their preference on the theory that "the lower the taxes the better." Others may believe that a certain amount of government activity is necessary, differing among themselves only on the amount. They prefer some intermediate tax rate. A third set of voters, however, seeks to insure the adequate financing of current programs and, consequently, favors a substantial increase in the tax rate—as opposed to an incremental increase—so that additional programs can be financed optimally. A prospective loss function for this type of citizen which fails to satisfy our assumptions is depicted in Figure 8.

From the mathematical perspective of our assumptions the occurrence of such functions offers no problem. We can satisfy our assumption about the form of the loss function if we increase the dimensionality of the analysis—by decomposing one dimension into two or more (e.g., reversing the process of factor analysis). But if loss functions on tax policy, for example, are similar to the function illustrated in Figure 8, and if our assumptions are satisfied

by decomposition, what substantive political interpretation can be given to these new dimensions? We begin with a politically meaningful dimension—tax policy—which we assume has substantive meaning for both citizens and candidates. Can we assume further that the derived dimensions have substantive meaning? Are the candidates able to formulate policies on these dimensions?

Riker suggests a tentative answer to these questions:

If the preference curves are single peaked, then . . . there exists a common qualitative dimension along which all preferences are ordered . . . the single peaked curves . . . reflect a cultural uniformity about the standard of judgment.²²

If this "standard of judgment" is not uniform—if preferences are not single peaked—then the mathematical exercise of increasing the dimensionality of the analysis should discover the underlying multiple standards. And we assume, furthermore, that the candidates are able to formulate and manipulate policy on these standards. Consider again Figure 8. Our assumptions about loss functions might be satisfied if, for instance, we substitute two dimensions—efficiency in government spending, and government involvement (e.g., in welfare)—for the single dimension of tax policy. Thus we speak of the issues in the campaign as being efficiency and government involvement, but tax policy, per se, is not an issue.

We can now specify the citizens' rules for candidate preference. Generally, we assume that there are two candidates, and we denote the position of the first candidate as θ_1 and the position of the second candidate as θ_2 . From the definitions of rationality and individual loss functions, a citizen prefers that candidate whose position yields him the smaller utility loss. Symbolically, the i th citizen prefers the first candidate if,

$$L_i(\theta_1) < L_i(\theta_2),$$

he prefers the second candidate if,

$$L_i(\theta_1) > L_i(\theta_2),$$

and he is indifferent between the candidates if,

$$L_i(\theta_1) = L_i(\theta_2).$$

We assume, moreover, that if a citizen votes, he votes for the candidate he prefers. Thus, we do not consider the possibility that citizens disguise their preferences by voting against a preferred candidate. Farquharson demonstrates

that in small committees such strategic behavior can be fruitful if the paradox of voting exists or can be generated.²³ Such falsifying strategies in large electorates, however, seem worthless, since one citizen can have only an infinitesimal effect on the overall electoral preference. For large subgroups of the electorate, however, preference falsification can be rewarding, so we cannot guarantee that some citizens fail to perceive and to employ this strategy. Nevertheless, we assume that such behavior does not exist (rather than proving it does not exist or incorporating it somehow into the model).

Our assumptions concerning candidate preference and choice, however, describe only the first stage of the citizen's two stage sequential decision process. The second stage is the choice between voting for a preferred candidate or abstaining. First, some of the results reported in this essay require the assumption that all citizens vote. And for an electorate in which as many as 83 per cent of all eligible citizens vote (e.g., the 1960 Presidential election) and in which we can attribute most non-voting to habit or special circumstances, this assumption is not unduly restrictive.²⁴ Conversely, electoral outcomes frequently are determined by variations in turnout and other forms of participation (e.g., contributing money, ringing doorbells), and to the extent that the decision to vote or to participate otherwise is a function of the candidates' strategies, we require a theory about participation.

Presently we consider only variations in turnout, but in the final section of this essay we discuss how our analysis might be extended to include other forms of participation. The decision to vote is posited to involve a comparison of the relative expected utility from voting and not voting. Only if the expected utility of voting is greater than that of abstaining is it rational to vote. Riker and Ordeshook analyze this expected utility calculation and express

²³ *Theory of Voting* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). For examples of the occurrence of paradoxes in legislatures and possible occurrences of contrived paradoxes see William H. Riker, "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," this REVIEW, LII (1958), 349-366, and "Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of the Paradox of Voting," in J. M. Claunch (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas: Arnold Foundation, SMU Press, 1965).

²⁴ William G. Andrews, "American Voting Participation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, (December, 1966), 639-652.

²² *Op. cit.* p. 908. See also Niemi, *loc. cit.*, and Clyde H. Coombs, *A Theory of Data* (New York: Wiley, 1964), Cps. 5-7.

the expected utility of voting hypothesis as,²⁵

$$(7) \quad R = PB + D - C$$

where:

P is the citizen's subjectively estimated probability that his vote materially affects the outcome,

B is the absolute value of the subjective differential loss (or utility) between the candidates,

D is the utility a citizen derives from participating in the electoral process—termed the citizen's sense of duty,

C is the subjectively estimated cost of voting,

R is the expected utility of voting less the expected utility of not voting.

Thus, the citizen votes if and only if $R > 0$, and he abstains from voting if and only if $R \leq 0$.

The earlier analysis of equation (7) demonstrates the necessity for inclusion of the PB term, and, specifically, how P might be calculated. Presently, this equation serves as an *indicator* of the relevant factors in a citizen's decision to vote. The equation, however, must be augmented by a specification of these factors' relationships to the candidates' strategies.

We consider two causes of abstention: (1) indifference and, (2) alienation.²⁶ First, a reasonable interpretation of B suggests that it is not independent of the candidates' strategies, and this relationship, termed *indifference*, can be represented by the variables employed in our model.²⁷ From the definition of B and of the loss functions, it follows that,

$$B_i = |L_i(\theta_1) - L_i(\theta_2)|$$

where $|\cdot|$ means "absolute value of."

Thus B and, therefore, R, the utility of voting, decrease as the losses associated with both candidates become less disparate. Additionally, if we assume that factors other than P, B, D, and C affect R, and that these factors have random effects on the citizen's expected utility calculations, then, with the present formulation of abstention from indifference, we can assume that *a citizen's probability of voting decreases as the difference between losses which he associates with each candidate becomes less distinct.*

This assumption, however, appears to ignore the possible effects the candidates' strategies

might have on the citizen's sense of civic duty, D, which appears to be largely the product of long-term socialization (e.g., learning or long-term reinforcement through non-voting). We consider the potential short-term effects on D, nevertheless, and assume that *a citizen's probability of voting decreases as the loss he associates with his preferred candidate increases and that his probability of voting increases as this loss decreases.*²⁸ Thus, if we say that a citizen's decision to vote is a function of alienation, we mean that in the short run he identifies a preferred candidate, and, if this candidate is not deemed to be satisfactory, the citizen abstains.

Both assumptions—alienation and indifference—have intuitive appeal and it is probable that both operate to some extent in all electorates. We consider each assumption separately, however, to provide ourselves with a tractable mathematical model. We do not consider, though, one potentially important effect on turnout which is represented in (7) by P, the subjective probability of affecting the outcome. We ignore P not because we consider its effects unimportant, but because it would be difficult to include it and because it does not affect many of our results. Generally, we wish to ascertain the dominant spatial positions in a campaign. Our analysis focuses primarily on perfect competition and on equilibrium states; under such conditions P is maximized, identical for all conditions, and can be ignored with some justification.

The list of assumptions which constitute the foundation of our model is now completed. We proceed to the specification of dominant campaign strategies. Note, however, that ascertaining dominant positions or dominant ranges of positions should not be interpreted as presuming that these are in fact the strategies candidates adopt in elections. Candidates obviously have neither the luxury of perfect spatial mobility nor the endowment of perfect information about citizens' preferences. Ascertaining the electorate's preference is one of the difficult objectives for candidates in campaigns. Thus, we assume only that on the average (or in the long run) candidates act in accordance with the model. Deviations from the predictions of our model are expected to occur. We hope, nevertheless, that the model describes and explains some fundamental forces operating in democratic electoral systems and, by a process of Darwinian selection, that these deviations occur around a mean which the model predicts. We turn now to a description of these forces

²⁵ "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," this REVIEW, LXII (March, 1968), 25-42.

²⁶ Our assumptions about nonvoting conform closely to the two factors Garvey (*op. cit.*) identifies.

²⁷ See Ordeshook, "Some Extensions . . .," *op. cit.*

²⁸ See Hinich and Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium . . .," *op. cit.*

when the electorate's preference is best described by a single multivariate density.

IV. ELECTORAL STRATEGIES WITH A SINGLE DENSITY

Since dominant strategies generally do not exist in a multi-dimensional world, one objective of our analysis is to find conditions which yield dominant positions. In other words, our model should be interpreted as an attempt not only to correct the flaw of unidimensionality attributed to Downs, but also to specify conditions sufficient for majority rule. First, we consider two-candidate competition when the electorate's density of preferences is distributed unimodally. Second, the situation when the electorate's density of preferences is unknown is explored. Third, the effect of increasing the dimensionality of the election (i.e., the effect of variations in n , the number of issues) is analyzed. Finally, we consider competition when the electorate's density of preferences is bimodal.

Prior to beginning the analysis, however, we shall assume that the candidate's objective is to maximize his plurality. Although the rewards candidates seek vary (e.g., some candidates might desire idiosyncratic benefits from political activity), it is important to note that winning, at the very least, is instrumental for realizing most such goals. We assume plurality maximization, rather than vote maximization, because if winning is his criterion, a candidate must consider the votes his opponent receives as well as the votes which he receives.²⁹ A candidate must receive a positive plurality to win—not simply “many” votes. Even for those candidates who cannot win because of the historical prejudice of the voters of some districts (e.g., the one-party South), or those who do not seek to win (e.g., candidates who require ideological purity), the standard measure of performance is the disparity between a candidate's votes and the votes which his opponent receives. Thus, in game theoretic terms, we assume that elections are two-person zero-sum games.

It is possible to specify, with this game theoretic assumption, conditions that guarantee the dominance of a single position for *any* number of dimensions. The most prominent of these conditions is the symmetry and unimodality of

the electorate's preference density. By unimodality we mean that the preference density, say $f(x)$, has a single mode (e.g., the normal density function). Symmetry implies that if, for example, the mean of $f(x)$ equals zero, the probability that a randomly selected citizen prefers the position x equals the probability that he prefers the position $-x$ (i.e., $f(x) = f(-x)$). Thus, symmetry requires that there exists for every citizen with a given preference, another citizen with a diametrically opposed preference. An example of a symmetric, unimodal density in two dimensions (Figure 9) consists of a density whose contour lines are concentric circles or ellipses.

The dominant position for these densities is μ , the vector of the means of the preferred points for each dimension. Thus, *if $f(x)$ is symmetric and unimodal, a candidate cannot be defeated if he adopts a position equal to the mean of the electorate's preference on each dimension, and this conclusion is valid if all citizens vote or if citizens abstain from voting because of alienation or indifference.*

Assuring that conditions exist in a multi-dimensional contest which guarantee the existence of dominant positions should not obscure the eminent restrictiveness of these conditions. It is unlikely that the electorate's preference is perfectly symmetric, even though the proof of the above theorem assumes perfect symmetry. On the other hand, symmetry and unimodality are merely sufficient conditions, and dominant positions can exist for preference densities which do not have these characteristics. Nevertheless, one should not presume the existence of dominant positions.




FIG. 9

²⁹ For an analysis of electoral strategies when vote maximization is the posited goal see Hinich and Ordeshook, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," this REVIEW (forthcoming, September 1970).

This latter bleak possibility can be emphasized by returning to the simplistic Downsian world of unidimensional competition. Black demonstrates that if preferences are single peaked and if all citizens vote, a dominant position exists at the median. Furthermore, this result does not require symmetry of preferences. Note, however, that if a new feature is introduced into Black's analysis—if citizens are permitted to abstain—then this feature can preclude the existence of any dominant position under conditions equivalent to those that Black examines. Specifically, if $f(x)$ is a non-symmetric, unimodal, and unidimensional density, and if all citizens are assumed to vote, a dominant position will exist. On the other hand, if citizens can abstain because of indifference, then dominant positions, in general, do not exist.³⁰ This conclusion suggests that dominant positions are more unlikely in a multi-dimensional world, and especially one in which there is abstention, than either Arrow or Black suggest.

Let us now turn to unidimensional competition with abstention from alienation. If $f(x)$ is not symmetric, necessary and sufficient conditions for dominance are mathematically complex thus rendering difficult any substantive interpretation of the conditions. We have been unable to ascertain whether or not these conditions are satisfied for all unimodal densities of preference. These problems manifestly justify further rigorous investigation of Downs's assertion that candidates converge to a unique position when the electorate's density of preference is unimodal.

Two interesting and important observations can be culled from the conditions for dominance in unidimensional competition when $f(x)$ is unimodal and when abstention from alienation is allowed. First, if a dominant location exists, its location is, *ceteris paribus*, a function of the sensitivity of a citizen's probability of voting to variations in his preferred candidate's strategy—referred to as the *sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy*. If this sensitivity is low the dominant position is near or at the median of $f(x)$, if sensitivity is high, the dominant position is near the mode, but if this sensitivity is at some intermediate value the dominant position is typically not near the median or the mode. Substantively, consider the logical situation of a citizen's probability of voting being inversely related to his cost of voting. Obviously, by selectively varying such costs the

probabilities that certain citizens vote can be altered so as to change the policies candidates should adopt. Assume, however, that the cost of voting is varied *uniformly* throughout the electorate. Because a uniform variation increases every citizen's sensitivity (by definition) *electoral outcomes also are altered by uniform variations in the cost of voting*. Thus, such factors as the availability of polling stations, and *progressive* poll taxes affect the social choices which elections might produce.

A second observation concerns the strategy that a candidate should adopt if his opponent selects a non-optimal strategy. Consider three situations: (1) the opponent is near the dominant position; (2) the opponent is far from the dominant position; and (3) the opponent adopts some intermediate strategy. If $f(x)$ is unimodal and univariate, and if alienation causes abstention, a candidate who seeks to maximize his plurality adopts the following position for these three situations: (1) near the dominant position and closer to it than his opponent; (2) near the dominant position; and (3) near his opponent but closer to the dominant position than his opponent. Thus, if $f(x)$ is symmetric, and if we conceive of a situation in which the opponent shifts his strategy from the median to some extreme position, one can plot the candidate's plurality maximizing position against his opponent's position. Thus in Figure 10 the two axes measure the same unidimensional space but with one axis being reserved for one candidate and the other for his opponent so that the line (which does not represent a density) traces out the optimal position for the candidate if his opponent takes any given position.

Observe from this illustration that the candidate adopts a strategy near the dominant position (the median, which is represented here as the origin) if his opponent is either close to or far from this position. Thus, to contradict an observation made by Tullock (in reference to situations with all citizens voting) *if alienation causes abstention, the presence of an extremist opponent should not draw the candidate far from the equilibrium point*.³¹ A plurality maximizing candidate has an incentive to diverge significantly from this point only if his opponent is at some "reasonable" distance from the dominant position. This suggests an intuitively appealing strategy for candidates who do not seek to win but who simply wish to create incentives for other candidates to shift their positions—adopt a moderate as opposed to an ex-

³⁰ A counter example to dominance is presented in Ordeshook, "Some Extensions . . .," *op. cit.*

³¹ Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 52.




FIG. 10

treme position. Perhaps we have here an explanation for Goldwater's failure to influence Johnson's strategy of consensus.

Even with this interesting observation we must consider the situation in which no dominant position exists; specifically, one might desire to ascertain what bounds a rational candidate should place on his strategy (i.e., what region dominates alternative regions). Briefly, if everyone is assumed to vote and if little is known about the multivariate density of preference, $f(x)$, one can derive bounds on the relative distance from the mean a candidate can get before he insures that his opponent wins. We can show that if θ_2 is farther than two standard deviations from the mean of $f(x)$ than is θ_1 , then the first candidate is certain to win. If a candidate's position is close to the mean of $f(x)$, then his opponent either should adopt a position which is also close to the mean or should face the consequence of losing the election with certainty. Alternatively, if his opponent adopts a platform distant from the mean, the candidate is afforded greater freedom in the positions he may adopt without insuring that his opponent wins.

The importance of the mean becomes more impressive if we imagine a situation in which the first candidate selects the mean as his strategy and his opponent adopts some other position. *If the number of dimensions required to describe the preferences of citizens increases, the proportion of the vote received by the first candidate increases; and if the number of dimensions goes to infinity, the first candidate receives all the votes.* Thus, as the number of issues increases, the strategic importance of the mean as the focal point of the candidates' strategies increases.

This result demonstrates that varying the number of relevant issues is a potentially valuable campaign strategy. Candidates in strategically advantageous positions should increase the dimensionality of the contest while candidates in disadvantageous positions should simplify the election (i.e., reduce the dimen-

sionality) in addition to shifting to a dominant position. Note also that this result complements the intuitively satisfying notion that if a candidate is in a strategically advantageous position on a number of issues, he should attempt to increase the relative importance of these issues in the campaign.

We conclude that *as the number of issues increases, the electoral significance of candidates who advocate extreme positions decreases.* Obviously, the number of relevant issues varies from campaign to campaign. The cause of the variation is found, *inter alia*, in the exigencies of events, the candidates' focus on issues, and an increasingly pluralistic society. Perhaps as the electorate becomes more sophisticated, the number of dimensions required to represent issues increases. The civil rights "issue," for example, is no longer restricted to questions of voting and desegregation. Jobs, housing, business ownership, income distributions, and health, are now also components of this issue. Thus, assuming that responses unrelated to issues do not increase, then as a society grows more complex and the electorate more sophisticated, the chance that an extremist candidate might win is correspondingly diminished. One can also infer that the electoral fortunes of third parties are greatest when the number of issues is small, *ceteris paribus*. This inference is supported by the observation that, historically, the genesis of minor parties involves a single and dominant issue, and that any subsequent increase in the dimensionality of competition is accompanied either by a decrease in the fortunes of such parties, by their absorption by a major party, or by their replacement of a major party.

It is legitimately argued that individual voters do not perceive, and especially do not have feelings about, the entire spectrum of issues. Instead, voters are characterized as being concerned with a narrow subset of issues with the contents of the subset varying from voter to voter. Thus, farmers are supposed to care about farm price supports and those associated with the petroleum industry are supposed to be concerned with oil import quotas while the rest of us hardly even know about, and certainly are not concerned with, these issues. As the model is stated earlier, it does not include this type of phenomenon. However, with suitable assumptions, it is possible to show that our results concerning the dominance of the mean are valid for the special case in which each voter is concerned with a single issue, but in which the issue varies from voter to voter. Specifically, if we compute the mean preference for each issue by counting only those who care

about that particular issue, and if there is a symmetric preference density, then the mean vector is dominant. Also, if one candidate advocates policies which are "closer" to the vector of means than his opponent's vector, and if everyone votes, then the former candidate wins the election. Thus, our basic results obtain even if voters care only about a single issue which varies from citizen to citizen.

Thus far, however, our discussion considers competition only if $f(x)$ is either unimodal or unknown, though many electoral contests are interesting because the electorate's preference is distributed bimodally. Bimodal distributions indicate the presence of only minimal consensus, and it is competition without consensus which is of most interest for speculating about the selection of public policies by election. It is here, moreover, that we begin to uncover instances when candidates should not converge.

The results of our analysis of bimodal distributions are best expounded if we contrast these results with those achieved when preferences are distributed unimodally. In Table 1 we summarize our results.

Notice that *electoral outcomes differ between unimodal and bimodal densities only if alienation causes abstentions*. Thus, if all citizens vote or if indifference causes abstentions, the candidates should converge to the mean. One of us discusses this conclusion elsewhere within the context of the responsible parties controversy. Specifically, internal party discipline and an ability to implement programs to which the electorate has given its consent are not sufficient conditions for distinct programs.³² This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting to proponents of a responsible two-party system. Normatively, many of us might feel that whenever preferences are bimodally distributed the two modes of opinion should be represented. Consider, as an example, a situation in which

the society is governed by an omniscient and beneficent dictator faced with the task of selecting the "best" policies for his country, and where citizens' loss functions are marginally increasing (see Figure 6). The dictator should realize that in any nontrivial situation there is no possibility of satisfying everyone so he must select some scheme for evaluating the relative importance of the society's citizens—some scheme for making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Suppose that the dictator makes the judgment that such comparisons are meaningful, and decides that everyone should be weighed equally. These judgments imply that the best policies are those which minimize the total utility loss of the society. The dictator accomplishes this objective by selecting a position identical to the average desires of the population, so he selects the mean. Hence, competitive conditions which cause the two parties to converge toward the mean result in the electoral process producing the kind of result that a beneficent dictator should choose. This result, of course, although it does tend toward minimal utility losses, is quite contrary to the responsible party doctrine.

The beneficent dictator's preference for the mean is, in fact, more pervasive than the example might suggest. Instead of weighting each citizen identically, assume that the i th voter, with the preference vector x_i , is assigned the weight $w(x_i)$. Assume also that $w(x)$ is symmetric about the mean of $f(x)$ so that $w(x) = w(-x)$ if the mean is zero. There are two general forms of the weighting function $w(x)$ which are of interest here. First, the beneficent dictator might assign more importance to those in the "middle" than to those who held extreme positions, and in this instance we say that $w(x)$ is unimodal. Second, the dictator might weight "liberals" and "conservatives" more heavily than the "moderators" and in this instance $w(x)$ is termed not unimodal. With these assumptions the dictator's preferences are presented in Table 2.

Thus, *if the citizens' loss functions are marginally increasing the dictator selects the mean for all symmetric $f(x)$ and $w(x)$* . Alternatively, if loss functions are both marginally increasing and marginally decreasing no general solution exists (unless $f(x)$ and $w(x)$ are both unimodal). The social welfare "optimality" of the mean, therefore, is sensitive to the form of the citizens' loss functions, as well as the density of citizen preferences. The point here, however, is that in a variety of situations, with a variety of ethical assumptions arbitrarily assigned, the mean appears to be a desirable point. Accordingly, contrary to the responsible parties doctrine, forces

TABLE 1.—LOCATION OF DOMINANT POSITION

Distribution	All Citizens Vote	Non-Voting Because of Alienation	Non-Voting Because of Indifference
Symmetric Unimodal	Mean	Mean	Mean
Symmetric Bimodal	Mean	No General Solution	Mean*

* This result assumes that individual loss functions are quadratic, i.e., expression (6). If these loss functions are simply monotonic functions of (6), e.g., see Figure 7, then there exists no general solution. This case, however, is not yet satisfactorily analyzed.

³² Ordeshook, *op cit*.

TABLE 2. DICTATOR'S PREFERENCE

$f(x)$	Loss Functions Marginally Increasing Only		Loss Functions Marginally Increasing and Marginally Decreasing	
	$w(x)$ Unimodal	Otherwise	$w(x)$ Unimodal	Otherwise
Symmetric Unimodal	Mean	Mean	Mean	No General Solution
Symmetric Bimodal	Mean	Mean	No General Solution	No General Solution

which cause both party platforms to converge toward the mean, rather than recognizing differences in opinion, are not necessarily "bad" and, in the majority of the above cases, are positively "good" if one is willing to accept the assumptions.

Returning to Table 1, note that no general solution exists when $f(x)$ is bimodal and alienation causes non-voting. To specify the location of the candidates' preferred positions we must consider two additional aspects of the model. These aspects are (1) restrictions on the candidates' strategies, and (2) the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. First, if candidates are strategically unrestricted, then even for a single dimension, no dominant position, in general, exists. By imposing restrictions, nevertheless, equilibrium may be restored so that the candidates fail to converge and adopt strategies near the modes of $f(x)$. Specifically, if the candidates are restricted so that they cannot cross each other or cross the median, dominant strategies exist, and they can be different strategies for each candidate. And since both candidates converge to the mean if all citizens vote or if indifference causes abstentions, the only explanation for divergent positions (if candidates are afforded perfect spatial mobility) is that citizens abstain because of alienation.

This situation illustrates one of the values of formal mathematical analysis. Downs offers the intuitively satisfying but mathematically unproved proposition that whenever preferences are distributed bimodally, the forces of abstention prohibit rational candidates from converging. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that this proposition generally is false—restrictions on strategies may be necessary for equilibrium. We can also give meaningful interpretations to these restrictions. First, candidates may be committed ideologically and may be unwilling or unable to adopt platforms abridging such commitments. Second, a party's nomination is commonly a requisite for winning

the general election. The candidates, therefore, may find it necessary to make public commitments in conventions or in the primaries which bind them to these policies in the general election. Third, the electorate may associate traditional policies with a candidate and with his party and, therefore, strategies may be beyond the manipulative reach of the candidates except within a limited range. Finally, by crossing either the mean or his opponent's position, a candidate can alienate citizens—political activists, opinion leaders, and interest groups—whose support is vital. In electoral politics, citizens cannot be weighted in proportion to their numerical strength. If the preferences of activists differ from the preferences of the entire electorate, a candidate's optimal strategy should not be calculated from an unweighted aggregate density of preferences.

This last cause of strategy restrictions also offers an explanation of why candidates, who are afforded perfect spatial mobility, might not seek to converge when the mass electorate's preference is unimodally distributed. If the preferences of activists—citizens who are credited with disproportionately greater weights—are bimodally distributed, an electorate in which citizens are weighted in proportion to their potential contribution to a campaign, from a strategic perspective, may be equivalent to an unweighted electorate whose density of preferences is bimodal.³³ This idea is consistent with the observation that in competitive districts the legislative acts of Congressmen diverge more frequently from their constituencies' preferences than in less competitive districts.³⁴

³³ See, for example, Herbert McCosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, LIV (June 1960), 406-427, and; Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), ch. 8.

³⁴ Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in E.

It may be that competition forces Congressmen to assign disproportionate weights to activists, thereby affecting a bimodal distribution (even when the electorate's preference density may be unimodal). Thus, if candidates diverge and if preferences are arrayed unimodally, this should not be interpreted as a refutation of spatial models, but as an indication that the components of competition are far more complex than such simple minded tests.

Earlier we note that a second important consideration in the discussion of bimodal densities is the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. Specifically, if this sensitivity is sufficiently low, the candidates converge to the mean. Thus, we find a second important qualification for Downs's analysis of such distributions of preference. *Candidates diverge when preferences are bimodally distributed and when alienation causes abstentions only if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently great. Bimodal distributions and abstentions caused by alienation, then, are not sufficient conditions for non-convergence.* "Sufficiently great" is imprecise and most likely it must remain so. The incentives for convergence or divergence are sensitive to so many parameters of $f(x)$ and of turnout that generalization appears impossible. (It is possible, nevertheless, to ascertain dominant positions in specific instances.) We can generalize only by stating that, *as the sensitivity of turnout increases, the incentives for non-convergence increase if $f(x)$ is bimodal.*

V. ELECTORAL STRATEGIES WITH TWO DENSITIES

Having sketched some theoretical results for competition between two candidates in an electorate which is characterized by a single density of preferences, we now consider electorates characterized by two densities. Specifically, assume that the sum of two symmetric unimodal densities characterizes the electorate's preferences. This permits us to consider the phenomenon of political parties. We cannot analyze, of course, the detailed quality and variety of parties. It is possible to consider in these developments only some salient characteristics. Our approach to party politics assumes that a multivariate, symmetric, uni-

modal density characterizes the desires of the party membership and two (possibly overlapping) densities characterize an electorate of two competing parties. Additionally, assume: (1) all citizens vote; (2) candidates are first selected in primaries; (3) in primary elections citizens can only vote in their party's primary; and (4) in the general election citizens select the candidate whose strategy yields them the smallest loss without regard to party.

The term "without regard to party" may be viewed as a most unsatisfactory assumption. Previously, we indicate that a multidimensional model is valuable because partisan identification is admissible as an additional dimension of taste. However, it is now desirable to assume that partisan identification can be ignored—although this assumption is clearly contradicted by empirical fact. A solution to this *contretemps* is available. First, since the model permits as many dimensions of taste as necessary, one might assert that a substantial basis for party identification is found in these dimensions. Thus, if a sufficient number of dimensions is provided, we can minimize the distortion afforded by ignoring party identification. Alternatively, we may retain partisan identification as a dimension, say the n th, without affecting our definition of parties. We can analyze strategies, then, on the first $n-1$ dimensions and take cognizance of the citizen's bias inherent in the n th dimension.

The idea now is to utilize previous results to analyze the relationship between victory in the general election and the preferences of party identifiers. Thus, if candidacies are determined by primaries, a candidate is nominated whose position is identical with the mean vector of the preferred positions of the members of his party. Symbolically,

$$\theta_1 = \mu_1; \quad \theta_2 = \mu_2$$

where μ_1 and μ_2 are the means of the first and second parties' densities of preference respectively.

Imagine the means of the two densities being pulled apart or moved away from each other. In American politics, for example, the Democratic and Republican densities "overlap." However, as the means are moved further apart by shifting the distributions, this overlap diminishes until it vanishes. An illustrative, one-dimensional situation is set forth in Figure 11 in which no overlap exists. Obviously, since citizens select the candidate whose strategy is nearer their preferred position, at some point during the shifting all or nearly all citizens prefer the candidate of their party. In this instance the majority party always wins. The minority cannot exert an influence upon the formation of policy and is totally ignored. While




FIG. 11

the formal proof of this argument is of the limiting variety, the argument need not be stated here in such a form. The inference derived from the theorem is that, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the discrepancy between μ_1 and μ_2 , the less a minority party should favor government by simple majority rule.

Among the *ceteris paribus* conditions, however, are two important parameters of $f_1(x)$ and $f_2(x)$ —their variances. Considering the usual case in which overlap exists between the two densities, and assuming that the densities are normal or multivariate normal, it is possible to obtain some mathematically rigorous results. Assume that the preferences of the second party are more dispersed (in the sense that its members represent a “wider range” of opinion) than are the preferences of the first party. Two such distributions are represented for the unidimensional case in Figure 12.

Under these circumstances a necessary condition for the second candidate to win is that it be the majority party. Thus, a “dispersed” minority party, one which encompasses a much wider range of opinion than the majority party, cannot receive a positive plurality. An obvious corollary to this theorem is that *minority parties can win elections. Their chances increase, furthermore, as the range of opinion of their membership diminishes, ceteris paribus, relative to the dispersion of the opposition.* In the situation depicted in Figure 12 the first party, assumed to be a minority, might win, since the variance of $f_1(x)$ around μ_1 is considerably less than the variance of $f_2(x)$ around μ_2 . The discrepancy implies that the first party attracts more votes from the opposition than it loses from defections of its own membership. This point is intuitively satisfying and is useful for interpreting the efforts of minority parties to enforce a singleness of purpose and ideology in countries holding meaningful elections.

The preceding analysis assumes that each candidate adopts the mean vector of his party as his position in the general election. Obviously parties should not seek to constrain their

nominees to strategies reflecting solely the preferences of party activists. Otherwise, movement toward the mean of the opposition party, which might increase a candidate's probability of winning, is prohibited. This reasoning suggests an interesting conflict. The minority party has the most to gain by permitting its candidates to diverge from the party's preference, but it must work hard toward retaining its singleness of purpose. The internal tension of minority parties, therefore, is the tempering of ideological purity with the necessity of nominating viable candidates. The majority party, on the other hand has less to gain by permitting its candidates to diverge from the preferences of the party, but it is less concerned with its ideological purity. The internal tension of majority parties, therefore, is the necessity for selecting among an abundance of viable candidates on the basis of some criterion other than ideology.

VI. FROM THEORY TO THE REAL WORLD

Our definition of party structure undoubtedly abstracts many interesting and important distinctions between minority and majority parties, as well as the pervasive conflicts within such organizations. This is, of course, a feature of all theories. Abstractness is not an evil nor can it be avoided in the development of any science. The relevant question is whether we have deduced an empirically valid and meaningful situation or whether we have provided only an insight into the logical equivalences of a mathematical structure which bears little relevance to actual campaigns. Political scientists should not be concerned *per se* with insights into a mathematical structure. They *should* be concerned with the relevance of such a structure to exceedingly complex processes. Hence, the correspondences between the real world and our model require identification, and it is these correspondences which should be considered.




FIG. 12

Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem is an example of the properties of an abstract analysis and its relation to the real world. In section 2 the paradox implied by this theorem is illustrated with a relatively simple situation consisting of three citizens, with unambiguously identified preference orderings over three alternatives, and a predetermined decision rule. One concludes from that illustration that the possibility of intransitive social preference is a pervasive feature of all collective decision-making situations. More importantly, Arrow's analysis consists of ascertaining the logical consequences of certain assumptions—*assumptions which do not begin to encompass the complexity of social processes*. We regard his General Impossibility Theorem as a relevant consideration in all such processes, though, because we believe that he abstracts from these processes certain fundamental characteristics. Our model, like Arrow's, should not be interpreted as a *description* of the electoral process, but as an *abstraction* of characteristics which seem fundamental and pervasive in electoral processes.

Despite such conditional statements, some scholars discount a model's value if its assumptions seem naive and unrealistic or if the opportunities for empirical analysis and further development are obscure. These conclusions about a model's assumptions, however, often are the result of two factors which, if recognized, can render the assumptions more palatable. First, there may be an unintentional resistance either to conceptualizing (perhaps diverse) empirical phenomena in terms of a model's parameters or to reinterpreting these parameters. Second, an assumption's suitability may be disputed because of a confusion between the properties of an adequate theory and the properties of a description of reality in terms of the theory.

As an example of the first factor, consider Downs's assumption that competition consists of parties presenting alternative ideological positions to the electorate. Obviously, a party is a complex and heterogeneous organization, and no single point on a scale is an adequate description of its campaign behavior. Thus, Downs abstracts from his analysis a pervasive and important feature of elections. If this assumption seems to be essential for spatial analysis, and if weakening it is a formidable task, we might reject spatial analysis. But if we represent reality as competition between candidates (individuals) and change Downs's label from "party" to "candidate" we increase somewhat the promise of his approach. A party can be interpreted then as a density of individual preferences which constrain the positions can-

didates adopt in the general elections.³⁵ Hence, a seemingly naive assumption becomes less objectionable by a simple reinterpretation of its content.

As a second example of the first factor, consider our multidimensional model. A common criticism of spatial analysis is that many citizens do not evaluate candidates on the basis of "issues", since voters' preferences are explained by partisan bias or the candidates' images. Some scholars conclude, therefore, that spatial models of competition are wholly inappropriate for understanding elections. Nevertheless, one can argue that partisan identification or candidate "image" can be conceptualized not simply as biases or new parameters but as additional preference dimensions (i.e., elements in each citizen's x vector). Thus, while additional measurement problems require consideration, we can at least reinterpret our data so that no new theoretical variables are required.

As a final example of the first factor, consider the observation that many citizens do more than simply vote in an election—many people contribute time and financial resources to one candidate or to the other. Much of a candidate's energies, moreover, are directed towards such citizens because their support is worth more than an equal number of citizens who contribute only their vote. Thus, spatial models might be construed to be inappropriate for understanding this vital aspect of elections. If we interpret voting as *only* one kind of political participation, however, and if we assume, by an appropriate redefinition of the terms in equation (7), that R is the utility a citizen derives from participating in some specified manner, we may interpret our results as the strategies candidates should adopt if they seek to maximize their plurality of any measure of participation. Thus, if we employ the assumption that variations in alternative forms of political participation can be explained by an equivalent calculus we can extend our analysis to the competition for these forms of support.

Reconceptualization also increases opportunities for testing the model. It may be difficult to measure adequately many parameters of a citizen's calculus in mass electorates; factors which we abstract out of the real world (e.g., uncertainty) may confound testability. Our sources of data, though, need not be confined to mass electorates. If we allow the

³⁵ See Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections," (forthcoming); and R. G. Niemi and H. T. Weisberg, *Probability Models in Political Science*

generalization concerning participation, for example, we can focus on citizens who might contribute money. And if the model supplies a satisfactory explanation for such people's actions then we have some confidence that the model is useful for discussing other forms of participation. Citizens comprising this restricted data base, furthermore, should have more information concerning the candidates' strategies, and their own preferences. Some of our ideal-type assumptions thereby are rendered more consonant with our view of reality.

Nevertheless, reconceptualization cannot account for other phenomena, such as the degree of uncertainty citizens associate with a candidate's strategy. Obviously, citizens associate some uncertainty with each element of θ_j , and candidates manipulate the stochastic properties of these elements as a strategic alternative to varying spatial location. Because we explicitly assume that θ_j is deterministic, we cannot consider such strategies presently. A fundamental variation in our assumption is necessary, then, if we wish to incorporate uncertainty into the analysis.

Reconceptualization, moreover, cannot diminish the difference in complexity between our theorems about elections and the real elections themselves. What is a candidate's optimal strategy, for example, when he and his opponent seek *both* votes and finances, when the subset of voter and financial contributors overlap, when the concerns of both subsets overlap, and when the candidates eventually hope to convert dollars into votes? If one assumes that competition occurs between candidates and not parties, as another example, what is the proper role of parties and party structures in a spatial model? Thus, even reconceptualization cannot now include many important elements of elections such as uncertainty, cognitive dissonance, misperception, and the strategies of varying uncertainty and issue saliency. Therefore, one must evaluate the adequacy of spatial models from the perspective of these omissions.

This evaluation entails clarification of a confusion which plagues political research, and which is the second factor accounting for the charge of naivete or unrealism of assumptions. Political scientists commonly confuse the desirable properties of a deductive theory with properties of an adequate description of reality in terms of such a theory.³⁶ Theory con-

struction consists of formulating general sentences about reality. The general sentences of one or more theories may be applied to particular classes of real world situations. Thus, science proposes no general "theory of falling feathers," for example, which attempts to predict every twist and turn of a feather's flight. One the other hand, one might attempt to fully explain and predict a feather's path if the environmental conditions are well specified, and if sufficient computer resources are available; and such an effort would undoubtedly utilize existing theory. Nevertheless, the fact that parsimonious propositions about falling feathers cannot be constructed is not interpreted as an inadequacy of Newtonian physics.

For identical reasons, political scientists should not expect theories from which we deduce directly all relevant or interesting aspects of reality. Instead we must differentiate between the process of constructing theories and that of applying them. This distinction necessarily entails differentiating between those facets of reality which we do not conceptualize as elements of our theory and those elements which are simple complex combinations of laws we understand theoretically.

Consider, for example, our assumption that all citizens weight the issues in an identical fashion (or our weaker assumption that these weights are distributed independently of preference). Obviously, this assumption is not satisfied generally. Hence, the critic might reject our analysis or demand that such an assumption be removed. If we remove it, however, no general sentences may be forthcoming—the situation appears to be entirely too unstructured for the construction of law-like generalizations, although our perception may or may not be correct. We can suggest, however, a strategy for empirical research about the positions which candidates are likely to adopt: (1) decompose the electorate into subgroups such that for each subgroup one reasonably might anticipate compliance with the independence assumption (e.g., Pool *et al*'s categories);³⁷ (2) assuming that, for each subgroup, preferences are distributed symmetrically and unimodally, ascertain the mean

Davis, "Notes on Strategy and Methodology for a Scientific Political Science," J. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, IV (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1969).

³⁷ Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964).

use of the word *theory* see Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966). See also, Otto A.

preference vector of each such group; (3) for each candidate, ascertain those subgroups he is unlikely or unwilling to satisfy under any circumstances; (4) for each candidate, ascertain those subgroups he is likely to satisfy under any circumstance, and; (5) for the remaining (i.e., pivotal) subgroups find some strategy vector which comes closest to the aggregate mean preferences of these groups. This latter step, admittedly, is ambiguous, and it suggests employing devices such as ascertaining an optimal strategy by trial and error in simulated campaigns.

A second example in which we might combine productively techniques of application such as simulation with abstract theoretical principles concerns the potential conflict between the policy preferences of activists and those of voters.³⁸ By activists, we mean those citizens who, in addition to their vote, contribute valuable resources, such as finances or a party's nomination, to a candidate. Candidates

must accord these citizens additional consideration when formulating strategies. Generally, however, the means of the preference densities of the activists and of the mass electorate do not coincide, so the candidate somehow must compromise his strategies. He might, for instance, attempt simply to assign a weight to each citizen's preference on the basis of the citizen's value, ascertain the mean preference of the weighted population, and adopt this mean. But such *ad hoc* procedures require additional justification. A citizen's value is likely to be a function of the particular resource he contributes, the amount he contributes, and the candidate's opportunities for utilizing this resource—all of which may be functions of the candidate's present strategy which, in turn, is a function of the citizen's value and the weight the candidate assigns him. Within such cyclical relationships we can suggest a few factors candidates must consider (and which we must consider when testing spatial models):

1. the resources various groups of activists can contribute,
2. the preference density of each group and of the mass electorate,
3. the patterns of issue saliency within each group and within the mass electorate,
4. the opportunities for converting each resource into votes.
5. the tradeoffs between resources necessitated by conflicting policy preferences.

This list illustrates only some of the complexity of electoral processes. A deductive approach may be suited to analyzing abstractly the opportunities for converting resources such as finances into resources such as votes and the tradeoffs between resource procurement necessitated by conflicting policy preferences.³⁹ Candidates, moreover, probably employ simplifying decision rules. But elections are far more complex than falling feathers, so political scientists must be cognizant of the distinction between the processes of constructing theories and those of applying them in particular instances. The important problem is determining what aspects of electoral behavior are amenable to parsimonious deductive examination and what aspects are not susceptible to the development of law-like propositions.

Definitive answers to such questions, of course, are difficult to ascertain, and the absence of adequate research about even a few of

³⁸ Some practitioners of simulation methods might object to our removing simulations from the class of deductive scientific theories. We agree with Hayward R. Alker's observation that the logical operations of computer simulations are deductive ("Computer Simulation, Conceptual Frameworks and Coalition Behavior," in S. Groennings, et. al. (eds.), *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, forthcoming). But Alker's assertion constitutes a serious confusion of the use of deduction as a method of science with the notion of a deductive theory. In the first usage a deduction is the process of inference from general statements to concrete instances. Thus, one infers that, if all α are β , then a particular α is a β . In the second usage, deduction is the process of inference from general sentence to general sentence. Thus, one infers that if all α are β and if all β are α , then α is equivalent to β . The first kind of deduction is used in fitting models to reality, and, where analysis is complex, is the proper function of simulations; the second constitutes finding necessary and sufficient relations (i.e., cause) and is the proper domain of abstract mathematics. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, "Realities, Assumptions, and Simulations," in William D. Coplin (ed.), *Simulation in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), and Charles A. Powell's review of Coplin's book, this REVIEW, LXIII (September 1969), p. 937. Perhaps the most fruitful attempt at applying in concert simulation and the generalizations of game theory and coalition theory, and the one which comports with our understanding of the proper uses of simulation—is presented in Coplin's volume by Howard Rosenthal in "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulations."

³⁹ See Gerald Kramer, "A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political Campaigning," in J. L. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II* (Dallas: Arnold Foundation, SMU Press, 1966).

the factors we illustrate lessens the value of speculation. Nevertheless, we propose to identify some areas in which a deductive approach (theory *qua* science) might best be applied and some in which a less deductive approach might be more suitable. First, it seems reasonable to suppose that uncertainty can be introduced into the model if we let either the citizens' preference vectors, x , or the candidates' strategy vectors, θ_1 and θ_2 , be random variables.⁴⁰ Thus, we might examine the strategy of varying the uncertainty associated with a candidate's position and thereby consider situations in which an incumbent's position is known (because his position is the policies he supports while in office) and his opponent's position is a matter for speculation. Similarly, we should be able to construct general propositions concerning the strategy of varying the relative saliencies of issues, and to contrast the efficacy of each strategy—varying uncertainty, saliency, and spatial location.

A citizen's cognitive processes, however, are undoubtedly less amenable to such aggregate analysis, and approaches similar to those which McPhee suggests may be more appropriate.⁴¹ We might incorporate the effects of cognitive dissonance in a deductive analysis, for example, by assuming that the candidates' strategies are restricted and that these restrictions are mathematical functions of issue saliency. As with our assumption concerning a common pattern of saliency, however, an analysis of cognitive dissonance and its effects in heterogeneous electorates may not be susceptible to the development of general law-like propositions.

The inherent limitations of theories also should be kept in mind when analyzing situations in which no dominant position exists. We

note previously that dominant positions do not exist for most preference densities—even for idealized situations. So we propose in section 4 a general bound on acceptable strategies for any density, and our analysis of symmetric densities suggests that strategies near or at the median are powerful attractions for candidates in less restricted circumstances. The strategies candidates really do adopt if no dominant position exists, however, are at present a function of factors which are not included in our model. It is reasonable to suppose that some of these factors, such as restrictions on spatial location and the candidates' reaction paths, can be incorporated rigorously into the model. Other factors, such as miscalculation, probably must remain external.

Obviously one can imagine many additional extensions and inherent limitations of our model. We offer these suggestions as an alternative to a banal call for further research and the observation that people develop theory slowly and incrementally. Instead, we identify some extensions which we are currently researching, and we offer some notes of caution to others who seek to develop deductive political theories. These notes of caution are relevant also to those who might attempt to test some of our conclusions or who might attempt naively to draw inferences from the model about reality. One cannot, for example, conclude that two candidates should converge whenever polls reveal that preferences are distributed unimodally. The underlying distribution of activists' preferences may be bimodal and the support of these activists may be essential. If this is the case, it would be unwise for either candidate to set his position equal to the median because to do so would be to alienate this support. Additional complications are easily imagined. Hence, those who would test and develop a theory—as well as those who would criticize it—must recognize the distinction between features of politics which are expressions of general theoretical propositions and those which are complex combinations of these propositions.

⁴⁰ For a unidimensional spatial analysis of uncertainty see Kenneth Shepsle, "Essays on Risky Choice in Electoral Competition," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1970).

⁴¹ William N. McPhee, *Formal Theories of Mass Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 40.

AN AXIOMATIC MODEL OF VOTING BODIES*

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1. INTRODUCTION

The act of voting in legislative and judicial bodies is one of the most widespread and valuable sources of information available to political analysts. When individuals make structured choices within some known institutional constraints, there is opportunity for the generation of data concerning how issues are collectively defined within an institution, the relative position of each actor with regard to every other actor, and the identification of blocs of actors which are more or less persistent from one issue to another over time. With proper techniques of analysis, we should be able not only to generalize about behavior within a given voting body but also to make general statements about the voting process.

Cumulative studies of voting can be undertaken, however, only on the basis of some paradigm of the voting process—that is, some consensus on how voting as an act of political commitment is to be viewed.¹ Such a paradigm not only should provide a viewpoint for the study of voting but should also suggest an orientation to the more general political phenomenon of which voting is an example—that is, actors making mutually exclusive choices in

response to a series of questions, issues, candidates, etc. That such an agreed-upon viewpoint—not to mention a model that gives the viewpoint a precise focus—does not exist is obvious from the uses which have been made of voting data.² Despite the ubiquity of such data and the many different kinds of analyses that have been performed on them,³ there is no model available that logically interrelates (1) systemic characteristics of voting bodies, (2) individual characteristics of their members, and (3) relational characteristics between pairs of members in such a way as to yield operational measures of voting behavior that are comparative in nature. This lack of a model seems to us the basic reason why there are so many quantitative indicators of voting behavior and so few comparable results. More often than not, the indicators used by analysts are “interesting” measures that are unrelated to a set of explicit definitions and assumptions about voting behavior and therefore incapable of rigorous

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¹ We use the term “paradigm” to indicate the generally accepted assumptions, concepts, and techniques used by members working in a particular field or on a particular problem, but not necessarily accepted by, or relevant to, all members of a discipline like political science. See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), esp. pp. 49ff.

² We use the term “model” to mean both (1) an *arithmetical representation* of empirical phenomena, characterized by a set of tautological or logically true statements to which we shall co-ordinate descriptive concepts (e.g., Agreement Level, Variance Level, etc.), and (2) a *formalization* achieved by replacing descriptive concepts with symbols that facilitate the deduction of theorems. For an explication of these different meanings of the term “model,” see May Brodbeck, “Models, Meaning, and Theories,” in her *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), esp. pp. 588–597.

³ For a useful survey of different methods that have been used to analyze roll-call data, see Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966). See also Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) for a careful and systematic review of the statistical literature relevant to roll-call analysis.

comparison with indicators used by other analysts.

In this article we hope to do more than continue the proliferation of *ad hoc* indicators of voting behavior. What we shall propose is a probabilistic model which can be applied to voting data in order to develop a set of *a posteriori* probabilities⁴ that two randomly-selected members of a voting body agree on zero or more roll calls. These probabilities will allow us to calculate the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree, which is the basic measure we shall use to define operationally a set of empirical indicators of (1) agreement and variance in voting for the body as a whole, and (2) relative agreement between pairs of members. Additionally, we shall define a somewhat independent probabilistic indicator for individual members that measures the extent to which a member supports the position of the majority, or other specified members, of the body.

These indicators are all comparative in the sense of being applicable to voting bodies of any size whose members take any number of different positions on a roll-call vote. Although we shall develop our indicators in terms of three different kinds of votes ("yes," "no," and "abstain"), they can easily be extended to any number of options which seem appropriate

⁴ As distinguished from *a priori* probabilities based strictly on the outcomes of a conceptual experiment. Although we shall present in the beginning an abstract model of the outcomes of a voting experiment, we wish to differentiate this kind of model, whose probabilities depend on the actual voting of members of a body, from models in which the probabilities arise from the institutional prerogatives of the members (i.e., the "voting rules" of the system). For an example of the latter kind of model, see L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, XLIII (1954), 787-792; for an example of the kind of model used in this article that is based on the distribution of different kinds of votes, see William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies," in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (eds.), *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Research and Theory* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), pp. 377-384. It should be noted that the distinction we draw between *a priori* and *a posteriori* probabilities is quite different from that made in applications of Bayes' theorem. Cf. Peter W. Zehna, *Finite Probability* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 47-50.

under a particular voting procedure.⁵ Previous studies have been bedeviled with the problem of how to deal with more than two voting options, and all techniques so far suggested have been in our view unnecessarily arbitrary.

To begin our analysis, we shall develop a mathematical model, based on probability theory⁶ and using some calculus, that conceptualizes voting as a mapping of a set of members of a voting body into a set of voting options. From this abstract representation of the voting process, we can determine the numbers of members who voted in particular ways, which will serve as the basic parameters of the model.

The next step in the process of formalizing our model is to relate these parameters, or certain quantities based on the parameters, to each other through a set of assumptions (or axioms). The purpose of this *axiomatization* is to provide a starting point, in the form of an economical and self-contained set of elements and relations, from which we can efficiently generate a rich array of theorems that lay bare the concepts we define and logical connections among them. Defining concepts and proving theorems that help us to simplify and interrelate the concepts, and discover implications of the axioms, is the final step in the *mathematization* of the model, the product of which is a *deductive system* tied directly to reality only through its parameters and axioms. It is the concepts derived from the parameters and the theorems deduced from the axioms in the system, however, that are of greatest interest to us: the concepts provide us with our different measures of voting behavior, and the theorems help us to explicate their underlying logic, with the proofs providing a check on the correctness of our reasoning. In the absence of the logical structure that the system provides, one can easily run amok on a set of ambiguous concepts and inconsistent propositions, which are some

⁵ We have chosen to develop our model in terms of three kinds of votes instead of two since abstention is a frequently chosen voting option in some bodies (e.g., UN General Assembly, whose roll calls for several sessions we are now analyzing using the indicators of the model).

⁶ An excellent reference is William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications*, Vol. I (3d ed. rev.; New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968); at a less advanced level, see John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell, and Gerald L. Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), chpts. 3 and 4.

of the difficulties that have beset other studies of voting bodies.

The antecedent of the mathematical model is the mathematical theory on which it is based, the parameters of the model being an *interpretation* of the primitive, or undefined, terms in the theory. We have endeavored to provide not only the primitive terms with an interpretation in the context of voting bodies but the axioms, derived concepts, and proved theorems as well. Also, we have sought to give the model a concrete *operational* meaning by showing how the various measures developed in the model can be computed for a hypothetical voting body.

Because the approach we have taken to model-building is still unorthodox in political science⁷ (though its usefulness has recently been debated⁸), and because we do not want our purposes misunderstood, two points need to be stressed at the outset. First, our model, like verbal models, is an abstraction, or idealization, of reality that may or may not be regarded as fruitful in the building of empirical theory. Because it is *not* such theory, it is neither correct nor incorrect, true or false. Rather, through its assumptions the model provides a representation of the behavior of members of a voting body, just as a plane in Euclidean geometry may be used to represent

any real portion of the earth's surface.⁹ We can only hope at this stage that the model will give some logical coherence to the study of voting bodies and that some of the major concepts developed in the model may prove useful in the testing of hypotheses about the voting process. Toward realizing the latter aim, we shall give some examples later in the paper of testable hypotheses that incorporate concepts from the model, buttressed by some preliminary empirical results on the application of the model to both voting bodies (U.S. House of Representatives, national party conventions) and nonvoting data (wartime alliances in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).

Second, in our effort to make the exposition of the formal model as intelligible as possible, we have steered away from a heavy use of symbolism and strayed somewhat from a strict adherence to the stern canons of mathematical rigor and logical proof. We have, for example, tried to show that the parameters and axioms in our axiomatization are reasonable and useful (in general, there is more than one way to axiomatize a model), if not always "realistic," but not that they constitute an irreducible set (i.e., are logically independent). In fact, we have not even tried to enumerate all the definitions and assumptions of probability theory underpinning our axiomatization, but the mathematically inclined reader can easily fill in the gaps. We have not generalized our theorems to a voting body with more than three voting options, though in most cases the extensions are obvious. In the interest of economy, we have assumed without proof the properties of such well-known statistical measures as the mathematical expectation and variance and, in addition, have not included in this article the fairly long proofs of two theorems, though we will be glad to make these proofs available to anyone interested in them on request. Furthermore, so as not to clutter up the paper with innumerable, separately-stated "definitions," we have defined minor concepts which facilitate further description of aspects of a voting body in the statement of theorems. Thus, in building a model that might appropriately be regarded as "semi-formal," we have ignored some of the strictures of the axiomatic method and instead tried to highlight the intuitive rationale of the

⁷ Pioneering works by economists, relevant to political science, that employ the axiomatic approach include Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957); Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1958); and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Major works by political scientists using this general approach, though with rather different specific emphases, are Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957); and William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).

⁸ See the "Symposium on Scientific Explanation in Political Science" between John G. Gunnell and Arthur S. Goldberg and A. James Gregor, this REVIEW, LXVIII (Dec. 1969), 1233-1262.

⁹ For a brief history of the axiomatization of geometry, see Herbert Hochberg, "Axiomatic Systems, Formalization, and Scientific Theories," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 419-422.

FIGURE 1
MAPPING OF MEMBERS INTO VOTING OPTIONS




Fig. 1

formalization and illustrate with concrete examples the utility of the concepts developed in the model.

II. SOME FORMAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL

Preliminaries. We start with the notion of a set, or voting body, containing a finite number of members. "Voting body" is a primitive term to which we can add the relational concept of a "vote on a roll call" as a mapping of members of a voting body into (but not necessarily onto) a "set of voting options" containing, for example, the members "yes," "no," and "abstain." The idea of a *mapping*, which relates the members of two different sets to each other in a particular way, is a fundamental one in mathematics, but for our purposes it is only necessary to consider the results of the mapping (voting process). That is, on each roll-call vote the usual many-to-one correspondence established between the *domain*, or set of members of the voting body, and the *range*, or set of different voting options, partitions the domain into *preimages*, or subsets whose members voted in a particular way. Conversely, the mapping associates with each preimage a unique *image* (voting option), as shown in Figure 1.

Given three kinds of voting options in a voting body—"yes," "no," and "abstain"—the parameters (or variables) of the model for each roll-call vote are the numbers of members in each of the preimages:

y =numbers of members who vote "yes" on the roll call,

n =numbers of members who vote "no" on the roll call,

a =number of members who vote "abstain" on the roll call.

The total number of members present and

voting on each roll call is

$$t = y + n + a.$$

Interrelating these parameters through the axioms of our model will be the means by which we impose a *logical structure* on the voting of members in a voting body.

Definition 1. The probability that two *randomly-selected* members i and j agree on a roll call, $P(AG_{ij})$, is equal to the probability that both vote "yes," $P(Y_i, Y_j)$, both vote "no," $P(N_i, N_j)$, or both "abstain," $P(A_i, A_j)$:

$$P(AG_{ij}) = P(Y_i, Y_j) + P(N_i, N_j) + P(A_i, A_j). \quad (1)$$

Since the values of each of the three terms on the right-hand side of equation (1) are

$$P(Y_i, Y_j) = \frac{\binom{y}{2}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{y!}{2!(y-2)!} \cdot \frac{2!(t-2)!}{t!} \\ = \frac{y(y-1)}{t(t-1)},$$

$$P(N_i, N_j) = \frac{\binom{n}{2}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{n!}{2!(n-2)!} \cdot \frac{2!(t-2)!}{t!} \\ = \frac{n(n-1)}{t(t-1)},$$

$$P(A_i, A_j) = \frac{\binom{a}{2}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{a!}{2!(a-2)!} \cdot \frac{2!(t-2)!}{t!} \\ = \frac{a(a-1)}{t(t-1)},$$

where $\binom{m}{n}$ denotes the number of combinations that can be formed from m objects taken

n at a time, or $m!/n!(m-n)!$, equation (1) can also be written as¹⁰

$$P(AG_{ij}) = \frac{y(y-1) + n(n-1) + a(a-1)}{t(t-1)}.$$

Concretely, this measure may be interpreted as the ratio of the number of ways of choosing two members who voted the same way (without replacement of the first member before selection of the second) to the number of ways of choosing two members of the entire body (again without replacement). It is easy to show that $0 \leq P(AG_{ij}) \leq 1$.

Axiom 1. If $P(DG_{ij})$ is equal to the probability that two randomly-selected members i and j disagree on a roll call,

$$P(AG_{ij}) + P(DG_{ij}) = 1.$$

That is, it is a certainty that two randomly-selected members present and voting will either agree or disagree on a roll-call vote. More formally, we assume that the events "agree" and "disagree" are not only mutually exclusive (if one event occurs for a pair, then the other cannot) but exhaustive (no other event can occur).

Definition 2. $P(DG_{ij}) = 1 - P(AG_{ij})$.

The above follows immediately from Axiom 1 (i.e., $P(DG_{ij})$ is implicitly defined by Axiom 1). Alternatively, we can calculate $P(DG_{ij})$ from the formula,

$$P(DG_{ij}) = P(Y_{ij}, N_{ji}) + P(Y_{ij}, A_{ji}) + P(N_{ij}, A_{ji}), \quad (2)$$

where $P(Y_{ij}, N_{ji})$, for example, is equal to the probability that i votes "yes" and j votes "no" or j votes "yes" and i votes "no" (i.e., one member votes "yes" and the other votes "no," but it does not matter which one). In this case,

$$P(Y_{ij}, N_{ji}) = \frac{\binom{y}{1} \binom{n}{1}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{y!n!}{(y-1)!(n-1)!}.$$

¹⁰ Similar calculations could be made for the probability that blocs of three or more members agree on a particular roll call. For example, the probability that three randomly-selected members— p , q , and r —agree on a particular roll call is

$$P(AG_{pqr}) = \frac{y(y-1)(y-2) + n(n-1)(n-2) + a(a-1)(a-2)}{t(t-1)(t-2)}.$$

For a discussion of the probability of bloc voting under varying assumptions, see Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," this REVIEW, LVII (Dec. 1963), 906-908.

$$\frac{t!(t-2)!}{2!} = \frac{2yn}{t(t-1)},$$

and, after analogous calculations for the other two terms on the right-hand side of equation (2), we get¹¹

¹¹ The probability of paired disagreements based on the party affiliations of members rather than their actual votes on roll calls, is what Douglas W. Rae calls the "fractionalization" of seat shares in a parliamentary body. His probability calculations are valid, however, only for a body that approaches infinite size in which, having chosen one member of the body, the probability of choosing another member of the same (or a different) party is unaltered by the fact that there is one less member of the body (and the party, if it were that made on the previous choice) from which the second choice can be made. Since we are dealing with bodies of finite size, Rae's assumption of sampling with replacement is untenable and we must instead assume sampling without replacement in calculating these probabilities. Fortunately, the practical difference between these two assumptions is small except when the fractionalization index is applied to small voting bodies, so most of Rae's empirical results on fractionalization probably remain unaffected by his erroneous calculations. See *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 62ff. We shall see later that the size of a voting body will affect the probability that two randomly-selected members agree (or disagree), which Rae did recognize in a subsequent article, "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (Oct. 1968), 413-418. For a generalization of the fractionalization index to the study of political cleavages, see Michael Taylor and Douglas Rae, "An Analysis of Crosscutting between Political Cleavages," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (July 1969), 534-547; and Rae and Taylor, *On Political Cleavages*, forthcoming. An ingenious index, A_{ij} , developed by Duncan MacRae, Jr., for measuring agreement between two specific members of a voting body, has a probabilistic interpretation for bodies that approach infinite size in which two voting options are allowed: when two members agree, A_{ij} is equal to the probability of two randomly-selected members' taking the contrary position; when two members disagree, A_{ij} is equal to one-half the negative value of the probability of two randomly-selected members' taking different positions. These curious values have substantive implications which, as S. Sidney Ulmer has shown, are not justified by any explicit theoretical framework. See Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Indices of Pairwise Agreement Between Justices or Legislators,"

$$P(DG_{ij}) = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{l(l-1)},$$

where $0 \leq P(DG_{ij}) \leq 1$.

Axiom 2. The probability of agreement of two randomly-selected members on a roll call(s) is statistically independent of the probability of agreement on any other roll call(s). More formally, the number of agreements of two randomly-selected members on each roll call (0 or 1) are mutually independent random variables.¹²

This is a somewhat controversial axiom and deserves clarification. For the case when one member agrees to support another member in exchange for that member's vote at another time, it is evident that Axiom 2 is violated because the probability of agreement of the pair on one roll call is completely determined by their probability of agreement on the other roll call. It is doubtful, however, that of all possible pairs of members in a legislative or judicial body, the voting of a significant fraction of them is governed by pairwise pledges of support on most roll calls.

Variables exogenous to the model, like party membership, may upset the independence axiom in a more serious way. In the extreme case of a legislature whose parties exercise complete discipline over the voting of their members, membership in a party is tantamount to pairwise pledges to vote with each other member of the party on all roll calls, which clearly violates Axiom 2. In fact, any forces impinging on the members of a legislature that induce a subset of members to vote consistently the same way (e.g., because they are from the same geographic region) introduces a steady bias in voting that does violence to Axiom 2. Thus, though a particular vote on one roll call does not *logically* imply a particular vote on another roll call, two voters may decide to vote together because of reciprocal pledges to each other or blanket pledges to party, region, etc.

Midwest Journal of Political Science, X (Feb., 1966), 138-141; and S. Sidney Ulmer, "Pairwise Association of Judges and Legislators: Further Reflections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XI (Feb. 1967), 106-115. The inattention of analysts to the theoretical justification of quantitative indices underscores our previous argument of the need for deriving indices from models with clearly-articulated assumptions about the voting process.

¹² Cf. the "axiom of local independence" in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Neil W. Henry, *Latent Structure Analysis* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), p. 22.

To the extent that a member's affiliations are cross-cutting (e.g., Republican party, urban black constituency), his commitment to any particular subset of members will tend to be eroded and blanket pledges of support will less certainly be translated into pairwise pledges. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that the greater the number of cross-cutting affiliations of members of a legislature, the lower the probability that they will vote consistently with any one subset of members and, therefore, the more applicable Axiom 2 will be to the body.

Even in the extreme case where a steady voting bias prevails (e.g., because of strict party discipline) that is incompatible with Axiom 2, this does not make the definitions and theorems flowing from this axiom irrelevant or useless. In fact, the probabilities we shall give below in Theorems 1 and 1a may be strictly mythical in the sense that they do not reflect the voting of *any* pair of members. For example, if members vote strictly along party lines in a legislature containing two parties always at odds with each other, each member will agree with every other member with either probability 0 or 1 across a set of roll calls—and not some intermediate value which our calculation below will produce.¹³

The probabilities we shall give below apply to bodies whose pairs of members vote *as if* their probabilities of agreement were statistically independent across successive roll calls. What this involves is translating the deterministic fact that every voter unmistakably agreed or disagreed with all other voters on each roll call into a probabilistic statement for a hypothetical "average" pair.¹⁴ Thus, what we are really conjuring up in this conceptual experiment are two mythical voters whose probability of agreement reflects the amount of agreement between a "typical" pair of members of the body. The behavior of actual voters will be compatible with Axiom 2 to the degree

¹³ What we have specified are, in effect, the "limiting conditions" on the veracity of this axiom. See Herbert A. Simon, "On Judging the Plausibility of Theories," in B. van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (eds.), *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Sciences III* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 442ff.

¹⁴ For examples in mathematics and physics where "the determinateness of the simple single event and the probabilistic theory of the highly composite whole may seem to be equally compatible . . .," see G. Polya, *Patterns of Plausible Inference* (2d ed.; Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 194, fn. 3.

that their voting corresponds to that of the fictitious "typical" pair.

While this "typical" pair may not exist, it is precisely this kind of construct we are searching for in order to say something about how members of a body behave "on the average," just as the actuary is interested in describing the "typical" individual's chances of surviving "on the average." As Feller put it, "Practical and useful probability models may refer to non-observable worlds,"¹⁵ which sometimes can only be built on a structure of "unrealistic" assumptions (in the mortality tables of the actuary, everyone is dead at age 100). Milton Friedman described the role assumptions play in theory-building as follows:

Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions. . . . The reason is simple. A hypothesis is important if it 'explains' much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained. . . . Its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.¹⁶

The natural sciences have been built on a set of idealized situations (e.g., ideal gases, rigid rods, frictionless surfaces, perfect vacuums, and instantaneous velocities are all idealizations of physical states and objects) and "as if" assumptions, sometimes highly unrealistic, from which have been generated a set of nonobvious consequences possessing great explanatory power. To illustrate, Galileo's law of the inclined plane—that the distance traveled by a ball rolling down the plane increases with the square of time—

. . . does ignore variables that may be important under various circumstances: irregularities in the plane or the ball, rolling friction, air resistance, possible electrical or magnetic fields if the ball is metal, variations in the gravitational field—and so on, ad infinitum. The enormous progress that physics has made in three centuries may be partly attributed to its willingness to ignore for

a time discrepancies from theories that are in some sense substantially correct.¹⁷

Thus, assumptions (or axioms) are useful only because they are radical simplifications of the world.¹⁸ What is at issue here is not the verisimilitude of our axioms but (1) whether concepts can be derived from the axioms that are descriptive of important aspects of voting bodies, and (2) whether nonobvious consequences linking these concepts, which are amenable to empirical validation, can be deduced from the axioms of the model. We shall return later to these considerations, as they apply to the model, but for now the adoption of Axiom 2 enables us to calculate the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected

members i and j across a set of roll calls a —simply the product of the (unconditional) probabilities of agreement on each roll call.

Theorem 1. The probability that two randomly-selected members i and j , present and voting¹⁹ on m roll calls, agree all the time—or m out of m roll calls—is

$$P(AG_{ij})^{m,m} = P(AG_{ij})^1 P(AG_{ij})^2 \cdots P(AG_{ij})^m,$$

where the superscripted factors on the right-hand side of the equation indicate the probabilities of agreement of members i and j on all roll calls 1, 2, . . . , m , based on the actual number of "yes," "no," and "abstain" vote on each roll call.

Proof. Immediate consequence of Axiom 2.

Theorem 1a. This is a generalization of Theorem 1. The probability that two randomly-selected members i and j , present and voting on m roll calls,²⁰ agree on *exactly* k out of

¹⁷ Yuji Iriji and Herbert A. Simon, "Business Firm Growth and Size," *American Economic Review*, LIV (March, 1964), 78. Italics in original. We owe this citation to Bruce M. Russett, "Is There a Long-Run Trend Toward Concentration in the International System?" in Russett (ed.), *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), p. 312.

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realities, Assumptions, and Simulations," in William D. Coplin (ed.), *Simulation in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), p. 106.

¹⁹ Later we shall consider various ways to include absentees in the analysis.

²⁰ For the special case in which the voting members of a body are the same across all roll calls, the probability that *at least one* of the $p = t(t-1)/2$ pairs of members agrees on all roll calls is

¹⁵ Feller, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Italics in original.

¹⁶ Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 40–41. For a critique of this viewpoint, see Tjalling C. Koopmans, "The Construction of Economic Knowledge," in May Brodbeck (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 534–538.

the m roll calls ($k \leq m$) is

$$P(AG_{ij})^{m,k} = \sum_{\binom{m}{k}} [P(AG_{ij})^1 \cdots P(AG_{ij})^k P(DG_{ij})^{(k+1)} \cdots P(DG_{ij})^m].$$

Proof. Immediate consequence of Axiom 2.

The summation on the right-hand side of the above equation ranges over all combinations of m roll calls, $\binom{m}{k}$, on k of which members i and j agree and on $(m-k)$ of which members i and j disagree. The superscripts do not indicate particular roll calls but only the fact that in each term of the summation there must be k distinct roll calls on which members i and j agree and $(m-k)$ on which members i and j disagree. Since i and j may refer to any two randomly-selected members of the voting body, we can drop these subscripts and write the joint density (or mass) function of the probability distribution across m roll calls as follows:

$$f(m, k) = P(AG)^{m,k}$$

The key summation process of the model is embodied in the above theorems, which allow us to make probabilistic statements about agreement between members on more than one roll call. To calculate the probability, for example, that two randomly-selected members agree on two out of five roll calls, the summation on the right-hand side of the above equation would include $\binom{5}{2}=10$ terms. Each of these terms would contain two factors equal to the probability of agreement on two specific roll calls (e.g., roll calls 1 and 2)—the two roll calls being different for each of the ten terms—and three factors equal to the probability of disagreement on the remaining three roll calls (e.g., roll calls 3, 4, and 5).

Definition 3. The probability that two randomly-selected members agree on *at most* k out of m roll calls (i.e., agree on 0 or 1 or . . . k roll calls) is the distribution function,

$$P(AG_{p \geq 1}) = 1 - [1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]^p,$$

since $[1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]$ is the probability that a randomly-selected pair of members disagrees on at least one roll call and $[1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]^p$ is the probability that all pairs of members disagree on at least one roll call. Furthermore, the number of pairs, p , such that the probability is $P(AG_{p \geq 1})$ that at least one of the pairs agrees on all roll calls is

$$p = \frac{\log [1 - P(AG_{p \geq 1})]}{\log [1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]},$$

since

$$[1 - P(AG_{p \geq 1})] = [1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]^p.$$

$$F(m, k) = \sum_{x=0}^k f(m, x) = \sum_{x=0}^k P(AG)^{m,x},$$

or the sum of the density function's images for all points $x=0, 1, \dots k$.

Definition 4. The probability that two randomly-selected members agree on *at least* k out of m roll calls (i.e., agree on k or $(k+1)$ or . . . m roll calls) is

$$G(m, k) = \sum_{x=k}^m f(m, x) = \sum_{x=k}^m P(AG)^{m,x}.$$

Definition 5. The expected (or average) number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members present and voting on m roll calls agree is

$$E(AG) = \sum_{x=0}^m x f(m, x) = \sum_{x=0}^m x P(AG)^{m,x}.$$

Theorem 2. The expected number of agreements for each roll call i is equal to the probability of agreement on each roll call i , i.e.,

$$E(AG)_i = P(AG)_i.$$

Proof. For any single roll call i , $m=1$ in Definition 5. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG)_i &= \sum_{x=0}^1 x P(AG)_i^{1,x} \\ &= (0)P(AG)_i^{1,0} + (1)P(AG)_i^{1,1} \\ &= P(AG)_i^{1,1} \\ &= P(AG)_i \quad \text{from Theorem 1 or 1a.} \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 3. The expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members present and voting on m roll calls agree is equal to the sum of the probabilities of agreement on each of the m roll calls, i.e.,

$$E(AG) = \sum_{i=1}^m E(AG)_i = \sum_{i=1}^m P(AG)_i.$$

Proof. A well-known property of the mathematical expectation is that the expectation of the sum of a set of a random variables (whose values x on each roll call, given in the proof of Theorem 2, are equal to the number of agreements—0 or 1—for each pair) is equal to the sum of their expectations.²¹ Since the expected number of agreements on each roll call i is equal to the probability of agreement on each roll call i from Theorem 2, it follows that the expected number of agreements across a set of m roll

²¹ This is true even if the random variables are not mutually independent, as assumed in Axiom 2. While this axiom is not necessary to the proof of Theorem 3, we shall see later that it will prove necessary to the proof of Theorem 8 in the summation of variance across roll calls.

calls, given in Definition 5, can be expressed more simply as the sum of the probabilities of agreement on each of the m roll calls.

We shall now postpone a further elaboration of the formal model in order to illustrate some of the concepts which have so far been defined and develop heuristically the rationale for some later theorems which incorporate these concepts. We shall then present further formal aspects of the model, attempting throughout, however, to interpret the theoretical consequences flowing from the model with more understandable intuitive justifications and appropriate examples.

III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO VOTING DATA

To show how the probabilities can be calculated from voting data, consider a voting body of five members whose votes on five roll calls are given in Table 1. The probabilities that two randomly-selected members agree, $P(AG)_i$, and disagree, $P(DG)_i$, are shown for each roll call i . Note that the probability of agreement is at a maximum when all members vote the same way (roll call 5) and at a minimum when the three kinds of votes are split 1-2-2 (roll call 2).

For all five roll calls, the probabilities, $f(5,k)$, that two randomly-selected members agree on zero through five roll calls are given in Table 2, along with the cumulative probabilities, $F(5,k)$ and $G(5,k)$, that two randomly-selected members agree on at most, or at least, zero through five roll calls. Graphs of the density and distribution functions are shown in Figure 2, with smooth curves drawn through the points given in Table 2. It can be seen that the votes of no two members agree on zero roll calls (i.e., disagree on all five roll calls), so the corresponding probability, $f(5,0)$, is necessarily equal to zero. The probability that two randomly-selected members agree on two or fewer

TABLE 1.—PROBABILITIES OF AGREEMENT AND
DISAGREEMENT ON EACH ROLL CALL IN A
HYPOTHETICAL VOTING BODY

Roll Call	Votes of Members					Probability of Agree- ment and Disagree- ment of Two Randomly- Selected Members on Each Roll Call i	
	1	2	3	4	5	$P(AG)_i$	$P(DG)_i$
$i=1$	Y	Y	N	Y	A	.3	.7
$i=2$	N	N	Y	A	A	.2	.8
$i=3$	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	.6	.4
$i=4$	N	N	Y	N	A	.3	.7
$i=5$	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	1.0	0.0

TABLE 2.—PROBABILITIES OF AGREEMENT ON
FIVE ROLL CALLS IN HYPOTHETICAL
VOTING BODY

Number of Roll Calls	Probabilities That Two Randomly-Selected Members Agree on		
	k $f(5, k)$	At most k $F(5, k)$	At least k $G(5, k)$
$k=0$	0.00	0.00	1.00
$k=1$.16	.16	1.00
$k=2$.41	.57	.84
$k=3$.32	.89	.43
$k=4$.10	.99	.11
$k=5$.01	1.00	.01

roll calls is greater than one half ($F(5,2) = .57$), but the probability that two randomly-selected members agree on all five roll calls is very small ($f(5,5) = .01$). In fact, in the latter case a glance back at Table 1 will show that the votes of only members 1 and 2 coincide perfectly on all five roll calls.

What do these *a posteriori* probabilities tell us? First, they provide convenient summary indicators of agreement on roll calls that may be very helpful in measuring changes in the amount of agreement among members of a voting body over time. Not only are they useful for looking at the amount of agreement in a voting body as a whole, but they can also be applied to subsets of members (e.g., the members of a political party) to measure agreement within these subsets. For example, from Definition 5 the expected number of roll calls on which members 1 and 2 agree is

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG) &= 0f(5, 0) + 1f(5, 1) + 2f(5, 2) \\ &\quad + 3f(5, 3) + 4f(5, 4) + 5f(5, 5) \\ &= 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 5(1.00) = 5.00, \end{aligned}$$

where the probability values for the first five terms on the right-hand side of the equation are all equal to zero. For members 3, 4, and 5, on the other hand, the expected number of agreements of two randomly-selected members is

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG) &= 0(0) + 1(.45) + 2(.44) + 3(.11) \\ &\quad + 4(0) + 5(0) = 1.67. \end{aligned}$$

For all five members of the voting body,

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG) &= 0(0) + 1(.16) + 2(.41) + 3(.32) \\ &\quad + 4(.10) + 5(.01) = 2.40. \end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, from Theorem 3 we could have summed the probabilities of agreement on each roll call to obtain the above values of $E(AG)$ for the body as a whole and the subsets. Note that


DENSITY AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL VOTING BODY

Fig. 2

these are not necessarily values that we expect to observe, since we would never observe 1.67 or 2.40 agreements between a pair across a set of roll calls, but rather the over-all average number of agreements per pair in the subset or the body.

Thus, while members 1 and 2 can be expected to agree on 100 percent (five out of five) of the roll calls, two randomly-selected members of the subset comprising members 3, 4, and 5 can be expected to agree on 33 percent of the five roll calls and two randomly-selected members of the entire five-member body can be expected to agree on 48 percent of the five roll calls. The amount of agreement would therefore appear to be least in the subset containing members 3, 4, and 5.

Having made these calculations for subsets of different size, it might appear that we could compare the amount of agreement not only in such subsets but in voting bodies of different size as well. A quick calculation will show, however, that for a given distribution of yeas, nays, and abstentions in a voting body (say, in the proportion 3:2:1), the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected members on a roll call will be greater when there are more members (say, 60) so divided (30-20-10) than when there are fewer members (say, 6) so divided (3-2-1). In the latter case, the probability that two randomly-selected members agree is

$$P(AG) = \frac{3(2) + 2(1) + 1(0)}{6(5)} = .27,$$

while the probability in the former case is

$$P(AG) = \frac{30(29) + 20(19) + 10(9)}{60(59)} = .38.$$

We may formalize this result as

Theorem 4. As the size of a voting body, t , becomes larger and larger (with a constant distribution of votes),²² the probability that two randomly-selected members agree on roll call i approaches the limit,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P(AG)_i = \frac{y^2 + n^2 + a^2}{t^2},$$

which in the case of the above distribution will be equal to

$$\frac{3^2 + 2^2 + 1^2}{6^2} = \frac{14}{36} = \frac{7}{18} = .39.$$

Proof. This involves proving that the function, $P(AG)_i$, for the limit postulated above, satisfies the definition of the limit of a function as $t \rightarrow \infty$. This proof is completely straightforward, though somewhat tedious, and will not be presented here.

IV. MEASURING AGREEMENT IN VOTING

Why is the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected members of large bodies necessarily greater than for small bodies? The reason for this surprising finding is that in larger bodies there are proportionally fewer pairs of members who can disagree. For a voting body consisting of only three members in which three kinds of votes are allowed, it is possible for all the members always to disagree on a roll call if one votes "yes," one "no," and one "abstain." If there are four members of a voting body, however, the votes of at least one pair of members must agree; and as the number of voting members increases, so does the *minimum number* of pairs that must agree. The *minimum proportion* of pairs that must agree, when the body is split as equally as possible among the different kinds of votes, is a non-decreasing (but not always increasing) function of the size of a voting body, as we see from the following theorem.

Theorem 5. In a body where the votes remain as equally divided as possible among the "yes," "no," and "abstain" positions, the proportion of agreeing pairs in the body will in-

²² If the distribution of votes does not remain constant and only some kinds of votes (say "yes" votes) tend toward infinity as the body becomes larger and larger, then $P(AG)$ will approach a different limit. For the case, for example, where only the "yes" votes approach infinity and the numbers of "no" and "abstain" votes remain finite as t increases,

$$\lim_{\substack{y \rightarrow \infty \\ t \rightarrow \infty}} P(AG) = \frac{y^2 + n(n-1) + a(a-1)}{t^2}.$$

crease as the number of members increases, except for the case where the size of the body increases from $(3n+2)$ to $3(n+1)$ members, where $n \geq 2$ (e.g., from 8 to 9 members); in this case where the membership increases to a multiple of 3, the proportion of pairs that agree in a body as equally divided as possible remains constant with increasing membership (e.g., $7/56$ for 8 members equals $9/72$ for 9 members). *Proof.* Available from the authors on request.

If the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected members for a given distribution of votes is greater in large bodies than in small bodies on each roll call, then the expected number of agreements between two randomly-selected members across a set of roll calls will also be greater in large bodies. This "bias toward agreement" in large bodies renders our previous measure of agreement—the expected number of agreements as a percentage of total possible agreements—incomparable in voting bodies of different size.

In order to make comparisons between voting bodies (or their subsets) of different size, we must be able to show how close the votes of members of a body approach "maximum disagreement" (or "minimum agreement") on a set of roll calls. The maxima for voting bodies of different size can then be used as a baseline against which to compare the relative closeness of different bodies to maximum division.

Theorem 6. If three kinds of votes are allowed in a voting body, the probability that two randomly-selected members disagree on a roll call will be maximized when one-third of the members vote "yes," one-third "no," and one-third "abstain."

Proof. This can be proved by showing that

$$P(DG) = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{t(t-1)} \\ = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{(y+n+a)(y+n+a-1)},$$

subject to the constraint,

$$t = y + n + a,$$

has an extreme value for

$$y = n = a = t/3.$$

This is easy to demonstrate using the Lagrange multiplier method. By finding partial derivatives of the function,

$$f(y, n, a, \lambda) = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{(y+n+a)(y+n+a-1)} \\ + \lambda(t - y - n - a),$$

with respect to the variables y , n , a , and λ , and setting them equal to zero,

$$f_y = f_n = f_a = f_\lambda = 0,$$

we can solve these four equations for y , n , and a (as well as the multiplier, λ), whose values are all equal to $t/3$. Since the bordered principal minors alternate in sign, the first being positive, the sufficient conditions for the extreme value to be a maximum are satisfied.²³

When the number of members of a voting body is not exactly divisible by three, the probability of disagreement will be maximized when the addition or subtraction of one vote equalizes the yeas, nays, and abstentions. For example, in a 33-33-34 roll call in a 100-member body, the subtraction of one abstention would equalize the division, and thus such a vote would maximize the probability of disagreement between two randomly-selected members of the body.

For the two and three-member subsets in our hypothetical voting body, disagreement is at a maximum when each member votes differently from the other(s) on all roll calls. For such a distribution of votes, the probability that two randomly-selected members agree on one or more roll calls is equal to zero, and so, therefore, is the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree.

The probability of disagreement for all five members of the voting body is maximized when two members vote one way, two another, and one the third way. Since two pairs of members must necessarily agree on each roll call in such a split, the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree will therefore be greater than zero. In fact, for five roll calls the expected number on which two randomly-selected members agree is 1.00 when there is the above division among the five voting members on each roll call, as contrasted with an expected number of 5.00 if all five members vote the same way on each roll call. Since the expected number in our hypothetical voting body is equal to 2.40, we conclude that the voting behavior of this body is closer to the disagreement extreme than the agreement extreme. We may formalize this notion as

Definition 6. For a voting body of any size voting on any number of roll calls, its Agreement Level (AL) is

$$AL = \frac{E(AG) - E(AG_{\min})}{E(AG_{\max}) - E(AG_{\min})},$$

²³ See Taro Yamane, *Mathematics for Economists: An Elementary Survey* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 348. When only "yes" and "no" votes are considered, the probability of disagreement will be maximized when the members come as close as possible to a 50-50 split.

where $0 \leq AL \leq 1$ and

$E(AG)$ = expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree (Definition 5 and Theorem 3),

$E(AG_{\min})$ = expected number when vote on each roll call is as equally divided as possible (i.e., when probability of agreement is minimized and disagreement maximized),

$E(AG_{\max})$ = expected number when all members vote the same way on each roll call (i.e., when probability of agreement is maximized and disagreement minimized).

The AL index is the only "agreement" index of which we are aware that varies between zero and one for a voting body of any size, voting on any number of roll calls, using (in principle) any number of voting options.²⁴ The larger the value of the index, the greater the amount of agreement among the members. In our hypothetical voting body,

$$AL = \frac{2.40 - 1.00}{5.00 - 1.00} = \frac{1.40}{4.00} = .35.$$

This value compares with AL values of 1.00 for the subset containing members 1 and 2 and .33 for the subset containing members 3, 4, and 5. As before, the amount of agreement is less for the subset containing members 3, 4, and 5 than for the entire body ($AL = .33$ versus .35), but by a much narrower margin than our previous calculation (33 percent versus 48 percent

²⁴ Though the proposition put forward by Aage R. Clausen that "measures of paired agreements cannot be converted into measures of group cohesion by simple summation" is not entirely clear, the AL index would seem to meet most of the objections raised by Clausen against other indices (in particular, the sensitivity of Grumm's "index of colligation" to group size and its inapplicability to individual roll calls). See Aage R. Clausen, "The Measurement of Legislative Group Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XI (May, 1967), 212-224; and John Grumm, "The Means of Measuring Conflict and Cohesion in the Legislature," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XLIV (March, 1964), 375-388. It should be noted that the AL index does not allow one to determine the stability of factional alignments in a voting body (a particular AL value may reflect either permanent or shifting cleavages across a set of roll calls), but later in the article we shall develop an index which will be useful in determining the most cohesive voting blocs in a body.

expected agreement on five roll calls), which did not take into account the size of a voting body, suggested.

V. MEASURING VARIANCE IN VOTING

On occasion it is useful to know not only the level of agreement in a voting body, which may be the same for many different voting patterns (e.g., the same AL index may reflect high agreement on some roll calls and low agreement on others or moderate agreement on all roll calls), but also the deviation from this level of agreement averaged across a set of roll calls. In this regard, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, in a study of United Nations voting utilizing "standardized ranks" of countries on roll-call votes, employed factor analysis to construct an "index of divergence" to measure the lack of cohesiveness in voting groups on different issues over a number of years.²⁵ This index is "simply the mean deviation from the group average factor score,"²⁶ the factor scores having been derived from the correlation matrix which in turn was computed from the "standardized ranks" of all countries on all votes. The relation of this index to observable phenomena is so remote that we find it very difficult to attribute any substantive meaning to it.

A statistic for measuring the divergence (lack of uniformity) in the voting of members of a body that is "closer" to the data, and therefore more readily interpretable, can be computed from the probability measures already developed.

Definition 7. The mean squared deviation from the expected number of agreements across m roll calls (i.e., the squared deviations weighted by the probability of their occurrence), or variance in the number of agreements, is

$$\text{Var}(AG) = \sum_{x=0}^m [x - E(AG)]^2 f(m, x),$$

where $\text{Var}(AG) \geq 0$.

Theorem 7. The variance in the number of agreements on each roll call i is

$$\text{Var}(AG)_i = P(AG)_i - [P(AG)_i]^2.$$

Proof. For any single roll call i , $m = 1$ in Definition 7. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(AG)_i &= \sum_{x=0}^1 [x - E(AG)_i]^2 f(1, x)_i \\ &= [E(AG)_i]^2 f(1, 0)_i \\ &\quad + [1 - E(AG)_i]^2 f(1, 1)_i. \end{aligned}$$

²⁵ *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 255.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

From Definition 2 and Theorem 1 or 1a,

$$\begin{aligned} f(1, 0)_i &= P(DG)_i = 1 - P(AG)_i, \\ f(1, 1)_i &= P(AG)_i. \end{aligned}$$

From Theorem 2,

$$E(AG)_i = P(AG)_i.$$

Substituting these values into the above equation,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(AG)_i &= [P(AG)_i]^2[1 - P(AG)_i] \\ &\quad + [1 - P(AG)_i]^2[P(AG)_i] \\ &= P(AG)_i - [P(AG)_i]^2. \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 8. The variance in the number of agreements across m roll calls is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(AG) &= \sum_{i=1}^m \text{Var}(AG)_i \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^m [P(AG)_i - [P(AG)_i]^2]. \end{aligned}$$

Proof. This result follows from the property of the variance measure that specifies the variance of the sum of a set of random variables, which are mutually independent (Axiom 2), is equal to the sum of their variances.

As we showed for the expected value in Theorem 3, so we have shown here that the variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls is solely a function of the probability of agreement, $P(AG)_i$, on each roll call i . Thus, knowing only the distribution of different kinds of votes on each roll call, from which the probabilities of agreement on each roll call can be calculated, we can compute the over-all Agreement Level (AL) as well as the variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls.

For members 1 and 2 of the voting body, the variance is equal to zero because their voting on all roll calls is identical. The variance for members 3, 4, and 5 is equal to .44; for all five members of the voting body, the variance is equal to .82. Thus, the *dispersion* in voting about the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree—that is, the “spread” or “scatter” in the distribution—is greatest in the entire body, despite the fact that the entire body has a slightly higher AL value than the subset containing only members 3, 4, and 5.

Roughly speaking, we might say that the addition of members 1 and 2 to the subset containing members 3, 4 and 5 has two effects: (1) it raises the Agreement Level among the members after the effects of body size have been removed; at the same time, (2) it increases the over-all deviation (variance) of the members from the expected value for the body. In other words, it is possible for members to have a

high level of agreement, but the deviations from this level might also be high. In general, the variance will be greater across a set of roll calls when there is *moderate* agreement on each roll call i ($P(AG)_i \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}$)—that is, some “spread” in the distribution of the number of agreements—rather than *high* agreement on some ($P(AG)_i \rightarrow 1$) and *low* agreement on others ($P(AG)_i \rightarrow \frac{1}{3}$)—that is, little “spread,” with most members tending either to agree or disagree on each roll call. Why this is so can be seen from the next theorem.

Theorem 9. The variance in the number of agreements on any roll call i is maximized when $P(AG)_i = \frac{1}{2}$.

Proof. Let $y = \text{Var}(AG)_i$ and $x = P(AG)_i$. Then Theorem 7 states

$$y = x - x^2, \quad \text{where } 0 \leq x \leq 1.$$

This function has an extreme value when the first derivative, y' , equals zero, i.e.,

$$y' = 1 - 2x = 0, \text{ or } x = \frac{1}{2},$$

which is a maximum since the second derivative, $y'' = -2$, is negative.

Definition 8. For a voting body of any size voting on any number of roll calls, its Variance Level (VL) is

$$VL = \frac{\text{Var}(AG)}{\text{Var}(AG)_{\max}},$$

where $0 \leq VL \leq 1$ and

$\text{Var}(AG)$ = Variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls (Definition 7 and Theorem 8),

$\text{Var}(AG)_{\max}$ = Variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls when $P(AG)_i$ for each roll call i is as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as possible.

We use the term “as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as possible” to indicate the fact that in some voting bodies no possible division of the vote can give a probability value exactly equal to $\frac{1}{2}$. For example, in a three-member voting body with two voting options, $P(AG)_i$ may equal 1, $\frac{1}{3}$, or 0 on any roll call i . Since the value $\frac{1}{3}$ is as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as can be achieved, this $P(AG)_i$ value would be used in the calculation of $\text{Var}(AG)_{\max}$, and the VL index, across a set of roll calls for this body. This convention insures that the VL index always has a maximum *achievable* value of 1; for bodies of moderate size, however, the maximum achievable value will usually be very close, or equal, to the maximum theoretical value (i.e., where $P(AG)_i = \frac{1}{2}$ in the $\text{Var}(AG)_{\max}$ term for each roll call i).

TABLE 3. VALUES OF $P(AG)_i$ ON EACH ROLL CALL i THAT MAXIMIZE AND MINIMIZE THE AL AND VL INDICES FOR A VOTING BODY WITH THREE VOTING OPTIONS

Index	Maximum Value When	Minimum Value When
AL	$P(AG)_i = 1$	$P(AG)_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$
VL	$P(AG)_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$	$P(AG)_i = 1$

Like the AL index, the VL index has a convenient zero-to-one range that makes it useful in the comparative analysis of voting bodies of different size, as well as those with different numbers of voting options whose members vote on different numbers of roll calls. In our example where the values of $\text{Var}(AG)$ were .44 for members 3, 4, and 5, and .82 for all five members, the "normalized" VL values are .40 and .68, indicating that the difference in the amount of dispersion between the body and its subset is less than we were led to believe by the $\text{Var}(AG)$ statistic, which does not give comparable values for bodies of different size. Incidentally, we do not define the VL index for a body containing only two members, because there are only two $P(AG)_i$ values for this body (0 and 1), which are both equally close to the value $\frac{1}{2}$ and which both make the denominator of the VL index, $\text{Var}(AG)_{\max}$, equal to the unruly value of zero.

Although we shall not formalize these results as theorems, it is interesting to note that the Agreement Level is at a maximum ($AL=1$) and the Variance Level at a minimum ($VL=0$) only when there is unanimous agreement in the body. That is, $AL=1$ if and only if $VL=0$ (i.e., when $P(AG)_i=1$ on each roll call i); on the other hand, minimal agreement ($AL=0$) is not equivalent to maximal variance ($VL=1$). This is so because when the body is as equally divided as possible among the different voting options ($AL=0$), the probability of agreement will not necessarily be as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as possible, which maximizes the variance ($VL=1$). These results are summarized in Table 3 for a voting body with three voting options. In the minimum AL case, the "approximately equal to" sign (\approx) becomes an "equal" sign only in the limit as the body approaches infinite size; in the maximum VL case, it becomes an equal sign only if it is an *achievable* value for a voting body on a given roll call i .

VI. MEASURING AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAIRS

At times we may not have sufficient information to identify blocs of actors for the purpose

of computing the Agreement Level and Variance Level in their voting. In order to identify blocs with a high degree of internal cohesion, it is often necessary to compute indices of agreement for all pairs of actors as a first step.

Many ingenious schemes have been devised for identifying and measuring the cohesiveness of voting blocs. Arend Lijphart, in reviewing defects in some of these schemes, singled out those schemes, among others, that required attitudes to be scalable along a single dimension, failed to take account of the incomparability of cohesiveness in groups of different size, ignored abstentions, etc. He then went on to propose an agreement index based on the percentage of times two countries agree or partially agree (one country abstains) on a set of votes, with partial agreement being accorded half the weight of complete agreement. From a sample of 44 roll-call votes on colonial issues in the UN General Assembly between 1956 and 1958, Lijphart computed agreement indices for all pairs of countries and then used them to identify, and measure the cohesiveness of, voting blocs.²⁷

In the previously-cited study of UN voting by Alker and Russett, the authors assigned "standardized ranks" to each "yes," "no," and "abstain," in a manner too complicated to describe here, and used them to calculate correlation coefficients to measure voting agreement between pairs of countries.²⁸ In a more recent study, Russett assigned each country a voting score of 2 (affirmative), 1 (abstain and most absences), or 0 (negative) on all 66 roll-call votes which were not unanimous or nearly unanimous in the Eighteenth (1963) Session of the General Assembly and used the Q-technique of factor analysis to extract from the correlation matrix of countries, based on their voting scores, the most cohesive voting groups.²⁹

Despite their obvious technical sophistication, all these recent studies suffer from one serious drawback: they ultimately rest on the assignment of arbitrary values to the different voting options in a body. In his analysis of voting groups in the Eighteenth Session, Russett offers no justification for his assignment of the arbitrary values 2, 1, and 0 to affirmative votes, abstentions and most absences, and negative votes, respectively, though the assumption implicit in this assignment is that abstentions and most absences fall between affirmative and negative votes on some kind of

²⁷ Lijphart, *op. cit.*

²⁸ Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

²⁹ "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," this REVIEW, LX (June, 1966), 327-339.

continuum.³⁰ We fail to see any stronger justification in Alker and Russett's use of "standardized ranks," though the claim is made that they have a "nice . . . operational interpretation."³¹ Lijphart convincingly demonstrates the advantages of his index over others but confesses that crediting a partial agreement with half the weight of a complete agreement is a "tenuous assumption."³² Although there may be no "sacrosanct technique," as Alker and Russett admit,³³ for assigning scores to the different voting options in a body, at a minimum any scheme should avoid the assignment of arbitrary numerical values or ranks to yeas, nays, and abstentions for the purpose of computing indices of agreement between pairs.

Our *a posteriori* probabilities of agreement between a randomly-selected pair of members, because they are derived from the actual distribution of yeas, nays, and abstentions on each roll call, avoid this pitfall which has plagued previous studies. The expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree, based on these probabilities, seems to provide as good a yardstick as any against which to assess the extent to which two members agree in their voting. Expressing the deviation from the expected number of roll calls on which each pair of members agrees in relative terms, we arrive at

Definition 9. The Relative Agreement, RA_{ij} , of members i and j across a set of roll calls is

$$RA_{ij} = \frac{AG_{ij} - E(AG_{ij})}{E(AG_{ij})}.$$

where

AG_{ij} = the actual number of times members i and j agree across a set of roll calls,

$E(AG_{ij})$ = the expected number of roll calls on which a randomly-selected pair of members, for all roll calls on which members i and j are both present and voting, agree.³⁴

³⁰ The consequences of such assumptions on the values of correlation coefficients are shown in Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 216-218.

³¹ Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 30, fn. 18.

³² Lijphart, *op. cit.*, p. 910, fn. 41.

³³ Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

³⁴ We append the subscripts i and j to $E(AG)$ in the index to underscore the fact that only the roll calls on which members i and j are both present and voting are used in the calculation of the expected value, $E(AG_{ij})$, for each RA_{ij} index.

Theorem 10. The maximum RA_{ij} for a voting body decreases as the body gets larger and larger, approaching the limit of 2 as the size of the voting body, t , approaches infinite size, i.e.,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} (RA_{ij})_{\max} = 2.$$

Proof. Available from the authors on request. Basically, what is shown in the proof is that the maximum value of RA_{ij} does not depend on the number of roll calls but only on (1) the size of the voting body and (2) the distribution of votes. With regard to the distribution of votes, RA_{ij} for two agreeing members is at a maximum when the votes are as equally divided as possible among the "yes," "no," and "abstain" positions. As for size, the maximum RA_{ij} decreases as the size of the body increases: for a body of four members, the maximum RA_{ij} is 5.00; for five members, 4.00; for ten members 2.75; and for a body of twenty members, no two members can agree more than 2.33 times the expected number ($E(AG_{ij})$) of agreements per pair for the body. Thus, the maximum RA_{ij} for a body of four members (5.00) is more than twice as great as for a body of twenty members (2.33).

The RA_{ij} values for our hypothetical voting body are given in Table 4 and indicate that only members 1, 2, and 4 are positively linked, all with each other, with members 1 and 2 hav-

This index is adapted with modifications from one used, among other places, in Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," this REVIEW, LX (Dec., 1966), 880-89; and Steven J. Brams, "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System," *Peace Research Society: Papers*, VI (Vienna Conference, 1966), 143-164. Although the transaction-flow model is applied to international transaction data in the above articles, it is not necessary to assume that votes are transactions to use as a measure from the model to analyze voting data. For some purposes, however, the act of agreeing or disagreeing with other members of a voting body might be considered a "symbolic transaction." Another useful index for measuring agreement between pairs is the phi coefficient, but as used by Ulmer (*op. cit.*) and others it does not allow for more than two voting options. Jacobsen's measures of "voting agreement" and "voting concordance" do take into account abstention votes, but the theoretical import of these measures is left largely unspecified. See Kurt Jacobsen, "Voting Behavior of the Nordic Countries in the General Assembly," *Cooperation and Conflict*, III, No. 4 (1967), 139-157.

TABLE 4. RELATIVE AGREEMENTS (RA_{ij})
FOR EACH PAIR OF MEMBERS

Member	1	2	3	4
2	1.08			
3	-.17	-.17		
4	.67	.67	-.17	
5	-.58	-.58	-.58	-.17

ing more than twice the expected number of roll call agreements with each other ($RA_{12} = RA_{21} = 1.08$). Members 3 and 5 have no positive links with any other members in the body, including each other, and therefore might be properly classified as isolates. For larger bodies, of course, simple inspection of the RA_{ij} matrix will not be sufficient to identify the most cohesive voting blocs, but many data-reduction techniques are now available for delineating the most tightly-linked subgroups on the basis of a variety of linkage criteria.³⁵

³⁵ For a review of some of these techniques, see Geoffrey H. Ball, "Data Analysis in the Social Sciences: What About the Details?" *Proceedings—Fall Joint Computer Conference*, 1965, pp. 533-559; J. J. Fortier and H. Solomon, "Clustering Procedures," in Paruchuri R. Krishnaiah (ed.), *Multivariate Analysis* (New York: Academic Press, 1966), pp. 493-506; Stephen C. Johnson, "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes," *Psychometrika*, XXXII (Sept., 1967), 241-254; and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Statistics and Politics: The Need for Casual Data Analysis" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-8, 1967). A discussion of the relative merits of different clustering techniques would take us too far afield of our analysis at this time; our attempt here is only to suggest a measure of agreement for all pairs to which these techniques can be applied. We also note in passing that roll calls might be grouped into sets of issues by measuring "agreement" among them across the votes of the members. We can do this by first calculating the "total" probability of agreement for a randomly-selected pair of members on two roll calls as the sum of the products of the $P(AG)_{i's}$ and $P(DG)_{i's}$ for the two roll calls (assuming they are independent events). For example, for roll calls 1 and 2 given in Table 1, the probability that a randomly-selected pair of members will agree on both roll calls is $(.3)(.2) = .06$, disagree on both, $(.7)(.8) = .56$; for a randomly-selected pair, therefore, its "total" probability of agreement (by either agreeing on both roll calls or disagreeing on both roll calls) is $.06 + .56 = .62$. Since there are 10 pairs of members in a five-member body,

Given the identification of voting blocs on the basis of either empirical or *a priori* criteria, one may then be interested in measuring agreement between blocs. For this purpose we shall define a group RA_{IJ} .

Definition 10. The relative agreement of subsets I and J , each of which might comprise several different individual actors, is

$$RA_{IJ} = \frac{\sum_{i,j} A_{ij} - \sum_{i,j} E_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j} E_{ij}}$$

Each of the summations on the right-hand side of the equation ranges over all individual actors i and j that are members of each of the respective (disjoint) subsets, I and J .

VII. MEASURING THE SUPPORT OF MEMBERS

So far the concepts we have defined, applicable to a voting body as a whole (AL and VL) and pairs of members (RA_{ij}), all have depended on the probability of agreement, $P(AG)_i$, between two randomly-selected members on each roll call i . We shall now lay the groundwork for a concept applicable to individual members that is analogous to RA_{ij} but based on a different set of probabilities, which we define below.

Definition 11. If t is the total number of members present and voting on roll call i , the probability that a randomly-selected member supports the majority (or plurality) is

$$P(S)_i = \frac{o_{\max}}{t},$$

where o_{\max} is equal to the number of members choosing that option which receives, or is tied

the expected number of agreements for the 10 pairs is $(10)(.62) = 6.2$. In fact, for roll calls 1 and 2, 7 of the 10 pairs agree or disagree on both roll calls. In the same way in which we computed RA_{ij} for members i and j , we can compute RA_{IJ} for roll calls as the difference between the actual and expected, divided by the expected, number of pairwise agreements on both roll calls. In the above example.

$$RA_{12} = \frac{7.0 - 6.2}{6.2} = .13,$$

which indicates a greater-than-expected (i.e., positive) level of "agreement" between roll calls 1 and 2. Thus, while our focus in this article has been on measuring agreement among members across a set of roll calls, the above procedure would allow one to compute RA_{ij} indices, analogous to those given in the text, that measure the "agreement" between pairs of roll calls instead of between pairs of members.

for, the greatest number of votes. Whereas $P(AG)_i$ was defined for a randomly-selected pair on roll call i , $P(S)_i$ is defined for a randomly-selected individual member, and its values for our hypothetical voting body are given in Table 5.

In the same manner in which we computed $E(AG)$ from the $P(AG)_i$'s on each roll call i , we can compute an expected value of support, $E(S)$, for the majority (or plurality) across a set of roll calls.

Definition 12. The expected number of roll calls on which a randomly-selected member votes with the majority (or plurality) is

$$E(S) = \sum_{i=1}^m E(S)_i = \sum_{i=1}^m P(S)_i.$$

For our hypothetical body, $E(S)=3.4$, which means that a randomly-selected member would support a majority (or one of the two tied pluralities on roll call 2) on an average of 3.4 out of 5 roll calls.

Now we could substitute $E(S)$ for $E(AG)$ in the AL and VL indices, and, with appropriate changes in the definitions of the minimum and maximum expected values in the AL index, come up with new measures of agreement and variance in voting based on the probabilities of support defined for members on each roll call rather than the probabilities of agreement defined for pairs. In addition to our desire to keep new concepts to a minimum, however, the main reason for not introducing these new concepts is that the member probabilities do not capture as much information as our previously-defined pair probabilities.

This is because $P(AG)_i$ for each roll call i is a function of the number of members voting on all options, while $P(S)_i$ depends only on the number choosing the option that receives the most votes. If there were three voting options and a plurality voted "yes," for example, $P(AG)_i$ would reflect not only this plurality but also the number of members voting "no" and "abstain," while $P(S)_i$ would be insensitive to the distribution of "no" and "abstain" votes. Thus, it would seem that the most useful measures of voting agreement and variance

for the body as a whole are the previous AL and VL indices based on the $P(AG)_i$'s, which tap all information on the voting divisions in a body.

It is interesting to note that in a large body whose members split evenly among the different voting options on any roll call i , $P(S)_i \approx P(AG)_i$ ($\approx \frac{1}{3}$ when there are three options), but in general $P(S)_i$, defined for a randomly-selected member, bears no necessary relationship to $P(AG)_i$, defined for a randomly-selected pair. This is somewhat dismaying to our purpose of trying to explicate through theorems logical relationships among our different measures of voting behavior (as we were, for example, able to relate the AL and VL indices to each other because they were both based on $P(AG)_i$), but the introduction of the new probabilities, $P(S)_i$, has proved necessary in order to define a measure of voting support which individual members tend to give to the majority (or plurality) on roll calls.

Definition 13. The Support Level (SL_j) for each member j across a set of roll calls is

$$SL_j = \frac{A(S_j) - E(S_j)}{E(S_j)},$$

where

$A(S_j)$ = the actual number of roll calls on which member j votes with the majority (or plurality),

$E(S_j) = \sum_{i=1}^m E(S_j)_i = \sum_{i=1}^m P(S_j)_i$ = the expected number of roll calls on which a randomly-selected member, for all roll calls on which member j is present and voting (assumed in above summations to be equal to m), votes with the majority (or plurality).³⁶

We can establish the upper and lower limits of SL_j in a more informal manner than we did for the RA_{ij} index. Clearly, SL_j will be minimal when member j never agrees with a bloc with the most votes ($A(S_j)=0$), so the lower limit of SL_j will always be equal to -1 , regardless of the number of voting options. On the other hand, the index will be maximal when member j agrees with a largest voting bloc on all m roll calls and these largest blocs on each roll call are of minimal size ($E(S_j)=m/3$ when there are three voting options). For a voting body with three voting options, therefore, the upper limit of SL_j is

³⁶ As with the RA_{ij} index, we append the subscript j to $E(S)$ to underscore the fact that only the roll calls on which member j is present and voting are used in the calculation of the expected value, $E(S_j)$, for SL_j indices of each member j .

TABLE 5. $P(S)_i$'s FOR EACH ROLL CALL i

Roll Call i	$P(S)_i$
$i=1$.6
$i=2$.4
$i=3$.8
$i=4$.6
$i=5$	1.0

$$SL_{ij(\max)} = \frac{m - m/3}{m/3} = 2.$$

It will be recalled that RA_{ij} also ranges between -1 and 2 in large bodies, which should not be surprising since it is a completely analogous index, differing only in that it is based on probabilities defined for pairs rather than for individual members.

Values of SL_j for each member j of our hypothetical voting body are given in Table 6 and pinpoint members 1, 2, and 4 as supportive of the largest voting blocs (which mainly include each other) and members 3 and 5 as diverging sharply from the majority position. From the considerable difference between these two sets of values, it would appear that some members—out of conviction, influence being exerted on them, the desire to side with a largest voting bloc, or other reasons—vote with most of their fellow members and others do not.

It should be noted that even though members 1, 2, and 4 agree with the majority (or tied pluralities in the case of roll call 2) on all five roll calls, they differ substantially from the maximum theoretical upper limit of 2. This is due to the fact that SL_j is also a function of the size of the largest voting bloc and attains its maximum value for a member only when this bloc tends to be as small as possible on each roll call. In a five-member body with three voting options, two members are the smallest plurality possible, and this division occurs on only one roll call (roll call 2) in our hypothetical body. This accounts for the fact that even though members 1, 2, and 4 vote with a largest bloc on all five roll calls, they are only 47 percent more "supportive" than expected.

The concept of an expected level of support incorporated in the SL_j index, generated from the actual voting patterns in a body, could be particularly useful in comparative analyses of voting bodies. Without this expected level as a baseline for comparison, calculations of support for a member or bloc would not distinguish between support in bodies that tended to be closely divided and those characterized by large majorities on many roll calls. In those

bodies that tended to be closely divided, the expected level of support would be low, so SL_j would be high for those members j who lent their support on most roll calls. In voting bodies where roll calls tended toward unanimity, on the other hand, the expected level of support would be high, so even the most highly supportive members would not exceed the expected level by a wide margin, and their SL_j 's would therefore be low.

To be sure, the SL_j index will rank members of a body, who vote on the same roll calls, in the same order as the simpler statistic measuring "percentage agreement with a largest voting bloc."³⁷ For comparative purposes, however, SL_j would distinguish, by giving added weight to, a member of a closely-divided body who tends to support "minimal" largest voting blocs from a member of a less closely-divided body who tends to support large majorities. Thus, even though two voters might have the same "percentage agreement" scores in different voting bodies, our SL_j index credits the voter who tends to align himself with smaller pluralities in the closely-divided body with more "support."

This bias in the operational concept well reflects the greater marginal importance a coalition leader normally would attribute to the member or members who "just make" the coalition a largest bloc (or a majority) than the members who join later and are superfluous to victory.³⁸ Though we cannot determine in most voting situations the order in which members join a coalition prior to a ballot, it seems reasonable to assume that the "support" a plurality or majority of members receives from a voter is inversely related to its size: the more members a largest bloc contains, the less support that can be attributed to individual members of the bloc.

If less attribution of support results in smaller payoffs to members, then the coalitions

TABLE 6. SL_j 's FOR EACH MEMBER j

$j = 1$.47
$j = 2$.47
$j = 3$	-.41
$j = 4$.47
$j = 5$	-.41

³⁷ A similar statistic is Edward T. Rowe's "win-loss score," described in his "Changing Patterns in the Voting Success of Member States in the United Nations General Assembly: 1945-1966," *International Organization*, 23 (Spring, 1969), 235.

³⁸ William H. Riker ("A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies," *op. cit.*) has incorporated this idea in his measure of the "significance" of roll-call votes. For a critique of some technical aspects of Riker's index, see William P. Yohe, "Riker's Method for Assessing the Significance of Roll Call Votes," *Public Choice*, IV (Spring, 1968), 59-66.

which maximize payoffs will tend to be of minimal winning size. Indeed, insofar as voting can be considered a zero-sum game, Riker has shown that it is not rational for a coalition of minimal winning size to accept additional members, though it may not be able to exclude them in voting situations.³⁹ There may be circumstances, however, under which it is rational to allow additional members in a larger coalition when they permit the formation of *several* different minimal winning coalitions that can be put together from different subsets of the larger coalition and whose *combined* preferences are preferable to those that could be achieved by a single minimal winning coalition always containing the same members.⁴⁰

We need not restrict our measure of support only to a largest voting bloc. We could use it to measure the support of each member of a voting body for any particular subgroup of agreeing members, not necessarily a plurality or majority, above and beyond the number of agreements we would expect from a randomly-selected member. For example, if members 1 and 2 in our hypothetical voting body, who constitute a plurality (but not a majority) of members who vote the same way on all roll calls, were our standard of comparison, then $SL_1 = SL_2 = .47$ would remain the same as before, as would $SL_3 = -.41$, because member 3's two previous agreements with a largest voting bloc were also agreements with members 1 and 2. However, members 4 and 5 would each lose an agreement, namely that with a largest bloc of two abstaining voters (themselves) on roll call 2, which are not agreements with members 1 and 2 (also a largest bloc on that roll call). As a consequence, the SL_j 's of members 4 and 5 are lower (.18 and $-.71$, respectively) than they were (.47 and $-.41$, respectively) when support was counted for *any* largest bloc on a roll call. Similarly, we could compute SL_j 's of all members with member 3 or member 4 or member 5 as the standard of comparison, which would give us an index of support, in relation to an expected level for a randomly-

selected member, for the voting of each member against these individual members.⁴¹

The notion of an expected level of support is not necessarily descriptive of any particular member's voting behavior but rather serves as a norm against which to assess deviations in each member's voting. Where this norm is based on support of the majority (or whatever the number required by the decision rule of the body), those with the highest SL_j 's will be those who most consistently align themselves with the winning side. This is not an easy task for a member to perform across a set of roll calls in a closely-divided body, and it therefore may be interesting to measure how nearly each member approaches this ideal. While this is not a strategy each member wishes or tries to pursue, in some contexts being consistently on the winning side might be used as a measure of an actor's influence.⁴²

These and other questions seem worthy of further investigation, and in the next section we shall suggest how the operational concepts derived from, or related analogously to, the model might be used in the testing of empirical hypotheses.⁴³

VIII. APPLYING THE MODEL AND TESTING HYPOTHESES

In applying the model to specific empirical situations, it is usually convenient to assume that members who vote together share common attitudes and interests. The model can

⁴¹ The standard might even be an ideological position (e.g., liberal versus conservative), where those voting "yes" on some roll calls, and "no" or "abstain" on others, would be interpreted as supportive.

⁴² This would tend to be the case for the member instrumental in putting together winning coalitions but not for the member simply shrewd enough to foresee the winning position and to align himself with it. This is the "problem of the chameleon," recognized by Dahl in his attempt to rank the influence of United States Senators on the basis of the differences between the proportion of times a bill passed the Senate when a Senator favored it and the proportion of times a bill passed when he opposed it. See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July, 1957), 209-214.

⁴³ For this purpose, a write-up and source deck of a computer program called PROVOTE, which computes all the indices in the model, are available from the Academic Computer Center, New York University, Washington Square, 725 Commerce Building, New York, N. Y. 10003.

³⁹ William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, op. cit., esp. pp. 32-101.

⁴⁰ This may in part explain why a majority party in a legislature, of greater than minimal winning size, stays together: it can win on individual roll calls by pulling together *different* subsets of its members, which may be less costly than relying on one subset (i.e., a single minimal winning coalition with always the same members on each roll call), to hold the line.

easily be adjusted, however, to situations where members may vote the same way for different reasons. If there were evidence, for example, that there was no commonness of interests reflected in abstentions (or absences) on a set of roll calls, one might either exclude abstainers (or absentees) from the analysis or assign them, on the basis of other information, to affirmative and negative positions. Alternatively, one could subdivide abstainers (or absentees) into finer classes (e.g., "weak" affirmative and "weak" negative) and compute the probabilities of agreement on the basis of more than the three kinds of votes assumed in the preceding analysis.⁴⁴

The analysis is, in fact, generalizable to whatever voting or nonvoting criteria the analyst chooses to use in identifying actors who take particular positions, however many, on a set of issues. Besides positions taken on roll calls, other kinds of commitments which actors periodically make in political life include decisions to join or withdraw from a coalition or alliance, establish or sever diplomatic relations, support or oppose candidates for political office, issue policy declarations, etc. Like roll calls, all these forms of political commitment suggest agreement with some actors and disagreement with other actors in a political system.

As an example of the application of the model to nonvoting data, consider Morton A. Kaplan's proposition that in a balance of power system "any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations."⁴⁵ If we consider alignments to be defined by the different associations of countries in wars, where the belligerents in effect elect different voting options and the nonbelligerents abstain, then the equiprobability of different alignments could be translated into a proposition about the tendency of RA_{ij} scores to be equal, i.e., approach zero, for each pair. In the "classic" balance-of-power period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a preliminary analysis of RA_{ij} scores of European countries, where the twelve wars during the period involving at least one major power (beginning with the Franco-Spanish War in 1823 and ending with

World War I) represent the "roll calls" of the model, reveals that most countries tended to associate considerably more frequently with some countries than others, which would seem to reflect the upsetting influence of "specific interests" in the proposition.⁴⁶

In some cases it is relatively easy to gather systematic information on the positions taken by a political actor (e.g., a newspaper); in other cases these data are more elusive, and it may not always be easy to draw up a homogeneous set of discrete acts of political commitment over time from which agreement or disagreement with other actors can be surmised. (Interviews and questionnaires would be possible instruments that could be used to make data on the positions of actors more comparable.) Provided suitable data can be obtained, however, the comparative empirical indicators described in this article would seem to provide one means for transforming the widespread and recurrent commitments made by political actors into testable hypotheses on such processes as census formation, coalition building, and conflict resolution in political systems.

To illustrate this point, consider Riker's "size principle," which states that in social situations similar to n -person, zero-sum games where side payments are permitted, whose players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur.⁴⁷ As applied to voting bodies, we would expect that one implication of the size principle when the above assumptions are met is that the Agreement Level in a voting body will remain unaffected by the distribution of seats by party. For example, in a legislature containing only two parties, the Agreement Level should remain constant no matter what percentage of seats are held by the majority party.

For the roll calls of six recent sessions of the United States House of Representatives, David H. Koehler compared the percentage of seats held by the majority party in each session, which varied between 51 percent (83d Session) and 68 percent (89th Session), with the value of the AL index based on roll calls in that session.⁴⁸ On most roll calls, to be sure, the winning coalition had more than a bare majority,

⁴⁴ This feature of the model would seem to make it especially useful in the study of judicial bodies, whose members may not only associate themselves with or against the majority opinion but may also express particular qualifications in individual affirming or dissenting opinions.

⁴⁵ Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems," this REVIEW, LV (Sept., 1957), 695.

⁴⁶ Robert M. Rood, "Agreement in the International System: An Empirical Test of Balance of Power Theory" (unpublished paper, Syracuse University, 1968.).

⁴⁷ Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ David H. Koehler, "Representational Consensus and the Size Principle" (unpublished paper, Syracuse University, 1968).

PREDICTION OF THE SIZE PRINCIPLE




FIG. 3

indicating that the size principle was not confirmed in an "absolute" sense on every roll call. Under a less strict interpretation, however, evidence supporting an implication of the size principle over a longer time span was found: the value of the AL index of the House in sessions where the party division was nearly equal did not differ appreciably from its value in sessions where one party held a lopsided majority of the seats.⁴⁹

The size principle might be tested comparatively for a number of different legislative bodies by comparing the AL index based on roll-call votes in a legislative session with the AL index based upon the seat shares of each party. In the computation of the latter index, each party's seats, in effect, could be treated as the number of votes cast a particular way on a single roll call. As shown in Figure 3, the size principle would predict that the AL index based on roll calls would not depend on the AL index based on seats held by each party in different sessions.

⁴⁹ An alternative explanation for the constancy in the level of agreement in different sessions might be "situational": if the ideological differences between the two parties are not great, then the cost of assembling a winning coalition across party lines, often necessary when the majority party has only a small edge over the minority party, would not differ appreciably from the cost of assembling a winning coalition within the majority party when it has a big edge. If the same amount is expended on coalition building in each case, it should buy winning coalitions of approximately the same size. Thus, when ideological differences between parties are slight and a fixed amount (or percentage) of resources tends to be spent on coalition building in a session, the level of agreement in the session should be approximately the same whether one's party majority is large or small.

As another example of the use of the AL index in the testing of a hypothesis, consider the observation that in multi-ballot national party conventions one candidate typically has almost a majority on the first ballot, loses strength on the next few ballots to other candidates, one of whom eventually moves toward a majority on the last few ballots. To frame this observation as a quantitative hypothesis and thereby make possible a more precise test of its validity, we would predict that, where the voting options are different candidates, the value of the AL index will be quite high on the first ballot, trial off on the next few ballots, and rise again on the last few ballots.

A test of this hypothesis reveals that it is in fact upheld only for the 1844 and 1852 Democratic conventions. In the twenty-four other Democratic and Republican multi-ballot conventions that have occurred since 1844, the AL index, on the average, tended to hover around .20 over about the first 75 percent of the ballots, and then to increase slightly until the final ballot, when agreement soared rapidly over the level needed to achieve nomination. This pattern in which a point is reached in a convention when a large number of delegates suddenly decides to support a particular candidate (the "bandwagon effect") tends to characterize conventions operating under both a simple majority rule and those where a two-thirds majority is necessary for nomination (i.e., Democratic conventions prior to 1936, except for the conventions of 1860 and 1920).⁵⁰

It would seem that other interesting questions might be asked, and hypotheses tested, utilizing the empirical indicators developed in the model. Like the AL index, is the VL index independent of party alignments in a legislative body? Are high SL_j scores of members associated with measures of influence not based on votes (e.g., seniority, committee assignments)? What are the best predictors of high RA_{ij} scores between pairs of members? These and other questions are all susceptible to empirical analysis which, given the applicability of the indices to any voting body as well as nonvoting situations, could probably most fruitfully be conducted on a comparative basis.

IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To recapitulate, we began our analysis of voting in legislative and judicial bodies by showing how voting could be conceived of as a mapping between the members of a body and the voting options available in the body. This

⁵⁰ Timothy K. Barnekov, "Measuring Agreement in National Party Conventions" (unpublished paper, Syracuse University, 1969).

allowed us to determine the numbers of members who chose each voting option on each roll call, and with these numbers as the parameters of the model we were able to compute *a posteriori* probabilities that two randomly-selected members agree on zero or more roll calls. From these probabilities, we in turn were able to calculate the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members of a hypothetical voting body of five members, and subsets of the body comprising two and three members, agree. After noting that the number of pairwise agreements in a voting body would depend not only on the distribution of votes but also the size of the body, we then developed an Agreement Level (*AL*) index that eliminated the "bias toward agreement" effect in larger bodies and therefore could be used in the comparative analysis of voting bodies of any number of members. An analogous index of the Variance Level (*VL*) indicated that the voting of members of our hypothetical body and certain of its subsets exhibited different degrees of dispersion from the expected values.

In order to identify the most cohesive voting blocs, we then defined Relative Agreement (*RA_{ij}*) indices for each pair of members (as well as groups) that avoided the arbitrary assumptions made in other studies about the assignment of voting scores to different voting options. These indices showed that not only was voting nonrandom in the body but that its members could be partitioned into one three-member bloc and two isolates on the basis of their voting. We concluded the development of the formal model by defining a Support Level (*SL_j*) index for individual members, related analogously but not directly to the Relative Agreement index for pairs, that measured the extent to which a member supported the majority, or any other, position taken by one or more agreeing members on each roll call. In sum, we were able to derive in our model comparative indicators of voting behavior for three different units of analysis—the body as a whole (*AL* and *VL*), pairs of members (*RA_{ij}*), and individual members (*SL_j*)—as well as to develop some implications of these indicators in the form of several theorems.

We then suggested how information about a voting body, in addition to the roll-call votes of its members, could be used to tailor the model more closely to a particular empirical situation. We also indicated how other forms of political commitment besides voting could be made amenable to the methods of comparative analysis described in the article. Finally, we presented some examples of testable hypotheses, with some preliminary empirical results,

that incorporated indicators developed in the model.

In conclusion, we have tried to show in our formalization how meaning can be wrung out of a simple set of parameters and axioms in the form of new concepts derived from the parameters and new theorems deduced from the axioms that (1) logically organize important features of voting bodies in an economical and perspicuous way, and (2) provide operational indicators of voting behavior. While our indicators, like any summary measures, abstract only certain aspects of a situation, they at least are based on a set of explicit *and* interpretable axioms that suggest how and in what ways they distort reality. In particular, our simplifying "independence" axiom unquestionably does violence to the "reality" of voting in many actual bodies, but it gives us great leverage in generating a stock of concepts and theorems that throws into bold relief certain idealized aspects of a voting body. If at a later stage empirical research suggests other useful concepts and axioms (e.g., about coalitions), or a modification of old ones, then these can be formally introduced into the model and new theorems proved. Eventually these theorems should carry us beyond the realm of formulation and clarification of concepts—our primary task in the development of the model so far⁵¹—and instead should help us discover nonobvious relationships between concepts that shed light on basic political processes (e.g., of coalition building⁵²). Insofar as these concepts can be operationally defined and hypotheses linking them tested, parts of the formal model will be subject to empirical validation. Then the further revision of the model, and the testing of its implications, can begin again.

⁵¹ We do not wish to stress, however, too rigid a distinction between "concept formation" and "theory formation," which in Hempel's words "are so closely interrelated as to constitute virtually two different aspects of the same procedure." Carl G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 1-2.

⁵² For an attempt in this direction, see Steven J. Brams and William H. Riker, "Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston, Dec. 26-31, 1969); and Steven J. Brams, "A Cost/Benefit Analysis of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies" (unpublished paper, New York University, Feb. 1970). The assumptions of the models in these papers, however, are not related to those of the present model.

ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE MODELS OF THE VOTING UNIVERSE: THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA: 1960-1968

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I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Of all the fields of political science where quantitative methods have been developed over the past generation, probably the one where scholarly understanding has been most enriched has been that of mass voting behavior. But while we know vastly more about this behavior on the individual and aggregate level than we did a quarter-century ago, there are still large territories on the map which are blank, or in which exploration has only very recently begun. There remain a number of doubtful areas in which issues of methodology and of substantive interpretation are still very much open to systematic inquiry.

One such area is that associated with the interrelation of socio-economic correlates of the vote.¹ That is, there is a real question as to whether such independent or predisposing variables should be conceptualized as making mutually independent or, alternatively, interdependent contributions to the prediction of voting patterns. The normal practice in research involving multiple correlation of aggregate voting behavior with a set of independent variables has been to assume implicitly that the relationship of these variables is additive (*i.e.*, non-interactive) and that the appropriate theoretical representation is of the general form $y = b + m_1x_1 + m_2x_2 \dots + m_nx_n$. Such an assumption seems plausible so far as individual voting for American major parties and their candidates is concerned. Thus, for example, the authors of the MIT 1960 simulation study found strong evidence that predispositional factors summate, *i.e.*, are indeed additive in character.²

If these assumptions and findings provided the best fit to this portion of reality under all or nearly all circumstances, we would be justified in leaving the problem of independent variable in-

teraction alone in this field, while remembering that interactive models might form a part of useful research strategies in other fields of political science.³ But a recent contribution by Glaucio Soares and Robert Hamblin has reopened the question, at least on the macro level of aggregate data.⁴ The authors argue that voting for radical parties (whether of left or right) is an act of positive or aggressive alienation; that such alienation is linked to feelings which are part of a class of involuntary responses; that it may well be that a (multiplicative) power function is the general form of relationship between the magnitude of stimuli and of non-voluntary responses; and that one might consequently expect to find, and does in fact find, that correlations based on an additive theoretical mode explain substantially less of the variance in the radical vote than do correlations based on a multiplicative theoretical model. Whatever the adequacy of the conceptual framework of the Hamblin and Soares article may appear to other researchers to be, there is no doubt that their procedures produced a spectacular increase in the power of a relatively few socio-economic variables to explain the variance in the 1951 vote for Allende in Chile.

Such results, standing as they do in sharp differentiation from many implicit assumption and some explicit findings regarding American and other voting behavior, present a challenge to further research in this area, and raise at once a number of questions to which answers seem rather urgently needed. Such questions include at least the following:

(1) Assuming the general validity—or at least plausibility—of the hypotheses developed in the Soares-Hamblin article as explanations of the greater power of the multiplicative model, it should follow that variation in voting for radical candidates or parties in other systems should be

¹ Multiple correlations of predisposing variables over time, of course, are nothing new in voting-behavior studies. See as the *locus classicus* Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); and also his *Grass-Roots Politics* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1942).

² Ithiel de Sola Pool *et al.*, *Candidates, Issues and Strategies* (Cambridge; M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 127-143 and especially Table 4.2.

³ See Hayward Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 108-111 and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 91-93.

⁴ Glaucio Soares and Robert Hamblin, "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," this REVIEW, LXI (1967), 1053-1065.

predicted more completely by multiplicative than by linearly additive models involving a set of socio-economic predictor variables. But it should also follow that variation in voting for non-radical candidates or parties should be predicted at least as well by additive models as by multiplicative. Is this in fact the correct pattern?

(2) On the other hand, it may be that when certain kinds of aggregate electoral and social data are employed, one can gain an across-the-board increase in explanatory power for all or most kinds of voting patterns (whether radical or not) simply by performing the appropriate transformations on variables to be included in multiple-correlation analyses. Such a result would be somewhat surprising, granted the MIT findings concerning American voting for major-party candidates at the level of the individual, but seems at least an *a priori* theoretical possibility. If converting to multiplicative models were a species of "black magic," the problem would lose most if not all of its theoretical interest, except as a possible empirical refutation of the explanatory hypotheses advanced by Soares and Hamblin. If, on the other hand, multiplicative formulation improves the power of socio-economic variables under some circumstances but not under others, then the use of a multiplicative model may have great potential as a tool of analytic discrimination in the study of aggregate voting behavior across time and space. Thus an additional question is simply, does conversion to multiplicative form tend to increase correlations across the board or not?

(3) What is the most appropriate way to conceptualize the difference between individual analysis based on the sample survey and aggregate-data analysis based upon official statistics from geographical units? This is one face of the units of analysis problem.

A word must be said about word usage. In this article we use the term interaction and interactive in a relatively loose way. The same can be said for our use of the terms additive, multiplicative, and linear. As a guide to the reader the term interactive can be thought of substantively as naming the situation where the effect of group membership on voting behavior is quite dependent for its magnitude or direction or both on the magnitude or properties of other groups in the same, context, *e.g.*, an intensification of blue collar tendencies to vote for Wallace as the density of non-whites increases. Technically we express this as a product among at least two variables measured on Pennsylvania counties and refer to this variously as a multiplicative or interactive model. Conversely, if the impact of a

social grouping on voting behavior is not affected by the presence, absence, or magnitude of other groups in the environment we refer to a non-interactive or additive environment. This is expressed technically by the sum of at least two variables measured on Pennsylvania counties and we refer (blithely and loosely) to an additive, linear, or non-multiplicative model.

The distinction in meaning between our use of additive and multiplicative is crucial for understanding the argument, for each term stands in turn as shorthand for a very different way of viewing the impact of social structure on individual behavior. The distinction between additive and multiplicative involves not only different technical representations and different substantive interpretations but ultimately must produce different theoretical commitments.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

We decided to attempt a preliminary answer to the first two questions by applying a partial replication of the Soares-Hamblin technique to recent American electoral politics. If it is assumed initially that correlations based on a multiplicative model explain more than additive ones on a selective rather than an indiscriminate basis—as their argument demands—it is reasonable to suppose accordingly that the alternative relationships between additive and multiplicative correlations correspond roughly to the paradigm of Table 1.

TABLE 1. THREE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND THEORETICAL REPRESENTATION OF ENVIRONMENT

"State of Political Nature" (Environment)	Representation	
	Additive Model	Multiplicative Model
Interactive	r^2	$< r^2$
Non-interactive	r^2	$> r^2$
Random	r^2	$= r^2$

That is to say—and again assuming initially what is assumed in the Soares-Hamblin article—it can be postulated that in cases where socio-economic factors aggregatively interact with each other (or are interdependent), correlations associated with multiplicative models will provide systematically greater explanations of variance than will those associated with additive ones, but that this will be true for such cases only.

But what kinds of contexts or "states of na-

ture" could be realistically described as "random"? Probably none in the real world; but such contexts might be artificially created. Here it is necessary to deal with the problem raised in question 3: what is measured by aggregate-data analysis and how does this relate to the behavioral measurements associated with survey-research work?

The answer to this question formulated by Erwin Scheuch is probably as good an approach as any to be found in the recent literature. His argument, essentially, is that research strategy is closely associated with the level of social analysis which the researcher chooses to study, and that as surveys provide the indispensable means for analyzing individual behavior in all of its ramifications, the analysis of aggregate data is an appropriate vehicle for the study of system properties and boundaries.⁵ Certainly some of the most exciting and illuminating work on electoral behavior now being done—for example by scholars such as Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen—involve a skillful blending of survey and aggregate analysis, with each mode being employed to shed light upon those ranges of political behavior to which it is appropriate.⁶

Our position is that measures on aggregate units are not only measures of summary individual behavior but also are measures of the context of individual behavior and that, in particular, these measures of context of environment are both useful and necessary for the complete analysis of electoral behavior. Furthermore, a choice of technical model will be especially crucial for assessing the effects of context. It has recently been argued that these environments not only are not "random" in the real world, but that in American politics they appear to have enormous importance as well as very great durability.⁷ Discussion of the environmental context in aggregate data can be found in the literature ranging back several decades. An outstanding

example was provided by Herbert Tingsten when, in a survey of 55 groups of Stockholm precincts, he found that socialist voting and turnout among working-class voters are related in a curvilinear fashion to the proportion of working-class people in the entire electorate, *i.e.*, that both socialist vote and turnout among working-class electors (especially working-class women) decline more rapidly than does the working-class percentage of the electorate.⁸ Similarly, the authors of *Voting*⁹ found that in Elmira there is a kind of *ceteris paribus* or "breakage" effect: all other things being more or less equal, the "Republican atmosphere" of the city will produce more Republican votes than could be explained on the basis of socio-economic characteristics alone. The argument presented by Soares and Hamblin is not fundamentally dissimilar from this: it is that certain kinds of socio-economic attributes tend aggregatively to be associated with each other, that the macro environment of Province X is correlated with the macro environments of all other provinces, even additively, in such a way that there is a strongly non-random relationship between the relative importance of the predictor variables and of the vote for the radical left. What they have provided, however, is a technique which may prove to be of considerable use in the analysis of aggregate voting behavior, and thus of the influence and nature of the environmental contexts surrounding that behavior.

The first step in the present research was to develop a series of socio-economic and political indicators and apply them to an American setting. For this purpose the 67 counties of the state of Pennsylvania were chosen as primary units of analysis. It should be noted here that Pennsylvania was not selected at random. Rather, this state was chosen as the focus of this study for several reasons. Of these, perhaps the most important was the fact that Pennsylvania's electoral politics is structured heavily around a set of polarizations classically associated with the New Deal and post-New Deal eras. At the least, these cleavages are organized around foreign-born/native-born, working-class/middle-class, center city/suburbs, so that, among the white population, the more Catholic an area's population, the larger the working-class component, the higher the proportion of the

⁵ E. K. Scheuch, "Cross-National Comparisons Using Aggregate Data," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 131-167; see also Nils Diderich, *Empirische Wahlforschung* (Köln, 1965), pp. 16-60.

⁶ Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 162-238; Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, *Political Parties in Norway* (Oslo, 1964), especially pp. 120-186.

⁷ Walter Dean Burnham, "American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XII (1968), 1-40.

⁸ H. L. A. Tingsten, *Political Behavior* (Stockholm, 1937), pp. 177-180.

⁹ Bernard Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 98-106. See also Warren E. Miller, "One-Party Politics and the Voter," *THIS REVIEW*, L (1956), 707.

labor force in manufacturing or mining, and the more urbanized, the higher the Democratic vote has tended to be since 1934. This structure of politics has—with the notable exception of Philadelphia city before 1949—been highly stable since the mid-1930's. If the existence of multiplicative relationships among predisposing variables were associated with the relative "modernity" of partisan alignment organized along class-ethnic lines, it should appear in major-party voting in Pennsylvania if anywhere in the United States. The evidential bases for the analyses we report come from three sources: (1) the 1960 census; (2) voter registration; and (3) election returns for 1960, 1964, and 1968.

A final caveat is in order concerning what we do *not* attempt in this paper. We are not attempting to find or present the "best" model for predicting variation in aggregate voting measures. Nor are we concerned with investigating the implications of the many different models we consider. Better predictions in the sense of tighter fit would undoubtedly be possible with so simple a variant as combining the additive and multiplicative models where the multiplicative contribution would enter as an index variable constructed by means of a separate regression. We are not attempting to settle the question of self-conscious model and theory construction but rather to raise it, and raise it in terms of the *form* of the model rather than in terms of the direction of causation. Thus, from the perspective of model construction and comparison in general, we are considering a very special case.

III. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Let us now turn to some methodological issues which are presented by the necessity of transforming variables if a multiplicative model is to be used in regression analysis. We may begin with a banal but necessary observation: geometric intuition is often used in discussions of correlation and regression problems but we wish to focus attention on algebra, not geometry. It is, after all, the algebraic form of a function which determines its properties.

Our first question can be rephrased in its simplest form as follows: given Y as a function of X_1 and X_2 , does a model which "builds in" interaction between X_1 and X_2 predict better than one which does not build in interaction? An ancillary question is the following: Does the relative influence of the two predictors depend on the model chosen? Notice that these are very different kinds of questions, for it is certainly possible that both an interactive and a non-interactive model will have about the same predictive power but will lead to very different interpretations of

the importance of the variables used as predictors. These two questions present issues of theory construction (choice of models) and also systematic description (what to observe). This is not just an exercise in curve fitting or selecting the transformations which best predict a criterion. The problem of choice of models at issue here has substantive and theoretical import, as we hope to show empirically.

Several of the methodologically relevant and important suggestions made by Soares and Hamblin can be recapitulated most conveniently by considering a three variable example with our Pennsylvania data. Let the Y variate, the criterion variable to be predicted, be percentage Democratic vote in 1960 in Pennsylvania counties. As predictors X_1 and X_2 we choose a measure of income and a measure of cultural variation in the rural-urban character of the counties.¹⁰ All measures are expressed in percentage form.

We wish to ascertain which of the following forms is the best predictor of variation in Y :

$$(I) Y = b + m_1X_1 + m_2X_2$$

or

$$(II) Y = bX_1^{m_1}X_2^{m_2}$$

It is a happy accident of algebra that model II can be converted to a form which allows the application of least squares regression techniques for estimating the necessary constants.¹¹ The results of correlation analysis for these two models using our Pennsylvania data are given in Table 2. For these particular data model II provides a more adequate representation. If the square of the multiple correlation coefficient is used as a criterion, the interactive model accounts for more than 10 percent more variance. Substantively (and theoretically) the analysis suggests that wealth and social milieu (or culture) interact in influencing the voting behavior of individuals. Put another way, if we assume that the influence of income on the vote depends on the degree of urbanization (and conversely) we can predict more variation in the vote than if we assume they are independent. On the other hand, both models lead to the same interpretation as to the relative importance of income and culture if partial correlations are used

¹⁰ We selected here the 1960 county percentages of income receivers earning less than \$3,000 per year and of rural-farm population of the county total. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book*, 1962 ed.

¹¹ A succinct account of the two-variable case is found in F. E. Croxton and D. J. Cowden, *Applied General Statistics*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1955), pp. 508-512.

TABLE 2. CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE REPRESENTATIONS FOR $Y = F(X_1, X_2)$. (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

	Model I	Model II**
	$Y = b + m_1X_1 + m_2X_2$	$Y = bX_1^{m_1}X_2^{m_2}$
Multiple R^2	0.36	0.47
Partial $r^2_{X_1}$	0.06	0.08
Partial $r^2_{X_2}$	0.34	0.45
degrees of freedom	64	64

* Y is Democratic presidential vote in 1960 in percent, X_1 is income measured by percent receiving less than \$3,000 annually, and X_2 is rurality measured by percent rural farm.

** Actual regression was

$$\text{Log } (Y) = \text{Log } (b) + m_1 \text{Log } (X_1) + m_2 \text{Log } (X_2)$$

as a criterion. For reasons developed below we will reject the interpretation of interdependence as being generally true for these variables even for these Pennsylvania data, but the example serves to demonstrate the real possibility and the potential significance of difference in form in the analyses of aggregate voting data.

Although the algebra by which a linear form for use in regression is obtained is straightforward, it is doubtless the case that some empiricists feel as we did: is this black magic? Indeed, one can find remarks in the statistical application literature which suggest that when dealing with logarithmic (or any other non-linear) transformation, caution is in order.¹²

It seemed that two tests would make us believers in the Hamblin-Soares results: first, that increases in explained variance did not automatically occur, no matter what the data, when a multiplicative was substituted for an additive model (this is our original second ques-

¹² The issue is whether or not variances are changed proportionately in all variables. Certainly no data will exhibit precise proportionality. What we do in the text below is exhibit a test procedure which assesses the consequences of the error that is (inevitably) introduced by transformation. The test is basically empirical. Paul G. Hoel asserts that these consequences are typically of small magnitude. See Hoel, *Introduction to Mathematical Statistics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 178. On the other hand, transforming variables to meet distribution assumptions is a common practice engaged in for its statistical benefits. See for example, J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), especially pp. 44-45.

tion); and second, using the results of the regression based on logarithmically transformed variables, it should be possible to predict the original untransformed dependent variable with the degree of accuracy indicated by the correlation associated with the regression based on transformation.

The first issue was quickly settled. Very few of the analyses attempted on aggregate data from Pennsylvania counties showed increases in prediction when a multiplicative model was used. Indeed, as Table 3 shows, for a set of three predictors and a distinct set of four predictors in both 1960 and 1964 an additive rather than a multiplicative model would account for more total variance.¹³

We turn now to the question of whether or not the analysis based on logarithmically transformed variables and the correlation coefficient associated with it seriously misrepresents the predictive power of multiplicatively written (untransformed) original measurements for these data. In the logarithmic equation the estimates of coefficients are the powers to which the various predictors are to be raised in the multiplicative equation. The constant in the logarithmic regression is the logarithm of the multiplicative constant for the multiplicative equation. As an empirical test we executed still another regression analysis.

The estimates of constants from the logarithmic regression, being estimated by least squares are presumably unique. Hence, if a new variable is constructed using these constants to weight its components, and this is used in a simple regression on the original untransformed variables, we should expect: (1) approximately the same but slightly higher correlations, (2) a new regression constant close to zero in value, and (3) a new slope close to one in value.

The procedure is as follows: starting with the results of the logarithmic regression analysis create a new variable, X^* , an index variable, given in the three variable case by

$$X^* = bX_1^{m_1}X_2^{m_2},$$

where b , m_1 , and m_2 are obtained from the logarithmic regression. Next, do a simple two variable regression using X^* as the predictor and obtain a new slope and intercept, b^* and m^* , i.e., regress to obtain

$$Y = b^* + m^*X^*.$$

The correlation associated with this regression is a measure of the ability to predict the un-

¹³ Professor Hamblin has assured us that he does not always, or even usually, obtain dramatic results by resort to a multiplicative mode. Personal communication from R. Hamblin.

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF THE SQUARE OF THE MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT FOR ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE MODELS (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

Multiple Predictors**	R ²			
	1960		1964	
	Additive	Multi- plicative	Additive	Multi- plicative
Non-white, Foreign Parents, Income Less than \$3,000, and Rural Farm	.66	.56	.49	.43
Urban, White Collar, and High School or More Education	.27	.22	.20	.19

* The criterion measure was the percentage voting Democratic in both years.

** All variables are measured in percentages.

transformed original variable Y with a multiplicative model. If the correlations are not approximately the same, we have empirical, rather than methodological, grounds for suspicion.

Now consider the constants b^* and m^* . If the original estimates of constants were the unique least squares constants, then X^* must be related to $bX_1^{m_1} X_2^{m_2}$ by an identity transformation, *i.e.*, m^* should be one and b^* should be zero. Otherwise the logarithmically estimated constants are not unique. This means that in our new regression b^* and m^* should be close to zero and one respectively, empirically.

Table 4 presents a comparison in terms of squared correlations. The comparisons of Table 4 show that the multiplicative model does as well as the logarithmic model on which it is based. The multiplicative correlation is somewhat larger and this bias becomes more pro-

nounced as the correlation increases. The bias is not large, however, and no row shows a reduction in correlation.

Table 5 gives the slopes and regression intercepts with standard errors for the same relationships as those of Table 4. Although there is no sampling problem here, the use of standard errors gives a measure of the magnitude of deviation from our hypotheses. The maximum error from our expectations is for the slope of the foreign parents regression, which is one and one eighth standard errors different from 1. Tables 4 and 5 are typical of what happens in all cases we have examined: correlations are slightly larger for the new regression, the slopes are close to one, and the regression constants close to zero. We conclude that empirical tests confirm the algebra—there is no black magic in the procedures advanced by Hamblin and Soares and the error introduced by transformation is small.

From the point of view of illustrating the possibilities of the paradigm set out in Table 1,

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS BASED ON LOGARITHMIC REGRESSION WITH THOSE BASED ON THE RELATED INDEX CORRELATION (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

Single and Joint Predictors**	Logarithmic	Multi- plicative
Urban	.09	.10
Urban and Non-White	.17	.20
Foreign Parents	.38	.44
Foreign Parents and Non-White	.42	.49

* All variables are measured in percentages.

** The criterion is in each instance percent voting Democratic in 1960.

TABLE 5. SLOPES AND REGRESSION CONSTANTS FOR REGRESSION BASED ON PREDICTOR VARIABLE CONSTRUCTED FROM LOGARITHMIC REGRESSION (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

Predictors**	Slope	Standard Error	Regression Constant	Standard Error
Urban	1.13	0.42	-4.0	9.0
Urban and Non-White	1.20	0.27	-3.5	9.3
Foreign Parents	1.18	0.16	-6.3	7.8
Foreign Parents and Non-White	1.15	0.15	-5.5	7.4

* All variables measured in percentages.

** The criterion in each instance was percent voting Democratic in 1960.

there remains the case of a random "state of political nature." Tables 3 and 4 clearly show that it is at least empirically *possible*, interpretations aside, to obtain instances of both additive and multiplicative model superiority when judged by a correlation criterion. But how can a random "state of political nature" be created?

For this problem we offer the following solution.¹⁴ Shuffle a random sample of United States voters and assign them to arbitrary groups of the same size. Compute percentage measures of group characteristics and proceed in analysis as if the groups were ordinary aggregate data, *i.e.*, as if they were the same as Pennsylvania counties. This procedure creates random counties by creating arbitrary environments—a lumping together of individuals who lack neighborhood and other relationships with other members of the group. The objective of the procedure was to approximate the hypothetical random state of political nature of Table 1 with systematic data, *i.e.*, "real" observations.

If the paradigm of Table 1 is correct, then correlations associated with additive and multiplicative models should be about the same. Unfortunately our results were not that clear. Although sometimes the multiplicative model appeared superior, the preponderance of our analyses reveal a slightly better prediction for the additive model. Why is this the case? The fault lies with our conceptualization of the difference in correlations associated with the two different models. It tests only whether the predictors interact. But if predictor variables are randomly related they are independent, and this is another way of saying they do not interact. The additive model provides a theoretical representation of independent influences, but with the tools of analysis used here, this cannot be distinguished from a random state of political nature. Both random and independent political influences have the same formal representation and hence, from a technical point of view, row 3 of Table 1 is redundant for it asserts the same relationships as row 1. We found very weak relationships for the random groups. It may be that the appropriate prediction for row 3 is no relationship for either model.

IV. FINDINGS

Turning to the substantive aspects of this study, we may appropriately begin with an examination of the simple correlation arrays matching the percentage Democratic for 1960–1968

¹⁴ We report our results only in qualitative terms. The data were from the 1964 S. R. C. election study (courtesy of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research).

TABLE 6. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN PREDICTOR VARIABLES: THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1960–1968*

Predictor Variable	Correlation (r) with Democratic Percentage of the Vote:		
	1960	1964	1968
Foreign Parents	+ .72	+ .58	+ .68
Dem. Registration 1960	+ .67	+ .65	+ .61
Non-White	+ .41	+ .23	+ .32
High-school Graduate	— .13	— .12	— .09
Rural-farm	— .56	— .59	— .63

* All variables measured in percentages.

with five leading predictor variables.¹⁵ Simple correlations are presented in Table 6.

The first point of interest about this array is that it corresponds both to intuitive understanding about the mass base of party support in an industrial state and to the findings of survey analysis on the individual level: the Democratic percentage of the vote is strongly and positively correlated with ethnicity on one end of the continuum and strongly but negatively correlated with rurality on the other. Secondly, these arrays display an impressive continuity over three elections which had an extraordinary variety of short-term appeals and stimuli. There are not only no sign changes during the eight-year period, with a marginal exception in 1964; the variables also show very high continuity both in their absolute values and their ranking relative to each other.

But while this conveys an accurate picture of the profound stability of aggregate partisan allegiance, a third aspect—that of marked decline in the values of *r* in 1964, followed by a return nearly to 1960 levels in 1968—is also visible. It seems virtually certain that this change is intimately associated with the intense but probably mostly ephemeral short-term effect of the Goldwater campaign on voting behavior. As has been recently pointed out, the 1964 election was more heavily influenced by sectional response differentials than any other in at least a generation. In the case of Pennsylvania, as in those of other

¹⁵ As throughout this study, the Democratic percentage is of the three-party vote in 1968, and of the two-party vote in 1960 and 1964. As to the predictor variables, all are taken from the 1960 census, except for percentage Democratic of two-party registration. This is also, however, derived from a 1960 base.

states in the Northeast, the Democratic landslide of 1964 was produced not by an across-the-board pro-Democratic surge, but by a surge which was heavily concentrated among normally Republican voting groups.¹⁶ Such asymmetrical concentrations of shift within a given state seem to be central characteristics of temporary or permanent sectional realignment. It is obvious that to the extent that they occur, within-state differences—whether based upon cleavages associated with class, ethnicity or other factors—will be partially suppressed. The decline in overall prediction from our variables in 1964—particularly the decline in the r 's associated with ethnicity and race—quite nicely captures this sectional skewing by revealing the expected decline in the explanatory power of within-state differentiations. Similarly, the resurgence in 1968, which may well be more complete than it looks because of the obsolescence of 1960 census data, must strongly imply not only that the 1964 surge was a short-lived “deviating” election situation but that in Pennsylvania the now-traditional contours of the New Deal alignment were substantially restored in 1968.

A conversion of the major-party (Democratic) simple correlations to the function form $Y = bX^m$ generates an array, Table 7, which can be compared with that in Table 6.

TABLE 7. POWER FUNCTION MODEL* AND THE PENNSYLVANIA VOTE, 1960-1968**

Predictor Variables	Correlation (r) of Democratic Percentage of the Vote:		
	1960	1964	1968
Foreign Parents	+.62	+.51	+.65
Dem. Registration 1960	+.65	+.64	+.58
Non-white	+.35	+.21	+.29
High-school Graduate	-.12	-.11	-.07
Rural-farm	-.65	-.59	-.67

* Actual analysis was with $\text{Log } (y) = m \text{ Log } (x) + \text{Log } (b)$.

** All variables measured in percentages.

The most obvious conclusion to be derived from a comparison of the two tables is that, so far as major-party voting in Pennsylvania is concerned, there is generally very little difference in the explanatory power of the additive and power function models. Indeed, for all variables except

percentage rural-farm, the simple linear model is somewhat to be preferred. Thus, there is no reason in such a case to prefer the more complicated interpretations associated with the power function model.

When one turns to the interrelationships between the variables in an additive multiple correlation set, Table 8, a pattern emerges which is remarkably different in its implications from that which is suggested by an array of simple correlations for each variable with the percentage Democratic of the vote.

TABLE 8. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN EXPLANATION/PREDICTION: SQUARES OF MULTIPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 1960-1968*

Predictor Variables	Partial R^2		
	1960	1964	1968
Foreign Parents	.55	.10	.32
Dem. Registration 1960	.45	.37	.31
Non-white	.26	.00	.03
High-school Graduate	.18	.01	.06
Rural-farm	.14	.27	.28
Multiple R^2	.88	.72	.80

* Degrees of Freedom = 61. All variables are measured in percentages.

What stands out here with remarkable clarity, using the partial correlation as a criterion, is the steep decline in the importance of the ethnic and racial variables, the increased importance of the rural variable, and the enduring if gradual declining significance of the registration or aggregate-party identification variable. The result is a massive short term difference in the relative weighting of the “independent” variables. Thus in 1960 ethnicity and party are the two most important factors, but these become party and rurality in 1964. The 1968 restoration, while it is a restoration, displays pointed differences from 1960. Again, the massive difference between the 1964 alignment in Pennsylvania and those which preceded and succeeded it stands out in bold relief. The loss of significance for the foreign-parents and non-white variables in 1964 is not to be understood, of course, as indicating a lessening of the absolute magnitude of support for the Democrats from such groups; to the contrary, especially among nonwhites. What is explicitly revealed is the effect of a within-state compression in which largely white, native-stock counties move more heavily toward the Democratic

¹⁶ Burnham, “American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election,” *op. cit.*

candidate than do those which have large concentrations of foreign-stock whites and/or non-whites. This within-state compression, to reiterate, seems a direct consequence of the sectional impact of the Goldwater candidacy on this northeastern state. Thus, what is left to explain in within-state terms is a set of cleavages which revolve around party registration and a rural-nonrural dimension.

Lest we lose sight of the curious mixture of change and continuity associated with these three elections, we pause for a moment in this discussion to present an array of much simpler data-reduction and autocorrelation measures associated with both the Democratic and Wallace votes during this period.

The data in Table 9 capture rather nicely the purely political side of Pennsylvania voting behavior at the county level during this period. The very great compression of county percentages Democratic between 1960 and 1964 comes

into clear view—the variance is cut nearly in half—as is its 1968 return to a level substantially equal to that of 1960. Such a massive deviation was largely the result, first, of an anti-Goldwater movement which tended to be maximized precisely in areas of 1960 Republican strength, and, second, of a counter-movement between 1964 and 1968 which returned the aggregate profile of the state's Democratic vote back approximately to that of 1960. But the sectional distortion of 1964 only partially subsided, for the time being, the basic electoral divisions within the state: this is clearly evidenced not only by the rather high 1960–1964 autocorrelation, but also by the extremely strong 1964–1968 r, whether measured in two-party or three-party terms for the latter year. The 1968 Wallace vote on the county level stands out for its very low correlation with any major-party percentages during the whole 1960–1968 period; but this is a matter of discussion at a later point in

TABLE 9. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY, 1960–1968: THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Year and Party	A. Measures of Central Tendency and Dispersion				
	Variance	Standard Deviation	Mean (N = 67)	State Percentages	Difference
1960 Democratic	104.49	10.22	40.9	51.2	–10.3
1964 Democratic	59.51	7.71	60.3	65.2	–4.9
1968 Democratic					
(Of 3-party vote)	96.57	9.83	39.7	47.8	–8.1
1968 Democratic					
(Of 2-party vote)	111.31	10.55	42.8	51.9	–9.1
1968 Wallace	4.58	2.14	7.3	8.0	–0.7
	B. Autocorrelations of Party Vote by County				
	1960 D	1964 D	1968 D (3-party)	1968 D (2-party)	1968 Wallace
1960 D	1.000	+.869	+.932	+.941	+.006
1964 D		1.000	+.957	+.951	–.133
1968 D (3-party)			1.000	+.995	–.152
1968 D (2-party)				1.000	–.054
1968 Wallace					1.000
	C. Squared Correlation Coefficients (r^2)				
	1960 D	1964 D	1968 D (3-party)	1968 D (2-party)	1968 Wallace
1960 D	1.000	.756	.868	.885	.000
1964 D		1.000	.915	.905	.018
1968 D (3-party)			1.000	.990	.023
1968 D (2-party)				1.000	.003
1968 Wallace					1.000

this paper. So far as the basic political data for major-party voting in this period is concerned, the abnormality of the 1964 array stands out, but remains somewhat marginal. The political data alone suggest that continuity of aggregate voting structures through the 1964 upheaval is at least as important as that upheaval itself—at any rate, in Pennsylvania.¹⁷

Taken over the entire eight-year period, indeed, there is reason to assume that, while the short-term deviating effects of 1964 are again dramatically visible, the 1968 coalition is very similar to, but is not quite the same as, its 1960 predecessor. In particular, the ethnic and racial variables were markedly less important in 1968 than eight years previously, while the rural-farm variable was considerably more so. Granted the low correlations between the Wallace vote in 1968 and any of our variables presented below, it seems quite unlikely that this decline in importance for two variables and increase in importance for another between 1960 and 1968 can be directly causally related to this third-party intrusion.¹⁸

¹⁷ There is, of course, a longer historical dimension to the story which cannot receive very explicit treatment here. The 1964 variance of 59.51, for example, is the lowest in the electoral history of the state since 1940, although the Eisenhower landslide of 1956 produces an almost comparably low figure of 72.69. All others in the period show variances roughly the same as those of 1960 or 1968. Similarly, if one extends autocorrelations of contiguous pairs of elections back to, say, 1916/1920, evidences of massive realignment emerge between 1920 and 1940 which have no counterpart in the data *within Pennsylvania* for the 1960's. Thus, the squared coefficients (based on the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote except for 1924) are as follows during this period: 1916/1920: .76; 1920/1924: .77; 1924/1928: .00; 1928/1932: .46; 1932/1936: .61; 1936/1940: .91. Thereafter, except for 1956/1960 and 1960/1964, all pairs yield a squared coefficient of .91 or above. For a discussion of the changing socio-economic and demographic correlations of the Pennsylvania vote during this period, see Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Future of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970). The appendix reports two tables relevant to these considerations.

¹⁸ It may, unfortunately, be partly an artifact of census data which, while fitting the 1960 election closely, has become more or less obsolescent by 1968. It is more probable than not that the basic relationships among Pennsylvania's counties have not undergone sweeping changes since 1960, but only intercensal interpolation and analysis of 1970 data, once it is available, can settle this question.

We have already noted that a power function model generates rather less explanatory power when correlated with major-party percentages than the additive model when one takes variables one at a time. The same relationship, not surprisingly, obtains when the model is extended to several variables. Taking the 1960 case, the pattern of Table 10 is instructive.¹⁹ As is evident, there is little to choose between the aggre-

TABLE 10. WHICH MODEL DO YOU PREFER?
CORRELATIONS BASED ON ADDITIVE
AND MULTIPLICATIVE
(PENNSYLVANIA DATA, 1960)*

Predictor Variables	Partial R ²	
	Additive	Multiplicative
Foreign Parents	.55	.24
Dem. Registration 1960	.45	.48
Non-white	.26	.08
High-school Graduate	.18	.02
Rural-farm	.14	.17
Multiple R ²	.88	.81

* All variables measured in percentages. The dependent variable was Democratic vote.

gate explanatory capacity of these five variables in additive or multiplicative form. What is of considerable interest, however, is that the relative importance of each variable judged by a partial correlation criterion, results in radically *different* interpretations in the two forms. In the additive case, ethnicity looms large as the single most important of variables, with party coming in a close second. But in the multiplicative case, the party variable is clearly predominant. Which is to be preferred?

The literature in the field—particularly the survey literature—places great stress upon the relevance of group-related characteristics in determining both party identification and voting choice by individuals.²⁰ Indeed, there are some spectacular recent examples, for instance in the voting behavior of Baltimore Negroes between 1964 and 1968, in which race not only virtually determined electoral choice but also assumed clear supremacy over party identification under conditions of conflict between the two.²¹ On a

¹⁹ Patterns for major-party voting in 1964 and 1968 are similar to this.

²⁰ See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, "Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election," in Angus Campbell *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 96-124.

²¹ The 1966 Democratic gubernatorial candidate

speculative basis, we may conclude that the 1920 Republican landslide in all probability involved similar movements among ethnic voters, notably Germans and Irish Catholics. At this late date the argument that voters are anchored to partisan politics by a pre-existing network of primary and reference group relationships hardly needs elaborate defense.²²

On the other hand, what rationale can be given for the proposition that party identification itself may predominate? While there is little point in elaborating what may be a chicken-and-egg argument, there is considerable evidence to support the view that party cannot be appropriately viewed as an exclusively dependent variable in the United States. Surveys have pointed to the significance of party identification, however established initially, in acting as a selective filter for the individual's cognition of political objects; so much so, indeed, that the availability of voters for shifts in accordance with short-term stimuli seems to be inversely and monotonically related to the strength of their perceived party identification.²³ At the extremes of strong party identification, movement can hardly occur except in the very rare case, like the Maryland 1966 election, in which the individual perceives a direct attack by his party and its candidates on his core group-related identity and values. Moreover, the electoral strategies employed by party leaders are frequently designed to prevent the erosion of party-identified perceptions and behavior by reactivating group hostilities and reinforcing the preceptual link between group and party.²⁴ Fi-

nally, one of the most dominant characteristics of party identification, one which has been abundantly demonstrated for the current period by survey methods and for earlier times by aggregate analysis, is its extraordinary *durability*. Once it is brought into being, it persists as a semi-autonomous determinant of perception and choice over long periods of time, and long after the group-related stimuli which brought it into being have faded from view. As Key and Munger pointed out ten years ago in their study of Indiana politics in the 1868-1900 period, the origins of American partisan commitments are frequently far more obscure and localized—ever disaggregated down to the family level—than would be suspected by advocates of simple socially deterministic cause-effect relationships. The truth of the matter seems to be, as Lee Benson has forcefully argued, that American voting behavior is chiefly marked by its *pluralism*. Not least among the attributes of this pluralism is the heterogeneity of predispositional factors which enter into partisan identification and partisan voting.

The point of this argument is not to make a choice between two possible "explanations" (ethnicity more important than party or conversely, party more important than ethnicity), but to emphasize that each describes an important aspect of political reality under American conditions. The implication of different results in the two models is literally that form is substance. The additive model yields results which tend to stress the salience of group-related characteristics; the multiplicative model suggests unambiguously the supremacy of party as such as an explanatory variable. That this should be so suggests first, that which model is selected may well be a legitimate matter for research strategy, and second, that it may be very profitable for the investigator to set up comparative tables of partials and multiples, using each mode.

Our finding for the major-party vote thus far is that the additive model is superior in overall explanatory power to the multiplicative. In other words, aggregate voting behavior associated with major-party coalitions in Pennsylvania, whether measured in individual elections or over time, displays characteristics which are roughly inverse to those described by Soares and Hamblin for the "radical-left" vote in Chile. But

received about 6% of the black vote in Baltimore, running as he did on an explicitly closed-housing platform. This contrasts with an approximately 97% Democratic of the two-party vote in 1964 and an approximately 93% Democratic of the three-party vote in 1968 in Negro precincts of Baltimore City. One of the ironies of contemporary American politics is, thus, that Negroes played a decisive role in the chain of events which was to elevate Spiro T. Agnew to the Vice-Presidency of the United States.

²² For the nineteenth century, see Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 165-207 and 270-287.

²³ See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in Angus Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-39.

²⁴ Raymond Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Voting," in M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

²⁵ V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," reprinted in Frank Munger and M. Douglas Price (eds.), *Readings in Political Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1964), pp. 366-384.

what effects are generated by a major third-party protest effort?

When we turn to the Wallace vote in 1968, the first salient point that can be noted from Table 9 is that its county variance is incomparably lower than the lowest major-party variance—indeed, this third-party variance of 1968 seems to be lower than in the case of any other third party casting 5% or more of the total vote in this state's electoral history—and that, as could be expected, the discrepancy between the county mean and the statewide total vote for Wallace is extremely low. In this context, it seems of particular significance that a critical differentiation occurs in the relative explanatory power of the two forms of regression model, as indicated in Table 11.

TABLE 11. THE WALLACE VOTE OF 1968:
A DEVIANT CASE?

Predictor Variables* (1960 Data)	Partial R ²	
	Additive	Multi- plicative
Foreign Parents	.07	.12
Democratic Registration	.02	.03
Non-white	.01	.14
High-school Graduate	.02	.00
Rural-farm	.01	.00
Multiple R ²	.07	.27

* All variables are measured in percentages.

Two aspects of this table are of paramount importance. In the first place, the county-level correlation of Wallace's percentage of the three-party vote with any available predictor variable

is extraordinarily low, as is its correlation with any major-party vote in the 1960-68 period.²⁶ This is another way of saying that this vote cut directly across all major socio-political cleavages in Pennsylvania. Viewed in terms of this sub-universe of counties, it was a "wild vote." The inference is strong that individual responses outside ordinary group contexts were of unusually great significance in the building of Wallace's vote in this northeastern state.

George Wallace's support among Southerners and among blue-collar workers in northern cities is well known from the results of surveys and the analysis of aggregate data at the precinct level. As Table 12 reveals, this is clearly the case when the minor-civil-divisions of two counties of the Philadelphia metropolitan area are examined. Unfortunately, minor-civil-division data

²⁶ Research which has just been completed by several of our graduate students but not yet verified suggests the existence of similar interactivity in the Wallace vote in Georgia (43.4% of the total) and also in voting in Quebec for Real Caouette's *ressentiment*-oriented Social Credit movement in 1962. In the latter case, the vote for Progressive Conservative candidates was similarly analyzed as a "control"; the additive form of multiple correlation apparently had slightly greater explanatory power so far as Quebec voting for this Canadian major party was concerned.

²⁷ This table's fourth column includes the following Pennsylvania urban-metropolitan counties: Allegheny, Beaver, Berks, Bucks, Cambria, Cumberland, Dauphin, Delaware, Erie, Lackawanna, Lancaster, Lehigh, Luzerne, Montgomery, Northampton, Philadelphia, Washington, Westmoreland and York. The other three columns are based on minor-civil-division data for the counties concerned.

TABLE 12. LEVELS-OF-ANALYSIS DIFFICULTIES? CORRELATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL VARIABLES WITH WALLACE VOTE, 1968²⁷

Category Correlated	Delaware Co. Pa. (N = 49)	Camden Co., N. J. (N = 33)	Luzerne Co., Pa. (N = 49)	Urban-Metropolitan Counties, Pa. (N = 19)
<i>Occupations (% of Males in Active Labor Force, 1960)</i>				
Professional-Managerial	-.795	-.776	+.219	+.114
Clerical-Sales	-.567	-.698	-.349	-.131
Skilled, Semi-Skilled	+.872	+.822	-.129	-.060
Unskilled, N.A.	+.123	+.353	+.231	+.038
<i>Political Behavior</i>				
% Democratic, 1960	+.503	+.757	-.527	-.172
% Democratic, 1964	+.351	+.595	-.453	-.354

for the 1968 election in Pennsylvania came to hand too late to be fully used in this study; but it would appear that similar relationships also obtain in white communities of the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. But they tend strongly to wash out at the county level, even when analysis at this level is confined to the nineteen largest SMSA counties in the state. To what extent does this represent a levels-of-analysis problem?

One may begin by noting that among Pennsylvania's metropolitan counties, the Wallace vote ranges from a high of 11.2% in Allegheny county to a low of 3.1% in Lackawanna, a county fully as "urban" in the gross census definition of the term as is Allegheny.²⁸ This suggests at once that, even if the relationships between the Wallace vote and class-party variables were similar from one county to another at the most minute level of aggregate analysis, the intercepts if not the slopes of the regressions would be quite diverse. A minor-civil-division correlation which lumped together stratification patterns which were generally similar but of wide geographical dispersion would produce a pretty severe erosion of the size of these correlations. Thus, for example, the Wallace percentage in a minor-civil-division in Lackawanna or Luzerne counties which had 50% of its male labor force in skilled or semi-skilled occupations would

cross-county correlations at the subunit level would reflect such local variations. Indeed, when the 122 minor divisions of four New Jersey metropolitan counties are so analyzed, this is precisely what we find.²⁹

Moreover, one key to the problem seems to be provided by the results in Luzerne county. Here Wallace won 4.8% of the vote. Correlation of the Wallace percentage with occupational and political variables among its 49 comparable subdivisions yields a result which is both radically dissimilar from those of the two Philadelphia metropolitan-area counties and rather close to that yielded at the county level for Pennsylvania's metropolitan areas as a whole. A variety of explanations can no doubt be advanced for this

²⁹ If one executes a simple linear correlation program with two independent variables—percentage professional-managerial and percentage skilled and semi-skilled in the 1960 male labor force—it can at once be seen that (a) very significant differences exist in the regression equations, the partials, the beta weights and the R²'s for four New Jersey counties at this level; and (b) an aggregation of the minor-civil division units of these four counties, taken together, yields an R² which accounts for only three-fifths of the variance. The arrays look like this:

County	N	r _{12,3}	r _{13,2}	r _{23,1}	b ₁	b ₂	R ²
Bergen, N.J.	61	-.868	+.907	-.945	-.103	+.810	.824
Camden, N.J.	33	-.825	+.821	-.934	-.455	+.396	.701
Hudson, N.J.	12	-.624	+.331	-.572	-.647	-.040	.391
Passiac, N.J.	16	-.513	+.483	-.648	-.346	+.258	.302
Four N.J. Counties	122	-.665	+.766	-.801	-.146	+.649	.594
Metro Counties, Pa.	19	+.114	-.060	-.766	+.164	+.065	.015

The regression equations are:

County	Y _c =
Bergen, N.J.	0.501 - 0.021 X ₁ + 0.163 X ₂
Camden, N.J.	11.346 - 0.214 X ₁ + 0.166 X ₂
Hudson, N.J.	18.790 - 0.523 X ₁ - 0.029 X ₂
Passiac, N.J.	7.247 - 0.119 X ₁ + 0.106 X ₂
Four N.J. Counties	-0.143 - 0.059 X ₁ + 0.253 X ₂
19 Metro Counties	4.348 + 0.086 X ₁ + 0.032 X ₂

county subunit with 30% or even less; and tend to be equivalent to that of a Delaware

²⁸ The Wallace vote in these metropolitan counties ranges from 3.1%, 4.1%, 4.2%, and 4.8% in Lackawanna, Lehigh, Northampton and Luzerne counties, respectively, to 9.8%, 10.6%, 10.7% and 11.2% in Beaver, Washington, Bucks and Allegheny counties, respectively.

Thus, while it is clear that a positive relationship exists between the magnitude of the Wallace vote and the percentage of blue-collar workers in New Jersey minor-civil-divisions, there is considerable variability in this relationship between the divisions in one county and another. The amount of variance in the Wallace vote which is accounted for by these two variables ranges from less than one-third to more than four-fifths.

striking divergence—for example, the durability and strength of ethnic and religious polarizations within this anthracite county, its geographical remoteness from conurbations despite its intense urbanization, and the absence of more than a trace of blacks in the population. Whatever the relative weighting which may be given to these and other possible hypotheses, the key point for our purposes is that both the intercept and the direction of the slope of the regression are utterly different as between Luzerne and Delaware counties. It is thus evident that the hypothesis of heterogeneity in the Wallace vote has validity even in the metropolitan areas of the state; the heterogeneity becomes more marked, of course, when nonmetropolitan and nonurban sources of Wallace support are added and patterns are studied for the state as a whole at the county level. Thus, while it may be the case that the low correlation of the Wallace vote with our predictor variables at the county level may involve a levels-of-analysis problem to some extent, clearly something more substantive is also present. This impression is merely reinforced by contemplation of such outcomes elsewhere as the 25.7% of the vote won by Wallace in Payette county, Idaho; his 20.8% in Alaska's 10th Election District; his 27.5% in Esmeralda county, Nevada; or, on the other hand, his failure to achieve even 5% of the vote in such Massachusetts proletarian centers as Fall River, Lawrence, New Bedford, Revere or Somerville.³⁰

Secondly, the Wallace vote of 1968 provides the only convincing evidence in our series of the presence of interactive effects along the lines suggested by Soares and Hamblin. These effects, not surprisingly, are concentrated inversely between the ethnic and racial variables. It is very clear, of course, that the improvement in explanatory power by shifting from additive to multiplicative form of correlation is considerably less in absolute value than was found in the 1952 Chilean case. Even so, a result which produces a threefold increase in the explanatory power of our variables is not to be derided. That it exists at all in American conditions—far removed indeed from the world of the “radical left” in a relatively underdeveloped country—is significant enough. That it represents the only contempo-

rary evidence of interactivity or interdependence among the predisposing variables which we have for American voting behavior is still more so. That the interactions can be traced to two variables which could intuitively be expected to interact under current conditions of escalating racial tension is gratifying—though, of course, only from an analytic point of view.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) *The structure and implications of the findings.*

The analysis performed here appears to cast significant light upon several major aspects of aggregate voting behavior. In the first place, we have discovered evidences of all three forms of relationships suggested in Table 1 in recent American voting behavior. The “normal case” appears to be one in which the predictor variables are more or less independent of one another. In contemporary major-party voting—at least in Pennsylvania—multiple correlations based on simple additive models appear to explain more of the variance than can be explained with a multiplicative power function model. This appears to be confirmation on the aggregate level of the proposition advanced by the authors of the Simulmatics study that predispositional factors at the individual level summate rather than multiply in the normal American case. Secondly, when we attempted to construct completely random, arbitrary “environments” composed of groups of individuals in the 1964 SRC sample, the result was a set of correlations consistent with the independence of environmental factors. Thirdly, the Wallace vote of 1968 stands out as a phenomenon which is quantitatively unique in this series, and which more closely resembles the 1952 vote of the “radical left” in Chile—and possibly the 1962 “radical right” in Quebec—than it does the apparent American norm. Finally, there are two methodological points which are worth considering: first, it is clear on both logical and empirical grounds that there is no across-the-board “black magic” in logarithmic transformation; and second, there may be a significant ambiguity which cannot be resolved on *a priori* grounds between the relative explanatory power of the contributing variables in additive and multiplicative forms, even when the multiple correlations are approximately the same.

Let us turn to the substantive implications of these findings, beginning first with the “normal case.” It seems reasonable to suppose that the rather clear superiority of the additive to the multiplicative form of regression model as applied to voting for American major parties is related to some of their salient traditional char-

³⁰ The Wallace percentages in these cities were: Fall River, 2.9%; Lawrence, 3.9%; New Bedford, 4.1%; Revere, 4.8%; Somerville, 4.3%. Impressively, it appears that the same general pattern of relatively greater Wallace penetration in blue-collar areas than in middle-class areas obtains in Massachusetts as in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. But both the intercepts and the slopes probably vary considerably from those for either Delaware or Luzerne counties.

acteristics. The first of these is that the major-party formations in the United States have normally been grounded on political oppositions which in most other societies would be described as marginal. These parties have both contributed actively to the maintenance of a massive national value consensus which emphasizes the primacy of the private over the public, the individual over the collective. This value system is probably the closest approximation to eighteenth-century Whiggish liberalism now in existence. It is hardly too much to say that the American political system as a whole, with its extraordinary diffusion of political power, makes sense only as a structural precipitate of this pervasive liberal *Weltanschauung*.³¹ Not surprisingly, the coalitional structure of the established political parties in a two-party system in this primordially liberal society is not specific to class, confessional or other polarizations. Of course such polarizations exist and are reflected in the structure of mass party identification and voting behavior; but they exist in a party system which has aptly been classified on comparative criteria as *heterogeneous*. This heterogeneity implies that there is a protean, labile quality to American voting coalitions that is rather unusually marked in western systems of electoral politics, and, in policy terms, ties in nicely with Theodore J. Lowi's observations that "... American parties represent outcomes *in general*; parties seldom shape or represent outcomes *in particular*."³² In short, their coalitional structure no less than their organization, presupposes the normal absence of "hard oppositions" of the sort found in European politics; and it precludes any very effective coalescence of voting groups in a mass-based effort to capture the apparatus of state for positive social-transformation purposes. This too is reflective of a liberal political system one of whose most fundamental characteristics is the denial, both in theory and in operational terms, of internal or domestic political sovereignty.

Such an interpretation of American politics carries with it some clear implications for its electoral-politics subsystem. There is no question that the threshold-of-representation features of the American electoral system—in particular the indivisible but immensely important office of the Presidency—have been enormously influential in maintaining and reinforcing a two-

party norm in the United States.³³ But, important as they are, they do not absolutely determine the dominance of two and only two parties in the United States, much less the long-term trend over the past century for third parties to disappear, or the extent to which—both in political rhetoric and in the electoral laws of certain states such as Ohio and Nebraska—the two-party norm itself has increasingly become part of an "American celebration" in this century.

The persistence of this two-party norm, and most other of the salient peculiarities of American major-party politics for this matter, may perhaps best be explained by the thesis that questions of party or electoral politics in this country have not for the most part been questions of power. Putting the matter another way, electoral politics and voting are very rarely widely perceived here as vehicles for attacks upon any basic aspect of the social order. On only a very few occasions in our history have internal social tensions escalated to the point where serious efforts have been made to use electoral politics as a means for achieving sweeping redistribution of policy outcomes. These, of course, have been indissolubly associated with critical realignments.

The American two-party system, in short, is formed of two structural elements which share a common and most important political characteristic: the continuing supremacy of the traditional liberal middle-class value-system as it becomes concretized in terms of political demand, and the phasing out, non-recognition of morselization of potentially disruptive political demand. Such a structure and the value-system which it reflects do not preclude the existence of high levels of tension and violence in American society, but they do normally rule out the expression of active or aggressive political alienation through major electoral-politics instrumentalities.

In such a context, Theodore J. Lowi's argument that American parties are constituent rather than policy-making is reinforced.³⁴ What that constituent function is may perhaps be restated here: it is to contribute to the maintenance of a high wall of separation between society and polity in the interest of maximizing private, *i.e.*, middle-class, decision-making in the former. It follows from this, first, that under normal circumstances major-party electoral politics becomes something of an end in itself rather than a politically directed transformation in society which the majority coalition may think desirable; and, second, that this

³¹ For fuller elaboration of this argument, see Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Future of American Politics*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 7.

³² Theodore J. Lowi, "Party, Policy and Constitution," in William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), *The American Party Systems* (New York: Oxford, 1967), p. 263.

³³ S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.

³⁴ Lowi, *op. cit.*

would be reflected in aggregate terms: that, for example, correlations based upon additive models would explain more of the variance in "normal" American electoral politics at the mass base than would correlations which reflected strong interactions among predisposing social variables.

It may be here, by the way, that a possible explanation may eventually be found for the kind of semi-autonomous, extraordinarily durable and socially heterogeneous structure of party identification or aggregate party alignment which is found in the United States, and which our data has also suggested. For if the structure of traditional party identification has much to do with marginal differentials in policy outcomes and major differentials in ethnocultural prestige and recognition, it would be entirely to be expected that once set in motion, such identifications and alignments would have tremendous endurance over time and little clear relationship to policy outcomes.

(2) *Alienation and Multiplicative Power Functions: Wallace and 1968.*

The durability and marginality of American major-party operations bears with it a remarkable political stability. This stability has its price, however. It is becoming rather clear that there is a recurrent dynamic in American electoral politics; in particular an apparent oscillation, punctuated by third-party protest movements, between long-term stable phases and short but intense patterns of realignment. Very probably this peculiar pattern is a direct outgrowth of the interaction between the static, nondevelopmental or nonadaptive behavior of major-party elites, followers and structures on the one hand and a rapidly changing, politically largely unfettered socio-economic system on the other. Emergent political demand arising from these incessant social transformations tends in this political system not to be aggregated by the practitioners of a fairly closed producer-oriented, end-in-itself

kind of electoral politics, until the demand has had time to reach explosive proportions. The eventual results scarcely conform to what might be expected from the equilibrium models which have often been used to analyze American politics.

That 1968 was not a year marked by profound nationwide realignment at the mass base is fairly obvious—our Pennsylvania major-party data indicate as much. But it was an election year which would rank close to the top of any imaginable scale which might measure the intensity of intergroup tensions, discontent, and aggressive hostility directed by significant elements of the public against existing institutions and leaders. Electoral politics had to compete directly through the year with the politics of direct action and confrontation up to the well-barricaded gates of the Democratic national convention itself. Insurrection within the Democratic coalition against the Johnson Administration took on such major proportions that a Republican presidential candidate could win a mere four years after one of the worst defeats in his party's history. Finally, of course, a third-party coalition of *ressentiment*, based on racial hostility and on the hostility of the periphery toward the center, won 13.6% of the three-party vote. This, it should be noted, was the second-best showing in American political history for any third-party movement which was not clearly associated with formal ruptures in the organizational structure and mass following of one of the major parties. It represents an exceptional, if regionally-concentrated, "act of aggressive hostility" against the leaders, parties and policies associated with the existing political order.³⁵

³⁵ Partitioning of the country between the "Greater South" (the eleven ex-Confederate states plus Oklahoma and Kentucky) and the remaining parts of the country reveals the following patterns in major third-party years since 1892:

Year	Greater South			Non-South		
	% D	% R	% Oth	% D	% R	% Oth
1892	37.9	27.3	14.8 Pop.	44.4	48.4	7.2 Pop.
1912	61.3	17.7	16.1 Prog. 4.9 Soc.	39.1	24.7	29.9 Prog. 6.3 Soc.
1924	60.0	34.2	5.8 Prog.	24.2	57.3	18.5 Prog.
1948	52.3	29.7	17.5 S.R. 0.5 Prog.	49.4	47.9	0.0 S.R. 2.7 Prog.
1968	31.5	36.0	32.6 Wall.	46.3	45.8	7.9 Wall.

It is probably appropriate to view the Southern wing of the Wallace movement as the latest, if one of the greatest, in a series of periphery-oriented revolts against a cosmopolitan center—revolts which have deeply involved, although they have been far from coextensive with, responses to efforts from the center to define citizenship in the American polity uniformly as between the races and as between one region and another. In this respect, the Wallace movement can be seen as an authentic continuation of an old regional tradition, a tradition in which colonial resentment against a dominant metropole or resistance to the periphery against the center's efforts at coordination is inextricably bound up with issues involving race relations. Thus, we find that in Oklahoma the Wallace vote is visible and positively correlated with the Socialist vote in the 1914 election, and particularly with the mean Democratic percentage of the total vote between 1932 and 1948.³⁶ It is also worth noting, however, that here the Wallace vote also reflects a pattern similar to that found in Pennsylvania: its variance is less than half of the 1914 Socialist variance, and one-third as large as that of the 1932-1948 mean percentage Democratic.

If it is the case that even border-South states

Not only does the Wallace movement represent the largest Southern third-party insurrection since 1860; it is surpassed in the *non-Southern* states since that date only by the 1912 and 1924 Progressives.

³⁶ The partial correlation of % Wallace with % Socialist in 1914 is +.316, while it is +.618 between % Wallace and mean % Democratic, 1932-1948. The latter two correlate at +.531. The relative significance of the former in correlations with the Wallace vote is clearly very small compared with the latter: $b_1 = -.017$, while $b_2 = +.627$. R^2 for both predictors = .382. Neither the partials nor the R^2 are quite as large as might have been supposed *a priori*. This corresponds to the fact that the Wallace vote was much more uniformly distributed across the state's 77 counties than were either the 1914 Socialist vote or the 1932-1948 Democratic vote. Thus, the variance for the Wallace vote was 43.52 and the standard deviation 6.60; for the 1914 Socialist vote (with a mean almost identical with the Wallace mean in 1968) the variance was 97.73 and the standard deviation 9.89; and for the 1932-1948 mean Democratic percentage the two figures were 119.69 and 10.94 respectively. The data for the latter measure were taken from Oliver Benson *et al.*, *Oklahoma Votes* (Norman, Oklahoma: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1964), p. 18.

such as Oklahoma yielded substantial shares of its vote to the 1968 insurrection against the established political order, it seems clear that the Northern wing of the movement was less "respectable" than the Southern. It seems reasonable enough to suppose that the Wallace vote in the North was composed essentially of a hard-core residue of voters who were strongly alienated from, and actively hostile to, the candidates of both major parties. The larger regional sub-cultural context in which they lived was not very supportive to their commitment to Wallace. Thus it appears quite reasonable to view the non-Southern Wallace vote as essentially a "radical" vote, indicating a very high intensity of political dissatisfaction by American standards.

Recapitulating our findings for Pennsylvania, we have suggested, first, that the Wallace vote correlated very weakly with all of our variables in the additive form, and that it alone revealed persuasive evidence of interaction among the "independent" variables. Such findings are entirely consistent with two hypotheses. (1) Viewed at least on the aggregate level of the county, this cutting across most or all traditionally significant group-related variables is probably indicative of a mass base which has an abnormally large component of idiosyncratic, negative, or "alienated-voter" elements. (2) The interactivity disclosed in the multiplicative model and involving two of our set of variables suggests the possibility that a "multiplicative power function" exists for this vote, and is associated with nonwhite and foreign-stock population elements. Is it possible that this is in turn linked in some way to the existence of some sort of abnormal involuntary-response phenomenon among these voters but not, it would seem, among voters for the major, "non-radical" parties?

The emergence of the Wallace movement as a mass-based phenomenon would probably be enough, taken alone, to indicate the presence of an abnormal, if perhaps transitional, stress on the American political system as a whole. If there is any one characteristic of that system which stands out above any others, it is probably its enormous inertial stability as an institutional and behavioral structure. Such stability in turn probably dependent upon at least two conjunctures for its survival. The first of these is that our historical privatizing consensus, with its encouragement of disaggregation or "incrementalization" of policy outputs, continues to dominate the political culture. The price which this middle-class individualist consensus has exacted has been very high, particularly among the disadvantaged at the bottom of the social structure.

who have been largely virtually excluded from political participation in any form from the turn of the century until very recently.³⁷ But this consensus has worked admirably over the years to inhibit the rise of seriously dissonant political demand by inhibiting awareness of political man as a member of some collective sub-national entity rather than as an atomized individual acting in a political, economic, and social marketplace.

The second conjuncture which seems required is a negative one: that developments in society itself not be such as to raise overt or widespread doubts about the relevance or universality of this value consensus. Our great political upheavals of the past have apparently involved interactions between a dynamically transforming socio-economic system and a highly stable, if not static, political system. Such interactions have brought in their wake glaring and growing discrepancies between parts of the then-current American political formula and the exigencies of emergent political demand. Such also seems to be the case at the present time. But it may well be that the now well-known transformations which have occurred over the past generation in the demographic, social and economic structure of the United States have produced conditions in which the core values of this traditional individualist belief system are themselves brought into question. The major problems confronting the American polity at the present time—racial consciousness and racial antagonism, the galloping decay of the central cities, pollution of the human environment and so on—seem to arise directly from either or both of two sources: the rapidly growing dysfunctions of private-decision supremacy in the socio-economic system on the one hand, and the tendency among decision-makers to deal with collectivity problems—particularly, but not exclusively, those involving race—in morselized, individualist-liberal terms on the other. If so, then resolution of these problems may well require, among other things, some form of massively expanded central political control over and channeling of private decisions in the society and economy. Such expansion seems incompatible with the core premise of the traditional American political formula—the separation of political and social life, the dominance of private decisions in the latter sector, and the dispersion of internal sovereign power—and hence with the deeply-established behav-

ioral and institutional structure and routines of American politics.

In Chalmers Johnson's terms, the dissynchronization which develops between political values and behavior on one hand and social transformation on the other has produced a condition of "power deflation" in the United States.³⁸ This is reflected in overt challenges to the legitimacy of hitherto-accepted political institutions and routines by growing segments of the public; in a widespread and increasingly self-conscious—hence aggressively hostile—political alienation which is scattered among the public and concentrated among newly politically mobilized minorities; and in perceptible increases in the magnitude and intensity of anomic behavior of an antisocial, though not necessarily political, type. It is in such periods, periods like the present, that patterns of voting can be found which diverge sharply from the "norm" identified by the voting studies of the 1950's, as well as other kinds of politically relevant behavior for which there are scarcely any domestic references at all from the literature of the 1950's. It would hardly be surprising if such patterns involved widespread responses to political stimuli of the sort which Soares and Hamblin found in a very different political and social system. In the case of the Wallace vote in Pennsylvania, they apparently do. It is, unfortunately, more than likely that the near future will reveal other instances of "acts of aggressive hostility" for scholars to examine.

(3) *Implications for further research*

Our findings, particularly when taken in tandem with the Soares-Hamblin study, suggest with some clarity that multiple correlation analysis based on interactive theoretical models is highly useful and might well be employed in a wide range of comparative studies of aggregate voting behavior. There are a number of questions regarding such use which remain unanswered.

One of these might be called the question of the "institutionalization" of a definably radical vote. Allende, for example, made his first of several bids for the presidency of Chile in 1952, winning 5.5% of the vote. By 1958 his vote had risen to 28.9%. It would be useful to ascertain whether, as the base of Allende's coalition expanded, the multiplicatively written variables retained the clear superiority of explanatory power in 1958 which they had over their additive form in 1962. It would be similarly desirable to learn whether the radical vote in other

³⁷ See, e.g., E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), pp. 97-113; Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, LIX (1965), 7-28.

³⁸ Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 27-33.

countries with a tradition of electoral support for the far Left which is both stable and substantial—France and Italy, for instance—manifest similar evidence of multiplicative relationships.

A second area of uncertainty which might profitably be studied is the possibility that the vote for stable clientele parties in multi-party systems might generally fit into the "interactive" end of our paradigm, while the vote for more broadly-based "portmanteau" parties of a majority bent might display non-interactive characteristics similar to those associated with American major-party voting. One very recent discussion of German electoral politics has developed a finding which is particularly intriguing in this context: that the absolute magnitude of the vote for the CDU is strongly and inversely related over time with the absolute number of non-voters—in other words, that it has the same sawtooth characteristics as between "general" and "off-year" elections in the 1949-65 period as does American major-party voting—while the SPD vote in the same period describes an almost completely smooth linear increase.³⁹ Does this phenomenon indicate the kinds of differences in mass electoral support which can be captured by multiple-correlation analysis based on interactive models?

Finally, let us return to the American case. The discovery that the multiplicative model has greater explanatory power for the 1968 Wallace vote than does the additive raises a number of significant questions. Transitional stages marked by major third-party efforts and by rapid escalations in ideology and politically-related violence are not unique to the 1960's, but seem to have periodically recurred throughout American electoral history. Duncan MacRae, among others, has noted that major third-party movements seem to be integrally related to the processes of realigning change in the system, and serve as halfway houses for large numbers of voters who are en route from one major-party commitment to another.⁴⁰ While generalization is a tricky business, it may be suggested that, on the whole, such third-party movements have in the past tended to occur during the earlier stages of realignment.

If an appropriate model of American electoral politics over time is that of dynamic transformation, with interactions between long-term sta-

ble phases of party alignment and short-lived but massive bursts of realignment, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that predispositional factors entering into aggregate voting behavior would undergo sweeping changes associated with the realignments. In conjunction with this, certain questions can be asked.

(1) Is the superiority of the additive to the multiplicative theoretical form in explaining American major-party voting a constant or universal phenomenon? Or, on the other hand, might there be systematic differences in the relative explanatory power of the two forms dependent upon the existence or the absence of political realignment in the period being examined?

(2) Granted the development of an unidirectional set of changes in American voting behavior during the period 1904-1920, was the nineteenth-century major-party vote as clearly non-interactive as it is at present, or were the relationships between the explanatory capacity of the additive and multiplicative forms significantly different even during "stable phases" from the present?

(3) Does voting for other and earlier third party protests reveal a superiority of multiplicative to additive models similar to that of the Wallace vote in Pennsylvania or not?

Assuming that the theoretical argument developed by Soares and Hamblin is at least oriented in the right direction, assuming further that there is no as yet undetected factor which would serve to cast doubt upon the validity of the technique used, and assuming finally that the propositions presented here about American electoral politics are generally valid, it is easy enough to construct the following set of hypotheses. (1) Electoral alignments under "stable-phase" conditions will probably best be explained by an additive model, since American major parties are essentially "constituent" rather than policy-oriented, and are loose, majority-bent coalitions of horizontally linked elements. (2) Major third-party movements arise out of the failures, which tend to be cumulative, of the old party leadership to aggregate emergent political demand. It may be supposed (a) that where such third-party movements can be identified as organizational fractures of one of the two older party organizations, as with the Democrats in 1860 and the Republicans in 1912, the vote for these third parties will be approximately as strongly additive as the vote for the parent party in the same or contiguous elections; and (b) that where such insurgent movements arise as "grass-roots phenomena" outside the leadership-organizational structure of the two old parties, as in 1892, 1924, or 1968, multiplicative relationships may prove of greater

³⁹ Klaus Liepelt and Alexander Mitscherlich, *Thesen zur Wahlerfuktuation* (Frankfurt a/M, 1968), pp. 32-36.

⁴⁰ Duncan MacRae, Jr., and James A. Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois: 1888-1958," this REVIEW, LIV (1960), 669-683.

explanatory power than additive ones. (3) Since ideological polarization seems to be a manifest characteristic or realigning elections at the level of elites, and since such elections produce abnormally large shifts in the mass base of support for the two major parties, it is plausible to suppose at the very least that the superiority of the explanatory power of additive correlations over multiplicative ones is drastically and systematically reduced in such periods. It may even be

the case that significant evidence of interaction among predisposing variables will be found for one or more of the major parties' votes in such elections.

Such hypotheses can, of course, only be tested by further research. As of now, however, the prospects seem good that the techniques discussed in this article will prove useful in increasing our understanding of the process involved.

APPENDIX

The two tables below report more completely the data for footnote 17.

TABLE A1

Pennsylvania: Measures of Central Tendency and Dispersion based on Counties, 1940-1968

Year and Party	Variance	Standard Deviation	County Mean	State %	Difference
1940 Democratic*	90.11	9.49	46.6	53.5	-6.9
1944 Democratic	94.05	9.70	43.2	51.4	-8.2
1948 Democratic	103.42	10.17	41.5	48.0	-6.5
1952 Democratic	103.32	10.16	38.6	47.0	-8.4
1956 Democratic	72.69	8.53	36.4	43.4	-7.0
1960 Democratic	104.49	10.22	40.9	51.2	-10.3
1964 Democratic	59.51	7.71	60.3	65.2	-4.9
1968 Democratic (3-party)	96.57	9.83	39.7	47.8	-8.1
1968 Democratic (2-party)	111.31	10.55	42.8	51.9	-9.1
1968 Wallace	4.58	2.14	7.3	8.0	-0.7

* Percentages and the measures based on them are Democratic of the two-party vote, except in 1968.

TABLE A2

Comparisons in Autocorrelations of Contiguous Pairs of Presidential Elections, 1916-68: Pennsylvania and the United States

<i>Election Pair</i> (Percentage Democratic)	<i>U.S.A.</i> (States)		<i>Pennsylvania</i> (Counties)	
	r	r ²	r	r ²
1916-1920	+.90	.81	+.87	.76
1920-1924	+.98	.96	+.88	.77
1924-1928	+.75	.56	+.06	.00
1928-1932	+.78	.61	+.68	.46
1932-1936	+.94	.88	+.78	.61
1936-1940	+.90	.81	+.96	.91
1940-1944	+.98	.96	+.96	.91
1944-1948	+.96	.92	+.96	.92
1948-1952	+.74	.55	+.96	.92
1952-1956	+.60	.36	+.97	.95
1956-1960	+.54	.29	+.86	.74
1960-1964	-.11	.01	+.87	.76
1964-1968 (3-party)	+.86	.74	+.96	.92
1964-1968 (2-party)	+.23	.05	+.95	.91

FORMS OF REPRESENTATION: PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR IN THE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

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Debate over representation has been a continuing part of the Western political tradition at least since the writings of Hobbes. Recently, Hanna Pitkin, using the tools of linguistic analysis, has clarified, if not resolved, the debate by examining the disparate uses of the term in both political and non-political discourse.¹ In order to elucidate the issues, she discussed such different forms of representation as formal representation, descriptive representation, substantive representation and interest representation. In this paper I will utilize the distinctions she has developed as a framework for analyzing the process of representation within the community action program of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) during its initial formative period (1964-1966) in the cities of Chicago, Philadelphia and New York City.²

¹ Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

² The field research for this paper was conducted between June, 1965 and August, 1966. All statements refer only to community action program developments prior to August, 1966. Semi-structured interviews with over 175 political actors in the three cities and in Washington, D.C. were held during the course of the research. Respondents included representatives of the poor, public officials, heads of public and private welfare agencies, civil rights leaders and newspaper reporters. In addition, the research involved detailed inspection of newspaper coverage, review of minutes of community action agency committee meetings, attendance at neighborhood and citywide poverty meetings, and examination of public and private documents. Statements in the text are thus based on the close familiarity with the program in the three communities that is achieved through discussion with a wide range of political actors. In all cases, reports of the behavior of actors is based either on written evidence or on oral evidence from several actors speaking from various perspectives. A more detailed description and analysis of the community action program in these three cities can be found in Paul E. Peterson, "City Politics and Community Action: The Implementation of the Community Action Program in Three American Cities" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967).

I wish to express my appreciation to the Russell

I will argue that 1) the manner of selecting representatives of the poor (formal representation) was a function of the political resources of competing interests in the city; 2) the orientations (interest representativeness) of the formal representatives affected their influence (actual representation); 3) the influence (actual representation) of the formal representatives affected the level of intra-neighborhood conflict, which in turn affected the representatives' orientations (interest representation); 4) the character of the actual and interest representation was affected by the type of formal representation; and 5) the social characteristics of the representatives (descriptive representation) influenced the character of actual and interest representation.

I. FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

The formalistic view of representation, as Pitkin described it, conceives of representation "in terms of formal arrangements which precede and initiate it."³ It was Hobbes who used *formal representation* as the lynch-pin to hold together his Leviathan, the state in which all members of the political community had authorized the sovereign to exercise for them their political rights. Representation was in no way related to the substance of the acts of the sovereign; representation inhered only in the formal arrangements which preceded these acts. Hobbes' view was altered but not fundamentally changed with the development of democratic theory; the new formula focused on elections "as a grant of authority by the voters to the elected officials."⁴ According to this view, anyone holding public office is a representative of the electorate who selected him. Formal representation, then, is representation dictated solely by the arrangements which establish the way in which the representative is selected.

Such a view enables one to specify rather easily *for whom* the individual is acting as representative. Whether or not an alderman takes a

Sage and Woodrow Wilson Foundations for assistance which made this research possible. I am indebted to J. David Greenstone, Theodore Lowi, Duncan MacRae, and Michael Lipsky for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

³ Pitkin, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

narrow, parochial view or a broad, city-wide view of his responsibilities, he is still formally representative of the members of his ward, not of the city as a whole. Members of farmer advisory committees elected by farmers are formally representative of the farmers, not of the public as a whole. Individuals appointed to a labor relations board by the President formally represent the President, not the labor movement—even if they are all ex-union leaders themselves.

With such an understanding of representation it seems difficult to speak of an individual as being more or less formally representative, a difficulty which provides Pitkin with one of her reasons for rejecting as inadequate this definition of the term. This, however, is true only when speaking from the perspective of the representative. From the perspective of the constituency it is possible to say which of its representatives is formally the most representative. The criterion is the directness by which the population formally selects its representative. The more indirect the selection process, the less the formal representation. Thus, the change from electing United States Senators by the state legislature to electing them directly by the voters was a move toward greater formal representation of the voters by their Senators.

Formal representation, as the name implies, refers only to the arrangements by which the representative is selected; it in no way takes into account characteristics of the representative himself. For an interpretation of the concept that stresses the representative's characteristics, it is necessary to consider what Pitkin calls *descriptive representation*. Descriptive representation refers to the extent to which the representatives reflect accurately the characteristics of those whom they formally represent. Since no representative can reflect his constituents in all respects, it is necessary to state which characteristics determine representativeness. The representatives' social class, ethnic or racial background, age, and place of residence have all been considered by analysts and political actors as politically relevant social characteristics which affect descriptive representation. The social characteristics deemed politically relevant have no *a priori* standing, however, and in fact have changed considerably over time and from place to place. This provides Pitkin with one of her reasons for rejecting the socially descriptive definition of representation as inadequate.⁵

⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. IV. Pitkin includes accurate reflection of political opinions as well as social characteristics within her definition of descriptive representation. Since we will confine our use of descriptive representation to considerations of social

Since neither the formal nor the socially descriptive understandings of representation refer to the substantive behaviour of the representative, additional interpretations of representation must be examined in order to develop a typology of *substantive representation*, i.e., representation which takes into account the "realm of action."⁶ Two aspects of the actions of representatives must be considered in order to assess the character of substantive representation—the representative's *influence* and his *orientation*. Ignoring momentarily the representative's orientation, it can be argued that the more influential the representative, the more effective his substantive representation. Thus, senior members of Congress argue that their position on influential committees makes them more effective representatives than their aspiring opponents would be. The degree of *actual representation* is thus a function of the representative's influence.⁷

However, influence alone cannot measure the quality of substantive representation; the extent to which the orientation of the representative is in accord with the interests of his constituents must also be assessed. But we encounter at this point a controversy of considerable complexity. Those who believe that interests of constituents cannot be known apart from their stated preferences have debated persistently for generations with those who believe that constituents have interests of which they may not be aware. Simply stated, the argument revolves around the question: Do people's *interests* include their needs as well as their wants? Although Pitkin's solution to this question is too complex to discuss adequately here, essentially she argues that

characteristics, we will call this *socially descriptive representation*.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁷ Actual representation may be distinguished from symbolic representation. As Pitkin argues, "We distinguish practical activity rationally directed toward bringing about 'real' goals . . . from expressive, symbolic actions." *Ibid.*, p. 102. This latter form of representation, she says, "need have little or nothing to do with . . . enacting laws desired by the people." p. 106. Insofar as all formal representatives have the capacity to stimulate some favorable response among their constituents, symbolic representation is, to some extent, always present. Thus, where actual representation is almost nil, as it was in Chicago's community action program, it could be characterized by "only symbolic representation." In order to avoid introducing still another form of representation into the analysis, we have instead classified Chicago simply as "very low" on actual representation.

the representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict [between representative and represented], or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest.⁸

Such a position, though not unreasonable, raises considerable problems for the empirical social scientist. In trying to establish which of two representatives is substantively acting in the most representative fashion, it becomes necessary for the analyst to secure intersubjective agreement on the quality of the reasons the representative gives for his disagreement with his constituents.

This and other difficulties have led many social scientists to equate interests with preferences of individuals. The objection here, as Pitkin and others have stressed, is that such an equation departs drastically from ordinary usage of the word.⁹ One small example can illustrate this point. There is a tendency for preferences of individuals to change rapidly even when it is difficult to see any change in their interests. Such behavior is commonly referred to as changes in the individual's awareness of his interests rather than changes in the interests *per se*.

The concept of role provides a means by which this Gordian knot may be cut—at least for purposes of social analysis. A major reason for the difficulty in specifying a man's interests independent of his preferences is the complexity of factors which combine to make him a unique individual. The concept of role, however, selects out from the multitude of relationships that comprise the totality of an individual's social action and focuses on those patterns of behavior of interest to the analyst. The purpose of such a concept is to simplify for analytic purposes the subject for inquiry. Among other things, role analysis simplifies use of the concept of interest. Whereas determining the policies that are in the interest of, *i.e.*, are "good for," an individual is indeed difficult, it is a far easier task to specify policies that would enhance the desirability of performing a particular role. Policies which improve the life chances of incumbents of specific roles by increasing the wealth, power and/or prestige associated with the role serve their role interests, whether or not the role incumbents are in favor of these policies.¹⁰ Thus, the representa-

tive provides more or less interest representation for individuals performing certain roles according to the extent to which he favors policies improving the life chances of the role incumbents. In the following analysis, then, interest representation will refer only to role as distinct from personal interests.

As long as the representative's influence is so marginal that actual representation is virtually nil, his orientation is not significant for determining the form of substantive representation. When actual representation does occur, however, it is possible to specify at least three points along a continuum ranging from negative to positive interest representation. A representative whose actions are oriented against improving the role interests of his constituents may be said to

with the interests of institutions, Samuel Huntington presupposes an argument along the lines I have set forth. Huntington argues that "Institutional interests differ from the interests of individuals who are in the institutions. . . . Individual interests are necessarily short-run interests. Institutional interests, however, exist through time; the proponent of the institution has to look to its welfare through an indefinite future." "Political Development and Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April, 1965), 412-413. But institutions are only complexes of role relations which individuals wish to sustain. In order to attribute interests to institutions, one must initially distinguish between personal and role interests. Speaking of the interests of institutions independent of the preferences of those with the authority to speak for the institution is thus perfectly parallel to speaking of role interests independent of the opinions of those occupying the social role.

Another solution to the problem of defining interests is to use the concept for heuristic purposes only. It can be argued, as does Ralf Dahrendorf, that it is analytically useful to postulate objective role interests in order to explain social conflict and social change. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 173-179. This solution rests on the explanatory power of making such an assumption about role interests. Although J. David Greenstone and I have adapted Dahrendorf's assumptions to the analysis of race conflict in our study of *Politics and Participation*, to be published by the Russell Sage Foundation, in this paper I am arguing that one can identify objective role interests on quite separate grounds. As Pitkin has pointed out, ordinary language usage justifies a definition of interest that is not simply dependent on the subjective feelings and desires of the individual.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Ch. IX-X. Also, see Richard Flatham, *The Public Interest* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), *passim*.

¹⁰ In attempting to identify the public interest

provide *negative representation*. This category will be of no concern to us in this exercise.

Substantive action which seeks to improve the life chances of specific individuals among all those performing the designated social role may be called *particularistic interest representation*. Perhaps the best illustration of such representation is the machine politician who represented lower and working class immigrants.¹¹ In a style that accorded with particularistic norms familiar to the European villager, the friendly precinct captain could find "help" when a constituent needed emergency fuel, shoes for his children, or even a low-paying but badly needed job. Such actions, however, assist only particular individuals within a broad social classification.

Actions which seek to improve the life chance of all incumbents of the social role in question may be called *universalistic interest representation*. The welfare state, which has developed employment, housing, welfare, and health policies that have improved the life chances of the working classes, is the product of working class interest representation more universalistic in that it improves the conditions of nearly all those performing such a social role. Thus it may be said that universalistic interest representation provides *more* substantive representation than particularistic interest representation, which improves the life chances of only particular individuals within the role classification.

II. CONFLICT OVER FORMAL REPRESENTATION

The means of providing formal representation was one of the most hotly contested political issues during the formative period of the community action program.¹² Social engineers in the federal government sought to strengthen the political resources of low income and minority groups as part of the war against poverty.¹³ Relying on the requirement in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 that community action

programs be "developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served," federal officials within OEO issued regulations requesting that local communities specify the ways in which their programs would foster such participation.¹⁴ The details by which this could be achieved were difficult to specify. However, it was immediately apparent that direct mass participation in policy formulation by low income or any other residents of the city was impossible. As normative and empirical political scientists have recognized for centuries, the participation of any segment of society in decision-making can only occur indirectly through the actions of its representatives. Political conflict over formal representation developed as conflicting factions sought arrangements facilitating the selection of representatives who would act in a manner consistent with their interests. OEO's early administrative "rule of thumb," which was later written into law by Congress, required that at least one-third of the policy-making body for local community action programs consist of representatives of the poor, chosen "whenever feasible" in accord with "traditional democratic approaches and techniques."¹⁵ Even as the Congressional enactment requiring "maximum feasible participation was open to a variety of interpretations, so was this administrative guideline. Consequently, political action shifted from the national to the local arena, as local communities sought to develop a formula which both reflected power relations in the community and fell within OEO guidelines.

The mayors of New York, Chicago and Philadelphia all sought to control the appointments to the city poverty council. Robert Wagner of New York articulated the common mayoral reaction in testimony before a Congressional committee:

When I testified a year ago, I urged that the local governing bodies, through their chief executives or otherwise, should have the ultimate authority, as they have the ultimate responsibility, for . . . the conduct and operation of the anti-poverty program.¹⁶

¹¹ See, for example, descriptions of the machine in Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Random House, 1955) and Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning and The Public Interest* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1955).

¹² The analysis of the political determinants of the arrangements for formal representation, which we are only able to sketch here, can be found in J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines and the War on Poverty," in James Wilson (ed.), *City Politics and Public Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 267-292.

¹³ John C. Donovan, *The Politics of Poverty* (New York: Pegasus, 1967), pp. 41-43.

¹⁴ U.S. Congress, *An Act to Mobilize the Human and Financial Resources of the Nation to Combat Poverty in the United States*, Public Law 88-452, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 9.

¹⁵ Office of Economic Opportunity, *Community Action Program Guide* (Washington, D.C., 1965), I, p. 18.

¹⁶ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings, Examination of the War on Poverty Program*, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 483.

An early unpublished document of the Richard Daley Administration in Chicago stated the mayor's position in more convoluted yet more revealing language:

Chicago believes the role of active and constructive citizenship cannot be imposed on the poor person by participation in an action committee which has ignored his personal development. That if development is postponed in order to involve the poor person immediately in committee action roles, his involvement may frequently lead to the negative involvement of protest.

Mayor James Tate echoed these sentiments in a letter to the *Philadelphia Bulletin*:

Knowledgable Philadelphians appreciate the fact that it was the city's responsibility [as distinct from that of a body including representatives selected by the poor] to . . . get the beginnings of a program underway. . . .¹⁷

While the mayors in the three cities agreed that the city poverty council should be appointed by the chief executive, neighborhood groups in low income and black communities argued for selection of representatives of the poor by community organizations. Coalitions of these community organizations in New York and Philadelphia sought to establish the principle that at least one-third of the members of the city poverty council as well as all of the members of neighborhood councils should be selected by neighborhood organizations. In Chicago no coordinated opposition to the mayor's plan for appointing representatives was ever mounted, but sporadic criticisms were levied against mayoral appointments by one or two of the better organized and more militant neighborhood groups. Significantly, at no time did neighborhood groups in any city call for direct election of the representatives to the city poverty council; in place of mayoral appointment, they preferred election at meetings of existing neighborhood organizations. Neighborhood groups, as did mayors, preferred a means of providing formal representation which they themselves could control.

Although the polarization of conflict in the three communities was similar, the eventual arrangements for providing for formal representation of the poor on the city poverty councils differed considerably. Philadelphia's process of selecting the policy-making committees for its community action program provided the most formal representation. It was decided that representatives would be elected by residents living in low income sectors of the city, which were

divided into twelve areas. The residents in each of these areas elected in May, 1965 twelve representatives who formed a neighborhood council.¹⁸ Each of these councils elected, in turn, one of their number to sit on the city poverty council.¹⁹ The neighborhood council was thus elected directly by low income area residents, and the citywide representatives were just one step removed from direct popular election.

In New York City there was less formal representation, because only organizational representatives could participate in the election of the neighborhood council. During the summer and fall of 1965, community conventions were held in twelve of the sixteen neighborhood areas into which the low income sectors of the city had been divided.²⁰ Organizations in the neighborhood were invited to send delegates to the convention, which elected representatives to the neighborhood council. The council then selected delegates to the city poverty council.

Chicago's selection process provided the least formal representation of the poor in the community action program. The neighborhood council was appointed by the director of the local neighborhood service center, who also selected the delegate from his neighborhood to the city poverty council.²¹ Since the director was chosen by the executive director of Chicago's poverty program, a political appointee of the mayor, the representatives were indirectly selected by the mayor.

These varying arrangements for formal representation of the poor reflected the balance of power between the mayor and the organized voices of the black community. The neighborhood groups were in the strongest bargaining

¹⁸The proper name for these councils varied from city to city. For purposes of simplicity and in order to emphasize inter-city comparisons, we shall refer to all of them as "neighborhood councils."

¹⁹Again, I am avoiding the use of proper titles.

²⁰Procedures in the other four areas were even less formally representative; community leaders came together, formed an organization, and were recognized by the City as the policy-makers for the community action program in the neighborhood.

²¹Toward the end of my research, in the spring of 1966, it seemed that at least one representative from each neighborhood to the city poverty council would soon be chosen by the council instead of the director.

We are substituting a more general descriptive name for the proper title of Chicago's service centers in order to emphasize inter-city comparability.

¹⁷Emphasis added. *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, February 8, 1965.

position in New York City, because the political leader supervising the poverty program was seeking vital political support from liberal and civil rights organizations in a closely contested mayoral election.²² In Chicago the lack of significant opposition to a mayor supported by a powerful political machine deprived community groups of essential allies; anticipating the strength of their opponent, they failed to mount a sustained drive for greater control over the selection of representatives.²³

Interestingly enough, Philadelphia's elections, which were given nationwide newspaper publicity, were a compromise that was the first preference of neither the mayor nor the neighborhood groups. A black political ally of the mayor advocated elections as a means of curtailing criticism of mayoral dominance without giving the protesting organizations control of the program. The proposal split the coalition of neighborhood groups, some of whom boycotted the elections, some of whom sought to elect their members to neighborhood councils. The compromise reflected the political support for the mayor, who was stronger than New York's but weaker than Chicago's.²⁴ He felt he must obviate sustained public criticism, but he did not believe it necessary to capitulate to demands for representation by the organized opposition.

III. SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION: THE INFLUENCE AND ORIENTATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE

These varying patterns of formal representa-

²² The declining political strength of the New York City mayor, who must contend with a virile reform movement, is described in a number of penetrating analyses of New York politics. See Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965); Theodore J. Levi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); and Edward N. Costikyan, *Behind Closed Doors* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966). The relationship between the political strength of the mayor and the development of the community action program in all three cities is analyzed in Greenstone and Peterson, "Reformers, Machines . . .," *op. cit.*

²³ The power of the mayor in Chicago politics is well described in Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

²⁴ Although the style of politics has changed somewhat since this book was written, the best published introduction to Philadelphia's politics is James Reichley, *The Art of Government* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1959).

tion in the three cities were associated with variations in the patterns of actual and interest representation. In this section we will first compare the community action programs on these two dimensions along which substantive representation varied and then show the way in which particularistic interest representation led to declining levels of actual representation. Representatives of the poor in Chicago provided almost no actual representation, the representatives in Philadelphia provided moderate amounts of actual representation, and in New York actual representation was considerable. The bases for making these assessments of the influence of the representatives were 1) the extent to which neighborhood councils controlled poverty resources, including the selection of staff, the allocation of funds, and the determination of local programs, and 2) the degree to which the funds allocated were distributed to independent neighborhood groups.

If formal representation was low in Chicago, substantive representation in the city was equally so, for the representatives scarcely had any influence over the operations of the community action program.²⁵ The neighborhood service centers carried on their activities with little or no direction by local neighborhood councils. Although the councils could "review" and "recommend" programs and policies, they had no authority over the operations of the center. They did not even have the authority to participate in the selection of the personnel for the neighborhood programs. It is true that the neighborhood council had the authority to spend a limited amount of money each year (somewhere between \$25,000 and \$50,000), provided that the money was administered by the service center personnel; but in practice the center staff decided the purpose for which these funds were spent, a decision which was then ratified by the neighborhood council. Moreover, as of January, 1966, small sums had been given only to four neighborhood groups in Chicago, amounting to but 2.2 percent of the total community action appropriation.

²⁵ This analysis is based on research in three of Chicago's seven neighborhood service centers, including a white and Puerto Rican community on the North Side, a better organized, more stable Negro community on the South Side, and a disorganized slum providing the first home for southern Negro migrants on the West Side. I wish to thank Isaac Balbus, Marguerite Barnett and Rennie Davis for granting me their permission to use material they have gathered on Chicago's community action program. More supporting evidence for the argument presented here can be found in Peterson, *op. cit.*, Ch. III.

Not only were Philadelphia's representatives elected directly by voters in poverty areas, but they initially had considerably more influence over the community action program than their Chicago counterparts. Nonetheless, throughout the first two years actual representation steadily declined.²⁶ In the beginning, the representatives of the poor had been able to revise substantially a planned parenthood proposal so that it would include services rather than be purely educational.²⁷ But this kind of contribution to policy-making declined rapidly after the first few months of the program. For a small but significant illustration, in the summer of 1965 the newly elected representatives turned down a staff request seeking permission to join a national association of community action agencies formed to lobby Congress and the OEO. In the following summer, however, the representatives of the poor unanimously agreed to join the association; by this time they seldom turned down the staff's recommendations. On the other hand, during the first two years of the program the city poverty council allocated 16 percent of the community action funds to neighborhood and minority groups, which was considerably higher than the comparable figure for Chicago. Moreover, the representatives obtained considerable influence over the hiring of "nonprofessional" employees. They appointed hundreds of employees hired both by public and private agencies operating community action programs and by their own neighborhood service centers. Thus, it was an especially dramatic instance of declining power when in the spring of 1966 the representatives relinquished their authoritative control over the director of the neighborhood service center in exchange for the possibility that they could be hired to work in the service center. The service center, which had been under the formal control of the neighborhood council, came under the direction of the central staff, much as was the case in Chicago.²⁸

²⁶ In addition to observation of citywide developments in Philadelphia, research was conducted in three randomly-selected neighborhood council areas. This research is reported in further detail in *ibid.*, Ch. IV.

²⁷ Arthur B. Shostak, "Containment, Co-option, or Co-determination?" *The American Child*, XLVII (November, 1965), 17.

²⁸ Since the representatives of the poor continued to have some influence over employment of "nonprofessionals," it is an exaggeration to say, as did one close observer of the program, that the "poor were rendered as powerless as ever." Arthur B. Shostak, "Urban Politics and Poverty," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1966, p. 2 (Mimeo-

graphed.) Yet the fact is that this same observer had earlier reported such a glowing picture of poor people participating in policy-making that the statement clearly discloses the declining representation of the poor in Philadelphia. See the article in footnote 27 for the earlier, optimistic analysis.

Even though representatives were selected by neighborhood organizations rather than directly by the voters, actual representation was nonetheless greater in New York City than in Philadelphia. First of all, more than 46 percent of the community action funds were allocated to neighborhood and minority groups.²⁹ Also, neighborhood councils won increasing influence over the development of the community action program. In two of the three communities studied, the locally selected leadership had the status of independent contractors with the city government and controlled their own funds once the contract had been signed. Even in the other community which did not have this status, the local neighborhood council was successful in maintaining a large measure of local control over the selection of personnel, the determination of local programs, and the expenditure of community action funds.

This variation in the level of actual representation among the three cities was directly correlated with the variation in the level of interest representation. In New York representatives articulated universalistic interests, in Philadelphia they were oriented towards particularistic interests, and in Chicago they lacked influence to provide either positive or negative interest representation. In order to reach these assessments concerning the level of universalistic representation, we examined the extent to which representatives fulfilled OEO expectations that they would use their position to strengthen the political resources of their communities. Data were collected on 1) the extent to which the resources at the disposal of the neighborhood councils were actually used to organize neighborhood residents, and 2) the extent to which representatives, neighborhood councils, and organizations under their supervision articulated demands

²⁹ Because of the need to examine operating programs in a city where the community action program was slow in being implemented, we selected for investigation the first three neighborhoods in which a community action program was operating. Thus, although data on citywide developments were collected, this report draws largely upon developments on the Lower West Side of Manhattan, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn, and in East Harlem. New York's community action program is discussed in greater detail in Peterson, *op. cit.*, Ch. V.

aimed at changing the quality of services to the poor.

Since the representatives in Chicago lacked influence, they were unable to provide universalistic interest representation. Instead, the community action program was operated in accord with the policy of the Daley Administration, which felt that political action in black neighborhoods was undesirable. As a leading local official pointed out to a federal observer: "[It] is through the public bureaucracies with their professional staff that mayors must now build their reputations with the poor and minority groups of the city." In accord with this emphasis, neighborhood service centers, which were the primary institutional expression of Chicago's poverty program, co-ordinated a wide variety of governmental services to the poor. The employees of the center were trained to provide personal services rather than to channel group demands; political activists were reprimanded and, in some instances, fired. The neighborhood service centers were efficient, highly bureaucratized institutions whose mission, as stated by personnel throughout the organization's structure, did not include strengthening the neighborhood's political resources. Nor did the representatives themselves make broad political demands for new policies that would improve the life chances of the members of their community. Neither the neighborhood councils nor the neighborhood service center employees encouraged voter registration drives or group efforts directed toward improving education, welfare, or housing facilities.

The representatives in Philadelphia had greater influence on the development of the community action program, but they were, for the most part, oriented towards securing particularistic benefits for themselves and their friends rather than towards promoting broad, universalistic changes in government policy. Thus, the two issues which dominated much of the discussion during the first two years of the program were 1) payment to the neighborhood council representatives for their services, and 2) neighborhood council influence over the hiring of poverty employees in their neighborhoods.

The great majority of neighborhood representatives felt that they should be paid. Monthly stipends for the representatives were proposed, grants to attend an in-house training institute received the backing of university professors, actual employment on the staff of the poverty agency was practiced, and, finally, generous expense allotments for the representatives were decided upon. Although the local poverty agency was receptive to these demands of the representatives of the poor, OEO refused to condone such use of limited poverty funds. Nonetheless,

throughout much of the first year, elected representatives did hold jobs with the poverty agency, and only after a major confrontation between the City and the federal government did such practices diminish.

The representatives' influence over personnel selection was exercised, in many cases, on behalf of close friends and relatives. A minority of representatives objected to this practice in terms such as the following:

"They get mothers, brothers, neighbors, and people they owe favors [for the available jobs]. I had my husband apply, because at least he's qualified."

"The trouble is that a few of them get all the jobs for their friends. I have recommended people, but they don't get jobs. You can't get a job unless you say the chairman recommended you or something."

A more satisfied representative stated that one of the reasons she enjoyed her position was:

"I know what's going on and this way I can help my family and friends."

In sum, much as the machine politician provided for the needs of particular members of the immigrant community, the Philadelphia council members sought particularistic benefits that would improve the life chances of specific members of the low income population.

The focus on particularistic benefits to the exclusion of broader policy questions contributed to the decline in actual representation in Philadelphia. Although the majority of respondents claimed that these centers had attempted some organizational activity, such as the formation of block clubs, identification of block leaders, and holding neighborhood meetings, only a few specific examples of the actual formation of new organizations could be given. Moreover, the representatives themselves rarely sought to make broad changes in the operations of other institutions serving the urban poor. The representatives did appeal to the state legislature in a well-coordinated effort to obtain revision of state welfare laws. But with the exception of one attempt to retard an urban renewal project, the representatives hesitated before criticizing local bureaucracies for fear that this would jeopardize staff support for the particularistic goals they sought. They also sacrificed authority over their neighborhood service centers for the possibility (which never materialized) of employment opportunity.

In New York, on the other hand, the representatives utilized their considerably greater influence to promote universalistic interests. Consistent with the autonomy of neighborhood

councils mentioned earlier, the extent of universalistic interest representation in New York differed considerably from neighborhood to neighborhood. But in all three neighborhoods investigated intensively, staff members were charged by the neighborhood councils with the responsibility of organizing tenant groups, block clubs and other community groups. In Bedford-Stuyvesant community action personnel had begun to generate community pressures in favor of major changes in the operations of the welfare department and the school system. But it was in East Harlem that poverty resources were most obviously used to strengthen the political resources of the community. Although two factions were in competition for control of poverty funds, both factions used the resources at their disposal to organize the local population on behalf of causes which had some promise of improving the life chances of the neighborhood population as a whole. These resources helped to maintain a cadre of community activists who continually demanded changes in welfare, housing and educational policies in the community. Indeed, the political activity in East Harlem generated citywide movements for drastic reorganization of the city's educational system.³⁰ Whatever the merits of the goals of East Harlem leaders, it is clear that representatives of the poor addressed themselves to questions of broad public policy.

Particularistic interest representation, in the sense that representatives sought payment and jobs for themselves and patronage for their friends, was certainly not absent in New York City. But in contrast to Philadelphia these concerns did not become so predominant as to handicap the capacity of the representatives to provide universalistic representation as well. This difference between New York and Philadelphia was due in part to the way in which actual representation, conflict, and interest representation were inter-related.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICT

Higher levels of actual representation generated intra-neighborhood conflict, which in turn encouraged more universalistic interest representation. The greater the level of influence by community representatives over the program, the greater the level of conflict within the com-

munity—particularly in neighborhoods of ethnic and/or racial heterogeneity. As representatives of the poor gained more control over the allocation of poverty program resources, they found more at stake to divide them. But organized and extensive conflict reinforced tendencies towards universalistic interest representation. Competition for power within the community forced the competing leaderships to justify their appeal for community support by representing broad community interests.

The variation among the three cities in actual representation, conflict, and interest representation illustrates the relationship among these three variables. Given the low level of actual representation in Chicago, the major problem for the poverty staff in that city was to stimulate sufficient interest among council members so that a quorum necessary to conduct council business could be achieved. Conflict was sporadic, disorganized, and related to specific issues that occasionally arose. In Philadelphia, where the representatives had some influence over hiring policies, conflict revolved largely around the distribution of employment opportunities to claimants sponsored by different members of neighborhood councils. Conflict was the greatest in the community where racial factionalism was apparent, as black and white councilors opposed each other over the selection of council employees. The animosity was subdued, however, and did not reach the level of public discussion. Although the agreement tended to break down in the heat of the electoral campaign, the two sides had even formed an agreed slate for the second poverty election.

The relative serenity of community action politics in Chicago and Philadelphia contrasted sharply with the community action politics in New York City, where the much greater level of actual representation gave rise to organized and extensive conflicts worthy of more detailed attention. Conflict was organized in all three New York neighborhoods, as two factions competed for control of the neighborhood's community action program. These factions can be characterized as the traditional community leadership faction and the partisan-oriented faction. The traditional community leadership in the field of welfare was vested in settlement houses, YMCAs,³¹ and Catholic, Protestant and Jewish churches and welfare agencies. Even though these groups did not have a common view towards welfare policy, they buried their differences in order to obtain lucrative community action funds. On the Lower West Side of Manhattan memories of conflict between a prominent settlement house

³⁰ A detailed analysis of the attempts by representatives of the poor to change the structure and policies of East Harlem's educational system can be found in Paul E. Peterson, "The Politics of Educational Reform," in Frank Lutz (ed.), *Dynamics in Urban Education* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Jones, 1970).

³¹ Young Men's Christian Associations.

and the Catholic Church strained relationships but did not prevent surprisingly close co-operation in the development of community action plans. In Bedford-Stuyvesant the community had a paucity of community leadership, for private welfare agencies had deserted the community as the neighborhood became black. Only the YMCA, supported by local Negro clergymen, doctors, lawyers, and other middle class professionals, remained to provide the traditional leadership. In East Harlem a settlement house and a combined church and welfare agency provided basic institutional strength for the traditional community leadership. Despite the diversity of the leadership grouping among these three neighborhoods, they bore in common the burden of being known as "the Establishment," which was the favorite epithet leveled against them by their opposition.

The opposing faction in each of the communities is more difficult to characterize, but inasmuch as they had more overt political ties than the "Establishment" faction, we shall call them the "partisans." We do not mean to imply that the "Establishment" had no political connections, but it is possible to say that these connections were secondary sources of strength, connections which were the result of (rather than the cause of) their basic institutional importance to the community. The "partisans," on the other hand, were more vulnerable to the charge of "playing politics," for their base of support appeared to be more narrowly political. On the Lower West Side the institutional base of support for this faction was the reform club movement, which is the predominant partisan political force in that part of New York City. In Bedford-Stuyvesant the general lack of any stable political force inhibited the development of a stable partisan faction. But the director of the neighborhood service center in the community, a politically astute and capable administrator, sought to develop an alternative, more political base of power in order to free herself from the constraints that the "Establishment" placed upon her. Within two years, the "Establishment," realising the dangerous possibility her attempts to mobilize a power base on a previously apathetic population would have for their own position, removed the director from her job and replaced her with a more traditional social worker. In East Harlem the partisan faction rested primarily on an ethnic base. Since the traditional community leadership came from and serviced the black population in this racially heterogeneous community, the partisans appealed to Puerto Rican pride in order to mobilize support from another wing of the community. Led by an attractive and personable Young

Puerto Rican social worker, they depended on close ties with Democratic leaders in the Robert Wagner Administration and in the United States Senate.

The extensive character of the conflict was evident both in its duration and in the range and significance of the issues. In East Harlem both factions had separate access to poverty funds, and each side attempted to secure control of all resources allocated to the community. On the Lower West Side the debate was over the method by which council representatives should be selected in the future and the kind of programs that should be operated by the neighborhood service center. In Bedford-Stuyvesant the debate was over relations with private welfare agencies and the balance of power between the council and its staff. In all three communities the conflict was detectable at least as early as the summer of 1964, and it continued into the summer of 1966 when this research was completed. During this period the conflict between Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the heterogeneous community of East Harlem became so intense that on more than one occasion physical force was threatened.

Organized and extensive conflict reinforced tendencies towards universalistic interest representation. In Chicago and Philadelphia the relatively amiable relationships among the representatives of the poor hindered community discussion of the representatives' obligations to their constituencies. In New York both factions, constantly competing for community support, sought to establish their credentials as vigorous defenders of the community's interests. Public officials in East Harlem frequently dismissed community agitation against their agency as simply the byproduct of organizational aggrandizement. Their observations, though an oversimplification, cannot be dismissed entirely, for the competition for power kept both organizations searching for means by which they could expand their support. In this way, community conflict functioned to generate the articulation of demands for broad changes in governmental services to the poor.

V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

Table 1 sets forth the patterns of representation and conflict we have observed in the community action program in Chicago, Philadelphia and New York. The relationships among actual representation, conflict, and interest representation have already been noted. It remains for us to analyze the relationships between formal and substantive representation. It is apparent from Table 1 that differing arrangements for formal

TABLE 1. FORMAL REPRESENTATION, SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICT IN CHICAGO, PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK CITY

Patterns of Political Action	Cities		
	Chicago	Philadelphia	New York City
1. Formal Representation	Low (Indirect via mayor)	High (Direct elections)	Moderate (Indirect via neighborhood organizations)
2. Substantive Representation			
a. Actual Representation (Influence)	Very low	Moderate and declining	High
b. Interest Representation (Orientation)	—	Particularistic	Universalistic
3. Conflict	Low	Mild	Organized and extensive

representation of the poor are associated with differing patterns of substantive representation. Formal representation of the poor controlled by an elected city official (Chicago) was associated with such a low level of actual representation that the orientations of the representatives were insignificant. Formal representation controlled by neighborhood groups (New York) preceded relatively high levels of neighborhood control and universalistic interest representation. Direct election of the representatives of the poor (Philadelphia) was the precursor of moderate influence and particularistic orientations. Are these relationships causal or spurious? With only three cases to draw upon, a definite answer is obviously impossible. Yet a reasonable interpretation may emerge from analysis of the patterns that were observed.

Serious consideration must first be given to the possibility that the formal arrangements had no significant effect on the influence and orientations of the representatives of the poor. As was pointed out at the beginning of this analysis, the neighborhood groups in New York were the strongest and in Chicago they were the weakest. The settlement over formal representation may be understood simply as an initial statement of the power relations between the city government and the community organizations. It can be argued that the subsequent pattern of substantive representation may be due basically to this underlying power relationship rather than to the arrangements for formal representation, which

merely reflected this power relationship. Such an interpretation is persuasive, for it stresses informal, extra-governmental political relationships rather than the technical arrangements of governmental institutions.

However, it would be incorrect to dismiss the significance of formal governmental arrangements altogether. To do so would, in the first place, ignore the fact that political actors regarded these formal arrangements as critical and were in many cases willing to invest many resources in securing a process of selecting representatives which they could influence.³² Secondly, it is possible to identify a factor which helps to explain the empirical association between formal and substantive representation. The constituency for the representative, as shaped by the arrangements for formal representation, influenced the patterns of substantive representation.

Formal representation in Chicago provided a constituency for representatives of the poor that facilitated a low level of actual representation. The constituency of the representatives, as shaped by the selection process, was a powerful political institution whose interests were hostile to the mobilization of new political energy among low income groups. The constituency was the same center of power towards which demands that necessarily accompany universalistic interest representation must be directed. But the

³² *Supra*, p. 121.

representatives found their position too insecure and their independent base of political power too weak to attack those that appointed them.

The constituency of the representatives of the poor in Philadelphia encouraged substantive representation particularistic in character. The poverty elections were an extreme case of "friends and neighbors" politics. In *Southern Politics* Key informs us that friends and neighbors politics is likely to occur when there is an

absence of stable, well organized . . . factions of like-minded citizens formed to advocate measures of common concern. In its extreme form localism justifies a diagnosis of low voter-interest in public issues and a susceptibility to control by the irrelevant appeal to support the home-town boy. . . .³³

One indicator of the low voter interest in the poverty elections, which was widely broadcast by the news media at the time, was the less than 3 per cent of the eligible population participating in the balloting. Closer analysis of the election data suggests that those few who voted were influenced by localist considerations. Each of the twelve areas in which neighborhood council representatives were chosen was divided into four sections for polling purposes. In order to determine the relationship between the residence of candidates and voting behavior, each candidate was classified according to the polling section in which he lived. A voter was eligible to cast his ballot upon presentation of evidence that he resided within that section. Since votes were tallied by voting section, it was possible to determine localist influences on the voting behavior.

Localism influenced, first of all, the voter's decision as to whether he should vote at all. Among all forty-eight voting sections in the twelve neighborhood council areas, there was a strong correlation between the number of council candidates residing in that section and the number of voters on election day. Table 2 reveals the sharp increase in the number of voters as the number of candidates increased.³⁴ The

data suffer from our inability to state the voter turnout in percentage terms. But for those twelve voting sections (chosen at random) for which we did estimate the percentage turnout,³⁵ the relationship between the number of candi-

since many people did not fully utilize all twelve votes. The best, though far from satisfactory solution, we felt, was to assume that at each of the four polling places within a CAC area the voters used equal amounts of their total voting power. Such an assumption enabled us to formulate the following proportion:

$$\frac{S_v}{S_b} = \frac{A_v}{A_b}$$

where S_v equals the total number of voters in the voting section, S_b equals the total number of ballots cast for all candidates in the voting section, A_v equals the number of voters in the CAC area, and A_b equals the total number of ballots cast for all candidates in the CAC area. Since three of the four quantities were known, we were able to solve for the fourth, giving us an estimate of the number of voters in each voting section.

Where more candidates ran for office in a section, it is possible that voters used more amounts of their voting power in order to vote for several of their friends and neighbors on the ballot. If so, this would mean that our assumption that voters used equal amounts of their voting power in estimating the number of voters biases the findings in the direction of estimating more voters in sections that had more candidates. Some of the high correlation between number of candidates and voter turnout, therefore, may be attributable to the exercise of greater voting power by voters in those sections that had more candidates. Even if this were the case, however, it would in no way be contrary to our basic contention that voting behavior was affected by friends and neighbors politics.

³³The size and characteristics of the total population in the sample areas were estimated from data made available by Richard H. Uhlig of the Philadelphia Health and Welfare Council. Since areas (and sections within areas) did not correspond with census tracts in a number of cases, all calculations based on these data are subject to some error. In addition, our estimate of the population was based on all people eighteen years and older reported in the 1960 census data. Since voting was limited to those twenty-one years and older, our figures underestimate the percentage of those eligible that voted. However, unless the age distribution for the three years eighteen to twenty-one varies substantially from one neighborhood to another, it is unlikely that this affects inter-area comparisons.

³³ V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), p. 37.

³⁴ While records were kept on the number of voters for each CAC area as a whole, the number of voters for each voting section within the areas could not be obtained directly. Although the number of votes cast for each candidate within each voting section was available, the sum of these votes could not be accepted as a direct measure of the number of voters because each person was permitted to vote for as many as twelve candidates. Neither was the solution to divide the total number of votes cast in an election by twelve,

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF CANDIDATES LIVING IN SECTION AND VOTER TURNOUT IN FORTY-EIGHT VOTING SECTIONS

Number of candidates living in section	Number voting in section
0-3 (9)	60.9
4-6 (14)	252.2
7-9 (13)	316.5
10-12 (12)	433.1

dates and voter turnout was even more dramatic. The rank order of the two variables for these twelve sections was nearly identical, and the product-moment coefficient of correlation attained a value of .86. The details are in Table 3. In an election having such a low turnout, people did not vote unless there was some particularly compelling reason for them to go. In this case the most powerful force inducing voters to participate was a friend or neighbor running for office; the more candidates in an area, the more people would do a friend a favor by showing up at the polls.

The pattern of support for each candidate within his neighborhood council area revealed that a voter tended to vote for candidates that lived within the same voting section that the voter did. An index of localism was developed in order to state the degree to which localist influences were revealed by the voting behavior. The rationale for this index is stated in the Appendix. In brief, the index of localism states numerically the proportion of votes received by a local candidate as compared to the average proportion received by all non-local candidates,

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF CANDIDATES LIVING IN VOTING SECTION AND VOTER TURNOUT IN TWELVE SAMPLE SECTIONS

Number of candidates living in section	Per cent voting in section
1	5.6%
12	5.7
10	2.2
8	1.4
8	1.2
6	2.3
6	.9
5	2.0
4	.7
0	.4
0	.1
0	.1

TABLE 4. PROPORTION OF NON-WHITES IN COMMUNITY ACTION COUNCIL AREA AND AREA'S SCORE ON INDEX OF LOCALISM

Percent non-white in community action council area	Index of localism score
0%-15% ^a (2) (Predominantly White)	2.03
25%-45% ^a (6) (Racially Mixed)	2.00
65%-90% (4) (Predominantly Negro)	2.03

^a No CAC areas had 16 to 24, or 46 to 64 percent nonwhite populations.

holding constant the general popularity of each candidate. If the local candidate did proportionately no better than non-local candidates, the value of the index is 1.00. If his proportion is less than that of non-local candidates, the value is less than 1.00.

As measured by this index, localism pervaded Philadelphia's poverty election. Out of 348 candidates 93 percent ran proportionately better in their home section than did the average non-local candidate.³⁶ Only 6 percent did not do as well, while two candidates ran proportionately as well as did the average non-local candidates. The index of localism for the average candidate was 2.07. Thus, the average candidate did proportionately twice as well in his own section as did the average non-local candidate in that section. This pattern of voting behavior appears not to have been due simply to racial loyalties which would appear as localist influences because of segregated housing patterns. If such had been the case, one would have found a lower index of localism in those neighborhood council areas which consisted largely of one racial group. But, as can be seen in Table 4, the racial complexion of an area had little effect on the index of localism.

The tendency for the voter to favor the neighborhood candidate, together with the strong correlation between the number of candidates living in a section and voter turnout, suggests that personal acquaintance with one or more of the candidates crucially affected both the decisions to vote and for whom to vote. Indeed, friends and neighbors politics, in this context, takes on a literal meaning that could not have been quite the case in the southern states that Key analyzed. The neighborhood council areas were so small that non-local candidates often lived only

³⁶ Two candidates were excluded from the analysis, because it was impossible to ascertain in which voting section they lived.

a few blocks away. Finding localism in the voting within these supposedly compact council areas reveals an extreme instance of friends and neighbors politics. This friends and neighbors style of politics indicated the lack of issues disputed by organized competing factions, which usually stimulate citizens to vote. During the six weeks before the election no significant issues and no citywide organizations contesting the elections emerged. The Congress of Racial Equality and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, realizing their own weaknesses, decided to let "the poor people choose their own representatives." The party organizations accepted the decision of community action program officials that party activists were not eligible to participate in this election. Such neighborhood slates as were formed were little more than hastily arranged agreements for temporary gain rather than a coalition of interests with a discernible perspective concerning the proper approach to ameliorating the plight of low income citizens.

Certain structural characteristics of poverty elections encouraged this issueless, friends and neighbors political style. The elections were held separately from other elections. They were electoral contests between politically unknown individuals for an obscure and relatively unimportant post with almost totally undefined responsibilities. The announcement that such an election would be held was made only six weeks prior to election day, an inordinately short period for the selection of candidates, the organization of campaigns and the development of issues.

The constituency formed by the arrangements for formal representation contributed to the representative's particularistic orientation. To the extent that the newly elected representatives had any constituency at all, it consisted of those few personal acquaintances who had been mobilized by the candidate to support him on election day. Since the representatives lacked a strong, organized constituency upon which they could depend for future political support, they sought to develop a small, personally loyal following by distributing particularistic benefits. The bureaucratic staff and the Tate Administration won the acquiescence of the representatives on larger policy questions by encouraging their interest in questions of patronage and financial remuneration. Friends and neighbors politics in Philadelphia, as in the South, extended the power of the dominant political force in the community, the City Administration. It is not surprising that in subsequent years, the City fought for continued election of the representatives of the poor—even after OEO had lost enthusiasm for this innovation.

The constituency for New York's representatives, as shaped by the processes of formal representation, encouraged substantive representation of a universalistic interest character, because the representative's constituency was organized through neighborhood groups. Since the concerns of the organizations in the community did not, for the most part, depart radically from the interests of the population, their very organization helped them to become effective links binding representatives to their constituents. Representatives thus spoke for and were accountable to an organized constituency which could be relied upon in moments of crisis. Whatever disagreements existed among community leaders, they drew together to protect the local community action program from the city's intervention. Representatives sought to protect the autonomy of their local organizations rather than simply to secure particularistic benefits for themselves. Although examples of combined community efforts to ensure autonomous local influence over the poverty program occurred in all three (and many other) neighborhoods, we shall illustrate the pattern by briefly describing events in Bedford-Stuyvesant.

The community action program in that community had been developed by a staff responsive to the interests of "the Establishment," but as prospects for funding by OEO improved, a new, more politically oriented director took the helm. The Wagner Administration, noticing the growing split within the Bedford-Stuyvesant community, seized this opportunity to bring the program under more central direction. The community responded to this threat with unexpectedly unified political action. Community meetings were held, telegrams and phone calls were sent to Congressmen (and even to the Vice-President), and a vigorous defense of the decentralized arrangements was made in personal discussions with city officials. Representatives from the community on the city poverty council were able to use their position to protect local control of the community action program. In the face of this opposition, city officials retreated from their attempt to centralize authority. It was the availability of the resources of an organized community that enabled New York's representatives of the poor to win the local control which was essential for the universalistic interest representation peculiar to that city.

This relationship between formal and substantive representation may be peculiarly characteristic of representatives of disadvantaged groups in society. The formal process by which corporations, labor unions, and professional associations are selected as representatives on official policy-making bodies probably has little effect on

their subsequent behavior. Analyses of group influence in policy-making throughout the federal system in the United States suggest that such groups are capable of providing quite effective interest representation under a variety of formal and informal relationships with policy-makers.³⁷ The multiplicity of access points—both formal and informal—available to higher status groups reduces the significance of any one channel of influence. If a particular representative does not provide effective interest representation, the high status group may be crippled temporarily in its relations with the government, but sooner or later it will find a more effective channel or representation. To guard against loss of position within their own group, representatives thus tend to be vigorous exponents of the group's interests.

Among low status groups the number of alternative channels through which the group can influence public policy is likely to be significantly less. Thus, the importance of any one channel of representation is thereby enhanced. The representative's bargaining position *vis a vis* the agency he is trying to influence is minimized and his bargaining position *vis a vis* the group he is representing is strengthened. Other factors being equal, he is more likely to make greater concessions merely to maintain his position as formal representative. Consequently, the formal selection process has particular significance for the substantive behavior of representatives of the poor.

VI. SOCIALLY DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

Socially descriptive representation was far less controversial in these three cities than were the arrangements for formal representation. Neighborhood groups were far less insistent that any income limit be placed upon those chosen to represent the residents of low income communities. Their reticence on this point may have been due to the tendency for organizations to recruit the more skilled, better educated, and more affluent members of the community; many of their leaders would be disqualified from participating if a strict income limit were placed on those who could serve as representatives of the poor. The extent to which socially descriptive representation was implemented must be attributed to OEO's dogged insistence that at least some of those representing the poor come from similar backgrounds themselves. In New York and Chicago no more than one-third of the representatives on the

neighborhood councils and an even smaller percentage on the citywide councils had incomes within the poverty zone.³⁸ In Philadelphia, on the other hand, election regulations required that *all* members of neighborhood councils have incomes of less than \$6000 annually (the limit for any individual council member varying with the size of his family).³⁹ Forty percent of the city poverty council consisted of representatives who also conformed to these income restrictions. Moreover, Negroes were also well represented among the elected council members. Although nonwhites (mostly Negroes) comprised only 44 percent of the population in designated poverty areas, 70 to 80 percent of the one hundred and forty-four elected representatives were nonwhite.⁴⁰

This difference between Philadelphia and the other two cities enables us to inquire as well into the effect that socially descriptive representation had on the patterns of actual and interest representation. In general, it seemed that lower income representatives were more interested in securing particularistic benefits, whereas more middle income representatives were interested in achieving both influence and universalistic changes in government services to the poor. As we noted earlier, Philadelphia's representatives focused on payment for themselves and positions in the agency for their family and friends as major goals which they wished to pursue. Similarly, on New York's Lower West Side, the partisan factions, who agitated for greater involvement of the poor, were repeatedly disappointed by the support which low income representatives gave to their opponents in exchange for particularistic

³⁸ Both the level of income which was the upper limit of the poverty zone and the percentage of poor on neighborhood and citywide councils fluctuated over time. In general Chicago's social representation increased somewhat from a very low level, whereas New York's decreased in 1966. More detailed information can be found in Peterson, "City Politics and Community Action," pp. 56-59, 133-153.

³⁹ There is some evidence that enforcement of this rule was not excessively rigid, but it was nevertheless apparent that the overwhelming majority of council members had incomes below the upper limit and the remainder were in only slightly better economic circumstances.

⁴⁰ In three randomly selected areas, the distribution was 72 percent Negro, 25 percent white and 3 percent Spanish-speaking. A close observer of the program estimated that in the city as a whole about 80 percent of elected representatives were nonwhite. Shostak, "Urban Politics and Poverty," p. 1.

³⁷ See, for example, Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966), *passim*.

benefits.⁴¹ Thus, the particularistic character of interest representation in Philadelphia might not have been so pronounced had income restrictions on candidates been less severe. Certainly, the middle class organization leaders in New York in many cases were more concerned about strengthening their power and influence in the program than in gaining material benefits for themselves or their friends. Thus, whereas the Philadelphia representatives were slowly losing influence in the hope of securing material benefits, this trend was not apparent in New York City. In fact the victory of the Bedford-Stuyvesant community in its conflict with the mayor must be attributed in part to the skills and positions of influence which the middle class leaders of the neighborhood organization had at their disposal.

But it is too facile an explanation to say that Philadelphia and New York community action programs took different directions because lower income representatives seek material gain whereas middle income representatives sought influence for their organizations. Such an interpretation ignores the extent to which political power relations and the arrangements for formal representation strengthened the representatives of the poor in New York. Lower income representations in East Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant fought for greater neighborhood influence over the program with a vigor unknown in Philadelphia. It was the coincidence of disorganized politics *together with* restrictions on the income of representatives in the latter city that explains their particularistic interest representation.

This tendency of socially descriptive representatives to provide particularistic rather than universalistic representation may well be peculiar to representatives of disadvantaged groups in society. Lower status representatives, on the other hand, are more likely to have personal financial difficulties which can be eased by trading power and influence for monetary assistance. The greater dependence of his constituency upon him as a representative enables the representative to strike such a bargain with the agency he is trying to influence without losing his status

vis-à-vis his constituency. Moreover, perhaps because of the realities of power relations, this pattern of behavior does not depart from the norms of lower class culture. The machine politician was respected for his power, even though it was well known he used his power for personal gain. Since political power was one of the few avenues for social mobility, the culture condoned such a political style. The Philadelphia representatives provided but another illustration of this pattern of behavior.

VII. SUMMARY

The following hypotheses are supported by the data in this comparative case study:

1. Representation of universalistic interests of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:

a) an organized relationship between the formal representatives and the low status group, provided that this organizational link is not controlled by interests antithetical to those of the low status group;

b) political competition and conflict among those seeking to be the formal representatives of the low status group;

c) formal representatives who are related to the low status group in an organized manner, but who are not socially descriptive of the low status group with respect to such status variables as occupation, education and income; and

d) substantial influence by formal representatives over the operations of the relevant governmental program.

2. Representation of particularistic interests of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:

a) little organized competition for the position of formal representative together with selection of representatives more for their personal qualities than for their position on political issues;

b) few, if any, organizational mechanisms systematically linking formal representatives to their constituencies as a whole;

c) ample opportunities for the distribution to constituents of divisible, material benefits by the formal representatives;

d) moderate influence over the operations of the relevant governmental program by formal representatives; and

e) formal representatives who are socially descriptive of the low status group with respect to status variables.

3. Representation of scarcely any substantive interests—either particularistic or universalistic—of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:

⁴¹Community action program officials in Oakland also eliminated middle class neighborhood leadership seeking to provide universalistic interest representation by requiring that representatives be socially descriptive of their constituency (i.e. having annual incomes of less than \$3000). Nicholas Masters *et al.*, *Politics, Poverty and Education: An Analysis of Decision-making Structures*, Report submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, February, 1968, p. 253.

a) a relationship between the formal representatives and the low status group which is organized by an interest contrary to those of the low status group; if this factor is present, other variables are unlikely to affect significantly the character of substantive representation.

APPENDIX¹

Any measure of friends and neighbors politics or localism must be based on votes cast for various candidates in various constituencies, which in this case were called sections. These data may be arranged in a matrix whose rows correspond to candidates and whose columns correspond to sections. Thus we define as an entry in the data matrix

v_{ij} = The number of votes cast for candidate i in section j .

Then, let

S_i = the sum of the votes cast for candidate i in all sections.

T_j = the total of the votes cast for all candidates in section j .

V = the sum of all votes cast for all candidates in all sections.

From this an index of over-representation R_{ij} for candidate i in section j can be calculated.² R_{ij} simply states the ratio of the actual proportion of candidate i 's total vote that he received in section j to his expected proportion, or:

$$R_{ij} = \frac{v_{ij} \text{ (actual)}}{v_{ij} \text{ (expected)}}. \quad (1)$$

The expected proportion is the proportion candidate i would have received in section j had his vote been distributed in equal proportions among all sections, or:

$$v_{ij} \text{ (expected)} = \frac{S_i T_j}{V} \quad (2)$$

Substituting the right-hand of equation (2) for v_{ij} (expected) in equation (1) and dropping the no longer necessary designation "actual" from the numerator in equation (1) yields:

¹ Duncan MacRae provided considerable assistance in the development of the index of localism.

² The index of over-representation has been used widely by political scientists and sociologists. See, for example, Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 273-74.

$$R_{ij} = \frac{v_{ij}}{\frac{S_i T_j}{V}}. \quad (3)$$

which equals

$$R_{ij} = \frac{v_{ij} V}{S_i T_j}. \quad (4)$$

For purposes of measuring localism this index suffers from the overlap between the data upon which both the "expected" and actual proportions are derived. T_j is the column summation of all cases of v_{ij} , including the instance of v_{ij} which is the basis for determining the actual proportion of candidate's i 's total vote that he received in section j . As a result, the index of over-representation tended to measure not only localism but also the concentration of candidates among sections, a variable which conceptually has nothing to do with localism. This difficulty is eliminated by dividing the index of over-representation for local candidate l by the index of over-representation for non-local candidate m . This yields an index of localism L_l for local candidate l :

$$L_l = \frac{R_{lj}}{R_{mj}}. \quad (5)$$

Substituting from (4),

$$L_l = \frac{v_{lj} V / S_l T_j}{v_{mj} V / S_m T_j}, \quad (6)$$

which reduces to:

$$L_l = \frac{v_{lj} / S_l}{v_{mj} / S_m}. \quad (7)$$

In order to reduce the effect of random error, an average of all values v_m / S_m may be an improvement on the denominator of (7). Thus:

$$L_l = \frac{v_{lj} / S_l}{av(v_{mj} / S_m)}. \quad (8)$$

Thus, the index of localism as stated in (8) is simply the proportion of a local candidate's total vote that he receives in his own district divided by the average of the corresponding proportions for all non-local candidates. Note that this formula includes no T_j term, which frees the index from distortions resulting from an overlap between v_{ij} and T_j . However, the S_i term (visible in (8) as S_l and S_m) was not eliminated from the formula upon which the index of localism was based. Consequently, variations in the size of the vote among sections has affected the index to some extent. It is extremely unlikely, however, that any resulting imprecisions in the measurement of local influences in the Philadelphia elections were so great as to affect the substantive argument of the paper.

THE POLITICS OF REDISTRIBUTION*

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A comparatively new line of research in political science involves the systematic investigation of political, social, and economic factors important in the formation of public policy. So far, such research has yielded temptingly persuasive evidence that political variables exert little or no independent influence on policy outcomes; that policy outcomes are governed overwhelmingly by socio-economic factors. Stated more succinctly, these findings have raised the question: Does politics make a difference in the policy formation process?¹

We suggest in the following analysis that these prior findings have been the result of the examination of a measure of public policy in which the influence of the political system is likely to be negligible, that is *levels* of public revenues and expenditures. To examine this proposition empirically, our study shifts attention to the allocation of the burdens and benefits of state revenue and expenditure policies across income classes. In redirecting analysis to allocations rather than levels of state revenues and expenditures, we focus on a province we believe to be more predictably political.²

We have taken as our dependent variable the

* Some of the data used in this analysis were taken from information made available by Thomas R. Dye. Computation time was provided by Stanford Computation Center, Stanford University. Machine and secretarial assistance were provided by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, as well as by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University. Our thanks also go to Raymond E. Wolfinger, Heinz Eulau, Hubert Marshall, and William Paisley for their encouragement and criticism.

¹ This question is obviously a gross oversimplification of the problem. See Charles S. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," this REVIEW, LXIII (September 1969), 858-866.

² Easton, of course, has defined politics as "the authoritative allocation of values." See David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley), p. 21.

net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures as represented by the ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for the three lowest income classes in each state.³ The major hypothesis of our study is that, in regard to the allocation of the burdens and benefits of state government revenues and expenditures, political variables will have a stronger influence on policy outcomes than will socio-economic variables.

I. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature of the systematic analysis of public policy was launched with the publication in 1952 of Solomon Fabricant's *The Trend of Government Activity in the United States since 1900*.⁴ As part of his analysis, Fabricant used a multiple regression statistical model to examine interstate variations in levels of per capita state and local expenditure in the United States in 1942. He found that more than 70% of the variance in these levels could be explained by the impact of differences in per capita income, urbanization, and population density. Both Fabricant's focus and his method have inspired subsequent research.

For example, a number of studies published in the *National Tax Journal* have elaborated on Fabricant's initial findings within the basic framework of the multiple regression approach and with continued reliance on socio-economic independent variables. These efforts were directed mainly at extending Fabricant's analysis over time and breaking down the dependent variable to determine the differential impact of his three independent variables on various components of expenditures. What the studies indicated was, briefly, that the explanatory power of

³ This measure is a direct statistical analogue of Lasswell's and Kaplan's indulgence-deprivation ratio. See Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 61.

⁴ Solomon Fabricant, *The Trend of Government Activity in the United States Since 1900* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), ch. 6.

the independent variables has decreased since 1942, accounting for little more than half the variance in levels of state expenditures in 1957,⁵ and for only 18% of the *changes* in levels of state expenditures between 1957 and 1960.⁶ Further, these studies demonstrated that the effect of this set of independent variables varies with different facets of expenditures, having its least influence on welfare expenditures in the states.⁷ Probably the most impressive overall finding of these studies, however, is the consistently high explanatory power of the socio-economic variables employed relative to absolute levels of expenditures.

In 1963, Dawson and Robinson, through the explicit introduction of political variables, initiated an exploration of the political dimension of public policy outcomes.⁸ Drawing their inspiration from a V. O. Key hypothesis,⁹ they examined the relationship between interparty competition and welfare policies as evidenced by an amalgam of state tax and expenditure measures which they labeled "welfare orientation." They found that interparty competition is indeed fairly closely related to welfare orientation in the states, but this relationship disappears when controls for per capita income are introduced.

Subsequent research into the impact of political variables has tended to confirm Dawson's and Robinson's initial findings. For instance, Hofferbert followed Dawson's and Robinson's lead, but refined the definition of welfare orientation and added divided party control, malapportionment, and regional controls (South vs. non-South) to interparty competition as independent variables.¹⁰ He reported low zero-order correlations¹¹ for divided party control and malappor-

tionment, and no independent impact for any of the political variables considered.

Thomas Dye reported a veritable catalog of results in his book *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States*.¹² He employed the multiple regression model to analyze the relationship between certain socio-economic variables (urbanization, industrialization, income, and education) and political variables (division of party control, interparty competition, voter participation, and malapportionment) on the one hand, and a wide variety of expenditure and tax measures on the other. Dye's findings were generally consistent with those of his predecessors: for forty-seven of fifty-four tax and expenditure measures, socio-economic variables had more influence on policy outcomes than did political variables. As Dye states:

... correlation analysis reveals that these [political] system characteristics have relatively little *independent* effect on policy outcomes in the states. Economic development shapes both the political systems and political outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of states with different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product of different socio-economic levels rather than a direct product of political variables.¹³

But a few more positive results have appeared in the literature. Lineberry and Fowler shifted

correlation coefficient is the simple, bivariate correlation coefficient. It is a *summary* measure of association. A *partial correlation coefficient* is a measure of association or the strength of a relationship between two variables—e.g., urbanization and redistribution—controlled for a third or more variables. Thus, it is a measure of the unique portion of the association after the common portion has been controlled. The *multiple-partial coefficient* is a summary measure of the "explanatory" power of a group of variables. It states the unique portion of the variance attributed to one set of variables—e.g., political variables—after another variable or set of variables—e.g., economic variables—has been controlled. The *coefficient of determination* associated with any of the three above measures is the square of the coefficient of correlation (simple or multiple) which is equal to the portion of variance explained by the measures.

¹² Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

⁵ Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," *National Tax Journal*, XIV (December 1961), 349-355.

⁶ Roy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes in State and Local Government Expenditures," *National Tax Journal*, XVIII (March 1965), 50-57.

⁷ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

⁸ Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *The Journal of Politics*, XXV (1963), 265-289.

⁹ V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Random House, 1949), pp. 298-311.

¹⁰ Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, LX (March 1966), 73-82.

¹¹ Four statistical terms used in this paper might be unfamiliar to some of the readers. A *zero-order*

the level of analysis to American cities to determine the impact of reformism (reformed cities are defined as those having city manager government with nonpartisan and at-large elections) on tax and expenditure policy.¹⁴ The authors ran separate multiple regression analyses in reformed and unreformed cities and found that socio-economic variables accounted for less of the variance in tax and expenditure levels in reformed cities. They saw the difference as an effect of reformism. Unfortunately, however, their methodology did not permit an assessment of the relative impact of political and socio-economic variables on policy outcomes. Grumm developed a new independent variable, an index of legislative professionalism, which he found to have an independent relationship with public welfare expenditures.¹⁵ Sharkansky and Hofferbert factor analyzed a number of variables and discovered that the "political" factor positively correlated with welfare-education policies after controlling for their socio-economic factor.¹⁶

Two authors have followed a different approach, alterations in the dependent variable, in arriving at their more positive results concerning political variables. Sharkansky proposed that a distinction be drawn between public policy (expenditures and other indicators of official concern) and policy outputs (the results of those policies).¹⁷ He examined the relative impact of environmental variables and policy variables on high school attendance and completion (output measures). Sharkansky found policy measures more closely related than environmental variables to levels of attendance and rate of graduation, though that relationship was reversed in regard to dropouts. Walker, on the other hand, devised a non-monetary measure of public policy: his innovation index measures the extent and rapidity of adoption of eighty-eight

policies among the states.¹⁸ Walker found that, although each of a number of political variables (party competition, party turnover, legislative apportionment, and legislative professionalism) correlated fairly closely with innovation, the relationship disappeared when socio-economic controls were introduced for all but the malapportionment-innovation correlation (a finding of no mean significance in itself).

This brief literature review highlights a number of findings relevant to the present analysis. First, socio-economic variables have relatively high explanatory value in terms of policy as it is measured by levels of taxes and expenditures in the states. Second, where political variables have been examined in relation to tax and expenditure levels their effect has usually been overshadowed by that of socio-economic variables, and often have shown no independent impact whatsoever. Third, the relationship between socio-economic variables and fiscal policies varies according to the specific components of these policies, and the relationship is particularly weak in reference to welfare policies.

The first two findings suggest that the political analyst may have to look beyond levels of taxes and expenditures to find politics having an independent or dominant influence on policy outcomes in the states. The third finding indicates that, as Key originally hypothesized, a fruitful area of search for such influence may be the redistributive policies of state governments.

Accordingly, as stated earlier, this analysis takes as its dependent variable the net redistributive impact of state revenues and expenditures. The political relevance of this variable has been suggested by Jacob and Lipsky in a review of research on public policies:

The distribution of benefits or sanctions is perhaps the most significant output dimension for political scientists, since much of the conflict preceding adoption of a program is not about whether it should be embarked upon but who will pay and who will benefit. Even programs that apparently benefit most of the population—such as education and highway construction—have a variable incidence of benefits.¹⁹

Implicit in this statement and in our analysis is a conception of politics as a bargaining pro-

¹⁴ Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this REVIEW, LXI (September 1967), 701-716.

¹⁵ John G. Grumm, "Structural Determinants of Legislative Output"; paper delivered at Conference on the Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28-August 3, 1968.

¹⁶ Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," this REVIEW, LXIII (September 1969), 867-879.

¹⁷ Ira Sharkansky, "Problems of Theory and Method: Environment, Policy, Output, and Impact"; paper delivered at Conference on the Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28-August 3, 1968.

¹⁸ Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," this REVIEW, LXIII (September 1969), 880-899.

¹⁹ Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics*, XXX (May 1968), 510-538.

cess in which trade-offs are made at the margins in deciding among alternative policies. The product of this process is embodied in the final configuration of penalties and rewards, which we are measuring in terms of the net redistributive impact of state revenues and expenditures. In sum, though one would expect that environmental conditions would largely determine at what level revenues and expenditures will be set, politics is likely to be pivotal in establishing the allocations of rewards and benefits at that level.²⁰

Our purposes in this study are twofold: (1) to develop a statistical model that has a fairly high degree of explanatory power in regard to the redistributive policies of American states, and (2) to examine the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables within that model. We shall use multiple regression analysis as an instrument for accomplishing those purposes.

II. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The obvious first requirement of this analysis is to devise a satisfactory measure of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures. We use as a basis for this derivation the Tax Foundation study, *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditure by Income Class, 1961 and 1965*.²¹ This study, as the title implies, distributes revenue burdens and expenditure benefits across income classes. To do this, Foundation researchers selected a number of allocation bases which appeared to describe the incidence of revenue burdens and expenditure benefits by income class and applied these bases to revenue and expenditure totals. For instance, elementary and secondary education expenditure benefits were assumed to be distributed according to the number of children under 18 in families in each income class, so that if 20% of children under 18 were in families with an income of \$4,000 to \$4,999, 20% of expenditures on elementary and secondary education were assigned as benefits to that income class. Similarly on the revenue side, if 20% of total expenditures on al-

coholic beverages were made by families with an income of \$6,000 to \$7,499, it is assumed that 20% of the alcoholic beverage tax was paid by families in that income class. This process, with an appropriate allocation base for each revenue and expenditure category, was repeated for all federal government revenues and expenditures and for aggregate category totals of state and local government revenues and expenditures. Expenditure totals by level of government were taken from Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics reports, and the allocation bases from Department of Labor data.

For our study we have calculated by revenue and expenditure category the percentage distributions of state revenue burdens and expenditure benefits from the Tax Foundation study. However, since Office of Business Economics expenditure and revenue figures, which are the basis for the Tax Foundation study, are not available on a state-by-state basis, we have used Census Bureau expenditure and revenue state totals as the base to which allocation factors are applied.²²

Our analysis is restricted to revenues and expenditures for state governments only, rather than a combination of state and local totals, for several reasons. First, it would appear that the state-local combination is more a statistical construct than a coherent governmental jurisdiction. As Sharkansky puts it:

... the fusion of state and local government activities confuses the efforts of politically-distinct units. The state-plus-local aggregate is artificial, and not the arena in which policy-makers decide about the size of their budgets or the allocation of funds.²³

Second, the state level has traditionally been a level at which redistribution has been sought both in an attempt to overcome regional dif-

²⁰ Dawson and Robinson attempted to get at the concept of redistribution in the article already cited, but their perspectives were restricted by the measure of welfare orientation they chose and a concentration on levels of taxes and expenditures. See Dawson and Robinson, *op. cit.* We propose a considerably more comprehensive measure addressed specifically to allocations of benefits and burdens.

²¹ Tax Foundation, Inc., *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditure by Income Classes, 1961 and 1965* (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967).

²² This shift raises a procedural problem, since the Census Bureau and the Office of Business Economics define revenue and expenditure categories somewhat differently. To counter this difficulty, we have either grouped the Census Bureau figures into categories at least nominally equivalent to those set up by the Office of Business Economics or we have used allocation bases which appear to be appropriate to the Census Bureau categories. A number of technical differences prevent a direct comparison between the categories so derived and the Office of Business Economics data, but comparability is not a major consideration, since it is only necessary to assume that the allocation bases are appropriate for the revised categorization of the Census Bureau figures.

²³ Sharkansky, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

ferences in tax bases and expenditure policies and in the name of equity. Third, previous research has indicated that state and local levels are analytically distinct, responding in different ways to different influences.²⁴ Fourth, and in a more practical vein, there is a potential ecological problem in analyzing state-wide political, social, and economic indicators in relation to local output measures. Were local outputs to be included in the analysis, the prudent but difficult course to follow would be to collect data on the independent variables at the local level. The theoretical case for the state-local separation is not clear-cut, but we feel that the above considerations are sufficiently persuasive to justify that separation in this analysis.

A number of additional factors should be noted in our development of the dependent variable. First, we have included intergovernmental revenues and expenditures in state revenue and

²⁴ *Ibid.*

expenditure totals. This inclusion was made on the assumption that political and socio-economic conditions within a given state are related to both the level and nature of intergovernmental revenues and expenditures in that state. We have distributed intergovernmental expenditure benefits across income classes according to the distribution of each category of intergovernmental expenditures. We have distributed intergovernmental revenues in proportion to the distribution of the burden of all federal revenues. Second, we have treated unemployment compensation as a state program.²⁵ Finally, though the

²⁵ This classification is somewhat ambiguous since the federal government levies a tax on employers but allows a credit for state taxes up to 90% of the amount of the federal tax. Since most states have adopted a tax to take advantage of the credit, and in accordance with the Tax Foundation classification, we have considered unemployment compensation to be a state program.

TABLE 1. STATE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (1961)

Category	Amount (millions)	Basis for Allocation
Direct Expenditures	\$24,578	
Education	3,792	
Elementary & Secondary	226	Number of Children under 18
Higher and Other	3,566	Higher Education Expenditures of Families
Highways	6,230	Half Auto Operation Expenditure and Half Total Current Consumption
Public Welfare	2,311	Income from Public Social Assistance and Private Relief
Agriculture ¹	435	Farm Money Income Before Taxes
Liquor Store	873	Alcoholic Beverage Expenditures
Insurance Trust ²	4,701	Public Unemployment & Soc. Security Benefits
Interest ³	584	Interest Income
Other—General	5,652	Half Family Money Income Before Taxes & Half Number of Families and Unrelated Individuals
Intergovernmental	10,114	
Education	5,963	Combined Allocation for all Education Expenditures
Highways	1,266	Same as Direct Highway Expenditures
Welfare	1,602	Same as Direct Welfare Expenditures
General	1,283	Same as Direct General Expenditures
Total Expenditures	\$34,693	

¹ Prorated share of nonseparable intergovernmental expenditures deducted.

² Unemployment compensation classified as a state program.

³ Interest paid.

Sources: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *State Government Finances in 1961*. Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing Office; and Tax Foundation, Inc., *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditures By Income Class, 1961 and 1965*. New York, Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967. pp. 11 and 12.

TABLE 2. STATE GOVERNMENT REVENUES (1961)

Category	Amount (millions)	Basis for Allocation
Taxes	\$20,175	
Sales and Gross Receipts	14,328	
Alcoholic Beverage ¹	1,893	Alcoholic Beverage Expenditures
Tobacco	1,001	Tobacco Expenditures
Motor Vehicle ²	4,948	Automobile Operation Expenditures
All Other ³	6,486	Total Current Consumption
Individual Income	2,355	Personal Taxes
Corporation ⁴	1,712	Half Total Current Consumption and Half Dividend Income
Property Tax	613	Half Housing Expenditures and Half Total Current Consumption
Death and Gift	501	Completely to the \$15,000 and Over Income Class
All Other	648	Total Current Consumption
Severance	451	
Other	197	
Social Insurance Contributions ⁵	4,067	Combination of Social Security, Railroad, and Government Retirement Contributions and Total Current Consumption
Charges and Miscellaneous	2,854	Total Current Consumption
Intergovernmental ⁶	6,412	Distribution of All Federal Taxes
Total Revenue	\$33,508	

¹ Includes alcoholic beverage tax, alcoholic beverage license fee, and liquor store revenues.

² Includes motor fuel tax and motor vehicle license fee.

³ Includes general sales and gross receipts tax, other license fees, and other sales and gross receipts taxes.

⁴ Includes corporation net income tax and corporation license fees.

⁵ Excludes earnings on investments.

⁶ From federal government only.

Sources: Same as Table 1.

Tax Foundation analyzed revenues and expenditures for 1965, we have used their revised data for 1961 because both their allocation bases and the information used in our independent variables are based on figures for the earlier period. Expenditure and revenue totals, and the allocation bases for each revenue and expenditure category, are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Tables 3 and 4 display the percentage distribution of revenue burdens and expenditure benefits by income class for each type of revenue and expenditure.

Given the revenue and expenditure totals and the allocation factors, the remaining steps in the calculation of the dependent variable are relatively simple:

- 1) Apply the allocation factors to the amounts collected and the amounts spent in

each revenue and expenditure category in each state. This computation yields the amounts paid in revenue and received in benefits by income class for each category of revenues and expenditures in each state.

- 2) Sum the benefits received and revenues paid for each income class. The sums are the total revenue burden and expenditure benefit for each income class in each state.
- 3) Calculate the ratio of expenditure benefits received to revenues paid for each income class in each state.

The summary measure of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures in each state is simply the ratio derived in step 3 for the lowest three income classes in each state. This gives us a directional measure of redistrib-

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE BENEFITS BY INCOME CLASS (1961)

Expenditure Category	Under \$2,000	\$2,000 -2,999	\$3,000 -3,999	\$4,000 -4,999	\$5,000 -5,999	\$6,000 -7,999	\$7,500 -9,999	\$10,000 -14,999	\$15,000 & over	Total ¹
Direct										
Elem. & Sec. Education	5.0%	8.0%	10.1%	14.3%	15.6%	19.9%	17.1%	8.1%	1.9%	100.0%
Higher & Other Education	1.4	2.1	3.4	6.6	10.0	15.7	20.6	25.3	14.7	99.8
Highways	3.2	5.1	8.2	11.4	13.7	19.4	20.5	13.5	4.9	99.9
Public Welfare	49.7	24.8	8.1	5.3	5.1	2.8	1.8	2.2	—	99.8
Agriculture	5.5	8.6	11.6	11.1	12.6	14.5	15.1	11.5	9.4	99.9
Liquor Store	2.4	3.7	8.0	9.8	11.6	18.8	22.3	17.0	6.3	99.9
Insurance Trust	21.4	20.0	17.2	9.7	9.2	9.3	7.8	4.7	0.6	99.9
Interest	4.8	9.9	10.1	8.9	8.2	11.5	16.4	14.9	15.1	99.8
Other—General	8.6	7.8	9.1	11.2	12.4	16.6	17.4	11.3	5.5	99.9
Intergovernmental										
Education	4.5	7.1	9.1	13.1	14.7	19.3	17.6	10.7	3.9	100.0
Highways	3.3	5.1	8.2	11.4	13.8	19.4	20.5	13.4	4.9	100.0
Public Welfare	49.8	24.8	8.1	5.3	5.1	2.8	1.7	2.2	—	99.8
Other—General	8.6	7.8	9.1	11.2	12.4	16.6	17.4	11.3	5.5	99.9

¹ Rows may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Tax Foundation, Inc., *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditures by Income Class, 1961 and 1965*. New York, Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967, pp. 48-51.

bution (assuming, as is the case, that the ratios are higher in the lowest three income classes than in the remaining income classes), with higher summed ratios indicating more redistribution to the lowest income groups. Since it is commonly believed that the lowest income groups are denied access to the decision-making chambers of government, the limitation of our analysis to redistribution to the three lowest income groups poses a rigorous test for hypotheses involving political variables. The ratios for the lowest three income classes in each state are shown in Table 5.

There are a number of problems in this explanation of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures which should be kept in mind in interpreting the results of this study. First, the Tax Foundation analysis was not done

for each state, but only for aggregate state and local revenues and expenditures, with nationwide allocation bases. In applying these allocation bases to state-by-state revenue and expenditure totals we have necessarily assumed that the allocation base distributions are constant in all the states. Thus, for instance, in apportioning the burden of the cigarette tax, we assume that cigarette expenditures in each state are distributed across income classes in the same manner as in the nation as a whole. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption, but one necessitated by restrictions on available data. To the extent that these distributions diverge among the states, of course, the data will be in error. Second, in the interest of simplification, the Tax Foundation study embodies a number of assumptions about the incidence of revenue burdens and expendi-

TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE BURDEN BY INCOME CLASS (1961)

Revenue Category	Under \$2,000	\$2,000 -2,999	\$3,000 -3,999	\$4,000 -4,999	\$5,000 -5,999	\$6,000 -7,499	\$7,500 -9,999	\$10,000 -14,999	\$15,000 & over	Total ¹
Alcoholic Beverage	2.4%	3.7%	8.0%	9.9%	11.6%	18.9%	22.3%	17.0%	6.3%	100.1%
Tobacco	4.9	7.5	9.8	12.6	14.2	19.3	19.0	9.5	3.3	100.1
Motor Vehicle	1.9	4.4	8.2	12.0	14.5	20.6	21.0	13.4	4.1	100.1
All Other Sales & Gross										
Receipts Taxes	4.6	5.8	8.1	10.9	13.0	18.2	20.1	13.5	5.6	99.8
Individual Income	0.6	1.7	3.6	7.6	10.1	17.1	22.6	18.8	17.8	99.9
Corporation	2.7	4.2	7.7	7.5	10.2	13.2	15.5	17.7	21.3	100.0
Property	5.2	6.1	8.2	10.8	13.1	18.1	19.7	13.1	5.7	100.0
Death & Gift	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100.0	100.0
All Other Taxes	4.7	5.9	8.2	10.9	13.0	18.2	20.0	13.5	5.6	100.0
Soc. Ins. Conts.	3.7	5.2	7.7	11.1	13.5	19.0	20.8	14.0	5.1	100.1
Charges & Misc.	4.6	5.9	8.1	10.9	13.0	18.2	20.1	13.5	5.6	99.9
Intergovernmental	1.8	3.2	5.7	8.6	11.1	16.6	20.1	16.8	16.1	100.0

¹ Rows may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Same as Table 3.

ture benefits in allocating burdens and benefits to income classes. Perhaps the most controversial are the assumptions concerning the incidence of the corporation income tax and general expenditures. In recognition of this problem, the Tax Foundation has offered alternatives in both of these areas. In the present study, in deference to arguments among economists concerning the incidence of the corporation income tax, we have adopted the alternative which assumes that half the corporate taxes and fees are borne by stockholders and half are shifted to the consumer. We have also followed a middle course concerning general expenditures, assuming that half of these benefits are distributed in proportion to family money income before taxes and half in proportion to the number of families and unrelated individuals in each income class. The relevant question, in terms of this analysis, is whether or not these assumptions accord with the perceptions of fiscal policy-makers. We feel that our assumptions do no great violence to those perceptions, but this, of course, is a matter for empirical investigation. Third, some of the allocation bases employed in the Tax Foundation study would appear to be more applicable to federal revenues and expenditures than to those of the states, particularly in regard to income taxes (allocated according to the federal income tax burden) and insurance trust revenues and

expenditures (both allocated in part according to the distribution of the burdens and benefits of social security taxes and expenditures). The practical effect of the choice of these allocation bases is probably to reduce our level of measurement from an interval to an ordinal scale. Here we assume that the *order* of the relative redistributive impact of the revenue and expenditure categories is preserved despite the fact that the relative *degree* of redistribution is probably distorted. For instance, we assume that state income taxes have a higher redistributive impact than most other state revenue sources although the relative degree of redistribution is probably overstated because of the Tax Foundation assumption that the distribution of the burden of state income taxes is the same as that of the federal income tax. Finally, in our consideration of only revenues and expenditures, the deficit of the states has been ignored; therefore revenue burdens are understated. To the extent that this omission has an equal impact in all the states, there will be no distortion in the regression analysis.

III. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Consonant with our first objective, developing a model with relatively high explanatory power, we have embarked on a frankly exploratory expedition in choosing independent variables. Hofferbert provided the general structure for this exploration when he suggested that independent variables be drawn from several dimensions: historic-geographic conditions, socio-economic composition, mass political behavior, governmental institutions, and elite behavior.²⁶ We have attempted to draw variables from all of these dimensions save that of historic-geographic conditions, though our classification is admittedly arbitrary.

The socio-economic variables used in this analysis are median family income,²⁷ industrialization,²⁸ urbanization,²⁹ education,³⁰ percent-

²⁶ Richard I. Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in Policy Formation: A Model for Comparative Inquiry"; paper delivered at 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2-7, 1968, p. 8.

²⁷ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of the Population, 1960* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 1-288.

²⁸ Industrialization is measured by one minus the percent of the work force engaged in farming, fishing and forestry work; drawn from *ibid.*, p. 1-249.

²⁹ Urbanization is measured by the percent of the population living in urban areas; from U.S. De-

TABLE 5. REDISTRIBUTIVE RATIOS FOR 48 STATES¹

	Ratio ²		Ratio ²
1. Massachusetts	3.320	25. Washington	2.093
2. Missouri	2.712	26. Maine	2.060
3. New York	2.644	27. Tennessee	2.031
4. Oklahoma	2.567	28. West Virginia	2.011
5. Connecticut	2.486	29. Iowa	2.001
6. Rhode Island	2.482	30. Kansas	1.998
7. Colorado	2.464	31. Montana	1.962
8. Oregon	2.446	32. Utah	1.954
9. Kentucky	2.428	33. Maryland	1.923
10. Illinois	2.376	34. Michigan	1.920
11. Wisconsin	2.340	35. North Carolina	1.900
12. California	2.322	36. Florida	1.850
13. Mississippi	2.274	37. North Dakota	1.845
14. Alabama	2.267	38. New Hampshire	1.830
15. Louisiana	2.252	39. Nevada	1.826
16. Ohio	2.242	40. Nebraska	1.813
17. Arkansas	2.212	41. Texas	1.800
18. Idaho	2.205	42. Indiana	1.793
19. Vermont	2.199	43. South Carolina	1.775
20. Delaware	2.190	44. New Mexico	1.720
21. New Jersey	2.135	45. South Dakota	1.715
22. Georgia	2.127	46. Arizona	1.694
23. Pennsylvania	2.107	47. Wyoming	1.660
24. Minnesota	2.098	48. Virginia	1.620

¹ Alaska and Hawaii have been excluded from the analysis because data for some of the independent variables were not available for the time period considered.

² The ratio of expenditure benefits to tax burdens for the three lowest income classes.

tage of families with less than \$3,000 annual income,³¹ and the Gini index of income inequality.³² The first four variables—income, industrialization, urbanization, and education—were chosen because of the high explanatory power they have exhibited in previous studies as correlates of levels of revenues and expenditures. We hypothesize that as a state develops economically and more completely fulfills basic service functions, a larger portion of its resources becomes available for other functions which tend to be more redistributive in character. The use of these variables also allows a direct comparison between the results of this and previous studies. The percentage of the population with income under \$3,000 and the Gini index were both added on the assumption that the greater the inequality of income in a state and/or the larger the proportion of low income families in that state, the greater the perceived need for redistribution through state revenue and expenditure policies.

Political participation,³³ Democratic vote,³⁴

partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1968* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 367.

³⁰ Education is defined as the median school year completed by persons 25 years of age; drawn from *U.S. Census of the Population, 1960*, p. 1-248.

³¹ *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1968*, p. 286.

³² The Gini index is a summary measure of the inequality of income in a given population. It is derived from a Lorenz curve on which the percentage of total income is arrayed along the y-axis and percentage of consumer units is arrayed along the x-axis. A line drawn at a 45-degree angle across the graph describes perfect equality, since a given percentage of the consumer units will claim an equal percentage of total income at points on this line (e.g., the lowest 10 percent of the consumer units have 10 percent of total income). The Gini index describes, roughly, the area between the 45-degree line and the line representing the actual distribution of income. The larger the area—the higher the Gini index—the more unequal the distribution of income in the population. The Gini index used in this study is from David Verway, "A Ranking of States by Inequality Using Census and Tax Data," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XLVIII (1966), 314.

³³ The participation index is defined as the votes cast for the state's Governor as a percent of voting age population. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1963* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 367.

³⁴ Measured in terms of average Democratic vote

interparty competition,³⁵ and legislative inducements to participation³⁶ are used as indicators of mass political behavior. First, we hypothesize that the participatory aspect of the political system will have a positive impact on state redistributive policies. Both overall measures of political participation and legislative inducements to participate are related to this hypothesis. Our decision to consider political participation, as measured by the average rate of voter participation in gubernatorial races between 1954 and 1962, was prompted by the well-established proposition that lower income groups are less likely to vote than higher income groups.³⁷ Thus we assume that the higher the voter participation, the more likely it is that voters in the lower income groups have participated in the election. With more electoral participation by the lower income groups, we further assume there will be increased pressure for measures favorable to those groups. Our use of the Milbrath index of legislative inducements to vote was based on much the same rationale. On the premise that legal barriers to participation have a differentially greater effect on lower income groups, we assume that removal of these barriers—or positive encouragement to vote—will have its greatest impact on the lowest income groups.

We are also concerned with the partisan component of mass political behavior: interparty competition and Democratic vote are employed to measure this dimension. The inclusion in our analysis of the Hofferbert index of interparty competition follows a hypothesis posed by V. O. Key in *Southern Politics*—that interparty competition promotes the distribution of benefits to lower income groups.³⁸ Key asserted that in-

for Governor as in *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1968*, p. 367.

³⁵ The measure of interparty competition is a rank order measure integrating the state's competition in the presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial races. For more detail on the measure, see Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XXVI (1964), 550-567.

³⁶ The legislative inducements to participation index is a summed measure noting the extent to which each state has legal measures facilitating participation, e.g., absence of literacy tests and residency requirements, permanent registration, etc. See Lester Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 46.

³⁷ Robert Lane, *Political Life* (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 49.

³⁸ Key, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-311.

terparty competition leads to the organization and subsequent representation of lower income groups as the "outs" replace the "ins" and policies favorable to the new groups result. With the introduction of Democratic vote, we have taken the analysis of party behavior a step further. Here we attempted to probe the programmatic content of partisan behavior. We assume that the Democratic party propounds programs more favorable to lower income groups than does the Republican party. Hence we hypothesize, the greater the electoral support for the Democratic party in a given state, the more directionally redistributive will be the revenue and expenditure policies of that state. Democratic vote is measured by the average percentage of votes received by Democrats in gubernatorial elections between 1954 and 1964.

We have selected four variables to represent Hofferbert's next dimension, governmental institutions: legislative apportionment,³⁹ legislative party cohesion,⁴⁰ gubernatorial powers and gubernatorial tenure.⁴¹ Malapportionment has been a subject of considerable interest and analysis, and despite generally negative findings, the suspicion lingers that it has an important political impact. This suspicion is based on persuasive theoretical arguments which, in terms of redistribution, can be summed up rather simply: since malapportionment usually reflects underrepresentation of urban areas, and since the strongest demand for redistributive policies is likely to emanate from these urban areas, it is assumed that the degree of malapportionment will vary inversely with the extent of redistribution in a state.

Governor's tenure and power were included in

³⁹ Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this REVIEW, LVIII (December 1964), pp. 969-70.

⁴⁰ The measures of party cohesion and interest-group strength were derived from a questionnaire "sent to two or more competent persons in each state, including political scientists . . . , director of . . . research, agencies or bureaus, legislative officers and politicians. At least one reply was received from each of the 48 states—in most cases two or three." See Belle Zeller, *American State Legislatures* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1954), pp. 190-192.

⁴¹ The measure of gubernatorial tenure is an index combining the gubernatorial length of term and the legal possibilities for re-election. The gubernatorial power index combines evaluative indices of budget powers, appointive powers, and veto powers. See Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, pp. 220, 222, 226-27, 229.

the analysis on the basis of two assumptions. First, we assume that governors are likely to press for redistributive measures in response to the varied pressures of the broad-based constituency required for their election. Second, we assume length of time in office, re-election possibilities, and structural sources of power will provide the governor with the tools necessary for the accomplishment of his purposes. Legislative party cohesion is used on much the same rationale. Here we assume that the accommodation of the varied interests necessary to produce party cohesion will lead to the enactment of redistributive measures.

The final dimension suggested by Hofferbert is elite behavior. The variables we have chosen to represent aspects of elite behavior are interest-group strength,⁴² percentage of state employees under civil service coverage,⁴³ Grumm's index of legislative professionalism,⁴⁴ and Walker's innovation index.⁴⁵ In regard to interest-group strength, we hypothesize that redistribution to the lowest income groups is *negatively* related to the strength of interest-groups in a state. This hypothesis is based on Schattschneider's contention that a society with many interest groups incorporates a bias against the lower income groups, which typically are not represented in the interest-group system.⁴⁶ We would expect that the stronger the interest-group system, the lower the probability of success for political strategies based on the mobilization of the lower income classes. The inclusion of the percentage of employees covered by the civil service system can be justified in two ways. The more conventional explanation, expounded by such authors as Herring and Key, is that as civil service ap-

⁴² Zeller, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-91.

⁴³ Council of State Governments, *Book of the States, 1962-63* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1962), pp. 178-81.

⁴⁴ Grumm, *op. cit.*, p. 25. The index combined four important qualities of legislative life: (a) compensation of legislators, (b) total length of sessions in 1963-64, (c) expenditures for legislative services and operations, (d) a "legislative services" score.

⁴⁵ Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 882-883. The innovation index measures the rapidity and extent of adoption within the states of eighty-eight different programs. Such programs ranged from "the establishment of highway departments and the enactment of civil rights bills to the creation of state councils on the performing arts and the passage of sexual psychopath laws."

⁴⁶ E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 30-33.

pointments replace political appointments, state services (in this case measured by revenue and expenditure policies) replace patronage as an inducement or a reward for party loyalty.⁴⁷ The allocation of these rewards or inducements is here assumed to be redistributive in character in response to the broad-based coalitions which form political parties. An alternative formulation links civil service coverage with the indexes of legislative professionalism and innovation as measures of what may be termed the "progressive" character of the state political system. Fenton contends that as civil service coverage expands in state offices, "job-oriented" employees are succeeded by "issue-oriented" employees who perceive rewards more in terms of service than in terms of employment security, and that redistribution results.⁴⁸ The high incidence of professionalism in the legislature and policy innovation in the states can be taken as indicators of the same type of emphasis on "equitable, efficient, issue-oriented politics" that is associated with the progressive tradition in American politics.

IV. HYPOTHESES

Our basic hypothesis in this study, as indicated earlier, is that political variables are more closely related to the net redistributive impact of state revenues and expenditures than are socio-economic variables. However, in our attempts to develop an explanatory model of redistribution in the states, we have suggested a number of subsidiary hypotheses which can be tested in this analysis. These subsidiary hypotheses are listed below.

I. Socio-Economic Variables

- A. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the level of economic development in the state.
 1. Redistribution varies directly with median family income in the states.
 2. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of industrialization in the states.
 3. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of urbanization in the states.
 4. Redistribution varies directly with the level of education in the states.

⁴⁷ See for example Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940), p. 362; and V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Crowell, 1964), pp. 696, 698.

⁴⁸ John Fenton, *People and Parties in Politics* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1966), pp. 46-49, 50-78.

- B. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the perceived need for such policies in the states.

1. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of income inequality in the states.
2. Redistribution varies directly with the proportion of families with less than \$3,000 annual income.

II. Mass Political Behavior Variables

- A. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the extent of participation of lower income classes in the electoral process.
 1. Redistribution varies directly with the overall rate of political participation.
 2. Redistribution varies directly with legislative inducements to political participation.
- B. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the nature of partisan activities in the states.
 1. Redistribution varies directly with interparty competition in the states.
 2. Redistribution varies directly with the extent of the support for the Democratic party in the states.

III. Governmental Institution Variables

- A. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the quality of apportionment in the states.
- B. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of the governor's power in the states.
- C. Redistribution varies directly with the extent of the governor's tenure in the states.
- D. Redistribution varies directly with legislative party cohesion in the states.

IV. Elite Behavior Variables

- A. Redistributive policies of the states vary inversely with the degree of interest-group strength in the states.
- B. Redistribution varies directly with the extent of the coverage of the civil service system in the states.
- C. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of legislative professionalism in the states.
- D. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of innovative tendencies in the states.

V. FINDINGS

To test the hypotheses, we have run separate multiple regression analyses in 48 states and for non-Southern states.⁴⁹ We will examine the

⁴⁹ For the purposes of this paper, the following

overall coefficients of multiple correlation and determination as indicators of the explanatory power of our model, zero-order and partial coefficients of correlation to test the relationship between each independent variable and redistribution in the states, and multiple-partial coefficients of determination to assess the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables in determining interstate variations in redistributive fiscal policies. Our statistical findings are summarized in Table 6.

As Table 6 indicates, we have achieved a measure of success in our efforts to develop a fairly powerful explanatory model. For all 48 states, the multiple coefficient of determination (R^2) is .55, indicating that the model "explains" 55% of the variance in interstate redistributive fiscal policies.⁵⁰ When separate regression analyses are run for the socio-economic and political variables included in this analysis, we find that socio-economic variables alone account for 17% of the variance in redistribution in the 48 states, and that political variables account for 38% of that variance.

The importance of the regional distinction (South separated from non-South) is indicated by the multiple coefficient of determination derived from a separate regression analysis performed for non-Southern states. For these states, the multiple coefficient of determination for all independent variables increases to .67, with both socio-economic variables ($R^2 = .28$) and political variables ($R^2 = .46$) accounting for more variance than in the 48 states as a whole.⁵¹

states were considered to be in the "South": Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

⁵⁰ We have not used tests of statistical significance in this analysis, since all 48 states have been included.

⁵¹ Analysis of the impact of political variables in the 12-state area of the South is proscribed by limitations on the degrees of freedom. However, regression analysis of the lesser number of socio-economic variables permits some speculation about the South-non-South differences: the multiple coefficient of determination for the socio-economic variables in the South is .74, higher than for either the 48 states as a whole or for the non-Southern states. Thus, in this analysis we have a situation in which the socio-economic variables account for more of the variance in each region examined than in the 48 states as a whole. Though a precise investigation of this anomaly is not possible within the statistical confines of the present study, we presume that the 48-state analysis contains a number of sup-

The subsidiary hypotheses generated with the introduction of the independent variables in the analysis will receive only perfunctory attention since they are of secondary importance in this study. Table 6 provides a listing of zero-order and partial coefficients of correlation for each independent variable with redistribution for both the 48 states and the non-Southern states. In general the independent variables selected bear the hypothesized relationships to redistribution in both the 48 states and the non-Southern states.

In terms of zero-order correlations in the 48 states, all relationships are as hypothesized with the exception of education, Democratic vote, interparty competition, the Gini index of income inequality, and the proportion of families with less than \$3,000 in annual income. As one would expect, Democratic vote is redeemed when Southern states are excluded from the analysis, with a positive correlation between Democratic vote and redistribution for non-Southern states. The same reversal occurs for the Gini index of income inequality.

Shifting our attention to partial coefficients of correlation, a measure of independent impact of each independent variable on redistribution, we find somewhat longer lists of contrary correlations. For the 48 states, the partials for median income, industrialization, interparty competition, proportion of families with less than \$3,000 annual income, and legislative party cohesion are

pressed relationships which become statistically apparent only in the regional breakdown. The fragmentary data available to us support this presumption. An examination of the zero-order correlations between the socio-economic variables and redistribution in the South reveals that median income, industrialization, urbanization, and education have a strong *negative* relationship with redistribution. On the other hand, both the Gini index and the percentage of families with less than \$3,000 in annual income have a strong positive relationship with redistribution. In short, redistribution varies inversely with what appear to be measures of ability to pay and directly with perceived need for redistribution. Since we would expect federal aid to vary in the same manner, with assistance provided to those states most in need and least able to pay, we assume that South-non-South differences in redistribution can be accounted for largely by differences in the impact of federal aid, and that this differential impact produces relationships obscured in the 48-state data. This conclusion can only be considered tentative and in need of more direct substantiation, but it suggests a fruitful area for future research.

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

	48 States		Non-South	
	Zero-Order Partial		Zero-Order Partial	
I. Variables				
<i>Socio-Economic Variables</i>				
<i>Ability to Pay</i>				
Median Income	.18	-.27	.23	-.40
Industrialization	.29	-.02	.33	-.05
Urbanization	.34	.15	.42	.23
Education	-.01	.17	-.08	.19
<i>Need (Demand)</i>				
Gini Index	.00	.22	.13	.47
% under \$3,000	-.14	-.07	-.21	-.23
<i>Political Variables</i>				
<i>Mass Political Behavior</i>				
Political Participation	.14	.37	.06	.36
Democratic Vote	-.06	.11	.11	.17
Interparty Comp.	-.21	-.14	-.16	-.19
Leg. Inducements	.03	.07	.11	.33
<i>Government Insts.</i>				
Apportionment	.04	.01	.10	.09
Leg. Party Cohesion	.24	-.05	.25	.00
Governor Power	.26	.12	.24	-.04
Governor Tenure	.17	.12	.12	.17
<i>Elite Behavior</i>				
I. G. Strength	-.04	-.17	-.01	-.07
Civ. Ser. Coverage	.33	.34	.35	.48
Leg. Professionalism	.51	.28	.56	.14
Innovation Index	.46	.07	.50	.17
II. Multiple Coefficients of Correlation and Determination				
	R	R ²	R	R ²
All Variables	.75	.55	.82	.67
Socio-Economic Variables	.42	.17	.53	.28
Political Variables	.62	.38	.67	.46
III. Multiple-Partial Coefficients of Determination				
Political Variables Controlled				
for Socio-Economic Variables		.46		.54
Socio-Economic Variables Controlled				
for Political Variables		.27		.39

all related to redistribution in a direction opposite to that hypothesized. For non-Southern states, all of the same reverse relationships persist and the index of governor's power is added.

Two of these variables—interparty competition, and proportion of families with less than

\$3,000 annual income—are related to redistribution in a direction opposite to that hypothesized for both zero-order *and* partial coefficients of correlation and regardless of regional breakdown. For these two variables, then, the statistical evidence is most convincing for rejecting the asser-

tion that they are correlated as hypothesized with the degree of redistribution in the states. For interparty competition, our data lead us to reject the venerable Key hypothesis that an increased level of interparty competition will increase the level of redistribution in the states. The negative relationship between the proportion of families with less than \$3,000 annual income and the extent of redistribution should be evaluated in light of the positive relationships between redistribution and both legislative inducements to participate and the overall rate of participation. If we are correct in assuming that the latter two measures indicate the extent of electoral participation by lower income groups, we can tentatively conclude that, as might be expected, redistribution to the lowest income classes is more a function of participation by these classes than of their size.

The most interesting and significant finding in this study, however, concerns the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables in determining redistributive fiscal policies in the states. As indicated in the introductory section, previous studies of policy outcomes in the states have been hard pressed to find an independent impact for the political variables considered, and where the relative impact of political and socio-economic variables has been examined the socio-economic variables have predominated. In the present analysis, these findings are reversed. Not only do the political variables have an independent impact on redistributive policies in the states; they also account for considerably more of the variance in redistribution than do socio-economic variables. The relative explanatory power of the political and socio-economic variables is indicated by the multiple-partial coefficients of determination displayed in Table 6. For the 48 states the multiple-partial for political variables controlled for the socio-economic variables is .46 while the multiple-partial for the socio-economic variables controlled for the political variables is only .27. For the non-Southern states, the results are similar. The multiple-partial for political variables controlled for economic variables in the non-South is .54 while the multiple-partial for the socio-economic variables controlled for political variables is only .39. In other words, in the 48 states and in the non-Southern states, the political variables included in our analysis are considerably more powerful than the socio-economic variables in explaining variance in state redistributive policies.

Two objections which can be raised about the above interpretation of the multiple-partial coefficients of determination are: (A) the finding

may be an artifact of the number of political variables used in the analysis (12) relative to the number of socio-economic variables employed (6); and (B) there may be variables not yet considered which could alter the observed relative impact of the political and socio-economic variables. The first objection is susceptible to a direct statistical confrontation. Taking only the five most powerful political variables (measured in terms of sums of square-reduction) versus the five most powerful socio-economic variables, the multiple-partial for the political variables controlled for the socio-economic variables is .42, while the multiple-partial for the socio-economic variables controlled for the political variables is .20 for the 48 states. Making the same comparison in the non-Southern states, we find the multiple-partial for political variables controlled for socio-economic variables is .47, while the multiple-partial for socio-economic variables controlled for political variables is .34. Thus, our finding concerning the relative impact of political and socio-economic variables is not simply the product of the number of each type of variable incorporated in this study. The second objection, the possibility that a variable not considered in this analysis could alter the observed relationships, cannot be answered definitively. We have attempted to minimize this possibility by developing a model with a high degree of explanatory power. Our findings, of course, are only tentative and subject to modification by future research.

VI. CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has been specifically addressed to an investigation of the determinants of variations in the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures in American states. In a broader sense, however, this study has been concerned with the more general question of whether or not the political system exercises an independent impact on public policy outcomes, and with the specification of an arena in which such an impact is likely to be found.

Previous analyses of policy outcomes have generally indicated that socio-economic variables have a dominant influence on those outcomes, with few reported instances of political variables exerting an independent impact. We have contended that these results have been the product of a continuing concentration on policy outcomes as measured by levels of taxes and expenditures. Accordingly, we have shifted the focus of our analysis to an examination of allocations of burdens and benefits in state systems of revenues and expenditures.

Our statistical results indicate that the shift

in focus has been fruitful. First, we have been able to develop a statistical model that accounts for more than half the variance in redistribution among the 48 states included in the analysis and more than two-thirds of the variance in non-Southern states. Second, and more significantly, we have found that the political variables employed in the model are considerably more powerful than the socio-economic variables in explaining interstate variations in redistributive patterns. Thus, our data not only support the assertion that politics makes a difference, they suggest that politics plays a dominant role in the allocation of the burdens and benefits of public policies.

It is obvious that this study represents only a preliminary exploration of the theoretical utility

of the concept of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures as a dependent variable. The summary measure of redistribution employed in this analysis (the ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for the lowest three income groups) is only one of many possible measures with a variety of political implications. The complex interrelationships among the independent variables used in this analysis are susceptible to more systematic treatment. Longitudinal analysis could avoid the dangers inherent in the present research design of drawing dynamic inferences from a cross-sectional model of analysis. Our effort is meant to be but a first step in an intensive analysis of a dependent variable whose value we feel has been demonstrated.

THE SALIENCE OF AMERICAN STATE POLITICS*

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Research emphasizing the correlates of state policy outputs and the performance of particular institutions has overshadowed the role of the citizenry in the drama of state politics. One question of basic concern is the relevance of state government and politics for the inhabitants of a state. At the level of public policy and institutional performance the answer to this is factual and straightforward. The nature, amount, distribution, and to some extent the quality of a state's services and policies can be specified. Since states perform most of the traditional functions of governmental units and since these functions affect the fortunes of the citizens, state politics has an obvious, tangible, objective relevance for a state's inhabitants.¹ At another

level, however, the answer is not so clear-cut. Here we are dealing with the idea of what is subjectively relevant. Large numbers of people apparently pass their lives being touched by political institutions in a variety of ways without becoming particularly interested in or involved with these institutions. Other people become intensely, purposively related to these same institutions. Still others fall along a continuum between these two poles. If substantial variations exist in the general salience of politics, there is little reason to doubt that the same conditions may be found in particular subsets of political matters. In the case at hand this subset consists of the cluster of institutions, actors, and processes known as state political systems.

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¹ The literature on the correlates of state policy outputs is becoming voluminous. Thomas Dye's *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) perhaps represents the zenith of this approach. Other questions are also receiving attention, however. See, for example, some essays in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965); Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Cultures of the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 30 (February, 1968), 187-209; Norman C. Thomas, "The Electorate and State Constitutional Reform: An Analysis of Four Michigan Referenda," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (February, 1968), 115-129; and Wayne Francis, *Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967). Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky provide a sound and enlightened discussion of the field in their "Outputs, Structures, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 30 (May, 1968), 510-538.

I. THE CONCEPT OF SALIENCE MAPS

It may be assumed that for every individual at a given point in time some aspects of politics are more salient than are others. These varying degrees of salience result in cognitive maps yielding surfaces with divergent contours and topographies. Analytically, at least two kinds of mapping operations can be visualized. One is laid out according to issue domains. For some people civil rights issues are most salient, for others tax and fiscal issues, for still others questions of foreign affairs predominate, while education may be the prominent part for yet another cluster of people. Some individuals may place equal stress—ranging from high to low—on a host of disparate issues, but given the opportunity costs involved it seems likely that at any point in time the mapping operations result in an ordering of issue salience.

More germane for present purposes is a salience map arranged according to geopolitical units. A variety of investigations have suggested that people do, in fact, develop such maps.² Per-

² For an example and references to the literature see M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (August, 1967), 291-317. An historical perspective with a different focus is found in Samuel P. Hays, "Political Parties and the Community-Society Continuum," in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham

haps the most noted shorthand expression of this differentiation is the local-cosmopolitan dimension. Important ramifications for political systems stem from differentiated salience maps. One has only to think of the stresses and strains in the emergent countries or the separatist enclaves in established polities to grasp these possibilities. The difficulties encountered by national governments as a partial consequence of sub-national loyalties are impressive. Proclivities toward independence in the Canadian province of Quebec, the Nigeria-Biafra confrontation, the uneasy federalism of India, and the failure of the American South to be incorporated fully into the mainstream of American politics testify to the magnitude of these difficulties.

As with salience maps oriented around issues, the maps dealing with levels of government could in fact attach equal relevance to the component parts. That is, a person could be equally interested (or uninterested) in international, national, state, and local public affairs and politics. Yet this would seem to be an inefficient mode of operation if nothing else, and as we shall see momentarily it is a deviant pattern.

Upon what basis would a person distinguish among these four levels of politics? Assuming that he had equal information about all of them, or at least access to equal information, two dimensions can be suggested. First, he may arrange them according to his interest in the policy outcomes involved. Whereas some find local outcomes about services and amenities of greatest subjective relevance, others are more intrigued by the results of military encounters and diplomatic skirmishes at the international level. A second dimension rests not so much with outcomes as with the demands and conversion processes at work within a given system. Here the interest comes from watching how the game is played rather than in what the final scores are. Charismatic political leaders, factional fights, and broader societal cleavages are kinds of forces which can lead to differential salience along this dimension. Attention to outcomes and conversions may operate simultaneously and feed upon each other. Interest generated by a strong, personable governor might be combined with concern over a state tax program to produce a heightened salience for state politics. Should such convergences occur, the two types of salience maps begin to merge. That is, the overlay of the issue salience map on the system salience map begins to produce a single topography. Although the question of overlap between issue

and system maps is an important one, our major concern is with the system map arrangement.

II. THE PLACE OF THE STATES VERSUS OTHER LEVELS

For a variety of reasons one could predict that the states generate but a modicum of interest amongst their residents. Many of these reasons are either explicit or implicit in a statement by Dahl, made in the context of a discussion about optimum units for popular democratic government:

Yet in the perspective I am suggesting the states do not stand out as important institutions of democratic self-government. They are too big to allow for much in the way of civic participation—think of California and New York, each about as large in population as Canada or Yugoslavia and each larger than 80 percent of the countries of the world. Yet an American state is infinitely less important to citizens of that state than any democratic nation-state to its citizens. Consequently the average American is bound to be much less concerned about the affairs of his state than of his city or country. Too remote to stimulate much participation by their citizens, and too big to make extensive participation possible anyway, these units intermediate between city and nation are probably destined for a kind of limbo of quasi-democracy. . . . It cannot even be said that the states, on the whole, can tap any strong sentiments of loyalty or likemindedness among their citizens.³

In a sense the states are caught between the immediacy of the local system and the glamour and importance of the national and international systems. Without wishing to become embroiled in the question of the appropriate units for a democratic polity, we can nevertheless introduce some material which will clarify the location of the states in the salience maps of Americans.

Our data are drawn primarily from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's 1966 election study, which utilized a national probability sample of the adult population. In order to obtain the interest accorded various levels of politics a series of questions was put to the respondents, beginning with an initial question designed to filter out those people (17 percent) who barely attend to matters of the body politic.⁴ The remainder rank-ordered which

³ Robert A. Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (December, 1967), p. 968.

⁴ This question ran: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested.

TABLE 1. RANK ORDER DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SALIENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AT FOUR LEVELS

Level of Governmental Affairs	Rank of How Closely Followed				Total ^a	N
	First	Second	Third	Fourth		
International	20%	16%	22%	42%	100	983
National	32	31	26	10	99	983
State	17	33	27	22	99	983
Local	30	20	25	25	100	983
	99%	100%	100%	99%		
	N = 983	983	983	983		

^a Total percentages do not equal 100% due to rounding. Cases involving tied ranks or missing data have been deleted in this table. Their inclusion in any rows or columns would have a maximum effect of but 1 percent on any cell value. The total number of cases for analysis will be 1,008.

kinds of public affairs they follow most closely—international, national, state, and local.⁵

One immediate result of the ranking operations is that it reveals the readiness of Americans to distinguish among the four levels. All but 6 percent of the sample (excluding the inattentive) gave complete orderings. The ease with which the rankings were obtained as well as the meager proportions declining to give complete orderings indicates that people at least believe they have salience maps characterized by a rugged terrain rather than a smooth plain.

It is apparent that, while some respondents place state affairs above all other levels, the majority share of first rank attention is devoted to national and local affairs, such as Dahl predicted (Table 1). If one wants to consider international affairs a mental extension of America's role in world affairs (which some respondents undoubtedly did), then state affairs is even more clearly in last place. Taking only the leading rankings demonstrates that the attentive public for state politics is not particularly large.

The danger in closing the argument on the basis of first ranks is nicely demonstrated in two

ways. Looking at fourth ranks, for example, reveals that state affairs has next to the lowest proportions in this category. More compelling evidence is provided by moving to the second ranks. State affairs has strong second-place strength, being in fact the level selected most often at that rank. The contrast with the fate of international affairs is the most striking, since it too (compared with national and local affairs) had abundant opportunity to pick up second place strength. The result of combining first and second ranks finds one-half of the sample placing state matters either first or second, thereby moving it to an equal footing with local affairs, well ahead of international affairs, but still to the rear of national affairs. While the states may not be uppermost in the political thoughts of their residents, they do occupy a secure niche.⁶

What are the risks in using the respondents' rank orderings of interest in the four levels of politics as a way of deriving their interest in state politics alone? Three immediate justifications for the measure can be offered. First, it should be reemphasized that these orderings reflect those of the national sample *minus* an apolitical stratum, the 17% who avowed they paid no attention to public affairs and politics. Thus we have eliminated at least a substantial proportion of those people who might have contributed idiosyncratic, error-prone estimates of the differential salience of various levels of politics. Second, these kinds of rank-orders have been

Would you say that you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?" Those selecting one of the first three alternatives are considered to be members of the attentive public.

⁵ After handing the respondent a card showing the four levels of public affairs, he was asked to rank them in this fashion: "Which one of these kinds of public affairs do you follow most closely?" "Which one do you follow most closely?" "Which one do you follow least closely?" With first, second, and fourth ranks thus determined the residual level automatically occupied the third rank.

⁶ It should be recognized that we are not merely playing with numbers in order to make a case for the saliency of state politics. There is no logical necessity, given the nature of the questions used, that state affairs attract any second rankings. All respondents after making their first choice could have ranked state affairs third or even last had they been so inclined.

TABLE 2. RELATIVE VERSUS ABSOLUTE LEVELS OF INTEREST IN STATE POLITICS^a

Rank of How Closely State Politics Followed	Attention Paid to State Politics			Row Totals	Marginal Totals	N
	Great Deal	Some	Not Much			
First	58%	39%	04%	101%	15%	(166)
Second	44	50	06	100	38	(407)
Third	27	55	18	100	28	(307)
Fourth	22	56	22	100	19	(204)
Marginal Totals	37	51	12		100%	(1084)

^a Data are drawn from the Survey Research Center's 1968 national election study.

subjected to a spatial scaling technique which indicates the prominence of at least one major dimension running through the rank orders, *viz.*, that of the geo-political domain encompassed by given governmental levels.⁷ Essentially, this means that the ranking of state politics nestles reasonably well within an overall, multi-level salience framework.

A third argument is perhaps the most persuasive. It could be charged that the *relative* salience of state politics bears but little correspondence to its *absolute* salience. Illustratively, a politically passive person ranking state politics first might actually pay less attention to it than a political activist ranking it third or fourth. While the plentiful presence of such inconsistencies could be overlooked on the grounds that one is primarily interested in the workings of individual preference orders regardless of intensities, our concept of salience maps will acquire an extra dimension if it can be shown that this is not the common pattern. The 1966 election study did not ascertain absolute levels of interest in politics at multiple levels, but the 1968 election study did this as well as obtaining the rank orderings of interest.⁸ A moderately satisfying result would take the form of little association between relative and absolute salience. This would

at least allow for the play of relative salience across a spectrum of people having about the same absolute interest in state politics. A much more gratifying result, of course, would be a clear positive relationship between the two dimensions.

The cross-tabulation of the two measures (Table 2) is unequivocal in demonstrating a moderate correspondence between absolute and relative salience, in terms of self-reports. We can say with some confidence that, on the average, those who attend relatively more often to state affairs also tend to pay more absolute attention. By the same token (if the table is percentaged vertically) it is clear that the attentive public in absolute terms comes disproportionately from the ranks of those for whom the state is relatively more salient. There is little reason to suspect that different results would have been obtained from the 1966 respondents, had they been asked the additional questions. One indirect piece of evidence, for example, is that the marginals for the rank-ordered interest in state politics are remarkably similar across the two samples.⁹

⁹ Since we have both relative and absolute measures for the 1968 sample, it might be asked why we do not utilize that sample rather than the earlier one. The reasons are two-fold: 1) in order to capture a "purer" reflection of the salience of American state politics it seems desirable to base the analysis on data gathered during a period relatively uncontaminated by the forces of a national election, for much the same reasons that studies of state voting turnout, division of the vote, and party strength often separate the off-year from presidential year statistics; 2) a number of questions of direct relevance for state politics were asked in the 1966 study, but not in 1968. On the other hand, subsequent work in this general area might well utilize both absolute and relative measures of salience in order to arrange people in a multi-dimensional mode.

⁷ See Jennings, *op. cit.*, for an application of the Coombsian unfolding technique to data of this type from a national adolescent sample. Separate analysis with the sample at hand yields similar results.

⁸ In the 1968 study the respondents were, as in 1966, first put through a screening question which eliminated the apoliticals. They then replied to questions about their attention to the four levels of politics. For state politics the question read: "And how about affairs here in (STATE WHERE R LIVES); do you pay a great deal, some, or not much attention to state affairs?" Rank orders of relative interest were obtained after these questions.

Given previous work with the local-cosmopolitan dimension, a positive association between rank orderings for state and local affairs would be hypothesized. Rank order interrelationships can be demonstrated in a fairly straightforward way without the added refinement of spatial or scaling techniques. The respondents' rankings of state politics were crossed against their rankings of each of the other three levels of politics. From these matrices were extracted the sum of respondents who allocated either a first or second rank to each of the other three levels. These proportions are as follows:

First or Second Rank Given to:	State Affairs Ranked:			
	First	Second	Third	Fourth
International	5	9	30	40
National	43	38	42	37
Local	52	52	28	23
	100%	99%	100%	100%

Without doubt, the higher the salience of state affairs the higher is that of local matters and, on the other hand, the lower is that of international affairs.

An easy transition between and intermixing of state and local politics creates a sizable cluster of people who are state and locally oriented. Another way of viewing these rankings is to think of people living in the same geographical area, but focussing their attention upon different political objects. There is a state public—overlapping in great part with the local—and a more cosmopolitan public. Both cosmopolitan and state-local political processes operate simultaneously within a given area; but the “separate” publics of each level probably filter out to varying degrees the information about processes less relevant for them.

Having set forth the concept of salience maps and the place of the states in such maps, we can now turn to two major sets of questions. First, we are interested in the attitudinal and behavioral corollaries or consequences of differential state salience. Other things being equal, the various psychological theories of balance, congruence, and consonance would suggest a probable linkage between high state salience and the favorable evaluation of objects associated with states, and a negative evaluation of objects foreign to the states. Similarly, high salience should be associated with greater behavioral activity in the domain of state politics.

Second, we are concerned with the determinants of distinctive state salience maps. These may be presumed to flow from two sources, one

social and the other political. A variety of social experiences are ordinarily associated with narrower, more provincial perspectives. These lead us to predict that state salience will vary with the nature of these experiential histories. The strictly political factors to be considered are state-specific. Although theoretical underpinnings are less apparent here, we will take as a point of departure the progressive, “good government” model of politics. This model would suggest that the more the state political system conforms to the tenets of progressive democracy, the more interested will be the citizenry in the state as a political institution. That is, salience maps will vary with (good) systemic properties, *ceteris paribus*.

In the analysis to follow we have collapsed the four rankings of state politics into two by combining ranks one and two into “high,” and three and four into “low.”

III. SALIENCE, ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIOR

While one can argue that determining the distribution of differential salience maps is important in and of itself, the subject will be more compelling if it can be shown that certain attitudes and behaviors accompany the different configurations. For instance, it can be demonstrated that there is a connection between salience levels and affective orientations. Those following state affairs could, in fact, be responding to negative impressions about the state's institutions and leaders. Given the need for consonance rather than dissonance in the human psyche, it seems more likely that there would be a “strain toward congruity.”¹⁰ Attention and favorable dispositions do, indeed, occur together. One example is that those who pay more attention to state politics accord higher prestige to the occupation of governor than do those paying less attention ($\gamma = .32$).¹¹ That is, there is greater

¹⁰ For experimental evidence see, *inter alia*, Milton J. Rosenberg, et al., *Attitude Organization and Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

¹¹ The question read: “Now we're interested in learning what kinds of work Americans respect most highly. Which of these occupations do you respect the most?” Three choices were made. The list included, in this order: “U.S. Senator, Bishop or other church official, general or admiral, famous doctor, justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, atomic scientist, professor at a large university, President of the U.S., well-known athlete, president of a large corporation like General Motors, governor of your state.” Altogether governor was the fourth-most choice, being tabbed by 29% of the sample. The correlation in the text is based on first choices.

identification with a symbol (role) connected with the more salient level of government.

By drawing upon data from the 1968 election study it is possible to show more precisely the connection between salience and affect. Respondents rank ordered their faith and confidence in the three levels of the American federal system—national, state, and local.¹² Comparing salience and confidence levels reveals that as the salience of a state's politics rises so does the evaluation of that government's performance. Just as people tend to pay more attention to candidates they like, and vice versa, so too they seem to operate in a selective fashion with respect to political units such as the states. Again, there is no particular reason to suppose that this pattern would not hold for the 1966 sample with which we have been dealing.

Inferentially, the relatively more attentive public for state politics would seem to provide sources of political support for the ongoing performance of state officials.¹³ While the overlap of attention and support is a pleasing state of affairs for state officials, it also raises the possibility of a tacit exchange between these officials and the supportive public. The convergence between support and favorable perception suggests that the values of the attentive public are echoed and legitimized by the state's elites. In any event, if people for whom state politics is highly salient have socio-political views differing from those of the less attentive public, and if there is meaningful interaction between and among elites and attentive publics, then it should follow that the state's political life would vary according to the mix of people more closely attuned to state affairs. It becomes relevant,

¹²The questions ran: "We also find that people differ in how much faith and confidence they have in various levels of government in this country. In your case, do you have more faith and confidence in the national government, the government of this state, or in the local government around here?" "Which level do you have the least faith and confidence in—the (——) or the (——)?"

¹³Any further exploration of the linkage between salience maps and support structures needs to take into account such support dimensions as delineated by David Easton, namely, specific-diffuse; overt-covert; and direct-indirect. See his *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 153-340. For an investigation of support processes at the state level see G. R. Boynton, Samuel C. Peterson, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Support for Legislative Institutions," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (May, 1968), 163-180.

then, to assess the political values of this attentive public.

We may begin by noticing that people who pay more attention to state politics are basically less trusting of the world about them. They are more likely than others to say that one can't be too careful when dealing with other people rather than affirming that most people can be trusted ($\gamma = .31$). They are also more inclined to think that their fellow man is primarily looking out for himself rather than trying to be helpful to others ($\gamma = .19$). By ranking state politics higher than national and international affairs an individual has given a hint that he may be suspicious of larger, more remote environments. His more distrustful orientation toward other people rests comfortably in this outlook.

Attitudes more manifestly political give some glimpse into the way state-oriented individuals view national government and its role in their own lives. Those inclined toward state affairs avow more often that what Washington does makes less of a difference in their personal lives ($\gamma = .30$). In one sense this is a confirmation of our earlier speculation that a system-level salience map reflects in part an issue salience map, since state-oriented citizens see less subjectively important outcomes at the highest level of the federal structure.

Given the subjectively lesser importance of Washington decisions, it would be anticipated that the special public of the states is concerned about the increasing erosion of state decision-making by the federal government. Such concern is present, though not as visible as might be expected. Those attuned to state matters more often say that the federal government is playing too powerful a role in society ($\gamma = .16$). By the same token they more often oppose Washington's taking a strong role in integrating the nation's schools ($\gamma = .21$). The lack of stronger relationships may proceed from the fact that such people may simply not feel threatened by an actor (Washington) which is of lesser importance to them in general.

It should be noted, incidentally, that the prominent political orientation of party identification bears almost no overall relationship to state salience: ($\gamma = .08$), using the S.R.C. seven-point party identification measure which runs from strong Democrat to strong Republican. This is so despite the fact that, nationally, the Republican party is often linked with a states' rights position. Actually the only region in which party identification has an observable connection with state salience is the South, where Democrats more often rank state affairs higher ($\gamma = .21$). For the other regions the relationship is nil.

Although virtually all the above relationships persist within each category of the control variables employed,¹⁴ they are more marked among some strata. The prime example is not socio-economic or spatial; rather, it is by political strata. Non-voters in the 1966 general election (and to a lesser extent non-voters in the 1966 primary contests) exaggerate the original correlations. Thus the relationships are heightened for non-voters versus voters when salience is related to a disavowal of Washington's impact (.54 vs .15); belief that the federal government is too powerful (.30 vs .11); and being against federal intervention in school integration (.28 vs .17).¹⁵

Identification with the state is as much or more symbolic than active for the non-voters. Denying the relevance of a disliked national government, they interpose the state as a symbolic barrier between the national government and themselves. These and other variations denote a multiplicative effect, whereby salience maps are especially linked to views about the federal government among citizens with certain characteristics. Consequently, the practical, political effects of varying proportions of state-oriented residents in the state depend upon other traits of these residents.

Perhaps the most acute test of the impact of differential attention toward state politics comes in examining overt behaviors. If the concept of diverse salience maps is to have viability, some behavioral manifestations are in order. Should these be found, it would suggest that the fabric of a state's politics is further mediated by or informed by the distribution of interest orderings.

It may be stated at the outset that close followers of state politics are, in many respects, slightly less participative than are those less devoted to state politics. For example, they report following public affairs and politics often ($\gamma = -.20$), they vote less often in presidential elections ($\gamma = -.16$), they had less interest in the 1966 congressional campaign ($\gamma = -.13$), knew a little less about the candidates ($\gamma = -.10$), and were just a shade less likely to vote in the congressional election ($\gamma = -.08$). These relationships seem at first glance to cast doubt on our earlier demonstration (with the 1968 sample) that relative interest in state politics was linked to absolute interest. However, the declining magnitude of these correlations as one moves

from a general interest in politics on through to activities reflecting participation in congressional races contains a hint that the closer the activity is to state and local matters the more likely will this pattern be erased or even possibly reversed.

Such proves to be the case. There is absolutely no difference in turnout for the gubernatorial election in those states where that office was at stake. Furthermore, those most interested in state politics more often reported voting in the 1966 primaries ($\gamma = .15$). Finally, an indirect indicator of a linkage between state-level salience and forms of participation is that the more attention paid to state matters the greater is the likelihood of voting a straight party ticket in the 1966 state and local elections ($\gamma = .17$).¹⁶ The general drift of these admittedly modest correlations over a range of behavioral phenomena suggests that a higher focus on state affairs may depress participation within nationally oriented politics but enhance it at state and local levels. Thus the concept of attentive publics is given a behavioral as well as attitudinal dimension.

These overall relationships disguise some fascinating interplay between state level salience and other factors associated with political participation. It is well-known, for example, that education is positively related to both spectator and participatory levels of politicization. Since—as shall presently be demonstrated—education is inversely related to the attention paid state politics, it might be assumed that the generally negative relationships between state level salience and political participation are a function of education. If this were so, it would not account for the absence of a relationship with turnout in the gubernatorial election and the presence of a positive association with turnout in the primary balloting. Nevertheless, it is true that at least some portion of the meager relationships are a function of the confounding influence of educational attainment. What is much more intriguing, though, is that education and the attention directed toward state affairs interact with each other to produce strikingly divergent patterns of political behavior.


This process is best illustrated with three measures: interest in the 1966 congressional campaign, voting in the 1966 general election, and voting in the 1966 primary. It will be recalled that the bivariate correlations between interest in state politics and affirmative responses to these three items were either slightly negative (for the first two) or positive (for the latter). By noting the correlations at each of four educa-

¹⁴ Controls included region, urbanization, education, subjective social class, interest in public affairs, voting regularity, and party identification.

¹⁵ The results obtained when controlling for voting participation are not artifactual of differential turnout rates by region or urbanization.

¹⁶ This holds true among Democrats and Independents, but not for Republicans.

FIG. 1. Relationship Between Salience of State Politics and State-Level Participation, by Education.



tional levels it is possible to see the profound interaction effects between education and state interest. There is considerable deviation around the aggregate bivariate correlations. This is shown in Figure 1, which contains plottings by educational level for each of the three measures. Among the less educated, following state politics is marked by less interest and voting. As education rises these negative relationships either decline or move to the positive side. Finally, among the well-educated being attuned to state politics exerts a very positive effect. A similar pattern holds among the subsample located in states with a gubernatorial contest in 1966.

These changing relationships are not easily accounted for. One line of explanation is that the salience of state politics for the poorly educated and the well educated attentive publics rests upon different bases of psycho-political orientations. For the poorly educated, who have much less factual knowledge about state politics, the attachment is primarily affective, a buffer against a fearsome intruder. For the better educated, high interest in state politics takes a more instrumental form, whereby participation becomes more meaningful. If, indeed, the better educated transform their attention levels into more participation via an instrumental orientation, then it should follow that the participation levels in state (and local) elections would be higher for those paying more attention to state

politics. As we observed, this is precisely the case.

It is more difficult to say why the attention level is inversely related to participation among the poorly educated. Perhaps their more affective orientation, when combined with a higher interest in state politics, results in a perspective that voting accomplishes relatively little. High affective symbolic orientations may reduce the need for participation. Inner gratification flows from withdrawal and non-participation.

IV. INDIVIDUAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC BASES OF STATE-LEVEL SALIENCE

The place of state politics in an individual's attention frame will be a function of formative experiences—summed up in the term political socialization—as well as more contemporary factors denoting the type of life space occupied by the individual. Here we concentrate on the various "static" characteristics rather than on those reflecting dynamic elements.¹⁷

Where a person was reared says something, in gross terms, about his family of orientation, the life style around him, and the nature of the surrounding political culture. It is apparent that the more urban a person's upbringing the less likely he is to pay attention to state politics (panel 1, Table 3). A similar pattern may be discerned in terms of contemporary residence. For convenience, we have categorized locations in terms of the twelve largest standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA), other SMSA's, and non-SMSA areas. The more urban or metropolitan the area the less compelling are state affairs (panel 2, Table 3).

A third locational factor is that of region. As with the other spatial variables, region is a summary construct. That is, it often captures (imperfectly to be sure) a set of historical experiences, socialization patterns, life styles, and political culture differences which are relevant to certain political phenomena. Two recent illustrations of "regionalism" are the findings that the adoption of policy innovations and the patterns of state expenditures have distinct, independent regional components.¹⁸ It can also be argued

¹⁷ An attempt to look at the nuances of state level salience over the life cycle will be found in an extended version of this article to be published in Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (eds.), *Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior* (rev. edition, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, forthcoming).

¹⁸ Jack L. Walker, "The Adoption of Innovations by the American States," this REVIEW, 63 (September, 1969), 880-899; and Ira Sharkansky, "Econo-

TABLE 3. SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF STATE POLITICS SALIENCE

Proportion of People Paying First or Second Most Attention to State Affairs, by:					
					gamma ^a
<i>Where Reared</i>					
Farm	Small Town	Small City	Large City		
65%	50%	42%	40%		-.30
(323) ^b	(256)	(169)	(240)		
<i>Current Residence</i>					
Non-SMSA	Medium SMSA	Large SMSA			
62%	51%	38%			-.31
(359)	(357)	(292)			
<i>Current Region</i>					
South	West	Midwest	Northeast		— ^c
62%	54%	46%	43%		
(288)	(167)	(310)	(243)		
<i>Education</i>					
0-8 grades	Some high school	High school graduate	Some college or more		
64%	59%	52%	34%		-.32
(208)	(164)	(362)	(269)		
<i>Subjective Social Class</i>					
	Working	Middle			
	59%	41%			-.34
	(543)	(441)			
<i>Length of Residence in State</i>					
	20 years or more, but				
0-19 years	less than entire life		Entire life		
42%	47%		54%		.17
(120)	(236)		(620)		

^a These represent the correlation between the overall high-low salience dichotomy and the accompanying social and demographic characteristics.

^b These are the N's upon which the percentages are based.

^c Gamma computation inappropriate because region is a nominal variable.

that, even if region as a term simply disguises the "real" underlying dimension at work, this still does not alter the fact that the distribution of opinion and behavior within a region—hence the states in that region—is different, and that

mic Development, Regionalism, and State Political Systems," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (February, 1968), 41-59. See also Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Norval D. Glenn and J. L. Simmons, "Are Regional Cultural Values Diminishing?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Summer, 1967), 176-193; and M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "Political Expressivism Among High School Teachers: The Intersection of Community and Occupational Values," in Roberta S. Sigel (ed.), *Learning About Politics: Studies in Political Socialization* (New York: Random House, 1970).

these differences may either reflect or produce different political processes. In the case at hand it turns out that the salience of state politics does vary among the regions, with Southerners being most attuned to state matters, Westerners next, and Midwesterners and Northeasterns least (panel 3, Table 3).¹⁹ Similar proportions emerge by taking the individual's region of birth instead of current region.

A slight diversion is necessary here to comment on the possible historical and contemporary reasons for these regional divergencies. In one cluster are the Southern states, bound by the pains, memories, and dislocations of an historical trauma. To say that the states have a unique place in past and present Southern politics is to repeat a commonplace. At the other extreme is the cluster of Northeastern and Midwestern states, those states generally considered most cosmopolitan in outlook, the major repositories of the great economic, cultural, social, and political institutions of the nation. Between these two clusters are those states which may be characterized as Western and hybrid in nature. Settled in large part by immigrants from other states, carved in part out of the former federal territories, ushered into statehood at a time when the trend was toward stronger state government,²⁰ and physically remote from the centers of national power, these states have neither the high cosmopolitanism of the Northeastern-Midwestern tier, nor the scars and ethnocentrism of the South. It remains to be seen whether these regional patterns persist in the light of various controls which shall subsequently be applied.

To the locational factors may be added those characteristics reflecting a person's social status and life style. The higher a person's formal education and subjective social class the less interest he evinces in state politics (panels 4 and 5, Table 3). This pattern echoes the well-known propensity of the better off and better educated to be more concerned than lower status people with broader environments. In view of this it is

¹⁹ Regional groupings follow Census Bureau classifications: Northeast = New England and Middle Atlantic states; Midwest = East North Central and West North Central states; South = South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central states; and West = Mountain and Pacific states. Other regional combinations were employed, but with less rewarding outcomes.

²⁰ Daniel Elazar discusses the historical tendencies toward state centralism versus localism in *American Federalism: A View from the States* (New York: Crowell, 1966), pp. 186-193.

not surprising that those from the working class and lower educational strata are more likely to form a portion of the attentive public for state politics.

While the demographic and social strata components supply a substantial amount of differentiation, there are also temporal factors at work. One of these is simply the individual's length of residence in his state. The common-sense hypothesis that the longer a person resides in a state the higher the salience of that state's politics for him is borne out by the data (panel 6, Table 3). At this aggregate level the differences are not marked, but are clearly in the hypothesized direction.

We now know that the amount of attention devoted to state affairs differs according to several social and spatial characteristics. Of additional importance is whether the observed patterns hold under a variety of control conditions and whether there are cumulative effects at work. The answer to the first query is unequivocal. With only one exception²¹ the original bivariate associations are maintained when controls are exerted for each of several other variables. For example, the basic negative relationship between SMSA size and state level salience persists regardless of rearing site, region, education, social class, and length of state residence. With some confidence one can say that the social and locational factors cited above have an independent impact on the probable occurrence of divergent salience maps.

Although the staying power of the various characteristics constitutes an important aspect of the analysis, it is significant that there are also cumulative processes at work. Two examples will depict what is, for the most part, a common form of behavior when two of the predisposing factors are combined and then related to state politics salience. One instance of this process comes by combining educational attainment and the site where the individual was reared. It was established previously that the higher one's education and the more urban the rearing site environment the less salient is state politics. Now if these two factors operate in an additive fashion when combined it should mean, for example, that the highly educated from urban areas would be especially prone to rank state affairs low. Without doubt this is the case. Only 28 percent of the college educated per-

sons reared in a city placed state politics high. On the other hand, 74 percent of the elementary educated respondents who were reared on farms gave high prominence to state affairs. Percentages between these two poles tended to reflect very faithfully the operation of additivity principles.

A second example of the cumulative processes at work merges education and region. In addition to knowing that education is negatively related to following state affairs and that pronounced regional variations exist, we also know that educational differences persist within each of the four regions (α : South = $-.32$; West = $-.34$; Midwest = $-.34$; Northeast = $-.23$). Under such conditions it should come as no surprise to find that by categorizing people in terms of both education and region the range of high interest in state affairs is elongated. Furthermore, the elongation conforms remarkably well to the predicted values, assuming additivity.

Figure 2 contains two lines, one showing the predicted order of values under an additivity model, and the other showing the actual values attached to those predicted for each region-education combination. While the lines do not follow the same precise path, the actual proportions adhere rather nicely to the predicted ones.²² That is, given four overall regional means, the effects of education are roughly similar across each region. Conversely, given different educational strata means, the effects of region are approximately the same across each educational strata.

Because we are dealing with a national sample, none of the foregoing results would apply with certainty to particular states. Yet to the extent that the nationally-based findings provide state-specific clues it is clear that salience maps possess quite different configurations according to some well-defined individual and demographic properties. Short of dramatic events, the states thus seem destined to be populated by unequal proportions of state-attentive publics.²³ How


²¹ The deviant case is that of length of residence controlled by region. Interest in state affairs does not increase with length of residence in the West ($-.05$), a finding no doubt occasioned by the continued Westward migration of the populace. Correlations for the other three regions are South = $.39$; Northeast = $.26$; Midwest = $.16$.

²² The monotonic ordering and predicted values for given combinations were constructed by taking the marginal values from the appropriate column and row intersected by the cell (combination), and adding these row and column effects to the grand mean. The intercorrelation problem was handled by utilizing Multiple Classification Analysis, a program which helps remove the intercorrelation effects. Nearly identical results were obtained by using James Coleman's partitioning formulas. See his *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), Ch. 6.

²³ The sheer rates of interstate mobility impose a strong restraint on change. Contrary to popular impressions Americans do not change state of

FIG. 2

Predicted and Actual Values of High State Level
Salience for Region-Education Combinations



^aGrades 0-8, 9-11 have been combined because of small N's.

much and in what ways these inequalities affect the state's political life cannot be answered here, nor are they easily solved questions. Their solution, however, should enrich our comprehension not only of intra-state politics but also that of the linkages among the various levels of politics in the federal union.

V. SYSTEMIC BASES OF STATE-LEVEL SALIENCE

Each state comprises a set of distinctive social and political phenomena. Assuming individual-system interaction, the question is whether the individual's salience map will vary with the particular kind of political system in which he finds himself. To some extent, of course, the summary

residence with great frequency. For the present sample 63% had lived their entire lives in one state and another 24% had spent at least 20 years there.

variable "region" freights a political element; but here we wish to treat specific political indicators. In particular we will introduce a number of systemic properties which should be positively linked to state-level salience according to the good government, healthy competition, active citizenry view of politics.

One of the more significant and obvious aspects of a state's political life is the level of mal-apportionment in the state legislature. It might be thought that the better the apportionment, the more interested would people be in state politics: such is the "good government" view of the political world. That it is a false view is demonstrated by the negative relationship (−.27) between following state affairs and the fairness of apportionment—using the 1960 David-Eisenberg Index.²⁴ This association shows

²⁴From Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote*,

a remarkable persistence under a variety of control conditions. Region is an especially critical control to impose here since the South, which is relatively malapportioned, is also the area containing the largest number of state-oriented respondents. Nevertheless, with Southerners removed from the sample, the negative association persists ($-.21$); and in no region does a positive trend emerge.

Much the same conclusion can be reached about the degree of inter-party competition. Let contests for the governorship and Hofferbert's omnibus inter-party competition index serve as indicators of state-level competition.²⁵ While it might be expected that the more spirited the competition between the parties the more salient would be the politics of the state, the opposite is true. Regardless of which measure is used the relationships are negative, even though not strong ($-.24$ and $-.22$ for the governorship and Hofferbert's index, respectively). Again the pattern tends to persist under a variety of control conditions, including region.

Another common variable used to characterize the state's political culture is that of election turnout. In general it is argued that the higher the turnout the more vigorous the level of politics. Turnout for gubernatorial and U.S. senatorial contests will be used as a safe guide to the state-specific forces activating differential turn-

out. The common-sense hypothesis is that the higher the voting participation the higher the salience of state politics for the state's inhabitants. Such is not the case, however. There is, in fact, a small tendency ($-.12$) for salience levels to decline as turnout rises. Whatever forces are acting to develop a high following for state matters, they are not very well described by the differential participation of the electorate.

It has become apparent that for many people the affairs of government are wrapped up in what a few of the very visible political officeholders do. Accordingly, it might be advanced that the stronger the office the more salient would be the institutions, activities, and processes surrounding that office. While it is obviously true that a personable, aggressive governor can capture a substantial amount of attention regardless of the statutory limitations on his power, it seems reasonable to suppose that the same sort of governor with an arsenal of legal powers could do even more to make himself and the state government topics of conversation. As it turns out people living in states with powerful governors²⁶ are no more likely to follow state affairs than are people living in a state with weak chief executives. What correspondence exists is actually on the negative rather than the positive side ($-.12$).

As noted earlier, many of the recent investigations about state politics have treated the determinants of public policy outputs. Because the great share of operational measures so far developed for assessing state policy outcomes are based on expenditure items, we are restricted in examining the connection between salience and state performance. The "good government" advocate would argue that the more active the state government, the more salient it would be for its residents. There is but meager support for that proposition. Trivial, positive relationships (ranging from $.02$ to $.14$) exist between high salience and the number of state government employees per one thousand population, state expenditures per \$1,000 income, and state expenditures per capita. Slight negative associations are found between salience and state aid to cities and recent (1950-1960) changes in general state expenditures. These are all single indicators. Employing a ranking of the states based on Crittenden's "Scope of Government" factor²⁷—which has very high loadings on tax level per capita, tax level per income unit,

Vol. I (Charlottesville, Virginia: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1961). Although widespread reapportionment has occurred since the *Baker v. Carr* decision of 1962, most occurred after 1964. Indeed the latest reapportionment of both legislative houses occurred as late as 1965-66 for thirty states and 1967-69 for eight states. Given the time lag between legal changes of this sort and their imprint on the mass public, it seems advisable to use the 1960 malapportionment figures for our 1966 sample. To utilize this measure and the ones to follow the respondents have been allocated into roughly equal quartiles or quintiles according to the scores of the state in which they resided. It can be shown that the distribution of the sample across groups of states with varying score ranges approaches the distribution for the universe.

²⁵ The gubernatorial measure is based on contests from 1946-62, and is taken from Dennis Riley and Jack Walker, "Problems of Measurement and Inference in the Study of the American States," (unpublished paper, University of Michigan, 1968). Hofferbert's index is reported in Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (August, 1964), esp. pp. 562-563. More recent single elections were also used in our analysis; these produced results similar to those for the above two measures.

²⁶ The rankings come from Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, Chap. 6.

²⁷ John Crittenden, "Dimensions of Modernization in the American States," this REVIEW, 61 (December, 1967), 989-1001.

spending level per capita, and governmental employment—again produces an extremely modest positive correlation (.08). Regional controls reveal the association to be slightly higher in the Midwest and West.

Walker, among others, has argued that it is essential that non-expenditure policies be included in any attempt to explicate the articulation between state performance and socio-economic and political characteristics. In response to his own admonition he developed a set of policy innovation scores for the several states, stretching from the late nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century.²⁸ The "good government" position is that the innovative states would command more interest from their residents than would the laggardly ones. This is hardly the case, however, for the association is but slightly above zero. Unfortunately, few other reliable indicators of state performance are at hand. If we are to judge by the innovative pattern, non-expenditure performance measures are no more likely to affect salience maps of state residents than are those based on expenditures.

Most of the associations involving the foregoing political characteristics exhibit an exaggerated mode among non-voters. For better or worse, the less participative citizens react to the political culture in a more severe fashion than the more participative. That is, if a system manifestation such as malapportionment accompanies greater interest in state affairs, it is especially prone to do so among the less participative. One can picture them as less autonomous and self-assured than their more participative fellows. Environmental forces thus come to have more impact on them. There would seem to be a certain perversity about this, but apparently the less active citizens are, in effect, bolstered by these aberrations from what the reformers and democratic theorists see as progressive democracy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The concept of salience maps has been used to explore the relationship of the citizenry to their state governments as a particular set of institutions in the American political system. People do organize their cognitive views of the political world such that some system levels assume more prominence than others. There are indications that cognitive and affective dimensions of state salience are inter-locked. Attitudinal and behavioral corollaries of differentiated salience maps

depend in part upon one's social and political status. One of the most emphatic though somewhat puzzling findings is the degree to which these corollaries are exaggerated among less participative citizens. Correspondingly, the salience of state politics among these less active people varies more according to environmental forces than is true for the more active.

Broadly speaking, the forces which contribute to following state politics can be grouped into two categories. On the one hand, there are those factors which are essentially "given" or uncontrollable. On the other hand, there are other factors which are more subject to elite manipulation and political change. Place of residence, education, social class, and the like are—to a greater or lesser extent—set for the individual. To a similar extent, the states have limited control over these aspects of a person's life.

Asserting that these factors are given is not to adopt a crudely deterministic stance. Rather, it is to hold them in contrast to another set of variables that are substantially more malleable. State outputs, such as program expenditures or policy innovations, are more amenable to the short-run persuasive efforts of elites and the occasional demands of masses. These are the areas of a state's political life that attract a good deal of attention from political scientists and specialized publics, but have precious little positive impact upon the salience maps of individuals. The contours of such maps are determined largely by the individual's life experiences and the characteristics of his immediate life space.

We have suggested (though not demonstrated) that a state's policies are partially determined by the attitudes and behaviors of its attentive public. However, the obverse of this proposition is not necessarily correct: the attitudes and behaviors of the attentive state public reflect dimly, at best, the quality of a state's public policy. Arguments that a vigorous, strong, and innovative state government produces an interested public are open to question. So, too, are the emphases placed on such touchstones of liberal democracy as inter-party competition, equal representation, and enthusiastic electoral participation.

Whatever the correlates of state-level salience, it is apparent that the states still loom large in the perspectives of the American public. Any attempted juggling of political units involving the states would probably confront a reservoir of mass attachments to the states as political entities. Coupled with the historic traditions, legal preserves, and political utility of the states, this salience helps assure the continued prominence of the several states within the federal system.

²⁸ Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 883, Table 1.

THE "MOOD THEORY": A STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY*

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This paper is concerned with assessing the stability of the American public's attention to foreign affairs, and the relationship of this to public support of international programs and commitments. In particular, the paper presents an empirical investigation of the evidence for the "mood theory" proposed by Gabriel Almond as one element of his classic study, *The American People and Foreign Policy*.

The mood theory contends, first of all, that attention to or interest in foreign policy is generally low and subject to major fluctuations in times of crisis.

The characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference. A foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood.¹

* This research is a segment of a larger project on public reaction to international events (see also, William R. Caspary, "United States Public Opinion During the Onset of the Cold War," *Peace Research Society (International), Papers*, IX (1968), 25-46; and "Dimensions of Attitudes on International Conflict," *Peace Research Society (International), Papers* XIII (1970, forthcoming). This research has been partially supported by grants from Northwestern University and Washington University. Survey data of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), and the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), was obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center. Supplementary survey data was provided by the library of NORC. The author gratefully acknowledges the help he received from these sources and from individuals associated with these institutions.

It may interest the reader that, during the more than four years that have elapsed since this article was first written in substantially the present form, my own interests have shifted considerably. If one is passionately concerned as I am with the injustice of the U.S. globalist—or, if you will, imperialist—foreign policy, research of the sort presented here seems a rather sterile exercise. My current work is devoted to a study of the economic, ideological, and bureaucratic sources of American interventionism in the undeveloped world.

¹ Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 53.

On the basis of this premise about attention, Almond predicts that the *public* will not provide stable support for international commitments undertaken by the U.S. Government.

Because of the superficial character of American attitudes toward world politics . . . a temporary Russian tactical withdrawal may produce strong tendencies toward demobilization and the reassertion of the primacy of private and domestic values.²

The acceptance of this view by scholars is evidenced by its presentation in important textbooks and treatises.³ As far as I have been able to determine it has not been challenged.

The empirical investigation in this paper considers evidence on both of these variables—attention=interest, and support for foreign policy commitments.

It should be remembered that Almond warned against over-reaction to the Soviet threat as well as the tendency to demobilize. Discussion in this paper of popular support for American foreign policy should not be taken as indicating the author's support for the "globalism," the "Pax Americana" strategy that characterizes that policy today.

I. STABILITY OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR OVERSEAS INVOLVEMENT

In marked contrast to the mood theory is a result we have obtained from national public opinion poll data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). This result is the remarkable stability of strong popular support for an active U.S. role in world affairs. Trend data on the item: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?" are shown in Figure 1. The

² *Op. cit.*, p. 55. See also pp. 60, 80, 99, 106.

³ See for example, James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 35-37; Martin C. Needler, *Understanding Foreign Policy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), p. 23; Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Snyder, *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy* (New York: Rinehart, 1955), p. 198; Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 55.




FIG. 1. Percent supporting an active part in world affairs for the U.S., over time.

average percentage favoring an active part is 71%. The standard deviation of the points from the average is only 1.8%, less than the expected sampling error. This remarkable stability occurred over a time of violent change in world affairs from war to peace and demobilization, through the onset of the cold war and the shock of the Korean struggle. The popular commitment to an active U.S. role, however, did not appear to waver.

Some of these data were available when Almond wrote. His evaluation of this item on an active part in world affairs, however, stressed that it is an "emotionally loaded question" which evokes responses which misrepresents the amount of concern Americans have for foreign affairs. Nevertheless, I find that the respondent's answers to this question is an excellent predictor to his response on a wide range of policy questions involving international commitments. The tests of this relationship are shown in Table 1. Across 47 different tests, the average value of gamma is .50.

In the light of the strong association between the stable internationalism indicator and specific policies, it is not surprising to find that support for individual policies is also fairly stable (see Figure 2). Support for military aid to Europe was followed in NORC polls over an eight

year period. The support which fluctuated around 50% of the sample during the late forties gave way to slightly higher, but equally stable support after the Korean war. Though data were collected for shorter periods, the results for Marshall plan aid, military aid to Europe, support for NATO, and willingness to intervene militarily against a Communist attack also show impressive stability.

To a certain extent, Almond's interpretation allows for these findings. He formulates the concept of "permissive mood" to characterize the passive acceptance by the public of internationalist policies formulated and urged by its official leaders.⁴ He sees this permissive mood as a particular characteristic of the Cold War situation in which the threat of the Soviet Union at least temporarily forces Americans to accept international commitments. Almond repeatedly warns, however, that this is a mood response and not an intellectually structured one. The mood may change if the international environment does. "The undertow of withdrawal is still powerful."⁵

The question is whether Almond would have anticipated the amount of stability that our data indicate. Suppose we give a more precise

⁴ Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

TABLE 1. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR AN ACTIVE U.S. ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AND SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL POLICY COMMITMENTS

Survey Number	Policy	Gamma
124		
	Korea worth fighting	.58
	Talks fail: pull out, hold line, attack	-.48
	Defend other countries if Communists attack	-.61
127		
	Too many sacrifices for defense	-.39
137		
	Aid, as cut, is too much, right, not enough	-.35
	Do more to help Indochina	.48
105		
	U.S. was right to send troops to Korea	.64
	If Communists attack other countries, help defend	.74
	Continue Marshall aid	.50
	Approve NATO agreement	.66
	Send military supplies to Europe now	.50
	Send troops to Europe now	.39
	Too many sacrifices for defense	-.39
	Send military supplies to Asian countries threatened by Communists	.28
	U.S. has gone too far with the problems of the world	-.76
94		
	Send military supplies to Europe now	.50
	Continue Marshall Aid	.53
	Marshall Aid is too much	-.38
	As cut by Truman, Marshall Aid is too much	-.44
	Stop Communists from spreading in Asia	.53
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with Arab countries	.35
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with France	.47
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with Greece	.47
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with Israel	.33
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with India	.42
	Important for U.S. to obtain Middle East oil	.42
	Important for U.S. to stop spread of Communism in the world	.48

TABLE 1. (continued)

Survey Number	Policy	Gamma
091		
	Continue Marshall aid	.58
	Marshall aid too much	.51
	Aid really helps U.S.	.64
	Aid has been stopping Communism	.42
	Countries would go Communist without aid	.26
	Aid is getting Europe on its feet	.22
	They could get along without aid	-.58
	Use U.S. troops to stop Communist attack in Europe	.57
	Use U.S. troops to stop Communist attack in South America	.37
	Use U.S. troops to stop Communist attack in India	.49
	Send military supplies to Europe	.34
	Stop Communism in Asia	.58
	Real concern for England's finances	.62
078		
	Satisfied with Marshall Plan	.46
	Continue Marshall Plan next year	.73
	Spending too much on Marshall Plan	-.54
	Send military supplies to Europe now	.44
	Keep occupation troops in Germany	.74
	Keep occupation troops in Japan	.68
	Keep occupation troops in Korea	.65

formulation of Almond's analysis as follows: the percentage of people supporting international commitments will vary directly with the percentage perceiving a given level of threat from the Soviet Union. To test this, we will use as an indicator of perceived threat, the expectation of war. This indicator has several things to recommend it. It correlates strongly with various other items on expectations of Russian behavior, and trend data is available which is sensitive to changes in Soviet behavior and pronouncements.

Comparison between the trends in expectation of war and in support for an active U.S. role is shown in Figure 3. As we have already seen, support for an active role scarcely fluctuates. Expectation of war, on the other hand, shows fluctuations up to 50%. Clearly a direct ratio between the two variables does not hold.

A weaker formulation that is also consistent with Almond's analysis is that support for an active role should remain steady at some high level as long as perceived threat is above some threshold value. In this formulation, support for an active part would decline sharply if perceived threat fell below the threshold. From 1947 through 1953, the period covered by our data,




FIG. 2. Percent supporting internationalist policies, over time.




FIG. 3. Internationalism and perceived threat, over time.

more than 47% of the population expected war within ten years. But in November 1946, when NORC first asked about expectation of war, only 28% thought it likely within ten years. If the question had been asked in the immediate post-war lull, the figure would probably have been even lower. Nonetheless, support for an active part remained steady around 70% at these times.

In any event, the threshold formulation has weaknesses on theoretical grounds. The aggregate results with which we are dealing come from summing over individuals who are likely to exhibit different thresholds and to perceive different amounts of threat at a given time. A slight easing in Soviet pressures would probably mean that all individuals would perceive slightly less threat. If Almond is correct that the commitment is only a response to threat, some individuals would cross their personal thresholds and no longer feel compelled to support an active U.S. role.

II. MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS AN INDICATOR OF "ATTENTION" OR "INTEREST"

Almond's pessimistic expectation of unstable commitments is based on his belief that the characteristic response of Americans to foreign policy issues is indifference. His data lead him to see "(1) the extreme dependence of public interest in foreign affairs on dramatic and overtly threatening events; (2) the extraordinary pull of domestic and private affairs even in periods of international crisis."⁶ This conclusion is based upon trend data on one questionnaire item.

One of the most interesting accumulations of evidence on this general question of the focus of public attention is a series of Gallup polls which has been conducted since 1935. On more than twenty occasions during the fifteen year period the American Institute of Public Opinion has asked a sample of the public: "What do you regard as the most important problem before the American people today? . . . The form of this question has the advantage of registering spontaneous responses. In the multiple choice or 'yes-no' type of question one can never be sure that the respondent draws a clear distinction between what really is on his mind and what he thinks ought to be on his mind. The undirected response is a more reliable indication of the real degree and extent of spontaneous interest in foreign policy problems."

This question was coded for whether the respondent mentioned an international problem or a domestic one. The percentage of the sample

mentioning international problems over the years, as reported by Almond, is shown in figure 4.⁸ If this item is indeed an indicator of attention to or interest in foreign affairs, then it is plain that there have been dramatic fluctuations in interest and/or attention. It is also clear, as Almond elaborates in his book, that the peaks of the trend line come at times of international crisis such as the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Italian elections of 1948. Similarly the troughs of the curve show preoccupation with domestic concerns such as economic reconversion in the wake of World War II.

But is the mention of an international problem really an indicator of interest or attention? It would seem on the face of it that this is so, but surprisingly enough this response shows rather weak association with the respondent's judgment of how interested he is in China ($\gamma = .157$), the United Nations ($\gamma = .141$), and England's financial crisis ($\gamma = .146$). It may be that, as Almond says, the open-ended question is a more trustworthy indicator since it does not structure the replies or favor a particular alternative. On the other hand, one would expect a somewhat stronger association between the two.

To test this further, let us look at another indicator of attention—whether the respondent says he has heard or read of a particular foreign policy issue or international event. This item was frequently used and we have a total of 12 tests of association between it and mention of an international problem. These are shown in Table 2. Although the association is quite weak (γ less than .13) for five of these, the rest show stronger association. In all but one of these cases it turns out that the attention items cut the population into a large group aware of some important event and a small group that is unaware. It appears that only the people at the bottom of the attention scale differ significantly from the rest in their tendency to mention international problems. I shall discuss the significance of this finding in Section III.

The question about hearing or reading of an event, like the one about interest, may tempt the respondent to give a false report in order to gain the interviewer's approval. The respondent cannot, however, falsify replies to requests for factual information. Five such questions have appeared on surveys along with the item on the most important problem facing the country. The results of tests of association between these two variables are shown in Table 3. Three of the tests show very weak association (γ less than .09). Of the other two, one uses an indic-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 73.




FIG. 4. Percent mentioning international problems as most important, over time.

ator that discriminates a small group at the bottom of the attention scale. Finally, some additional miscellaneous indicators of attention were used. The results are shown in Table 3. All the associations were weak (gamma less than .14).

The result of these tests (with two minor exceptions) appears to be that for all but the very least attentive respondents an increase in mention of international problems is not likely to be associated with an increase in attentiveness. Though there might have been reason to doubt this negative result on the basis of any one of these indicators, the consistent findings across all of them strengthen that interpretation.

As a further check on the validity of the various attention indicators we constructed a matrix of intercorrelations among them as shown in Table 4. Some of the cells of the matrix are fuller than others because on many surveys not all of the various kinds of indices occurred together. We see in this matrix that all but three of the tests of association show gamma greater than .30 and that most of them are quite strong (gamma greater than .50). This suggests that there is a single dimension of attention which is tapped more or less by all of these items. Structured and unstructured questions, reports of interest and factual knowledge, and actual behav-

ior such as membership in organizations where foreign affairs are discussed all seem to be loaded on this dimension. Does trend data exist on these other attention indicators that compares in frequency with the most-important-problem data. The best that is available is four occurrences of the item, "How much interest do you take in the United Nations Organization?" A comparison between this item and the mention of international problems as most important is shown in Figure 5. It is fortunate that the National Opinion Research Center Poll which showed no change in interest in the U.N. at the end of 1958 was taken within a few days of the Gallup poll which registered a striking decline of mention of international problems. This indicates stability of attention to international affairs at a time when domestic events appear to have been exerting a great pull on people's attention. Thus we have not only cast doubt on the evidence from which Almond inferred instability, we have found evidence to the contrary.

III. RATE OF MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS BY THE MOST ATTENTIVE RESPONDENTS

We have seen that the mention of international problems does not seem to be associated

TABLE 2. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, AND AWARENESS OF ISSUES

Survey Number and Date	Heard or Read About	Gamma	% who did not hear or read
078, June 29, 1948	Reorganization of Berlin, (and have opinion)	.22	60
084, January 26, 1949	Tito-Stalin split	.08	53
	Indonesia dispute	.11	48
	Truman's Inaugural Speech	.04	40
510, January 9, 1953	H-bomb	.12	20
	Universal Military Training	.00	40
596, March 4, 1958	Foreign Aid Bill	.07	43
628, May 24, 1960	U-2 Incident	.26	6
631, July 14, 1960	U.S.—Cuba Relations	.26	17
648, July 25, 1961	Berlin Dispute	.27	13
663, September 18, 1962	Our Troubles with Cuba	.65	6
664, October 17, 1962	The Peace Corps	.24	28
	Berlin Dispute	.39	11

with this attention dimension, except to the extent that those very low on attention mention international problems somewhat less. Almond, on the contrary, singles out the *most* attentive group as the one that should be different! He expects that stable attention will be characteristic of only those individuals whose attitudes show "intellectual structure" and factual content.⁹ To meet this criterion, an individual must "have explicit evaluations of the relative costs and efficiency of alternative means of maximizing the value position of [his] country."¹⁰

Have we actually shown that this top attention group is not more likely to mention international problems? That would be demonstrated only if the attention tests we have used are finely enough calibrated to discriminate between this group and the others. Almond does not give a clear operational procedure for isolating this "attentive public," but Rosenau estimates on the basis of circulation figures for quality media that the attentive public is "no larger than ten percent of the population and possibly much smaller."¹¹ Roper gives a similar estimate.¹²

A few of the attention indicators we have used

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

¹² Quoted by Rosenau, *ibid.*

TABLE 3. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, AND FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND OTHER INDICATORS OF ATTENTIVENESS

Survey Number and Date	Indicator or Attentiveness	Gamma	% don't know or wrong answer
066, April 1947	Know that the U.S. has joined an organization for world peace	.26	36
084, January 26, 1949	Know who is Secretary of State	.03	40
078, June 29, 1948	Know if fighting still going on in Palestine	.08	51
	Know if some Jewish groups are opposed to the Jewish government in Palestine	.09	66
648, July 25, 1961	Know what a geiger counter is	.25	29
066, April 1947	Belong to organization in which foreign affairs are discussed	.09	
078, June 29, 1948	Report some impression of the Greek government (favorable or unfavorable)	-.05	
	Report some impression of the Chinese government (favorable or unfavorable)	-.11	
084, January 26, 1949	Believe that a citizen can influence his government by writing letters, or taking miscellaneous other actions; or don't know, or believe citizens can't or shouldn't have influence	.13	

discriminate a top group on the order of ten percent of the population or less, but show weak association with mention of international problems. To check this result, scales were constructed by taking the sum of the scores on two or three separate items. In no case is the top attention group sharply distinguishable from the neighboring ones in frequency of mention of international problems.

If the attentive public indeed has a stronger and more stable tendency to mention international events this difference should show up most at times when the overall percentage of people mentioning international events is low. At times of relative international calm, or at times when domestic events preempt attention, only the attentive public would continue to have its eye focused on international problems and mention them to the interviewer. The lowest level reached in mention of international problems was 28% (AIPO Survey No. 596, March 1958).¹³ The degree of association between men-

¹³ A slightly different interpretation of these

TABLE 4. ASSOCIATION (GAMMA) AMONG INDICATORS OF ATTENTION TO
OR INTEREST IN WORLD AFFAIRS

	Heard or read	Interest	Factual knowledge	Active part	Well informed	Belong to organization
Heard or read of event, person, program, etc.	098: .64					
	084: .81					
	664: .79					
		091: .73				
		.56				
		.58				
		088: .65				
		.64				
		.57				
		054: .60				
		.40				
		.65				
	088: .70					
Interested in event, issue, person, etc.	.44	077: .75				
	.51	.58				
		.69				
	077: .34	.48				
	.37	.59				
	.12	.70				
	.21					
		082: .72				
		.67				
		.70				
		.75				
		.74				
		.83				
		083: .16				
		.51				
		.77				
		648: .69				
Factual knowledge of event, person, etc.	084: .67	054: .31				
	.70	.53				
		.31				
Want U.S. to take an active part in world affairs	094: .54	091: .48				
		.43	127: .57			
	078: .44	.37				
Consider self well informed about event, person, etc.		688: .51				
		.34				
		.35				
		.18				
		.53				

TABLE 4. (continued)

	Heard or read	Interest	Factual knowledge	Active part	Well informed	Belong to organization
			066: .36			
Belong to organization			079: .78			
in which world			.71			Number in italic
affairs are			.73			is identification
discussed			.77			number of survey
			.74			
			.81			

tion of international problems and one indicator of attention (heard or read of foreign aid bill) was still quite low ($\gamma = .07$, see Table 2). For all other surveys on which attention measures were available the percent mentioning international problems was 37% or over, and for all but three it was greater than 50%.

marginals from AIPO Survey No. 596, item 2, has appeared in an article by Deutsch and Merriitt. See appendix for details.

IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE WEAKNESS OF MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS AN INDICATOR OF ATTENTION

It would appear, then, that a strong case has been made against using the mention of international problems as most important as an indicator of attention. The reader may wonder why such a major effort was mounted in this paper on behalf of the negative result of contesting the validity of a single indicator. There are several reasons: (a) the indicator has been widely used:




FIG. 5. Interest in the U.N. and mention of international problems, over time.

TABLE 5. VARIATION IN ATTENTION WITH INTERNATIONALISM
WITHIN MENTION-INTERNATIONAL-PROBLEMS-GROUP

Measure of Attention	Mention international problems			Mention domestic problem		
	Military aid to Greece			Military aid to Greece		
	Approve	Disapprove	Total	Approve	Disapprove	Total
Acheson named	47%	34%	40%	41%	39%	40%
Aware of change	22	27	25	23	24	23
Not aware of or don't know	31	39	35	36	37	37
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Tito-Stalin dispute	59	50	54	49	38	44
Didn't hear or read	41	50	46	51	62	56
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Indonesia conflict	64	56	59	54	43	49
Didn't hear or read	36	44	41	36	57	51
	100	100	100	100	100	100
	n = 246	322	567			
	Send Military Supplies to Europe now			Send Military Supplies to Europe now		
	Approve	Disapprove	Total	Approve	Disapprove	Total
Acheson named	47	31	40	40	35	38
Aware of change	23	27	25	24	22	23
Not aware of change	30	42	35	36	43	39
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Tito-Stalin dispute	61	41	53	43	49	46
Didn't hear or read	39	59	47	57	51	54
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Indonesia conflict	62	51	57	50	52	51
Didn't hear or read	38	49	43	50	48	49
	100	100	100	100	100	100

in addition to Almond's work and the many citations of it, Smith, and Deutsch and Merritt have made important empirical studies which rely upon this indicator;¹⁴ (b) a major proposi-

¹⁴ Paul A. Smith, "Opinions, Publics, and World Affairs in the United States," *Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (1961), 698-714; Karl W. Deutsch

tion about the instability of American foreign policy attitudes based on this indicator may now

and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).

be called into question; (c) we may be at a stage in the development of this area of inquiry at which it is appropriate to turn from sweeping and imaginative theory construction to the more mundane task of rigorous testing of individual indicators and propositions; (d) we have striven by using a variety of indicators and techniques to make the most of a data pool not designed to produce answers to this particular question. What would be desired, of course, would be an elite sample as well as a general population sample, and a battery of interest and attention measures. Given such data we conceivably could still find that the "most-important-problem" indicator proved to discriminate between the general public and a much smaller elite group on the order of less than 1% of the population. Even for such an elite, however, there are reasons to suspect that this measure will not be a valid measure of attentiveness.

(a) This indicator is a measure of primacy of attention, not of strength of attention. An individual who is inattentive to both international and domestic problems might be slightly less inattentive to international ones and mention one of these as most important. Conversely an individual strongly interested in politics may be slightly more interested in domestic than international issues and mention a domestic one to the interviewer.

(b) The use of the word "today" (or "now" in some variants) may do a great deal of structure the responses by focusing upon immediate problems and crises rather than broad, long term issues. The crisis dominated aspect of public responses which Almond found¹⁵ may be purely an artifact of this wording. Though this interpretation cannot be tested with available data, it is not hard to see how it would be tested in the future. One could simply substitute the phrase, "over the next ten years" for "today."

(c) Mention of international problems as most important is also uncorrelated with indicators of isolationism. Thus there must be substantial numbers of people whose responses were

coded as international who are of isolationist persuasion. When they mention international problems it may be with the thought of how best to withdraw from them. If the isolationists tend to be less attentive than the rest of the population, then their presence would lower the attention score for the group that mentions international problems. Evidence that this does happen is shown in Table 5. The variation within the four major cells of the table is greater than the variation between them.

V. CONCLUSION

The Mood Theory was summarized at the start of this paper as having a premise—generally low and unstable attention to foreign affairs—and a conclusion—unstable support for foreign policy commitments. Empirical evidence has been presented in these pages to show that both the premise and the conclusion are false.

On the basis of these findings I suggest the following alternative interpretation: that American Public Opinion is characterized by a *strong* and *stable* "permissive mood" toward international involvements. Although I have not included any data analysis on current opinion it is tempting to speculate that the support by the long-suffering American public of 10 years of fighting—and 4 years of heavy combat—in Vietnam is an indication of the existence of a permissive mood. It also indicates that such a mood provides a blank check for foreign policy adventures, not just a responsible support for international organization, genuine foreign assistance, and basic defense measures. Almond by no means ignored this line of thought—indeed the notion of permissive mood is his own and he stressed its dangers. There is no indication, however, that he anticipated the strength or stability of commitment to American foreign policy that our data suggests. He appears to have been heavily influenced (as have a number of other commentators) by evidence which we have demonstrated on closer examination to be of dubious validity. Finally it should be noted that we have dealt here with only one element of the rich array of theory and findings in Almond's classic work.

¹⁵ Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 72 (see quote, above, p. 5, footnote 6).

APPENDIX

INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSES ON "MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM,"
AIPO SURVEY NO. 596, MARCH 1958

AIPO Code ^a	% responding ^b	Gallup Press ^c Release	Deutsch and ^d Merritt	This Paper
"11 Peace; prevention of war; keeping out of war; fear of war, etc.	8%	"keeping the peace 17%	"foreign policy interest 17%	international problems 28%
12 Foreign affairs; international problems, general	4%			
13 Relations with Russia (general)	2%			
14 Threat of Russia, threat of Communism; communism	3%			
15 World Economic problems	0%			
16 Foreign aid, general	1%			
17 Problems of Space (general)	0%	"national defense 3%		
18 Arms race—atomic bombs, missiles	3%			
19 Rockets, missiles—space problems	4%			
21 Problems of the Atomic age (general)	1%			
29 Miscellaneous International Problems				
31 National Security; preparedness, national defense; defense program"	3%			
Total	29%			
"32 Clean Government; honest leaders, etc.	63%			domestic problems 63%
33 Balancing the budget				
34 Taxes (etc., 35-52; other domestic problems)"				

^a obtained from Roper Public Opinion Research Center

^b tabulated from survey cards

^c "unemployment" Named No. 1 Worry for First Time Since '37," *Public Opinion News Service*, for release March 23, 1958, American Institute of Public Opinion

^d Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert G. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior*, New York Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p. 161 (note: an error in the text of the Deutsch and Merritt article states that the survey took place in May but their information clearly identifies it as number 596 which was done in March 1958.)

THE RURAL AFRICAN PARTY: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TANZANIA*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Because the codes, rules and ideology of mass, single-party systems reach the village areas more slowly than do the tangible personalizations of party authority, a situation of potential misuse of power exists where rural party organizations operate. Peasants are aware of face-to-face confrontations by a familiar figure who has gained a party position; they are unaware of the precepts and regulations that the national party has laid down for the village level functionaries. Consequently, political victimization is most pronounced at the very grass-root level that national leaders are attempting to integrate politically. Moreover, by its nature the rural party is a multi-faceted organization that is acceptable to the peasants because its leaders provide services that in more structured societies are carried out by specific agencies and contracts. Functions such as family arbitration, police investigation and criminal adjudication are mixed with the more classical party activities of representation and the dispensing of patronage.

Taken together, the above two characteristics of a rural party—potential abuse, and the multi-faceted nature—significantly influence the extent and form of political participation in the areas they serve. This article attempts to analyze these characteristics in Tanzania, and thereafter to assess rural party participation, and more broadly to suggest the theoretical dimensions of political participation in a new nation.

Participation, it may be argued, is the problem *par excellence* for leaders of the new nations. The building of a state, both in terms of economic development and in the creation of a national consciousness, depends upon some type of

participation by the citizens. If the citizen population is dispersed throughout the state in remote homesteads and hamlets, as many African populations are, then the problem becomes one of linkage between the government and the remote populace. To gain participation, new political structures must be built at the rural level, and old institutions must be changed to fit into national goals. Rebellious attitudes by the people must be neutralized and consensus, or at least some support of the national goals, must be gained. It is necessary that rural people be brought into the government's plan, that they accept the government's general viewpoint, and that they provide the will and the manpower to change the status quo. In essence, peasant energy must be expended, muscles used, and attitudes altered if government goals are to be met.

The concept of mass participation presupposes a population shift from a disinterested mass to a participating citizenry. People must accept ideas of individual worth, loyal opposition, and electoral equality. In many new states stimulus for such participation comes from the ruling elite who see participation as a means to insure political stability. In essence, political participation, a degree of political integration, and some economic growth are the price the ruling elite must pay to gain the political stability in heterogeneous societies that will insure their own survival.

Participation, to be meaningful, must be within institutions that have channels of redress to the national level, and, simultaneously, have the capability of bringing about grass-root improvement. In one respect the process is essentially the building of new institutions at the grass-roots level. Mundane changes such as the development of agriculture, the encouragement of land reform, the creation of welfare and extension services, and the building of rural schools, roads, and clinics are necessary for orderly political growth. Participation in rural institutions such as the political party, the local administration, the local councils, the marketing cooperatives, and the local voluntary associations may be either voluntary or coercive. The essential fact is that participation, that is involvement, occurs.¹

*I am indebted to the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building (Ford), for field support in 1967-68, and to the African Studies Center, Michigan State University for research funds. Some data used in this article was collected during 1964-66 under a grant from the International Development Research Center (Carnegie), of Indiana University. Additional field work was done in 1969 while I was on leave with the American Universities Field Staff. Professors Paul R. Abramson, Henry Bienen, Walter W. Bowring, John Collins, and Carl Rosenberg, Jr. generously offered comment and advice.

¹For further discussion of the concept of participation and its importance in political science,

In summary, the argument is this: two overriding characteristics of rural parties are potential political abuse and a multi-faceted nature. These are in essence countervailing forces. Multi-faceted activities promote individual party participation. Abusive party authority tends to cause the individual to withdraw from party participation. When this occurs, political participation in the broader sense is also nullified; this is because the rural party is one of the few institutions that have communication links between the various upper levels of government and the people. Under these countervailing pressures, the individual pursues one of three courses of action: (1) participation in party activity, (2) non-participation, (3) active resistance to party activity. The continuance in one of these three patterns depends on the satisfaction the individual receives on a wide range of issues of direct interest to him. Intervening factors, such as the individual's expectations, personal links with party leaders in decision-making positions, the actual process by which a conflict situation is resolved, and the time needed to reconcile an issue, will all effect the process of issue satisfaction. They will in turn effect the individual's party participation. Constant pressures exist for the individual to participate. Pressures are exercised directly by local party officials, or indirectly by the propagandizing national leaders. How these processes work may be seen with an analysis of a particular rural party situation.

II. CASE FOR ANALYSIS: TANZANIA

The Rural Party

One of the most impressive efforts to create a party structure that would avoid the local abuse of authority phenomena while integrating the nation politically and mobilizing the people economically has been led by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU),² the legal single party, has

been particularly successful in penetrating the village areas and establishing viable rural branches in some 7,200 locales. Compared to other African states this is an important accomplishment. In most nations rural parties are election-year phenomena; they become viable organizations only to serve the campaign, nomination, and election functions. TANU's rural organizations operate throughout the year, engaging in many official and semi-official activities which are often geared to aiding the government's local development schemes. The party's rural component is doubly impressive when the obstacles are known. Tanzania is an economically poor nation, generally devoid of mineral wealth, and divided into 120 different ethnic groups.

TANU was founded July 7, 1954, as a nationalist independence movement, evolving in part from the earlier Tanganyika African Association. Although at the outset several of the founders of TANU, including Julius Nyerere, wished to keep the party a compact, elite organization for more concerted action, it gradually took on the dimensions of a mass movement. Since independence in 1961, the party has had the quality of an all-encompassing union, open to any citizen and extending to all sections of the society. At the present time TANU is the single legal party in Tanzania.

Although reorganization and experimentation is constantly going on, the party is basically organized into four tiers below the national headquarters: the regional, district, rural (or local), and cell levels. General policy is set through the National Executive Committee in the capital, interpreted by the regional offices and implemented through the district and rural branches. The district branch is generally coterminous with the 61 administrative districts in Tanzania, and will have within it anywhere from 20 to 300 rural party branches, depending on district size and population. The rural branch usually serves an area designated for local government tax pur-

see Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); and Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

² Since the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April, 1964, the United Republic of Tanzania has kept two autonomous political parties, the Afro-Shirazi Party on Zanzibar and TANU on the mainland. For the most important literature on TANU see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). See also George Bennett, "An Outline History of TANU," *Makerere Journal* (No. 7, 1963), 15-

32; and Harvey Glickman, "One Party System in Tanganyika," *The Annals*, 358 (March, 1965), 136-149. For party activity on Zanzibar see Michael F. Lofchie, "Zanzibar," in James S. Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 482-511. For literature on the administration and its relation to the party, see William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1967); and Stanley Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968).

poses as a village.³ Incorporated within each rural branch are the TANU Youth League (TYL), the women's organization (UWT), and in many areas, the TANU elders.⁴ Each of these affiliates has an administrative counterpart at the national, regional, and district levels. The party cell structure is organized below the rural party branch. Cells are made up of 10 homesteads; each family head has specific duties, such as chairman, vice chairman, or the officer in charge of education, agricultural, medical, security, roads and paths, and forests. The cells are organized for education and economic mobilization, but in many areas they carry out security and police functions.⁵

³ In Tanzania, the term village generally means a wide area of dispersed homesteads. There are few concentrated villages as those found in the West.

⁴ The TANU Youth League is usually the most important of the rural affiliates because it serves as a village police force. In most areas members have the right of arrest. They also serve as messengers, official escorts, and general party functionaries. Most TYL are between ages 18-35 and as a group may carry on commercial ventures such as operating a local bar or sponsoring sport or ceremonial activities. In some areas the youth groups have been subject to criticism from party leaders for becoming overzealous, taking the law into their own hands, holding illegal trials and occasionally forcing younger boys to drill with imitation rifles. Changes since the Arusha Declaration (1967) have included other, more politically oriented youth movements such as the Green Guards.

⁵ The administrative organization of the party is more complex than this brief statement suggests. For example, in some districts there are interim branch offices between the district and local branches. In other areas the village development committee (VDC), which ostensibly is a part of the local government apparatus, is often one and the same as the rural party branch. The officers, by government decree, are the same. In the early months of 1970 some village branches were reportedly to be consolidated into new TANU local branch offices which would be coterminous with district council wards. A new TANU constitution in 1965 reorganized the party structure in terms of the working and executive committees, and the annual conference of delegates at each level. Party leaders were empowered to summon witnesses, take evidence, and call for documents. A commission of inquiry was also established which gave citizens a means of airing their grievances against wielders of party and government authority. The commission received some 1627 complaints in 1966-67, some 439 were rejected as out of its jurisdiction,

Rural party organizations have several intrinsic characteristics. They are institutional nerve endings of the national party structure. They are the local institutions by which the people are brought into the national political system and through which the commands of the governing elite are channeled. At the rural level, the government and party functions are largely fused. TANU is the coordinating organization responsible for a wide range of nation-building activities.⁶ While keeping its identity, the party has extended its influence and personnel into most rural organizations, including the more important local administration and semi-governmental marketing cooperatives. The rural party is by nature an authoritative mechanism, operated by local influentials who are able to manage the allocation of scarce resources. In most areas the party is composed of poorly paid enthusiasts who hold other jobs as farmers, drivers, carpenters, and store keepers. Their political actions are only loosely controlled by the higher-level district offices.

Such rural party leaders are able to remain in power for at least three reasons. First, they offer the peasant, who may be in domestic or legal difficulty, the possibility of representing him at higher levels of authority. Second, the party leader is privy to information outside the village area by virtue of his contacts with the party organization. He can, therefore, provide the peasant with specific information, as well as an interpretation of new events. Third, the party leader often controls, or has influence over, the allocation of local jobs and other scarce resources. Such mundane matters as the dispens-

114 were investigated, 54 found justified, and 443 under consideration at the end of 1967. See: *Tanzania, Permanent Commissions on Inquiry: Annual Report, 1966-67* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968). Also see a review article on this unique constitutional entity by Robert Martin, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VII (April, 1969), 178-183.

⁶ With the Arusha Declaration, the party has been charged with implementing the teachings of African Socialism and self-reliance. The party was declared the supreme government institution in Tanzania during the 14th TANU Conference (June, 1969), with the government its instrument in implementing policies. (*East African Standard*, June 9, 1969). See *Tanzania, The Arusha Declaration* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967). Also see Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), and *Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

ing of medicines, free transportation, or honorific ceremonial duties, fall within the political arena dictated by a rural party leader.

A key organizational aim of the national party headquarters has been to gain mass involvement in political affairs. To this end a full ideological campaign has been in operation for amplification by the rural branches. From several points of view the results are impressive. Mass participation has occurred in voting, local government councils, marketing cooperatives, and self-held activities. There is general support for party rallies, party slogans, and local mobilization efforts, all of which are usually couched in terms of African socialism. As a coherent ideology, however, African socialism as yet has little meaning in the rural areas. The attending pronouncements on Pan-Africanism are poorly understood and the running anti-imperialism critique is reacted to more on a specific-issue basis than as a part of an on-going ideology. Within the ideology there has been an emphasis on national culture and on the historical uniqueness of Tanzania. African Socialism is referred to by national leaders as the rationale for governmental control of economic institutions. Such statements have meaning in the rural areas only in terms of job opportunities, salaries, and commodity prices. In sum, the parochial nature of the rural party precludes at the present time acceptance or understanding of a unifying national ideology. The ingredients of such parochialism can be seen graphically in the day-to-day activities of a rural party.

The Rural Party's Multi-faceted Activities

The types of activities carried out by rural party branches fall broadly into five classes. First, family and marital mediation is commonplace and includes giving assistance in divorce cases, arbitrating husband-wife disputes, fining wife deserters, and intervening when family heads cannot resolve a problem. Second, village administrative activities are carried out in the writing of reports on local projects, arranging self-help schemes, ordering building materials, and the like. Third, a welfare activity is exemplified in making public announcements, delivering public complaints, and aiding in specific problems such as sanitation or health. Fourth, a form of police activity is seen in protecting private property, warning troublemakers, investigating, and sending individuals to court. Fifth, the party serves as social critic in chastizing unpatriotic behavior, in condemning certain acts, or in encouraging compliance in such matters as school attendance and tax payment. Concrete examples of these activities are

seen in forty messages transmitted *to*, and received *from*, a typical rural party (Table 1).

The party activities reflected in the messages are varied and far-reaching. They tell us a good deal about TANU and allow for several points of analysis. First, it is obvious that TANU leaders perform nearly all authoritative acts that can be initiated within the limits of the rural political system. The party itself becomes a catch-all organization, its leaders acting as counselors, guides, father-confessors, investigators, and judges. The leaders reprimand and chastise, cajole and announce. They become personally involved in the full range of personal problems. Love quarrels, family feuds, and house-burnings are within their domain. Moral issues and money issues are common concerns. In terms of conflict resolution, party leaders provide a "safety valve" for community tensions by allowing individuals to transfer problems and complaints to them. Direct personal confrontations in many cases are thereby avoided.

Second, there are few guidelines to the leaders' legitimate areas of operation. In reality the party operates in all sectors in which the local chairman or other leaders wish to become involved. Formal authority channels are not recognized, and a leader will delve into administrative or legal matters if he feels he has a sympathetic audience. Nor is there a clear-cut pattern of when an individual will take a problem to a party official in lieu of a former traditional headman, although customary law disputes usually begin with mediation by the traditional headman.⁷ Authority is constantly being tested as party leaders try to win support and either succeed or are rebuffed. Other village leaders in more traditional positions such as former chiefs or headmen hesitate to test their long-established authority for fear that new conditions may have undermined their authority. Instead, they spend a great deal of effort in simply negating the party leaders who are attempting to take initiative.

Third, the messages give an indication of the rural people's attitude to the party. TANU is viewed much like a parental authority. Individ-

⁷ Although traditional chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen were officially removed from power in 1963, many were able to retain influence by taking party or administrative jobs. Other traditional leaders relied on their religious-magical, ritual, and customary law functions to retain local influence. A headman usually presided over what is now designated as a village. See Norman N. Miller, "Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VI (July, 1968), 183-201.

uals send greetings to the party, beg the party's forgiveness, and wish to stay on good terms with party leaders. There is little questioning of higher authority and usually there is compliance with a direct order. Such attitudes undoubtedly spring from fear of what the party leaders can do as public prosecutors, and as public informants. The authoritative nature of the tradi-

tional political system conditioned such attitudes.⁸ The backing the government now gives the

⁸Based mainly on the institution of chieftaincy, the traditional political system in its purest form would be equated with pre-European administration (Tanzania, 1890). Remnants from the traditional system persist into the present period. Both

TABLE 1. A RURAL PARTY'S COMMUNICATIONS*

<i>Content of Incoming Messages</i>	<i>Result**</i>
1. Old woman asks TANU's help in getting divorce certificate	Referred to local court
2. Bar owner reports quarrel and requests investigation	No action
3. Woman complains of husband's mistreatment	Letter sent to husband ordering him to improve his behavior
4. Farmer requests vote for local representative to district council be secret and that a box in a private room be used	Party promises to study the request
5. Old man confesses, after a hearing, that he failed to tend his sick wife, who has since recovered and left him	Party fines man 40 shillings and instructs him to pay his wife an additional 5 shillings; wife agrees to return home
6. Local government officer requests forms be completed which give composition of village development committee	Forms completed
7. Village medical officer complains of "great water shortage" at clinic and asks for help	Public water brigade formed
8. Young woman complains a man (named) has repeatedly accosted her in her hut	Party chairman warns man to improve his behavior
9. Farmer complains someone has set his hut on fire, and requests an investigation	Found to be caused by a field fire out of control
10. Teacher complains five children (named) are not attending primary school	Party chairman warns parents
11. Local government officer requests party chairman inspect an individual's house who is suspected of practicing witchcraft, and to look for specific medicines and poisons	Chairman investigates with three other party leaders; suspect banished, but order later rescinded
12. Shopkeeper asks party chairman to remind farmer of debt for kerosene and cloth	Farmer ordered to pay
13. Old woman writes to party chairman: "I am sending my bed on top of the bus and do not trust the bus driver. Please see the bed is put off at the house of Hamud Shams."	Problems given to TANU Youth League
14. Local government officer notes that all teachers are encouraged to stand for local election	Notice posted
15. Farmer writes: "This letter is just to say Salaam (Peace) . . . Salaam, that is all."	No action
16. Local government officer gives procedure for elections, and stresses need for peaceful voting	Announcement made
17. Divorced woman agrees to stop "misbehavior" in the maize fields, and begs party's forgiveness	No comment
18. Farmer informs TANU that his case against a named individual, and his dog, has been settled without trial. Farmer was bitten on ear while "resting" on beer-hall floor	10 shilling settlement

TABLE 1. (continued)

<i>Content of Incoming Messages</i>	<i>Result**</i>
19. Beer-making license requested for local farmer from local government official	Granted
20. Announcement of TANU parade to open new dispensary	Announcement posted
21. Woman is accused by TANU in theft of 89 shillings (12.70)	Referred to court
23. Gift to be given people when new dispensary is officially opened	Large clock presented by party official
24. Village beer sale hours are weekends 3-7 p.m. only	Posted
25. Legal action threatened those who failed to take part in self-help project to repair road	No action taken
26. Agenda announced for next party meeting to include local bus problems, building grass roof for school, and new clinic annex	Agenda sent to 20 party leaders
27. Man given receipt for his bicycle, confiscated when Youth League caught him riding without brakes	Claims he needs no brakes; action deferred
28. Two men charged in court for failing to work on community self-help scheme	Released by agreement with party leaders
29. Complaint sent to district headquarters that local bus runs infrequently, passes many who wish to ride, is too small, and is very dirty	No action
30. Youth League ordered to stop threatening violence	Request acknowledged
31. Chairman seeks job for villager in local government administration	No action
32. Announcement made that party leaders and Village Development Committee (VDC) members must have proof of paid-up tax	Circulated and posted
33. Public notice is made that the new TANU office is open.	Posted
34. Man who harvested and ate another man's crops is charged and sent for trial	Trial results not known
35. Divorced woman told 100 shilling bride-price must be returned to her former husband	Woman refers party leader to her father who received the money
36. Complaint to the cooperative union that crop prices are far too low	Complaint not acknowledged
37. Public collections for independence day celebrations will be one shilling per man	Announced
38. Citizens ordered to bring tools, rope, poles, and grass to build new clinic annex, or pay one shilling fine	Building completed
39. Man who used abusive language against TANU secretary is charged in local court	Paid 10 shillings fine
40. Letter to all citizens: "Warning, keep the peace during independence-day celebrations"	Circulated and posted

* Source: Random sample of correspondence files, Usagari TANU branch, Tabora District, Tanzania, for period January, 1964 to January, 1966.

** Messages written by party chairman or secretary, on behalf of the party.

rural party allows the modern leader unlimited

German and British administrators relied on chiefs for indirect rule, and although chiefs were often appointed, in lieu of hereditary claimants, their local authority was considerable in terms of law, tax collections, and ritual. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-196.

possibilities to exercise influence. The leader's role is increasingly proliferated.

Fourth, the party performs general police functions such as investigations, arrests, formal court charges, trials, fines, confinements, and property confiscations. The opportunity for party activities of this nature exists because in

most rural areas there are no police or formal trial structures immediately available. Trails are held by the party because the approximately 600 primary, or local, courts are spread so thinly over Tanzania that it is a major undertaking to use them. The party fills the void as the most authoritative organization operating in immediate contact with the people. In dealing directly with the people, party leaders are occasionally coercive. The messages substantiate this, particularly if a dichotomy is drawn between messages which reflect voluntary behavior, and those reflecting that which has been forced by party leaders. From this point of view, nineteen of the forty messages may be considered coercive or enforcing. Another six cases are mildly enforcing. On the other hand, fifteen cases deal with situations where coercion is not involved.⁹ As the messages indicate, TANU Youth League members carry out most of the police functions, and much of the coercion comes through this organization.

Fifth, rural party activities are supportive of broader government modernization goals in the sense that they generally enhance village solidarity, help to settle disputes, promote cohesion, build consensus, and aid communications. Activities which would have the *opposite* effects could be argued to negate modernization programs. Assessed in these terms witchcraft allegations, unwarranted party threats, or unfair arrests which cause withdrawal from self-help schemes would be included. Only four of the messages fall into these categories, suggesting that the party is usually a positive modernizing agent.¹⁰

Potential Abuse of Party Authority

Misuse of party authority occurs because most peasants are not aware of the limits national party leaders have placed on local leaders. In part this is because such regulations have been in effect a relatively short time. In the traditional political system, and the colonial system, the general limits on the main authority—the local chief—were known because they had evolved over time. Historically, there was little chance of flagrant abuse of powers because checks on the chief existed in the form of withdrawal from the chieftdom, or if necessary, violent dethronement by armed attack or assassination. In the modern period, the only recourse for the individual who becomes disenchanted with

the local political process is to oppose the process or to withdraw from it. The latter is in essence non-participation. In a political sense it is usually caused by alienation from local party leaders who have committed some abuse of power which has directly affected the individual.

It is important to note that when a rural party leader abuses his powers, it is an abuse of the national party regulations set down and defined by national leaders. It is in the application of party policy at the district and village level that individual misconduct occurs and rights are abused.¹¹ The criticisms leveled at rural leaders by national officials are broadly of four types.

First, local party officers are chided for their treatment of Asian traders who control a large sector of commerce. Local party leaders argue that the Asian has traditionally exploited the people, that most do not have Tanzanian citizenship and are probably not going to remain in the country. It is further argued that the Asians have made great wealth at the expense of the Africans and should be expected to contribute funds and take an active part in party projects. Tensions are also increased by the Asians' exclusiveness, and rumors of some merchants leaving the country with great wealth made at the expense of the African. Asians feel that local party leaders maltreat them: credit is demanded, bills not paid, financial contributions requested, shops closed for endless ceremonies, and shop-owners forced to work on self-help schemes. The result is to entrench Asian entrepreneurs in the towns, and to make them economically inter-reliant.

Second, the local party is criticized for financial irresponsibility. This usually takes the form of petty theft by minor officials, misuse and loss of party funds, unpaid debts, or inefficient record keeping. Higher level party leaders point to the increased spot-check and audit procedures and realistically argue that it is impossible to keep tight control on the remote rural branches. Nevertheless, villagers often mistrust local leaders and refuse to contribute financial support.

A further criticism involves attempts to force participation in party activities. Peasant refusal to pay fees, attend meetings, or take problems to the party often leads to accusations of disloyalty to the nation, and to harsh collection campaigns. The contrast between the current lack of participation in some rural areas, with the strong involvement the same area exhibited in the pre-independence, nationalistic period, causes local

⁹ Those messages classified as indicating coercive pressure were 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39; mildly coercive: 15, 17, 20, 32, 37, 40; non-coercive: all others.

¹⁰ Messages 11, 28, 30, 39.

¹¹ The Permanent Commission of Inquiry was established essentially to hear such abuses. *Tanzania, The Permanent Commission, op. cit.*

TABLE 2. INCIDENTS INVOLVING MISUSE OF PARTY AUTHORITY*

Incident	Result
1. Rural party leader intimidates local court magistrate by insisting he find an individual guilty who allegedly spoke against the party	Magistrate requests guidance from District court officials and incident is referred to higher authority
2. Man is either murdered or commits suicide (hanged). Rural party officials force family to bury body without inquest or police report	Rumor reaches police post, inquest ordered, rural leaders criticized
3. Rural branch holds "court" and fines individuals who do not cooperate with the party	Rural leaders reprimanded by district party officials
4. Rural chairman holds second job as bus driver. On several occasions he halts bus and collects license fees from passing bicyclists, but fails to turn in money to local government clerk	Police investigation requested
5. Leaders of Muslim welfare society claim party leaders used discriminatory tactics and abuse Islam followers in public meetings	Complaint sent to district party office; No action
6. Rural chairman controls rental of TANU-owned tractor. He charges exorbitant fees to some farmers, and allows his father, brother and father-in-law to use tractor without charge	Complaint to district party office causes tractor to be sent to another village
7. Agriculture extension worker threatened with beating for allegedly telling farmers not to join TANU or pay party fees	District party officer hears of threat, warns local branch, and complains to Agriculture department
8. Rural party chairman conducts membership campaign by forcing all farmers who wish to ride local buses or enter clinic to buy party membership card.	Chairman relieved of duties and incident referred to as an abuse of powers
9. Meeting at headman's house to resolve husband-wife dispute is broken up by party chairman. He dismisses husband and forces wife to return to his home where he allegedly accosts her	Chairman relieved of duties by district TANU officials and criticized for using party name as his authority; local court case brought by irate husband
10. Asian store owner complains of mistreatment by party leaders who demand contributions, impose store hours, and force road work	Complaint sent to regional party office; No action
11. Hospital staff complains of impromptu "investigation" by local party officials who threaten staff for being "inefficient, drunken, and mistreating patients"	District party officer promises to investigate problem
12. Prosperous bee-keeping cooperative accuses party of controlling their marketing procedures and of engaging in profiteering	After two-year delay regional office settles issue in favor of cooperative
13. Rural office demands and receives credit from local merchant for \$478; refuses to settle account	Merchant complains to regional party office; no action
14. Five village-level local government employees (ADEO's) forced out of jobs by the party and "TANU men" put in their places	Administration complains to regional party headquarters of unfair pressure which undermines efficiency; no corrective action taken
15. Audit of rural branch shows cash shortage, no control of membership cards, no cash box, and loss of President's picture	Rural chairman warned to discharge duties in accord with regulations

*Source: Survey of eight rural party organizations in Tabora District, Tanzania. Data based on interviews with party leaders, local government officers, district administrators, and a survey of administrative files of Tabora District Administration, 1964-66, 1968. The cases are not reflective of specific individuals or leadership positions.

leaders to intensify their campaigns. Their justification is that better participation in the past has been forthcoming. The result, however, is often only to elicit minimal tolerance of the party, lip-service to its aims, and little tangible support.

Fourth, the broadest form of criticism leveled at rural leaders involves their misconduct for personal gain, carried out in the name of the party. Financial gain, status rewards, or self-aggrandizement may be sought by using a party position in a coercive manner. Such situations are often characterized by a powerful, local individual exerting personal authority; the fact that he is a TANU leader is incidental to the fact that he has a strong personal base of authority.¹² The misuse of this authority may involve forced payment, illegal trials, threats of violence, temporary imprisonment, and outright extortion. When such incidents come to light, higher level party authorities are quick to counter them. The corrective action, however, in some cases taken by the Permanent Commissioner of Inquiry, does not nullify the incident's effect on the rural people. Withdrawal from any form of political participation is often the result.

Specific case-level examples of the misuse of rural party authority will illustrate the problems faced by national leaders in gaining local support for the party and participation in its activities. It should be emphasized that such incidents are precisely the basis upon which the national leadership criticizes rural officials.

Analysis of the incidents supports the initial departure point that party abuse occurs most often in rural areas where local branch leaders can use their party for a personal authority base, but where party rules are not yet operating. Party activities at the district level and above are usually rational and actions are usually taken for the best interest of the farmer. At the rural level, party activities are often the result of individual initiative and may be irrational. There are several reasons for such behavior by a rural leader. Rural leaders act as free agents a majority of the time, and there are no close checks on their activities by superiors. Rural leaders have little fear of loss of position because they are not paid well enough to make the positions highly prized. There are no clearcut ideas among rural people of what a party

leader's job is, or what the role involves. Such ambiguity allows the leader to reshape the job to his own ends. Viewed from the farmer's vantage point an abuse is individualistic. It is not so much TANU which is causing the difficulty, but a well-known individual who is incidentally the TANU leader; a man who, the farmer vaguely realizes, has gained some authority over him.

Policy ambiguity also exists. Much of all party business is a reaction to some event. Each level above the village has a corrective function; wrongs are set right by decree from higher party officials and usually on an *ad hoc* basis. There is little evidence that a formal policy is pursued or that a series of mistakes helps to establish a policy that is followed in the rural areas. More often rumor or gossip about an incident will set the guidelines of policy as a farmer understands them. The reported experience of a particular individual carries more weight than a formal statement, announcement, or circular.

III. FORMS OF PARTY PARTICIPATION

Findings on the behavior of individuals in rural party situations suggest that participation in the party takes one of three forms.

Active Participation: Under these conditions the individual is actively involved in the party process. He accepts most of the party rules as they are interpreted to him, helps enforce such rules, and generally does so on a voluntary basis. His compliance with the system indicates his general support of the political process, although he may differ on specific issues directly affecting him. His continued support of the party will depend on the satisfaction he gets from his party activities, and the decisions made on his behalf by party officials.

The extent of active participation, the reasons for taking part in party activities, and questions related to the process of active participation may be seen in survey data concerning rural party leaders and randomly selected farmers collected in three widely separated districts.¹³

Satisfaction with Party: Participation in the party may also be seen in terms of a *satisfaction expected*¹⁴ and *satisfaction received* ratio.¹⁵ The

¹³ For details of the sample survey, see the Appendix.

¹² The Arusha Declaration and subsequent pressures by Julius Nyerere have been aimed at keeping party and government officials from making personal gain by virtue of their positions. The efforts have been more successful on the national and regional levels, than with the isolated rural leadership.

¹⁴ Regarding satisfaction expected, an important parenthetical question is what is the rural party's ability to actually satisfy expectations. In most areas the local party leaders are increasingly able to control resources. The party has been declared the supreme governing body of the nation and the national party propaganda gives local leaders and cell chairmen continuous support and legitimacy.

responses to the question "What does the party do for the people?" indicate a general satisfaction with the party. Only 1.3% reported negative attitudes. The findings also support the general thesis that the party is a multi-faceted organization that engages in a wide range of activities.

TABLE 3. WHAT DOES THE PARTY DO FOR THE PEOPLE?

29%	Party leads economic development projects.
18	Party is the government; administers, maintains law and order, governs the people.
14	Party unifies the people, promotes cooperation, ends colonialism.
12	Party is the representative of the people, voice of the people, interpreter of government policy, voice of the government.
12	Party is an educator. Party teaches political ideas, agricultural methods, health and welfare improvements.
1	Party is a negative influence.
14	Other.
100%	
(N = 434)	

The question "whom do you go to when you have a political problem?" also gives an indication of the satisfaction with the party. Over 70% of the respondents stated they took their problems either to the chairman of the party cell (42%) or to the chairman of the village party branch (19%). Some 10% stated they would take their political problem to a local government officer. Less than 2% stated they would seek satisfaction on a political problem from a traditional leader (headman, subchief). About 22% failed to answer the question. The findings indicate an overall satisfaction with the party as an agent for settling disputes and problems. The figures, however, probably underestimate the importance of the family head and the traditional leader in the settlement of problems. My observations indicate that people go to the political party office with problems that have been already judged—perhaps unsatisfactorily—by

The result is party control over such basic resources as new jobs, local wages, access to some schooling, appointment to honorific positions, access to important meetings, free transportation, and the like.

¹⁵ Other approaches to analyzing participation such as formal-informal, and leader-follower typologies or the comparing of relative degrees of commitment to various roles, are considered less appropriate for an African rural party setting.

family heads. The same people may have gone to a traditional leader for interpretation and mediation. However, the only "proper" channels of settlement would be through the party, the government agents or the courts; traditional leaders are officially out of power. Our interviews indicate that peasants are aware of political realities, but the figures fail to reflect the *de facto* power of traditional authorities.¹⁶

Party Membership. Active party participation is indicated in questions concerning party membership. About 92% claim to be members of the party (at one time), and about 61% state they joined when first asked. Some 16% admitted to waiting for several months to join. Over a third of the respondents said they actively volunteered for party membership and another 25% said they joined because they were approached directly by a party official. Most members claim to have joined the party prior to independence (1961), and nearly 40% claim to have joined the party in the early years of its activity (1954-57).¹⁷

When asked why they joined the party, over half of the respondents said to "fight for independence" or to "get rid of the colonials." Some 10% joined because they saw the party as an organization to help build national unity and to develop the country economically. Some 8% reported they joined TANU under somewhat coercive conditions.

Other indicators of basic support and participation in the party activities are reflected in the nearly 50% of the respondents who knew the name of the leading political party leader in the district (Area Commissioner). Only slightly fewer knew the provincial political party leader (Regional Commissioner). In response to the opinion question: "Do you agree or disagree that political matters should be left to government officials and village people should not become involved," a total of 87% of the respondents disagreed. The finding indicates a strong feeling among farmers that they at least "should" be involved in local political affairs.

The extent of party activity is also seen in what the respondents believe to be the purpose of the party cell system (10-house cells).

¹⁶ Indicating the problem of getting totally candid responses from farmers on government matters. There is good reason to believe farmers are guarded in an interview situation and are less critical of the government in an interview than they are in their day-to-day exchanges.

¹⁷ Observations indicate the figures are high; farmers are inclined to falsely claim membership or to claim current membership if annual dues were paid in any one year.

Officially, the purpose is to educate farmers to new agricultural techniques, to bring together the 10-house *families* for cooperative purposes, and to provide a local cell chairman for the settlements of disputes. Villagers however ascribe far wider purposes to the party cell system.

TABLE 4. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE 10-HOUSE PARTY CELL?

12%	To provide police functions, to detect criminals, to observe newcomers, to report suspicious activities, to prevent crime.
8	To settle disputes and to judge cases.
8	To collect taxes.
11	To promote cooperation in communal work.
15	To bring about economic progress in agriculture.
15	To disseminate news and propaganda.
10	To aid government administration.
3	To aid the party.
9	Doesn't know.
9	Other/omitted.
100%	
(N = 434)	

Non-participation: In addition to our basic assumption that individual abuse causes withdrawal of support from the party, non-participation can occur for at least three other reasons. First, if individuals perceive that the party leaders cannot make authoritative decisions that resolve local conflicts, a shift to stronger authority figures such as traditional leaders or administrative leaders will occur. Second, unwanted party decrees or excessive demands can cause a group of individuals to pay lip service to the party, and at the same time, to withdraw from it. This is often done by villagers supporting a non-local, alien individual as a party chairman, and using him as a buffer against the unwanted decrees from the district party office. When the lack of participation is noted by higher officials, it is the tribally alien party chairman who is criticized, not the individual farmer. In essence the alien leader lacks kinship ties and other levers to effectively gain local support.

Third, the individual's realization that rural party officials do not have an economic base to their authority, such as controlling land usage, dictating job opportunities, allocating free transportation, and the like, will cause farmers to shift their support to leaders in the local administration or the marketing cooperative who do have economic influence. Shifting allegiances are particularly likely to occur if the administrative grid in a given district is weak. The strength of

the local administration varies graphically throughout Tanzania.

Specific data concerning non-participation is seen in the survey findings and in the statements made by both regional and local party officials. The most significant findings were:

Nearly 75% of the respondents had never had written communication with the party. About 8% had sent one or two letters during the year and another 8% had done so more than three times.

When asked why they joined the party about 6% gave answers indicating they had joined under some pressure, and would not be active participants. Such answers included "I was forced," "I followed others under pressure," "I had no other choice," or "my employer 'encouraged' me to join."

When asked what is the line of authority for settling disputes beyond the village level, 72% refused to express an answer—indicating a basic desire not to be committed to an authority system beyond their immediate neighborhood. Some 13% indicated they would follow the village-district-regional party system, the remainder indicated a mixing of party, local government and traditional authorities.

Although the majority of the respondents felt that the party had done something positive for the village, those who expressed dissenting opinions (about 2%) did so for the following reasons: "party leaders do nothing for the people," "they are destructive and self-seeking," or "they demand money."

Although the findings shed some light on why non-participation in party activities occurs, they must be interpreted in light of other field observations. The survey findings on written, formal communication with the party, for example, indicate there is little overall communication. In fact, there is a great deal of informal discussion with party leaders. Written communication is initiated in extreme circumstances, when party leaders indicate a message is needed, or when distance separates the individuals. The difficulty in getting letters written and the shortage of public scribes hinders written communication. The findings on the reasons to join the party, and on what the government and the party had done for the village, also need amplification. Indications are that the people are more critical than the figures indicate. The fear of giving open opinions, and the distrust of the interview situation, would lead the respondent to give "safe" political answers. In fact most peasant farmers keep up a running criticism of the gov-

ernment for failing to provide more for the village. In the eyes of the farmers there is usually no differentiation between the party and the government beyond the local leaders that are known on a face-to-face basis.

The lack of participation in some rural party branches is also a recurring theme among party officials above the village level. The usual criticism is that the rural branch is not active enough, that the people do not regard the party as an organization to solve their problems, and that the party is not "speaking for the people." Relations between local government officials and rural party officials are often strained. The result is a lack of support for the rural party branch by the local administration.¹⁸

Comments from rural party leaders in Central Tanzania indicate the general problem.¹⁹

Party chairman Itaga village: "... progress here is slow due to misunderstandings between TANU and local government officers ... people receive different orders from these leaders. ... Most are not paying their monthly fees. The party hardly gets any new members."

Party chairman Uyui village: "... people have stopped coming to TANU to report their difficulties and troubles ... they go straight to the local government employees. ..."

Party chairman Uyowa village: "I hardly collect any monthly fees as they don't value the office now. ..."

Party chairman Upuge village: "... before (pre-independence) many people joined and fees were paid by most of this chiefdom. TANU offices were always full of people with troubles. Some were settled and some referred to court. After independence (1961) TANU has been dropping down ... people don't attend meetings even when they are told to do so. ..."

On balance, non-participation is gauged by rural leaders in terms of fees paid, the use of TANU for problem settlement, and the general traffic in the TANU office. The higher levels of authority were equally concerned with the same problems and also with questions of respect for

the party, and the broader organizational questions of the party's relations with local and central government organizations.

Dissatisfaction with the party as an agent and partner of the national government is seen in responses to the question "What has the government done for the people of this village?" Over 40% of the respondents stated the government had done nothing for the village. Another 10% didn't know of any contribution, or refused to answer the question. Other responses include specific contributions as "provided tools and material goods" (10%), "provided administrative help" (7%), "financed an agricultural or construction project" (14%), "financed an education project" (8%), or "provided freedom and independence" (3%). Only 3% said the government had done a great deal for the village, or gave details of several contributions.

A further indication of dissatisfaction that would lead to an individual's failure to participate in party activities is seen in the responses to the question: "Do you agree or disagree that government matters and politics are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on?" Nearly 75% of the sample agreed with this statement, 18% disagreed, and 2% were uncertain. The remainder did not answer the question. Overall, the findings indicate a widespread dissatisfaction with the "outside party" and the "outside government." This finding also lends credence to the suggestion that peasants see the government as remote, disinterested, and ineffectual within their village.

Satisfaction is, of course, conditioned by peasant *expectations*. On the one hand, peasants expect the government to aid them and are annoyed and dissatisfied when this does not occur. On the other hand, the general cynicism reflected in the responses to the survey questions indicates a general expectation of abuse and maltreatment. Most peasants expect leaders to be self-seeking and to engage in petty theft. There is a general feeling that any man who gets into a high-level job will exploit the situation.²⁰ These attitudes are coupled with a broader belief in the inevitability of ill-fortune. Conditioned initially by the harsh life style, the expect-

¹⁸ The above specific criticisms were leveled against rural party leaders by the then Regional Commissioner for Tabora, R. S. Wambura in "TANU and the Government" (Tabora: District Council Pamphlet, 1963, cyclostyled). The comments are indicative of similar problems in many areas of Tanzania.

¹⁹ Selected as representative comments from a survey of rural party organizations in Tabora district, 1965-66 and 1968.

²⁰ In the general elections of 1965, the voters' expectation that many of the incumbents had gotten rich in office led them to vote the man out of office on the basis that another man should have a chance at wealth. See Bismark Mwansasu and Norman N. Miller, "The Fall of a Minister," in Lionel Cliffe (ed.), *One-Party Democracy* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).

tation of ill-fortune extends into the political arena. Maltreatment, for example, is expected if one ventures outside the face-to-face world and deals with a distant people or government.

Other peasant attitudes illustrate the relationship between satisfaction and expectation. Approximately 64% of the respondents expected to stay in their village the rest of their lives and only 14% were willing to say definitely that they would leave their village. When asked "What job would you do if you could change your work," over 50% indicated no change was desired. Approximately 12% indicated they would simply improve their present work, and another 11% indicated they would return to farming from their present type of work. Only two respondents (0.46%) indicated they would move to a political party job, and less than 6% indicated preference for government administrative posts. Jobs such as carpenters, drivers, shop-owners, traders, and positions in the police and the army accounted for less than 8% of the total. A similar question, "What would you like to be doing 5 years from now?" showed that 68% of the respondents expected no change or simply hoped for an improvement in their farming work. When asked "How much money do you expect to make in 5 years, per year," 47% didn't know and an additional 7% expected to make less than 100 shillings (\$14.00) per year.

In essence, satisfaction on personal issues may be impossible for some peasants because they are apathetic, because their expectation levels are unreal, or because they negate the party process by refusing to believe it will serve them and by refusing to participate in it. Seen in this perspective, it is understandable that mild dissatisfaction with the party—and non-participation in its activities—would be in line with the larger dissatisfaction with one's life style. For most individuals, such a situation usually leads more to apathy, disinterest and acceptance of the status quo. In extreme cases of dissatisfaction, active resistance to the party could also result.

Active Resistance: Under these conditions either coercion by party leaders has caused withdrawal from party activities and the individual is actively resisting party leaders, or an organization outside the party sphere has brought pressure on the individual to oppose party activities. The party rules and codes are broken and an attempt is made to either destroy the rural party organization, or to unseat its leaders. Rural party leaders in turn may react by lashing out against the individuals involved, or by calling on higher party authority. When knowledge of anti-party resistance reaches the district or re-

gional party authorities, prompt action is usually taken, either in the form of investigation and rebuke, or when necessary, containment by the police or the field force.

Resistance to party leaders may be mixed with general resistance to government activities. Such a situation usually springs from one of two sources. First, resistance to a specific demand or decree; in essence a collective refusal to follow party leadership for a specific reason which can easily become generalized to a refusal to follow party leadership on any issue. Second, resistance may spring from historical animosity. Groups that were at one time out of the party, such as former chiefs, Muslim organizations, or labor groups, are currently included in the broad party structure. Old antagonisms and old rivalries, however, create factions within the party which on the local level can lead to overt resistance to the existing leadership.

Examples of active resistance take several forms. The refusal to pay TANU dues or local taxes, and the stoning of Land Rovers when officials come to collect (Rungwe District); The refusal to support party or local government leaders to the extent that the President denounces the people as *wadui* or enemy of the state, (Kisarawe District); The attack on a TANU office by a dissident group, who after seizing the files and record books of the party, claim to be the new party leaders, in fact claiming legitimacy in symbols (Tabora District), are all indicative. Most cases of resistance are directed at the local leadership. There is little indication that organized wide-scale disenchantment exists with the national party organization, as was the case in Ghana the latter years of the CPP. Cases usually erupt spontaneously, are resolved, and generally have no implications beyond the village area. Leaders of the dissident groups generally find no support for continued active resistance and they slip back into an ongoing pattern of non-participation in party activities.

IV. FACTORS AFFECTING PARTY PARTICIPATION

In addition to the forms of party activity, four other questions must be analyzed for an understanding of rural party participation. First, what is the context of political life in which rural party participation takes place; second, what are the processes by which issues are resolved for the individual by party authorities; third, what are the links between village and national party organizations that effect peasant participation; and fourth, what are the broader implications for national leaders concerning the political participation of rural peoples.

Context of Political Life

A rural society is often a pedestrian society. There are limited means of transport, the peasant is largely immobilized, and movement to the outside is a major undertaking. The distance a man can easily walk to have a dispute settled or to gain assistance from a higher authority is the effective boundary of village political systems. For most rural individuals the world is in essence a microcosm with the village as the center. Attitudes toward movement are dictated by the relative magnetism of the home village versus the attraction of the outside world.

Political relations are based on kinship ties, clan membership, and the face-to-face, day-by-day interaction with familiar people. Locale, the neighborhood or chiefdom boundaries, and the dictates of an agrarian society heavily influence political life. The planting and harvesting cycle directly affects political considerations. Litigation diminishes during harvests; ritual and ceremony to resolve conflicts increase during planting. Flood, draught, or other natural calamities may cause a revival of traditional sorcery or witchcraft beliefs. Such beliefs provide causal explanations and serve as mechanisms of social control. In turn, witch cleansing, witch trials and banishment may occur with the full involvement of the local political leadership.

Three leadership groups tend to operate in the rural context, and to vie for political power. These include party functionaries such as chairmen, vice chairmen, secretaries, and officers in the youth league, women's group, TANU elders, and the cells. Administrative leaders such as resident local government officers, clerks, teachers and members of a central government ministry posted in the village, such as dispensers, agricultural instructors, forest guards, and game wardens comprise the second group. The third leadership group is composed of traditional leaders such as the former chiefs and headmen, secret society leaders, diviners, prophets, ritualists and soothsayers. The three groups together comprise the political leadership on nearly all issues. In most cases the administrative leaders have less local legitimacy and mainly serve the technical and clerical functions. Party leaders tend to serve mobilization and propaganda functions, and traditional leaders serve mainly to mediate, explain and translate demands made on the peasants.

The most important structures operating within this political context are the rural party and party cells, the village council (Village Development Committee), the marketing cooperatives, and voluntary associations such as parent-

teacher groups, welfare societies, dance groups, and in some areas, secret societies. If the village serves as communications center for out-lying areas, it may also include a primary court, and a local government divisional headquarters. Other local structures often involved in political activities include the local stores and markets, primary schools, tea houses, beer-shops, dispensaries, and mosques or mission stations.

The relationship between these structures at the rural level is characterized by overlapping leadership, a great deal of economic interaction, and communication linkages based on the informal village network, and rumor diffusion. The Village Development Committees (VDC) usually have 20 members who represent sections of the dispersed village area, as well as specific positions (teacher, dispenser); the party chairman is the VDC chairman, and members of the VDC are likely to include the leaders of the marketing cooperative, the local administration, and other organizations. Meetings are open to any individual with complaints or problems. Rural party functionaries are usually members of other social and economic structures and business tends to be transacted informally. Roles tend to be fused. This is not the case for relationships between the party and other organizations at the district, regional and national level. These relations are formalized by written contract and letter, although overlapping leadership exists among the national elite.

Process of Issue Satisfaction

The various survey findings give a picture of what issues are taken to the party. In fact, any potential conflict situation can become a party issue. There are no hard rules, and no precedents are followed except for the interests of the peasant who initiates the incident. He, as noted, will take the issue where he has the best chance of satisfaction. This is conditioned by his view of who is the most authoritative figure in his political arena—and, of these individuals, who would receive his request with the greatest sympathy. It is in part the peasant's view of the relative balance of power between a few local influentials. Since traditional authorities have been severely curtailed in their legal exercise of power, and since government administrators often lack legitimacy in the village areas, the most potentially useful leaders for the peasant are often party functionaries. However, the peasant is usually the initiator of the resolution process and the arena he chooses will depend on where he believes he can get the greatest satisfaction. He may demand, for example, that both traditional and administrative authorities have some

voice when party officials are judging his case. Essentially, then, party participation is based on how satisfied the individual peasant continues to be with a number of issues taken to the party. The peasant is in fact a political chameleon. The situation can change with the issue at stake.

The actual grass-roots process by which a peasant's grievance would be resolved through the party is basically as follows. When a conflict between individuals or groups arises, the issue is either taken by them to the party authority, or the party authority hears of it informally through the neighborhood communication network. If he hears of it informally he may either intervene on his own or do nothing. If the issue is taken to him he usually will either take action on his own, or, after hearing the particulars, call for a broader "public" meeting of other party influentials and elders. Such a public call has two consequences. It brings the issue up to the level of neighborhood knowledge and permits anyone who is interested to participate in the debate. Second, as the messages go out to convene the meeting, the time lag gives the leader an opportunity to consider the problem, to put it in perspective with similar issues, and to debate it informally with others.

When the public meeting begins, the limits of discussion may be framed by a few key leaders, but debate is generally open and evidence may be volunteered from the family, friends, or neighbors of the disputants. Evidence may also be called for by the party leaders and be given either by a specific individual, or in "Greek chorus" fashion. The latter technique also serves to test the feeling of the community at large. If the chorus is not largely unanimous, and there is in fact a counter chorus, the issue divides the community, and the leaders proceed more cautiously. This slower, more laborious process is tedious and has the effect of eventually driving away all those who do not have a vital stake in the issue.

Leadership under these circumstances is generalized; no single party individual dominates. When a consensus is sensed by a few of the leaders, this fact is noted. The decision will then be framed by one or two leaders and usually delivered by the "convening authority." To give the decision legitimacy, the pronouncement may be in the name of the party, in the name of the government, or occasionally in the name of a chiefdom or traditional authority. In most cases the finding would be accompanied by a threat of harsher punishment if the decision of the group is not carried out. Punishment might include a beating, a fine, or banishment from the village. The right of appeal to a higher authority would probably not be noted or discussed.

Links Between Village and National Party

The Tanzania party structure is organized to incorporate the village party officials under the administrative direction of a district branch which is usually headquartered in one of the sixty-one district capitals. The effective linkage between the village and the outside world is in this district-village connection. Although communications from the national and regional offices supposedly filter down to the village through the district offices, the district-village tie is the weakest link in the party structure.²¹ Communications are often non-existent, and requests are often misunderstood or unheeded. Guidelines from the district headquarters on how village leaders should deal with various problems are followed at the whim of the local leader. The immobilized and remote nature of the country creates a situation in which party authority is essentially "Land Rover" authority. District officials come to the village, confer with local leaders, settle problems, and depart. The circuit-riding nature of the system in fact only offers temporary solutions to village problems.

Because of the infrequency of the visits from district officials, villagers generally believe that the district office does very little for their local branch. Higher officials are thought to be mainly interested in collecting membership fees, and of only helping "richer" villages where newly established cash crops create exploitable wealth. Other difficulties arise from the fact that higher party officers are usually staffed by younger, more educated men whose views of village leaders can be hyper-critical.

A portion of the communications problem between the two party levels lies within the district party office. Like the village branch, the district office engages in a multitude of activities. No guidelines are created however, and village leaders are often confused as to what action is appropriate for them to take. Problems considered for settlement by district officials might include a marital quarrel in the district town, a bad-debt problem, an allegation against a merchant or trader, or a complaint concerning an unfair act by a government official. Welfare acts are also considered party business. If a man is released from prison and has no bus fare to his village, the party will assist him. Money for medicine may be given and medical advice offered. Special investigations are launched concerning such problems as thefts, beatings, school

²¹ Party directives in 1969 indicate awareness of this problem and an increased desire by the national party to facilitate local-level communication.

abuses, cheating by a shopkeeper or complaints about the hospital. The party is also engaged in economic enterprises. Building small party hotels, organizing cooperative societies such as carpenters groups and building societies are commonplace. Resettlement schemes, homes for TANU employees, and facilities for destitute elders are within the district party activities.

The many sides to the party create a basic problem for its district leaders: how to differentiate between an administrative activity that should more properly be carried out by a government organization, and a "political activity." Most district party officials are unable to define exactly what a political issue would be. One district official in western Tanzania suggested that it would be "any offense against the government." Another suggested a political issue was "anything needing investigation." The Area Commissioner, the chief party official of the district in Tabora, said the party could legitimately enter any issue "involving tensions and conflicts—such things as clashes between the staff of an organization, a man pushing too hard to get ahead, or a verbal attack on the government."

Although functionally diffused, party leaders do admit officially to some distinction between their areas of responsibility and those of the police, judiciary, and administration. Usually, however, no clear-cut idea exists when a party official's investigation encroaches on a police investigation, or when the party's right to judge and hold small trials encroaches on the judiciary. Although the district level officials are less flagrant in such mixing of channels, some confusion also exists at this level. The Area Commissioner, for example, is the head of both political and administrative functions in his district, and gives directions to both political and administrative leaders. Such confusion filters down to the village level and helps to create the local situation in which there is no distinction between administrative, party or police activities.

The difficulties in communication between the two party levels tend to inhibit participation in party affairs and to keep information and resources from flowing to the village areas. This breakdown in communication linkage is perhaps most graphically seen in statements made by a district party official and a village party official about how the *other man* carries out his work.²²

Village Party Chairman—a 47-year-old Zaramo who has lived in the village some 11 years. He came originally in 1957 as a *Kiongozi* or party

²² A Tabora District official and a Uyui village official interviewed 1965–66. The situation typified here was essentially the same in 1968, during a re-study of the area.

organizer (spearhead) and initially was extremely unpopular. He was accused of being a thief, of collecting party dues for his own purposes, and of being a rabble-rouser. He was often threatened with attack and initially made little headway until the local chief quietly lent his support to the party activities. By 1961, however, the village party leader had personally gained enough popularity to be elected the representative of the village to the district council. He has also held the party chairmanship since it was formed in 1959. His leadership position is reinforced by a partial ability to read and to write, by a flair for public speaking, and by virtue of his trade as a tailor which gives him constant contact with the public.

District Party Official—a 36-year-old Nyamwezi who has had 8 years of schooling and a great deal of experience in various jobs throughout East Africa. Before independence he worked on the Mombasa docks and as salesman for a tobacco company. He joined the party early in its formation, probably around 1956, and after independence was paid for his efforts with the chairmanship of a district office. He has drawn criticism for pushing the membership campaigns too hard, and for threatening people with mild forms of punishment if they do not pay their party dues.

- | <i>District Party Leader</i> | <i>Village Party Leader</i> |
|--|---|
| 1. "The village chairman is lazy and slow and often does not do his work properly." | "He pushes too hard and threatens to close the hospital and local buses to those who do not pay party dues." |
| 2. "He is often not serving TANU and is sometimes looking after his own interests." | "I have wondered if his real interest is in the nation or in himself." |
| 3. "He does not understand my problems and does not understand how to organize a local party." | "It is too difficult to talk to him. If I bring up a problem, he will interfere and some action will be taken against me. He does not understand my problems, he is not well-informed, so I do not go to him very often." |
| 4. "He is getting to be an old man and his effectiveness is seeping away." | "He is often acting as a <i>bwana mkubwa</i> (big man), although he is young." |

Key factors affecting the links between the district and the village areas are the graphic

differences between district-level leaders and their village-level counterparts. On the other hand, the survey findings indicate a strong similarity between village leaders and randomly selected farmers. No significant differences, for example, emerge between these two groups in such categories as age, education, attitudes toward magic and witchcraft, attitudes on why to send a child to school, etc. When village leaders, however, are compared to district leaders, several major differences occur.

The ages of district leaders tend to be younger than village-level leaders in all districts (Table 5).

dren, and understandably to have more possessions such as radios, bicycles, and tools. The overall picture of the district leader indicates a less parochial, less isolated individual who has some contact outside his immediate community. He has generally greater mobility and is more enlightened on the events affecting his time. He tends to have a technical competence in specialized areas as opposed to the more generalized skill of the village leader. He has probably resided in his community a shorter period of time and has fewer inter-personal contacts within the community. He is probably more inclined to accept the changing political symbols and fads as

TABLE 5. AGE OF VILLAGE-LEVEL LEADERS

	<i>Birth Date</i>			N.
	Before 1910	1910-1930	1930+	
District Leaders	3%	45%	52%	150
Village Leaders	26%	54%	20%	171

$\chi^2 = 49.23$, $df = 2$, $\alpha = 0.0$

The religion of district leaders tends to be Christian; there are no leaders at this level who claim pagan beliefs. On the other hand, village leaders tend to be Moslem.

Type of school attended also correlated significantly. District leaders tended to be graduates or have been enrolled in government schools whereas village leaders overwhelmingly had attended mission schools or Koranic schools. Implications in these findings suggest that the chance to reach a post as a district-level leader is significantly enhanced by the attendance of a government-run school.

Considering length of party membership, district leaders in two out of three of the districts surveyed tended to have been party members a significantly shorter period of time than had village leaders. These districts (Kisarawe and Rungwe) were also the districts in which the age difference between district leaders and village leaders tended to be the greatest, a factor which partially explains the findings. For Tabora District, which historically gave support to the party later than other areas of the nation, there was no significant difference between the length of party membership for the two leadership groups.

Other differences between the village leader and the district leader appeared in terms of life style. For example, the district leader's education, income per year, amount of travel, and frequency of travel tended to be higher in almost all cases. The district leader tended to have fewer numbers of wives, fewer numbers of chil-

they come from the capital. The differences between the two groups in age, education and income can be graphic and lead to antagonism. The district leader's ideas for initiating changes in the village may be based on a legitimate desire to bring advantages that he has seen elsewhere. The local leader, conversely, may have had no similar experience and obstruct any such changes. Such differences lead to rigidity and entrenchment. Village leaders retreat to the traditional beliefs and justifications of the past while district leaders escape into petty professionalism. Village leaders will then demand more fact-to-face confrontations before they will act on a specific project whereas their counterparts may wish fewer personal meetings and attempt to rely on bureaucratic channels. The result is a continued disruption in a communication between the two most vital levels of the political party.

Implications for the National Government

Political participation in the rural party is the implicit goal of TANU. To gain the continued participation of the peasant is the overriding problem facing national leaders. One of the key problems is that the party at the rural level is suffering the throes of general economic disenchantment following the high hopes of the nationalistic period. In spite of peasant expectation, little has changed in their essential routine. The economic life of the people has not been greatly altered and most of the lofty expectations of the pre-independence period are unreal-

ized. The party has been forced to shift from a nationalist protest organization to an agency for the mobilization of human and natural resources. Its new role is creative and positive. It is a role which in some respects is a contradiction of the earlier goals which were to bring about the destruction and downfall of the colonial regime. Those individuals who lead the nationalist protest had personal qualities which could arouse mass dissent. Although these nationalist leaders have remained in important offices, they do not necessarily have the talents nor the personal inclinations to provide the more mundane form of administrative leadership necessary for building a state.

Even those leaders who do combine administrative talents with some form of charismatic ability, face continued problems of peasant apathy toward the party, unpaid membership, and cynicism toward the government. As noted, links between the district and rural branches are difficult to maintain. Representation of the individual peasant's problems is on an *ad hoc* basis. The two-way highway that Julius Nyerere envisioned by which the goals and plans of the government reached the village and by which the problems and wishes of the people reached the government, is often simply not operative. The government's recruitment of rural leaders encounters basic problems of an individual's status, his traditional basis of legitimacy, and his kinship obligations. In many ethnic groups, there are strong pressures not to assume leadership for fear of alienating neighbors or of gaining undue economic advantages. In other areas there is little understanding of what a party leadership position entails.

Perhaps the most important problem concerning the political participation of peasants lies in how the central government consciously plans for such participation. There is a tendency for officials, particularly those in ministries dealing with resource planning to either implicitly or explicitly oppose political participation in specific geographic areas. This is because resources are allocated on a priority basis for economic development. Political participation without accompanying economic change is considered unwise, particularly if political stability of the geographic area is in question.

However, this form of Machiavellian banishment of inaccessible, semi-desert or exceptionally backward areas, mainly on a rationale of economic priority, may in fact be more politically dangerous than the cost-benefit thinking anticipates. Political participation is necessary for the entire population. If national leaders attempt to create "holding areas" where rural institutions are not encouraged, the inhabitants of

these areas are politically alienated as well as economically depressed. This process does not, however, exclude peasants from travelling to see strikingly better human conditions in the privileged areas. Nor does this form of planning prohibit migration out of the rural sectors to the over-crowded, socially-deprived urban areas. When such exposure does take place, the individual is in fact in the larger political arena. His disenchantment with the events in his home region and his knowledge of better conditions elsewhere make him a potential dissident and agitator. It may be argued that the difficulties this individual can cause the central government would be eliminated if he had opportunities to participate locally in political institutions which are engaged in economic development. If rural political institutions are to survive, they must be created universally. No amount of Machiavellian banishment and isolation, no amount of government refusal to plan for a depressed region will keep agitation from beginning. Once begun, it is impossible to predict the speed at which agitation can lead to collective, destructive political action.²³

In spite of the difficulties in gaining party participation, there are other strong reasons why national leaders persist in promoting such involvement. First, the party has a potential capability of economic mobilization. It serves as a catalyst of several local interests and, if supported, can be effective in reducing the conflicts brought about by rapid economic change. The rural political party is at the cutting edge of the national plans for agricultural development; its leaders can stimulate support for these plans and gain their acceptance among the local populace. Second, if there is no participation in the rural party, checks and balances on party leaders will not exist. The party apparatus has been constructed but, if it is not used and supported by the people, it can be misused by self-seeking local leaders who gain support from the remote higher party levels.

A further reason for the national leaders to encourage local participation is to facilitate the building of local institutions such as the cooperative societies and voluntary welfare associations. Like the party, these rural institutions introduce specific innovations that may benefit the peasant. Other reasons for participation exist. Party leaders at the local level are often alien to the village in which they are working. Acceptance of alien party leaders will eventually mean the acceptance of local leaders in other positions.

²³See Samuel Huntington "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April, 1965), 386-430.

The process aids in the breaking down of ethnocentrism and the establishment of new forms of legitimacy. The local party, by encouraging peasant participation, is forcing the individual into a broader political system and exposing him to institutional structures that can represent larger numbers of people, and more effectively introduce modernizing innovations for the village.

Perhaps the most convincing argument for national leaders to promote and channel local participation is that political involvement by the peasant in some form has always occurred. Traditional political systems stimulated political participation in several forms as indicated by the constant intrigue and subversion that occurred within and between chieftains. Individuals have, and will participate politically over what affects them directly: their purse, their dignity, their job, their food, their status, or their future. What is new is the individual's participation in a broader system of values and in new institutional forms. As events move along in a new nation like Tanzania, it may be that peasant participation on a broader scale cannot be avoided.²⁴

²⁴ Goran Hyden, *Political Development in Rural Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), based on research in the Bukoba area, is directly related to the above findings. Comparison of the two studies shows similarities in the high degree of confidence the peasant has in the party, particularly as a "parental" authority; both studies indicate, however, the peasant feels the government does little for the people (pp. 180-212). Misuse of party authority exists in Bukoba, and many complaints similar to those in Tabora were reported by Hyden. These include extortion, peculation, undue court pressure, irregular party procedures, and coercion of Asians. Active resistance to the party directives also occurs, particularly surrounding the orders to up-root coffee trees. Clashes are common, often between old and young coffee planters in the party (pp. 184-191). Similar findings also exist on the multifaceted nature of the party, and that the party essentially operates in an immobilized, pedestrian society. Both studies indicate a significant improvement for peasants' opportunities to participate in local political issues since 1963 (p. 139). Difficulty in making distinctions between claimed party membership and actual party membership was also reported by Hyden (p. 151). In both studies party support exists outside party membership, and membership does not necessarily mean compliance with the party. Dissatisfaction with income, education and housing are similar in both studies (pp. 200-201).

By contrast, several differences exist in the find-

V. TOWARD A LOCAL-LEVEL THEORY OF PARTICIPATION

This section briefly summarizes the major conclusions of the study, puts forth a simplified model on the process of individual participation, and suggests several propositions that emerge from the model and the data. The propositions are the first step in establishing testable connections between data and a more theoretical scheme about participation.²⁵ The aim is to provide links to more generalizable micro-political concepts.²⁶

ings. Bukoba region has more highly developed communication facilities, and there is a greater dependence on the Village Development Committees to disseminate news. Higher levels of literacy and wealth explain some of the differences. Hyden's findings also differ on the assertion that the district and regional level officials are usually equalitarian and corrective of abuses. He points out the numerous dismissals President Nyerere has instigated for abusive or incompetent Regional and Area Commissioners. A further difference lies in the degree of expressed alienation and cynicism; Hyden reports far less than exists in Tabora Region (p. 216).

Only partial agreement exists on the role of traditional authority (pp. 106-124). In Bukoba, peasants are divided on the chief's contemporary legitimacy, whereas in Tabora, traditional leaders still exercise considerable authority. The Bukoba study indicates the Haya have a more cosmopolitan outlook than do the Nyamwezi—again a function of greater wealth, more educational possibilities, and proximity to an urban center; Kampala (p. 157). Political involvement, the level of discussion about politics, the frequency of such discussions, and relative political knowledge are all about equal in the two studies (pp. 217-228). The comparisons were discussed with Professor Hyden in Nairobi, July, 1969.

²⁵ The model's key variables are suggested by the empirical findings of the study; the model should have the capability of explaining how local-level participation occurs, and at the same time, serve to suggest propositions on peasant political behavior.

²⁶ The importance of local-level analysis is a recurring theme in recent literature in the sub-fields of political anthropology, local politics and development administration. For a methodological discussion of the implication of these sub-fields, see essays by Fred Burke, David Brokensha, Ronald Cohen, Nelson Kasfir, Alvin Magid, Melvin Perlman, Aiden Southall, Marc Swartz, and Rodger Yeager in Norman N. Miller (ed.), *Research in Rural Africa* (East Lansing, Michigan:

The major conclusions are:

1. The rural party is a multi-faceted institution that is acceptable to the rural people because it provides a broad range of services of value to the individual in his local political microcosm. Rural party functions include family mediation, administration, adjudication, police, welfare and propaganda.
2. Misuse of individual power exists in rural party situations because the regulations established by national leaders are not known to rural peoples, or because peasants are unable to communicate such abuses to higher authorities.
3. There remains a heavy reliance on traditional authority. The traditional political system with its institution of chieftaincy has socialized most peasants in their expectations of authority; there is little inclination to question the legitimacy of higher authority.
4. Although peasants hold varying ideas on what the party does for the people, there is overall satisfaction in Tanzania with the party as an agent for settling disputes; however there is a widespread feeling among peasants that the government and the national party have not done enough for local villages.
5. The political context in which the rural party operates is essentially an immobilized pedestrian society. Most important political considerations are face-to-face relations, kinship ties, localized boundaries, and the ecological dictates of an agrarian culture. Within this political context the process of issue satisfaction is informal, consensual and

pluralistic with most peasant allegiances dependent on the issue at stake.


6. Communications within the rural party are ineffective because they are based on daily exchange and rumor diffusion within neighborhood networks. Communications linkages between the rural party and other party levels are ineffective. In addition to logistic problems, communication failure is based on the major differences that exist between village-level and district-level leaders in terms of age, religion, wealth, education, type of school attended, and general life style. The result is often a failure of information and resources to reach the rural areas.
7. The opposition of natural leaders to the bypassing of local institutions and to political participation in depressed areas for cost/benefit reasons may be unwise; such planning could trigger immigration to over-crowded areas, disenchantment with events in the home regions, political unrest, and large-scale hostility to government.

For the purposes of the model, specific variables that determine the process by which an individual participates in local-level institutions may be isolated as follows:

<u>Key Variables</u>	<u>Intervening Variables</u>
naturating of specific issue	mores and customs
perception of potential issue	time
perception of potential rewards	method of processing issue
patterns of participation	individual's links to government authority
expectations	issue's importance to government
satisfactions	how government could intervene
inclinations to change pattern feedback	how government does intervene

African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1969), parts I, II. For a discussion of processional analysis at the local level see Marc Swartz, *et al.*, *Political Anthropology* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); also see Swartz (ed.), *Local-Level Politics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968). A number of local-level studies relate directly to the present article. For comparisons on the evolution of political changes in Tanzania see particularly J. Gus Liebenow, "Response to Planned Political Change in a Tanganyika Tribal Group," this REVIEW, L (June, 1956), 442-461; and Liebenow, "Legitimacy of Alien Relationships: The Nyatura of Tanganyika," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (March, 1961), 64-86. For comparisons on the role of chiefs and traditional political systems in Tanzania see Hans Cory, *The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma* (New York: Eagle Press, 1954). For comparison to local government processes see Fred G. Burke, *Local Government and Politics in Uganda* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1965).

The flow chart (Figure 1) illustrates the relationships between the variables. The basic process is first, that local-level participation depends initially on how a specific political issue is viewed by the individual, (1). If the issue is vital to his self-interest he will take a preliminary position and assess whether he should or should not participate. This is often determined by his perceived rewards from the many activities of the institution, as weighted against the potential



Flow-Chart: Relationships Determining Local-Level Participation

Figure 1

abuse he may suffer through involvement, (2). Potential abuse and the potential rewards are countervailing pressures. If he decides to participate on this particular issue, his personal expectations will immediately come to bear, (3, 4). If he decides not to participate or to actively resist the institution, his expectations on these decisions will also be activated, (3, 4). The degree of satisfaction each course of action gives the individual will be determined by his expectations, and by several intervening variables, (5). These include the prevailing mores and customs surrounding the issue, and his position on the issue, (5-a); the amount of time that the issue has been under consideration, (5-b); how the issue is processed locally, (5-c); what the local links are between the individual and higher levels of authority, (5-d); the issue's importance to higher levels of government, (5-e); how higher levels of government could intervene, (5-f); and how higher levels of government do intervene, (5-g). The intervening variables also influence the individual's expectation and satisfaction levels.

Depending on these factors, satisfaction in the course of action taken can either be attained or not attained, (6). The result at this point will influence a continued course of action in the same pattern, or will cause a move to one of the two alternative patterns, (7). This decision will in turn feed back to influence the individual's reaction to the next specific political issue that affects him directly, (8). The *sum* of the individual's actions on several issues over time determines the overall institutional participation by the individual. Participation is the collective result of an individual's reaction to specific, concrete political issues that affect him directly.

Several specific propositions could be evolved directly from the model. For example:

1. If satisfaction on the specific issue is attained, the individual is inclined to continue the pattern of political participation he has begun.
2. If abuse on a specific issue or action is expected, the individual will be inclined to withdraw from participation or actively resist the institution.
3. Because expectations of rewards are often unreal, satisfactions on individual issues are often not attained, and withdrawal from the institution's activities occurs.
4. Local-level participation is based on the individual's collective response to specific political issues that he perceives to be of immediate importance to him.
5. If a local leader must use force to obtain his goals, an inverse relationship exists between the amount of force, and the benefits his constituents see themselves receiving from his presence in office.
6. If abuse of power by a local authority occurs, it may be related to the demands of the national government to bring about rapid economic and political change at the local level.
7. If pre-independence, nationalistic leaders are retained at the local level, administrative efficiency and rural economic advancement will be impaired.
8. Local-level institutions grow, and are probably more successful, when leaders who are alien to the local area are accepted by the people.
9. Because of distrust for outside authority, the peasant will attempt to keep the process of issue settlement at the local, face-to-face level.

In realistic terms, the "force" a leader uses may in fact be varying degrees of persuasion. The benefit the constituents see themselves receiving from the individual may overlap with the benefits they expect from the "office" of which the leader is a particular incumbent. The ratio of expectations to satisfactions gained from the leader is not exact, and one particular expectation is not necessarily measured against the satisfaction received on a particular issue.

Misuse of authority is inevitable when the national leadership permits and encourages various forms of coercion to be used to mobilize a local area. The distinction between acceptable pressure and unacceptable coercion is a delicate balance that constantly needs redefinition at both the policy-making and the implementation level. Such pressures are the net result of government demands to create rapid economic and political change in relatively short periods of time. For the individual, it may be argued, pressure becomes coercion when he is forced to act in spite of strong personal objections to doing so.

Leaders who came to power during the pre-independence nationalistic period tended to do so on the basis of charismatic, crowdpleasing abilities. Many are entrenched in leadership posts, although they often lack the administrative talents, or inclination, to deal with the more routinized, mundane tasks of rural development.

Because party leaders who were born in the village area tend to be well known and to have many kinship ties and obligations, they are often drawn into biased judgments. Local leaders alien to the area can promote confidence and participation in the party because they offer more objective judgments.

More general propositions emerge from the model when considered in conjunction with the findings of the study:

Local party leaders generally hold the same view of the world, and are similar in attitude to randomly selected peasants. The peasant is unsure of the views of higher level authorities and is therefore inclined to keep most conflict issues within the confines of his political microcosm. He will maximize his future bargaining potential by maintaining relations with all leadership groups: traditional, administrative and party.

The model of political participation, and the propositions should help to generate further questions about how local-level institutions function. The vital importance of such questions lies in the primary purpose of the rural organization. Organizations like the rural party which deal *directly* with the people are the institutional nerve-endings of the entire governmental process. They are the point of the elaborate administrative apparatus, the point of the total bureaucratic system. If there is no understanding of how these local institutions operate, and if there is no understanding of the political character of the rural peoples, then there is no effective way government can channel resources and information to the villages. There will be no way the assault on rural deprivation can be continued. Most important, there will be no way the national leaders can avoid being overtaken and run down by unforeseen, uncontrolled events in the rural areas.

APPENDIX

The survey of 434 peasants and peasant leaders was carried out in Tabora, Rungwe and Kisarawe Districts between March 1965 and January 1966. The instrument consisted of 120 questions on biography, life-style, political and economic opinion, and political and economic awareness. The interviews were conducted by three research assistants, each a resident of his respective district and a member of the main ethnic group. The questionnaire was pre-tested for six months, and each assistant did 20 trial interviews to assure his total understanding of the questionnaire. The interviews were conducted in Swahili, following lengthy briefing of the research assistants on the meaning of key terms in the questionnaire and their commentators. Distinctions between terms such as "government," "party," "politics," "nation," and "leader" were particularly noted. Because of the difficulty in administering questionnaires to some peasants, interviewers were allowed to give limited interpretation of questions, but were cautioned on leading respondents.

The 434 respondents were selected by one of two methods. Approximately half were ran-

domly selected farmers whose names were taken from the tax rolls of the local government. The remainder were selected as village leaders. The latter method was a combination of the standard reputational, positional and panel-of-judges techniques. A preliminary list of leaders from each of the twelve villages under study was compiled. The list included elected members of the Village Development Committees (VDC), plus local administrators, party officials and traditional headmen, sub-chiefs or chiefs and other suggested influentials. This complete list of potential leaders was then presented to each member of the VDC. This panel of judges rank-ordered the names in terms of their relative influence in the village. The results were tallied and the top 25 names were considered to be in the village leadership class. They were thereafter interviewed in the same manner and with the same questionnaire as the randomly selected farmers. For this article the distinctions between leader and non-leader are not focused upon; in the data presented there were no significant differences between the two groups. For discussion of the techniques used see Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill and Charles R. Wright, *Public Leadership* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1961), ch. 1.

The location of the three rural areas (districts) was initially chosen on the basis of the traditional political system that existed among the major ethnic groups of the area. Thus the Zaramo people of Kisarawe District (coastal area) were chosen because they represented an acephalated, fragmented authority system which traditionally had no political integration above the clan level. The Nyakyusa of Rungwe district (highland area) were considered a middle-range example of political authority; they traditionally had some 90 small chiefdoms, each of which was largely autonomous. There was no political integration above the petty chiefdom level, although the Nyakyusa as a whole share a common language, customs and history. Third, the Nyamwezi of Tabora district (plateau area) were chosen as a research area because they represented a political system, that although basically made up of petty chiefdoms, had experienced some political integration under senior chiefs such as Mirambo and Fundikira. The three districts also represented diverse agricultural and geographic conditions (coastal, highland, plateau). Tanzania's main religious and educational institutions were also represented in the selection.

The actual field method was to spend seven to eight months in each of the three districts; in each area a basic research village was chosen in which to reside. Interviewing was done in this

village and thereafter in three villages located in representative sections of the district. The interviews were usually conducted at the farmer's homestead, or in the case of party and administrative leaders, at local offices.

The data was coded and processed at Michigan State University. Interviewer bias between the three assistants was tested with negative results. The general findings and impressions were reevaluated during a re-study in East Africa in 1967-68 and 1969. At this time several of the findings included in the preliminary drafts were eliminated.

Although the sample is not representative of all of Tanzania, the findings would hold for a major portion of that nation. Subsequent local-

level research will hopefully test these findings in other areas. For background literature on the three areas under study see for Tabora and the Nyamwezi, Rev. Fr. Boesch, *Les Banyamwezi peuple de l'Afrique orientale* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930), and R. G. Abrahams, *The Political Organization of Unyamwezi* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967); for the Nyakyusa of Rungwe district see Monica Wilson, *Good Company: A Study of Nyakyusa Age-Villages* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951); and for the Zaramo of Kisarawe district see A. H. J. Prins, *The Swahili Speaking People of Zanzibar and the East African Coast* (London: International African Institute, 1961).

THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

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The scientific study of politics requires an environment which accepts free inquiry and discussion. Scholars must be permitted to ask questions of their own choosing, gather data without hindrance, and communicate freely with one another about their findings. To be sure, freedom to investigate sensitive policy matters is limited by all governments. Moreover, political scientists themselves inevitably introduce some measure of their own values or ideological predispositions into their works. But it is obvious that without the guarantee of certain minimum freedoms, political science as we know it in the West could never exist.

Communist regimes traditionally have made independent inquiry or objective discussion of political phenomena impossible. In the Stalinist period, scholarly analyses of politics—or, for that matter, of aesthetic, literary, moral or economic questions—amounted to little more than doctrinal exegesis or the elaboration of practical measures to implement the Party's demands. An autonomous social science in Stalin's Russia or Eastern Europe was simply unthinkable.

Since the dictator's death, however, Communist governments have modified their hostility toward the social sciences in general, and toward political science in particular. A decade of de-Stalinization has been accompanied by steps to encourage the scientific study of politics. In several East European countries, political science now enjoys recognition as a discipline in its own right.

This does not mean that political science in Communist countries has freed itself of political controls, or that what is presented as political science is always of scholarly merit. On the contrary, one of the greatest difficulties in evaluating the emergence of a Communist political science stems from the lack of any clear cut dividing line between ideological or political works on the one hand, and studies of genuine scholarly merit on the other. In making distinctions between these two categories of writings on politics it is necessary to apply criteria which take into account the realities of the political science profession in Communist countries, while following broadly accepted standards of what may properly be termed political science.

First, it is clear that propaganda and dogma do not properly belong within the discipline. At

the same time, there is no justification for rejecting works as unscholarly or unscientific simply because their approach is Marxist. The principle that separates propaganda and polemics from scholarship is the elusive but fundamental consideration of independence of judgment. As F. Burlatskii, a Soviet philosopher, has remarked, political science asks questions "whose answers are not known beforehand."

A second criterion for distinguishing between works which are political science and those which are not concerns the extent to which Communist scholars rely on authorities other than the standard works of Communist doctrine. Such a practice, of course, is subject to abuse by writers who seek to give official dogma a scholarly veneer by reference to non-Communist as well as Communist sources. On the other hand, attempts to exploit Western scholarship for official ends cannot disguise the fact that in those countries where political science has been allowed to develop, there has been a sharp break with Marxist-Leninist approaches to politics, and much of the terminology, method and conceptual framework of Western political science has been adopted. In such cases, one can speak of a fundamental change in method, in which the standards of the discipline replace those of the ideology in determining the validity of research and scholarly analysis.

Finally, it should be noted that contributions of real merit can be made to the study of politics by persons who are trained in other fields, particularly in countries where political science is not officially recognized as a discipline in its own right. Given the hostility to the discipline present in many Communist countries, this may be the only way in which the scientific study of politics can develop.

We do not devote equal attention to each country of the Communist world. In Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany and Hungary, and in the non-European Communist states as well, there has been little or no public discussion of the merits of political science. Studies on political questions published in these countries are dogmatic and polemical. In other Communist countries, conditions vary widely. Poland and Yugoslavia have shown the most progress; Rumania and Czechoslovakia have only recently accepted the concept of political science as a dis-

cipline. The Soviet Union has yet to officially sanction research and teaching in political science, but maintains a political science association and tolerates research on political subjects by social scientists in related fields. Our discussion will deal first with the USSR, and then turn to Eastern Europe, where the primary focus will be on the two countries in which political science has developed the furthest—Poland and Yugoslavia.

With these remarks in mind, we can now proceed to a more detailed examination of political science in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

I. POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION

Conditions in the Soviet Union are far from congenial to the development of a genuine political science. While many of the stultifying constraints on intellectual inquiry introduced by Stalin have been discarded or modified, and social science research has in some measure replaced Marxist-Leninist dogma, adherents of a Western-style political science still face almost insuperable obstacles. Soviet leaders have, by and large, been extremely reluctant to permit research and writing on the essential questions of political science.

Soviet writers blame Stalin and his "cult of personality" for the slow development of social science in their country. Under Stalin's rule, social science involved a process of "dogmatic deduction, alien to the spirit of Marxism, which 'fitted' real phenomena and facts to the ideas of J. V. Stalin. Inductive research . . . was forgotten."¹ Stalin's views "on any question, and most of all on the development of social phenomena, were considered 'truth of the highest order.'"² With Khrushchev's assaults on Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 and the 22nd Congress in 1961, conditions for creating an empirical social science were materially improved.

Progress, however, has been slow. The 1961 Party Program, for example, while encouraging social scientists to investigate contemporary political problems, reminded them that such studies:

. . . must disclose the law-governed process of mankind's advance toward communism, the change of the balance of forces in favor of socialism,

¹G. V. Osipov, *et al.*, "Marksistskaya sotsiologiya i sotsiologicheskyye issledovaniya [Marxist Sociology and Sociological Research]," *Nauchnyye Doklady Vysshey Shkoly*, No. 5, 1962, 24.

²V. P. Kazimirschuk, "Nauka prava i metod konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya [Legal Science and the Method of Concrete Sociological Research]," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (hereafter SGP), No. 1, 1964, 35.

the aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, the breakup of the colonial system of imperialism, and the upsurge of the national-liberation movement of the peoples.³

The conclusions, already dogmatically established, are thus to be confirmed by research. This is hardly social science. Rather, it requires conscious selectivity and dedication to (or willingness to be used for) a political purpose.

The past decade has seen Soviet scholars increasingly willing to engage in empirical research—or, as it is known in the USSR, "concrete sociological investigations." Their earliest efforts were far from rigorous; the first public opinion polls lacked methodological sophistication and had an obvious political bent.⁴ The intellectual community was officially committed to the empirical approach in 1962, when the USSR Academy of Sciences formally resolved that, "a necessary condition for the success of scientific work on urgent problems of the social sciences is the comprehensive development of concrete sociological investigations. . . ."⁵ Since that time, Soviet social scientists have acquired considerable sophistication in the use of modern research techniques and have recently begun to apply these to the study of political matters. Indeed, many of the techniques familiar in the West are now employed: scaling techniques (e.g. Guttman and Coombs scales), factor analysis, content analysis, and the use of computers.⁶

³XXII S'ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, *Stenograficheskii Otchet* [22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *Stenographic Report*], 1962, Volume III, 324.

⁴The first poll was published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the Young Communist League newspaper, on May 19, 1960. For a critical evaluation of early polling efforts, see "Voprosam metodologii izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya [Problems of Methodology in Studying Public Opinion]," *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 6, 1961, 82-84. See also Emilia Wilder, "Opinion Polls," *Survey*, No. 48 (July, 1963), 118-129; and Allen Kassof, "Moscow Discovers Public Opinion Polls," *Problems of Communism*, 10, No. 3 (May-June, 1961), 52-55.

⁵Kazimirschuk, *op. cit.*, 35-36.

⁶See V. N. Shubkin, "Kolichestvennyye metody v sotsiologii [Quantitative Methods in Sociology]," *Voprosy Filosofii* (hereafter VF), No. 3, 1967, 33; F. T. Selyukov, "Kolichestvennyye metody v sotsial'nykh issledovaniyakh [Quantitative Methods in Social Research]," SGP, No. 8, 1967, 143; M. I. Zhabskii, "Testirovaniye voprosnika v sotsial'nom issledovanii [Pretesting Questionnaires in Social Research]," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta* (hereafter VMU), Seriya VIII, Filo-

It should be pointed out that some Soviet social scientists, like their counterparts in the West, have expressed concern (or perhaps a measure of insecurity) over the increasing emphasis on quantitative methods. They have spoken out against what they regard as "the fetishism of numbers" and even expressed doubts about such concepts as arithmetic average, degree of error, or correlation. They refer to sampling surveys as "creeping empiricism" (*polzuchii empirizm*) and accuse certain polling enthusiasts of "questionnaire mania" (*anketomaniya*).⁷ They have found powerful support in the Party's Central Committee, whose members have little regard for empirical research lacking in "serious theoretical and practical importance."⁸

Given the indifference or even hostility of the highest Party authorities, plus the traditionally value laden orientation of Soviet social science, two facts become clear. First, only by emphasizing the utilitarian character of their research can empirical social scientists gain the necessary latitude to move in new directions. And second, it is difficult for a discipline such as political science to gain official acceptance, for its value free, "pure science" approach may threaten the existing order. Adherents of political science, then, must adopt an indirect approach toward establishing their discipline: by focusing on methodology and concrete sociological investigations, they may be able to build a science of politics. It is precisely such empirical investigations, conducted by representatives of other disciplines, which have already produced studies ap-

sofiya, No. 4, 1967, 63-69; N. V. Golubeva and M. I. Ivanyuk, "Tekhnika provedeniya nestandardizovannogo interv'yū [Techniques of Conducting Non-Standardized Interviews], *Filosofskiiye Nauki*, No. 1, 1969, 110-116.

⁷ A. M. Rumyantsev and G. V. Osipov, "Marksistskaya sotsiologiya i konkretnyye sotsial'nyye issledovaniya [Marxist Sociology and Concrete Social Research], *VF*, No. 6, 1968, 4; E. Lisavtsev, et al., "Na nauchnoi osnove: sotsial'nyye issledovaniya v praktiku partiinoi raboty [On a scientific Basis: Apply Social Research to Party Work], *Pravda*, May 11, 1965, 2. See also Shubkin, *op. cit.*, 31.

⁸ "O merakh po dal'neishemu razvitiyu obshchestvennykh nauk i povysheniyu ikh roli v kommunisticheskoy stroitel'stve [On Measures for Further Developing the Social Sciences and Increasing Their Role in Communist Construction], *Pravda*, August 22, 1967, 1. See also V. Yadov, "Prestige in Danger," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, February 28, 1968, 11; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter *CDSP*), 20, No. 10 (March 27, 1968), 7-8.

propriately called political science. At the same time, they have stimulated a number of Soviet scholars to seek the creation of political science as an independent field.

There is at present no academic discipline in the Soviet Union known as political science.⁹ Nor are there political scientists. There is, however, a Soviet Political Science Association (SPSA),¹⁰ an organization which, for the past decade, has brought together Soviet scholars studying political institutions and practices. While such a body would seem a likely vehicle for establishing an independent political science discipline, it is, paradoxically, one of the major obstacles to such a development.

The SPSA is comprised mainly of legal scholars, a fact with far-reaching implications for its orientation toward political science as a specialized field of study.¹¹ These will be dealt with more fully below. Here we may point to the legal-institutional focus of the Association and its members. The organization is rather small, with total membership amounting in 1966 to only some 360 persons.¹² The current President (V. M. Chkhikvadze), his predecessor (V. S. Tadevosian), and four of the Association's six vice-presidents are legal scholars, as are seventeen members of the nineteen-man executive committee.¹³

⁹ When writing for a foreign audience, Soviet scholars sometimes suggest that political science is a recognized field of study in the USSR. See, e.g., M. Zvorykin, "The Social Sciences in the USSR: Achievements and Trends," *International Social Science Journal* (hereafter *ISSJ*), 16, No. 4 (1964), 588-602; Makar Gorianov and Igor Glagoliev, "Notes Concerning Research on Peace and Disarmament Conducted in the USSR," *ISSJ*, 17, No. 3 (1965), 417-419. Zvorykin (596-597) defines political science as "the study of the political superstructure of a given society."

¹⁰ Until 1965, this organization was known as the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences. Its present name is, more properly, the Soviet Association of Political Sciences.

¹¹ E. V. Tadevosian, then President of the Association, is reported to have assured a Western scholar that creation of the organization did not imply recognition of political science as an independent discipline. See Gordon Skilling, "In Search of Political Science in the USSR," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 29, No. 4 (November, 1963), 519.

¹² I. T. Pomerantsev, "V Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh nauk [In the Soviet Political Science Association], *SGP*, No. 6, 1966, 135.

¹³ G. S. Ostroumov, "Nauchnyye osnovy politiki — v tsentre vnimaniya Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politiki

The SPSA has two purposes: (1) to facilitate Soviet dealings with Western political scientists, particularly through the International Political Science Association, and (2) to criticize Western political science, especially those works which challenge Soviet ideology or conduct.

Soviet delegates have been increasingly active at IPSA meetings and have attended IPSA Congresses and round table discussions since the Fifth Congress in 1961. For some time, they expressed concern about their subordinate role in the organization and demanded that they be accorded the status appropriate to a Great Power. At the Seventh Congress, held in Brussels in 1967, Chkhikvadze was named a vice-president of the IPSA, and another SPSA representative delivered one of the major addresses to the Congress. These developments, an official of SPSA has argued, are evidence of the impressive stature of Soviet political science.¹⁴

To the Soviet Association, an international gathering is an ideological battleground and a proper forum for East-West confrontations. Indeed, the SPSA has even attempted to use the IPSA as a vehicle for official Soviet foreign policy. Thus, in 1962 the SPSA appealed to the American Political Science Association to "raise its voice in protest" against the "persecution" of the Communist Party of the USA.¹⁵ Having failed to persuade the American Association to act, the Soviets turned to the IPSA with a similar protest.¹⁶ The IPSA, too, chose not to accept the Soviet challenge.

The purpose of the SPSA, then is not simply scholarly contact and exchanges of views. It is also required to "unmask the slanderous fabrications" of "bourgeois political science" and the horrors of "bourgeois" political life. The first conference of the SPSA was told that "criticism of contemporary bourgeois political science is not conducted sharply and actively enough. A

comprehensive criticism of bourgeois political science is needed . . ."¹⁷ Western political science, far from being the scientific study of politics, is depicted as a prescriptive, value-laden pseudo-discipline. It supports the existing order by devising reformist schemes and by conducting "an active struggle with Marxism."¹⁸

Clearly, the Soviet Political Science Association is more interested in polemics and official dogma than in developing a scientific study of politics. Those anxious to create a genuine political science have had to approach their objective from another direction.

The removal of Nikita Khrushchev from power in October, 1964 provided adherents of political science with an opportunity to state their case. On January 10, 1965, *Pravda* published a major article by F. Burlatskii, a philosophy professor and member of the executive committee of the SPSA, explicitly calling for the establishment of such a science.¹⁹ Emphasizing the utilitarian purposes of his proposals, and citing Khrushchev's errors as evidence of what an unscientific, unsystematic approach to political problems can lead to, Burlatskii urged that a genuine political science be created. Although he focused on its instrumental value, Burlatskii's essential purpose was quite different. He sought to take the study of politics out of the hands of the dogmatists and place it the hands of true social scientists. He dismissed "the tendency to

¹⁴ V. Slavin, "Pervoye ezhegodnoye sobraniye Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [First Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP*, No. 7, 1961, 133.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 131-135; Shatrov (1962), *op. cit.*, 127; S. Z., *op. cit.*, 139; V. G. Kalenskii, "O predmete i metode burzhuaznoi politicheskoi nauki [On the Scope and Method of Bourgeois Political Science]," *SGP*, No. 9, 1966, 37; G. S. Ostroumov, "Teoriya gosudarstva i prava kak politicheskaya nauka [The Theory of State and Law as Political Science]," *SGP*, No. 2, 1968, 29-30. Soviet writers are particularly critical of the American literature on systematic political theory and pluralist theory. See Kalenskii, *op. cit.*, 41; B. A. Shabad, "O sovremennykh antikommunisticheskikh teoriyakh gosudarstva [On Present-Day Anti-Communist Theories of the State]," *SGP*, No. 8, 1968, 82-89; V. Ye. Guliyev and E. L. Kuz'min, "O nekotorykh burzhuaznykh teoriyakh gosudarstvennoi vlasti [Several Bourgeois Theories of State Power]," *VMU*, Seriya XII, Pravo, No. 2, 1968, 31-38; V. Kalenskii, *Politicheskaya nauka v SShA [Political Science in the USA]*, 1969.

¹⁹ F. Burlatskii, "Politika i nauka [Politics and Science]," *Pravda*, January 10, 1965, 4.

cheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [The Scientific Bases of Politics—At the Center of Attention of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP*, No. 7, 1965, 151.

¹⁶ S. Z., "Mezhdunarodnyi forum po voprosam politicheskoi nauki [International Forum on Questions of Political Science]," *SGP*, No. 1, 1968, 140.

¹⁷ V. P. Shatrov, "V Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [In the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP*, No. 8, 1962, 127.

¹⁸ V. P. Shatrov, "Tret'e ezhegodnoye sobraniye Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [Third Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP*, No. 7, 1963, 163.

comment"—the established practice of interpreting and elucidating known Marxist texts. A "truly profound investigation" of politics, according to Burlatskii, "presupposes the raising of questions whose answers are not known beforehand." This is a demand for a true political science.

Burlatskii also called for the scientific discussion of a wide range of political questions, both domestic and international. He thus challenged the traditional Soviet approach, which involves reliance on the "classics of Marxism-Leninism" and almost exclusive concern with the formal institutions of government. Burlatskii advocated a kind of behavioralism: he hoped to investigate real political processes involving the entire range of political actors, i.e., individuals, the party, the state apparatus, and public organizations such as the Komsomol and the trade unions.

Burlatskii's article precipitated a lively debate among Soviet scholars on the merits of political science. His supporters, despite their differences, are united in urging a shift from dogma to science.²⁰ His opponents, without specifically addressing themselves to Burlatskii's criticisms, have dismissed his proposals as superfluous.

Resistance to the suggestions of the Burlatskii group has come from two sources. One is comprised of doctrinaire ideologists, those for whom the "sciences" of Marxism-Leninism and Scientific Communism provide the answers to all political questions. This group, whose members include E. V. Tadevosian, former President of the Soviet Political Science Association, argues that Marxism-Leninism is *the* political science.²¹

²⁰ S. S. Alekseyev and V. Ye. Chirkin, "O sisteme nauk, izuchayushchikh problemy politicheskoi organizatsii obshchestva, gosudarstva i prava [On the System of Sciences Concerned with Problems of the Political Organization of Society, the State and Law]," *SGP*, No. 5, 1965, 48-50; N. M. Keizerov, "O sootnoshenii ponyatii 'sotsial'naya' i 'politicheskaya' vlast'" [On the Relation Between the Concepts 'Social' and 'Political' Power], *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta* (hereafter *VLU*), Seriya Ekonomiki, Filosofi i Prava, No. 5, 1966, 45; Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 150; D. I. Chesnokov, "Vzaimootnosheniye obshchestvennykh nauk i mesto nauchnogo kommunizma sredi nikh [Interrelations Among the Social Sciences and the Place of Scientific Communism Among Them]," *VF*, No. 3, 1965, 24; "O razrabotke problem politicheskikh nauk [On Working Out Problems of the Political Sciences]," *Pravda*, June 13, 1965, 4.

²¹ E. V. Tadevosian, "Diskussiya o politicheskoi nauke [A Discussion of Political Science]," *VF*, No. 10, 1965, 165; "O razrabotke problem politi-

They have put Burlatskii and his allies in the awkward position of appearing to challenge the authority of Marxism-Leninism. The other group resisting political science consists of those legal scholars—including many members of the SPSA—who resent the intrusion of a new discipline into a field they consider properly their own. Academic discussion of political and governmental questions has been the responsibility of specialists in jurisprudence. Now, as one non-Soviet scholar has remarked, the proposal to establish political science as an independent field has evoked the greatest hostility from "precisely those jurists whose own discipline stood to be restricted by the new arrangement."²² Some of them refuse to set off any science as "political," in contrast with other "non-political" social sciences.²³ Others complain about attempts to "politicize" or "sociologize" jurisprudence.²⁴ A third group is willing to extend the purview of the already existing "political sciences" (jurisprudence and the science of state and law) and "bring them up to date."²⁵ They agree only on one matter: the need to combat political science.

While the ideologists and jurists differ with one another and among themselves in many respects, they seem to share a common concern: to create an independent political science would be to create a rival. Beneath the intellectual arguments and rhetoric, it would seem, lie entrenched interests which want to retain control over scholarly inquiry into political matters. This conservative alliance of ideologists and legal specialists, whether tacit or formal, has been a powerful barrier to the establishment of politi-

cheskikh nauk," *op. cit.*, 4; Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 148.

²² Laszlo Revesz, "Political Science in Eastern Europe: Discussion and Initial Steps," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, VII, No. 3, 194. See also Joseph Frankel, "Theory of State, Cybernetics and Political Science in the Soviet Union," *Political Studies*, 15, No. 4 (February, 1967), 59-60; and L. G. Churchward, "Towards a Soviet Political Science," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 12, No. 1 (May, 1966), 66-75.

²³ Ostroumov (1968), *op. cit.*, 24.

²⁴ According to P. N. Galanza, jurists ought to deal with political science only if "the legitimacy of the latter should ultimately be proved." See Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 149, and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Post-Stalin 'Thaw' and Soviet Political Science," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXX, No. 1 (February, 1964), 33.

²⁵ Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 149.

cal science. Plans to introduce a political science course in secondary schools in 1961-62 were canceled abruptly in the spring of 1961, and a course on the USSR Constitution was substituted.²⁶ Formal instruction in political science at the university level, too, has been discouraged.²⁷ Clearly, then, to find evidence of political science in the USSR, we will have to enlarge the scope of our inquiry.

Soviet scholars in a variety of other social sciences, from history to computer science, have been engaged in research which can properly be termed political science. Their efforts are as yet very uneven: some mix official dogma with scientific inquiry, while others focus their attention on matters of only marginal concern. But important questions are being asked, and the rough outlines of a Soviet political science are clearly visible. Certain fields within Soviet "political science" are more advanced than others. Non-polemical writings in political theory, comparative government and international relations, for example, seldom appear. These fields are still the domain of ideologists and politicians; scholars are called upon merely to provide support for officially prescribed interpretations and conclusions. The fields of local government and public administration, on the other hand, have received considerable scholarly attention and show promise of achieving professional, scientific standards.

The operation of local government has been the subject of several scholarly inquiries in recent years. The most important of these are studies of local soviets in the Siberian city of Irkutsk and in the republic of Estonia. Both investigations make use of survey research techniques, sampling the opinions of representative groups of deputies and—in the Siberian study—the deputies' constituents as well. The Siberian research team has focused its attention on three questions: (1) relations between deputies and their constituents, (2) work patterns of deputies, and (3) ways to improve the work of deputies. Among their more interesting findings was the fact that fewer than 10% of the citizens they polled knew the names of the local deputies for whom they had voted. At the same time, the investigators discovered, 13% of the population had contacted their deputies at least once within the past year. Of these, almost half (44%)

raised questions of importance only to their families, while only about 8% were interested in matters of broad social significance, i.e., concerning the entire city or their own borough.²⁸

The Estonian researchers have looked into related questions. A poll of almost 1,000 deputies indicated that, while there are significant differences among individual deputies, few devote an appreciable amount of time to their work. It appears, moreover, that deputies spend less time performing political services in their districts than they do in official meetings. And, when asked how well they performed their tasks, a large majority (77.6%) expressed reservations. They pointed to two major factors: (1) their lack of experience and (2) inadequate working conditions, i.e., lack of assistance from local agencies, lack of funds, and the indifference of higher bodies, particularly Party officials.²⁹

The beginnings of a scientific approach can also be seen in the field of public administration. Soviet representatives have participated in meetings of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences since 1956. They have adopted a number of "bourgeois" suggestions in such areas as planning and budgeting.³⁰ More recently, scholars have pointed to the irrationality of Nikita Khrushchev's frequent reorganizations and have called instead for more systematic measures. As one writer urged: "not one reorganization or restructuring of the administration without science; the first word in organizing the administrative apparatus belongs to science."³¹

²⁶ V. A. Perttsik, "Puti sovershenstvovaniya deyatelnosti deputatov mestnykh Sovetov [Ways of Improving the Work of Deputies of Local Soviets]," *SGP*, No. 7, 1967, 16-21.

²⁷ I. Kalits *et al.*, "Izucheniye deyatelnosti deputatov s pomoshch'yu konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo metoda [Studying the Work of Deputies With the Aid of Concrete Sociological Methods]," *SGP*, No. 9, 1965, 65-70. A more recent study of deputies of local soviets in the Armenian SSR tends to confirm the conclusions of the Estonian researchers. "Effektivnost' deputatskoi deyatelnosti [The Effectiveness of the Deputy's Work]," *SGP*, No. 1, 1969, 110-115.

²⁸ "Varshavskaya konferentsiya Mezhdunarodnogo instituta administrativnykh nauk [Warsaw Conference of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences]," *SGP*, No. 10, 1964, 138-140; Ts. S., "XIII Mezhdunarodnyi kongress po problemam administrativnykh nauk [XIII International Congress on Problems of Administrative Sciences]," *SGP*, No. 11, 1965, 146-149.

²⁹ V. M. Manokhin, "O predmete i zadachakh

²⁶ "On Teaching the USSR Constitution in Graduating Classes of Secondary Schools in the 1961-1962 School Year," *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, April 4, 1961, 3; translated in *CDSP*, XIII, No. 18 (May 31, 1961), 26.

²⁷ Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 151.

Soviet scholars are trying to create a science of administration. There have been numerous proposals to channel thinking in this area, including suggestions for a science of organization, a science of administration, a science of "social administration," and a science of "Soviet construction."³² Several scholars have been exploring a systems approach to administrative questions. The philosopher V. G. Afanasiev, for example, has developed a theory of society as a complex administrative system—an "integral self-regulating system," as he terms it.³³ A legal scholar, Ts. Yampolskaya, has carried out the most imaginative research in the field of admin-

istration, using a systems approach. She and others from the Institute of State and Law have investigated the workings of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Culture, examining the correspondence reaching, leaving and circulating within the Ministry. According to Yampolskaya, "the routes and rates of document circulation . . . are . . . significant indices of the correctness or incorrectness of the internal structure of the system." By studying the administrative system and its subsystems, she has been able to work out, at least in a preliminary way, measures of responsiveness, initiative, leadership and control.³⁴

Soviet social scientists are exploring a number of other questions which are clearly within the purview of political science. In addition, they have identified a broad array of important political matters which they would like to investigate, including many that traditionally have been regarded as too sensitive or controversial for scientific inquiry. Prospects for a thorough investigation of all these subjects is problematical, and here we can only outline recent efforts and proposals.

Small group behavior is a subject of increasing scholarly interest. Several investigators presently are working in this area, and a conference at Moscow State University in late 1967 indicated that important "political science" questions are being explored. Among the more imaginative investigators is I. V. Sergeyeva, who has been examining patterns of leadership in small groups. She has isolated distinctive leadership types, e.g., "planners," "arbiters," "experts" and "ideologists."³⁵ Other researchers have focused on communications patterns regulating small group behavior, changes in individual and group values, and the dynamics of socialization.³⁶

Investigators in other areas, too, have been examining "political science" questions. In the field of international relations, several social scientists have begun to work with game theory, simulation and modelling, as an aid in analyzing international conflicts.³⁷ In addition, A. V. Bara-

nauki upravleniya v sovremennyy period [On the Scope and Tasks of the Science of Administration in the Current Period], *SGP*, No. 2, 1965, 87-88. See also D. A. Kerimov, "O perspektivakh razvitiya obshchestvennykh nauk v universitete [Perspectives on the Development of the Social Sciences in the University], *VLU, Seriya Ekonomiki, Filosofii i Prava*, No. 23, 1965, 18-19; "Revolutsionnaya teoriya osveshchaet nash put' [Revolutionary Theory Illuminates Our Path], *Pravda*, November 5, 1964, 2.

³² Z. M. Bor, *Upravleniye proizvodstvom i organizatsiya truda* [The Administration of Production and the Organization of Labor], 1967, 17; G. I. Petrov, "Predmet nauki sotsial'nogo upravleniya [The Subject Matter of the Science of Social Administration], *SGP*, No. 6, 1968, 75-82; Ya. N. Umanskii, "O predmete i nauke sovetskogo stroitel'stva [The Subject Matter and the Science of Soviet Construction], *SGP*, No. 10, 1968, 73-79. See also K. I. Baldina and N. G. Salishcheva, "Koordinatsionnoye soveshchaniye po voprosam nauki upravleniya [Coordinating Conference on Questions of Administrative Science], *SGP*, No. 2, 1969, 137-138; Yu. A. Tikhomirov, "Teoriya sotsialisticheskogo upravleniya [The Theory of Socialist Administration], *SGP*, No. 7, 1969, 77-85. The proposed science of "soviet construction" would focus exclusively on government bodies (the soviets). The broader sciences of "social administration" and "socialist administration" would deal with government bodies and with such non-government bodies as the trade unions and the Komsomol.

³³ V. G. Afanasiev, *Nauchnoye upravleniye obshchestva* [The Scientific Administration of Society], 1968, 22-51. See also two earlier works by Afanasiev: "Nauchnoye rukovodstvo sotsial'nymi protsessami [Scientific Direction of Social Processes], *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1965, 58-73, and *V. I. Lenin o nauchnom upravlenii obshchestvom* [V. I. Lenin on the Scientific Administration of Society], 1966.

³⁴ Ts. A. Yampolskaya, "K metodologii nauki upravleniya [Toward a Methodology for the Science of Administration], *SGP*, No. 8, 1965, 12-21. Quotation on 12.

³⁵ Selyukov, *op. cit.*, 143.

³⁶ Ye. A. Yablokova, "Problema mal'kh grupp v burzhuaaznoi i marksistskoi sotsiologii [The Problem of Small Groups in Bourgeois and Marxist Sociology], *VMU, Seriya VIII, Filosofiya*, No. 4, 1968, 101-103.

³⁷ D. Yermolenko, "Sociology and International Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No.

nov has been studying changes in the values of the Soviet leadership by performing a content analysis of the newspaper *Izvestia* during the period 1919-1964.³⁸ A. I. Verkhovskaya has begun to analyze letters to the editors of newspapers.³⁹ A team of researchers at Tartu University in Estonia is investigating, *inter alia*, the political views of 1,000 university students, a project whose followup interviews will continue into the early 1970's.⁴⁰ Even the extremely sensitive subject of the attitudes of various nationality groups toward one another and toward certain social and political questions is now being examined.⁴¹

Perhaps most significantly, Soviet social scientists have begun to treat the work of Western political scientists with greater respect. The American literature on mass communications, for example, has aroused considerable interest

1, 1967, 14-19; D. Yermolenko, "Sociology and Problems of International Conflict," *International Affairs*, No. 8, 1968, 47-53; N. Ustinov, "Mathematical Methods in the Analysis of International Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 12, 1968, 74-82. See also G. Gerasimov, "Teoriya igr i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya [Game Theory and International Relations]," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya*, No. 7, 1966, 101-108; N. N. Vorobiev, "Nekotoryye metodologicheskiye problemy teorii igr [Several Methodological Problems of Game Theory]," *VF*, No. 1, 1966, 93-103; L. A. Petrovskaya and S. A. Petrovskii, "Teoriya igr i sotsiologiya [Game Theory and Sociology]," *VMU*, Seriya VIII, *Filosofiya*, No. 4, 1968, 49-59. A comprehensive treatment of the Soviet literature on international relations may be found in William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations* (1969).

³⁸ Selyukov, *op. cit.*, 143.

³⁹ A. I. Verkhovskaya, "Pis'mo v gazetnuyu yego avtor kak ob'ekt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya [The Letter to the Editor and Its Author as an Object of Sociological Research]," *VMU*, Seriya XI, *Zhurnalistika*, No. 4, 1968, 49-59.

⁴⁰ S. Murashov and V. Orel, "The Student and the Social Sciences," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 20, 1966; 1-2; translated in *CDSF*, 18, No. 17 (May 18, 1966), 5.

⁴¹ Yu. V. Arutyunian, "Opyt sotsial'no-etnicheskogo issledovaniya [An Experiment in Social-Ethnographic Research]," *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 4, 1968, 3-13; L. N. Lentsman, "Konkretnyye sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya partiino-ideologicheskoi raboty v Estonskoi SSR" [Concrete Sociological Research into Party-Ideological Work in the Estonian SSR], in V. I. Mudragei *et al.*, *Problemy nauchnogo kommunizma [Problems of Scientific Communism]*, 1968, volume 2, 76-78.

and enthusiasm.⁴² Moreover, Soviet scholars have published a number of relatively non-polemical works on "bourgeois" government, relying almost exclusively on Western sources and explicitly adopting the findings of Western scholars. Studies of American federalism and of federal efforts to regulate campaign spending are good examples of this genre; while they do not demonstrate original scholarship, they treat their subject in a detached and unemotional manner.⁴³ Almost inevitably, however, even the best of these works are marred by the sudden insertion of gratuitous propaganda slogans.

⁴² Yu. A. Sherkovin, "O prirode i funktsiyakh massovoi kommunikatsii [The Nature and Functions of Mass Communications]," *VMU*, Seriya XI, *Zhurnalistika*, No. 6, 1967, 41-58; V. S. Korobeinikov, "Analiz soderzhaniya massovoi kommunikatsii" [Content Analysis of Mass Communications], *VF*, No. 4, 1969, 100-110; Ye. A. Nozhin, "Teoriya kommunikatsii i yego znachenie dlya propagandy" [The Significance of Communications Theory for Propaganda], in Mudragei *et al.* *op. cit.*, 149-172; Yu. A. Sherkovin, "O vzaimodeystvii reklamy i propagandy" [The Interaction Between Advertising and Propaganda], in Mudragei *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 186-200; and L. N. Fedotova, "Analiz soderzhaniya—sotsiologicheskii sposob izucheniya pechati, radio, televiziya" [Content Analysis—Sociological Means for Studying the Press, Radio and Television], *VMU*, Seriya XI, *Zhurnalistika*, No. 4, 1969, 57-65.

⁴³ B. S. Krylov, "K probleme suvereniteta federatsii i shtatov v SSHA [The Problem of Federal and State Sovereignty in the USA]," *SGP*, No. 9, 1964, 74-85; A. V. Dmitriyev, "O federal'nom kontrole assignovani na vybory prezidenta SSHA [Federal Control of Spending in Presidential Elections in the USA]," *VLU*, Seriya *Ekonomika*, *Filosofiya*, *Pravo*, No. 17, 1968, 114-116; V. M. Abarshtalin, "Parlament Efiopii" [The Parliament of Ethiopia], *VMU*, Seriya XII, *Pravo*, No. 3, 1969, 49-58; N. V. Sivachev, "Vmeshatel'stvo organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti SSHA v trudovyye konflikty v gody vtoroi mirovoi voiny" [Interference by Executive Organs of the USA in Labor Conflicts During the Second World War], *VMU*, Seriya XII, *Pravo*, No. 4, 1969, 20-30; and V. V. Smirnov, "Munitsipal'naya Sistema N'yu-iorka" [New York's Municipal System], *VMU*, Seriya XII, *Pravo*, No. 6, 1969, 44-52.

⁴⁴ For example, in his study of American campaign spending, Dmitriyev argues that only the American working class, struggling "to create a broad anti-monopoly front and to democratize the country's political life," can prevent abuses. Dmitriyev, *op. cit.*, 116. See also R. Kh. Vil'danov, *Konstitutsii v politicheskoi sisteme burzhuanogo*

This need not be a disabling problem; even works marred by the presence of unwarranted or polemical remarks can contribute to the growth of a more scientific study of politics. Thus, while the Soviet social scientist Yermolenko has attacked Herman Kahn for allegedly advocating nuclear war, he has also acknowledged that "Kahn's reasoning could be of some positive value."⁴⁵ The implications of such an attitude are vast indeed.

Proposals for future research provide additional momentum in the direction of political science. Many of these suggestions reveal an increasing impatience with traditional descriptive-institutional studies and favor a behavioral approach. "For many years," a leading Soviet jurist has written, "Soviet public law specialists confined themselves . . . primarily to commentaries upon various decisions and provisions of the USSR Constitution." He has called instead for survey research into such matters as reasons for the recall of deputies, and the opinions of deputies and officials of soviets.⁴⁶ Another member of the legal profession has urged research into other significant questions, e.g., relations between individual Party committees and soviets, relations between local soviets and their executive committees, and even the "effectiveness" of the existing election system, i.e., its capacity to provide adequate representation for the citizenry).⁴⁷

The most dramatic and far-reaching suggestions for scientific study of political affairs have come from R. A. Safarov of the Institute of State and Law.⁴⁸ He has proposed that an Institute of Public Opinion be established under the Academy's auspices. It would conduct regular samplings of public opinion, using rigorous scientific procedures, and explore basic political questions. To be sure, an Institute of Public Opinion has been operating in the USSR since 1960, under the auspices of the youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Its activities, however, often have deviated from acceptable scientific

practice, and it has avoided matters of direct political concern.⁴⁹ Safarov's Institute would be policy-oriented: it would take samplings both before and after official policies were adopted. His purpose is to bring public policy into line with public opinion—a dramatic change from today's practice of asserting that the Party's policies are public opinion. Safarov would poll the citizenry on major questions of domestic and foreign policy, including reforms in the administrative structure, the activity of public officials, and even questions of labor law, pensions, collective farm law, and civil and criminal law. Effective government, he argues, requires responsiveness to true public opinion. At the same time, he emphasizes that empirical social science can be an effective aid to the Party; it can remove existing sources of dissatisfaction and improve the direction and administration of society.

In the near future, we can expect continuing challenges to Party ideologists by social scientists anxious to expand their field of research. If they continue to circumvent or even ignore the Party's demands for a "class viewpoint" in the study of politics, adherents of a scientific approach may make further progress. The Party, because it finds the promise of political science inviting as well as threatening, seems willing at this time to permit some measure of independent research.⁵⁰ But the regime's pervasive concern with *partiinnost* (party-mindedness) and increasing emphasis on proper Marxist-Leninist indoctrination⁵¹ suggest that it will be difficult indeed to transform this greater measure of independence into a value-free political science.

II. EASTERN EUROPE

The growth of political science in Eastern Europe has not been uniform. Political science associations exist in four East European countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia

obshchestva [Constitutions in the Political System of Bourgeois Society], 1968.

⁴⁵ Yermolenko (1967), *op. cit.*, 17.

⁴⁶ A. I. Lepeshkin, "Nazrevshiye voprosy razvitiya nauki sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo prava [Urgent Questions in Developing the Science of Soviet Public Law]," *SGP*, No. 2, 1965, 5–15. Quotation on 6–7.

⁴⁷ Perttsik, *op. cit.*, 21.

⁴⁸ R. A. Safarov, "Vyyavleniye obshchestvennogo mneniya v gosudarstvenno-pravovoi praktike [The Expression of Public Opinion in State and Legal Practices]," *SGP*, No. 10, 1967, 46–54.

⁴⁹ See Paul Hollander, "The Dilemmas of Soviet Sociology," *Problems of Communism*, 14, No. 6 (November–December, 1965), 43–45.

⁵⁰ The present contradictory approach to the social sciences was stated explicitly and succinctly by S. Kovalev: "Our social science must combine consistent Marxist-Leninist party-mindedness with a strictly scientific approach." "Trebovaniya zhizni i obshchestvennyye nauki [Life's Demands and the Social Sciences]," *Pravda*, May 6, 1966, 3.

⁵¹ P. Demichev, "Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i zadachi obshchestvennykh nauk [The Construction of Communism and Tasks of the Social Sciences]," *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1968, 14–35; Rumyantsev and Osipov, *op. cit.*, 7.

and Rumania.⁵² Of these four, however, only Poland and Yugoslavia have advanced to the point where the study of the discipline has had an impact on teaching and research in the social sciences. Even in these two countries, there are important differences in respect to the achievements of and prospects for the profession.

In Poland, an Association of Political Science was established in 1957 as a loose federation of learned societies concerned with the subject matter of political science.⁵³ In 1960 the association was reorganized to permit membership on the part of individuals; since that time the group has been active in holding conferences of its members and sending delegations to congresses of the IPSA. On occasion the Party has attempted to utilize the association to control political science in Poland, but this effort has not met with great success. The Polish Association, in contrast to its counterpart in the USSR, has a record of defending the rights of its members, and supporting the growth of an independent political science discipline in Poland.

While many institutions have been engaged in research in political science in Poland over the past decade, resistance to the new discipline on the part of traditionally oriented faculties for many years limited the teaching of political science in the universities to a chair in political sociology at Warsaw University. In 1963 political science was included in the curriculum of a limited number of institutions of higher learning in the form of a course entitled "The Fundamentals of Political Science," and in 1965 the

Institute for the Political Sciences was established with the objective of training persons to teach the "Fundamentals" course. While the formation of the Institute, with a five year program in political science, was a victory for the advocates of the profession, the "Fundamentals" course has been primarily a means of political education and indoctrination and only secondarily concerned with imparting a knowledge of the discipline. With the extension of the course to all institutions of higher education in the fall of 1969, political science teaching in Poland became even more closely identified with the ideological and political interests of the regime.

In Yugoslavia a political science association was formed in 1951.⁵⁴ In 1957-58 the Law Faculty of Belgrade University introduced changes in its curriculum designed to encourage the study of political science within the faculty, and in 1962 a faculty of the political sciences was founded at the University of Zagreb. Since 1964 the faculty has published a journal, *Političko Misao* (*Political Thought*), devoted to research and discussion of the field of political science. Currently, the four "High" (Advanced) Schools for the Political Sciences, which in the past have been responsible for training party cadres, are being reorganized into faculties with open enrollment. This step has already been taken at Sarajevo, where a faculty of political science—which includes in its curriculum the study of sociology—has been in operation for several years.

Instruction in political science in Yugoslavia is less concerned with indoctrination and more directed toward political education in the broadest sense. The faculties of political science specialize in training for careers in public service; many of their graduates can be found in positions, such as radio and television, which require a general familiarity with politics. Presumably these faculties will become an even more important training ground for persons filling politically sensitive positions as the party schools are closed and all or part of their student body transfers to the political science faculties.

⁵² For the official attitude toward the social sciences in East Germany, see the October, 1968 resolution of the SED Politburo, *Einheit*, December, 1968, 1455-1470. In Hungary, a recent article by the Director of the Sociological Research Group of the Academy of Sciences, Kalman Kulcsar, gave support to the idea of political science. Other articles have described empirical research on village councils, and on certain aspects of the legal system, being carried out by the Sociological Research Group and Legal Sciences Institute in Hungary. See *Partelet*, July, 1969, 36-41 and *Nepszabadsag*, May 31, 1969, 4-5.

⁵³ For the development of Polish political science, see Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Les Sciences Politiques en Pologne," *International Social Science Council Bulletin*, March, 1966, 66-77; Marian Zychowski, "Nauki polityczne [The Political Sciences]," *Nowe Drogi*, 20, No. 12 (1966), 20-27; Uniwersytet Warszawski, *Osrodek Metodyczny Nauk Politycznych*, *Studia Nauk Politycznych: Biuletyn Informacyjno-Naukowy* [Studies in the Political Sciences: Scientific Information Journal], No. 1, 1966.

⁵⁴ Nerkez Smailagić, "Problemi nastavnog plana Fakulteta političkih nauka [Problems of the Curriculum of the Faculty of Political Sciences] *Politička Misao*, 1, No. 1 (1964), 114-50; Radoslav Ratković, "O predmetu i mestu političkih nauka [On the Subject and Role of Political Sciences] *Naša Stvarnost* 14, No. 2 (February, 1960), 156-68; Leon Geršković, "O stanju i problemima studija političkih nauka u visokoškolskoj nastavi [On the Situation and Problems of the Study of Political Sciences in the Higher School Curricula]," *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke*, 49, No. 4 (October-December, 1963), 489-501.

The establishment of special faculties for political science in Yugoslavia has not been free of problems. At the University of Zagreb existing faculties resisted the change, while over-zealous proselytising for the new political science—"politologija"⁵⁵—led to controversy with political scientists from other institutions. Friction also developed between political scientists and the Party, which had insisted on approving the courses which the Zagreb faculty originally planned to offer its students.⁵⁶ In 1965 the faculty succeeded in reforming its curriculum in such a way as to reduce party influence over the teaching of political science. More recently the faculty incurred the enmity of the Party when its Party organization (made up of both faculty and students) sided with the liberally minded philosophy faculty in support of student demands during the June, 1968 demonstrations at the University of Zagreb.⁵⁷ One consequence of this incident has been new demands from the party for reorganization of the faculty's curriculum.

In Czechoslovakia, criticisms of the Stalinist method of studying politics and suggestions for the development of political sociology appeared as early as 1963.⁵⁸ A Czech political science association was formed and joined the IPSA in 1965. Following the publication of Burlatskii's views in the Soviet Union, articles were published urging the development of political science in Czechoslovakia.⁵⁹ While the Novotny regime never acted on these proposals, steps were

taken to enlist social scientists in the search for new approaches to the country's many political and economic problems. An Institute for the Political Sciences was established under the Party Central Committee to carry out research on the operation of the Czech political system. At the same time an interdisciplinary research team was formed under the Academy of Sciences to make recommendations concerning the future development of the political system in Czechoslovakia.⁶⁰

Prospects for the rapid development of political science, which looked bright after the removal of Novotny,⁶¹ suffered a severe setback as a result of the August, 1968 invasion. It need hardly be added that the prospects for future development of the discipline in Czechoslovakia now appear uncertain in the extreme.

In Rumania, a political science association was formed in the spring of 1968. Insufficient time has elapsed to permit evaluation of its activities. The wording of the charter of the organization suggests that it is to have a dual role, encouraging research and at the same time acting as an instrument for disseminating regime propaganda.⁶² The fact that the first chairman of the association is a politician,⁶³ rather than a political scientist, indicates that the Rumanian government is primarily concerned with the propaganda value of the organization. At the same time, articles in the press and scholarly journals have supported the study of political science in Rumania.⁶⁴ Conditions now seem favorable for at least limited moves toward initiating research and teaching in the discipline.

In the course of a decade, Polish and Yugo-

⁵⁵ The meaning of "politologija" is not entirely clear in Yugoslav literature. One position is that *politologija* is an approach to the study of politics designed to integrate existing fields of political science through the development of a comprehensive theory of politics. See Professor Geršković's views in *Politička Misao*, 2, No. 1 (1965), 145. The term often is used by Yugoslav political scientists simply to refer to the study of politics generally.

⁵⁶ *Politička Misao*, 2, No. 1 (1965), 119.

⁵⁷ *Vjesnik*, June 28, 1968, 1.

⁵⁸ František Šamalík, "Význam sociologie pro vědu o státu a právu [The Meaning of Sociology for the Science of the State and Law]," *Právník*, 102, No. 3 (1963), 177-85; "Překonání důsledků kultu osobnosti a dogmatismu ve vědě o státu a právu [Overcoming the Consequences of the Cult of Personality and Dogmatism in the Science of the State and Law]," *ibid.*, 102, No. 8, (1963), 621-33.

⁵⁹ For contributions to the discussion by Alexandr Ort, Karel Ondříš, František Kratochvíl, Miroslav Soukup and others, see *Nová Mysl*, No. 5, 1965, 684-93 and 1966, No. 8, 12-14; No. 18, 13-15; No. 20, 16-18 and No. 25, 24-28.

⁶⁰ *Rudé Právo*, July 6, 1967, 3.

⁶¹ The interdisciplinary research team referred to above, originally part of the Institute of State and Law, was made part of a new Institute for the Political Sciences. The period between January and August was also marked by a rapid increase in the number of public opinion polls on political and other subjects. Ninety per cent of those responding to a *Rudé Právo* questionnaire indicated that they preferred a multi-party system to a one-party system. *Rudé Právo*, June 27, 1968.

⁶² *Analele Institutului de Studii Istorice si Social-Politice de pe Linga CC al PCR*, May, 1968, 249-50.

⁶³ The Chairman of the Rumanian Political Science Association, George Macovesco, is First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁴ See Ovidiu Trăneș, "Probleme actuale ale științei politice [Current Problems of Political Science]," *Lupta de Clasă*, 48, No. 3 (March, 1968), 84-93.

slav political scientists have produced a sizeable literature in practically all sub-fields of the discipline. This material can be broken down into two types: studies in political behavior, and work in more traditional areas such as comparative government, international relations, or political theory. While Polish political science has made its major contribution in the realm of political behavior, Yugoslav scholars tend to favor the more classical fields of the discipline. This difference is reflected in the political science journals of the two countries. The Yugoslav *Politička Misao* seldom publishes empirical studies of political behavior; *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne* (*Studies in Political Sociology*), during the period of its publication the only Polish journal devoted exclusively to political science, was oriented toward political sociology.

Studies in political behavior date from the early 1960's when Western concepts and research methods penetrated into Poland and Yugoslavia. The result was a wave of interest and enthusiasm for political science. The latest techniques in interviewing, and in the assembling and interpreting of data were tried out. While the results were not always up to expectations, empirical research on Communist systems began to appear for the first time, while the political scientists themselves, many self-trained, gained experience and professional skill.

In Poland, much of the research in the field of political behavior was initially focused on the study of community power structure.⁶⁵ Studies carried out in cooperation with the Party identified key decision-makers in Polish localities and gathered data on changes in the composition of the Party and the attitudes of Party members brought about by the post-war industrialization of Poland.⁶⁶

Polish political scientists have also been engaged in research on electoral behavior, utilizing data on the number of registered voters that participate in elections, the percentage voting for the government list, and the order in which the Polish voter ranks candidates on the ballot.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ This research is summarized by Winicjusz Narojek, *Studies in the Polish Political System* (Warsaw, 1967), 179-200 and *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 23, 1967, 29-43.

⁶⁶ Zygmunt Bauman in *Studies in the Polish Political System*, *op. cit.*, 13-32; see also his "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation: The Case of Poland," *ISSJ*, 16 (1964), 203-16.

⁶⁷ Jerzy Wiatr, "Niektóre zagadnienia opinii publicznej w świetle wyborów 1957 i 1958 [Several Problems of Public Opinion in the Light of the Elections of 1957 and 1958], *Studia Socjo-*

The operation of local government has been approached through the study of political attitudes and values; in this work, Polish political scientists have cooperated with Yugoslav, American and Indian political scientists in a comparative approach to the study of political behavior at the local level.⁶⁸ Polish political scientists and sociologists have also conducted numerous public opinion polls, and sample surveys carried out by Polish social scientists have supplied extensive data on social stratification, modernization and related problems which have been utilized by political scientists.⁶⁹

The findings of these studies in political behavior have not always corresponded to official views and have at times underscored the problems facing Poland in a period of rapid social and economic change. Research into community power structure has confirmed the importance of small groups in the conduct of local affairs. Thus, Winicjusz Narojek, on the basis of data gathered in 1962, identified thirty-seven key persons in the power structure of a town of 30,000, thirty-one in another locality, and so on.⁷⁰ Public opinion polls have on occasion indicated that non-Communist attitudes persist in Poland; for example, research conducted by Józef Koszek on the socio-political attitudes of the peasants pointed to the continuing importance of the middle-aged, better-off peasants as opinion leaders, and the political preferences of this group for the United Peasant Party over the United Workers' (Communist) Party.⁷¹ The analysis of elections, although obviously more limited in scope than similar studies conducted in the West, has suggested the existence of variations in attitudes toward the regime both on a regional and class basis. Jerzy Wiatr's studies of

logiczno Polityczne, No. 4, 1959, entire issue; Stanisław Bereza, "Wybory do Dzielnicowej rady narodowej Warszawa-Ochata w roku 1958 [Elections to the People's Councils of Warsaw Ochata District 1958]," *ibid.*, No. 2, 1959, 161-64; Instytut Nauk Prawnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, *Problemy Rad Narodowych: Studia i materiały* [Problems of the People's Councils: Studies and Materials], No. 7, 1966, entire issue.

⁶⁸ See *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 25, 1968.

⁶⁹ See Władysław Markiewicz, "Sociological Research in People's Poland," in Stanisław Ehrlich (ed.), *Social and Political Transformations in Poland* (1964), 221-54.

⁷⁰ Winicjusz Narojek, *loc. cit.*

⁷¹ "Postawy społeczno-polityczne chłopów [Socio-Political Attitudes of the Peasants]," *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 16, 1964, 207-49.

the 1957 election, moreover, showed the widespread popularity of non-Party over Party candidates, when a choice between the two was possible.

Research in political behavior has developed more slowly in Yugoslavia than Poland. As a consequence it sometimes lacks the professionalism of Polish works. Nevertheless, valuable studies have been produced by Yugoslav political scientists and sociologists. This applies in particular to the work of the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana. Pioneering research has been conducted by members of the Institute in the field of informal decision making.⁷² The results of this work parallel the findings of Polish political scientists on community power structure in Poland, pointing to the existence of informal centers of power at the local level. Public participation in local government and in meetings held for the purpose of choosing candidates for elections has been studied extensively;⁷³ information gathered by the Slovenian group has pointed to public distrust of the bureaucracy and Party as a factor limiting the democratic character of these institutions.

With the exceptions just cited, Yugoslav research on political behavior has not provided an accurate picture of the Yugoslav power structure or the actual manner of operation of self-management and self-government organs. The functioning of the Party is rarely studied from an empirical viewpoint.⁷⁴ Studies of workers,

⁷² Janez Jerovšek, "Neformalne strukture odlučanje na nivou općine [The Informal Structure of Decision Making at the Level of the Opstina]," *Sodobnost*, 12, No. 12 (1964), 1183-94. See also his "Distribucija moći na nivou općine [The Distribution of Power at the Level of the Opstina]," *Teorija in Praksa*, 2, No. 4 (1965), 652-64, and "Uticaj socijalne diferencijacije na strukturu moći na lokalnom nivou [The Influence of Social Differentiation on the Structure of Power at the Local Level]," in *Zbornik promene klasne strukture savremenog jugoslovenskog društva* (1967).

⁷³ Zdravko Mlinar, "Kje se zaustavljate pobuda in kritika [Who Prevents Initiative and Criticism]," *Teorija in Praksa*, 3, No. 11 (November, 1966), 1514-27; "Sociološki aspekti samoupravljanje u komuni [Sociological Aspects of Self-Government in the Communes]," *Gledište*, 6, No. 2 (February, 1965), 195-210.

⁷⁴ One pioneering work which provides selected data from a sample survey on the role of the Party in institutions of self-government carried out in the district of Kraljevo (Serbia) is Krsto Š. Kilibarda, *Samoupravljanje i Savez Komunističke Partije u Srbiji* [Self-Government and the League of Communists in Serbia] (1966).

councils and local governments, and also of public opinion and electoral behavior, have tended to be vague and less revealing than analogous Polish research.⁷⁵ Pressure groups have not been studied to any great degree, although their existence in Yugoslavia is recognized.⁷⁶ Public opinion polls, while they demonstrate familiarity with sample survey techniques, have often suffered from respondent bias.⁷⁷

Polls do, however, touch on political questions and from time to time reveal sources of discontent that exist within the Yugoslav political system. In a special study of student opinion carried out by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, "lack of self-criticism and modesty in life" were identified as the chief defects of so-

[*Self Government and the League of Communists: Results of a Sociological Investigation in the District of Kraljevo*] (1966).

⁷⁵ The vast literature which has appeared in these areas cannot be cited here in detail. Some of the best empirical data on workers' councils have appeared in *Sociologija*, No. 1, 1961, and in the work by Jože Derganc and Ana Cukova, *Delovna skupina v sistemu delavskega samoupravljanja* [Workers' Councils in the System of Self-Management], Institut za sociologijo in filozofijo, Ljubljana (mimeographed) (1966). The Institute for Social Sciences in Belgrade has published many studies in this area as well. An excellent monograph on the Yugoslav commune, which may well be the best empirical piece yet produced by a Yugoslav political scientist, is Eugene Pusić, "Area and Administration in Yugoslav Development," *ISSJ*, 21, No. 1 (1969), 68-82. For a solid discussion of the problems of public administration arising from the operation of the Yugoslav federal system utilizing concrete examples from Yugoslav practice, see Institut za uporedno pravo, *Podela normativne funkcije između organa različitih političkih jedinica* [The Division of Normative Functions Among Organs of Different Political Units] (1966).

⁷⁶ See Zdravko Mlinar, "Družbena struktura komune in problem oblasti [The Social Structure of the Commune and the Problem of Authority]," *Problemi*, 2, No. 13 (1964), 69-79; Milan Knežević, "Neformalne grupe [Informal Groups]," *Oslododjenje*, February 8, 1967, 5; Miodraga Dj. Zečević, *Društvene organizacije i udruženja građana u komuni* [Social Organizations and Associations of Citizens in the Commune] (1965).

⁷⁷ See for example, the poll taken in 1964 on national attitudes in Yugoslavia: "O aktuelnim političkim i društvenim pitanjima [On Immediate Political and Social Problems]," *Jugoslovensko Javno Mnenje*, Series A-3, 1964, 83-108.

cialist relations in Yugoslavia.⁷⁸ One of the annual polls conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences on current issues, asked, "What do you like least in Yugoslav society?" The majority chose "connections and familiarity," an allusion to the importance of political connections and influence in getting ahead.⁷⁹ In another poll, which asked whether the status of the Party had risen or fallen since the war, the 19.1% who answered that it had fallen gave as their explanation the "lack of moral character" of Party members, and the belief that anyone could become a Party member.⁸⁰

In Poland and Yugoslavia the study of the traditional fields of political science has also undergone significant change. Western authorities are now regarded as the single most important source of ideas in most sub-fields of the discipline. Although dogmatic works on government and politics continue to be published in great numbers, there has been a modest but steady flow of more serious studies aimed at incorporating the insights of Western political science into the study of Communist political systems.

Certain areas have received special emphasis. In Poland, local government institutions have been the focus of research since the late 1950's, when the Institute for Legal Sciences began a long-term project on the study of local government organs. The Institute's publication, *Problemy Rad Narodowych* (*Problems of the People's Councils*) has made a significant contribution to our knowledge of local government in Poland.⁸¹ In both Yugoslavia and Poland, the early 1960's were marked by an emphasis on the comparative study of Western political systems. These studies permitted Yugoslav and Polish political scientists to investigate pressure groups, political parties, and other political phenomena at a time when research on domestic political institutions was just getting underway.⁸²

⁷⁸ Miloslav Janicijević *et al.*, *Jugoslovenski studenti i socijalizam* [*Yugoslav Students and Socialism*] (1966).

⁷⁹ "O aktuelnim političkim i društvenim pitanjima 1965 [On Actual Political and Social Questions 1965]," *Jugoslovensko Javno Mnenje*, Series A-3, 1965, 78-79.

⁸⁰ Institut društvenih nauka, *Godišnjak 1965* [*Yearbook 1965*], 126.

⁸¹ See also *Komisije Rady narodowej m. Łódź: podstawy prawne struktura, skład i działalność* [*The Commission of the People's Council of Łódź: The Foundation of its Legal Structure and Activity*] (1960); Wojciech Sokolowicz, *Rzad a prezydium rad narodowych* [*The Work of the Presidium of the National Councils*] (1964).

⁸² Dan Gjanković, "Dvostranački sistem u SAD

Both Yugoslav and Polish political scientists have engaged in the comparative study of Communist political systems, although efforts in this field have slackened in recent years. Yugoslav interest in the subject was perhaps most evident in 1964, when a project on the comparative analysis of socialist systems was under consideration.⁸³ At the same time, Polish constitutional lawyers were looking at comparative problems of Communist systems from a more traditional point of view. The focus of their research was the role of the presidium of the national assembly and the constitutional position of the head of state.⁸⁴

The study of international relations has also been stimulated by the influence of Western political science. This is particularly evident in discussions of the theory of international relations, which now make considerable use of Western models.⁸⁵ At the same time, the increased inter-

[The Two Party System in the USA], *Politička Misao*, 1, No. 3 (1964), 11-63; Kosara Pavlović, "Organizaciona struktura političkih partija Zapadne Evrope [The Organizational Structure of Political Parties in Western Europe], *Gledišta*, 4, No. 8 (1963), 46-56; Maria Hirsowicz, "Problemy państwa Brytyjskiego [Problems of the British State], *Studia socjologiczno polityczne*, No. 7, 1960, entire issue; Albert Meszorer, *Brytyjski System parlamentarny w zarysie* [*The British Parliamentary System in Outline*] (1962); Sylwester Zawadzki, *Panstwo dobrobytu* [*The Welfare State*] (1964); Stanisław Ehrlich, *Władza i interesy. Studium Struktury Politycznej Kapitalizmu* [*Power and Interests. A Study of the Political Structure of Capitalism*] (1967); Jerzy Wiatr, *Amerykańskie wybory* [*American Elections*] (1961).

⁸³ Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, *Društveno-politički sistemi socijalističkih zemalja* [*Social-Political Systems of Socialist Countries*] (1964); *Pregled*, 54, No. 4 (April, 1964), 404.

⁸⁴ Tadeusz Szymczak, *Instytucja prezydenta w socjalistycznym prawie państwowym* [*The Institution of the President in Socialist State Law*] (1963); Ludwig Gelberg, "Problem kolegiálnego prezydenta w państwach socjalistycznych [Problems of the Collegial President in Socialist States], *Panstwo i Prawo*, 22, No. 4-5 (April-May, 1967), 749-53.

⁸⁵ Djure Ninčić, "Metodologija proučavanja međunarodnih odnosa [The Methodology of Studying International Relations], *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke*, 46, No. 3-4, 1960, 238-55; Institute of International Politics and Economics (Prague), *International Relations: A Czech Foreign Policy Review, Selections of Studies from Volume II*, 1967, 55-81; Antonín Šnej-

est of Eastern European governments in Africa, the middle East and Asia has led to rapid growth of research on the problems of developing countries.⁸⁶ Eastern European scholars are nevertheless seriously hampered in their work by the virtual impossibility of publishing views not in accord with official policy. Although carefully researched and well-documented studies in the field of international relations have been published in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the analysis of foreign policy problems by Eastern European political scientists offers relatively little that is new or original.

It is clear that political scientists in Poland and Yugoslavia have had considerable success in introducing Western concepts into the study of politics. At the same time the results have often been disappointing to those involved. In Yugoslavia, political scientists are still experiencing great difficulties in carrying out research. Expectations that the study of political behavior would develop into a new field of major importance have not yet been realized, despite repeated efforts to remove obstacles to work in this field.⁸⁷ Political scientists representing a

traditional point of view have raised questions concerning the wisdom of quantitative methods and the utility of polling techniques; even Leo Strauss has been brought into the controversy in defense of the traditional approach.⁸⁸

Yugoslav political scientists are nevertheless individualistic, deeply concerned with gaining recognition for the discipline, and receptive to a wide variety of ideas. The young Belgrade political scientist Stevan Vračar aroused widespread interest in Yugoslavia and abroad in 1967 by proposing a modified type of two party system for Yugoslavia.⁸⁹ Professor Leon Geršković has championed the cause of "politologija" as a new approach to political science, although now in less strident terms than in the past.⁹⁰ The late Dan Gjanković was a sharp and knowledgeable critic of the federal system in Yugoslavia,⁹¹ and Professor Eugen Pusić of the University of Zagreb has made significant contributions in the field of public administration.⁹² Jovan Djordjević, one of the country's leading constitutional lawyers and now a member of the Yugoslav constitutional court, has for many years been an advocate of self-management and a greater role for parliament as a check against the abuses of concentrated power in Communist systems.⁹³ Younger political scientists and political sociologists such as Janez Jerovsek have been stressing the importance of changes brought about as the result of modernization and industrialization in Yugoslavia, and the need to bring political practices into harmony with these new conditions.⁹⁴

dárek, "The Development of Research in Czechoslovakia on International Relations," *ibid.*, *Selection of Studies from Volume I, 1966*, 5-18; Jerzy Wiatr, "Les Sciences Politiques en Pologne," *op. cit.*, 76-77.

⁸⁶ Some of the vast literature appearing in Poland on underdeveloped areas is described in Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, *Bibliografia polskich publikacji na temat Afryki* [Bibliography of Polish Publications on Africa] (1965). For Czech works, *International Relations* (Prague), *loc. cit.*, Evidence of Yugoslav interest is found in Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, *Politički sistemi i pokreti u nerazvijenim zemljama: Metodološko-teorijski okviri izučavanje* [Political Systems and Movements in Underdeveloped Nations: Methodological-Theoretical Frameworks for Research] (1964).

⁸⁷ One approach to the gathering of empirical data which has been tried on several occasions in Yugoslavia is the organization of joint research projects with foreign social scientists. While this enables the outside researcher to gather much valuable material, the impact on Yugoslav political science, measured in terms of published data, has not been significant. Differences have also arisen over the interpretation of the data gathered by international research teams of this type; an early and well known case is the research of the French sociologist, Albert Meister, on workers' councils. See his *Socialisme et Autogestion: L'Experience Yougoslave* (1964).

⁸⁸ Mihailo Djurić, "Stara i nova nauka o politici [The Old and the New In Politics]," *Gledišta*, 8, No. 6-7 (June-July, 1967), 846.

⁸⁹ "Partijski monopolizam i politička moć društvenih grupa [The Party Monopoly and the Political Power of Social Groups]," *Gledišta*, 8, No. 8-9 (August-September, 1967), 1053-1066.

⁹⁰ See "Politički sistem Jugoslavije u nastavi [The Political System of Yugoslavia in the Curriculum]," *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke*, 52, No. 2, 1966, 175-88.

⁹¹ "O federativnom karateru naše države [On the Federal Character of Our State]," *Zbornike Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu*, No. 4, 1964, 230-34.

⁹² See his work, "Area and Administration in Yugoslav Development," *supra*.

⁹³ See especially his debate with Geršković, "Neka pitanja ostvarivanja i razvitka socijalističke demokratije [Some Questions of the Creation and Development of Socialist Democracy]," *Politička Misao*, 1, No. 2 (1964), 153-82.

⁹⁴ "Socijalna diferencijacija i struktura moći [Social Differentiation and the Question of Power]," *Socijalizam*, 9, No. 3 (1966), 378-81.

The problem facing Yugoslav political science is to translate its enthusiasm for the discipline into research results of lasting value. Many of the leading figures in the profession have produced impressive theoretical works grounded in Titoist political theory.⁹⁵ but as yet no major work has been produced on the actual functioning of Yugoslav political institutions. It has proven impossible to discuss contemplated reforms of the political system—at least in print—until action has been taken by the Party. Even then, most political scientists feel constrained to speak in guarded terms, and very seldom in opposition to official views.

The failure to produce critical studies of the Yugoslav political system is a source of concern to Yugoslav political scientists. Speaking in 1964, Professor Djordjević complained that

we still don't know the real value and real role of all these Yugoslav institutions; we still don't have one solid study of a scientific character concerning even one of the fundamental institutions on which we base not only the program but also the actual process of socialism.⁹⁶

Djordjević's criticisms gained major support several years later when Leon Geršković spoke out forcefully on the same problem, urging political science to develop a more critical approach to the study of the Yugoslav political system, examining its actual operation rather than dwelling on its theoretical principles.⁹⁷ This critical analysis of the state of Yugoslav political science, coming from the originator of the plan to create a new science in the form of *politologija*, is a sign of the growing maturity of Yugoslav political scientists as well as an admission of the problems the discipline must overcome in the course of its further development.

Polish political science has made important contributions to the discipline in the realm of empirical research and has also produced a number of valuable theoretical works in the realm of political sociology. In contrast to Yugoslavia, Polish research has been free, until recently, to

describe the realities of Party rule with surprising frankness. Polish political science also gained an advantage from the comparative orientation which political sociologists such as Zygmunt Bauman and Jerzy Wiatr brought to the study of political behavior. Zygmunt Bauman in particular deserves special recognition; his attempt to create a synthesis between Marxist and Western elite theories, and his critique of the modernization process in Poland, were significant contributions to the field.⁹⁸

At the same time the theoretical and empirical boldness of Polish political science has created difficulties for the discipline. The use of quantitative methods in studies of political behavior has been exposed to professional criticism and ideologically motivated attacks. Since the 13th plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1963, the social sciences have been strongly castigated by Party spokesmen for their "value free" approach, and sociologists and political scientists have been accused of advocating the control of society by a managerial elite. The campaign against the social scientists reached its height in the fall of 1967 and the spring of 1968 when Polish liberals were everywhere under attack. A serious blow was struck against the political science profession at this time when Zygmunt Bauman was deprived of his chair in political sociology at the University of Warsaw⁹⁹ and several members of the editorial board of *Studia Socjologiczne Polityczne* were dismissed.¹⁰⁰ Over the protests of Polish political scientists, publication of *Studia Socjologiczne Polityczne* was then suspended.

These developments have been paralleled by the emergence of what might be called a "non-Western" research approach to the social sciences in Poland. In writings espousing such a view, criticism of Western research methods is coupled with a stress on the role of the nation and the state in shaping society, and preference is given to an historical approach to the social sciences in place of comparative techniques.¹⁰¹ Responding to the growth of nationalist elements in Polish political life, this view has given priority to nationalism over Marxism in its efforts to inject a new orthodoxy into the study of the social sciences. Political scientists were exposed to these ideas at the first congress of the

⁹⁵ Examples of this type of work are the immense and erudite work of Professor Jovan Djordjević, *Politički sistem* [Political System] (1967); Leon Geršković, *Problemi i perspektive razvoja skupštinskog sistema Jugoslavije* [Problems and Perspectives of the Development of the System of Assemblies in Yugoslavia] (1967); Radomir Lukić, *Ustavnost i zakonitost* [Constitutionalism and Legality] (1966).

⁹⁶ *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke*, 50, No. 1-2 (1964), 84.

⁹⁷ "Politički sistem Jugoslavije u nastavi," *loc. cit.*

⁹⁸ See earlier references to Bauman's works.

⁹⁹ See *Trybuna Ludu*, March 22, 1968, 4-5.

¹⁰⁰ Those involved were Bauman, Maria Herszowicz and Julian Hochfeld.

¹⁰¹ Krzysztof Ostrowski, "Uwagi o perspektywach badań socjologicznych w Polsce [Remarks on the Perspectives for Sociological Research in Poland], *Nowe Drogi*, 21, No. 4 (April, 1967), 129-36.

Polish Association of Political Sciences in December, 1967.¹⁰² Jerzy Wiatr, in his capacity as president of the Association, set the note for the meeting by emphasizing the importance of national values in the development of the Polish political system, while at the same time stressing the positive role of the state in the task of constructing a socialist society.¹⁰³

The ultimate effect of such efforts to create a distinctive Polish political science is uncertain. A number of the papers presented at the 1967 congress reflected the continuing concern of Polish political scientists with the comparative analysis of contemporary issues, especially the effects of modernization on Polish society and the democratization of politics.¹⁰⁴ In any case, the discipline may find it difficult to regain its former momentum. A new publication, *Studia Nauk Politycznych* (*Studies in Political Science*) has been founded under the editorship of Marian Zychowski, known for his lack of sympathy toward liberal elements in the political science profession.¹⁰⁵ Even more disturbing is the decline of empirical studies in Polish political science. Except for articles appearing in the publication *Problemy Rad Narodowych*, the bulk of the data published today was gathered prior to 1964. If it is to maintain its position as leader and pioneer in the study of political science in Eastern Europe, Polish political science must open up new areas of research and tap new sources of information. This, however, will be no easy task under the conditions which now prevail.

CONCLUSIONS

The major accomplishment of Communist political science has been to raise the issue of an alternative approach to the study of politics, in which ideological and dogmatic attitudes are replaced by the objective and scientific study of political events. A number of Polish, Yugoslav and Soviet scholars have adopted as their own

the standards and literature of the discipline; their published writings often do not include even perfunctory references to Marxist-Leninist sources. Although this writing is not in most cases characterized by great originality—and indeed may be highly imitative of existing Western works—there are persons who have sought, within their own field of specialization, to deal with questions “whose answers are not known beforehand.” Given the nature and magnitude of the constraints they face, their achievement is all the more impressive.

Moreover, in several countries of the area (Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union), the level of discussion and original research among political scientists is much higher than a reading of published sources would indicate. In papers meant for limited circulation within research institutes, in references to debates taking place at meetings of political scientists, and even in research topics assigned to graduate students, there is evidence of a much more vital discipline than the often cautious published materials reveal.

Recently, however, the ruling parties have become increasingly concerned about manifestations of revisionist thinking and of works which might be construed as critical of the regime. Although not always successful, attempts have been made to curb the development of political science. The conduct of research in Poland and Yugoslavia, always beset with difficulties, seems on balance to be suffering from greater restrictions now than in the early and mid-1960's. The CPSU, too, after its earlier interest in political science, now emphatically calls for “partiinost” in social science. Given these circumstances, the immediate prospects for the discipline are not encouraging.

There are, nevertheless, forces which continue to favor the growth of political science. Communist regimes remain sensitive to the need for expert advice and may seek out the assistance of political scientists in areas where they have special skills. At the same time, continued exposure to Western literature and association with Western scholars at international conferences may promote the acceptance of Western methods and concepts in the social sciences. Finally, it may be that the advocates of political science will be successful in persuading the Communist regimes that it is to their advantage to encourage the growth of a value free political science. The persistence and enthusiasm of those who have supported political science in the past have kept the discipline alive even in its most difficult moments; given favorable circumstances, they may yet prevail.

¹⁰² *Trybuna Ludu*, December 19, 1967, 6.

¹⁰³ *Trybuna Ludu*, December 21, 1967, 4.

¹⁰⁴ *Zycie Gospodarcze*, February 4, 1968.

¹⁰⁵ The first issue of the journal, which became available in 1969, provided a broad range of articles on such subjects as international relations, political theory and local government. Current publications and professional activities in the field outside Poland were well reported. At the same time, the journal was more ideologically oriented than its Yugoslav counterpart, *Politička Misao*. Zychowski, in his account of Polish political science, focused mainly on the contribution the discipline was expected to make to the “Fundamentals” course.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

Below is a copy of a telegram sent on May 14, 1970 to President Nixon. The eight signatures on the telegram are those of the current President of the American Political Science Association, the President Elect and all past Presidents from 1964 on. In that year the Johnson Administration began the term of office during which the war in Vietnam clearly emerged as the deepest domestic crisis of this century. Those signing the telegram feel that as professional students of politics their special knowledge permits them to offer sound and objective advice for easing this crisis. The signers might be contacted individually for comment, and a number of them could be gathered on short notice for a press conference in New York City.

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TELEGRAM
MAY 14, 1970

Acting in our individual capacities as political scientists who are devoting their lives to the study of politics we are impelled by the present crisis to offer our considered professional advice for the quickest, most effective way of saving lives in Indochina and reducing strife at home. One course alone remains: an immediate and clear commitment to a rapid and orderly withdrawal of all American Armed Forces from Indochina to be substantially underway by December, 1970 and to be completed by July, 1971.

Karl W. Deutsch

Professor, Harvard University*

President, American Political Science Association

Robert E. Lane

Professor, Yale University

President Elect, American Political Science Association

All past presidents of the American Political Science Association from 1964 to the present, listed alphabetically:

Gabriel A. Almond

Professor, Stanford University

Robert A. Dahl

Professor, Yale University

David Easton

Professor, University of Chicago

Merle Fainsod

Professor, Harvard University

C. Herman Pritchett

Professor, University of California, Santa Barbara

David B. Truman

President, Mt. Holyoke College

*(NOTE: INSTITUTIONAL NAMES ARE FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY)

TO THE EDITOR:

As a service in time of national crisis we undertook to conduct during mid-May a sample survey of opinion among American college and university teachers of political science. The preliminary results of the survey indicate that three-fourths of the respondents polled disapprove of the Administration's action in Cambodia, over four-fifths now think that it was a mistake to have sent combat troops into Vietnam, and two-thirds anticipate a constitutional crisis in the United States if the war continues at its present pace. There was also strong apprehension about the domestic repercussions of the war. Results in more detail follow below.

Drs. Allen H. Barton, James Guyot, Charles Kadushin, and Donald Puchala of Columbia University designed the survey and were responsible for the analysis. Questions were prepared in consultation with James David Barber, Yale; Richard Brody, Stanford; Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvard; Ithiel de Sola Pool, M.I.T.; and Sidney Verba, Chicago. Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia, acted as overall coordinator. The poll was carried out by telephone on May 14 and 15, two weeks after President Nixon's announcement of the dispatch of American combat troops to Cambodia. Costs of the survey were underwritten in part by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, and in part from a grant by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education to Professor Lipset for the study of "the politics of academe." Graduate students and faculty of the Columbia Department of Political Science acted as interviewers. Duplicates of the survey punched cards will be available at cost for further scholarly uses after full processing at Columbia and Harvard.

The random sample of 394 was drawn from the approximately 5,000 individuals listed in the Biographical Directory of the American Political Science Association (1968 edition) as full-time teachers or administrators at colleges and universities in the continental United States. Since all of them had attained their academic positions by mid-1967, when the questionnaires for the directory were filled out, they are at this point in time likely to represent overwhelmingly a senior and experienced group of scholars. Of the 394 persons in the sample, 286 were reached, and 265 agreed to respond.

The largest group of respondents (66 percent) identified themselves as specialists in American government, but some of this group as well as others in the sample (totalling 55 percent) specified added expertise in comparative politics and international relations. Sixteen percent of the

respondents polled reported Asian politics as one of their areas of professional interest. Most respondents were Democrats (66 percent) and Humphrey voters in 1968 (71 percent), while a considerably smaller group were Republicans (9 percent) and Nixon voters (12 percent).

Respondents polled were highly critical of the Nixon Administration's policies in Southeast Asia. Not only did three-quarters of the political scientists feel that U.S. troops should not have been dispatched to Cambodia, but an even larger group (84 percent) now consider that it was a mistake to have sent American combat troops to Vietnam in the first place. Among respondents who voted for Nixon in 1968 only a minority agreed with the move into Cambodia (44 percent in favor, 28 percent against, and 24 percent undecided). As many as 78 percent of the Nixon voters thought in retrospect that we should not have gone into Vietnam. A majority of the whole sample polled expressed skepticism that "the Nixon Administration's policies are likely to lead to a negotiated peace settlement"; at the same time, a similar proportion (71 percent) clearly rejected the Nixon Administration's assumption that immediate withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to American involvement in "a bigger war later." Sixty-four percent, or over, favored complete U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam during the next eighteen months. Only a minority (22 percent) of respondents felt that "the United States has a moral obligation to ensure South Vietnamese the right to choose their next government in a free election."

Other results of questioning regarding the Southeast Asian situation were more mixed. There was a division of judgment as to whether immediate withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to "large-scale slaughter of South Vietnamese"—31 percent agreed, 43 percent disagreed, and 25 percent were undecided. Neither was there any clear consensus as to whether a viable Vietnamese government could be obtained via the Administration's formula of troop withdrawal, Vietnamization of the war, and continued U.S. aid. Here 35 percent saw a viable South Vietnamese government emerging, but 40 percent did not, and another 25 percent were undecided.

The survey further revealed widely-felt concern about the impact of the war at home. Feeling on the domestic costs of the war was clearly evident in the avowal by 85 percent of the political scientists that the military conflict is preempting funds that should be devoted to dealing with pressing problems in race relations, the cities, and the environment. In addition, a large group of respondents (66 percent, with only 19 percent disagreeing) believed that a constitu-

tional crisis may develop in the United States in the event that the war in Vietnam continues at levels of intensity recently reached. An even larger group (86 percent) saw increased violence and polarization in our society as a likely result of the continuing war. Seventy-nine percent of the scholars interviewed feared that a continuation of the war will make it "increasingly difficult for educational institutions to carry out their function of education."

For reasons of moral and political responsibility, the undersigned are transmitting the results of this survey to the political science profession and the American public in the belief that the views of a professional group of experts on American and international politics ought to be widely known at this time (May 16, 1970).

GABRIEL ALMOND

MERLE FAINSON

ROBERT A. DAHL

ROBERT E. LANE

KARL W. DEUTSCH

DANKWART A. RUSTOW

DAVID EASTON

DAVID B. TRUMAN

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Sheldon Wolin's assault on the nature and consequences of "methodism" in contemporary approaches to politics and political theory (this REVIEW, December, 1969, 1062-1082) was a welcome and on first reading a potentially valuable corrective to political studies which have, in their efforts to achieve a "value-free" stance, merely become bloodless.

I say "on first reading," because pondering Professor Wolin's recommendations for the civilizing of political education via the study of traditional political philosophy, I sense not only what I think are some serious mistakes in his view of political theory, but some positively distasteful implications.

The route of his argument seems roughly to be as follows:

- (1) Political education in the United States, to the degree that it is tied to formal education, has become "impoverished." "Methodism" in political science has deprived students of politics of the capacity to make theoretical discriminations which are of genuine political significance. Thus, we talk of "inputs," "system maintenance," "decision making," ignoring the textures of passion, justice, and anguish. The overall result is a political science myopically unable to provide attention to the more dire and threatening aspects of contemporary social-political developments in the United States.
- (2) What is needed is a wider pervasion of the ability to make "appropriate" theoretical discriminations. We need, in a word, the restoration of civic vision, the ability to concentrate

our focus politically on what is "politically appropriate," rather than the merely "theoretically operational."

- (3) A political education rooted significantly in the study of the tradition of political theory (Plato to Marx) will provide the antidote to the toxin of methodism. "Magnitude," the "public concern," and the willingness of traditional theorists to confront real problems in the real world, rather than to look for mistakes in theory when anomalies arise, all will help in the development of a "lore" of politics, in the achieving of that bedrock of "tacit political knowledge" so necessary to the making of sensitive political judgments.

Having finished reading Professor Wolin's essay I was left with a good feeling. I felt that a meaningful erosion of the sterility of much of modern political science had thus begun, that here indeed, was a calm and unhysterical voice arguing for a return to sanity in the study of politics. But, as if I had first only viewed the path of his argument from the air, my mood changed when I got closer to it, when I tried to traverse the same distances by the same route. What was a happy mood turned sourly to disappointment. At the very center of his argument he had built upon not merely a serious error, but an almost deliberate piece of obscurantism. As I tried to retrace his journey I discovered that a crucial bridge over the abyss had been destroyed by the corrosion of "tacit knowledge." The pivotal point in Professor Wolin's notion of how political theory can educate us is here in the accretion of our grasp of politics' supporting lore, tacit knowledge. "Political life," he writes, "does not yield its significance to terse hypotheses, but is elusive and hence meaningful statements about it often have to be allusive and intimated." (1070)

The argument is subtle. But the upshot is an almost occult sense of the mysteries of politics, the magic of insight and sensitivity, the alchemy of special, unarticulated wisdom. Consider the vocabulary of "tacit knowledge" that Professor Wolin employs—"elusive, allusive, intimated, sensibilities, civilized, connotative, appropriate richness, intellectually curious and broadly educated, intuitions, feelings, initiation, discriminating, cultivation, that sense of significance."

But this is a great deal more than merely cabalistic, it is also aristocratically snobbish. He is saying tacit knowledge, but it sounds strangely like that nineteenth century literary and artistic mask of Taste! I cannot dispel images of sensitive, melancholy young men, pensively poised, pen-in-mouth, seeking inspiration from delicate gardens and lacy virgins. It is the same sort of

facile solution to the same kind of difficult problem. And what makes Professor Wolin's piece finally so disappointing is that it is exactly at the hardest, most crucial point that he retreats behind this Victorian screen. How *really* could the study of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau foster in the twentieth century the political skills and refinements of judgment that he thinks are so necessary to inoculate students to the bacteria of systems theory and data gatering? That everybody doesn't read these theorists in quite the same way as Professor Wolin does could raise considerable difficulty. I could imagine a perfectly defensible reading of classical theory which would yield an awareness of the need for obedience to authority, a deep fear of disorder and a willingness to make serious sacrifices in the name of order, a belief in the justifiability of illusion and myth in the spreading of political lies, and an acceptance of the naturalness and frequent necessity of war and militarism. Certainly this is not the tacit political knowledge that Professor Wolin is seeking. And certainly these are not the things which are needed by the class of people likely to be reached by formal education. In the face of corruption, waste, desecration, war, international adventurism, etc. we need something else, something more. Although Machiavelli said he loved his native city more than his soul, he said that privately, in a letter. What he often said publically, in his writings, was something much less consoling. Professor Wolin has mistaken his own particular perception of the teachings of traditional theory for what others might learn. He has, moreover, taken it for granted that it is really clear not only what we should learn from the study of traditional theory, but also just what of this "tradition" we ought to study.

Some of the truly difficult problems of the study of political theory—the existence of and the nature of any tradition we might describe or posit, the problem of interpretation (what there is significant and why?) the *processes* of political education, the distortions inherent in beginning with the conclusion that there really is a history of the "working out of an inherited form, which is what a tradition is all about"—these things are all slighted by Professor Wolin. Perhaps some of these shortcomings can be attributed to his admirable sense of the seriousness of our political problems and the urgency with which we need to offset them. But, some of it has, finally, to be attributed to the implicit sense of aristocratic complacency and a kind of over-extended intellectual assuredness which hide from Professor Wolin just those very knotty problems which complicate the study of

political theory in particular and literature in general.

CHARLES D. TARLTON

State University of New York at Albany

TO THE EDITOR:

Before taking up some of the problems mentioned in Professor Tarlton's letter, I should like to enter one point of clarification regarding my exchange with Professor Dahl and a word of explanation concerning Professor Pool's communication.

In his original letter Professor Dahl had kindly included a reproduction of the specific passages from *A Preface to Democratic Theory* which were at issue in our discussion. I had assumed that the *Review* would include them along with his letter, but, unfortunately, it did not. May I suggest, therefore, that readers who may be mystified by my allusions consult pages 50-51 of Professor Dahl's work?

Professor Pool had communicated his objections in a letter to me (January 23, 1970). I replied to him at some length.

Professor Tarlton characterizes my essay as "an almost deliberate piece of obscurantism" whose "upshot is an almost occult sense of the mysteries of politics . . ." and an aristocratic snobbishness. It is not easy to reply to a charge of being "almost." If Professor Tarlton believes that the language which I used to describe tacit knowledge is evidence of a position which is "almost" like alchemy, magic, and cabalism, then he probably believes that most great creations of scientific theory, philosophy, literature, music, and art are rooted in occultism.

Professor Tarlton also charges me with arguing that the study of the major political theorists of the past will "inoculate students" against certain contemporary trends. If I had argued this, I would have been undercutting the point of my critique of "methodism." My basic position was stated in this form: "Appropriateness of judgment cannot be encapsulated into a formula." (p. 1077)

I would agree with Professor Tarlton's commonplace that "everybody doesn't read" the major theorists in the way that I might and that many of the assertions advanced by past theorists are objectionable or false. My position in these matters is not very startling: in reading past theories, students are not being asked to suspend their critical faculties but to extend them by scrutinizing the arguments and assumptions being systematically worked out by serious thinkers. The value of the activity lies in the awareness which is cultivated, an awareness of what sorts of problems have been regarded as political and of what is occurring when a theorist proceeds to develop a theory. As my

essay tried to suggest, most of the major theories have been designed to destroy and to innovate (p. 1079) and hence the student has the opportunity of observing minds in disagreement and of deciding for himself.

I would also agree with Professor Tarlton that the notion of tradition presents difficult problems for the study of political theory. Most of my work has been concerned with these problems. It remains unfinished.

SHELDON S. WOLIN

Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

TO THE EDITOR:

In the December issue of APSR, Sheldon Wolin in his article "Political Theory As A Vocation" talked about the "embarrassments" that are recognized "when it is asserted that a supposedly democratic system requires a certain measure of indifference or apathy, especially on the part of the poor and uneducated." As an illustration of that viewpoint, he cites a quotation from me in which I point out that "in the Congo, in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic" the restoration of order does require imposing a measure of passivity and defeatism on newly mobilized strata.

It is hard to understand how the list, the Congo, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, could have been interpreted by Prof. Wolin as examples of democratic systems. Clearly, what they represent, on the contrary, is countries undergoing the turmoil of civil war. Indeed, in two of those countries, the Congo and Vietnam, neither side could properly be called democratic. To me, it seems fairly obvious that what I was trying to say was that where people have become so aroused politically as to be openly killing each other, order depends upon somehow demobilizing these participants in the turmoil and inevitably involves a certain measure of defeatism for those who find that their apocalyptic goals failed to be achieved. Had I been talking about democracy rather than about civil war, what I might have said was that "order depends on somehow stimulating newly mobilized strata to acquire a measure of political participation and a sense of efficacy to which they have not been adequately aroused by the ordinary processes of modernization." In short, a sentence about democracy would have said almost exactly the opposite of the sentence that Professor Wolin quotes.

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

TO THE EDITOR:

Alex Inkeles' article, "Participant Citizenship

in Six Developing Countries" raises some distressing questions about the comparative study of development and modernity. The avowed purpose of his study is to obtain a cross-culturally valid concept of modern man. Despite his apparent wish to avoid the stigma of being "culture bound" in his approach, I wish to emphatically point out that the conception and execution of Prof. Inkeles' study is just that.

It is curious that Prof. Inkeles offers no justification for selecting an exclusively male interview sample—cannot women be modern? Why is the study interested only in the male as a participant citizen?

The totally indefensible assumption that only men are relevant in the modernization process belies an incredible blindness to the crucial fact that in those countries in which there is an all-out drive towards modernization: i.e., bringing individuals into political participation, the emancipation of women is regarded as a key to changing the social, economic, and political, consciousness of both men and women. It is hardly a coincidence that the status of women has altered most drastically in those countries which have and are exerting the most effort to develop and change individual consciousness. May I cite China, Russia, Cuba, and Israel?

Unless American political scientists—who are predominantly men—cease regarding women as "persona non politica," the comparative study of modernization will continue to produce results which are less than fully valid.

SHELAH G. LEADER

State University of New York at Buffalo

TO THE EDITOR:

Dependent as she was on the limited account I could give in a journal article, Mrs. Leader misconstrued my purpose and mistakenly projected on to me views I do not hold.

Our main purpose was to test the effect of a limited number of independent variables, particularly education and factory experience, on the process of individual modernization. We designed our samples to have maximum variability on these dimensions. Given limited sample size this restriction meant we could afford only minimum variability on all other dimensions. We therefore excluded not only women, but all men over 32; all ethnic and linguistic groups except the predominant one in any region; all people working in factories with less than 50 employees; all individuals having higher education or holding managerial jobs. What theory of prejudice will encompass this array? It is true, of course, being obliged to limit ourselves to one sex did not require us to exclude women. Why not exclude the men? The reason was that in the developing countries we studied there were very

few women working in the factories. In short, the exclusion of women from our sample was dictated by our sampling frame, and reflected no judgement about the importance of their participation in politics.

In fact, our views are quite the opposite of those projected on us by Mrs. Leader. The Harvard Project on the Social and Cultural Aspects of Development has defined individual modernity precisely in accord with Mrs. Leader's conviction that the emancipation of women is a key to modernization. In our scoring system the interviewee gains points toward a higher score on our measure of individual modernity (OM) if he affirms that for equal work women should be paid wages equal to those for men; that women should be able to speak for their families with a voice equal to that of men; that women should, if qualified, be freely elected to the highest office of the land; and so on through numerous other issues. This hardly suggests that we believe that "only men are relevant in the modernization process."

ALEX INKELES

Harvard University

TO THE EDITOR:

In the December 1969 issue of the *REVIEW*, Professor Donald Hindley's discussion of my book, *The Broken Triangle*, raises an epistemological issue which I mistakenly had hoped had finally been laid to rest in the discipline: the place of systematic, replicable analytical techniques in handling limited—and hence manageable—research problems. One of the major purposes of *The Broken Triangle* is to provide historically trained area specialists, like Professor Hindley, with a demonstration that social science theories and techniques can provide new ways of ordering and analyzing the material which has been heretofore virtually the exclusive province of intuitive analysis. Hindley appears to reject the enterprise out-of-hand.

He begins by questioning the meaning of "national perception" and suggesting that the difference between *real* and *politically calculated* perceptions in dealing with data generated from authoritarian states render it a fruitless concept. He ignores completely, however, the fact that I have quite explicitly operationalized my definitions of national perceptions in terms of theme, media level, frequency, and intensity in dealing with Chinese sources (the study's primary concern) in a number of places in the manuscript, including pages 5-12 and 125-130. At the same time the specific utility of documentary content analysis is explained for handling the statements of totalitarian regimes. Professor Hindley dismisses the latter as mere "translation clippings," ignoring the criteria by which they were se-

lected. (Incidentally, to be logically consistent, he would equally have to reject much of the documentary source material—other than interviews—for his own solid, earlier studies of the PKI).

Throughout his review Hindley rejects the position that social science propositions developed from other data bases can be applied to the Indonesian milieu. I suppose the logical extension of this stance is that Indonesian behavior is not a subcategory of human behavior! For example, he dismisses the symbolic proposition on group behavior adapted from the careful studies of Mancur Olson on American and British group dynamics as an "appalling . . . simple mathematical equation." The truly appalling element, however, is not the attempt to see whether Olson's proposition may be of explanatory value in other group contexts but rather Professor Hindley's obvious and indeed prideful ignorance of empirical theory and technique in political science.

Hindley raises specific questions about the interpretation of events. This would be perfectly legitimate if he would offer alternative explanations to those presented in *The Broken Triangle*. In fact, he does not do so—merely asserting *ex cathedra* that the author's are in error. His objection to the lack of causal analysis in the discussion of the relationship between the PKI, Peking, and Sukarno escapes me completely unless it is a further product of Hindley's ignorance of causal theory. That is, the chapters on NEFO and the PKI could *not* show a *causal* relationship between Chinese intentions and PKI and Sukarno's behavior both because of data inadequacies and because the conceptual framework was not designed to develop such relationships. These chapters do demonstrate, however, the evolving complementarity of goals and values among these actors; for purposes of demonstrating conditions conducive to alliance formation, this should be all that is required.

I could go on to refute Hindley's specific interpretive objections point-by-point, but unfortunately this communication is not the appropriate place. (Should any of the Review's readers so desire, I should be happy to provide individual responses.) Some of these objections hardly merit rebuttal when, for example, Hindley enigmatically asserts that my depiction of Peking as xenophobic is based on personal prejudice. It is hard to believe that the evidence of Peking's international behavior in the course of the Cultural Revolution marshalled in the last chapter is merely a product of my "personal prejudice." Suffice it say that Professor Hindley's objections to *The Broken Triangle* have considerably reduced my optimism about the

growing propinquity between the Asian area specialist and general political science theory.

SHELDON W. SIMON

University of Kentucky

TO THE EDITOR:

Herewith my reply to Professor Simon's letter.

My review was of a particular book, not of the analytical utility for regional studies of advances in social science theory and methodology. Professor Simon's *The Broken Triangle* is as unencumbered with originality in theory-building as it is unembarrassed by knowledge in breadth and depth of its purported subject matter. As for innovative technique, Professor Simon employs the simple quantification of translation clippings. What I question at this point, however, is not the relatively low level of methodological sophistication being displayed, but the woeful inadequacy, in extent and reliability, of the resource base to which the quantification is applied.

One may, of course, borrow theoretical propositions developed in one context and apply them usefully to another. Professor Simon does not. He refers to my unflattering reference to his application to an Indonesian situation of a mathematically-expressed proposition loaned from Mancur Olson. My objection is not to the borrowing as such, but to Professor Simon's failure to use it as the springboard for a tenable, explanatory hypothesis. His shallow and often incorrect information on the politics of China and Indonesia, combined with a paucity of imaginative creativity, lead inexorably to hypotheses that range from the risible to the aggravating. In the instance cited above, it is sufficient here to note that Simon does not present, nor can he from the limited sources at his command, any evidence that the PKI members did in fact withdraw their support from the party. That is, he presents an hypothesis of dubious value to explain a development whose occurrence is, to say the least, in doubt.

Professor Simon courts disaster from the start by failing to establish ("operationalize") an analytically serviceable definition of "national perceptions," the central focus of his study. Perception has a common usage, even if translation clippings from dictatorial regimes are inadequate data with which to distinguish true perceptions from those that are publicly stated but politically contrived. But what constitutes the nation? Even if it is defined as the topmost political elite, *The Broken Triangle* fails signally to expose, let alone explain, the diversity of the Indonesian nation during the period of Guided Democracy. Professor Simon and his uninformed

readers are thereby left unprepared for the post-1965 leaders, whose perceptions are very different from those he attributes to Sukarno's nation, and yet who were part of the Sukarno elite. Perhaps they should be condemned as un-national.

Both Professor Simon's letter and a second reading of *The Broken Triangle* confirm a degree of ideologically-based prejudice that damages even further the value of his interpretive guesses. It is prejudice and not scholarship, for example, that evokes the conclusion that China's leaders are xenophobic. No persuasive evidence is presented. The incompatibility of Maoism and xenophobia remains unexplored. But Professor Simon is not overly concerned with fact when characterizing those who oppose the policies of the United States: most notably Sukarno, the PKI and the Dullesite version of the Yellow Peril.

Prejudice, a pitifully inadequate resource base, pedestrianism in theoretical and methodological application, and a failure to establish analytically viable definitions of fundamental concepts do not lead to interpretive hypotheses that are plausible. Nor do they lead to hypotheses that are implausible but stimulating.

In short, Professor Simon has failed to achieve what he set out to do: to discover the *real* values and perceptions of the actors; the *real* goals and the techniques applied to achieve them; the sources of those values, perceptions, goals and techniques; and the interaction between Indonesians and Chinese.

As a reviewer I am required to criticize fairly but severely an endeavor of this caliber.

DONALD HINDLEY

Brandeis University

TO THE EDITOR:

Numerous grave errors mar the article by Richard Ashcraft ["Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"] in the September 1968 issue of this REVIEW, but for the sake of brevity I will limit my comments to the two most serious of them:

1. Ashcraft uses as the basis of his central thesis a word—moral—that Locke never used in *Two Treatises of Government*.

2. Ashcraft never uses a word—self-preservation—that Locke used frequently and emphatically and described as "fundamental."

The result, as I will show, is a distortion instead of a clarification of what Locke meant by the state of nature.

1. Ashcraft's main thesis is that Locke's state of nature must be understood to have a moral aspect, and to buttress that thesis Ashcraft quotes extensively from Locke's writings. But

any reader can detect the weakness of Ashcraft's evidence by a very simple test (I mean *any* reader; no prior study of Locke is required): Examine all of the passages from Locke and their source as given in Ashcraft's footnotes: you will discover that *every* use of the phrase "state of nature" occurs in *Two Treatises of Government* and *every* use of the word "moral" occurs in some other writing of Locke, published or unpublished. Ashcraft does not provide even one passage in which Locke spoke of morality and the state of nature together. In speaking of them together, Ashcraft has joined together what Locke scrupulously kept asunder.

2. The second major error is a mirror image of the first. Ashcraft, in a lengthy discussion of the transition from the state of nature to civil society, never speaks of self-preservation. Locke, on the other hand, spoke of the "Fundamental, Sacred, and unalterable law of *Self-Preservation* for which they [men] enter'd into Society."¹ Ashcraft purports to explain Locke's account of the foundations of political society without discussing or even mentioning what Locke himself tells us is the fundamental basis of civil society.

From this shaky foundation, Ashcraft proceeds to assert (and he merely asserts; there is not even an attempt at demonstration) that the state of nature is, at least in part, a "moral fiction." (I pass over the astonishing fact that Ashcraft does not tell us what he means by "fiction.") Having "established" by mere assertion that the state of nature partakes of morality, he proceeds to assure us that the state of nature is not a state of war: "the fact is, for Locke, the natural condition of man is one of uncertain peace."² Now, the fact is that nowhere did Locke say that the state of nature is a state of peace, certain or uncertain. On the contrary, Locke described only civil society, the opposite of the state of nature, as a state of peace.³ What makes the state of war is the use of force (without authority) and, as Ashcraft rightly says, the use of such force may very well occur in the state of nature. Thus, by insisting on calling the state of nature a state of uncertain peace, but acknowledging the occurrence of force, Ashcraft is reduced to this scholarly nonsense: the state of nature is a state of peace except when it is a state of war. Ashcraft would be more consistent with his own argument, and Locke's, if he would say, simply, for Locke, the state of nature is a state of uncertainty, period. And the uncertainty of the state of nature is surely linked with Locke's silence about moral-

¹ *Two Treatises of Government*, II, sec. 149.

² P. 902, column 1.

³ *Two Treatises*, II, sec. 212.

ity and his emphasis on self-preservation.

If we ask ourselves, then, why Locke did not mention morality in his major political book, whereas he spoke of it very frequently in much of his other writing, many interesting possible answers present themselves. One is that Locke did not equate the law of nature and morality (as Ashcraft does); instead, Locke equated the law of nature and self-preservation. He thus replaced a politics of morality with what might be called a "politics of self-interest." Locke did not go so far as to say that morality has nothing whatever to do with politics, but, even so, a comprehensive account of the origins and purposes of civil society that makes no reference to morality transforms our understanding of politics and of the rights and obligations of citizens.

The purpose of this communication cannot be to present a full interpretation of Locke's political teaching. I intend only to point out how Ashcraft's elementary errors of reading totally obscure the core of Locke's political teaching. Ashcraft used a vast collection of Locke's books and papers and drafts and correspondence, but he misread the one book before him.

ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

St. John's College

TO THE EDITOR:

I am fortunate that Mr. Goldwin's ability to misread has resulted in a short communication; Locke, unfortunately, has suffered more elaborately from this non-scholarship.

Goldwin says Locke does not use the word 'moral'; hence, it cannot be applied to the state of nature. Later, he even suggests that the Law of Nature and morality are not conjoined. In the simplistic fashion in which all this is gravely stated, one might also note that Locke did not apply the phrase, 'political theory' to his work. Should we therefore cease to regard the *Two Treatises* as embodying a 'political theory'? If the reader must take such nonsense seriously, let him consider, as Goldwin did not, what Locke means when he denies that men in the state of nature 'have an uncontrollable liberty' because 'the State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone' not to harm another.¹ It is the rule 'of reason and common equity' which 'God has set to the actions of men' and those who transgress it are to be regarded as 'evil' or 'noxious.'² If Locke is not talking about a moral standard, what is he talking about?

Goldwin's second point is even more obscurantist. I shall not try to imagine why he refers to the principle of self-preservation, but the reason Locke refers to it in the passage Gold-

win cites is that he is speaking of 'the preservation of the Community.' He refers to men *collectively*, as having entered society for self-preservation, and on this ground, Locke justifies the sovereignty of the community in the sentence immediately following the one Goldwin cites. "And thus the *Community* may be said in this respect to be *always the Supreme Power . . .*"³, i.e., the community always retains the right of self-preservation. Indeed, as Goldwin says, this point is 'a mirror image of the first;' it is precisely because the Law of Nature 'willeth the peace and *preservation of all mankind*' that the *community* does retain the right of self-preservation.⁴

Goldwin 'passes over the astonishing fact' that I did not tell him what I meant by 'fiction.' It is the second time he has 'passed it over.' Obviously, he did not read F.N. 14 (p. 900) in which I not only explain what I mean by 'fiction,' I also explain what Locke means by it. With a reader who will not read, what is one to do?

But it is not only that Goldwin does not read the text, Locke's or mine; a more serious difficulty lies in his methodological treatment of political theory. He imagines that when, *on the same day* that Locke is writing passages of the *Second Treatise*, he records in his *Journal* that it is 'every man's duty to be just, whether there be any such thing as a just man in the world or not,' (p. 906, n. 52) Locke neatly compartmentalizes his thought: 'morality' goes into the *Journal*, and amorality or immorality into the *Second Treatise*. If Goldwin has any specific evidence for believing that Locke consistently or inconsistently operated in this fashion—apart from his own imagination—we would all be interested in seeing it. For one so willing to pose 'simple tests,' this one should be easy to meet.

Perhaps when we refuse the name of scholarship to the kind of word play engaged in by Goldwin and others, political theory will cease to be the captive of those who would turn it into a new form of scholasticism. What we need to understand is the 'structure of intentions' of a political theorist, how his thought develops over time, and its relationship to the social and historical setting in which it arises. Only then can we begin to determine the relevance of 'traditional' political theory to our own lives and problems.

By the way, how is it that Goldwin purports to interpret my 'central thesis'? I never used that term in my article.

RICHARD ASHCRAFT

University of California, Los Angeles

³ *Ibid.*, par. 149 (italics in original).

⁴ *Ibid.*, par. 7 (italics in original); cf. pars. 6, 8, 135, 159.

¹ *Second Treatise*, par. 6.

² *Ibid.*, par. 8.

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BOOK NOTES

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind. By ROBERT E. LANE. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 348. \$6.95.)

Robert Lane's new book provides an interesting addition and counterpart to his earlier *Political Ideology*. The basic objective has remained the same—the discovery and explanation of regularities in the associations of life experience, personality needs, and political ideas—but there are major differences in method of data collection, type of respondents, and focus of inquiry. The data for the earlier analysis were obtained through interviews of fifteen adult members of the working- and lower-middle-class, the primary focus of conversation being the institutions and events that constituted the respondents' social and political environment. The data for *Political Thinking and Consciousness* come from essays of "ideological self-analysis," written by twenty-four college undergraduates, most of whom had middle- or upper-middle-class backgrounds.

Ideological self-analysis is an

... analysis of one's own political values, opinions, and beliefs, and the functions they serve in one's personality and life situation. It is an extended response to the questions "Of what use to me are my political ideas?" and "How did I come to have these political ideas?" (p. 16).

Self-analysis demands more of the respondent than interviewing, and while it provides better data for a study of intrapersonal dynamics than most interviews, the population with which this technique can be used probably is quite small. Lane's students, who, at least comparatively, ranked high in self-awareness and analytic skills, were given considerable coaching before they were thought to be ready to write the essays (cf. pp. 16–17).

From the parts of the essays that have been transcribed, it appears that most of the twenty-four students succeeded to a very substantial degree in their attempts to discover the developmental history and current functioning of their political ideas and to lay bare facets of the self normally shielded by complex defenses. The essays are frank in tone and richly textured in substance; they allow Lane to consider a great variety of propositions about the linkage of personality and politics.

Lane starts his analysis with an assumption: in ambiguous situations, that is, in situations where alternative cognitions about some matter

are available, *unrewarding* ideas will not be adopted, or retained, or utilized (p. 2). The status of this assumption is not altogether clear. Under a maximal interpretation of "rewarding" it can be taken as true by definition and hence empirically empty. More restrictive interpretations give the assumption empirical standing, but make it controversial. There is considerable evidence to show that not all human thought and action is reward oriented, whether one speaks of psychic gratification or of cognitive gain. In any case, once the assumption is stated it becomes clear what is to be taken as problematic, and the questions for Lane's inquiry reveal themselves: In what way is the idea rewarding? What needs influenced the adoption of the idea? What needs or motives does the idea satisfy presently?

For Lane, needs and motives are part of the personality system and constitute the "energizing sources" of political thought: "... human needs are the parents of social thought; the effort to gratify these needs or to reduce their urgency stimulates and shapes thinking" (p. 24). Lane's emphasis is on learned needs and motivations rather than on physiological needs. Informed in part by the thinking of Henry Murray and Abraham Maslow, Lane lists ten need syndromes particularly cogent for studies of political thought (pp. 31–46). The data permitted a treatment of the following of these: the need to be liked, the need to express and control aggression, the need to appear moral to the self and others, the need for social esteem and status, the need for identity continuity, and the need for autonomy.

The political ideas found in the twenty-four essays are the dependent variables in Lane's analysis schema. Arranged by Lane as "liberal" and "conservative" alternatives, the most important of these ideas concern: opportunity for all versus opportunity for the able; inclusive versus exclusive personal and social orientation toward minority groups; equality among nations versus emphasis of American interests and rights; belief in positive government versus suspicion of government; Capitalism as neutral versus positive symbol; greater acceptance of social change versus greater faith in the status quo; no identification versus positive identification with business (p. 52).

The connection between needs and ideas is forged by the dynamics of Lane's "model of a political 'idea machine.'" Briefly, a message or cue engages or arouses a need, stimulating

need-reducing efforts, which are shaped by a person's habitual modes of conflict resolution and strategies of defense, and which express themselves as a search for ideas to satisfy the need. This search is guided by various personality features, elements of belief systems, learning strategies, relation to reference groups and persons, definitions of the situation, and similar such matters (pp. 48-49).

Lane's model can be identified as belonging to a cluster of conceptual constructs, predicated upon the proposition that human thinking and action follow tension-reduction dynamics. Cross-pressure theory, balance theory, and cognitive dissonance theory are a few of the better known members of this cluster. Tension-reduction theories have dominated psychology and large portions of the social sciences for several decades. Their influence, however, has begun to wane. Critics have noted many unresolved conceptual difficulties and empirical work has produced important disconfirmations. There are weighty reasons to think that tension-reduction propositions are appropriate and useful only in the analysis of primitive stages or pathological forms of human development. It is doubtful that Lane's model provided the most advantageous orientation for his inquiry.

Lane's findings are many and cover a large substantive range; a comprehensive summary cannot be given here. Some of the findings add support to propositions that have become well accepted in political psychology, e.g., that personal insecurities and uncertainties can produce an intense need to be liked by others and/or to have power over them (p. 124); that hatred of one's father can give political thought an exceptionally aggressive quality (p. 163); and that the adoption of ideas and strategies of an "outsider" often is a consequence of damages to the self-image caused by bodily handicaps or other early deficiencies or disappointments (p. 228). Other findings are new or, in any case, throw light on propositions that have not yet gained general acceptance, e.g., that there is a causal link between fear of intimacy and bids for the affection of underdogs and outcasts (p. 117); or that "politically conscious upper- middle-class people whose aggression is inhibited solely by fear of consequences are more likely than others to be reactionary" (p. 173), whereas "those who are restrained in their aggression because of an other-embracing aggression anxiety, empathy with the intended victims, or guilt will tend to be moderate liberals or apolitical" (p. 179).

Lane, of course, does not take at face value all the facts asserted and beliefs and sentiments expressed in the essays. The students might not only wish to deceive the prospective readers of

their essays, consciously or not, but they also tend to "deceive themselves and often are out of touch with their own deepest needs" (p. 17). The analytic quest is for the hidden meaning and for the clues below the surface. But while the attempt to go to the hidden and refracted message is appropriate and necessary to the task, Lane leaves the reader severely frustrated by failing to specify the rules and standards that guided his non-face-value interpretations (for one of a very few exceptions see p. 262). The reader is given almost no opportunity to judge the validity of the interpretation criteria (the rules of evidence) or to inquire into the consistency of their application.

The feeling of frustration is increased by the fact that the essays are not reproduced in full, and that the selections from any given essay are scattered widely throughout the volume. This makes it impossible for the reader to gain the comprehensive and integrated perspective on each student which must have provided important contextual clues for Lane's interpretations of specific passages. When trying to assess the validity of Lane's inferences, the reader mostly is limited to asking whether the interpretations "make sense"—in terms of the selections that have been reproduced, or in terms of the concordance of Lane's conclusions with accepted theories.

If *Political Thinking and Consciousness* frustrates the reader, it also gives him much that is stimulating and challenging. Lane displays an uncommon understanding of the adolescent's struggle to come into his own; the findings and suggestions of the new book will be of interest to students of the socialization progress as well as to students of political ideology.

PETER W. SPERLICH

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African Armies and Civil Order. By J. M. LEE.
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969,
Pp. 200. \$6.00.)

In the last few years, Africa has displaced South America as the continent on which takeover bids by military forces occur most frequently. Attempted coups d'état there have now become a monthly event. Their incidence defies prediction. Arab and Bantu nations have proved equally vulnerable. East and West Africa have both had to contend with the problem. Military uprisings have become common in both francophone and anglophone areas. One-party states have proved no more resistant than more pluralistic regimes. Coups have occurred because the rank and file desire higher pay, or because officers tire of "corrupt" politicians; because ethnic minorities resent the dominance of gov-

ernment by other groups, or because previously excluded minorities are now being recruited at the officer level; because military men are dismayed by the chaos of civilian rule, or because they wish to retain some measure of autonomy within an increasingly totalitarian order. Many mutinous units have sought no more than the redress of limited grievances within a continuing framework of civilian government; on other occasions, uprisings express the determination of the armed forces—or a critical segment thereof—to assert the primacy of military values in political life. Almost the only constant is the increasingly demonstrated fragility of civilian regimes amid such pressures.

Africanists have recently begun to take account of these developments. J. M. Lee's *African Armies and Civil Order* is only the most comprehensive and ambitious of a recent stream of articles, bibliographies, and books on the subject. Yet there were few indications of this outpouring a mere five years ago. Until, in late November of 1965, General Mobutu's decisive takeover of the Congo sent a spreading shock wave of coups through francophonic Africa, climaxed some two months later by the overturning of seemingly well entrenched civilian governments in anglophonic Nigeria and Ghana, political scientists tended to treat the intervention of African military units in civilian politics as the transient eruptions of aberrant bands of mutineers. Mesmerized by the dramatic efforts of political leaders to transmute primordial attachments into populist nationalism, they continued to focus their attention on the seemingly successful processes by which "integration" and "nation-building" were being achieved through transference of "charismatic" authority to constitutional regimes. A rather slight volume by William Gutteridge, together with a half dozen cursory survey articles in widely scattered French and English language publications, comprised the contributions of scholarship to the question of civil-military relations in Africa.

One might infer from this record that African soldiers played a negligible role in the life of their nations before 1966. The inference would be hard to sustain. African troops were serving under colonial commanders before World War I. The first modern nationalist army coup in Africa took place in Egypt in 1952. Five bloody years of almost unparalleled disintegration in the formerly Belgian Congo were triggered off by a mutiny of the armed forces on July 4, 1960. Between 1957, when Ghana became the first tropical African nation to obtain its independence from a colonial power, and January 1, 1966, military units in various parts of the continent rose up against the newly con-

stituted civilian authorities no less than sixteen times. Even when these uprisings were suppressed, they usually traumatized the regime and fundamentally reordered its priorities. Yet it is also true that the role of the armed forces in modern Africa has had few parallels in other parts of the world. The relatively peaceful and almost total division of the African continent among the European colonial powers obviated the emergence of large traditional sovereign armies. Throughout the colonial period, the primary function of the relatively small-scale indigenous armed forces consisted not of protecting the colonial borders against external aggression, but of maintenance of internal order. Their visibility on the world scene remained correspondingly low.

One of the anomalies of contemporary Africa is that the balkanization of the continent at the time of independence has hardly altered this role. Attempts to interpret the recent wave of coups in Africa as the working out of certain allegedly universal propensities of "the military mind" are thus misleading. African soldiers have only rarely confronted, even prospectively, the conventional battlefield. Nor is it particularly helpful to view the armed forces, by analogies derived from other continents, as the representatives and/or protectors of determinate class interests. In countries where over ninety percent of the inhabitants are independent cultivators of small-scale plots, the apparatus of government is still the almost exclusive allocator of class status. African military leaders have indeed been interested in the pattern of their governments' distribution of scarce resources. But to say this is to redirect attention from the isolated compositional properties of the armed forces in Africa to the nature of the political regimes with which they are currently seeking to define their relations. It is the special merit of Lee's work to have pursued unstintingly the implications of this perspective.

The important questions about African armies today are ultimately, according to Lee, questions about the extent to which civil disorders on the continent spill over into the armed forces and involve them in the political conflicts of the larger society. One illustration of this perspective arises from the British colonial policy of recruiting indigenous army personnel from the less westernized, less well educated tribes on the dubious supposition that such troops would at once retain a more martial spirit and prove tractable to military discipline. This created, in Kenya, a predominantly Kamba officers corps that could be relied upon after independence to disassociate itself from the tense maneuverings of the larger Kikuyu and Luo tribes for ascendancy within

the government; in Uganda, a dependable ally for the Nilotic Prime Minister Milton Obote during his desperate struggle with Bantu cabinet ministers and royalty; in Nigeria, a complex stratification of the armed forces by generation and region that brought about a succession of coups and counter-coups within the army as ethnic hatreds surged to the surface elsewhere. When a single policy can have three such different outcomes, it follows that the composition and internal dynamics of the military structures in question become significant primarily in relation to the civilian sector's ability to cope with the ethnic tensions of the nation. A practical corollary is that, as Lee observes, the more an African government seeks to make its officer corps representative of the new nation, the more it makes its army vulnerable to complete collapse if the coalition of interests in the civilian order also breaks down.

Lee's book is consequently more than a monograph on African armies; it is, in fact, an interpretive essay on the politics of tropical Africa as the unifying drama of independence begins to fade. The central characteristic of this politics, as Lee sees it, is one of intense competition for the scarce material and status rewards of public employment—a competition unregulated or only weakly regulated by any common normative conception of legitimate public authority. This "competition for jobs may often transform old conflicts between the different social groupings which claim access to the new state, and adds a new dimension of rivalry between generations" (p. 180). Although African armies have frequently sought to perpetuate their colonial tradition of standing somewhat apart from the overtly political branches of the government, they seldom succeed because not only the coercive resources at their disposal but even quite simply the stable employment they offer appears too tempting a prize to the contending factions within the new states. Since military officers themselves were conditioned to obedience to an external colonial sovereign in the era preceding independence, they have rarely exhibited any deeply rooted loyalties to the generally fragile successor regimes, and have proved correspondingly more accessible to the importunities of particularist groups. Hence despite the contentions of certain scholars that armies in the new nations are the natural conservators of a unified civic order, in tropical Africa "it looks as if the army is more likely to succumb to the influence of the values expressed by the political community, than to create and diffuse new concepts of national identity" (p. 113).

The exposition offered here can only hint at the important issues canvassed in Lee's densely

argued and richly suggestive work. Multi-faceted in its analysis, it is equally impressive for the scope of its coverage. Lee ranges freely and authoritatively throughout anglophonic and francophonic Africa, repeatedly drawing pertinent illustrations from opposite ends of the continent. Generalizations are derived not only from the inevitable cases of Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania but also from Togo, Somalia, and the Central African Republic.

This synoptic approach predictably has its price. The familiar but critically significant efforts of Tanzania to forestall a second mutiny deserve more than the brief remarks Lee allots to this deviant case. The references to Gabon could well have been sacrificed to an analysis of the lines of continuing cohesion and cross-cutting cleavage within the Nigerian army that would have revealed the excessive ethnic reductionism involved in talking of "Ibo officers" vs. "North-erners." A seductive but methodologically indefensible aspect of Lee's procedure is that exotic illustrations often serve as a surrogate for a systematic survey of confirming and disconfirming instances. Readers familiar with conditions in Africa will sympathize with Lee's reference to the "fragmentary nature" of the available statistical evidence, but are likely to feel that a more ambitious effort could have been made to relate the data he presents to the patterns he elaborates.

It must be said, moreover, that Lee's style of presentation makes needlessly unmerciful demands on the reader. It reflects too well the chaos he describes. Topical sentences too rarely provide an organic clue to the concluding sentence of a paragraph. The logical intension of concepts frequently shifts within a page; suggestive analytic propositions and classifications are devised and as promptly abandoned, only to reappear several chapters later. Repeatedly, Lee accounts for a variance with an explanation that is either incomplete or apparently contradicted by something previously written; one then encounters the critical missing premise several paragraphs later. The result is that a 185 page book reads like one approximately twice that length—one is forever rereading a paragraph or shifting from page to page in pursuit of a tantalizingly permuting argument. Both author and editor have much to answer for.

Much allowance will be made, however, for the artificially foreshortened gestation period of such intensely topical themes. For all its evidence of hasty composition, Lee's study suggests important new questions, sharpens several that have been asked before, and explores them at length from a consistent and fruitful perspec-

tive. Given the almost daily flux of the subject matter, one could hardly have asked for so much so soon.

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Power in Committees: An Experiment in the Governmental Process. BY JAMES DAVID BARBER. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Pp. 185. \$6.25.)

This book is unusual in at least two respects. As a systematic, empirical investigation of the process of committee decision-making, it is a welcome addition to an area of the discipline much in need of such research. As a piece of laboratory research, utilizing small-group concepts and methods, it is a distinctive and innovative work which is bound to receive critical scrutiny from a discipline largely unaccustomed to this type of research. From either standpoint, the book is a provocative and insightful piece of highly original scholarship.

It is Barber's concern with group processes and his perception of the difficulties involved in researching them in the natural setting which leads him to the laboratory. However, he is extremely skeptical concerning the value of trying to generalize from the findings of conventional small-group studies which typically involve naive subjects working on unfamiliar problems in an artificial setting. Barber perhaps states the case against such research too strongly, failing, for instance, to take account of the conventional defense of small-group research which asserts that *theory* is both the rationale behind apparent artificiality and the bridge between small-group findings and real-world phenomena. Nonetheless, his position leads him to attempt the fruitful innovation of bringing existing political decision-making bodies (Connecticut Boards of Finance), virtually intact, into the laboratory for observation.

Barber invited twelve Boards to the Yale small-groups laboratory to engage in two simulated decision-making tasks, which were designed to approximate the kinds of problems commonly encountered by such groups. The groups' behaviors were observed and scored according to the Bales Interaction Process Analysis system, and verbatim transcripts of the proceedings were also kept. Afterward, the participants completed a set of questionnaires and each group engaged in an evaluation session, which was also recorded. Barber did not attempt to conduct an experiment in the strict sense—the Boards performed identical tasks under identical circumstances. This fact points to a possible limitation in the general utility of his method, since groups lifted intact from their natural setting

inevitably bring to the laboratory their own particular internal structures and assumptions, which have an independent and unique effect upon each group's behavior. This introduces a source of uncontrolled variation in the groups' performance which could make it difficult to determine precisely the effects of an experimental "treatment" in the context of a controlled experiment. However, this presents no problem in Barber's design, and Barber has a plausible case when he argues that the gain in relevance from using "real" groups out-weighs any loss in experimental precision.

Barber's central theoretical concern is with power, both the power of the committee to perform its tasks and operate successfully within its environment and the exercise of power within the committee by individual members. In examining the first problem, Barber relies primarily upon verbatim transcripts, and his analysis, although not methodologically rigorous, is sensitive and insightful. In his discussion of the criteria employed by the Boards to sort their way through the complexities and uncertainties of budgeting, Barber makes an excellent contribution to the literature on incrementalism. His criticisms and suggestions for the "incremental improvement" of incrementalism are reasonable, if modest. Similarly, Barber's discussion of the power of the Board, in which he analyzes the contexts in which perceived power develops, strategies for enhancing power, and the relationship between contexts and strategies, is interesting and suggestive. These chapters may be best regarded as useful sets of hypotheses which warrant further testing.

In the succeeding chapters, Barber relies primarily upon the interaction process and questionnaire data. After showing that individual Board members' perceptions of the "power structure" in which the Boards operate are explainable primarily in terms of the individuals' self-images (certainly an interesting finding), Barber turns to the problem of power within the committee. His findings on the role of the chairman are substantially what one would expect on the basis of small group theory, but in a chapter entitled "Integration and Interaction" he produces some evidence which is not only important but sometimes surprising. For instance, he discovers that "there is apparently no relationship whatsoever between participation (frequency) and satisfaction" in the committees (p. 104), and that "there is apparently no relationship between rewarding experiences and integration" (p. 109). He finds norms of non-partisanship, impersonality, and unanimity important to the functioning of the Boards, and he finds evidence of substantial internal stratification and

role specialization. While these and other important propositions are not really integrated into a general theoretical framework, they are significant in themselves and should provide a good basis for further exploration in other contexts.

In his final analytical chapter, Barber factor analyzes 45 measures of interpersonal power. Each of the five major factors which results is composed mainly of slightly different measures of a single type of behavior or attribute. In operating inductively, Barber, perhaps unfortunately, declines the guidance of any formal theory of power. Nevertheless, the procedure does provide plausible evidence for Barber's contention that "power" is not a unitary phenomenon, but rather a set of phenomena which are substantially independent of one another or, in some cases, negatively related. Barber's attempt to explain his factors in terms of the possession of power resources produces numerous significant correlations but no very strong relationships. Interpretation of the findings in this chapter is difficult, but these data still seem well worth the attention of scholars concerned with the concept of power.

This book has some problems, including a lack of overall theoretical integration, despite conceptual linkages between the chapters. The presentation of data is not always as clear as it might be, and Barber's failure to perform significance tests on some of his data is puzzling. On the whole, however, as a basically exploratory effort, the book is a success. Barber clearly demonstrates the importance of paying attention to the internal structures and processes of political decision-making, especially at the small group level, and he shows the utility of laboratory research as one method of approaching this field. Hopefully this work will stimulate further investigations of its kind, both in laboratories and in field settings, and will not be disregarded as simply a curious, albeit interesting, piece of methodological heresy.

CHARLES WALCOTT

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The Political Economy of Change. BY WARREN F. ILCHMAN AND NORMAN THOMAS UPHOFF. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 316. \$8.50.)

This book might be described as an almost flagrantly successful expedition in what has been called "economics imperialism," that is, the attempt on the part of economics to take over all the other social sciences. Its success is the more remarkable because neither of the authors are professional economists but rather political scientists. Nevertheless, they have taken the trouble to master what economics has to offer,

which is not always done in these cases, and the economist can find very little to complain about in the concepts and the theories which they have borrowed from him.

The success of economics imperialism depends on the fact that exchange, which is the central concept of economics, is a concept which can easily be generalized into virtually all other aspects of the social system, especially in its most general form of a transformation function, in which a certain quantity of A is given up and a certain quantity of B is gained. A and B in this case do not have to be commodities in the narrow sense of the word; they can be such things as the support of a particular sector for a politician, a sense of legitimacy which a regime creates, the capacity to do damage and to influence people by threats, and so on. It is, furthermore, easy to extend the concept of the transformation function into its limiting case of the one-way transfer, or grant, in which A is zero and B is positive or negative. It can also be extended to the concept of the threat, explicit or implicit, which may not, of course, be carried out, but remains as a potential transformation. If I do not pay my income tax ($-A$), I will go to jail ($-B$). One can argue very convincingly, therefore, that transformation functions and their more particular form of transformation coefficients (prices and shadow prices) underly all of social life, and indeed all systems of any kind, and as economics has specialized in the study of transformation functions of a particular kind in society (ratios of exchange), it is not surprising that the concepts and theories of economics have broad applicability.

We can see this in another form perhaps if we reflect that transformation functions which imply scarcity, in which A and B are of opposite signs, so that the more of A, the less of B, which are peculiarly the province of economics, extend over the whole field of social life, and it is again not surprising, therefore, to find that the principles of economics have very wide applicability. This reflection may also provide a clue, however, to the limits of economics imperialism, for transformation functions do exist which do not exhibit scarcity or conservation, in which for instance the more of A, the more of B. Teaching increases knowledge both of the teacher and of the student. An act of goodwill may increase the benevolence of both parties, as an act of illwill may increase the malevolence of both parties. With these kinds of transformations, economics is not at home, and the general theoretical structure which is based purely on economics is likely to miss them and their significance. It is not really a criticism of this book that its authors did not build the non-scarce transforma-

tion functions into their theory, for the object of the book is quite explicitly to apply the concepts of economic theory to political reality as far as it will go, and it goes a very long way. Nevertheless, the reader should be warned that economics cannot do everything, even though what it can do may be a large part of the field.

The book is so dense in content that it is difficult to summarize and though it is clearly written it is not always easy to read. Undergraduates, I think, would find it difficult, though graduate students in any field of social science would find it most rewarding. It begins with a justification for "political economy," as a new, or perhaps one should say, a resurrected science, and it ends with a plea for a new and a better Machiavellism for giving good advice not only to the sovereign or "statesman," as they call him, but also to the "anti-statesman," who may be more ethically desirable than the incumbent. The central chapters of the book deal with such problems as political resources, political exchange, political inflation and deflation, where incidentally the economic analogy often tends to break down, political resource management, political resource accumulation, and political administrative infrastructure. The political organization is seen as a kind of "firm" with the statesman making decisions in the light of his political exchange environment and also his political production environment. We see the statesman operating by inputs and outputs of both economic goods, threats, persuasions, charisma and what not. The authors are well aware of the great importance of legitimacy and legitimation and aware also that this is a quasi-economic good which can be produced and exchanged. They recognize in many places the limitations of the economic framework, especially as a result of the fact that in political life there is no single medium of exchange, like money. Hence, we have something which looks much like a complex barter economy which is much harder to reduce to simple terms and to measurement. This leads to some real confusions in the concepts of political inflation and deflation which clearly correspond to some sort of reality, but where the economic analogy is not very close because of the absence of any political equivalent of the price level. Nevertheless, the contrast which is drawn between regimes which have a deficiency of political demand, hence are lethargic and traditional, and those regimes where political demand is in excess and hence are unstable and chaotic, is a valid and powerful insight. The book is full of brilliant little "asides," like the comparison in the footnote on page 261 of the four Parsonian functions with the four "humors" of medieval medicine. The

attack on "general" theories of social change and development, like those of McClelland and Hagen, by comparison with the more particular and short-run theories, like those of Hirschman and Papenek, is very cogent.

This work is an important landmark in the development of an integrated social science, and everyone who reads it seriously will profit by it. It is perhaps a little unfortunate, in its illustrative material at least, that it concentrates so heavily on the problems of the poor countries and of development, because the principles which it expounds are of complete generality and indeed the applications to the rich countries may be of even greater interest. Perhaps the authors will consider this in the future. Whether the book fulfills its avowed intention, however, of developing a body of doctrine which will be useful to the "statesman," such as Colonel Gowan of Nigeria, may be doubted. The basic problem here is not so much the body of concepts and theory, but the problem of collecting and processing information in a form which is accessible to the "statesman." The authors recognized the problem, but also recognized that in the present state of knowledge they cannot do very much about it. Economics has been successful in influencing policy, not so much because it has developed an elegant body of theory, as because it has developed a technique—one might almost say a ritual—of information collection and processing which presents information to the "statesman" about the economy in a form which he can appreciate and act upon. Until political economy can do the same, one suspects that its actual impact on political behavior will be small. It is no great criticism of this book, however, to say that it does not go all the way. It has laid down the beginnings of a high road over very difficult country and its authors are much to be commended.

KENNETH E. BOULDING

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Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community. BY FRANCIS A. BEER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969. Pp. 330. \$10.00.)

Francis Beer attempts to analyze the processes of alliance cohesion in NATO in terms of a theory of integration. This approach provides an interesting addition to the great majority of literature on alliances in which theoretical considerations often are overlooked altogether. Even in the more theoretical work on alliances, the applicability of integration theory has largely been disregarded. Through an examination of NATO institutions the author seeks to

investigate the extent to which NATO has passed beyond a traditional alliance to become a political community. This transition is treated in terms of integration, defined as "the process whereby political actors in several discrete national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." (p. 3)

In his theoretical introduction Beer suggests that movement toward an integrated political community will be indicated by an increase in institutional autonomy, the growth of authority, and increased legitimacy of the central institutions. He also suggests the hypotheses that integration will be more likely as: 1) alliance leadership combines ideological clarity in specific programs with ambiguity in abstract goals; 2) allied decisions are made jointly by independent experts and instructed national delegates; 3) coalitional support varies according to the issue in question; and 4) functional sectors tend to be technical rather than political in nature, so that spillover is more likely to result. Each of these relationships is then examined in great detail for five functional areas. The author chooses for this purpose political consultation, military forces, armaments, infrastructure, and science.

It is unfortunate that the author often loses sight in these detailed sections of his theoretical propositions, so that the theory serves more as an organizing scheme than as a set of hypotheses to be tested rigorously. The result is that the relationship between the detailed middle sections and the theoretical introduction is often drawn rather sketchily. As a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the development of NATO institutions, these interior sections are excellent; as a contribution to a theory of alliance cohesion, however, they fall somewhat short of the expectations generated in the introduction.

The author's general conclusion is that little integration has taken place in NATO in the 20 years since its formation. He finds that, while NATO has performed many useful tasks in all five functional areas, there has been little integrative spillover. This has been indicated by the lack of binding institutional procedures, limited task expansion, predominantly indirect authority, the lack of authoritative centers of decision-making, and the politicization of even technical functions, making spillover unlikely. Indeed, the only two factors contributing to alliance cohesion, Beer finds, were the ideological proclamations of NATO's leadership and the presence of external crisis. While all of these conclusions are quite reasonable and well docu-

mented, from a theoretical perspective the author's historical/narrative methodology makes it difficult to generalize these findings systematically beyond this specific case study.

In his introduction the author raises three criticisms of previous studies of integration, all of which tend to be contradicted somewhat by his own research. First, he argues that integration has been treated too often as a condition rather than as a process. Yet, in treating integration as a process, Beer fails to realize that process models are not necessarily uni-dimensional and one-directional. Spillover does not necessarily contribute solely to integration; indeed, *disintegrative* spillover may also occur. This point, which has been emphasized only recently by theorists of political development, needs also to be taken into account by theorists of international relations. Indeed, Beer's own analysis would seem to suggest that political disputes continually tend to be injected into technical areas of NATO organization. For example, French resentment of American domination of NATO, a political dispute, has undoubtedly contributed to French rejection of integrated NATO military forces and infrastructure, nominally technical issues.

In applying a functionalist model, Beer has failed to confront explicitly one of the fundamental paradoxes of functionalist theory. Functionalism assumes that integration is possible in technical areas because they are insulated from political conflicts; it then assumes that integrative habits learned in performing technical functions may spill over into political ones. But this then implies that the two spheres are not totally insulated or spillover would not occur. And if they are not entirely insulated, then political conflicts may even spill over to destroy co-operation in the performance of nominally technical functions. In short, there may be a reverse process of *disintegrative* spillover, and this seems to be what is appearing in NATO. A crucial task then, not dealt with in this book, may entail the identification of those conditions which may account for the direction of the spillover process.

Second, Beer charges that the importance of institutions has been de-emphasized, obscuring a great deal of the integrative process. While this is probably true to a degree, this may not have obscured as much as Beer assumes. Indeed, one conclusion that seems to stand out in his analysis is that somehow, in spite of the existence of a plethora of autonomous and differentiated institutions, NATO cohesion has declined substantially. Certainly this should suggest that a good deal more than institutions are relevant to alliance cohesion.

Third, the author contends that "there has

been a concentration on environmental configurations as causal factors and a neglect of the immediate motives and expectations of key political actors." (p. 3) Once again, several of his own findings seem to contradict this assertion. The one crucial factor which seems to account for the greatest change in NATO cohesion, according to Beer, is the degree of external crisis, an environmental factor. In his conclusion the author traces at some length the changes in NATO integration in relation to the degree of East-West conflict, and he finds that institutional advancement consistently tailed off during the periods of East-West détente in 1953-55, 1958-59, and 1963-65. Clearly perceptions of environmental conflict and the resulting tension appeared to have an integrative effect on NATO.

In addition, Beer finds that the ideology of NATO's leadership also tended to favor integration strongly. However, the minimal influence of these key political actors on the actual outcome tends to indicate their relative lack of importance. From this reviewer's perspective, one of the strongest points about the author's narrative was that it did *not* attribute all changes in NATO cohesion to one or a few key political actors, like de Gaulle, as so many other studies of NATO have done. In fact, he often seems to be quite aware that there are more basic factors, often environmental ones, at work. Thus, it appears to be essential to analyze the actors' environment and their perceptions of it as well as their own unique and idiosyncratic personalities.

In summary, Beer's book is certainly one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date analyses of changes in NATO cohesion during the past 20 years. It exhibits considerable substantive research effort and is organized in an interesting framework based on an analysis of the integrative process. Unfortunately, it has several theoretical shortcomings which illustrate rather clearly how far we are from a systematic, potentially generalizable, and empirically grounded theory of alliance cohesion.

P. TERRENCE HOPMANN

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Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence. BY ERIK H. ERIKSON. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969. Pp. 474. \$10.00.)

When Erikson's *Young Man Luther* was published in 1958, it was little noticed by historians and social scientists, even by those who had special interests in the Protestant Reformation and rise of modern Europe (if memory serves, the book was not reviewed by This Journal or any

other political science publication). By now *Luther* has achieved almost classic status as a work of psychobiography, and indeed serves as a model to those attempting to apply psychoanalytic insights to history and biography. But Erikson's eminence goes far beyond the confines of academic departments in universities and the pages of *Daedalus*. Unlike many of his psychoanalytic colleagues who write for outside audiences, he is a prophet honored in his own country. His *Childhood and Society*, with its skilled delineation of the stages of child and adolescent development in different cultures, is among the most widely used books in psychiatric residency training programs. No wonder that for his contributions to the study of ego identity and identity 'crisis' Erikson was recently named by a large number of his fellow practitioners as among the three most outstanding living analysts and psychiatrists.

Gandhi's Truth is unlikely to lower these estimates; in fact, a case can be made that this latest book is superior in depth and relevance to the one on Luther. The focus of the work is a 1918 textile worker's strike—referred to by Erikson as "The Event"—in the Indian city of Ahmedabad. At the time of the strike Gandhi was almost fifty years old, and while he was already well known in India and abroad as a leader in the Indian civil rights movement in South Africa and in India itself, he was not yet the revered Bapu of the Indian masses he was later to become—or, from another point of view, not yet the "naked Fakir," as Winston Churchill, in his kindlier moments, used to refer to him. Gandhi was asked to mediate the strike by Ahmedabad's leading mill owner, Ambalal Sarabhai, whose sister was a social worker sympathetic to the striking textile employees. In the course of the strike, which was eventually settled by a compromise favorable to the workers, Gandhi converted a number of those on both sides to the principles of *Satyagraha*, a non-violent method of persuasion, according to Erikson, by which one's opponents are won over to the versions of truth, justice, and peace that are being put forward. By the end of the strike the techniques of *Satyagraha*, including for the first time fasting, had been more or less successfully tested, and a year later they were to reach and affect the stage of world history when Gandhi led the first nationwide civil disobedience campaign.

It was another thirty years before India saw the last of the British Raj, and perhaps India's achievement of independence in the late Nineteen Forties owed more to Britain's exhaustion following World War II and forces moving toward the dissolution of empires everywhere than

to Gandhi's *Satyagraha*. To take this direction further, it is possible to argue, as Arthur Koesler has recently done, that Gandhi's influence in India has been almost wholly reactionary and so backward, in terms of India's need for economic and political modernization, as to suggest that Churchill's "naked Fakir" designation was not far wrong. Erikson's interest, however, is less in modern Indian history or even in Gandhi's relation to Indian independence than in the possibility that *Satyagraha* may have momentous application to the increasing violent controversies of our own time. In promulgating and perfecting *Satyagraha*, Erikson asks in effect, did Gandhi know something that we in the West don't know?

Before turning to this question Erikson as psychoanalyst is concerned to explicate some important themes and occurrences in Gandhi's life prior to the 1918 strike. Gandhi's early years appear to have been more than usually complicated by oedipal relationships. Up to a point it is the familiar story of the male child's closeness to the mother and his rivalrous ambivalent and guilty feelings about the father. Even granting the point that these relationships should not be approached as if they had been lived out in Vienna or New York, it is reasonable to suggest that Gandhi throughout this life was more comfortable with the feminine side of his nature than with the masculine component. Erikson touches on this when he remarks that the "total image" of Gandhi's home in childhood "is one in which it is difficult to allocate masculine and feminine identifications"; "Father Time," he observes suggestively, is in India a Mother. Clearly in India the attributes of masculinity and femininity are not as sharply differentiated, and sexual role definitions as sharply marked, as in western culture. If I understand Erikson correctly, he wants to emphasize that Gandhi's acceptance of his own femininity and associated maternal instincts partly explains not only his success as a mass leader but also clarifies some of the necessary conditions for a world order based upon *Satyagraha* principles.

Gandhi himself, of course, is associated with a variety of bizarre sexual anecdotes, much used against him by his enemies. It is well known that he suffered life-long guilt as a result of having intercourse with his pregnant wife at the very moment his father was dying; some years later, after fathering several children and not wanting additional offspring (he was opposed to contraception), he renounced sex altogether. Or did he? Those opposed to Gandhi have always smirked about his habit in old age of sleeping with naked women and girls, allegedly to keep warm and to test his self-control. What-

ever the reasons, it cannot be denied that Gandhi throughout life suffered a good deal from demands made upon him as a husband, lover, and father. For his treatment of his sons, in particular, there is nothing to be said by way of justification. Perhaps it is a fair question whether, in this respect as in his failure to recognize the "mutuality" of sexual relations, Gandhi ever succeeded in practicing in private some of the principles of *Satyagraha* that he espoused in public. While Erikson does not raise such a question directly, it is with reference to Gandhi's treatment of his family that he abandons his customary affectionate regard for his subject, rightly scolding Gandhi for rationalizing his own behavior "with ambivalent phrases and principles."

Not that Erikson interprets Gandhi solely in terms of his complex psychosexual development. Indeed those who seek in the book a simple monocausal deterministic explanation for Gandhi's career will be disappointed to find that Gandhi's life as depicted by Erikson was not that simple. Erikson is content to demonstrate how certain themes from Gandhi's early years were played out in Durban, London, and, finally, Ahmedabad; beyond this, neither Erikson nor any other psychobiographer is really entitled to go unless he eschews the limitations imposed by the known available facts of Gandhi's life. Since Erikson is familiar with clinical realities, he knows that even these facts, like the manifest content of dreams, are subject to distortion, and he therefore is cautious in interpreting the 'facts' set forth in Gandhi's autobiography.

Some readers, no doubt, will think he is too cautious here and there, and perhaps it can be argued that certain interpretations evidence a considerable transference relationship between the analyst and his subject (Erikson admits to such a relationship with his 1962 host in India, the mill owner of 1918, Ambalal Sarabhai). The India experts among us will not be happy with his total ignorance of the social science literature pertaining to India, a literature that might have modified certain of his conclusions about the basis of Gandhi's charisma, and given greater depth to some other conclusions about the political and social significance of the 1918 strike. (Unfortunately, *Gandhi's Truth* illustrates rather than solves the problems presented when analysts with social science interests work in isolation from social scientists with psychoanalytic sophistication.) Erikson's writing style, which has always suffered from a conspicuous density and vagueness of expression, has not improved with this latest book, many paragraphs of which suggest that subtlety of thought and

phrasing if carried too far becomes merely another form of ambiguity. After much pondering I still cannot fathom the meaning of "Gandhi's actualism, then, first of all consisted in his knowledge of, and his ability to gain strength from, the fact that nothing is more powerful in the world than conscious nothingness if it is paired with the gift of giving and accepting actuality." One is tempted to wonder whether this sentence was intended to be understood. At other times, one suspects that a point made facetiously is designed to be taken somewhat seriously, and a point made seriously designed to be taken somewhat facetiously. Perhaps the author unlike the reader wishes to have it both ways.

These faults do not make *Gandhi's Truth* easy reading, but neither do they render its central themes so obfuscated as to elude meaning. Gandhi like Freud, Erikson suggests, understood the difference between ethics and moralism, and between what is instinctive and what is instinctual. Arguing an affinity between Gandhi's truth or *Satyagraha* and the insights of modern psychology, Erikson credits Gandhi with an awareness that man's propensity for destruction is an "unfunctional drive" that, because it is without preserving role, could be transcended or gotten rid of. Unlike most of us, Gandhi "prided himself on being half-man and half-woman," and Erikson is right to observe that wars owe something to the "age-old male propensity for considering the renunciation of armament an abandonment of malehood." Thus Gandhi, to whom the usual masculine-feminine dichotomies did not apply, was far more hopeful than Freud about the human condition, but like Freud understood the need for "mutual activism with others" in a non-violent context, and the achievement of "more inclusive identities." 'Reality testing,' Erikson seems to be saying, enables psychoanalytic man to think more clearly about himself and his problems, and may lead social man to the Gandhian solution of non-violent *Satyagraha* as a way of bridging the gap between personal and family ethics and the ethics of communities and nations. To choose any other direction is to choose certain death and the destruction of civilized life.

Would that it were so, that is, would that we were able to learn better from Gandhi than from Moses; Jesus, Freud, or, in our own time, Martin Luther King (to whom *Gandhi's Truth* is dedicated). But it seems that even the Indian followers of Gandhi have as little commitment to *Satyagraha* as the followers of Jesus have to the Sermon on the Mount. As this is being written there are reports of continuing communal strife between Hindus and Moslems in—one can

guess—Ahmedabad where the death toll may yet reach into the thousands. It is a sad commentary on the 100th anniversary of Gandhi's birth, and a pathetic footnote to *Gandhi's Truth*.

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Nationalism and Its Alternatives. BY KARL W. DEUTSCH. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. 200. \$5.95)

Among modern governments only nation states can—at their best—satisfy the needs and win the support of their inhabitants; but modern warfare makes those same states into "potential death-traps for their citizens." This "paradox" is the theme of Karl Deutsch's extended essay on *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*. He offers no panacea and preaches no sermon. Rather he seeks to contribute to a "political meteorology" that can provide timely "storm warnings."

The first three chapters trace parts of the global weather chart. In the West nations grew slowly along routes of transport and around administrative "core areas"; hence assimilation outpaced social mobilization. In Eastern Europe that ratio was reversed. Autocratic empires broke up into ethnic polka-dots. Internecine strife among nationalities led to expropriation, expulsion, and massacre—a wholesale disregard for human rights that cleared the way for communist repression. In the developing countries the nationalist and militarist rulers have shown themselves "spectacularly inept at economic, industrial, and educational development," and are venting their frustrations on the West.

Deutsch has only moderate hopes for federal integration among existing states (Chapter Four). Even in Europe, trade in the Common Market since 1957 increased no more than might be expected among any given group of growing economies. A more promising avenue is the formation of "pluralistic security communities"—groups of states that forswear war and hence can multiply their contacts through the flow of goods, news, and persons. Above all, Deutsch hopes for a concerted development of behavioral science (Chapter Five). Politics is like a game "with moderately loaded dice," a mixture of law and of chance. Hence it is amenable to techniques of analysis derived from probability, the theory of games, theories of imperfect communication, learning psychology, and other fields. And as understanding deepens, so do the opportunities for rational control expand.

Deutsch concludes that for the next eighty years or so there will be no substitute for the nation-state. Accustomed as we have grown to

its services we are not likely to settle for anything smaller—or for anything much larger. For with our present knowledge and habits, any substantial increase in size is likely to blunt a state's sensitivity to domestic needs and foreign dangers. Already the largest states resemble "irritable giants wearing blinders and defective hearing aids." We must therefore be prepared to give the nation-states "a larger part than ever of our material possessions and affairs . . . But we need not, and we ought not, give the nation-state our souls." Defense expenditures could be shifted toward indirect military assets such as transport, education, and foreign aid. International law could be developed not just as a moralizing law for international behavior but also as a pragmatic law of international behavior.

Deutsch's brevity and informal tone have their drawbacks. Future editions will no doubt eliminate some inadvertent inaccuracies or misprints. For example, Henry of Saxony was not a king who became emperor but a duke who became king; Greece became sovereign in 1830 not 1930, Germany federal in 1871 not 1918; Mustafa Kemal attained power in 1919–22, not 1918; and at the tenth step of a random walk the chances of being one step or less from the center are 672, not 712, out of 1024. (pp. 12, 49f., 118, 152.) Occasionally, too, a link in the argument appears to be missing. Would the Common Market economies have grown as much without the five year impetus toward unity provided by the Treaty of Rome? If boundaries once drawn turn people inward, is it still true that existing boundaries reflect (rather than restrict) present flows of communication? The analogy between international law and the rules of the road is less than convincing. Before the advent of unified government over long stretches of road, one might argue, there were no right and left lanes and no stop signs, and it was lurking highwaymen rather than "passing trucks" that were ready "to mete out the death penalty."

But the lucidity and succinctness of Deutsch's book more than compensate for such blemishes. For the political scientist, it draws together the major themes of his earlier works, such as *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (with Richard W. Van Wagenen and others, 1957), and *The Nerves of Government* (1963). For the general reader it provides a convenient introduction to the body of thought that has made Karl Deutsch the leading political scientist of his generation.

Where others have escaped from the real political world into quantified trivia or abstruse verbiage, Deutsch has chosen for his life's theme

the patterns of communication that lead to political conflict—or cooperation. He attains relevance (that ideal loudly proclaimed these days, but rarely specified) in the two ways in which a scholar must pursue it: relevance to large human concerns and relevance to his own life history. Growing up in Prague in the period between the world wars within the small circle that was working for German-Czech understanding, Deutsch experienced the problems of nationality and communication as a daily reality. From Europe, too, he brought that rich knowledge of history which saves him from the pedantry and shallowness of much of American "behavioral" science. But it was his adoptive country that furnished the intellectual tools, such as cybernetics and the theory of games, with which to master his chosen problem.

Deutsch does not pursue the will-o'-the-wisp of a "value-free social science." He is aware that the realms of fact and of value are (in W. G. Runciman's phrase) "distinct but inseparable." His technological enthusiasm is pervaded by a deep humanism. His hopes for a better future are strengthened by an unflattering appraisal of the perplexities of the present. Inventiveness, he assumes, will do more good than high sentiment. He is keenly conscious of the ambiguity of all political situations. In particular, he knows that "Throughout the history of nationalism . . . we find the noblest aspects of life mingled with the most terrible." His most telling weapon against inhumanity and barbarism is the rationalist's gentle irony.

The central question of politics to Deutsch is not one of power but of the satisfaction of human needs. Mankind, he suggests, resembles "a tipsy, but reasonably rational," person "stag-gering along . . . the edge of a cliff." The social scientist cannot make us sober. But by examining both drunkard and mountain, he can lessen the chances of our stumbling into the abyss.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW

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Community Conflict, Public Opinion and the Law: The Amish Dispute in Iowa. By HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 154. \$1.95, paper.)

This is a neat, tight little case study of an extended dispute over the schooling of Amish children. It is an interesting, sometimes absorbing account accomplished with considerable sophistication in data analysis. Although rough in spots, it is a useful contribution to professional understanding of relationships between local elites' attitudes and behavior and both local and general public attitudes, of the uses of legal machinery

for conflict resolution, and of the role of state officials in structuring local action. It could be useful in undergraduate courses in community politics or research design and methodology, as well as in some sociology of law contexts.

The dispute involved a community school board's efforts to force a handful of Amish children to attend local public school, or receive instruction in their two private schools exclusively from state-certified teachers paid for by the Amish community. The Amish sought to gain state support or local funds to pay uncertified teachers of their selection who would continue to instruct children according to Amish beliefs. Various means of enforcement were tried, and the dispute escalated to the point where the Governor of Iowa intervened to prevent physical coercion of the children. Ultimately, state requirements were amended to provide exceptions for the Amish, who emerged with substantially all their goals achieved.

Rodgers takes as his central questions (1) What type of circumstances lead responsible officials to refuse to enforce the law through the use of established legal machinery? and (2) What effect does such a refusal have on popular support for the law and the political system? Data collected for the purposes of the study included responses to similar structured questionnaires from twelve local "decisionmakers" (school board members and school officials), seventeen local "opinion leaders" (those named by decisionmakers as people they consulted), and a random sample of 289 local citizens (conducted by a professional survey organization). Some comparative data are also employed, the most useful of which are responses to a statewide survey which included some of the author's questions regarding the dispute and responses to standard attitudinal questions administered to another statewide sample by other researchers.

Rodgers finds that all segments of the generally conservative local community were agreed that the Amish should be obliged to obey the state school law requirements that they either attend public school or hire and pay for certified teachers in their own schools. The statewide general public, however, perhaps influenced by a dramatic photograph showing Amish children fleeing through cornfields from the pursuit of authorities who sought to force them into buses for transportation to public schools, favored exception to the law for the Amish. In what constitutes one of the most interesting findings of the study, Rodgers shows that the nature of the dispute was understood quite differently by different publics: local decisionmakers and opinion leaders saw it as a financial issue in which the Amish were simply unwilling to pay for their own teachers; the local public saw it as an

Amish attempt to avoid contaminating contact with the outside world; and the statewide public saw it as an issue of religious freedom for the Amish.

Decisionmakers felt strongly that the law should have been enforced as it stood, and they were aware of support for their position on the part of local opinion leaders and the local public. But they were reluctant to take the harsh final steps that the dogged Amish resistance made necessary, such as confiscation of Amish property, extended jailing of parents, or daily physical coercion of the children. All three local publics resented "outside interference" and continued to feel that the law should have been enforced, even though the Governor's intrusion took them off an uncomfortable hook and resulted in provision of special (non-local) funds to pay the Amish teachers' salaries. Only the two groups of local elites felt afterwards that respect for law had been undermined, however, while the local citizens' respect for law and the political system remained high.

The author deserves credit for tackling the difficult task of exploring the complex bases for noninvocation of legal machinery and the consequences thereof for future respect for the law on the part of various publics. On the whole, he does well in extracting hypotheses for future research. The scope of the problem, however, in contrast with the limitations of the data available, make the reader somewhat uneasy at points. The small size of the elite publics and the narrow focus on the process of a single rather unique dispute in this small community make for an uncertain base, and too often the author is forced to depend on answers to a single question to support broad characterizations.

To some extent, these are problems inherent in any small-scale research project which seeks to grapple with important problems. But the author has contributed to the difficulty here in some minor ways. Seeking efficient portrayal of comparisons between publics, for example, he employs bar graph presentations of group means to such an extent that the substance of responses are slighted, seriously so in one chapter (5). Nor does the conceptual armory of systems analysis seem well suited to the explication of the single chain of events and reactions involved in such a case study. The strengths of systems analysis are perhaps more visible in the design of research, or in interpretation of patterns of repeated behavior or recurring similar events. Here, the tale might have been told more clearly and directly if the author had not presented his findings in such an elaborate framework. And he might have avoided such minor annoyances as translating theoretical assumptions into "conclusions" for which his evidence offers little support

(e.g., p. 118.)

It is not inconsistent to add now that the author might also have sought to draw some implications of a different order out of his research; his central questions do not appear to wholly encompass the data developed. Part of the strength of this book lies in the multiple applications of the data, particularly those on the segmentation of attitudes within the community. In other words, this is more than a study of why the school board failed to go all the way with law enforcement and how various publics reacted in terms of support for the law. There are suggestive data permitting comparison of local elites and publics as to their relative propensity to make policy-preference-oriented exceptions to the neutral and consistent application of the law. In important ways, it appears, law is merely an extension of values, rather than an embodiment of a generally shared community desire for order and predictability. Support comes from those people whose preferences are served, and to the extent that they are; others, recognizing that the law embodies somebody else's preferences, prefer exceptions to allow them to do as they wish. There are interesting data comparing local elites and public attitudes on civil liberties questions which seem to show much smaller disparities than most other studies. And there is a series of implications for such policy questions as decentralization of decision-making: the data grant small encouragement to those who would see decentralization as a means of promoting local democracy, if democracy be defined to include the tolerance of strongly-felt minority preferences by local majorities.

These minor rough spots do not really detract from what is a decided professional contribution to the community politics and law-as-social-process literature. In addition, the book may offer a potentially useful classroom tool for teachers who want undergraduate students to learn research skills and concepts through field research in community contexts. It is well written, and the inclusion of timely anecdotes and revealing quotations enhances the impact. A description of the citizen sample, copies of the questionnaires, and descriptions of scale construction and computer programs and statistical techniques appear in appendices. All in all, it is an engaging and promising piece of work.

KENNETH M. DOLBEARE

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Men And Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory. BY JUDITH N. SHKLAR. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 245. \$8.50.)

Rousseau is truly the sphinx of modern social philosophy. Any student of the human condition

eventually encounters this sensitive and agonized genius, but the product of this encounter more often than not is a sense of paradox. One could say that he has been given a complex riddle to interpret. Many have been the interpretations proffered, and we now seem to have come full circle, in a way. Not long ago a prominent view of Rousseau was that he adored the noble savage, undefiled by exotic and corrupting arts and science and by any sort of government. Soon, however, scholars like Lovejoy perceived that Rousseau specifically denied that men could return to that condition, or even that it would be desirable. Before long our attention was being called to the profound rationalism and moral responsibility, revolutionary in character, of Rousseau's democratic political theory, and we were reminded of how highly Kant thought of him. We were then treated to a debate, whether he was totalitarian or democratic. What we now have from Mrs. Shklar is a denial of the significance of most of this argument through a sophisticated reversion to the negative aspects of the earlier thesis. To Rousseau, it is now said, there is no return to that happy past, but there is little happiness for men in the future, either. Man is indeed "born free" and "by nature good," but he is incurably fallen. Her argument is as fascinating as it is unexpected.

Robert Derathé warned us about twenty years ago that Rousseau could be understood only if all of his writings, including his letters, are considered, insisting with Rousseau that his thought would then show a consistency not otherwise discernible. Dr. Shklar has taken this advice to heart, but the consistent meaning she finds is not at all that found by Derathé. Whereas the French scholar, like Cassirer, concluded that Rousseau was basically a rationalist, and with elaborate documentation situated his thought in the context of the political science of the age, Dr. Shklar thinks that the outraged condemnation of rationalism and all its products with which Rousseau launched his literary career expressed his constant perspective and remained the foundation of his later writings. She insists that Rousseau can be understood only as a critic of society, informing men of their disease, and not as a constructive social thinker, suggesting remedies. He expressed, as she nicely puts it, "the individualism of the weak," as Locke had expressed that of the strong. He hated human suffering, which he portrayed in many passages with unexampled power, but finding its cause not in ignorance, which might be dispelled as Locke and the utilitarians hoped, but in weakness of will, he concluded that there is no remedy. His apparent remedies—*Emile*, *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, *The Social Contract*—all not only contain the seeds of their own destruction,

but do not provide, separately or together, an adequate world for the human soul. Man cannot live without society, society is impossible without inequality, and inequality is another name for human suffering. Rousseau is not only pessimistic, as has often been recognized; the very "perfectibility" of man, his distinguishing characteristic, is the source of his woes. This Rousseau is surely a prophet without hope.

Mrs. Shklar seems aware that her thesis is extraordinary, reducing a man who has been considered a great and important social philosopher, despite his unsystematic mind, to little more than an anguished cry of frustration, anger, and impotence. She deliberately ignores the historical influence of Rousseau's thought, and for the most part other scholarly interpretations, apparently considering that Rousseau cannot be held responsible for what others have made of his work. She would let Rousseau speak for himself. One cannot deny that she has been largely successful in permitting one Rousseau to emerge, the Rousseau who speaks to the modern, agonized, existentialist temperament, and this reader is grateful, since he now understands an appeal he had previously found inexplicable. Still, there are other voices of Rousseau: the protohistoricist of the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, the careful legal phrases and political demands of the *Social Contract*, the practical and evolutionary conservatism of his later writings, which impressed a Vaughn, a Cassirer, a Derathé, leading them to discern a quite fundamental development in Rousseau's thought and learning during the decade following his first discourse, and these are not given adequate consideration. For example, Mrs. Shklar's treatment of sovereignty and the general will seems to void them of all substance; they become inspired, critical metaphors, to be understood almost in reverse of what they seem to say. It is hardly certain that Rousseau considered them so. Nevertheless, Dr. Shklar has given us a distinguished book, ensuring that the debate over the meaning of Rousseau will continue, and contributing greatly to it.

WILLIAM H. HARBOLD

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Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967. By WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 336. \$9.50.)

The past several years have witnessed a spate of articles clamoring for more political science—greater methodological consciousness and rigor—in the study of Communist systems. Responses to these appeals, even when the injunction is taken seriously, have been disappointing. The

work under review is a happy exception to this generalization. Zimmerman displays a broad familiarity with contemporary IR literature and, better still, an ability to apply relevant concepts in a sensible manner.

As the title suggests, the book treats recent developments in the intellectual climate of Soviet foreign policy decision-making. By examining the growing Soviet literature on the theory and practice of international relations the author finds considerable evidence of movement towards a more empirical appraisal of the international system. Indeed, he notes a significant convergence with western concepts and perceptions. According to Zimmerman, the new appreciation of the complexities of international reality has entailed a progressive discarding of heretofore sacrosanct Marxist-Leninist principles with their simplistic zero-sum-game assumptions.

The book is organized topically, rather than chronologically. This strategy involves a certain cost in repetition and discontinuity, but the cost is generally balanced by analytical benefits. In Chapter Two, which provides a general integrative background, Zimmerman presents an extensive account of the development of IR as an autonomous discipline in the USSR. Particularly important was the re-emergence of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in the wake of criticism of Soviet scholarship by Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the Twentieth Party Congress. Much of the impetus proceeded from the new line on peaceful economic competition, which presumably required a more profound understanding of the nature of contemporary capitalism. Not surprisingly, economists and economic questions dominated the early scholarly output of the Institute. As representatives of other disciplines became involved, the range of interests accordingly expanded, as did the level of analytical sophistication.

This developmental process was not unilinear. The dead hand of traditional views and the unwillingness of conservative forces to envision IR studies as anything more than an aid to propagandists posed serious obstacles to growth during the 1956-1962 "foundation period." During the last two years of Khrushchev's rule there occurred a notable breakthrough. The author extends this period of "new respectability" up to the time of writing—1967. However, there is good reason to designate the post-Khrushchev period as a separate stage, in my opinion, even on Zimmerman's own evidence, exclusive, that is, of the Czechoslovak crisis.

Among the reasons for the new receptivity the author mentions Soviet impressions of the salutary influence of political and strategic scholar-

ship on American foreign policy! After the Cuban missile debacle the grass may well have looked greener on the other side of the fence.

The chapter on Soviet perceptions of the international "actors" is particularly well handled. Zimmerman traces the complex process whereby Khrushchev and the specialists came to view the nation-state as the primary actor. To be overcome were ideological proclivities for viewing IR in class-conspiratorial and cosmic world-historical terms. He notes important semantic changes in Soviet terminology as the centrifugal effects of nationalism created problems for both major power blocs in a period of détente.

In a chapter on perceptions of U.S. foreign policy the author cogently describes the overcoming of "contradictions" between the hoary conception of governments as mere executive committees of the capitalist ruling classes and the obvious importance of governments as relatively autonomous determiners of national policy. Indeed, he notes, towards the end of the Khrushchev era, a tendency to go beyond "power elite" or "military-industrial complex" explanations, which have so preoccupied Western critics. Zimmerman argues that during his final years Khrushchev found it expedient for his own purposes to "prettify American imperialism"—a tendency rejected by his successors. To Zimmerman this reversal offers greater promise for a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship than did Khrushchev's lily-gilding approach.

The book is not without faults. The style, although generally lively and interesting, is sometimes strained as the author reaches for the *bon mot*. It is one thing to "bracket" Mao between the K(h)a(n) boys—Genghis and Herman (p. 95); but it seems a bit inappropriate (even if hilarious) to refer to Khrushchev as "the Everett Dirksen of the world communist movement" (p. 225).

Some of the substantive problems are more serious. It may not be quite fair to mention the Czechoslovak crisis, but Zimmerman's analysis of trends, despite occasional caveats, is much too unilinear and leaves little room for such lapses into past "irrationalities." The predictive potential of the analysis is restricted to the most general level.

A more fundamental weakness is the failure to deal seriously and systematically with internal political factors. The excesses of Kremlinology notwithstanding, one cannot comprehensively treat Soviet foreign policy-making without serious consideration of leadership conflict. Zimmerman does not give sufficient attention to this crucial problem or to the related question of personal leadership style.

Finally, the basic issue of the erosion of ideol-

ogy as a major determinant of Soviet foreign policy is not handled as subtly as the general quality of the book would lead one to expect. What Zimmerman appears to see "eroding" is the petrified formulations and *pronunciamentos* of the Stalin era. It is certainly true that many of the hallowed doctrines of the past, including even some of Lenin's basic perspectives, have become inoperative in this "post-imperialist" age. Nevertheless, ideology has always been most important as a methodology, a way of ordering data. Its doctrines and even its categories have often been modified and "enriched." Lenin's *Imperialism* was nothing if not a major revision of Marxism. If the Soviet handling of the Czechoslovak crisis was "non-ideological," then so was Lenin's handling of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and Stalin's of the 1939 pact with Hitler. But a counter-explanation in ideological terms can also be made in each case and ought at least to be considered. What Zimmerman has done brilliantly is to trace the erosion of old doctrines and analytical categories and the emergence of new ones. This is not the same thing as demonstrating the inevitable end of ideology. What he has done is no mean achievement, however, and his book is an important contribution to scholarship on Soviet foreign policy.

ROBERT F. MILLER

University of Illinois

Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns. By ABNER COHEN. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 252. \$5.50.)

Black political scientists and members of the Caucus for a New Political Science will find Professor Cohen's book loaded with implications for their work. Africanists and political scientists generally will find the book a stimulating tonic.

Drawing on his fifteen months of field work in 1962-1963, supplemented by colonial records and earlier studies of Nigeria, Cohen describes and analyzes the social structure and behavior of the Hausa minority in the Yoruba city of Ibadan during the period 1906-1963. This tiny minority of less than one percent of the city's population adroitly exploited their own strengths, the anxieties of the Yoruba chiefs, and the British system of Indirect Rule to achieve 1) their own semi-autonomous residential and business quarter (Sabo) under the authority of a Hausa Chief of the Quarter, 2) a monopoly over the trade in cattle brought to Ibadan from the North, 3) a monopoly over the trade in kola nuts shipped to the North, and 4) for a while a monopoly over the butcher trade

in Ibadan. Cohen maintains that the technical requirements of long-distance trade in perishable commodities are best met, in a pre-industrial society, under the conditions of ethnic monopoly, and the book's primary focus is on the relationship between Hausa ethnicity and their political and economic fortunes.

Cohen's treatment of this relationship utilizes two key analytic concepts. The first, "retribalization," makes the book revisionary of earlier studies which associated African urbanism with "detrribalization." Migrant Hausa have not been integrated in the course of time into the general life of the city. Nor have they merely replicated in Sabo the Hausa culture of their homelands in the North. Instead they have developed a locally distinct ethnicity, participation in which (i.e., "citizenship" in Sabo) is not acquired as a simple function of Hausa identity brought from the North but is achieved by a migrant's taking up roles that make him progressively more settled in Sabo. As he becomes more settled, he takes on a new, and exclusive, ethnicity; he becomes "retribalized."

Secondly, Cohen treats ethnicity as "essentially a political and not a cultural phenomenon." Throughout the history of Sabo, ethnic exclusivity has been a mechanism for fostering and protecting Hausa interests in trade and property. Even the mystic Tijaniyya order of Islam that became dominant in Sabo in the 1950's, leading to the "ritualization of authority" as malams became integrated into the decision-making process and to the intensification and increased pervasiveness of religious ritual, can be seen as a response to the threatened subversion of Sabo's autonomy by the collapse of Indirect Rule and the rise of nationalist parties. Thus, Cohen demonstrates that, contrary to certain notions, "tribalism" is not necessarily conservative and traditional but may be a dynamic and rational mechanism for solving problems. Moreover, "tribalism" is not the explanatory factor it might seem for analyzing African politics, for ethnic identity and exclusiveness are often more a function of vested economic interests than of particularly strong tribal sentiments. Cohen's work here supports that of Richard Sklar, among others, who has suggested that attention to class rather than tribal factors may advance the cogeny of African studies.

From the methodological point of view, Cohen's use of the "Micro-historical" procedure will be especially interesting to students of political development. Implying neither the history of small units nor the kind of brief narrative background we are accustomed to finding at the beginning of community power studies, Micro-his-

tory is an attempt to isolate and analyze the varying interrelationship of several factors through a series of historically related case studies set in a common and limited field and focusing at each point in time on a different sociological or political problem.

The Black Caucus at last year's meeting of the African Studies Association called for increased scholarly attention to the relationship between African and Afro-American phenomena. Here is one splendid point of departure. Cohen's concluding chapter contains a lengthy discussion of his findings within a comparative framework. In suggesting directions for future research and theoretical development, he recognizes that the study of political ethnicity and specifically "retribalization" should not be restricted to pre-industrial societies, and he even refers briefly to possible links between his work and that of C. Eric Lincoln, Essien-Udom, and Glazer and Moynihan. The parallels between the behavioral dynamics of Sabo Hausa and Afro-Americans are many and Black scholar-activists may find Cohen's discussion of "Cultural Strategies in Politics" very suggestive for political as well as scholarly matters. Whites, on the other hand, and especially those of us who are prone to treat Black Nationalism as a "fantasy" or a dangerous departure from liberal pluralism *cum* integration, may well wish to reevaluate the phenomenon and our reaction to it in light of Cohen's concept of the utility of ethnicity.

Just as Lipset demonstrated the possibilities for reinterpreting early American history in light of developmental theory based on research in the Third World, so now Cohen offers a promising basis for the reinterpretation of contemporary American life. The new nations, indeed, have much to teach us.

EVERT MAKINEN

Colby College

The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism. BY A. JAMES GREGOR. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 493. \$11.95.)
The Nature of Fascism. EDITED BY S. J. WOOLF. (New York: Random House, 1969. Pp. 261. \$7.95.)

After several attempts to penetrate the dense and convoluted prose of Professor Gregor, I am reluctantly led to the conclusion that he has produced a bad book. Gregor's volume exhibits thorough scholarship; it industriously "covers" a great deal of ground. Some of the analyses of individual thinkers (Gentile, Spirito, the early Mussolini) contain much that is of merit. Unfortunately, however, Gregor's principal theses, judgements and implicit evaluations are so

sweeping and questionable as seriously to detract from the value of the book considered as a whole.

Gregor sets out to provide an "accurate and objective account of Fascist commitment." This would be all to the good, except that he dispenses with the entire thorny question of what constitutes objectivity in the social sciences in a few apodictic pronouncements. The familiar distinctions between objective and "empirical" political "science" on the one hand, and subjective and "normative" political "theory" or "philosophy" on the other, are dutifully trotted out, but they are introduced without any attempt to deal with the severe critiques to which these very distinctions have been and are being subjected in our discipline. Had Gregor seriously considered these critiques, perhaps he would have avoided the perils of what I have elsewhere termed "pseudo-objective descriptivism." Instead, in the pursuit of a misconceived "objectivity," he is led to take literally some patently ridiculous and self-serving statements made by fascist propagandists and to offer up a portrait of Italian fascism which is unrecognizable because of the deep scars which have been omitted. Thus, in Gregor's interpretation, Italian fascism turns out to be committed to the "humanism of labor" and the "presumptive equality of all men" as members of the "Kantian kingdom of ends." According to this interpretation it is not valid to distinguish, as benighted "Anglo-American analysts" have been wont to do, between "fascism, Marxism, and democracy on the basis of fascism's putative 'anti-humanism' and 'anti-egalitarianism.'"

Gregor is intent in this volume not only upon demonstrating the objectivity of his political science but also its *relevance*. The relevance of authentic political science is held to consist in its explanatory and predictive capacity. By understanding the nature of Italian fascism and the conditions to which it responded, we are supposedly enabled to understand the nature of contemporary regimes in the "underdeveloped" and "developing" world. Gregor tells us that an "objective" analysis leads us to regard fascism as "a developmental dictatorship appropriate [*appropriate!*] to partially developed or underdeveloped . . . national communities in a period of intense international competition for place and status." (p. xiii) "One of the central theses of this book," the author informs us, is that Italian fascism "was the first, and remains perhaps the only, fully matured rationale for the totalitarian systems of the twentieth century." (p. 7) Thus, the ideological arguments of Italian fascism are seen to be "paradigmatic" for a host

of recent and contemporary regimes, ranging from Lenin's Russia and Mao's China [!] to numerous smaller societies of the Third World. In the strange alchemy of Gregor's political science, "African Socialism," for example, is held to possess "all the species traits of paradigmatic fascism." (pp. 364, 370)

Had Gregor stuck to his last and confined himself to an analysis of Italian fascist ideology, a subject on which he is most certainly knowledgeable and upon which he has intelligent things to say, it would have been possible for this reviewer to restrict his comments largely to difference of interpretation of the available evidence. I could then have focused on such matters as the relationship of Mussolini and Marxism, the relative weighting of Gentile's importance in the shaping of fascist ideology, whether Gregor has not neglected the "universalist" side of Italian fascist ideology via the Roman myth, whether in his overall characterization of fascist ideology, he should not have taken into account the positions of party militants such as Farinacci and Starace, whether the "corporativism" of Spirito and Bottai is worthy of the extensive attention he gives it, and whether his treatment of Italian fascist "racism" is not altogether too generous.

As it is, however, what is one to make of such a hopelessly amorphous concept of fascism as is that employed by Gregor in this volume? How can one even take seriously the "wave of the future" speculation which characterizes the author's attempt to be "relevant" and to fulfill his stated mission as a "predictive" social scientist? (See, for example, the sweeping generalization about present "totalitarian" trends in world politics on pp. 3, 329, and 381-382.) Essentially Gregor has done little more than abstract elements of fascist thought (nationalism, elitism, voluntarism, racialism, anti-parliamentarianism, ethnocentrism, etc.) and mechanically to discover some of the same elements in the pronouncements of Marx, Mao Tse-tung, Nkrumah and Leopold Senghor. The latter then, in effect turn into fascists. A similar game has been played for some time in the history of political thought, so that, for example, we have had Plato, Hegel, and Nietzsche reinterpreted as fascists (although few indeed have ventured to muddy the waters even further by suggesting that Marx and Mao were). This approach simply will not work, either for thinkers or for regimes. The detailed and specific features of each teaching and/or regime will have to be considered in the appropriate historical and cultural context. This is what real "empiricism" in political and social studies is about.

I find the style of this book to be lamentably lacking in grace, wit, or pungency and cannot but express the hope that in his next book Professor Gregor will devote more care to the art of writing and in particular will stifle his penchant for infelicitous neologisms and endless, convoluted sentences. We have too much of this kind of writing around in the social sciences as it is.

The volume edited by Woolf contains the proceedings of a symposium on fascism sponsored by the Reading University Graduate School of Contemporary European Studies in the spring of 1967. The papers—ten in number—are grouped under four headings, dealing with the political, economic, social, and intellectual aspects of fascism. Overall, the conference appears to have been a useful one, having brought together historians, political scientists, sociologists, and economists in an attempt to offer fresh interdisciplinary perspectives.

Woolf, in his Introduction, stresses the "contemporary relevance of fascism." However, this relevance stems primarily from the fact that fascism constitutes a "negative heritage" for those countries which had the "misfortune to experience a fascist regime," and secondarily from the insights it offers into such contemporary phenomena as "the processes of political modernization, the relationships between political and economic power," the problem of economic planning, and the "appeal of the irrational" to alienated intellectuals in the West. This is to pose the question of relevance far more adequately than did Gregor, for it is one thing to say that numerous contemporary movements and regimes have taken and will increasingly take on the features of "paradigmatic"—i.e., Italian—fascism, and another to conclude as Woolf does that an understanding of fascism may provide "insight" into some problems of contemporary societies, especially those searching for national identity and rapid economic development.

One could object, to be sure, to the failure of the participants more systematically and coherently to address themselves to the question of what constitutes the "essence" of fascism. However, this objection would not be entirely fair because it is quite possible that in the strict sense fascism as such has no essence but must principally be studied in the context of specific movements and regimes. One can perhaps more accurately speak of "fascisms," some of which are much closer to the totalitarian end of the spectrum than others.

Norman Kogan's opening paper is helpful in at least setting us on the way to considering the problem of "defining" fascism. For Kogan, the key characteristics of fascism are that it (1) de-

pends on a "mass base" which supports a charismatic leader, (2) is a modernizing and revolutionary rather than a traditionalist and conservative movement, (3) rejects the egalitarian ethos and extols hierarchy and discipline, typically enforced by the single party, (4) systematically embarks on a program to create a psychologically conditioned "new man," (5) glorifies terror and violence on principle, and (6) embraces a distinctive kind of nationalism which we may call "integral nationalism." These traits, however, must *all* be present and interrelated if a political system is to be categorized as fascist. It is refreshing, after emerging from Gregor's pages, to find Kogan asserting what one had rather suspected all along, *viz.*, that "fascism and Marxism contrast in a number of respects," including in particular the fact that the latter entertains humanist aspirations while the former does not. (p. 18) All the same, it is surprising to see Kogan, after drawing many of his examples of fascist thought and practice from the Italian regime, conclude that in actual practice "Italy under fascism was not a fascist state"! (p. 16) This reviewer prefers to think that Kogan has not said quite what he intended here. If he had said that "Italy under fascism was not a *fully* fascist state," this would have been more consistent with his effort to articulate a model which, while not precisely faithful to any given fascist regime, could help to illumine the nature of all of them. As it is, if we take him literally, we must conclude that there were no fascist regimes (Nazi Germany being excluded on the grounds of its uniquely monstrous biological racism). In that event, what are we studying?

Space limitations do not permit detailed comments on the other essays, which are by A. F. K. Organski, J. Solé-Ture, Gino Germani, S. L. Andreski, S. J. Woolf, S. Lombardini, T. W. Mason, George L. Mosse, and P. Vita-Finzi. Students of fascism will find something of interest in all of them. Organski and Germani have contributed provocative essays on the *conditions* which facilitate the emergence of a fascist system. Woolf has contributed a substantial paper dealing with the question "Did a Fascist Economic System Exist?" (His answer is in the affirmative with reference to Italy, Germany, and Japan.) Mason's paper on "Economics in National Socialist Germany" and Mosse's essay on "Fascism and the Intellectuals" also deserve careful consideration.

Despite its accomplishments, the symposium does more to indicate problems than to provide "definitive" resolutions. In any event, it may well be too early for the latter. If there is a common mood to these studies (except for the paper by Kogan) it may be described as revisionist. The authors are particularly eager to

move beyond "polemics" regarding fascist regimes. But one wonders whether at least some of the earlier studies of fascism—while needing to be supplemented and revised in the light of new material and further opportunity for reflection—did not come closer to portraying the raw and oppressive features of what were, after all, unjust and intolerable regimes than do some of these more clinical recent studies. For if a critical study of politics cannot unequivocally reject fascism, what can it reject?

DANTE GERMINO

University of Virginia

Debtors in Court: The Consumption of Government Services. By HERBERT JACOB. Rand McNally, 1969. Pp. 260. \$6.00.)

The fact that most voters participate only minimally in government decision making has been well documented by political scientists during the past decade. However, the citizen's participation in politics through the consumption of government outputs has not been extensively explored. In this short, but suggestive book, Herbert Jacob addresses himself to the political behavior of people as they use government services, receive government grants and are objects of government regulation. Consumption has important influences upon the level of support for the regime, the distribution of symbolic values, and new demands upon the system. By extending his definition of politics to this linkage between government and the citizen as consumer, the author studied the use of bankruptcy and garnishment services in four Wisconsin cities.

Debtors in Wisconsin may have their wages garnished or avail themselves of bankruptcy or Chapter 13 proceedings. The latter, described as "bankruptcy on the installment plan," allows debtors to pay off their debts over an extended time period through payments made to an officer of the court. Each of these services has developed over time in response to political pressures from various sectors of the community. Garnishment laws resulted from creditor demands, while bankruptcy has been a response by government to the debtor. Wisconsin's political history may be partially understood by the differential treatment accorded these groups as they have attempted to structure the law towards their own needs. Of current interest is the fact that as the extension of credit has become widespread, the consumption of these debt-related judicial services has risen among all levels of society. This, in turn, has had an impact upon norms regarding credit and the use of government services to collect delinquent debts.

Various groups in the cities studied made use of garnishment and bankruptcy services. One

might expect wage garnishment to be a tool used against the poor, while bankruptcy to be a service extended to the more affluent. Jacob found that socio-economic variables such as income, race, education, and location, explained only a small portion of the decisions to go into bankruptcy. As the author notes, the effect of these correlates are not linear, but interact with one another with a variety of complex results. Especially important to the debtor is access to an attorney and a communications network of people who have had experience with bankruptcy. An attorney will probably steer his client towards bankruptcy or Chapter 13 proceedings rather than risk the imposition of garnishment. An equally important factor is the debt level and resources of the delinquent. Those with a high debt and low income are most likely to go into bankruptcy.

Creditors seeking to recover assets through wage garnishment also vary. The law is written so that creditors using this service must be well organized and willing to divert manpower towards this goal. In addition, Jacob found that many companies are unwilling to alienate customers through the use of formal proceedings and use other means to recover debts owed them. Thus businessmen resort to wage garnishment only after other alternatives have failed.

The impact of political culture on the rates of debt litigation is an especially intriguing aspect of this study. Using Alford and Scoble's typology which rates the cities on a four point scale from traditional conservatism to modern liberalism, Jacob found marked differences existing in the propensity of citizens to use bankruptcy and garnishment services. These differences parallel other aspects of political participation so that the modern liberalism of Madison supports the consumption of a high level of court services. The linkage between the political culture and the actors within the judicial bureaucracy needs to be further explored. The author notes, for instance, that the judicial personnel and procedures in some cities were more receptive to the use of their services than in others. What political influences bear upon the extension of these services to the citizen?

Professor Jacob has broken fresh ground. His conception of the politics of consumption has implications far beyond this study of the judicial process. Every day citizens use a multitude of public services which, as the author suggests, have a wide variety of political consequences. The political impact of usage patterns warrants additional study. This book will be an important guide to that work.

GEORGE F. COLE

University of Connecticut

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND METHODOLOGY

Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development. By ROBERT A. NISBET. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 335. \$6.75.)

The thesis of this book is that change in society is mostly in the eye of the beholder. The argument for the thesis commences with the ancient Greeks and their overworked word *physis*. Among other things it means essence, nature, and growth. The argument ends with an assessment of the inutility of 20th-century theories of development and such assertions as these: "change is, however, *not* natural, *not* normal, much less ubiquitous and constant. Fixity is." (p. 270); "continuity of change lies in our constructions; not in history" (p. 294).

Nisbet does not deny change as a phenomenon but objects to assertions that one stage of development does not simply follow but is also the consequence of its predecessor. He asserts that there is no genetic change. Like David Hume, he finds cause to be the result of man's desire to say post hoc, ergo propter hoc. From the Greeks with their cyclical view of growth through the ever-repeated steps of birth, growth, and decay down to Oswald Spengler and Walt Whitman Rostow—all such theorists are only Platonic realists who fail to tell it as it really was.

It is a bit odd that a writer could make such assertions about change and fixity in a century that continues to observe and participate in such widespread change and seems to experience so little fixity. One is reminded of myopic Mr. Magoo crossing a busy street with cantankerous unconcern and reaching the other side unaware of the cars that have honked and crashed into each other to avoid hitting him. And so one is tempted to say it's obvious that civilizations, including polities, are born, grow, and die and the only question is how. To both the Magoo and the growth analogies, Nisbet would reply that the trouble with social theorists is precisely that tendency to analogize and to compare the physical body to the body politic. And there the reviewer did it again.

The author is quite right about this tendency to analogize. In an early (perhaps the first) edition of *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes' publisher pictured a giant man composed of hundreds of homunculi. Thomas Jefferson called cities festering sores on the body politic. And Abraham Lincoln intoned that our forefathers brought forth a new nation in liberty. Nisbet with careful scholarship tells how Platonists and anti-Platonists

have analogized, in both the style and substance of their theorizing about cyclical and evolutionary change. As he says, "the power to conceptualize is also the power to hypostasize, to reify."

Indeed it is, and Nisbet does it himself. In criticizing Marion Levy's study of family change in China, Nisbet asserts that "the Chinese family was indeed freighted with stresses and strains. . . ." And functionalism, a rather ill-defined concept, an approach, becomes for the author "the most significant body of theory in the social sciences . . . [seeking] a unified theory of order *and* change." And he reifies history, so vividly that one looks for the man with hourglass and scythe. And he is evidently persuaded by an argument against cause in history that is based on the analogy of a baseball pennant race.

In short, the trouble with the book is that it throws out its own baby and every baby with the bath. Processes in civilization and society and in nature have been conceptualized by various writers both badly and well, but rarely without analogy and metaphor. It is hard to imagine how in social science we can do without such sometimes sharp symbolic instruments if what we are left with are such undefined, unedged reifications as functionalism and history.

The conceptualizations in natural science have been very metaphorical. The human ear contains these parts, among others: concha (meaning shell), the drum, the malleus (hammer), the stapes (stirrup), and semi-circular canals. The brain has its cortex (bark) or pallium (mantle) at one end and the spinal cord at the other, with such important parts as the hypothalamus (underchamber) and hippocampus (seamaster) in between. And the principle of parity in physics has to do with whether particles are arranged in a mirrored or a left- and right-handed relationship to each other. No scientist has been troubled by the fact that molecules really don't have a pair of hands. Two scientists get a Nobel prize for discovering in genetics what they called the double helix, the pair of springs coiled oppositely around each other. It is hard to imagine natural scientists theorizing and experimenting without the use of analogy and metaphor.

The tools of functionalism and history suggest the source of the author's problem, which is, as I see it, the inability to realize his own necessity to conceptualize and to abstract. If we must, as he mostly argues, stick to the concrete, the palpable,

we would of course have no use for such dull tools as even functionalism. We might be better off without such amorphous terms, but if we must indeed abandon conceptualization that is sometimes metaphoric, then we must abandon thought and generalization.

It is all reminiscent of the lack of introspection which Hume evinced when he said that man invented the concept cause because man tended to associate things that occurred one after the other. Hume did not understand that he himself could not explain cause without himself establishing what he thought was *the* cause for cause. Similarly, Nisbet, in conceptualizing, himself seems to reify.

The solution for the problem is to find analogies and terms, however metaphorical, that do help explain satisfactorily the phenomena of change. The author comes close to saying this when he says we can look for "the assertedly timeless, continuous, and uniform sources of change"—with the help of functionalism. Just what these sources (causes?) of change might be, we do not here learn. The author cites Comte for his assertion that change results from the human desires for knowledge, status, and power. He cites Teggart for the idea that change in any larger sphere (from cosmos to society to family) affects the individual. But he does not relate the Comtean assertion, which implies that sources (causes?) of change emerge from within the individual, who is therefore an originator of change, to the Teggart notion that the individual is only an object of change. There is no indication, in short, that the author has any awareness of any contemporary social or natural science other than sociology. Until sociologists and other social scientists become as familiar with psychology and neurology as biologists are with chemistry and physics, Nisbet will be right. We won't understand either stasis or change or development. But not because we use metaphors to describe reality. That has gone on since the first word was spoken. We won't understand because we have reified and refuse to change our own segmental analysis of social phenomena.

What is left open by the author's argument is the confirmation or disconfirmation of his thesis. He might call the gradual acquisition of political power of successive social groups (bourgeoisie, peasants, manual laborers, and black people) over the past four to five hundred years a mere change and not growth toward the realization of man's need for equality. But the author's critique of Platonic realism leaves such modern events unexamined. One is inclined to think historians and functional or systems theorists, replete in the boxes they have built for themselves, are responsible for this very realism which they so appropri-

ately oppose.—JAMES C. DAVIES, *University of Oregon*.

The Foundations of Human Society. By DONALD MCINTOSH. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 341. \$10.50.)

Several decades ago the British sociologist Morris Ginsberg wrote a warning to ambitious political theorists: "... what is general in common action is not will, and what is will is not general." Although a generation of political theorists heeded Ginsberg's warning and others like it, with the result that the idealist tradition in political thought went into eclipse, at least one contemporary political theorist is ready to present a novel and serious interpretation of the general will. The tenor of Donald McIntosh's *The Foundations of Human Society* is revealed by his remark that one must choose between the position that the State has a purpose and the standpoint that only subunits in the State have purposes "... before one can begin to grapple with the main problems of political theory in a coherent way." When he failed to make this choice Max Weber "defined himself as a sociologist rather than as a political theorist." McIntosh argues that the State does have a purpose and his book is devoted to exploring the questions of whose purpose it is and how this purpose is translated into action.

The Foundations of Human Society is the first part of a projected three-volume "systematic political theory," that constitutes an attempt to synthesize such diverse tendencies in political thought as the mathematical theory of games, Freudian psychoanalytic theory and the classical tradition as exemplified by Plato, Aristotle and Rousseau. Influences from Marxism, symbolic interactionism, Bentleyan group process analysis and even phenomenological views of zones of human activity are also evident. The result, at least in the first volume, resembles greatly twentieth century idealist thought as expressed by writers like Bosanquet and Hocking. If this string of references confuses the reader, he should not conclude that the book is hopelessly eclectic and contradictory. Instead, he should appreciate the effort that must have gone into relating together this wide range of perspectives. Unfortunately, McIntosh's restatement of the general will is not commensurate to the range of thought that he has brought to bear in creating it.

In the short space allotted to this review it is impossible to do justice to the many lines of argument that McIntosh opens up. *The Foundations of Human Society* repays careful reading for its many suggestive passages, as well as for the subtleties of its major argument. However, at the risk of oversimplification it is necessary to justify the con-

clusion that McIntosh's treatment of the general will is unconvincing. In an involved argument, McIntosh derives the general will from a ground in the process of psychological identification. Identification begins as introjection, or "the incorporation into one's self or something from the outside." Such introjection is a primary process and it includes the idea of "adopting a utility scale of another person as our own." Given this basis one can define the private will of an actor as his utility scale apart from the influence of the utilities of others and the particular will of an actor as his "actual utility scale" when the influence on his preferences of the utilities of others is taken into account. The formation of this particular will describes with McIntosh calls "simple identification."

The general will, however, is formed by two further processes of identification. In primary identification an actor forms an idealized conception of the utility scale of a significant other, takes it over as the utility scale of his superego and partially integrates it with the ego's scale through the process of simple identification. Primary identification is with a parent or parent substitute. Secondary identification involves a transfer of identification from the original object to a new object. Here, the superego image created by the process of primary identification becomes detached from its original object and displaced onto another individual or an institution. This is the ground of political leadership and authority. At the same time a process of "ego identification" goes on between followers in a social group. As a result of these two processes of secondary identification, a general will of a social group is formed. The dynamics of the general will can be described in four propositions. Superego utility scales of group members will normally be closely similar; these utility scales do not necessarily closely resemble the actual will of any actor; these utility scales may be visualized as representations of the actual will of an ideal group member; the utility scale of the ideal group member is the general will of the group. Since members of the group do not have exactly the same interpretation of what constitutes the general will, the real general will is defined as the area of agreement on the ideal group member between all of the members of the group. Thus, the general will must not be understood as a sum or aggregate or average of particular wills, but as a discrete utility scale, "a component of the psyche" of each group member. Freud has solved Rousseau's problem, and we can conclude that a State is an association organized for the purpose of putting the general will of a community into action.

McIntosh's restatement of the general will is unconvincing for several reasons. First, although he does not violate Ginsberg's rule that contents

cannot be regarded as having an independent existence prior to the act of apprehension or comprehension of particular persons (contents are universals, states of mind are temporal processes), he saves the general will from dependence upon a universal mind at the cost of introducing an argument with important gaps. There is a gap between the formation of a superego utility scale and the formation of an image of an idealized group member. Is McIntosh describing anything more profound than reference group behavior? There is a gap between the processes of identification in primary groups and their supposed parallels in secondary groups. Second, since every group has a general will, it is unlikely that the general will of the entire community will be a meaningful and significant variable for political analysis in complex societies. Despite these comments, *The Foundations of Human Society* remains an impressive effort.—MICHAEL A. WEINSTEIN, *Purdue University*.

The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, By ALAN RITTER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 222. \$6.75.)

With the possible exception of Rousseau, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is the most enigmatic of all modern political philosophers. Twisting and turning his way from one level of cognition to the next, his writings are a maze of paradox and irony which the reader enters at his own peril. This undoubtedly explains why Proudhon, obviously one of the most brilliant of all modern intellectuals, is not better known to political theorists in America. Alan Ritter's attempt to interpret Proudhon's political thought through a careful analysis of his writings, therefore, is highly commendable.

Rejecting the often expressed opinion that Proudhon's political thought is so hopelessly contradictory and confused that it cannot possibly be subjected to careful analytic treatment, Ritter prudently avoids existing secondary sources and goes right to the original writings, including some, like the *Notebooks*, which have just been published for the first time. In a further effort to achieve objectivity, Ritter views Proudhon's political ideas without reference to his colorful personality or his involvement in the social and political movements of his day. The author's object here is to be fair, for Proudhon's dazzling verbal exchanges with Marx and other outstanding nineteenth century intellectuals have created ideological backwaters that remain turbulent to this day. Proudhon's tremendous influence upon leading American anarchists, such as William B. Greene and Benjamin R. Tucker, moreover, has given rise to a virtual mountain of additional interpretation, and Ritter was indeed wise in deciding not to undertake the scaling of these forbidding heights.

The thesis Ritter sets out to defend in this book

is that Proudhon, "though a radical, was a realist and a moralist as well." Proudhon's most brilliant contribution to moral theory, according to Ritter, is that he ultimately draws a careful distinction between autonomy and conformity, thereby saving himself from the mistaken romantic notion that self-direction is only possible where all conventional norms are totally rejected as guide lines of social action. Ritter points out that it may well be true, as modern sociology insists, that no individual can altogether escape the pressures exerted upon him by the institutions of society. But this does not mean that the individual is destined to remain in moral limbo forever, the helpless victim of the pulls and tugs exerted upon him from without. To be considered autonomous it is not necessary that the individual reject all volitional directives urged upon him but only those which conflict with his own reasoned idea of what is correct and proper. Proudhon made this clear, Ritter maintains, when he argued that the man who obeys an edict not because it has been commanded by authority but because it equates with his own conception of what is right has not given away any part of his personal freedom at all. "Making dependence on self-validated norms the sign of autonomous choice," Ritter concludes, "reopens the door to liberation which is closed by the sociologists," and thus Proudhon is seen as one of the most reliable of all libertarian writers. Had Ritter stopped here, he would have furnished us with a helpful insight into the complex mind of one of the nineteenth century's most brilliant luminaries.

Unfortunately there are several glaring areas of confusion in Ritter's analysis that detract from its usefulness as a guide to an intelligent understanding of Proudhon's thought. One of these has to do with the excessive weight which Ritter gives to Proudhon's mutualist ideas. Proudhon, it is true, viewed the pressure exerted on the individual by the social group as much less socially harmful than the formal control directed at him by government. But this does not mean, as Ritter suggests, that Proudhon was blind to the enslaving characteristics of the social group. (p. 80) To the contrary, Association, or fraternity, as he sometimes calls it, was in his mind merely another step along the way toward authoritarian control over the individual. Even when proposed by radicals as a revolutionary expedient, Association, according to Proudhon, is essentially dogmatic in character and cannot end up in anything less than the "SYSTEM" which he so much dreaded. As G. D. H. Cole once observed, the only social group in which Proudhon placed much trust was the family. But even here, Proudhon insisted that the individual had to be constantly on guard lest he be

corrupted by the filial pressures he was surrounded by. In view of this it is difficult to understand why Ritter spends so much effort in chiding Proudhon for his failure to see that social pressure does in fact hinder free moral choice by the individual.

Ritter's analysis of Proudhon's political thought is further weakened by the shallowness of his understanding of the basic design of libertarian theory. In the last pages of the book he makes the perplexing assertion that Proudhon was in error when he objected to law on the grounds that it interferes with the growth of libertarian currents within society (p. 21). Ritter defends law as a regulating mechanism on the grounds that not only does it "encourage people to think critically about their norms of choice" but it also "offers valuable support to freedom of decision by guaranteeing the individual a kind of immunity from social pressure that he could not otherwise enjoy." The basic flaw in Ritter's analysis here is that he does not recognize that Proudhon's objection to legal system was not peripheral to his libertarianism but the very heart of it. Under no circumstance, according to Proudhon, can social regulation be imposed upon the individual by the authority of any group, social or political. Had Ritter read *The General Idea of the Revolution of the Nineteenth Century* more carefully, he would have discovered that Proudhon adamantly refused to admit that justice and authority can ever be reconciled. The most destructive of all social crimes takes place, according to Proudhon, when society attempts to sit in judgment of the individual and his actions. Only the individual has the right to judge himself, Proudhon consistently held, for "justice is an act of conscience, essentially voluntary," which owes nothing whatever to authority in any of its forms. Any attempt whatever to coerce or punish the individual for his personal actions is a species of force and hence utterly inadmissible in a libertarian society.

Ritter's inability to understand Proudhon stems from his own commitment to the liberal notion of force and authority as legitimate means of effecting social change. His bias in this regard is revealed when he writes that: "Proudhon's tactical stance, and its dilemma, anticipate those of contemporary libertarian radicals. Like him, they are uncompromising advocates of radical change. Like him, they are unwilling to use coercive means to achieve it." (pp. 193-4) Ritter seems to imply that it is the worst kind of intellectual confusion to believe, as Proudhon does, that society can function efficiently without its law courts, prisons, and other institutional means of compelling the individual to do what he should. Apparently Ritter, like so many other social scientists of the day, is unaware that it is the liberal idea of the state

itself which has brought us to the troubled times we labor to escape. If several centuries of experimentation with systematic force and compulsion have not led us out of the wilderness, is there any point in praying at the feet of that god any longer? Proudhon has much to say on that subject. Unfortunately, the real import of his argument has passed completely over Ritter's head.—WILLIAM O. REICHERT, *Bowling Green State University*.

Simulation and Society: An Exploration of Scientific Gaming. By JOHN R. RASER. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969. Pp. 180. \$2.95, paper.)

Simulation and Society is not a research report. Rather, it is a handbook of simulation and gaming lore which acquaints the reader with the kind of talk which is often overheard (and occasionally written in the fugitive monographs of) simulation and gaming subcultures of the social sciences. A simulation is viewed by the author as a "complete and accurate representation of a referent," while a game is considered to be "an initial postulation providing the framework for further building." The wide ranging discussion of these two research and teaching strategies is largely descriptive, punctuated with a generous number of excerpts from the writings of simulation and gaming practitioners, a style which is presumably responsive to the author's stated intention of writing a book about models and the men who construct them (although biographical data are quite sparse). The analytic or interpretive portions of the discussion are directed toward the author's additional avowed intention to consider the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of simulation and gaming, focusing primarily upon the process of discovery, criteria for evaluation, and questions of validity.

Generally the book is well put together. It is engagingly and imaginatively written, relating simulation and gaming as a research and teaching strategy to both images of man and models of man. With respect to the former, the author concerns himself with the implications of viewing man from a variety of perspectives. The discussion of models addresses itself both to the logic of modeling in general and to modeling in simulation and gaming modes more specifically.

The descriptive portions of the book are well executed. Taken as a whole they represent the best account of the breadth of activities associated with simulation and gaming of which I am aware. A comprehensive intellectual history of the social scientific roots of simulation and gaming is sketched and an enthusiastic account (complete with exclamation points!!!) of the successes of computer simulation, man-machine or complex environment games, games for teaching in schools

and games for instructing policy makers is provided.

In addition to its descriptive function, the book is designed to relate simulation and gaming to the metatheoretical or epistemological concerns which are the basis upon which all scientific activity is assessed. The portions of the book addressed to this function are very uneven. On the positive side, the general treatment of modeling as a research strategy is well executed. The author makes clever use of analogy to explain analogizing as a cognitive strategy which promotes scientific discovery. Moving from the process of discovery to the logic of justification, he, with the help of generous quotations from Donald Campbell, presents a competent account of the process of inductive inference from experiments.

The most serious shortcoming of the book is in its treatment of simulation and gaming as strategies for theory building and scientific explanation. The fact that a model (and hence the theory which it models) is an argument or explanation about some aspect of reality is hardly touched upon. When the discussion does turn to the nature of theories, some rather serious confusions are manifest. Theories are equated with theorems (p. 6), laws are contrasted with probability statements (p. 6), and variables are confused with parameters (p. 26). Generally, theories are identified in several different incompatible ways, the most frequent confusion being that of identifying a theory with one of the components (e.g., a law or a prediction) of a theory.

One of the weakest parts of the interpretive portion of the book is the last chapter on the validity of simulation and gaming. Here, the question of validity, which might be legitimately conceived in terms of the logic of justification, is treated more on the basis of biographical reports of how gratifying various experimenters have found their simulation and gaming experience to be. This unwittingly subjectivist position on meta-theory is maintained throughout the discussion which consistently confuses the problems of discovery with those of justification.

In sum, the contribution of *Simulation and Society* will not be one of giving the reader intellectual control over simulation and gaming as theory building strategies. It should, however, help to give both students and professionals in the social sciences a good perspective on what is happening in the laboratories and heads of those involved in these strategies.—MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, *University of California, Berkeley*.

The Mind of Jeremy Bentham. By D. J. MANNING. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968. Pp. 118. \$4.50.)

It hardly seems that almost twenty years have

passed since Michael Oakeshott, in *Political Education*, his celebrated inaugural address at the London School of Economics, exhorted us to regard legitimate political activity as the "pursuit of intimations," to recognize that the main task of "political education" is to train people to understand and participate in their concrete political traditions, and to eschew the "cookery book" approach to politics. Precisely how this conception applied to historical political philosophy—and especially to the leading thinkers of the "tradition"—has never been clear to those of us who were not privileged to attend Oakeshott's classes—and brilliant they were too, judging from the reports! But now D. J. Manning has provided some of the details in his *The Mind of Jeremy Bentham*, which is as much a study in the application of a specific method as it is an analysis of the political doctrines of philosophic radicalism. Indeed, it is more method than substance; as Manning acknowledges, his book "is an attempt to explore certain possibilities and suggestions in Bentham's work, leading, it is hoped, to a new appreciation of his thought" (p. 2). Not, mind you, what Bentham "said" or even "intended" but what can be inferred from his writings! Not what is there but what is suggested! "Suggested to whom and in what terms?" are the central questions, for inferring from the thoughts of others—pursuing their intimations, if you will—is a tricky business, and we must know what standards are being applied before we can begin to understand and evaluate the effort. Manning has been extraordinarily helpful in letting us know that his categories are Michael Oakeshott's.

In that incrementalist, romantic, and almost mystical world of Professor Oakeshott, the hero is the man of talent, insight, and action—the successful cook and statesman who is able to explore and extend the accumulated wisdoms of his art without going beyond them or attempting to condense them to a set of abstract principles that can be used as a "preface to political activity." The Oakeshottian villain, correspondingly, is the "rationalist," the thinker rather than the doer, the man who speculates, deduces political prescriptions from "premediated" ideals, pretends to universality, and shows a disregard for (or ignorance of) the concrete political arrangements of his own society; for it is in those arrangements, according to Oakeshott, that ideals are inevitably imbedded.

This, then, is the intellectual context for a book that is engagingly and concisely written, well organized, carefully and thoroughly researched, and exceedingly clever. To write interestingly and intelligibly about Bentham is no small feat, for "the hermit of Queens Square Place" did all he could to render interpretation difficult if not impossible. Neologisms piled upon archaic phrases, a crabbed

and often witless style, and literally thousands of manuscripts stored in University College, London—the eleven volumes of small print in Bowring's edition of the *Collected Works* are but the top of a monstrous iceberg—are enough to drive off all but the most stalwart of scholars. Dr. Manning has persisted, and we are to be grateful for those morsels he has rescued from the manuscripts. But precisely because the volume of Bentham manuscripts is so great and so relatively unexplored, it is almost impossible to evaluate the author's (substantive) findings. Undoubtedly what Manning has produced is there, and we must, as it were, take his work that it truly represents the still submerged portions of the iceberg. Fortunately, Manning's Bentham, in his essentials, is not strikingly different from the hedonistic curmudgeon with whom we are already familiar; that is, if we discount the excesses of the Oakeshottian sieve through which he is filtered.

The Benthamite system is sufficiently well known to make a summary superfluous. The point of Manning's book is that there is something seriously wrong with the pleasure/pain calculus—not just that it is silly and pretentious, which we already know—with the "greatest happiness" maxim and especially with the political doctrine Bentham extracted from them. With only a slight shift in emphasis that does no great violence to his thought, Bentham becomes the rationalist villain par excellence: he believed unyieldingly in the majesty and power of reason, attempted to formulate a universal system of social and political norms that would have permitted the deduction of rules governing specific conduct from general and abstract principles, and—most importantly—was downright hostile toward both the traditions and political institutions of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England. Bentham's individualist conception of human nature, Manning says, leads to a "society of stranger," the members of which must be organically reunited into a political community.

There is something fresh and exciting about the suggestion that Bentham faced a world of alienated men and sought to devise a political order that could accommodate them; it is quite the most intriguing argument in the book. Unfortunately, Manning sees this as a defect to be overcome rather than as a means of understanding Bentham more clearly, and the thesis is never developed. (The promise to analyze Bentham as a product of and response to his own times—repeated several times—remains unfulfilled.) Manning sees politics as not simply the technique for regulating competition; it is the art by which the forces that create alienation and conflict can be overcome; politics, in short, is the master skill through which the traditions, identities, and bonds of each unique com-

munity can be discovered and nurtured. Contrary to Bentham's fondest hopes, there can be no universal political ethic, for human life is infinitely complex and filled with singular experiences that transcend rational understanding. Tending to these complexities is, in the Oakeshottian scheme, the job of the politician and statesman, men who are wise in the care and pursuit of intimations. But Bentham, Manning contends, despaired of politicians and their ways; he would have replaced them with rational administrators and substituted for their art and decisions the conflict of interests and the resolution of these conflicts in accord with the sterile principle of utility. Thus, enactment of Bentham's ideals would make it impossible ever to reestablish organic, social bonds among men; each member of the "society of strangers" would continue to pursue his own interests without regard for the good of others, and certainly not caring about the good of the virtually inconceivable whole. In Bentham's "rational society," we are told, "every subject intimidates, and is in turn intimidated by, his fellows" (p. 84). Manning seems to believe that we are now living in a Benthamite world and that an awareness of the shortcomings in Bentham's thought will make our own foibles more apparent, a series of claims I cannot begin to deal with here beyond observing that they rely upon a naive and far-fetched view of historical causation that need not be attributed to Oakeshott.

How one reacts to this reading of Bentham will depend, in the final analysis, upon his attitudes toward both classical utilitarianism and the anti-rationalism of Michael Oakeshott (if it is not improper, at this point, to visit the sins of the student upon the master). There are always dangers in imposing upon a body of doctrine a ready-made scheme of analysis, especially if the scheme is hostile to the doctrine in question and contains an ideology (in the best sense) of its own that is neither clearly articulated nor fully acceptable. In the present case, the dangers are exaggerated, for, as Manning recognizes (p. 15), Bentham's system was neither consistent nor fully coherent. The only way to read Bentham from an Oakeshottian perspective, then, is to *make* him logical and to *force* him into a model he undoubtedly would have rejected. It is noteworthy in this context that Manning does not date or otherwise indicate the chronological sequence of the passages he quotes. This is a most serious failing, for Manning himself acknowledges that Bentham altered and expanded his doctrines from year to year. Thus, it is not Bentham who is presented to us but some "might have been" who never quite was, not—despite the title—the "mind" of Jeremy Bentham that is explored but some higher meaning that is obtained only by ignoring shifts within the several texts and by imposing an alien framework upon the whole. This method of interpretation is ques-

tionable at best. While I am not convinced that it is necessary to go the whole way with those who insist that all works can only be explicated within their own (historical) contexts, I am persuaded of the necessity of at least sticking to the actual texts and not making them (artificially) consistent so that they can be "understood" in terms of the commentator's own categories. Once we sew seed in this garden, we had best be prepared for the appearance of all sorts of hybrid and curiously anachronistic growths that now seem to be vestiges of an outdated way of doing the history of political thought, such as Plato the fascist, Machiavelli the scientist, Locke the democrat, Rousseau the totalitarian, and Bentham the rationalist. In the end, Manning can do no more than castigate Bentham for not conforming to an *a priori* model that was actually designed as a counter-doctrine. It is not just that Bentham was not Oakeshott, for only a moment's reflection suggests that very few political philosophers who were worthwhile have satisfied the rigid demands of intimation pursuit. Politics itself may be largely a matter of pushing beyond the fringes of present institutions ever so slightly, but this is certainly not an accurate description of political philosophy. It simply will not do to contend, as Manning does—and without any attempt to explain or justify his assertions—that the aim of "theory" is essentially to make experience "meaningful" and that political "philosophers" *per se* "do not make any" political prescriptions (pp. 111–112) and then to condemn Bentham for having failed the former and attempted the latter.

Before it retreated into the university sometime within the past century, political philosophy was self-consciously devoted to the justification of political systems and recommendations. And the act of political justification cannot help but commit at least one of the Oakeshottian cardinal sins of "abridging" a tradition, relying steadfastly upon the powers of reason, and calling for the overthrow of the whole of a way of life. The advocate of incrementalism must be either satisfied with the world in which he finds himself or fearful of the prospects of change; he believes that the "good" and "just" society has indeed arrived or is afraid that any but the most cautious of steps toward justice will bring greater misery than the conditions they seek to eliminate. Such a view is characteristic of the contented (and neutral) academician and successful politician; it can never be the vantage of the intellectual partisan or the political malcontent who has been denied power or access to it. So much the worse, then, for political philosophy once it entered the academy and became converted into "value free" analysis, explanation, and political "theory." And what happens when our "just" and "good" society begins to crumble,

or is exposed as a facade that hides manifest injustice, or when we learn that our politicians have been pursuing the wrong intimations all along

The Benthamite conception of interest conflict is undoubtedly an inadequate normative model of politics, but the elitism implicit in the anti-rationalist "pursuit of intimations" is probably even more defective. That Jeremy Bentham may have been among those who delivered us into our present bondage is an interesting suggestion that is undoubtedly open to question; that we are there and must be rescued is now beyond dispute. But Michael Oakeshott—for all his brilliance and insight—is not leading the way to a promised land. —GORDON J. SCHUCHET, *Livingston College, Rutgers University*.

Politik als Interessenkonflikt. BY WOLFGANG HIRSCH-WEBER. (Stuttgart: Friedrich Enke Verlag, 1969, Pp., 288.)

This book is a new and most interesting contribution to the Arthur Fisher Bentley discussion. Written by a German social scientist, the study seizes upon an analysis of *The Process of Government* as an opportunity to provide for a foreign audience a comprehensive, excellently informed and critical account of the "American Science of Politics" since Bentley but without the ironic harping of a Bernard Crick. To view behaviorism, functionalism and group theory as it were from the outside allows for some novel perspectives which by themselves make the book valuable.

That this can be done by a fresh investigation of the concepts, assumptions and methods of Bentley's *Process*, shows not only the (in the strict sense) epochal importance of the 1908-product. The new study also makes quite clear why in certain respects Bentley's book has become, at least for some of its admirers, the "conceptual and theoretical trap" of which La Palombara has spoken (in *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, p. 13). The rather loose structure of Dr. Hirsch-Weber's treatise is at times slightly confusing. But it helps the author to achieve his various objectives. Time and again he takes off uninhibitedly for interesting excursions covering in depth less well known aspects of Bentley's and of group theory. (He reserves for an appendix, perhaps more useful for a European than for an American audience, sharply focussed critical appraisals of the books by E. P. Herring, P. Odegard, E. E. Schattschneider, F. W. Riggs, and E. Latham.)

Instead of the usual general reference to Bentley's exposure to German social science at the turn of the century, Hirsch-Weber traces very concretely the fascination which such complicated thinkers as Georg Simmel, Gustav Ratzenhofer and the legal philosopher Rudolf von Ihering held for the young Mid-Westerner. However great the intellectual impact of these scholars on Bentley's

concepts, it is probably just as characteristic for them as for the author of the *Process* that his work completely ignores the "governmental process" in continental Europe. Just as his pragmatism is most of the time singularly unpragmatic, Bentley's functionalism is non-comparative to the point of making its assumptions largely useless for the analysis of any but the American system.

Dr. Hirsch-Weber is unable to explain why there is no trace of either Dilthey or Max Weber in any of Bentley's works. He had studied under Dilthey and Weber was rapidly rising to prominence when Bentley wrote. Was this a case of "selective attention?" Especially where Bentley speaks about the importance of "underlying conditions" and activities, he comes very close to Max Weber's insights. But Weber avoided the very pitfalls of Bentley's insistence that there is nothing but a "seamless web" between group politics and the governmental process. Could Bentley's failure to ever mention James Madison and the tenth Federalist Paper be due to a similar self-suggestion or originality?

Dr. Hirsch-Weber's discussion of Bentley's seldom highlighted treatment of the judicial process shows very well the merits and shortcomings of the *Process*: there are here, again partly inspired by Ihering, valuable building blocks for legal realism, but also the errors flowing from his conviction that Supreme Court decisions are "group activity" like everything else.

The most valuable and most original excursus of the book explores the concept of "interest" from the Corpus Juris to Planetz, via Rousseau and, of course, Bentley. Here a linguistic analysis drawing especially on the later Wittgenstein adds important dimensions to the discussion of the *Allgemeininteresse*, of the public interest in both its descriptive and normative content. Whether there might not be a connection between the ontology of the early Wittgenstein (at least as interpreted by the Vienna circle) and Bentley's thinking remains an open question not touched upon by Dr. Hirsch-Weber. But there is much valid criticism of the notion of latent and potential interests. David Truman's use of the term "attitude" evokes for the author certain highly problematic hypotheses of German experimental psychology, especially of the pre-behavioral structuralists.

Quite correctly the book points to and explains the empirical and logical weakness of Bentley's defiance as "mental terms" of all statements suggesting causality or motivation. The author might have been even more critical of Bentley's concept of "transaction," defined by Bentley (and Dewey) as "man-in process-with environment." Even though the term appears only in Bentley's later works, especially in the *Knowing and the Known* (1949), its substance is very much around in the *Process*. Arnold Brecht has contributed a short but

appropriately savage criticism of the entire notion (in *Political Theory*, pp. 512 f.) where he concludes: . . . "concentration on the transactional as distinct from the inter-actional (causal) aspects of events in social life is as yet a vague program rather than an achievement."

Of course on many points Bentley can be defended (and Hirsch-Weber does a good job of it) by pointing to his own often repeated claim that he did not wish to offer more than a "vague program," that he was merely proposing provisional methods for empirical research he himself had not undertaken. Disciple of Charles Peirce he was, he followed the command of his master "not to block the road to inquiry" so faithfully that he shunned all definitions which might have proven premature even though they might also have lent concreteness to his propositions. There is, however, one seemingly extravagant dictum of Bentley's which is often quoted to show that he was not just the pioneer of modern behaviorism but also an uncritical hanker after quantitative data. To be sure he has written (*Process*, p. 201): "The statement that takes us farthest along the road toward quantitative estimates will inevitably be the best statement." But this is preceded by a never quoted (here even Dr. Hirsch-Weber fails Bentley) and in present-day research often ignored caveat that it must first be ascertained whether such a quantitative statement "does not otherwise distort the social facts."

The excellent study concludes with a discussion of Bentley's legacy. This has been done before and most recently in the contributions by David Truman and by Richard W. Taylor to the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Just because the author looks at the *Process* from the outside, it would have been interesting to have him discuss the place of Bentley, the curious social philosopher and muckraker, in the tradition of American political thought. Described by some as a cynical conservative, Bentley was in fact (moderately) active in Mid-Western progressive movements. His assumptions of an eventually un-failing equilibrium emerging from the conflict between "activities" might appear naive. They are, however, in line with Bentley's acceptance of the democratic idealism and basic optimism that was prevalent at the time he wrote the *Process*. It might be worthwhile to investigate further (as Mancur Olsen has done very tentatively in *The Logic of Collective Action*, pp. 130 f.) the affinity between the populist strand of American pluralism and an antistatism of which corporatism is the conservative and mutualism or anarchism are the progressive manifestations.—HENRY W. EHRMANN, *Dartmouth College*.

Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. By ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE. Edited by Alan Bloom, trans-

lated by James Nicholls. (New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 287. \$8.50.)

Studies on Marx and Hegel. By JEAN HYPPOLITE. Edited and translated by John O'Neil. (New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 202. \$6.50.)

Idealism Politics and History: Sources of Hegelian Thought. By GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 387. \$13.50.)

The first two books are translations of very prominent French-language commentators on Hegel's work. Kojève, a Russian by origin who finished his life as a civil servant of the European community, taught in Paris during the thirties at the *Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*. This book is based on those lectures, but Kojève did not publish it himself; rather the book was put together from Kojève's lectures for a number of different sessions, and published together with an introduction by Kojève shortly after the war by Raymond Queneau. This translation includes about half the material of the original.

This book is a fascinating one in more than one way. Kojève remains a mysterious figure, who published very little, but had an extraordinary influence. In fact it was through these lectures at the *Ecole Pratique* in the 'thirties that Hegel really entered the French philosophical scene. In fact up to the thirties France remained strongly impervious to post-Kantian German thought—strangely, that is, in view of what has happened since. Even Marxism was not a serious force intellectually. Then Hegel suddenly gained intellectual naturalization, in the company of Marx and Heidegger.

Thus the Hegel who is an important reference point of post-war French thinkers of the so-called "existentialist" left, of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, is first introduced in these lectures which are important documents in the history of thought. Those familiar with the work of the later authors will recognize the link at once. We are looking here at a Hegel who is being read in the light of Marx, but is not seen as a simple "fore-runner," but rather as a way of rediscovering in Marx the full philosophical depth of a dialectical notion of history; rescuing Marx as one might put it from the mechanical interpretation according to which the "base" determines the "superstructure," an interpretation which always has to be balanced later by an admission that the "superstructure" also affects the "base" to some degree. Whether this has been a correct interpretation of Marx is certainly open to question (the reaction to it has come in France with Althusser and his associates); but no one can deny that, aided by the rediscovery of the early Marx manuscripts, it has been an immensely influential one.

One might also question the interpretation of Hegel. The central text for this contemporary re-

interpretation is the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and this is the work on which Kojève lectured, and which he studied minutely; the most discussed passage is the dialectic of the Master and the Slave, to which Kojève gives a central place. And this is understandable in an approach which is interested in understanding what Hegel had to say about man and human history. On this subject there are few more fascinating works in the history of Western philosophy. But the danger, from which Kojève doesn't fully escape, is an "Anthropologizing" distortion of Hegel's thought. Hegel's Spirit is not simply that of man, even if it is not equivalent to the orthodox idea of God. It was the young Hegelians who centered the dialectic on man; much of Hegel's thought becomes incomprehensible if one does this. It would be impossible to read the *Logic* or the philosophies of nature, or religion, for instance, with the same eyes that Kojève has read the *Phenomenology*.

In a sense we should think of Kojève more as an original philosopher who thought out his ideas through a meditation on the *Phenomenology*. Hyppolite, on the other hand, is a genuine commentator, the dean of Hegel scholars on the French scene. He too is best known for his admirable translation of, and commentary on the *Phenomenology*; but his interpretations are well grounded in the whole of Hegel's work (he has also published a commentary on the *Logic*).

The book of Hyppolite's translated here is a collection of essays which touch on one of the central issues which arises from the contemporary concern with Hegel, his relation to Marx. Precisely because Hyppolite doesn't share the "anthropologized" interpretation of Hegel, but sees that Hegel is talking about an absolute subject who is not simply human but cosmic, he can appreciate the extent of Marx's break with Hegel: it involves in fact a declaration of independence of man and human purpose within the cosmos. For this point of view the monism which Engels re-established supposedly on a materialist basis, and which has become the orthodoxy of official communism, seems to run counter to the spirit of Marx's work. As Hyppolite says of these "East European commentators" in the preface written specially for the English edition, "they preserve in Hegel what Marx felt obliged to reject" (p. viii).

The essays, which are arranged in four sections, range fairly widely. The first and fourth sections contain papers dealing strictly with aspects of Hegel's philosophy. The middle two sections are, however, of particular interest to political theorists. Part II contains an essay on "the significance

of the French Revolution in Hegel's *Phenomenology*" which is well worth reading. Hegel's attitude to the French Revolution is one of the keys to understanding the genesis and purpose of his political thought. One of the crucial passages for understanding this is the short, ten-page section of the *Phenomenology* on "Absolute Freedom and the Terror," in which Hegel tries to draw out the contradiction which he sees in the goals of the Revolution. Hyppolite gives a very useful background and commentary to this passage and the preceding one.

Part II also contains a commentary on Lukacs' *Young Hegel*, while Part III, devoted to Marxism and Philosophy, has papers on Marx's critique of Hegel's concept of the state, and on the structure and philosophical presuppositions of *Capital*.

Professor Kelly's book is an attempt to trace the development of idealist thought in modern politics through its formative period in four connected essays, devoted respectively to Rousseau, Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Idealism is seen here as the doctrine that reality must be understood in relation to mind, spirit and reason, which means ultimately in relation to an underlying ideal form. Hegel stressed how much his idealism was in continuity with that of the followers of Socrates, with the theory of Ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and not with the epistemologically-based views of a Berkeley, for instance. But the crucially new dimension, unknown to the Greeks, was that of 'historicism,' the notion that history could be seen as polarized by the Idea towards higher and higher forms of its realization, culminating in a state founded on reason.

Although Rousseau, and even in some respects Kant, were not idealists in this sense, we cannot understand the background to this extraordinary current of thought which arose in Germany at this time, and which has had such a fateful influence on modern history, without returning to them. We have been familiarized with this filiation by the polemics of some modern authors against "totalitarian democracy."

But Professor Kelly's work most emphatically does not belong to this class of put-downs. "Although an empiricist by conviction" (p. 6), he has attempted to understand the views on politics and history of his authors against the background of their deeper philosophical ideas. In particular, for instance, he attempts to cast light on the differences between the four authors by relating them to their different notions of time. This book is a really valuable and timely contribution to our understanding of this important tradition of thought.

—CHARLES TAYLOR, *McGill University*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Congressional Committees. By WILLIAM L. MORROW. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969. Pp. 261. \$6.95.)

In the exploratory work on congressional committees advanced during the past several years, most studies have dealt with a particular committee, or a particular congress, and considered a limited number of explanatory variables. Such specialization is understandable given the importance of "field" research, the value of interviews with congressmen and staff, and the number and complexity of relevant factors even for such limited designs. But students of the field now urge testing of some of these particular findings across a range of committees or a range of congresses—to see the varying impact of subject matter, external environment, changes in membership and in chairmen. Work on comparative committee studies is beginning. The more elaborate designs which will test one set of findings against a range of possible influences still remain a goal for future research. It is an emergent, challenging field—with much of the task of comparative analysis and empirical generalization remaining to be accomplished.

In this field at this time, William Morrow has written *Congressional Committees*. The book offers a macro-view of the place of committees in the American political system (pp. 1, 2). It traces the formal and informal committee structure in relation to such systemic variables as the separation of powers, federalism, patterns of conflict and decentralized decision-making in the national government. Chapter 2 outlines the formal committee structure, discusses the impact of the seniority system and the committee assignment process on that structure and concludes that "the formal organization of committees represents a response to those social forces which have been able to exploit constitutional features and the decentralized character of American politics to their best advantage." (p. 57). Chapter 3 examines the informal structure. It traces the possible role relationships members may adopt with participants in the external environment, such as interest groups, the public, executive department personnel; discusses the role of committee hearings; and points out "how informal organization . . . nourishes and extends formal organization in a mutually reinforcing, cyclical pattern which helps to institutionalize the patterns of conflict in the American system and within Congress" (pp. 143, 144). Chapter 4 examines the relationship between committees and the Executive; discusses the procedures and possibilities for congressional oversight; and concludes that "the same factors which encourage committee

reinforcement of the decentralized character of the American political system . . . also profoundly affect the character of committee-executive relationships" especially as regards the exercise of the oversight function (pp. 220, 221). While the author draws on some interviews conducted as a Congressional Fellow in 1965-66 and some research in committee hearings and other documents, the main basis for generalization is the existing literature on Congress and its committees. The ambitious scope of the enterprise deserves notice, offers a useful overview of the subject, but invokes certain obvious difficulties.

At the present stage of knowledge, some of the generalizations offered cannot be substantiated. For example, Morrow discusses the "group influence" on the assignment process and points out how this influence contributes to intra-committee conflict: "Such a procedure usually guarantees that committees will be structured so as to promote conflict between groups' spokesmen, each seeking to advance the cause of the dominant group or groups in his district" (p. 85). He cites the House Education and Labor Committee as example. But we do not know the extent of group influence on the assignment process, nor its relative influence compared to that of the party leadership or the chairmen of the committees concerned, nor the extent to which that influence may vary from one committee to another. The House leadership keeps an eye on selection for the three prestigious committees of Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means—partly to ensure that conflict will not dominate committee decision-making. And from time to time the leadership may influence other appointments. Nor do we know the range or variation in committee conflict. The group conflict that fractionalizes Education and Labor is not found on Armed Services, particularly notable under Chairman Carl Vinson for producing unanimous committee votes on controversial legislation. Some pioneering work by Richard Fenno suggests conditions under which committee cohesiveness may vary. Indeed, according to Fenno's analyses, Education and Labor—cited by Morrow to illustrate his point—may be, rather, the limiting case of extreme committee conflict. Other such statements recur through the work—on the impact of the seniority system, on patterns of substantive committee oversight—which require just that specification of degree of impact and committee variation that is only beginning to be available in the literature.

Morrow admits the difficulty in the preface and urges that the conclusions be taken as "hy-

potheses" rather than "principles." (He continues: "To the author, there is little doubt that the generalizations to appear in the following pages are for the most part valid, but few attempts will be made to explain the extent of their validity.") However, in the vocabulary and phrasing of conclusions, the absence of questions raised for future research, and the lack of admission of areas where no firm information exists, the text does not follow the spirit of the preface on this point.

And yet in providing a macro-view of committee structure and functioning, *Congressional Committees* makes certain definite contributions. Morrow's outlining in Chapter 3 of the possible dimensions and impact of the committee role system and its basis in six spheres of external influence deserves attention and may prove helpful as a base for typologies in future work. His application of committee structure to the problems of oversight in Chapter 4 is particularly thorough and thoughtful. Most importantly, he manages to bring together in one volume an impressive amount of literature on the subject. And throughout the work, the author succeeds in conveying a sense of the complexity of pressures brought to bear on the committee system and the way that system may function as a "vital . . . part of the nerve center of the American political process" (v). These descriptions make useful reading not only for political scientists, but for undergraduate students of Congress as well. There will be other, more analytical books on congressional committees. But this is a first—which, by itself, is no mean achievement.—BARBARA HINCKLEY, *University of Massachusetts*.

The Corporation in American Politics. By EDWIN M. EPSTEIN. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. 365. \$8.50; paper, \$4.95.)

Epstein establishes seven goals for his book: he intends to be descriptive and prescriptive regarding corporate political activity, and he hopes to offer a framework for the analysis of this activity that will reveal its significance for the American social order and corporate system. In addition he offers, for changing legal constraints on this activity and for further research, recommendations which are consistent with his text and argument. Epstein is neither a social theorist nor a political philosopher. He is a scholar who tries to be careful, thorough, and unbiased. His references are extensive, his prose is concise and always clear, he avoids concealed value judgements on small matters. Within his value system he is neither friend nor enemy of corporations. He maintains a distinction between electoral and governmental politics and is never deflected from his chosen focus of corporations. This is not a book about any other kind of pressure group. It is, then, modest,

thoughtful, and easy to read. The book should be manageable in undergraduate courses (although the paperback price is singularly inflationary), for it contributes to the rational discussion of a complex issue. For the modern political scientist the book is less fruitful and for the political activist it can be maddening, for reasons I shall try to state.

Chapters 1 and 2 are introductory. Chapters 3 and 4 contain an historical review of corporate political activity. Epstein traces the growth of corporations, the abuses of the robber barons, and the failure of early regulatory efforts. Detailing the growth of trade associations and corporate public relations, he outlines the changing nature of corporate political involvement in the 20th century. For the Post-World War Two period he subordinates his historical review to a discussion of the reasons for federal expansion and its consequences for the distinction between private and public enterprise. His historical outline is untheoretical however. The development of corporate political activity has been influenced by the changing nature and scale of economic organization, technological innovation, political invention, ideological changes, the need for socializing risk, and the dynamics of the bureaucratization of the activity itself. Epstein leaves the modeling of these factors to the reader. The absence of formal thinking at this stage allows an unsophisticated justification of corporate political activity. He can view it as a response to increasing public-private interdependence without analyzing its extent, loci, or causes in more than a superficial manner.

Chapter 5, detailing the extent of corporate political activity, contains many items that normally escape the attention of political scientists yet could be informed by Drew Pearson's columns or the pages of *Hard Times*. In general, the less savory aspects of corporate involvement are neglected and involvement in administrative processes and regulatory proceedings is treated weakly and naively.

The next three chapters consider arguments for and against corporate political involvement. His analyses are usually crisp and telling. Chapter 8 contains a first-rate, imaginative, 40-page discussion of the political resources of corporations. It is one of the highlights of the book. But it, is followed by a weak, biased and irrelevant discussion of community power structure. He accepts the caricature of the elite theorists offered by Polsby's *Community Power and Political Theory*. Chapter 9 discusses the legitimacy of corporate political involvement in a vacuous manner. The question posed is whether such activity is or is not legitimate, and I do not see that this is an empirically or normatively useful way of posing the question. Chapter 10, the last one, contains a thoughtful discussion of the laws surrounding corporate polit-

ical activity. Epstein never gets around to defending the major premise of his book: that corporate political activity is legitimate because of public-private interdependence and the pluralist nature of American politics.

Epstein's writing is marred by occasional statements and jargon that betray an uncritical acceptance of contemporary consensus politics. The FTC is viewed as a leading defender of the public against corporations; the Vietnam War is "our commitment." Regardless of what one thinks of such a value system, the fact is that this is a political position in a book that needs either to scrupulously avoid one or advance a blatant one. It is the value position of much of the white, "liberal," upper-middle-class, and thus too often a political position that is greeted as the hallmark of objectivity.

Such a matter might be a minor annoyance were it not symptomatic of the major flaw of the book: a permeating, uncritical acceptance of pluralist dogma. Three components of this dogma which Epstein accepts are: (1) insensitivity to what Schattschneider has called "the scope and bias of the pressure system;" (2) evaluation of the political system on the basis of limited attributes of the input side of the policy-making process; and (3) inattention to policy outputs in operation. Like all pluralists, Epstein is also unaware there is something called analysis that enters the policy process as well as bargaining. Any evaluation of corporate political activity must confront Schattschneider's arguments and works complementary to them such as Mancur Olson's theories of interest group mobilization in *The Logic of Collective Action*. Adherence to pluralist dogma allows Epstein to avoid corporate involvement in regulatory proceedings and administrative agencies where serious issues of the capture of public power by private groups are involved. Finally, if one concentrates on policy outputs in operation, one gets a very different view of the consequences of corporate political activity. Pluralist dogma allows Epstein to avoid attention to such matters as the symbiotic relationships between defense contractors and the military services, the role of food corporations in suppressing the production and distribution of fortified foods to the poor at potentially negligible cost, or the industry-dominated Coal Mine Safety Review Board.

Pluralist dogma—on the one hand an ideology in the service of a limited set of social interests and on the other a seriously incomplete model of American politics—is not an adequate model for the study and evaluation of corporate political involvement in the U.S. Because this dogma suffuses Epstein's argument, his book is far less than the sum of its often admirable parts.—MICHAEL J. WHITE, *University of Kentucky*.

Power in the Senate. By RANDALL B. RIPLEY. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969. Pp. 246. \$6.50.)

Professor Ripley purports to discuss the distribution of "power" in the Senate from two complementary points of view. In part I the history of the Senate since the Civil War is sketched in terms of three modes of power distribution—centralization (preponderance of power in party leadership), decentralization (committee-centered), and individualism (power dispersed to subcommittees and individuals). Parts II and III then set out "to explore the present Senate in depth," relying mainly on Round Table sessions with senators and aides held at the Brookings Institution in 1965. The intention is to examine the dimensions and consequences of the current phase of "individualism," which Ripley claims had its beginnings in the mid-fifties. Though he eschews any attempt to devise a precise definition or measure of "power," it becomes clear in the course of the book that what he has in mind is the ability to effect or influence policy outcomes. He thus contributes to the growing literature on the erosion of the Senate's so-called "inner club" and the increasing dispersal of lawmaking roles and opportunities within the upper chamber.

Though Ripley acknowledges that power has both "personal" and "institutional" bases, his historical chapters generally focus on the latter; he thus presents a brief organizational history of the Senate together with an assessment of the relative importance of party and committee leadership posts in successive periods. Ripley's criteria of "importance" are not always clear; relying mainly on biographical and historical studies he refers sometimes to a person's or a position's reputation for powerfulness, sometimes to more concrete legislative achievements. His dependence on David J. Rothman's *Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869-1901* is particularly heavy, and he is able to reinforce Rothman's observations with some interesting data on the late-nineteenth-century "institutionalization" of the Senate. His treatment of other periods, however, is often less impressive. He does not seem to be aware, for example, of Joel Silbey's demonstration of the strength of party identification in determining congressional voting alignments in the 1840's and even into the fifties; Ripley rather assumes (p. 25) the James Sterling Young's generalizations with respect to the pre-1828 Senate can be applied to the entire pre-war period. Nor does he take adequate account (pp. 15, 31) of the inroads the emerging "conservative coalition" made upon the "centralized" 74th and 75th Congresses. The labeling of various other problematic periods is likewise left unqualified and unexplained.

The most recent historical transition, that of the

post-World War II Senate from "decentralization" to "individualism," poses particular difficulties. Even if one acknowledges that it is possible meaningfully to speak of overall distributions of power-in-general, serious questions as to the mechanisms of transition and the relationships among Ripley's three modes of power distribution remain—difficulties attested to by Ripley's inability to pin a single label on the years 1955-1961. What these years demonstrate in particular is the inaccuracy of conceiving of "individualism" and "centralization" as opposing modes of organization; this period in fact displayed *both* trends, and there is considerable evidence that exercise of certain prerogatives by the majority leadership, rather than diminishing the "power in the hands of individual senators" (p. 106) in many instances did very nearly the opposite. And problems of explanation loom large. While Ripley's main concern is with the gradual erosion of the "institutional" power of southern conservatives, he acknowledges (pp. 66, 76) that subcommittee proliferation and a general dispersal of "personal" power antedated the decisive weakening of "the hold of southern Democrats on the Senate" by several years. Yet neither here nor in the earlier historical sketches is there any sustained attempt at explanation, even in terms of such obvious "external" variables as the character of executive leadership, the context of policy needs and demands, and changes in the nature of electoral politics.

In Parts II and III Ripley turns from historical analysis to a fuller description of the "dispersion of power in the contemporary Senate," dutifully reporting the views of Round Table participants on the character and strength of various party and committee posts. Of particular interest is the generally positive assessment among the senators as to their own potential as legislators and the opportunities afforded by committee structures and resources, though Ripley makes little attempt to analyze the variations and conditions of this sense of efficacy or to test it against performance. Ripley accepts at face value his respondents' portrayal of "segmented, sporadic" processes of legislative initiative and increasingly permissive norms which exclude only "six to ten" senators from some sort of "legislative effectiveness" (pp. 160, 168), but he makes no attempt to discriminate among the various facets of legislative initiative or between different policy areas and committees.

While one can appreciate the service Professor Ripley has performed in pointing to significant general changes in Senate norms and in the distributions of legislative roles and resources since the fifties, the study's usefulness is considerably reduced by this failure to discriminate and differentiate. Various observers have noted that a cer-

tain type of senator has become more conspicuous of late—activistic in his legislative orientation, generally liberal, often low in seniority and representing a large or urban state, oriented toward the media and national issues—and Ripley in fact hints that his sample may be disproportionately composed of such men (p. 236). What we need to know is not simply that senators-in-general are enjoying a new-found "legislative effectiveness;" we need to be much more precise about the types of legislative roles that are emerging, their distribution and their viability. To what extent is this new activism a matter of publicizing and investigating issues? How much actual policy innovation and formulation is going on? Most importantly, is the capacity to *mobilize* the chamber becoming more widely shared as well? Rarely can the answers to such questions be given in broad general terms; nor is the matter of explanation any less complex. The roles a senator assumes, the initiatives he undertakes, and the degree of success he enjoys may well be dependent, for example, on such diverse factors as the character of his constituency and his electoral situation, the nature of his committees' leadership and organization, patterns of agency activity and group access in various areas, and so forth. This is not to say that general trends cannot be discerned. But any overall picture we gain of dispersals of "power" in the Senate will remain undifferentiated and vague, and our efforts to isolate and order the relevant causal factors will be frustrated, until we pay considerably more attention to patterns of empirical detail and to the necessity for analytical precision in approaching them.—DAVID E. PRICE, *Yale University*.

Congress and the New Politics. By JOHN S. SALOMA, III. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969. Pp. 293).

John Saloma's study of Congress is an ambitious and thoughtful effort. It seeks to establish guidelines for evaluating present-day congressional performance, to suggest ways in which Congress will adapt to the new computer technology and the concomitant "information revolution," and both to outline the basic challenges that Congress will have to confront in the future and to presage the possible adjustments it will make in response to these challenges. The author accomplishes these tasks with varying degrees of success.

Much of the book focuses on the difficulties of evaluating so complex and multi-functional a political institution. Professor Saloma maintains that those who are critical of Congress and wish to reform it are not always sufficiently concerned with the possibility that the prescriptions they offer are a product of their own normative predilections, and that the alterations they advocate will dimin-

ish the institutions capacity to undertake responsibilities which other students of American politics happen to think are important.

He discusses six significant functions which Congress is expected to perform (the representative, legislative, investigative, informative, administration control, and the constituent service functions) within a context of alternative "models" or "conceptual frameworks" (the latter is a more appropriate description of his constructs) of legislative-executive relations, on the one hand, and the distribution of power within Congress on the other. Four perspectives of legislative-executive relations are delineated: the presidential-responsible party perspective, where "the President is assigned the primary leadership role supported by powerful party leadership in Congress;" the presidential pluralist or pluralist perspective, which views government as a "bargaining system with varying veto powers available to the participants;" the constitutional balance perspective, which stresses the constitutional or legal "balance in the roles of the President and Congress;" and the Whig or congressional supremacy perspective, which insists that Congress, not the President, "should be the locus of policy leadership." His four formal models of the legislature's internal organization are defined as "control by the presidential party, control by congressional party, control by congressional majority, and decentralized control with accommodations reached through the bargaining of all participants, the President included."

Saloma concludes that Congress has fulfilled its functions more responsibly and has been more agile in adapting to changing demands than most of its' critics have suggested. His is obliged to note, however, that its' performance in many respects still leaves much to be desired. The chief merit of this portion of the book is that it brings together in a reasonably systematic fashion the varieties of vantage points from which Congress has been assessed and the normative concerns that have influenced thinking about the role of Congress within the American political system. Saloma marshalls his evidence and arguments well. He adds little to the discussion that is new, however. This is true primarily because, as the author himself observes, the conceptions of American government inherent in the frameworks within which congressional performance is gauged are inadequate. They are static and stereotypical, for the most part, and neither contain nor permit particularly rewarding generalization. This weakness is partially an indictment of the literature on Congress, since other specialists have not given Saloma the comprehensive models his analysis requires. On the other hand, if the book does de-

velop *new* guidelines for a more realistic and sophisticated evaluation of congressional performance, the author fails to make them sufficiently explicit.

The final two chapters look ahead to the challenges that are likely to face Congress in the 1970's and beyond, with particular emphasis on how the institution is likely to adapt to the changes that computers hold in store for the aggregation, retrieval, and application of information. Saloma rightly asserts that Congress has been at the mercy of the Executive branch for much of the information that informs its' deliberations. He suggests that independent access to greater amounts of data will provide Congress with far more information than it is now able to compile and that electronic data processing will permit Congress to use this information more efficiently. If congressmen will only seize the opportunity to exploit the new technology, he argues, they will improve their capacities to review legislative measures proposed by the administration, to initiate appropriate measures of their own, and to exercise greater control over the manner in which the bureaucracy administers ongoing programs.

His discussion about the ways in which Congress is likely to apply the new technology is interesting and wide-ranging, but it is also less disciplined than his earlier chapters. Some of the possible consequences of computer use forecast by Saloma are difficult to accept. He suggests, for example, that computers will "introduce a bias entirely consistent with democratic theory—toward the free exchange of information and ideas." Yet, it is not entirely evident why swift, easy access to reams of information by future congressmen will necessarily facilitate the exchange of facts and arguments. Much will continue to depend upon which members of Congress avail themselves of the information, the uses to which the information is put, and the rules of relevance individual members and the Congress as a whole apply to the law-making process. Nor is it entirely clear why new information systems "should also afford democratization of committee power," or why congressmen will not have to rely upon "middlemen" for their information, as members do now.

Saloma's final chapter deals with the legislature's capacity to adapt to future challenges, and is the least rewarding section of the book. He catalogs some significant, but obvious, changes currently taking place in the United States (*e.g.*, "increased nationalization of politics and the decline of southern power, the growth of a sophisticated electorate and corresponding new forms of political organizations, metropolitan growth and the rise of a new urban cleavage"), although some

may take exception to his assertion that there has been and will continue to be a "decline in southern power" in national politics. Unfortunately, his efforts to link these changes with the adjustments the institution is likely to make to them is not terribly convincing. He generates more speculation than he can handle well in a single chapter, and the relationship between Congress and the "New Politics" which is promised in the book title is given short shrift, indeed. The "New Politics" is defined so broadly that the term's usefulness for analysis is severely circumscribed.—IRWIN N. GERTZOG, *Yale University*.

Cooperative Lobbying—The Power of Pressure.

By DONALD R. HALL. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1969. Pp. 347, \$8.50.)

Donald Hall's *Cooperative Lobbying* must have been a terribly frustrating book to research and write. Hall set out to examine in depth the lobbying activities of "peak" associations—organized interest groups whose primary members are other, narrower voluntary associations—and of ad hoc alliances among interest groups to achieve specific legislative goals. In order to make his research manageable, he chose to concentrate on business associations, particularly the national Chamber of Commerce.

At every turn, the author had doors slammed in his face. First, the Chamber of Commerce refused to discuss intergroup activities in which it engaged, and charmingly disclaimed that it ever did any such thing. At the time the research was being conducted, the Chamber was undergoing a three year-long audit by the Internal Revenue Service, and Chamber officials stated that the IRS might misuse such information to harass the organization.

As a result, Professor Hall had to rely on data of questionable objectivity: on interviews with former Chamber employees, on comments from leaders of interest groups which admitted that they cooperated with the chamber, on the self-serving publications of the group he was studying, and on exposé-type articles in popular magazines and newspapers. Furthermore, most of the people who did talk to Hall demanded anonymity and requested that their comments be sufficiently doctored to prevent any possible identification of their source.

Inevitably, one wonders whether all interest groups which engage in cooperative tactics are equally secretive about their activities, or whether groups which are highly defensive, such as business associations tended to be throughout the 1960's, are perhaps extreme in this regard. A hypothesis testing this relationship could be formulated in operational terms. Yet, because Professor

Hall chose to focus on business associations, the book does not raise questions of this nature.

Given the research limitations imposed by the cloak and dagger nature of his investigation, Hall has done a creditable job. The reader comes away from *Cooperative Lobbying*, however, with the feeling that much remains to be done in this field. The author mines the data available to him skillfully but, to put it simply, the data is not very rich.

It is important to add that Professor Hall does not generalize beyond the limits of his data and consciously avoids constructing theories about cooperative lobbying. His approach is straightforward. He spins no gossamer webs. As a result, this book will be most useful to undergraduates and others who are yet amateur explorers of interest group politics; it has much less of value for political scientists familiar with books like Truman's *The Governmental Process*; Bauer, Pool and Dexter's *American Business and Public Policy*; Milbrath's *The Washington Lobbyists*.

Let me illustrate the above point: *Cooperative Lobbying* begins with a chapter about lobbyists in Washington. The author admits that the ore from this particular vein has been pretty well extracted already, but he justifies his work on the ground that "a few non-scientific comments by newspaper reporters and lobbyists are still needed to fully describe current lobbying recruitment." He proceeds to rehash a number of recent popular magazine articles and, disturbingly repeats their jargon and some of their inanities. The chapter reads easily, but it detracts from the focus of the book.

The following two chapters concentrate on motives for and against interest group cooperation. Essentially, these chapters develop—in depth and with illustrations drawn from contemporary business interest groups—the reasons for and against cooperative action outlined in Truman's *The Governmental Process*. After 90 pages of analysis, the author concludes that "only a few generalizations can be drawn" and that these generalizations are "simple in nature." Two such conclusions are "Groups often cooperate to exchange information about issues and problems common to their perceived interests" and "Economic self-interest is one of the most compelling motives that activates interest groups."

The second half of the book offers the knowledgeable reader more substance. Professor Hall is clearly more adept at analyzing and writing about actual examples of cooperation among voluntary associations than he is at speculating about such vague phenomena as the "motives" of multi-member organizations. His chapter entitled "Methods of Intergroup Cooperation" makes worthwhile reading, especially for those interested

in studying the Washington activities of associations in the food industries.

Hall focuses on the Food Group, a twenty year-old informal conference group whose members include representatives of over sixty business associations. Officers of the Food Group tend to be men from associations like the National Institute of Fisheries, the National Canners Association, or the International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers, but peak associations like the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and the American Farm Bureau Federation also belong to the conference.

The Food Group claims to be simply an informal group which holds frequent lunches to discuss what is going on in Washington and to exchange information relevant to the interests of its members. Nevertheless, Hall found that the Food Group appeared to be the parent of a more formalized ad hoc interest group, the Information Committee on Federal Food Regulations, formed specifically to fight Senator Hart's "Truth in Packaging" legislation.

For example, the Chairman of the Information Committee, who had major responsibility for planning and executing the response of food industry members to the threat of Federal regulation, was simultaneously program chairman of the Food Group, a top-level executive in the National Canners Association, and a member of the National Association of Manufacturers.

Besides studying 1) informal groups which avoid structure, rules, organization, etc., and claim that they serve purely an informational rather than a pressure function and, 2) ad hoc industry groups, the author concentrates on what he calls the "conference association." He explores the Greenbrier Conference, an annual "summit meeting" of representatives of the major business associations and other generally conservative groups like the AMA and the AFBF, and the Conference of National Organizations, a somewhat broader organization which meets three-times yearly. Both of these Conferences exclude reporters, do not take minutes, nor make public the substance of their discussions. The Greenbrier Conference, in particular, tends to be highly influenced by the National Association of Manufacturers.

Given the secrecy of these Conferences, the author was unable to attend any of their meetings or to get wholly reliable information on their significance. He concludes, logically and I think correctly, that these secret summit meetings are not as nefarious as might be assumed, since they have built-in limitations; the groups which attend sometimes have conflicting interests and frequently disagree over priorities; frequently second and third-rank employees who have little or no

responsibility for policy-making within their organizations are detailed to "represent" their respective associations; the very secrecy which encourages free discussion and consensus-building prevents effective use of the results of the discussions in the political process. Strategy and tactics cannot be planned and carried out through the mechanism of broad summit conferences.

The final chapters provide brief case studies of "Intergroup Cooperation in Action." The conflicts over "Truth in Lending," "Truth in Packaging," and the Dirksen Reapportionment Resolution are examined by the author. About his last case Professor Hall concludes that the activities of the various groups can be observed and cooperation inferred but only the participants—none of whom is willing to discuss such cooperation—could actually document the existence of an alliance and the methods employed by alliance members.

Professor Hall would perform a valuable service for political science if he builds upon his present book and concentrates in his next work on attempting to research and write one or more in-depth case studies of group alliances in action. Furthermore, such studies should not be limited to business-oriented groups; an analysis, for example, of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights might prove especially rewarding. A break-through is needed here, and Professor Hall may well be the one to achieve it.—ALAN H. SCHECHTER, Wellesley College.

Congress and Urban Problems: A Casebook on the Legislative Process. EDITED BY FREDERIC N. CLEVELAND. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969. Pp. 450. Cloth, \$7.50; paper, \$2.95.)

It is generally acknowledged that America has become a nation of cities. But although the extensive growth of large metropolitan areas on a national scale is a relatively recent phenomenon, urbanization and many of its attendant problems certainly are not without long standing precedent. It is rather surprising and a matter of no small interest that this fine collection of case studies edited by Professor Cleveland represents the first major attempt to analyze the challenge which urbanization as a field of public policy has posed for Congress. Why has a volume dealing with this important topic been so long in coming? The answer to that question reflects more upon the nature of American politics than it does upon the inclinations of American political science.

What emerges as the central theme of these studies (and particularly of Professor Cleveland's masterful concluding essay) is the delineation of a political system which is not yet structured at the national level to treat the problems associated with urban life as problems of urban life *per se*. It

is one thing to recognize that the United States is confronted with an urban crisis on a national scale and quite another to conclude that there ought to be a national urban policy which somehow addresses itself to that crisis. Institutionally, the recent establishment of both a cabinet level department and a White House staff for urban affairs may move the Executive branch in that direction. But as Professor Cleaveland points out, "there is little evidence that Congress has developed regular patterns of decision making where urban problems are concerned. To put it another way, Congress has not yet developed stable issue contexts organized around the notion of 'urban affairs policy.'" (pp. 358-59)

In addressing themselves to the problem so stated, Professor Cleaveland and his associates have made a major contribution to a growing body of literature which seeks to explain systematically the formation of public policies at the national level. Seven cases exhibiting varying degrees of "urban-relatedness" (Prof. Cleaveland's term) are presented—air and water pollution control, assistance for airports and mass transit, the establishment of programs to control juvenile delinquency and to feed the urban poor, and the creation of a department of urban affairs. Although a number of relevant and important legislative fields are not included (e.g., housing, urban renewal, and anti-poverty), students of Congress will find that the case studies describe well the extraordinary spectrum of legislative committees, executive agencies, professional staffs, and interest groups involved in urban policy making. More than that, however, these essays show how this complex structure of decision making tends to treat urban problems as non-urban issues.

In fact, the authors find urban policy making to be an almost capricious enterprise in Congress: thus legislation to abate air and water pollution bogged down in controversy over state enforcement powers and resource conservation; a proposed urban affairs department was defeated in 1962 when the House became embroiled in a racial controversy over the appointment of a Secretary; airport assistance was conceived primarily to promote the interests of commercial carriers, without reference to urban development; similarly, mass transit was not regarded as fundamentally urban legislation until the indifference of the Senate Commerce Committee virtually compelled supporters to turn to the more urban oriented Housing subcommittee on Banking and Currency; and the food stamp program, long regarded as a general welfare measure and as a means of reducing agricultural surpluses, became an "urban" issue almost gratuitously in 1964 when non-urban Congressmen used it as a means of bargaining for the urban support needed to save an unpopular farm

subsidy. Because Congress lacks a perspective on urban life and development as a whole, the urban element is often ignored, sidetracked, or treated as an incidental by-product of other concerns.

The judgment that there ought to be a reasonably explicit urban orientation or field of public policy at the national level provides the authors with a concept for ordering their analyses of decision making and serves as a standard for evaluating both the process and the policies produced. Of course it can be argued that as the nation has become increasingly metropolitan most public policies have acquired important "urban" implications. A field of urban policy would encompass so much of the legislative process as to become virtually synonymous with domestic affairs. Moreover, given the great and widely recognized influence which local governments and interests have in Congress, and the consequent tendency to make what the late Professor Morton Grodzins referred to as "decentralizing decisions" at the national level, it can be argued that the complex interests of urban America are powerfully represented in Congress. In fact, contrary to the widely held theses that effective legislative leadership has become an executive function, Professor Cleaveland observes that "these seven studies [demonstrate] the vitality of Congress itself as a source of initiative in legislating on urban problems." (p. 354) The real question, as the authors imply, is whether urban interests have been adequately or properly represented and legislated upon. Given the diffuse nature of metropolitan politics and the heterogeneous character of urban interests and group life, such a judgment is difficult to make. But complexity as such is not really the heart of the problem.

What is involved here is the impact of institutional or structural constraints upon the substance of public policy. In Congress the organization of authority systematically discourages the development of an urban field of legislation. It is not surprising that these studies are compelled to focus upon the character of the committee system, which almost invariably divides legislative responsibility on a functional basis that cuts across an areal phenomenon like metropolitanism. Such a system not only discourages the development of a comprehensive urban perspective, but distorts or conceals the urban dimension in individual legislative proposals. The seniority system exacerbates the problem by elevating to positions of authority many legislators from rural or small town constituencies which are unlikely to sensitize them to urban problems or interests. Under these conditions the principle or mechanism of representation, which is inherently divisive, cannot be relied upon to produce reasonably responsive urban policies. Even big city congressmen rarely represent

constituencies which are likely to encourage a comprehensive perspective on metropolitan problems. This is especially true of House districts, which usually divide urban areas ethnically, racially, economically, and politically.

The necessity of attracting the support of non-urban representatives further complicates the process since urban leaders must often compromise their legislative proposals and avoid defining issues in explicitly urban terms. Since it is the structure of authority which makes it virtually impossible to see or to treat urbanism as a complex whole, some reorganization fostering a broader perspective will have to be undertaken if Congress is to respond to the urban crisis in an enlightened manner. Professor Cleaveland suggests that at a minimum this would require creating House and Senate committees with legislative jurisdictions roughly equivalent to that of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It might also entail the creation of a non-legislative joint committee with authority to review the urban implications of all relevant legislation—a function similar to that of the Urban Affairs Council in the White House.

The impact of institutional reform is always problematic. Even with the recent changes in executive organization and those proposed for Congress, certain fundamental features of American politics mitigate against the emergence of urban affairs as a stable, broadly conceived, and reasonably well defined field of national policy. Such a field would cut into the decentralized structures of political power associated with federalism, the party system, and the urbanized areas themselves. But the most important obstacle is the absence of an identifiable (let alone self-conscious) urbanized constituency in the welter of metropolitan interests, organizations, and political jurisdictions which make it difficult to mobilize support for urban policies at any level of government. The recently formed Urban Coalition may make some contribution in organizing such a support structure. Professor Cleaveland argues that urban based interests are so diffuse and difficult to organize that only the party system can supply the energy needed for defining, articulating, and supporting national urban policies. And he believes that "time is fast approaching, perhaps is now here, when the parties will base their appeal to [urban] voters on proposed national solutions to urban problems. . . ." (p. 389). But this is precisely what the parties have been unable to do well because they, too, are diffuse, disorganized and rooted in the very conflicts which obscure the perspective and obstruct the support needed for creating a national urban policy.

It may be an irony of the American system that if an urban constituency and support structure

emerge, they will do so primarily within the context of institutional developments at the national level. Although the structure of American politics makes this particularly difficult, a national government organized to legislate broadly conceived urban policies can provide the perspective and incentive needed to foster such support. But should this be surprising? Executive agencies and congressional committees typically contribute to the development of their own clientele groups. One must not underestimate the impact of institutional devices. That, after all, is the lesson which this book teaches.—LEO M. SNOWISS, *University of California, Los Angeles*.

The Contemporary Presidency. BY DOROTHY BUCKTON JAMES. (New York: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. 187. \$6.95.)

This is a relatively short study that claims to examine "the structure, uses and expansion of presidential power from the Roosevelt era to the present." (jacket) For the most part, it does. The author focuses on the demands and expectations of the modern institution, those forces that shape the character of the office and the roles of its incumbent. Routinization and institutionalization are described within the context of changing presidential responsibilities. The quagmire of personalized leadership in an increasingly bureaucratic system is presented.

It is a fruitful focus, one that breaks away from the traditional chieftain approach that still characterizes so much of the textual literature. The reader is presented with a systematic framework for understanding and evaluating executive policy-making. He is also presented with a concise summary of many scholarly writings. For these reasons *The Contemporary Presidency* should constitute a valuable introduction for most political science students.

It may not, however. It is very succinct; it summarizes a significant amount of published research; it provides insightful commentary. And it does all this in a body of a little over 150 pages. For a Ph.D. candidate intent on reviewing for his comprehensive examinations, such a compiliation might prove extremely useful and should be easily comprehensible. But for a student with only an elementary knowledge of the American political system, it is probably too compact and undoubtedly too advanced. It makes for difficult reading. On the other hand and to the author's credit, underliners would certainly be kept busy.

Perhaps the place for this book is alongside the Wildavsky collection of readings (*The Presidency*). Together they constitute a good anthology and synthesis of much of the Presidency literature. But used alone or with a less complete book of readings, *The Contemporary Presidency* may

be too brief and too sophisticated an introduction for most beginning students.

James concentrates the bulk of her analysis on the institutionalized aspects of the American Presidency. There is a chapter on the selection process, but it is not a very complete account. Similarly, the discussion on leadership is suggestive rather than informative. Personality theory is not explored in any detail. There are even some omissions in the institutional discussion, two of them serious. The author discusses the President's legislative role yet fails to explain the structure and function of the Office of Legislative Reference of the Bureau of the Budget. This is the office that is responsible for coordinating the clearance functions. She notes the need for strong executive leadership on the Hill yet does not describe the operation of the President's congressional liaison staff.

With these exceptions, however, the institutionalized Presidency is outlined in fairly complete detail. This is the book's chief merit. It examines structural-functional relationships within the framework of evolving responsibilities. James suggests that these evolving responsibilities set the parameters of presidential action and constituency reaction. She argues that the President is the prime mover in this process although the process itself is continual.

What is presented is a very mechanical model, updated from the Montesquieuian prototype. It has its checks and balances which the author suggests are operative. Others do act to moderate presidential initiatives but the extent of their moderation and the moderators themselves may differ.

In the domestic sphere Congress and the bureaucracy do the moderating. While they appear to exercise considerable power, James argues that the President can limit their impact by maximizing his own political power. Here she resorts to the familiar argument that a President must utilize his bargaining position to assume a role of leadership.

This argument, however, may obscure more than it reveals. Leadership itself is very complex. It does not necessarily follow from bargaining, although it can. The President's position can be persuasive, especially to those who have been socialized into believing that a chain of command exists, or more simply and to the point, that the President's wishes should be satisfied and his interests considered. It is the job of the White House staff to make these wishes and these interests known.

In the area of foreign and military policy James argues that the President is less restricted or at least, he seems to be. His constitutional prerogatives combine with his public position to create

the impression that he is limitless. The constitutional prerogatives that the author is referring to are those powers that provide for the Common Defense, powers as interpreted by modern Presidents rather than the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. James is of the opinion that the presidential interpretation will continue to prevail.

Nonetheless, the author does not conclude that Prometheus is, in fact, unbound. She hedges, suggesting restrictions of money, information and advice. In the final analysis, she adds, "... the greatest limitation upon Presidential initiative in foreign policy and defense is a personal one—his judgment and sensitivity to the strengths and weaknesses of the advice he is given." (p. 170) Vietnam indicates that this last limitation may not be too great. Besides, to say that the greatest limitation on presidential power is the President himself is to acknowledge that the external checks are not working, that there is no effective balance, that Prometheus can prevail under most circumstances.

This is one of the most critical problems—how to effectively check the President without at the same time preventing the efficient and often decisive formulation of foreign policy. The domestic Presidency faces somewhat the reverse situation—how to overcome internal constraints to meet an increasing number of institutional demands. For a President to succeed under these conditions, the author concludes, his sense of direction and style must be appropriate to the times. Unfortunately she offers no guide as to how Presidents can develop these attributes or how the electorate can determine who has them.

But this is probably asking too much. The author has given us a good book, substantial in content, fairly perceptive in analysis. Despite its difficulties for the beginning student, it is a useful addition to our textual literature.—STEPHEN J. WAYNE, *The George Washington University*.

The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840. BY RICHARD HOFSTADTER. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 280. \$6.95.)

Political scientists, historians, and sociologists in the last two decades have studied anew the phenomenon of the rise of open political parties. On this topic there are the writings of William N. Chambers, Noble E. Cunningham, Joseph Charles, Seymour Lipset and a number of others including myself. There also are a number of specialized works on the impact of parties in particular states. Various aspects have been emphasized by these writers and by earlier ones such as James Bryce, Marucie Duverger, M. Ostrogorskii and Charles A. Beard. Much attention has been given by the above authors to matters such as party structure,

some aspects of ideology and theory, and to the socio-economic base of politics.

Now we have Richard Hofstadter's book, also focusing on the rise of American parties. Hofstadter's approach is that of emphasizing intellectual history in the comparative setting of English and American ideas on parties. But he also focuses on the importance of the *acceptance* of parties in practice. For this purpose he stresses the significance of the struggle in the presidency of John Adams, 1797-1801, for the establishment of the right of an opposition party to exist. While he feels that the peaceful transition of power to the opposition in the election of 1800 is indeed an important land-mark, yet the central struggle about the opposition party's right to exist was won in the Adams period. Too much attention, he believes, has been given to Jefferson in power, not enough to the significance of the rise of the opposition.

This is the more important when we consider his carefully chosen material on the original ideas of our founding fathers. Their use of the term political party is carefully traced, both as to British and American usage in the eighteenth century. The terms "party" and "faction," as used by virtually all writers, were derogatory. Edmund Burke was a leading exception. His definition was: "Party is a body of men united for promoting, by, their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." This definition while deficient in certain aspects, did show recognition of the necessity of parties in a representative system of government. But the predominant view of the founding fathers was rather in agreement with Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke regarded factions as natural, but as being harmful. He, in his *Idea of a Patriot King*, wrote that statesmen and leaders must rise above party, even as they functioned. True leadership could not consist of just moulding the parties to support a program. This was the outlook of our own founding fathers in their writings. James Madison, in the famous tenth number of the *Federalist Essays* foresaw the rise of local and state parties but believed they should be neutralized and localized, not used as a structure for nationwide political programs. The Constitution itself reflected this point of view. It was intended to be, as Hofstadter puts it, "A Constitution against Parties." This same point of view was held by President Washington. In his presidency he sought to ignore parties. His first cabinet, in which both Jefferson and Hamilton served, was an attempt to establish a ministry of all the talents. But before long the proposals for programs and policies created divisions. Moreover to support his program, Hamilton organized support in what became the Federalist Party.

At this point Madison in Congress abandoned his support of the administration and Jefferson soon left it. But neither the administration nor the opposition clearly saw what was transpiring. It was not apparent that new institutions were developing. Rather there was the belief (by the opposition) that administrative errors needed to be corrected. In the administration Washington felt hurt. Hamilton ultimately felt that the opposition should be suppressed. As many of the Federalist Congressional leaders shared this point of view, it was in this spirit that in the Adams administration the Alien and Sedition laws were enacted.

After the election of Jefferson the role of parties was still not clear. Jefferson, most of the time hoped still to eliminate parties, to harmonize, to reunite. He saw the forces for development of some political opposition but was reluctant to institutionalize it, even in concept. He hoped to unify support. Ultimately Monroe came closer to achieving a momentary appearance of such unity, but the social, economic and personal forces for realignment and change immediately caused the rise of a new set of parties. Here Hofstadter finds the model for this in the work of Dewitt Clinton, and of the Albany regency. These forces in New York were typical of forces which produced the rise of a new set of parties. The new system of parties was analyzed in the writings of Martin Van Buren, especially his writings after leaving the presidency. To Hofstadter, the termination of his book is justified with the institutionalization of parties under Van Buren in 1840. By that date the concept, role, organization and activities of parties were clearly developed. The operation of the Constitution had been modified. The role of political parties was fairly clear and acceptance of parties was becoming general. Thus the writing about parties caught up to the actuality. The contribution of political parties to self government was no longer one of suffrage.

In summary, Hofstadter has confirmed some concepts, modified others, clarified many and developed some new departures, as outlined above. His book is a definite contribution and one which students of parties as well as students of theory will find quite important. Yet, the approach through intellectual history does have certain limitations. Both in this work as in earlier ones Hofstadter finds Madison more satisfying as an intellectual leader than Jefferson. I believe a change in perspective as to the political actions and leadership of each should reverse this judgment (p. 212). A reading of the newspapers in addition to the reading of the writings of the leaders would change some other points of emphasis. Also on the development of the Clintons and some other points on New York politics there is confusion, as between George Clinton who was still Governor in

the early 1800's and then United States Vice President, and Dewitt Clinton, with the result that Dewitt Clinton's career is telescoped with the later career of his uncle (pp. 221-222). This is chiefly of importance as indicating the necessity for a grasp both of ideas and also of practical politics to reach a balanced evaluation of leaders. Hofstadter is less at home in attempting such synthesis although he rightly sees the importance of such materials.

Finally there are theoretical questions beyond the scope of this book. Is there such a matter as the national interest? If so how does it evolve from the party struggle? Also for self government to function in an old or new nation, a basic consensus is probably necessary on the existence of the state and on what the British call "the rules of the game" as to how elections, the right of opposition, and the yielding of office are to take place. But all this cannot be done in a single book. Meantime, Hofstadter has made a valuable contribution, and has written an interesting and readable book with many new perspectives.—MANNING J. DAUER, *University of Florida*.

The Negro in Maryland Politics 1870-1912. BY MARGARET LAW CALLCOTT. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. 199. \$7.95.)

Dr. Margaret Law Callcott has delved beneath the surface and exposed in a most glaring manner, a fallacy, "Negroes do not vote." She dispelled this notion and this oft-times used or misused statement by tracing the history of the Negro in Maryland politics from 1870 to 1912, and finding that Negroes *did vote* and *still do* in the Free State. With meticulous care and consummate skill she examined the voting records of the counties and Baltimore City in election after election during the period under review to lay bare the facts. The book is replete with charts and is well documented. But, above all, it is written in a pleasing style. By any measuring rod it is sound scholarship at its best.

The book is not only a significant contribution to courses in political parties and the electoral process, political behavior, and political dynamism, but to Negro history. It should be required reading for leaders of both political parties in the Free State, but particularly for Negroes themselves. It certainly provides Negroes an opportunity to review the past, reassess the present, and chart the future. Negroes can well say—"Stormy the path we've trod, bitter the chastening rod. Let us march on till victory is won."

The historic position of the Negro in Maryland politics is a rather strange phenomenon, full of paradox and irony, simplicity and complexity, mystery and meaning, public injustice and poetic justice. His influence on Maryland's political systems,

structures, events, and public policies have been profound, central, and universal. In a very real sense, the Negro has been the key to Maryland politics since 1870. Since the political system determines who gets *what*, *when*, and *how* the fruits of political power are many and varied. Conflict is the heart of politics. A political system is creative or destructive in accordance with pattern and quality or response to basic problems and dimensions of human conflict.

It is safe to say that the Negro was wedded to the Republican party in Maryland from 1870 to 1936. His enfranchisement heralded a new era for the Republican party in Maryland, changing a seemingly hopeless minority party into an organization of real power. Negro membership in the party freed it from the confines of sectionalism and provided it with a constituency of varying size and steady loyalty in virtually every county in Maryland. The Negro was led to believe that the Republican party was his chief benefactor and only protector. For while the Negro was underrepresented and undervalued in proportion to his electoral strengths, he was at least accorded a place and recognition of sorts in the Republican hierarchy, which was more than he was offered by the Democratic party of Maryland.

Negroes were also slighted in the distribution of party patronage. Likewise, they were denied real influence in party councils. They had little to say about the jobs at the party's disposal. Yet, patronage is the life blood of political parties. Therefore, the oppressed status of the Negro in Maryland political life represented his victimization and exploitation of something precious and sacred to white Marylanders. The raping of Negroes by the Maryland political process was, therefore, born of and nurtured by the search for meaning as well as the will-to-power. There was, in fact, a marriage of the will-to-meaning and the will-to-power.

Laboring-class Negro Republicans could count some tangible rewards for having their party in power, but the middle class and upper class Negroes were slighted by Republican patronage policies. They still are in 1969. The Maryland delegation is split down the middle as far as party alignment is concerned and yet no Negro Republican has ever received a top level federal or state appointment. During the 1950's Maryland had a Republican governor, two United States Senators, and three members of Congress flying the Republican banner—all elected by Negro votes. The Maryland Republican leadership has not learned a thing in one hundred years with respect to significant patronage federal or statewide. Apparently it has lost one of its national commitments. This certainly is no way to win friends and influence others.

On the other hand, *racism* was the major

weapon in the Maryland Democratic party's arsenal. Race, in its many manifestations was the chief source and expression of conflict and tension in the life of this party during the period under review. *Gormanism* then was what *Agnewsticism* is now. Exclusion, oppression, suppression, and victimization of Negroes were the chief methods and techniques of the party in dealing with racial conflict and tension. Regulation, adjustment, accommodation, and resolution of conflicting interest were accomplished by the mobilization and application of "White Power." The system not only fostered but celebrated and glorified collective hypocrisy, conceit, egoism, and dishonesty. It still does. Majestic principles were invoked to justify reduction of Negroes to the status of subject and victim of the political process. Lip service was dutifully paid to democracy even as Negroes were excluded from the experience of every element of citizenship.

Fortunately they did not prevail. The Republicans learned something about both the strengths and weaknesses of their racially mixed party. They learned they could achieve power with the Negro in their ranks. This, too, the Maryland Democratic party learned in later years. Due to numerous changes in the political landscape the Maryland Negro is much nearer the shore of political equality. A new day has dawned in the political and governmental life of the state. For the Negro, then, reading Margaret Law Calhoun's *The Negro in Maryland Politics 1870-1912* should keep alive within him the memories of the past, the good experiences of the present, and the grand visions of the future.

Because of increased participation, Negroes are developing a reservoir of political experience and increasing their political confidence and skill. They can help redeem the past of the Maryland political process. They can be liberating and redemptive agents, just as the Negro was the key to the party's emancipation. Freed from the prison of racism, the Maryland political scene will be freed from the heavy yoke of deceit, hypocrisy, negativism, and obstructionism.—ROBERT LEWIS GILL, *Morgan State College*.

City Politics and Planning. By FRANCINE F. RABINOVITZ. (New York: Atherton Press, 1969, Pp. 192. \$6.95.)

The dependent variable being examined in this volume is "planning effectiveness." Initially, the design states that variance in effectiveness is to be explained in terms of organizational difference (independent or executive planning operations), variation in the role of the planner (technician, broker or mobilizer) and political system differences. The latter variable is conceived, with some qualifications, as a pluralist-elitist continuum. The ex-

ploration is ostensibly to take place using data from six New Jersey municipalities. However, something happened between the research proposal and the field. The ensuing problems are so severe that the usefulness of the volume is drastically impaired.

The first problem and the one which nearly wrecks the study is the lack of a dependent variable which can be satisfactorily operationalized. Evidently, the original plan was to measure effectiveness by contrasting city plans and subsequent realizations. When this strategy did not work out, a substitution was made of using informed judges to rate the six cities. This was done dichotomously, ending with a list of five effective cities and one one-effective city. After reading about the cities' experiences one wonders about the charitable proclivities of planners judging other planners. Aside from the crudeness of the ratings, the result creates a cell with one case, which in turn limits the ability to make statements. As the "effective five" turned out to have inconsistent characteristics with respect to role, organization and system, the original design was abandoned.

The study then shifts to constructing, in a rather ad hoc fashion, a typology of political systems based on the six cities. Three indices are employed to arrive at a "banded continuum" with designated stripes. These dimensions are power distribution, political culture and output, each hoary concepts indeed. There is no discussion of how they are to be measured and there is precious little indication of how the three dimensions are employed to come up with bands called cohesive, executive centered, competitive and fragmented systems. Given the number of cases and the procedures employed these are in fact tantamount to pseudonyms for the properly named cities. The classification is arrived at largely by impressionistically characterizing prominent attributes which came to the mind of the researcher. Based on the evidence presented the types are convincing, but there is no way to check on this.

The final section is devoted to a discussion of political strategies employed by the various planners and the fortune of these strategies in the various system contexts. This passage is informed by a kind of participant observer insight and judicious common sense. It furnishes highly recommended practical advice for those engaged in planning.—OLIVER P. WILLIAMS, *University of Pennsylvania*.

A Constitutional Faith. By HUGO L. BLACK. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. 97. \$3.95.)

In this compact little work, a compilation of lectures delivered in 1968, the aging Justice Black at last offers a book-length statement of his guiding judicial principles, which he calls his "constitu-

tional faith." In characteristic style he wields his pen like a sword, cutting swiftly through massive constitutional subjects, always tough-minded and keenly devoted to his ideals. Brushing aside the now fashionable claims that he is a New Deal liberal, whose recent opinions show that he has turned sour and conservative with age, Black assures us that his basic tenets have never changed, only his application of those tenets to the circumstances—a claim over which Blackophile and Blackophobe writers are sure to do battle.

The Justice's principles of jurisprudence are presented in three lectures on (1) the constitutional role of the courts; (2) due process of law; and (3) the first amendment. He holds fast to his familiar positions on the incorporation of all Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment and on his "absolutist" interpretation of the first amendment, guarantees of liberty of expression. The unifying theme that laces together these and other arguments is that judges are obliged rigorously to adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution as seen in its plain words and in the historical conditions of its drafting. Accordingly, Black's repeated lament is that his brothers too often arrogate to themselves the power to change the Constitution by interpretation, while their true obligation is to "follow the true meaning of the Constitution and other laws as actually written . . . leaving the problem of adapting the Constitution to meet new needs to constitutional amendments approved by the people under constitutional procedures." (p. xvi). Contemporary legal scholars are likely to label this a quaint version of "strict constructionism," since long-accepted theories of judicial legislation emphasize the sense in which judges are independent agents who make law rather than merely find it, as Black seems to be saying. But quaint or not, Black's theoretical statement takes on new relevance today with the recent election of a President who campaigned heavily on the theme that courts ought not to legislate and who appointed a supposed "strict constructionist" as Chief Justice.

Unfortunately for Black, the conviction of his writing style is not matched by the substance of his arguments. He advocates a close following of the literal wordage and the historical context of the constitutional provisions; but, his interpretations of some provisions are faulty, it seems to me, on just these points. To take one of the most glaring linguistic problems, Black maintains that the first amendment accords unconditional protection to "speech," but adds that this does not include direct protection for civil rights demonstrations since they are not engaged in "speech," but are "conduct." He says it is "speech," not "conduct," that the amendment explicitly protects. But does this not cavalierly overlook the presence of

the same provision of rights of "assembly" and the "exercise" of religion?

How can one make any sensible construction of these words without allowance for "conduct"? Some of Black's arguments about historical context are equally dubious. For example, not many reputable scholars have accepted his "incorporation" theory of the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment. And the Justice stands virtually alone in his absolutist interpretation of the first amendment (an interpretation which, he tells us, would strike down every defamation statute in the country). Indeed, Leonard Levy's thoroughgoing historical study, *Legacy of Suppression*, may put to rest once and for all the notion that the Framers had any idea of Black's absolutist first amendment.

Finally, it must be said that Black, for all his personal greatness and intellectual power, makes the fatal mistake of trying to resurrect dusty theories of mechanical jurisprudence which obscure the realities of judicial discretion. Even if the Justice's use of words and history were sound, his literal approach to adjudication would still be inadequate since it greatly overestimates the fixity and certitude of the meaning of legal documents, especially of the conveniently vague phrases of the Bill of Rights. The Justice is eloquent, but not persuasive in his attempt to get us to shelve Justice Holmes' maxim that courts "do and must make law."—PATRICK MCBRIDE, *Sacramento State College*.

New Jersey Reapportionment Politics, Strategies and Tactics in the Legislative Process. BY ALAN SHANK. (Rutherford, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969. Pp. 308. \$10.00.)

"A specter is haunting the United States—the specter of reapportionment" Alan Shank opens his book on this off-key note and ends it by reciting dreary details of the procedures for apportionment established in 1966. Along the way he presents much detailed information on legislative apportionment controversies in New Jersey, particularly in the twentieth century. He also makes an attempt to relate the strategies of the antagonists in these legislative struggles to the various models of coalition formation that have been developed in recent years. To that end Shank has painstakingly calculated the indices of likeness and of cohesion of various groups in the legislature, particularly county and party factions. Apparently Shank means to use all this to say something about New Jersey politics in general.

My impression is that the book rides off in all these directions. There is scant effort to bring the elements together in any meaningful whole. If, as sometimes appears to be the case, this is intended primarily as an attempt to show the applicability

of theoretical models to real politics, the result is not impressive. For one thing little space is allocated to it. The potential application of the models of Schelling, Buchanan-Tullock, and Downs is summarily dismissed—one paragraph apiece. Riker's minimum winning coalition model is found more applicable, but the ten pages devoted to showing instances where Riker's model would apply do more to whet than to satisfy the appetite. If, however, none of these was Shank's prime goal, and his purpose was to say something significant about New Jersey politics by commenting on reapportionment as an illustrative case, then, alas, the case became the leading actor and the original objective was shunted aside.

As a dissertation it merits the Ph.D. degree that it helped to get for the author; as a book it illustrates once more that publishers are more anxious to produce books than they are to hold to appropriate standards of publication.—DUANE LOCKARD, *Princeton University*.

Governing the City: Challenges and Options for New York. EDITED BY ROBERT H. CONNERY AND DEMETRIOS CARALEY. (New York: Frederick O. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 230. \$7.00.)

Several of the papers in this book were written for a conference in May, 1969, which was jointly sponsored by the Academy of Political Science and the Urban Center of Columbia University. Professors Connery and Caraley have performed a difficult task well—editing a series of diverse papers by a group of diverse authors. The number of papers (eighteen) makes it impossible to examine all of them here, but those that are mentioned below and others make *Governing the City* a worthwhile addition to the literature of New York City politics.

Part of the volume deals with the city's governing process. Included are papers by Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, the co-authors of *Governing New York City*, a monumental book for which *Governing the City* is a timely supplement. Sayre's "City Hall Leadership" focuses on the mayor and his relationships (poorly developed, in Sayre's opinion) with the other main elements of the city's fragmented power structure. Sayre suggests that "the city is not likely to find a shorter or more satisfactory road to a more responsible City Hall leadership than rebuilding the party system" (p. 39). Arnold J. Bornfriend in his "Political Parties and Pressure Groups" indicates why rebuilding the city's now impotent parties will be difficult, although his perceptive description of the city's new pressure group system indirectly lends support to Sayre's position. Bornfriend suggests that the currently intense conflict between primarily black and Puerto Rican "new-comer" groups and emerging "backlash" groups will not ease until the city's benefit sector is ex-

panded—an unlikely development in the absence of more inclusive hierarchies capable of extracting resources from larger governments and of increasing the quantity and quality of bureaucratic outputs.

Herbert Kaufman examines bureaucratic politics in "Bureaucrats and Organized Civil Servants" and focuses on municipal employee unions, among the most important of the many roadblocks to responsive government in New York City. There can be less disagreement than Kaufman seems to think with his suggestion that "the principle of joint management-labor administration attained and then abandoned in West German labor unions has been approached as normal practice in the government of New York City" (p. 43). On the basis of my own research on the city's labor relations it seems to me that Kaufman understates the influence of the organized bureaucrats and overstates the potential of emergent countervailing groups to restore public control over the bureaucratic process.

Governing the City also contains several good papers examining some of the broader systemic variables affecting the city's decision-making process and capabilities. The nature and implications of the city's complex and changing demography are discussed by Emanuel Tobier in "People and Jobs." David Bernstein's excellent "Financing the City Government" describes city expenses and revenues and along with Vernon M. Goetcheus' "State House and National Capitol" illustrates the city's reliance on and need for massive financial assistance from the state and national governments. The sheer magnitude of the city's functional responsibilities are concisely spelled out by Bruce Feld in "What the City Government Does."

The papers treating the city's major problems demonstrate that New York City's populace bears considerable hardships because of the city's governmental inadequacies. Separate papers treating recreation, education, crime, health, housing, poverty, and city planning all document the city's inability to focus enough resources and authority to resolve, even ameliorate, many of the conditions which make the city an undeserved burden for so many of its residents. As Roger Starr so aptly puts it at the conclusion of his excellent paper "Housing the City's People": "The challenge is there. Where is the power?"

That's a good question and one which the city's political leaders and chroniclers had better start confronting very soon. Co-editor Caraley in the concluding paper "Is the Large City Becoming Ungovernable?" deals with Starr's question from a national perspective. Caraley suggests that the power to govern large cities depends on the mobilization of national resources and that there is a potential "pro-urban" coalition capable of generat-

ing enough influence in Washington to assure requisite resources for urban development. After all, Caraley argues, a country which can win world wars, support worldwide alliances, develop nuclear weapons, and put men on the moon has the resources to accomplish a great deal. The rub, of course, is that the American people may not want to develop viable urban areas in which people of different races can live and work together. Furthermore, given the condition of New York City's fragmented governing process, one can question whether it is capable of converting substantially greater resources into consequential outcomes.

Caraley's optimism may be excessive, but his paper provides some balance to a book which is destined to send most of its readers into Spenglerian fits of doom about New York City's future. Actually, New York City's problems and prospects are more the same than different from those of most other large cities; if its problems are greater in magnitude and its options more limited, this is partly because New York City has made errors which other cities (and perhaps New York) still have time to correct. *Governing the City* documents a lot of these errors, but what it really does is to effectively underscore the first principle of most American urban political systems—urban governments are hardly the captains of their own ships. —RAYMOND D. HORTON, *Grinnell College*.

The Quest for Regional Cooperation: A Study of the New York Metropolitan Regional Council. By JOAN B. ARON. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 225. \$7.00.)

The most recent innovation in metropolitan governmental organization is the voluntary association of local governments, usually a council of elected officials, established to study area-wide problems and to discuss proximate solutions. The first such council of governments (COG) was organized in 1954. By March, 1968, encouraged by Federal financial support, the number of COG's had grown to ninety, with twenty others in various stages of formation.

Joan Aron's study is a history and analysis of the effort to establish a workable COG in the nation's most complex metropolitan environment, which in 1961 included over 1400 distinct political units and was designated by Robert Wood as "one of the great unnatural wonders of the world."

Briefly stated, the New York Metropolitan Regional Council (MRC), established in 1956, moved to a plateau of limited regional activity in the early 1960s and declined in importance after 1964, when it abandoned its efforts to gain legal standing as an organization of *communities*. In 1966 an attempt at rejuvenation was begun. At that time MRC was incorporated as an organization of elected *officials* to secure Federal funds under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965. By

March, 1968, when the research for this study was completed, MRC was attempting to establish itself as a viable regional organization.

Aron's comprehensive case study shows that during its formative years MRC suffered problems common to many COG's in the United States. There was no consensus among members as to what MRC's regional role should be. Shifts in membership occasioned by electoral outcomes, together with a general lack of money and professional staff, made leadership formation difficult. Because of goal confusion among local officials, MRC was often unable to communicate effectively with suburban governing boards and State legislatures. There was apparently no attempt to identify issues and personalities which could break the usual public apathy surrounding regional concerns. The Council was attacked from all sides: some critics charged it could never become a political unit of real force, while others claimed MRC was the harbinger of metropolitan "super-government."

In addition, MRC encountered a special obstacle in the particular governmental conditions of the New York region. Unlike many other States, the governments of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have been urban-oriented for some time and have attempted to meet several problems on a regional basis. But these efforts have been concentrated upon *functional* arrangements (e.g., Authorities) rather than general-purpose structures. MRC was unsuccessful in its attempt to change this State practice.

Faced with internal dissension and external hostility, MRC's accomplishments were "more good intentions than anything else." The Council supported proposals concerning regional transportation, the preservation of open space and recreational lands, and an air-pollution warning system. The organization also served as an arena for informal negotiation of some regional problems requiring action by several local governments. Although MRC served over the years as a useful device for the exchange of knowledge among local officials, it lacked the political resources to deal with continuing regional issues. When a problem became pressing in the Region, governmental authority was needed. This power rested with the States and they were unwilling to share it with MRC.

What is the future of governmental cooperation in the New York area? Aron sees no "supergovernment" for the Region. The Authorities will continue to furnish the most critical area-wide services. Any initiatives for regional coordination must come from the States or the Federal government. If MRC is to develop as the representative of local units in the planning and governing of the Region, the author feels that it must develop leaders who can establish meaningful relationships

with the principals in other regional organizations—Federal and State agencies, the Authorities, and private planning agencies such as the Regional Plan Association.

In the end, therefore, "cooperation" is still the watchword in the New York metropolitan area, just as it was when Wood examined its governments nine years ago. Any change must await future events. The author concludes:

MRC is not an ultimate solution. But it may provide the metropolitan community in New York with its first demonstration that local governments can play an effective part in shaping their own destinies.

In the opinion of this reviewer, such a demonstration, if it develops, will rest upon new initiatives taken during the 1970s rather than the limited past achievements of MRC.

This case study is a significant contribution to the literature on metropolitan councils of governments. While it deals with a metropolitan region which is perhaps unique in its composition and complexity, the work provides valuable data for future comparative research in metropolitan governmental organization.—ROBERT E. MCARTHUR, *Vassar College*.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Political and Administrative Development. EDITED BY RALPH BRAIBANTI. (Durham: Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. 1969. Pp. 667. \$15.00.)

There are fifteen essays here each specifically prepared for this volume. Three of the essays are critiques of selected sister contributions and one of them is a "conspectus" that summarizes and correlates the materials in the eleven primary pieces. Needless to say, any work of this range and variety of authorship (prepublication prose-minar notwithstanding)—is inevitably uneven in quality. Moreover, the degree to which different pieces may strike responsive chords in the reader probably depends as much on the instrument being struck as on the intrinsic merit of the essays themselves. In my own case, for example, I have not been in a sympathetic mood concerning the entire area of this book for some time. Basically my pessimism stems from an uneasy suspicion that much of the recent wisdom of public administration in general, might best be characterized as reinventing the wheel. And in the case of *development* administration it is a reinvention preceded by an agonizing appraisal as to whether you really need wheels. The entire enterprise is then packaged in such scholasticism that it takes considerable courage to suggest that all too often the emperor is naked. But this is an indictment of the state of the discipline and of all of us who continue to live within its confines rather than a thrust against any of these authors in particular.

Indeed, a number of the authors themselves indulge in embarrassed asides. Palombara, for example, states his central theme: "that certain values, ends-in-view, or ideologies carry with them implications for an administrative organization that would not be relevant or necessary were the values and goals of ideologies different," before he notes that "Although this observation appears truistic, it seems to me apparent that like many other truisms about public administration that might be enumerated here, it is not fully under-

stood by contemporary nation builders and by those who provide them with 'technical assistance.'"

Perhaps the reader might better evaluate for himself the strength of the volumes connective tissue, the interest level of the various themes and the prose style most typical of the essays from the following excerpt by the editor of the book and its lengthiest contributor, Ralph Braibanti: (This statement is from his "Conspectus" and is preceded by a demurrer concerning the volume's failure to present a unified model.)

"Despite the foregoing remarks, there appear to have emerged the glimmerings of a common perspective with respect to the purposes of development, the configurative or ecological tissue in which administration is embedded, the indigenization of political institutions, and the insistence on typological schema, however obscure and complex they may be, by which subsequently comparative evaluation may be made. Apart from what appears to be a group of not greatly divergent points of view toward these problems, there are on some issues conflicting emphases, uneconomic variations in terminology and constructs and varying perceptions of the same problems of political and administrative development."

This, apparently, is where we all are.

I will not, however, further emphasize the negative, but instead call attention to a few pieces that are in and of themselves worth the price of the book. Ralph Braibanti's opening essay, for example, provides an excellent review of the literature of development administration as well as a most timely reminder of the pitfalls of our foreign aid program. His major thrust is to emphasize the central importance for development administration of ongoing political institutions in terms of their general ideology, spread of power, institutional regularity and innovative capacity. He provides classificatory handles to aid in evaluating such institutions and also expresses the hope that through a careful balancing of administrative activities in relation to the activities of other sectors in the polity, the satisfaction level as well as the performance ability of administrative organizations will be raised.

In his final "Conspectus," moreover, Braibanti performs the Herculean task of compressing the ideas of his colleagues into an accurate and thorough set of precis, followed by an overview of the general themes and interrelationships found in the volume. This virtuosity is particularly helpful since the reader is likely to approach the book piece by piece. If there are timelags between the reading of one essay and another, it is inevitable that possible relationships will slip past unobserved. Braibanti's review, therefore, presents us with exactly what we may have failed to do for ourselves.

Another particularly useful portion of the volume is the interchange between Fred Riggs and Martin Landau. Riggs sets forth a richly imaginative schema of politics and bureaucratic subsystems. He places these against a complex backdrop of ecological settings, and a threefold classification of what he calls "transformations" whose consequences he subsequently explores. In and of itself this is an interesting essay. Landau's brilliant criticism, however, actually illuminates it. He deals with Riggs's conceptualizations and with his special terminology. This portion of the book could well serve as a model for teachers and students alike on how to analyze political science contributions. It is intellectual surgery at its best.

The themes that run through the book are essentially a counterpoint among ways of looking at institutions, values and persons. The authors vary in the emphases they place on each of these modes, as well as in the constructs they provide for analyzing them. For example, Friedrich together with his critic, Sartori, explores the problems and rewards of studying the ends of government in our political and administrative development work. Palombara discriminates between the drives that led to the development of the Weberian type of continental bureaucracy in distinction to those that led to the British-American systems and draws analogies for the more complicated field of the developing countries. Lasswell and Holmberg provide an eight item classification of values (neatly arranged into a mnemonic device) and then add a six-fold set of implications that the model might suggest for developing states. Kariel's essay enumerates a stimulating array of literary allusions that entertain as they illuminate problems in the field through varying definitions of "man."

But attempts such as this to encapsulate the various authors does a disservice to most of them. In essence, all the authors are struggling toward those insights that might best provide *all* nations, not just those variously defined as "developing," with some sense of direction and order for their political systems. The book on the whole, is a fair representation of the thinking in the field and on

this basis deserves the consideration of the profession and the neophytes.—BLANCHE DAVIS BLANK, *Hunter College*.

The Angolan Revolution. Vol. I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962). BY JOHN MARCUM. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. Pp. 380. \$12.50.)

In Angola the presence of Portugal and its imperial mystique has been challenged for centuries by the black African. The challenge has taken the form of sporadic outbreaks of resistance and rebellion, such as the uprising of Alvaro Tulante Buta during 1913 to 1915 in protest against labor conditions and the deportation of Africans to Cabinda, São Tomé, and Príncipe. Protest also took the form of nativist or messianic mass movements, especially in the Portuguese Congo after the colonial breakup of Bakongo territory in the late nineteenth century. It was manifested through *assimilado* protest writings, newspapers, and cultural journals as well as through official and semi-official African and European organizations. More recently, the opposition to Portuguese rule crystallized into tens of ephemeral nationalist movements among which a few represent a serious threat to Portugal's hold over the territory.

John Marcum has given us a detailed account of these movements, their origins and evolution from 1950 to 1962. A promised second volume will cover the period from 1962 to 1968. Marcum's account is based on personal experience and insight, interviews during the past ten years with nationalist leaders, and thousands of ephemeral and secondary sources.

The present volume is divided into three parts and concludes with four useful appendices of documents. The first part deals with the rise of Angolan nationalism during the decade preceding the revolt of early 1961. This period of nationalism is analyzed on geographical and ethnic lines focusing, first, on the Luanda-Mbundu sources represented by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Marxist revolutionary movement which evolved from the earlier intellectual *assimilado* and mulatto protest. A second focus is on Bakongo sources of nationalism in northern Ongola where dissent in the Congo monarchy is led to the formation of several movements under the leadership of Holden Roberto. Third, there are the Ovimbundu, Chokwe, and related sources of nationalism in the southern half of Angola, from which a third force later evolved during the mid-sixties. In each case Marcum meticulously explores the roots and causes of nationalism, identifies the principal personalities, and analyzes the ideology, organization, and significance of the many movements in relation to the open rebellion of the sixties.

The second part of the book concerns the uprising of 1961, the year of rebellion and "sequential explosion." Citing both nationalist documents and Portuguese sources, Marcum reconstructs the series of events, commencing with the attacks in January by members of a sect known as Maria, the Luanda riots and vigilante reprisals of February, and the upheaval of March 15 which thrust Angola into a protracted state of rebellion. He also examines the American and Portuguese responses to the conflict as well as the impact of the rebellion on subsequent developments in Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique.

The third part examines in depth the period leading to the 1962 formation of a government in exile and the effort of nationalists to cement relations and gain support in independent Africa. The effort to form a broad national front from ideologically diverse movements is analyzed with particular attention given to Roberto and the MPLA. Marcum concludes with an assessment of the rebellion in terms of the Portuguese commitment, Portugal's links to Western allies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the opposition to Portuguese colonialism in the United Nations, and the potential of pan-Africanism.

The appendices of documents concern the uprising of Tula Alvaro Buta and biographical notes on Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA; two Portuguese documents on alleged Communist subversion; three documents on the relatively unknown struggle of African factions to control the old Congolese throne; and Roberto's forged letter published in *Reader's Digest* as the result of Portuguese public relations effort.

Marcum has gone to considerable trouble to give us a balanced account of these chaotic events and to clarify details which have been badly confused by the divergent positions of the nationalists and Portuguese and by an often inaccurate press. One is especially impressed with the descriptive detail and event by event analysis, depicting the intricacies of nationalist politics. Rather than providing the reader with startling new interpretation and analysis, this book constitutes a necessary synthesis of contemporary political history with deep political insight.

This study is largely dependent on ephemeral nationalist documents which the author has had to weigh carefully. For example, he boldly documents the founding of the União das Populações do Norte de Angola, (the predecessor to Roberto's own movement) as late as in July 1957, some three years later than that officially documented by the nationalists themselves. Through interviews (with the participants involved in the founding of the movement) and inconsistencies in the nationalist documents, Marcum is able to revise the date and recast the historical perspective of Angolan

nationalism in the Portuguese Congo. In certain instances, one senses the author's uncertainty and frustration in dealing with disputable facts. Marcum goes to great length to discuss obviously biased and distorted propaganda emanating from all sides of the struggle.

While this study might be viewed critically by some behavioralists concerned with systematic and quantitative field analysis, it should be emphasized that due to present political conditions such analysis probably could not be undertaken in Angola today. Marcum, it would appear, has ventured into a study of events which are still much too close for detached assessment. Yet his book remains a highly successful synthesis of events as they probably happened. This very necessary study fills a gap which should serve as a basis for systematic social science research once Angolan independence is attained. Thus this is an important book, the best yet available to scholars and students who are interested in the continuing Angolan nationalist struggle. We are grateful to Marcum for his scholarly contribution and we look forward to the projected second volume.—RONALD H. CHILCOTE, *University of California, Riverside*.

Comparative Urban Research: The Administration and Politics of Cities. EDITED BY ROBERT T. DALAND. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1969. Pp. 368. \$10.00.)

It is the urban revolution to which we, after all, owe our civilization, and it is certainly to the culmination of that revolution, which is happening to us now, that we can ascribe most of our contemporary ills. And so it is to an understanding of that culminating process that had its beginning in prehistory (and is thus more than history; it may indeed be psychology or anthropology, though more aptly ecology) to which we must address ourselves. If we are to understand that culminating revolution, we must surely go beyond our provincial preoccupation with our own Western culture and norms, and seek generalizations and valid grounds for prediction in that world which used to be known as outside the bounds of Christendom, and which now is simply known as developing. To approach that developing world, however, one must have more than scientific curiosity and adequate methodological tools; one must have fortitude and courage for above and beyond the ordinary call of duty. One must indeed, to resort to the vernacular, have more brass than a government mule.

Professor Daland and his colleagues have all of these qualities in abundance. Their analytic approach and statistical examination of the data are as sophisticated as their material will allow, and yet, though I suspect them often of perfect, private certainty, they are not willing to visit upon

us their own inner perceptions of reality which we cannot possibly have, not having eaten with, drunk with, or gone to bed with the data. But they do not shrink from speculating about reality that cannot be empirically validated with the data at hand. Thus Miss Rabinovitz: "It seems intuitively that urban service levels are indicators of something other than the demographic level of urbanization. Could that something be the phenomena of 'urbanism' or the urban way of life?" If we are not ready to speculate intuitively, with Miss Rabinovitz, about what our data might show us at some time in the future, we shall surely be denied a scientific view of politics.

Much of this volume focuses on urban phenomena in the developing world. After an introductory essay by editor Robert T. Daland, which in itself constitutes a comprehensive statement of the problems as well as the goals of comparative urban research, Frank P. Sherwood looks theoretically at the position of the city as a subunit in the national system, and succinctly summarizes the possibilities for autonomous action by the local polity: "there is in fact a tremendous range of system-oriented behavior that occurs without reference to power and dominance"; and "power is highly variable. The addition of power at one level of the hierarchy does not at all mean the automatic withdrawal of power at another." Although Sherwood seems to be wanting to generalize for all time and every place, it is probably accurate to say that his principal points of reference are the American and Brazilian systems. Latin America at large, on the other hand, is the focus of Francine F. Rabinovitz; Malaysia of James F. Guyot; and two African cities of William John Hanna and Judith Lynne Hanna. Robert R. Alford, in a long concluding section, poses ways of viewing and interpreting the data shown from Latin America, Malaysia, and various African cities. Departing from this general pattern, Deil S. Wright and Daniel R. Grant examine American urban experience in separate essays on the city manager as development administrator and political access in the metropolitan governments of Nashville, Miami and Toronto.

Miss Rabinovitz, concerned with urban and political development in Latin America, uses her data well, while all the time admitting the uncertain nature of it. She is convincing, to my mind, when she argues that urbanization has affected economic development (there is a positive correlation between the two phenomena she insists), and that at the same time the city qua city affects little the politics of Latin America, except as a functioning subunit in a totally nation-centered political life. Equally dominated from the center are the urban villages being developed by the Federal Land Development Authority in Malaysia. This attempt to

urbanize a portion of the rural population, as described by James F. Guyot, is a center-dominated endeavor which could easily contain the seeds of its own destruction. Already there are signs of conflict between an elitist bureaucracy and the dominant political party, and this conflict may be a signal that cohesion could "dissolve into localism." Alford's criticism of Guyot—that he produces two possibly contradictory schemes of explanation—is valid, but he misses the point, I think, that Guyot is attempting to make, and that Sherwood in particular assumes: that urbanization may well develop a leadership cadre that is capable of challenging the center from a local base.

While not overlooking the relations of city to center in national political systems, the comparative focus of the Hannas is upon transnational differences and similarities found in two widely separated cities, Umuahia in eastern Nigeria (now Biafra), and Mbale in Uganda. The Hannas were able tentatively to conclude that similarities could be found in the politics of the two cities. For one thing, in both cities the role of the community influentials in integrating each system is partly a communications process (they "transmit the perspectives of one subunit's culture to another"), and partly a manipulative one (they "manipulate the practices and perspectives of one subunit so that they are more compatible with those of another"). For another thing, there seems to be a cosmopolitan orientation "on the part of members of the two communities' elites."

Oddly enough, the Hannas' research into the politics of Umuahia and Mbale, though carried out in a non-Western cultural environment, is conceptually closer to the investigations of Grant and Wright than to other essays in this collection. In using the non-Western world as its predominant focus, this volume puts a healthful emphasis on the role of cities in national systems, an emphasis that has been lacking in the study of American city politics and administration perhaps because of the smokescreen raised by the conceptually inadequate intergovernmental-relations approach. But is this focus too nation-centered? While exploring the importance of the relation of cities to national systems, the authors (except for Grant and the Hannas) tend largely to ignore the transnational character of larger cities (note the instances in which the metropolis physically spans national boundaries; note also that ecologically and organically there is a tendency for the city to become a *Weltstadt*, literally to reach out and encompass the world). Is it invalid to compare cities of 20,000 and 2,000,000 in the same national system, except as a means of understanding the particular national system? Does the city—at least the metropolis—so transcend the national system that comparative *urban* analysis (in contrast to *na-*

tional analysis) must emphasize the transnational over the national? To put the question another way, is the urbanist concerned primarily with the city qua city, or is his primary interest centered, to use that unfortunate coinage, in nation-building?

If the urbanist is interested primarily in the city qua city, then one of the opening statements by editor Daland very cogently identifies perhaps the only major difficulty with this otherwise excellent volume: "It has been noted that urban politics frequently varies more within nations than among categories of cities in different nations." This is a good working hypothesis, which I think most of us would perceive intuitively as valid. Acting upon this hypothesis, we would then divide this volume in two, and arrive at a more homogeneous mix in each one. In each case, the better mix would make a better book.—WILLIAM O. WINTER, *University of Colorado*.

Modernizing Peasant Societies: A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa. BY GUY HUNTER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 324. \$6.50.)

Perhaps the most common—yet the most irrelevant—argument in support of aid to the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa in the second decade after World War II was the success of the Marshall Plan in contributing to the economic revival of Europe in the first such decade. Programs, on the other hand, which did not implicitly confuse the preconditions of non-Western development with the quite different requirements of European reconstruction, tended, as in the case of President Truman's "Point Four" formulation, to invoke a strategy of assistance that would "greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and [hence] raise substantially their standards of living." It is significant that the primary emphasis in *Modernizing Peasant Societies* is on the need for change in the agricultural sector as a precondition of economic advance for most countries of Asia and tropical Africa, and that the author makes only a half-dozen (almost cursory) references to the contribution that foreign aid, on a government-to-government basis, might be able to make to such a process. While the reader's immediate reaction is to regret that this volume was not available as "required reading" for developmental specialists in years past, it is perhaps only with benefit of hindsight that it can fully be appreciated as embodying the "common sense" of a highly complex matter.

The author states in his preface that the book is "the outcome of two and a half years' work on a project sponsored jointly by the Institute of Race Relations and the Overseas Development Institute (both in London)," the purpose of which was to inquire more deeply into the effect of 'the transfer

of institutions from developed to developing countries.'"

But as the work proceeded, it became increasingly clear that to concentrate wholly on 'transfer' did not provide an adequate basis for explanation of the problems and performance of developing countries. These problems arise . . . because developing countries are seeking rapid economic growth in a wholly different total environment from that in which the main thrust of growth took place in the West. They can neither recapitulate the sequences of growth in Europe between 1700 and 1900 nor take the full modern equipment of institutions and technology of the 20th century. Their paths of development must be, in many senses, unique. This constituted a challenge to adopt a wider framework which I was forced to accept.

Hunter's "wider framework" will disappoint those seeking a tightly-reasoned "theory of development." It yields instead a series of remarkably acute insights into the variety of factors influencing acceptance or rejection, success or failure, of change at the local level of peasant society. While the policy planner will lament the dearth of sweeping prescriptions, the thoughtful Peace Corps returnee will nod in agreement at virtually every page. Consider, for example, the simple matter of the introduction of fertilizer: "surely this is not surrounded by a host of complications and consequences? Yet indeed it is" (p. 115). And Hunter proceeds to tell us why. Or the fact that

there is a great temptation to jump the steps from hand-cultivation to tractor, because it seems uneconomic to have both forms of capital—animals and machines—when farming capital is so short (p. 117).

followed by a discussion of the varied consequences of the substitution of the machine for the animal, some of which may be distinctly counter-productive in developmental terms.

It should not be assumed from the foregoing that Hunter is either pessimistic regarding the potential for change in peasant society or skeptical as to the possible contribution of Western technology. He argues, rather, for *measured* change as dictated by a capacity for acceptance at the local level, rather than for change arbitrarily imposed by central government fiat. As Hunter himself succinctly puts it, the most fruitful approach, in many cases, may well be "the marriage of 17th century scale with 20th century technology" (p. 271). And insofar as central planning is concerned, he quotes with approval, Hans Singer's observation that "a plan must start from resources rather than needs" (p. 274). His definition of modernization is keyed to both notions:

Modernization can in fact only mean following a path which is possible for each nation in its current circumstances, using to best advantage the common stock of scientific knowledge which is available simultaneously to every country in the world (p. 296).

Arguing that "a second-rate engineer has at

least some skills to give to society [while] a second-rate Arts graduate has very few indeed," Hunter's treatment of the role of education as a modernizing influence is in full accord with that of other developmental analysts, save, perhaps, for specific emphasis, in keeping with the overall thrust of the book itself, on the need for "qualitative improvement of Primary schools in their full capacity as socializing agents . . . and available not in the city but in the rural areas" (p. 253).

Equally central to the books thrust is the argument that developmental financing for most Asian and African nations must, in the main, be internally generated, with the primary contribution, for the foreseeable future, stemming from the rural sector. There are many, however, who would challenge the author's optimism that agricultural productivity will sufficiently outstrip population growth for the remainder of the century as to make this possible.

The sub-title of *Modernizing Peasant Societies* is somewhat misleading. The book is by no means a rigorous comparative analysis, but rather the distillation of a large number of case studies coupled with the author's extensive field observations in both Asia and Africa. As such, however, it is a well-integrated and uniquely informative effort.—ARTHUR S. BANKS, *State University of New York at Binghamton*.

Les Groupes Communistes Aux Assemblées Parlementaires Italiennes (1958-1963) Et Françaises (1962-1967). By PIERRE FERRARI AND HERBERT MAISL. (Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 1969. Pp. 214. 20F.)

In this interesting and valuable study of the Communist parliamentary groups in the lower houses of the French and Italian parliaments, Maisl and Ferrari have treated the two Communist groups separately in a work that really comprises two distinct monographs in juxtaposition. However, we gather from Duverger's remarks in the preface, as well as from the content of the work itself, that the authors compared notes at the outset regarding their respective plans of attack and also engaged in frequent consultation from time to time in the course of their research. There is, therefore, considerable similarity between the approaches employed by the two authors.

Although the French and Italian Communist parties are fairly similar in their electoral strength, there were some sharp differences between the two parliamentary groups under investigation, with regard to such questions as relative parliamentary strength and legislative role. After all, the Italian Communists entered the 1958-63 Chamber of Deputies with 140 out of 596 seats, whereas the French Communists had only 41 out of 482 seats in the National Assembly during the 1962-67 pe-

riod. The Italian Communists, as the second largest group in their chamber, had far more influence and leverage than did their French counterparts. Moreover, they confronted a shaky center coalition cabinet, whereas the French Communist Party was faced in 1962-67 by a strong Gaullist party with largely subservient allies—a party which, thanks to its virtual majority in the National Assembly and to a constitution which protected the executive branch against legislative recalcitrance, could afford to treat Parliament with some disdain.

Both authors begin by examining the official attitudes of the respective Communist parties with regard to the other parties in the system and to the parliamentary regime itself. They then proceed to analyze briefly the nominating process in the two parties in France and Italy, the campaign programs and techniques, and the social and occupational composition of the two parliamentary groups. The internal organization of both parliamentary groups is outlined in some detail; and the external relations of the groups are also given some attention, with Ferrari placing more emphasis on the relationship between the Italian Communist Party and various political forces outside of Parliament (such as pressure groups, local governments, etc.), whereas Maisl tends to dwell to a greater degree on the relations between French Communist Deputies and their parliamentary colleagues. In both countries there are close ties between the Communist party in Parliament and the extra-parliamentary party organization, with a considerable over-lapping of membership. And in Italy, of course, there was until recently a tendency for Communists and Socialists to collaborate closely on policy issues. The Ferrari study reveals that traces of this collaboration were still present in the 1958-63 Parliament.

Finally—and this is the core of the research—there are detailed statistical analyses of Communist participation in the work of the two chambers. The analyses cover private-member bills, private-member amendments to government bills, participation in debates, and questions addressed to the ministers. It becomes evident, as a result of these studies, that the Communist role in the French and Italian parliaments is by no means as important as one might superficially assume. Communist proposals are occasionally adopted by passing private-member bills or, more frequently, by passing private-member amendments to government bills. And Communist criticisms occasionally compel the government to modify its course somewhat. This is more often true in Italy than in France; for the Italian Communist Deputies are far more numerous and have enough votes to prevent Italian parliamentary standing committees from exercising their peculiar power to pass

laws in *sede deliberante*. In short, the Communist role cannot be cavalierly dismissed as being mere *a priori* anti-system opposition. For in both countries the Communist groups have made numerous constructive proposals, and have generally tried to project a moderate and democratic image.

The methods employed in the study are dictated to some degree by the nature of the phenomena under investigation. For instance, the analysis of roll-call votes would have been of limited usefulness in dealing with a party whose members invariably vote as a solid bloc in Parliament. Or, to cite another difficulty, the submission of a structured questionnaire to Communist Deputies might have aroused much suspicion in a highly centralized and disciplined party. And it is questionable, in any event, how willing busy national legislators would be to participate in such a time-consuming venture. For this reason perhaps, the authors have had to forego the more sophisticated findings which an opinion survey might have gleaned regarding the recruitment experiences and role perceptions of Communist Deputies. It might have been even more worthwhile to inquire as to how non-Communist Deputies perceive the role and effectiveness of the Communist parliamentary groups. But here again, of course, certain techniques might be rendered ineffective by lack of cooperation on the part of the politicians under scrutiny. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Italian Communist Deputies appeared to be much more willing to grant informal interviews than were their French fellow-partisans.

In concluding, one must confess to a certain disappointment at the authors' failure to include a final chapter synthesizing their findings, comparing the behavior of the two Communist parliamentary groups, and suggesting certain hypotheses to be derived from their data. As it stands, their work contains much valuable material and many interesting insights; but one might have wished for a more truly *comparative* effort. However, first-class descriptive analyses and experiments with behavioral techniques are not so embarrassingly abundant in the field of Western European politics as to justify us in "crying over fat broth."—RAPHAEL ZARISKI, *University of Nebraska*.

The Power of Parliament. By RONALD BUTT. (New York: Walker and Company, 1968. Pp. 446. \$3.50.)

From time to time it is valuable to examine phenomena from a different perspective in order to question the conclusions of a currently accepted perspective. This is what the British journalist and scholar, Ronald Butt, has attempted to do in his book, *The Power of Parliament*. Butt's purpose is to show that the concern of parliamentary critics about the decline of the British Parliament is in a

number of respects exaggerated. In the first place, many of the Parliament's critics explicitly or implicitly compare the influence of backbench MPs today to their influence in the mid-19th century, as if this period was both typical and desirable. Secondly, most critics contend that the impact of Government backbenchers and the Opposition on legislation today has practically disappeared, whereas Butt finds that this is not the case.

After conveying these purposes in his introduction, Butt enters into an examination of the functions of Parliament as they developed to 1945. This examination leads him to conclude that the influence of mid-19th century Parliament was both highly exceptional in its degree and undesirable in its effects. Whereas during the mid-19th century the Private Member unceasingly made and unmade governments, Butt contends that neither before nor after this short period did parliamentary predominance prevail. Instead, the function of Parliament has typically been to support government by an executive, whose broad policies it approved. Butt also produces evidence to indicate that the unusual influence of mid-19th century Parliaments was not thought to be desirable. "It seemed at the time an irresponsibility, which was the despair, not the pride of contemporaries" (p. 408).

Butt does not pretend to discover much about the pre-1945 period which historians had not already uncovered. His conclusions gain their thrust in part because they are set along side contemporary criticisms of the decline of parliamentary influence. Moreover, he complements his historical examination with an original analysis of the role played by Government backbenchers and the Opposition since 1945. This analysis is intended to demonstrate that the influence of backbenchers and the Opposition on Governmental policy and the public is not substantially different today from the influence Parliament has traditionally exerted.

Butt repeatedly points out that the influence of the contemporary Parliament remains within the traditional parameters of maintaining executive government. Within these limits, however, Government backbenchers and the Opposition still exercise effective influence and he forwards numerous instances to support this contention. Over twenty examples of backbench influence on Government policy are presented. His case study of Resale Price Maintenance, for instance, shows that the Conservative Government did not introduce legislation to abolish R.P.M. for almost a decade in part because of its anticipation of the reaction of a sizable section of its backbenchers. When the Government finally did introduce legislation in 1964, it did so in part because of pressure forthcoming from others among its backbenchers. Or, to select another example, Butt contends that

the reservations Macmillan was required to put on the British application for membership in the Common Market in order to avoid widespread backbench rebellion (as well as interest group disaffection) were sufficiently fundamental so as eventually to lead to the French veto. Butt also shows that even when Government backbenchers were unsuccessful in their efforts to influence legislation, their revolts often ended at least in focusing public attention on the issue.

The contemporary influence of the Opposition on Government policies was also shown to have been effective in several cases, especially those in which a group of Government backbenchers was aligned with the Opposition. The Government's Common Market policy can again serve as an illustration. Macmillan's compromises were in part induced by the opposition of the PLP to Common Market membership. The impact on the public of attacks made in the Commons by the Opposition was also in evidence in a number of cases such as Suez and the Rents Act. Butt is careful to stress, as well, that the Opposition still controls approximately 30 percent of all parliamentary time.

Butt's emphasis on the influence that Government backbenchers and the Opposition can and do have both on Governmental policy and the public makes a substantial contribution to the literature on the House of Commons. Few will be able to look upon backbenchers as nothing but "lobby fodder" or as totally ineffective actors after reading this book.

It is true that Butt leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, how often are efforts made to influence policy? One suspects the possibility that Government backbenchers (whose action is usually a necessary condition for influencing the Government), while making more successful attempts to influence the Government than the previous literature anticipated, do not make nearly the number of attempts that backbenchers did in earlier Parliaments or that governmental legislators do in other systems. Answers to questions such as this one would have considerable bearing on Butt's conclusions and deserve additional research. The significance of Butt's contribution is that he presents a case which advances knowledge sufficiently beyond that provided by the critics so as to be suitable as a focus for new discussion and research on the House of Commons.—JOHN E. SCHWARZ, *University of Minnesota*.

An Ideology in Power: Reflections on the Russian Revolution. BY BERTRAM D. WOLFE. (New York, Stein and Day, 1969. Pp. 394. \$10.00.)

At first glance this book appears to be a "scissors and paste" job. It is a collection of miscellaneous articles and addresses composed by the au-

thor from the early forties to the present. Only one chapter, "The Forced Labor Reform after Stalin's Death," seems not to have been published previously. The subject matter of these chapters is extremely diverse, covering such topics as: "Marxism and the Russian Revolution," "Backwardness and Industrialization in Russian History and Thought," and chapters on Lenin as a totalitarian, succession struggles, the secret police, Soviet elections, Soviet histories, Soviet science and culture, ideology, and foreign policy, and a final chapter on the theory of convergence.

Nevertheless, the book does form a coherent whole; there is unity in diversity. As Dr. Leonard Shapiro says in the Foreword, "... it becomes a kind of hand-book of totalitarian behavior in its various aspects, both internal and external." (p. VIII). Let us try to paraphrase the underlying unity of Dr. Wolfe's study.

First, take the chapter, "The Durability of Despotism in the Soviet System," which the author states is probably the most frequently anthologized of his essays. Here he makes a distinction between "changes so clearly of a secondary order that they may be designated *within-system changes* and those so clearly fundamental that they involve *changes in the system* or basic societal structure." (pp. 181-2). He characterizes modern totalitarianism as a society "calculated to assimilate the changes which it intends and those which are forced upon it, in such fashion that—barring explosion from within or battering down from without—the changes tend to be either inhibited or shaped and assimilated as within-system changes in a *persistent system with built-in staying powers*." (p. 185. My italics). Thus does Dr. Wolfe stress the durability of despotic systems.

Furthermore, the author does not see collective leadership as either a permanent change in the nature of the system or as a basic change involving dispersal of power. It is essentially transitional, because there is no legitimacy to provide a successor. There are no "*socially organized checks*" to restrain the flow of power to the top. A crisis of succession is almost guaranteed until the rise of a new dictator (Brezhnev and/or Kosygin and/or somebody else, watch out!):

"The whole dynamics of dictatorship calls for a personal dictator; authoritarianism for an authority; infallible doctrine for an infallible applier and interpreter; totally militarized life for a supreme commander; centralized, undivided, all-embracing, and 'messianic' power for a 'charismatic' symbol and tenant of authority." (p. 191).

Other "changes" since the death of Stalin that other writers have pointed to include the elimination of purges and relaxation of terror, law reform, and a "thaw" in the arts. Again, none of these are really basic.

Dr. Wolfe points out that the blood purge has not been forgotten, but is being held in reserve. He points to the facts that in preparation for the Twentieth Congress all the regional secretaries and leading committees were renewed; thirty-seven per cent of those present at the Nineteenth Congress disappeared, and forty-four per cent of the Central Committee failed to be elected as delegates. Also he recalls the execution of Beria and about twenty-five of his friends. It is true that terror in society as a whole has been diminished, but one reason for this is the now more deeply ingrained habit of obedience. Another is that concentration camps are a wasteful method of production. The camps are gentler now, yet they are there. Consider constant references in the Soviet press to people being "dispatched" or "allocated" to this or that construction project or industrial enterprise. The situation today has been referred to as one of "terror on ice."

The discussion on the codification and regularization of the laws Dr. Wolfe dismisses as "much fuss." He points out that in fact public prosecutors have been given much more control of trials and pre-trial inquisitions. Harold J. Berman, who does see some trends toward liberalization, nevertheless has pointed out that in 1961 and 1962 there was a return of harsher criminal and administrative penalties. In at least one case the death penalty was applied retroactively, and in this period he estimates that probably over 250 Soviet citizens were executed for economic and other crimes. (In 1961 forty-three persons were executed in the United States.)

As for "thaw" in literature and the arts one can easily perceive Dr. Wolfe's reaction to such incidents as the Pasternak affair, the imprisonment of Daniel and Sinyavsky along with others, the defection of Anatoly Kuznetsov, and the current agony to which Alexander Solzhenitzyn is being subjected.

This image of a state still basically totalitarian brings us to the theory of convergence, popular in some quarters, but hotly disputed in others—among them Dr. Wolfe. He attacks the arguments of John Kenneth Galbraith, James Burnham, Pitirim Sorokin, and others that, as the USSR approaches the USA as a "mature" industrial society, and managers, engineers, and technologists gain increasing influence, then the differences in the two societies will have become minor and may be ignored. Essentially this "simplification" borrows from the Marxist concept that economics determines politics and culture. As an ally in refuting this Dr. Wolfe calls on—Karl Marx! Although Marx himself was a "terrible simplifier," further study taught him that he had learned more than the content of the product he was trying to sell. He knew that the history of peoples was infinitely

more complicated than the simple formulae of "economic determinism" and "inevitable social progression." Hence many of his writings purposely left unpublished and appeared only after his death. For the same reason *Das Kapital* was never finished and remained a "torso." Technology like money is neutral. As Germany reached England's level of economic development between 1870 and 1914, for example, the two countries became less like each other politically, culturally, and institutionally. Beyond technology—the Russian heritage is very different from the American heritage.

Dr. Wolfe shows a keen appreciation of history, as chapters on Tsardom, World War I, and Poland testify. His reputation and credentials are well known. His prognosis is gloomy. (I am sure he wishes it could be otherwise.) It seems to this reviewer to be realistic and arrived at in a scholarly manner—years of study in the field and first-hand acquaintance with many of the major actors. He staunchly stands up to his critics, and his case is well made. If the patient is unhealthy, it is no use to say he is well because you want him to be. Dr. Wolfe's erudite and well-balanced observations can be of great benefit to Western students of the Soviet Union.—BENJAMIN M. MAY, JR., *Lafayette College*.

Fiji Goes to the Polls. BY NORMAN MELLER AND JAMES ANTHONY. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969. Pp. 184, \$5.50.)

The South Pacific remains the last major area of European colonialism, with the bulk of its people still living under British, French, American, Australian or New Zealand rule. But even there modern democratic institutions are being adopted whether the outcome is independence as in Western Samoa, autonomy as in the Cook Islands, or colonially controlled internal self-government as in New Guinea and Fiji. Professor Meller's book reminds us how slowly and cautiously the British have been moving in their largest remaining Pacific dependency, Fiji. He describes the 1963 Fiji Legislative Council elections, with a postscript bringing the story up to date. In 1963 Fiji still had the classic Crown Colony political structure abandoned in Ceylon as long ago as 1931. In 1963 it elected unofficial members to its Legislative Council in the first election in which the Fijians had been asked to vote by modern methods rather than be represented through their chiefs. Even so, the vote was granted only on the basis of literacy while candidates had to possess fairly high property qualifications. It was only a year later that the illiterate and virtually propertyless natives of Australian New Guinea voted for their own Legislative Council by universal suffrage.

The caution with which Fiji moved towards uni-

versal suffrage epitomizes the British colonial attitude. It is a pity that the authors have made very few comparative references. For the devices of literacy qualification and communal representation used in Fiji in 1963 had been tried out elsewhere in the British Empire over the preceding years. In all cases these conservative measures had to be abandoned under popular pressure. As the postscript reveals the same fate befell the Fijian system only two years after its introduction. While the main argument used for caution in Fiji has always been that the British had a contractual obligation to protect the rights of the indigenous Fijians, a comparative analysis might have suggested that the devices used in 1963 were by no means peculiar to the local situation.

While this book is a very valuable addition to the comparative study of elections it suffers by comparison, for example with Professor Colin Hughes' study of the New Guinea elections of 1964 and even with the much older *Five Elections in Africa* edited by Professors MacKenzie and Robinson as long ago as 1960. In part this is because the book is too short, in part because the authors did not actually witness the election and in part because it lacks the historical dimension which a comparison with the post-1963 situation might have given it. Unfortunately for the authors the entire basis of election was changed almost immediately. They might have been better advised to have contrasted the 1963 and 1966 situations, rather than simply adding their "Postscript."

The shortness of the book has meant that much of the fascinating detail of electioneering is overlooked. The candidates all appear as shadowy figures with no reality. As there were only thirty of them the reader at least deserves more detail than is given in Chapter Four—"Profile of the Candidates." We learn very little about any of them except that nearly all of them were lawyers or professional men, which is hardly surprising in view of the property and literacy qualifications, in particular the stipulation that candidates must be able to speak and read English. One also misses an account of the social forces at work. The authors note that the Indians returned were all from minority communities, but tell us nothing about the operation of caste, language or ethnic groupings amongst the Indian voters. Are these less important than in India itself? We do get a fleeting picture of the clash between traditional and modern deference patterns among the Fijians but it is scarcely full enough. The pressure groups and economic interests concerned with Fiji politics are scarcely mentioned. Most markedly the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. is only mentioned in a footnote. Are they not interested in what happens to one of their most profitable properties?

Had the 1963 and 1966 situations been compared

then much more would have been said about parties. The 1963 election appears to have been fought largely between individuals. Yet three years later there were flourishing and well organised parties, stemming partly from the already existing trade union movement. The authors seem to lend support to the British Conservative politician Nigel Fisher's rather old remark that "parties in Fiji will be racial if true political parties are not developed." What makes a party "true" rather than false is not stated. The authors seem to feel that only cross-ethnic parties on a policy basis are really parties. Yet the record of many underdeveloped countries suggests that parties are very often on an ethnic base and quite reasonably so, where, as in Fiji, the interest of one ethnic group is deliberately preserved against the interest of the other (which happens also to be the numerical majority). This was the case in the very similar situation of now independent Mauritius where the warring communal parties have developed, not as "true" parties, but as coalition partners in a dominant-party system.

Although Fiji moved much more rapidly towards self-government under the newly elected British Labour government it is still dependent and still faced with the sort of dilemma which the British have found almost unanswerable in other territories. It is—shall the numerically dominant and politically aware Indian community be allowed to capture power through the ballot box or will it be crushed between the dominant European business interests and their allies the conservative Fijian landowners? *Fiji Goes to the Polls* while an interesting and worthwhile study cannot, within its narrow scope, give us more than an inkling of the possible outcome.—JAMES JUPP, *University of York, England*.

Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude. BY IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ. (New York: Atheneum, 1969. Pp. 300. \$10.00.)

Professor Markovitz's book is a very valuable contribution to the already existing literature on Negritude. Considering the attacks on the concept of Negritude during last summer's symposium on African culture held concurrently with the First Festival of Pan African Culture in Algeria (*West Africa*, August 9, 1969; pp. 913-914), Professor Markovitz could have picked no better time to publish the book.

The Politics of Negritude, though focused primarily on Senegal, deals with the crucial problem confronting African states as they undertake the task of nation building—how to translate abstract ideas into pragmatic actions. The concept of Negritude which provided a sort of myth or an ideological foundation for the pre-independence African cultural and political nationalism is presently

losing its initial appeal. Senghor, one of its chief advocates, has modified his ideas "from the kind of abstraction which appealed to a humanistically educated intelligentsia to a new pragmatic reliance on science and technology" (p. 35).

Professor Markovitz treats Senghor's concept of Negritude under three periods—the pre-second world war, the post-second world war till independence and the post-independence. The first period witnessed the emergence of Negritude in France among the *évolués noirs* who, in anticipation of better economic and social status, had alienated themselves from their indigenous culture in favor of European culture. They realized that they were "caught between [two] cultures, and belong wholly to neither" (p. 46). Frustrated by alienation, prejudice and loss of dignity, they started a quest for the "holy grail," their "collective soul." Professor Markovitz describes Negritude at this stage as a protest ideology which "served the psychological needs of [black] intellectuals in the Paris . . ." (p. 28).

At the second period, Negritude is presented as an ideology designed to facilitate "dialogue and accommodation with the colonial power" (p. 61). Its advocates emphasized those elements which "bound together France and Africa" (p. 61). Professor Markovitz notes the functional change of Negritude at this period. "From a basic weapon of conflict, the radical aspects of Negritude had evolved into a theory of synthesis and unity" (p. 61).

Two main aspects of Senghor's thought are emphasized at the third period of Negritude. One of them is the concept of the "Civilization of the Universal." Here Senghor advocates a sort of Utopia based on the synthesis of unique elements of various civilizations. Professor Markovitz, like many critics of Senghor, tends to emphasize only the international ramifications of the idea, thus ignoring its possible contribution to the problem of nation building in Senegal and other African states. The idea of the "Civilization of the Universal," if properly directed and structured on the national level, could well be the answer to the problem of national unity presently confronting the African states. The existing ethnic and linguistic groups, or what Senghor describes as the "fatherlands" could become the units for the nation-states or "communities." Broadening the areas of shared interests among the "fatherlands" to the extent that each has to relate its own actions to those of others as well as regard the actions of others as giving point and direction to its own, could promote a sense of interdependence and unity as well as instill democratic attitudes.

Professor Markovitz tends to view the formation of "class cleavages" as the panacea to the problem of national unity because "class cleavages

can override other parochial loyalties . . ." (p. 149). Although this observation is plausible, it tends to be the least realistic to African experience when the following points are taken into consideration. First, considering the experience of the Western states, the formation of "class cleavages" based on economic interests out of the present poor economic situations in the African states, would take a long time, and could not, therefore, provide an immediate answer to the pressing problem of national consciousness and unity.

Secondly, even if it were possible to form "class cleavages" within a reasonable time, the experiences of the African states, have shown that the African bourgeoisie, irrespective of their class interests, tend to remain loyal to their ethnic and linguistic groups. Thus, despite "class cleavages" loyalty to "fatherlands" could still exist. Finally, since ethnic consciousness is an established fact in the African states, an attempt to ignore it by simply superimposing class systems could exacerbate further problems. A system which first recognizes the interests of the existing groups and then broadens these interests into national perspective is most likely to provide the most practical solution to the problem of national unity.—MOSES AKPAN, *Southern University*.

The Police and Political Development in India. By DAVID H. BAYLEY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 482. \$15.00.)

This book reports the analysis of an intensive study of civilian-police relationships in India as they affect both the efficiency of the Indian police and the development of a democratic polity. The data analyzed are of two types. First, aggregate statistics of crime and police effectiveness are presented with a detailed discussion of police organization. Second, a very ambitious survey research project was carried out on thirty-six hundred Indian respondents. Included in the sample are urban-rural, north-south, and student-non-student sub-samples. The data are presented clearly and with relevance to the points made in the text. Statistical analysis of the survey data included correlational analysis, factor analysis of selected variables, and chi-square and t-tests for differences between samples on parametric and dichotomous variables. The author has excellent sense in his choice of statistical applications. For these reasons alone, the book represents a significant improvement in the use of sophisticated research methodologies in political research in India.

The value of the book for scholars interested in political development from different perspectives hinges on the validity of the author's major premise, which is that favorable public attitudes toward the police are conducive to a higher order of political development. Unfortunately the relationship

between police and public on the one hand, and the prerequisites for a "developed" system are not clearly stated. Bayley does not define what he means by political development. One interpolates from his discussion, however, that he is concerned with the effect of police behavior on the development of a stable democratic political order. The purpose of the book, then, is to analyze data which would and does result in a series of recommendations which would improve police-citizen relationships. The assumption is that such an improvement will also benefit the democratic political order.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Indian police, Bayley directs his research in answer to a set of questions about what, how, and under what conditions the Indian police affect political life. In answer to these questions, Bayley suggests that police forces everywhere perform the following activities: maintenance of law and order, establishment of the boundaries of permissible political action, regulation of mobility and economic patterns through administration, and determination of the scope of police law and order activities. Related to these functions or activities are "styles" of performance. Police may be passive or active in their concern with crime prevention. They may be secret or open in their dealings with the public and other structures of government. They may be rude and insensitive or polite and informal, and partial or impartial in handling cases. All of these patterns affect the public perception of the police. Their corporate image in the eyes of the public may be an example of an integrated, national organization. They may, according to Bayley, "serve a symbolic role, representing a nation yet to be, developing national heroes, and giving a sense of pride in country by means of parades, reviews, and athletic competitions." Finally, the police through organization and socialization patterns mold future policemen to appropriate roles of the police in a society. The police, like the military, may become either an avenue for social mobility, or an important basis of political power.

From this basic model, obviously over-simplified from Bayley's discussion, we turn to his findings. The first part of the book is based upon an analysis of police organization and how well they perform their missions of crime control and the control of massive civil disorder. From this analysis, Bayley concludes that given their resources, the rigidity of the personnel advancement system, the rather low ratio of police to citizens, and the poor pay and education of the lower constabulary ranks, the Indian police are a remarkably effective organization.

Turning to citizen attitudes and perceptions of the Indian police, Bayley's survey research data points to low regard for the police by Indian citi-

zens. Related to low regard is real doubt about the sincerity, probity, and motivation of the Indian police. Public hostility towards the police is reciprocated by the police in their own attitudes towards the public. Police complain that people protect criminals, lie when giving testimony, and generally obstruct police work.

For Bayley, the consequences of this mutually hostile set of perceptions is to lower the quality of law enforcement, weaken the general capacity of government to gain diffuse support and compliance, and, perhaps, to erode citizen acceptance of democratic values and institutions.

Thus we have two potentially contradictory conclusions. An effective police force operates in an environment that is passive at best, hostile and uncooperative at worst. The liberal assumptions behind the analysis are that the democracy is better served if the public has active and positive orientations toward the police, and this end would be achieved by improving the "cutting edge" of police-public relationships, the constabulary. These conclusions raise at least four critical questions for this reviewer. First, might there be a positive relationship between police effectiveness and public hostility? Second, might public hostility toward police be a kind of check serving to maximize individual freedom by limiting police activity? Third, is it not possible that the Indian reluctance to involve the police in conflict situations is in part a consequence of other conflict-resolution mechanisms in the society? Fourth, are the problems which India has with the police so serious that their solution should demand a higher share of public resources than they now receive? The real problem for those who would like to see police reform in India is that the system as presently constituted works surprisingly well.—RICHARD N. BLUE, *University of Minnesota*.

The Politics of Defection: A Study of State Politics in India. BY SUBHASH C. KASHYAP. (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1969. Pp. 442. \$11.25.)

Shri Kashyap has attempted to study the politics of defection in seven Indian states: Rajasthan, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. His major thesis is that political defection of state legislators in India has not resulted in political polarization. While admitting the impreciseness of the term "defection" and without a defensible analysis of the concept, the major portion of this volume is devoted to a chronological summary of the defection of state legislators and the breakdown of legislative government in the states. The results of this analysis is a detailed step by step description of each state government crisis. The reader may well become confused by the myriad defections

and counter-defections he encounters. It becomes apparent that the immediate causes and consequences of defection vary from state to state.

In Rajasthan the cause of defection was the ambitions of legislators for a portfolio in the state government while the Congress party required their limited participation in order to achieve a slender majority necessary to form the Government. In Haryana, by contrast, where the Congress had a comfortable majority after the Fourth General Election, it lost the control of the government under the pressure of the age-old caste rivalries as well as the drive of individual politicians for power. While Rajasthan defectors were rewarded, by contrast Haryana defectors were severely punished by being deprived a place on the election rolls. In UP Congress formed its legislative majority by rewarding defectors who joined, only to have the rivalry of Congress leaders destroy their slender majority. Shri Charan Singh, a Congress leader, defected with his faction to join with opposition leaders to form a coalition government with its consequent instability leading to Presidential Rule. In Bihar, instability of coalition state government was characteristic after twenty years of unchallenged Congress control. Defection and re-defection were rampant, running as high as four times. Once again the result was Presidential Rule. A somewhat similar pattern existed in the Punjab where Congress coalition with the opposition toppled the coalition government with resultant instability and threats of Presidential Rule. By contrast in Madhya Pradesh a faction ridden Congress party could not form a stable coalition with opposition political parties to constitute a majority sufficient to form a state government. In West Bengal, Congress defectors joined with other groups to form an unstable coalition government which ultimately led to Presidential Rule.

The price for such instability is too obvious to catalogue. Shri Kashyap's solutions are not defensible in light of the twenty years of relatively successful experience with western model democratic government. While he believes that it "seems most advisable to look forward to and work for the emergence of programme-oriented parties and a two-party system based on a broad national consensus," he simultaneously believes "it may be ideal to grant a holiday to party politics." For him the issue is whether India is irrevocably committed to accepting western political models or whether "we would like to build our polity on the basis of our own genius and social ethos." His conclusion in support of Shri Jaya Prakash Narayan's "partyless democracy" is based upon the ideal of cooperation and harmony for the general good.

The Politics of Defection which has provided the details of defection and counter-defection,

ends in a trial of confusion. For the modern political scientist it has left unanswered such basic inquiries: What variables move the legislator to defect and re-defect? What political models may be extrapolated from the chronology of events? How could such models aid in stabilizing Indian state governments in order to attack important Indian political problems? How can the models developed be used to stabilize caste and community rivalries in order to prevent governmental dislocation? What hypotheses may be developed explaining the absence of polarization amid rampant defection? What models of national party intervention or non-intervention into state legislative conflict resolution can be developed from the evidence assembled?

Answers to these significant questions could provide us with sound theoretical assumptions by which to evaluate similar movements occurring in other states, including Kerala. They would provide valuable insights in dealing with other politically developing institutions in Ceylon and Pakistan.

It is well to consider whether Shri Kashyap's suggestions for importing the partyless government system is defensible in light of the history of the Sarvodaya movement in India. Jayaprakash Narayan's experience with party politics in India left him convinced of the barrenness of the political arena and the need to develop a political structure which reflected indigenous Indian values rather than an adaptation of western political institutions and their inherent values. His withdrawal from party politics may alternatively be evaluated as the results of idealistic disillusionment or the tactics of a sulking Agamemnon awaiting the call to national leadership. Whichever interpretation may be preferable, partyless democracy in modern India is an idealized nostalgia for the mythical past age of tranquility which rarely, if ever, existed. Indian economic and political development has engrafted western models and has managed them with varying degrees of success. None of the evidence offered by Kashyap can possibly justify the relevance and operational capability of a partyless system to modern India.

There is one sense in which the concept has validity within the framework which the author presents. Accepting the provisional validity of his conclusion that no polarization is resulting from defections, and that candidates and the issues rather than the party, are increasingly significant, the thesis which needs testing is whether India is now approaching a phase in which all but the extreme left and right parties are recrystallizing and re-aligning with the resultant emergence of coalition or "national front" governments which tend to blur programmatic and policy differences. If partyless government then comes to India it may

be within the framework of the consensus of party of which Shri Kashyap speaks. One immediately then asks whether this is in fact only a variant of the multi-party (weak type) model of western Europe. Under such circumstance the era of partyless democracy would refer to "partyless" in the programmatic sense rather than the constitutional.

Shri Kashyap has by his presentation opened the door to many possibilities for research and analysis. In providing us with the chronology of events in seven critical areas he has performed a useful and needed service. He has also thoughtfully included an Appendix which includes texts of the important governmental proclamations and orders dealing with the crises studied. These texts are of great value to the student of Indian politics who would otherwise have difficulty of access to them.—BENJAMIN N. SCHOENFELD, *Temple University*.

The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study. By JOSEPH M. LANDAU. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 300. \$9.95.)

It is almost too much to hope that so slim a volume as Jacob Landau's new study, *The Arabs in Israel*, could deal effectively with a topic so broad and controversial. Yet, Professor Landau, who is a Jewish scholar at the Hebrew University, is an unusually well-informed and perceptive authority on the domestic minority problems of the Israeli State. This is the first fairly objective and somewhat detailed study of the internal developments of the Arab community living as a minority in Israel (in 1966, Arabs made up 12 percent of the total Israeli population). This study is a highly sophisticated presentation representing a successful blending of accurate historical description, political insight and contemporary survey techniques. Landau's book, which includes an evenly balanced mixture of Hebrew, Arab and Western sources, should be a welcome addition to the bibliography of students in Middle Eastern Affairs. Although Professor Landau seeks with great determination to write objectively, fairly, and in an impeccably scholarly fashion about issues which all too often become shrouded in emotionalism, Arab writers and Pro-Arab scholars will find Landau's judgment on the assimilation policies of Israel controversial and somewhat sterile. The obvious divergence of interpretation of Arab conditions in Israel is singularly outlined in Landau's discussion on education. Arab writers have tended to chastise Israeli policy-makers for deliberately blocking attempts to increase the quality and quantity of education. Professor Landau argues that the State of Israel has "invested considerable effort in broadening and improving Arab education" and Israel, like the British before, have found this a formidable task. Recognizing the

problems of increasing educational opportunities, whether because of Israeli dereliction or Arab indolence, it must be admitted that Israel has little to gain from encouraging an educational experience which tends to broaden young minds to the world of conflicting nationalisms and competing ideologies.

One regrettable aspect of Professor Landau's book is his complete willingness to delineate the Arab grievances without fully probing the ramifications of these issues. Thus such problems as the military administration, discrimination, freedom of expression, expropriation of land, Arab education, and superior attitudes of some Jews are all properly listed, yet the analysis of these issues is, generally, limited to a paragraph or two.

While one may quarrel with the salient optimism of this study, and the tendency to white wash significant issues, few will fail to recognize that the number of questions raised, the complexity of the factors analyzed, the wealth of evidence adduced, and the astuteness of the hypotheses advanced are remarkable for a work of this size. In a study so rich and variegated, readers will probably differ as to what aspects are the most significant. Since the major emphasis of the book is on the political behavior of the Israeli Arabs, Professor Landau, in a series of chapters that cover two-thirds of the book, does seek to focus on: (1) the Arab minority's relations with Israeli parties and other political groups and organizations, (2) Arab participation in local, trade union and national Parliamentary election, and (3) The trends and pressures that presently influence Arab leadership patterns.

Several factors graphically analyzed by Professor Landau explain the present lot of the Israeli Arab minority. In 1948 the vast majority of those Arabs (some 160,000) who had not left Palestine (now Israel) were simple village peasants since most of the Arab leaders and intellectuals had departed prior to the 1947 Arab-Israeli War. Professor Landau carefully analyses the attempts by all Israeli political parties to control and monopolize this amorphous Arab vote. In a country where coalition government is the norm, extraneous minority groups can play a key role and all major parties have presented Arab lists which hopefully would attract Arab voters. In evaluating the dominant position of the Mapai Party (this major party in Israel has consistently obtained over fifty percent of the Arab voters), Professor Landau defines their strength among the Arab voters as largely a function of "opportunistic Arab notables" who, as their predecessors, have always cooperated with the occupying military forces, i.e., Ottoman, British and now Israeli. Far more significant as a harbinger of future political trends is the consistent ability of the Maqi (communist)

party to attract over 20 percent (except in 1959) of the Arab vote. The Israeli Communist Party has the obvious advantage of being the only Israeli party willing to repudiate Zionist aspirations. More recently the Communist Party has sought to identify with the more radical forms of Arab nationalism now supported by the Soviet Union. Supporting and encouraging every sign of dissatisfaction among the Arab youth, the Communist Party through a continuous barrage of propaganda, has presented itself as the natural ally of the young Israeli Arab who now seeks to break the influence of the traditional family (hamula) leaders.

While admitting that Landau's study does not include the dramatic shifts in Arab opinion since the June War, one has the feeling that Landau, in his desire to present a somewhat optimistic view of Arab-Israeli relations has actually failed to capture the egregious theme of the Zionist-Arab nationalist confrontation. One recurring *leitmotiv* acknowledged, but seldom pursued to its logical conclusion, is the inevitable and explosive conflict of Zionism and Arab nationalism which has produced not only violent outbreaks between Israel and the surrounding Arab states, but has also made smooth relations between Jews and Arabs inside Israel extremely volatile. It is this reviewer's guarded opinion that this endemic and infectious pattern of violent nationalism so prevalent among the young Arab intellectuals in Israel will recalcitrate against any majority-imposed form of "cooperation" and will, (unless present trends are reversed), eventually denote the total "bankruptcy" of the Israeli Arab-Zionist relations. —JAMES B. MAYFIELD, *The University of Utah*.

Chiefs, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia. By J. F. HOLLEMAN. (Assen, the Netherlands: Published on behalf of the Afrika-Studiecentrum by Royal VanGorcum Ltd., 1969. Pp. 391. Hfl. 29.)

Social anthropologist and urban administrative officer in Rhodesia (1945-1957), frequent visitor since then, and present Director of the Netherlands Universities' Afrika-Studiecentrum in Leiden, Professor Holleman has made a most valuable contribution to the understanding of the "Rhodesian situation" in its widest sense of black majority-white minority confrontation.

Core of the three-part work is the some 170-page case study of a chieftainship and its local Council based on the Report of the Mangwende Reserve Commission of Inquiry of 1961 of which the author was a member, preceded by a short account of the late nineteenth century British colonization of Rhodesia, and followed by an analysis of administrative and government policies leading up to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of In-

dependence in November 1965. Thematically, the study is concerned with the confrontation between the "theoretically superior external control" (the Rhodesian white administration) and the "limited local autonomy" (the African chieftainships) in the midst of which stands the traditional chief with his conflicting loyalties to both.

The study sheds light on the role of the chief in the expansion of white domination from the initial so-called "Treaty of Friendship" of 1888 with the Matabela King Lobengula through the "unanimous support" from the tribal authorities for the government's efforts to achieve independence on the basis of the Constitution of 1961, that is, under a white government," some seventy-five years later. (p. 348) The analysis focuses on the interaction between opposing group interests and on the conflict of value systems which, though derived from different cultures (African and European), were forced together into a single socio-political context on the local level: the council. There the traditional African chief—supposed to be both tribal representative and administrative spokesman—finds that if he tries to initiate programs or reforms, new schools for example, he changes from the white commissioner's subordinate to a threat to the system. "Tragic" conflict replaces communication and cooperation between the two individuals.

This conflict on the local level is the reflection of the cleavage on the national level; the source of both is misunderstanding. "For a quarter century and more, the indigenous population had been subjected in progressive degrees to measures based upon the premises that a sound economic basis was essential for a stable society;" the white administration did not realize that "equal weight should be given to the premises that no sound economy could possibly exist on an unstable social foundation." (p. 212) For example, legislation involving sweeping changes in agriculture was promulgated and implemented on the basis of modern agronomical principles with little or no knowledge of or regard for customary land usage.

During the sixties administrative policies changed: Aimed at stimulating responsible African local self-government, the "new nonauthoritarian and non-paternalistic philosophy of 'community development' was being advanced as the unitary purpose to which all service departments should as far as possible direct their efforts." (p. 258) This meant changing fundamental attitudes, both of the civil servants and of the great majority of Africans who had "through force of historical circumstances and the lifelong habit of submitting to the superior power of white government, accepted white authoritarianism and paternalistic initiative as part of the established order of their existence." (p. 269) But political circum-

stances discouraged the working relationship between officialdom and the African public needed to adjust attitudes.

Professor Holleman points out that the new policy of community development was "the product of the *administrative* mind, conceived to be carried out as a measure of administrative practice not to be associated with the diverse currents of party-politics in the country." (p. 274) But it *did* become a political issue and was "naturally but unjustly . . . interpreted by white liberals and African nationalists as an insincere and poorly disguised plan to arrest further racial integration and to reinforce the existing segregation . . . by stimulating a process of *separate* development." (p. 276)

The same political pressure led the white government to "rediscover" the chiefs and by recasting them from a subordinate position in the administrative hierarchy into a nationally organized political force to enlist their aid against the common enemy, the African nationalist. Evidence of the cooperation were a conference of some 500 chiefs with government representatives in 1961 and another of some 600 tribal chiefs and headmen in 1964. From the latter emerged their unanimous support (Holleman's explanation of the meaning of traditional unanimity (p. 349) sheds an interesting light on Africa's one-party states.) of the government's proposals; this decision of the chiefs, claims Holleman, "was a major factor which contributed to the government's decision, a year later, to drive the principal issue between London and Salisbury beyond the point of no return with its unilateral declaration of Rhodesia's independence." (p. 356) After U.D.I and by mid-1968 it seemed that "Government's policy would be to increase the power of the tribal authorities sufficiently to strengthen its own powers of control over the majority of black citizens" (p. 362)

The author has "deliberately tried to avoid passing judgement or expressing outright condemnation" of conflicting views about present-day Rhodesia. (p. xvi) The book is not and most explicitly is not intended to be an analysis of the problem of the Rhodesian declaration of independence, nor of the black-white confrontation in its entirety. These topics are touched upon to the extent that they are relevant to the central theme of the book: the changing and conflicting roles of the traditional chiefs.

As a sociologist and a scientist Holleman concentrates on the *sociological* reality of confrontation between two cultures (races), and in this capacity he foresees the possibilities of accommodation between the two. At fault has been insufficient understanding between blacks and whites due in part to an administration that just "disseminated instructions" instead of communicating. As a study of conflict between two cultures

the book's relevance is wider than the context in which the study was carried out. But, within the context of the Rhodesian situation—the *political* reality of minority rule which is unacceptable to the African nationalists—the work might be judged by them to be irrelevant.

This book is written by an involved and concerned individual, a fact which bears not so much on his objectivity, as he himself fears (p. xxi), as on his venturing into sidetracks which a personally detached reader (a political scientist interested in political development in general) may not find absolutely necessary. With this minor reservation, I highly recommend the book not only to specialists on Rhodesia but to social scientists studying community development and the intricacies of local government in developing countries.—DOV RONEN, *Purdue University*.

Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion. By AMOS PERLMUTTER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 161. \$6.50.)

The proliferation of military regimes in the Third World and growing concern regarding the strength and influence of military establishments elsewhere have spawned a significant increase in the number of studies of the role of the military in domestic politics. The socio-economic tensions and fissures that precipitate the demise of civilian authority, and the political context that propels military elites into the center of the political arena are endemic in many parts of the world. With the apparent trend toward greater politicization and political involvement on the part of military structures, it would be safe to assume that there will be increasing attention in the discipline to conditions favoring or inhibiting such developments. As comparative research accumulates (and it is a sad testimony to the state of this sub-field that most current studies are still single-country monographs or collections of essays), the nature of civil-military relations in Israel may well prove to be an effective control-case for the testing of the resulting hypotheses and models.

The Israeli Defence Forces (Zahal) have remained subordinate to civilian authority (though not without considerable say in defence and foreign policy) despite a variety of circumstances amenable to the ascendancy of military power and influence at the expense of civilian elites. Among these factors are: three highly successful campaigns that have enhanced the popularity and prestige of the military; the constant state of military vigil and preparedness so conducive to garrison-state mentality; huge military budgets and the development of a defence industry complex dominating sectors of the civilian economy; military administration into the sixties in minority areas har-

boring a possible fifth column; a fragmented multi-party system continuously engaged in political haggling; and strong personalities at the helm of the armed forces.

To what extent does Zahal play a role in the decision-making process in Israel and why have the above factors not brought about the ascendancy of the military? Noting some 300 interviews with Israeli officers and officials, and citing an impressive bibliography of English and Hebrew sources, Perlmutter sets out to trace civil-military relations in Israel and to challenge three general hypotheses advanced by Huntington, Andreski and Von der Goltz. Unfortunately, due to the author's over-ambitiousness and the study's brevity (135 pages of text, one third of which is devoted to the pre-1948 era) the result is interesting but very spotty coverage of the topic.

Perlmutter traces the stability of civil-military relations in Israel to several factors, two of which are the absence of a social gap between the military and the rest of society, and the close co-ordination at the highest level of civil and military elites. Zahal is very much a cross-section of Israeli society by virtue of universal conscription, the small size of the permanent force and the periodic promotion, rotation and retirement of its top officers. Retired officers are snapped up by private and public corporations or are integrated in the bureaucracy, all of which provide alternate channels for personal advancement. Moreover, being deeply involved in the nation-building process, there is relative harmony between the values and ideals of military and civilian elites in Israel.

While the absence of a civil-military social gap tends to inhibit the growth of a case mentality or militarism (though Perlmutter presents no hard data on the latter), the character of the civilian Defence Minister and his administrative concepts and skills determine the degree of cooperation or tension that will exist at the authority apex.

One of the first tasks of the nascent state in 1948 was the unification, depoliticization and nationalization of the existing semi-autonomous military formations. With Ben Gurion as Minister of Defence as well as Premier, general spheres of responsibility were drawn between the Ministry and the military itself, though there was no attempt at a strict separation of the civil and military functions as is more common abroad. Entrenched by the passage of time and by Ben Gurion's charismatic and personalist style, these lines of demarcation persisted during Ben Gurion's absences from power to plague reform-minded Ministers. And Ben Gurion's practice of favoring the High Command, "his boys," over the Ministry, also opened the door to possible Ministry-Command tensions.

Perlmutter chooses not to deal in any detail

with either the structural or dynamic features of the civil-military interplay of influence, or the precise manner in which Zahal participates in decision-making relating to defence or foreign policy—curious omissions insofar as these would be central to his inquiry. Instead, in his chronological narrative on civil-military relations he stresses the Lavon Affair as evidence that even in times of intense interelite strain and tension, civilian conflict-resolution mechanisms (in this case the dominant party, Mapai) are operative. Lavon's ambitiousness while Minister of Defence, and his desire to re-organize Ministry-High Command spheres of competence and coordination, isolated him from his source of power, drove a wedge between the Ministry and Zahal and resulted in his downfall. Elements in the military combined with Lavon's own subordinates to topple him. Forgery and perjury was involved. And though the military did eventually purge itself of these elements, the outcome of the Affair was indicative of the lengths to which the government would go to shield Zahal from possible tarnishing circumstances. As Perlmutter summarizes it (p. 134), "in periods when the military and political elites were separate and diffuse, either due to the personalist ambitions of the defence minister (Lavon) or his non-expertise (Eshkol), the Army's effectiveness as a political pressure group was enhanced." Ideal civil-military relations in Israel are achieved under a strong Defence Minister, respected by the High Command and fully backed by his colleagues in the Cabinet.

Perlmutter's study has a number of shortcomings arising mostly out of its brevity. Miniscule chapters result in somewhat superficial treatment of important topics ("Zahal's Role Expansion" covered in ten pages?) and complete neglect of others. The essentially historical narrative approach leaves too many questions unanswered. Is there total unanimity within the Army regarding the ministry-military division of labor? What evidence is there of the cohesion of the military that the author asserts: are there no "hawks," "doves" or empire-builders? To what extent, if any, is militarism gaining ground in Israel? Moreover, despite the excellent analysis of the Lavon Affair as a case study or civil-military tensions, one is still left with only a hazy notion of the precise role of the military in policy-making.

Though some significant tables are presented throughout the book, the study does not utilize much hard data to support various of the author's contentions. The defence budget figures themselves are at total variance with another set provided by the author in his recent article in *World Politics* (XX:4:1968, p. 642)—significant portions of which are incorporated verbatim without appropriate acknowledgment. The original three hypotheses challenged are not dealt with; indeed, the

challenge was quite unnecessary as Israel does not satisfy their stipulated conditions. Finally, inadequate proofreading has resulted in a significant number of printing errors.

In sum, the work promises us much, delivers considerably less and has certain shortcomings. Still, little research has been done in English on this difficult topic and there are significant security restrictions and obstacles to such endeavors. The book can be of use to the reader who will be content with a very general descriptive background picture of civil-military relations in Israel, rather than a detailed analysis. The latter kind is still forthcoming.—SAMUEL DECALO, *University of Rhode Island*.

Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru. By EDWARD DEW. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1969. Pp. 216. \$6.00.)

Social scientists are aware of the problems of gathering reliable data on the developing nations. In addition, there is increased concern for the style of analysis; that is, whether the methodology focuses on issues relevant to comprehending political phenomena in an area rather than agreeing with what is fashionable within a particular discipline. Political scientists interested in Latin American politics should consider the contribution of historian Edward Dew's *Politics in the Altiplano* which represents a prudent and effective use of data and a useful theoretical framework for interpretation.

Dew's micro-study of the politics of the Department of Puno in the Southern Peruvian Andes utilizes a group model of political activity. "Politics in any social system," he says, "involves the moderated conflict of system members over different resources in which they have an interest." Any change in the "relative allocation of resources among members of the social system" achieved through conflict constitutes political change. With this definition of politics and political change, Dew examines the "equilibrium" and "conflict" models of political change in culturally plural societies. The former conceives of the social system as composed of different geographic, social, ethnic and occupational groupings with overlapping memberships and loyalties contending for political power. Political brokers serve as moderators and generally succeed in achieving objectives through negotiation procedures rather than violence. The conflict model also conceives of a plural social system, but one in which overlapping membership in group activity is limited or virtually non-existent. If and when the moderation of conflict occurs among contending groups, it is achieved by leaders in a dominant cultural minority. Aware of the contributions and limitations of each model in the

analysis of social systems, Dew examines the politics of Peru's Andean region by using the conflict model and by paying particular attention to the emergence and decline of political brokers within the culturally dominant group and within those subordinate groups which challenge the existing system of resource allocation.

From a variety of primary and secondary sources, statistical studies, newspaper accounts and interviews, Dew marshals supportive evidence for his contention that the politics of the *altiplano* closely resembles the conflict model. Stagnant pluralism has been induced by the existence of extremes in land tenure and the use of land among large and small proprietors, resulting in the polarization of economic positions. When these conditions are combined with geographic isolation, climatic catastrophes and dense population, the resulting society produces a local political system where scarce resource allocation is controlled by a dominant minority within or outside the region.

The *altiplano* political system is further intensified by cleavages resulting from the interaction among racial and functional groups. A *mestizo* elite dominates and exploits different Indian groups but is challenged for control of the political system by newly emergent groups. Commercially orientated *cholos* (Westernized Indians) and *forasteros* (outsiders), unable to enjoy social and political assimilation commensurate with their newly acquired wealth and economic mobility, seek the prestige and power of public office by creating competing organizational structures, such as peasant syndicates and personalistic political parties. Political competition between two urban centers, Puno and Juliaca, reinforces conflict between *mestizos* and *cholo-forasteros*, as they compete to control the allocation of public works, an airport, roads, welfare funds, industrial projects and public offices. The lessening of polarized conflict within the region occurs when the *altiplano* brokers, principally congressmen, for reason of a natural disaster (drought, flood), achieve a united front to demand greater resources from the national government. Moderated conflict may occur under such circumstances, but the *altiplano* leaders themselves must contend with national political parties seeking power in the region. Dew asserts that common interests, which had served to unify regional leadership during emergencies, no longer provide a method of conflict moderation because the creation of a regional development agency (*Corpuno*) has increased the conflict over *who* will generate resource allocation. Further divisiveness is created when *cholo* political leaders build syndicates as means to mobilize political support and thus increase expectations among peasant farmers. Local political brokers often find themselves in precarious positions and, forced to take sides in a

conflict, are unable to maintain themselves in positions of influence for any great length of time.

As Dew points out, this study should not be regarded as a definitive statement on conflict and cleavage in the *altiplano*. However, the conflict model as used here has some validity. It sheds considerable light on the *altiplano's* tentative political system where economic and social conditions often polarize contending groups and induces aspiring politicians to use a variety of means—some violent, others non-violent—to mobilize political power and to control resource allocation.

Some political scientists will find weaknesses in Dew's treatment of political attitudes and elections. Evidently, he relied on unsystematic personal interviews with political activists, informants and American research personnel as well as secondary works to draw some inferences on Indian and *Mestizo* attitudes. Dew details the power struggle among local politicians during the congressional elections of 1962 and 1963, but the results of the elections could have been made more meaningful if he had considered the intricacies of proportional representation and apportionment on the outcome of the two elections.

Aside from these minor criticisms, Professor Dew has provided students of Latin American politics with an effectively researched and theoretically significant case study of the politics of one of the more remote regions of Latin America. A bibliography and an excellent index are included in this volume.—ORVILLE G. COPE, *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee*.

Institutionalizing the Grass Roots in Brazil: A Study in Comparative Local Government. BY FRANK P. SHERWOOD. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 173. \$2.95.)

This compact little volume underscores the paucity of analytical studies on the Brazilian political system. Taken as a relatively modest effort to discuss basic features of local government in Brazil, it could be welcomed as a useful, albeit rather limited contribution to the growing comparative literature in this field. Yet the absence of any full-scale analysis of the Brazilian political-governmental system since Karl Lowenstein's *Brazil Under Vargas* appeared more than a quarter century ago places a burden upon authors of this type of monograph, since only in the rarest cases will readers be familiar with even the basic features of the polity involved. Some such as Richard Graham in his recent *Civil Service Reform in Brazil* (University of Texas Press, 1968), are relatively successful in dealing with this problem by sketching a meaningful if very basic model of the national political system. Unfortunately Professor Sherwood has failed to respond to this challenge. The scant two pages devoted to "Brazil Sociopol-

itical Development" are not only too grossly oversimplified to effectively distinguish it in very fundamental terms from other countries, but make no effort to alert the reader to the existence of relatively adequate English language sources covering the crucial factors of environment, history and political culture the author caricatures more than characterizes. In other respects as well Professor Sherwood promises the serious student of politics a good deal more than he delivers.

Dr. Sherwood's book, in spite of efforts to mask the fact by using fashionable disciplinary terms for often commonplace observations, reflects a carryover of the once prevalent distinction between politics and administration. For when we move from his language to the level of his ability to handle the subject matter, the author does precious little with the substance of political life. Although an effort to deal with politics in a modern manner is clearly present, complete with a rather mechanical adaptation of the system-functional approach, the analysis is disjointed and rarely escapes superficiality. Description of selected institutional arrangements is often quite good, but the real nature of the Brazilian political system remains hidden from the reader.

It is where his strengths as a specialist in municipal administration bear most closely on the subject under discussion that Professor Sherwood is most adequate. Thus he demonstrates considerable facility in dealing with the legal, structural, and service aspects of local government and enjoys some success in applying Selznick's concept of institutionalization to the Brazilian *município*. Greater difficulty is encountered in utilizing a systems approach to explain the limited role and effectiveness of the "community municipal system" and its national aggregate in Brazil. Here part of the trouble comes from Sherwood's failure to consult the most relevant of Almond's works available at the time he was writing (*Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach*). Emphasis upon capabilities analysis as introduced by Almond into his scheme in this 1966 work, might well have served Sherwood better than his partial application of conversion functions. As it is, he has grasped more of the terminology than the substance of this influential approach.

Where Sherwood does treat of politics rather than government, chiefly at the formal level of elections, he is prone to significant factual errors as well as superficial interpretations based upon a very limited familiarity with appropriate sources. Thus he states on page 15 that in the 1962 São Paulo governorship race the winner received 37.8 percent of the vote to the runner-up's 24.1 percent. Since the margin was roughly 125,000 votes in a turnout of better than 3.3 million, his figures—for which he cites no source—were very far off

the mark indeed and obscure the important point that Adhemar de Barros won as the result of a last moment stop-Quadros movement which saw ex-President Kubitschek almost on the eve of the balloting divert the support of his party from the third candidate to de Barros as a less dangerous potential rival in the 1965 presidential campaign than a rehabilitated Quadros would be. Instead of tapping the relatively rich body of community power studies, Sherwood offers a largely pointless reportage on a single municipal council meeting in a provincial town, admitting at the same time that he could not follow what was going on and did not bother to stay around for more than the first hour. (pp. 107-112)

The book's weakness in the field of systematic political analysis is accentuated by the absence of any awareness of the relevant work by Brazilian political scientists. While drawing heavily rather than widely upon the appropriate Brazilian public administration studies, Sherwood has apparently neglected to consult political science literature which treats many of the problems he skirts more than he faces. Thus, for example, the only use the author makes of the work of such a prolific and internationally known Brazilian scholar as Hélio Jaguaribe is to overuse an analytical tidbit discovered second-hand in an article by an economic historian on Pernambuco elections. (Indeed, he passes up far more rigorous work on electoral politics in favor of over reliance upon this volume of very uneven quality and doubtful analytical value.) To add injury to the insult of ignoring Jaguaribe's really relevant work, particularly the fecund concepts of the clientelistic system and "cartorial" state, Sherwood badly mangles his citation (putting the name of the journal as the title of the article and stating that the publisher is unknown.). Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how the author could use very inadequate sources for his section on "The Political Consequences of Industrialization and Urbanization" while ignoring the work of Glaucio Dillon Soares who, although a Brazilian, has long been associated with such U.S. institutions as Washington University (St. Louis) and the University of California (Berkeley). First available in English as far back as 1964, Soares' revised paper on "The Politics of Uneven Development: The Case of Brazil" appeared in 1967 in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan's well-known volume on *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. Similarly, Sherwood's complete neglect of populism as the most important single concept in the complex politics of the great metropolitan center of São Paulo combined with over-reliance upon the misleading label of conservative for Adhemar de Barros tends to obscure the really interesting and significant aspects of the one area he selects to focus upon most closely. Whatever benefit of a

doubt might be extended to Dr. Sherwood regarding neglect of Brazilian scholarship, even that available in English, the same charity is strained by his failure even to mention the solid study of Brazilian local government by Dr. Carr L. Donald (a 1959 University of Texas doctoral dissertation from which two articles were subsequently published in such widely available journals as the *Western Political Quarterly* and *Inter-American Economic Affairs*).

In sum, Sherwood's study clearly adds to what is available in English on the narrow topic of Brazilian local government in a manner particularly meaningful to students of municipal administration in this country. It is equally apparent that this book does not contribute more than marginally to a deepened understanding of the political system of this discontinuously modernizing subcontinent which is on the verge of joining the exclusive club of countries with more than 100 million inhabitants. In this regard, the piece of the Elephant perceived by the author is not a vital part of the beast, while the developmentally critical aspects of political institutionalization do not include the narrow facet fastened upon in this work. Indeed, the very limited local authority described by Sherwood has been further restricted and eroded since the cut-off date of his book.—RONALD M. SCHNEIDER, *Queens College of the City University of New York*.

How The Conservatives Rule Japan. BY NATHANIEL B. THAYER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, Pp. 349. \$10.00).

Postwar Japan has been ruled continuously by the conservatives, except for a brief ten-month period in 1947-48. Yet few attempts have ever been made to study in depth the organizational and psychological determinants of their behavior. The book under review is the first major work focusing directly on the intricate mechanisms of conservative rule. As a pioneering work it admirably fulfills its mission. For the first time the organization and behavior of the Liberal Democratic party are subjected to a seasoned political scientist's systematic and critical observation and analysis.

Nathaniel Thayer starts the book with a detailed discussion of the dozen or so factions in the Liberal-Democratic party, which he regards as the focal points of Japanese political processes. "The Liberal Democratic party," he contends, "is an amalgam of personal power lodged in the factions and institutional power lodged in the party organs." (p. 14) In the eight substantive chapters which follow, the author proceeds to describe and explain in terms of this delicate balance between personality and institution the roles and influences of the business community and the official party organs, the logic and psychology of the electoral

politics, and the processes of intra-party personnel administration and policy making. His descriptions have a quality of extraordinary intimacy and drama, while his analysis is both disciplined and precise.

This of course does not mean however, that I agree with all of the author's observations, arguments and conclusions. On the contrary, I happen to disagree with his views in more than a few cases. In fact, I find some of his statements either outright erroneous or highly misleading, as when it is suggested that every standing and special committee of the Diet is chaired by a conservative, or that the Diet policy committee of the Liberal Democratic party consists of only about seven members. (p. 286) The fact is that the chairmanships of a few upper house standing committees and half or more of the special committees in both houses are customarily allotted to the opposition parties, while the party Diet policy committee regularly consists of over twenty-five members in addition to a chairman and several vice-chairmen. In an effort to prove the relatively high turnover rate of conservative members of the Diet, the author points to the high percentages of the quondam and new faces elected in each of the last four lower house elections. (p. 145) From this he concludes that the "new blood" thus imparted revitalizes the old organs. He should have noted, however, that more than half of these men were quondam, rather than new, faces and should more properly be regarded as part of the "old blood." In the discussion of the ratios of bills sponsored by individual members to those sponsored by cabinets the author also fails to mention that the bulk of the former category of bills are introduced by opposition members. As a result, the reader may be left with the wrong impression that individual members of the conservative party are responsible for the introduction of a substantial proportion of the bills.

In some cases I find Thayer's arguments ambiguous and confusing because he does not explicitly define the key terms and contexts. At one point he contends, for example, that "factions are built on the struggle for power and the seat of power is the lower house" (p. 49), and that "the factions didn't produce the leaders" but "the leaders produced the factions." (p. 56) The validity of these statements depends on what is meant by "power" and "leaders." Elsewhere he argues that the close association which the business community maintains with the politicians is not censured but rather approved by most *responsible* critics. (p. 75) Considering the criticisms against such association frequently voiced in the press by various critics, the reader would be interested to know which critics are the responsible ones and which are not and why. Likewise, the author blandly states that as a rule prime ministers, assisted by

the faction leaders, pick talented and capable men for cabinet posts and, as a result, "the Japanese people get as good a crop of ministers as they can expect." (p. 206) But by what standards are they deemed more or less talented or capable than others? There are also a few sweeping and unsubstantiated generalizations which may well cause some readers uneasiness. For example, the author simply declares that the Japanese have "always placed greater stress on personality in government than they have on institutions," (p. 4) or that the Japanese newspapers have consistently been "vicious in their attacks on the parties, particularly the conservative party." (p. 109) To me neither seems to be self-evident.

Much more serious from a methodological point of view, however, is the author's tendency to treat with almost unreserved confidence the opinions of his informants—many politicians and newspaper reporters and a few scholars. The extensive utilization of the information gathered by the author through conversations with these informants no doubt accounts for the extraordinarily vivid and absorbing narrative which distinguishes this book. On the other hand, his excessive and uncritical dependence on these sources seems to have seriously interfered with the author's own sound reasoning and judgment. For example, a conservative politician is quoted as saying, "In the old days, the young Dietmen used to spend all their time getting prepared for speeches in the Diet." (p. 40) Yet the author himself mentions elsewhere that many followers of the prewar factions, such as those led by Hatoyama Ichirō, used to meet regularly outside the Diet. (pp. 18-19) Another politician is quoted as saying, "Most councillors can anticipate . . . appointment to a cabinet post after their second election." (p. 52) The substance of this statement is patently wrong. A journalist's view quoted at some length to the effect that the leaders of the nation's business community have been unanimously urging the government to liberalize the flow of foreign capital into the country (p. 69) sounds only more incredible. Some of the uncritical quotations from written sources are no less damaging, as where Kōno Ichirō is quoted as stating that the powerful prewar Diet members "would not permit the existence of pressure groups" (p. 221), as if the *zaibatsu* had either been non-existent or completely devoid of political influence. I believe that such uncritical acceptance of the informants' judgments resulted in the one major flaw of this otherwise superbly written book.

These shortcomings are, however, far outweighed by the book's many obvious strengths. Most, if not all, of the broad generalizations put forward by the author are penetrating and incisive. For example, it is difficult to find fault with

his judgment that "the role of the Diet as a forum for making of policy is limited," that the policy affairs research council of the conservative party plays a role far more critical than has been credited to it. (p. 236), or that as an institution occupying "a central position in Japanese politics," the support organizations (*kōenkai*) of individual politicians deserve a much more serious attention than they have hitherto received. (p. 88) In connection with this latter point the author provides a most informative description of one specific example of a conservative politician's support organization. (pp. 89ff) I would hope that this will inspire others to look more closely and systematically into the anatomy of these evasive but critically important structures. The book will hopefully encourage interest also in areas of the conservatives' rule which Thayer has, for very good reasons, left virtually untouched. One such area is the relationships between the conservative politicians on one hand and, on the other, the opposition parties, and the national and local government bureaucracies.—HARUHIRO FUKUI, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

Haile-Selassie's Government. By CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, Pp. 218. \$7.50.)

The government of Ethiopia is Haile-Selassie's government. Its major personnel, with certain qualifications, have been chosen by him, promoted, demoted and transferred by him. "Their" decisions, until recently, were made by him. This view of the government has been traditionally held by students of Ethiopia's politics, and it is sustained in Clapham's new book. It is the strength of this work, however, that it attempts both to document and to qualify these assumptions.

In a culture notorious for secretiveness and hostility towards foreigners, Clapham, an Englishman, was able to acquire a great deal of rather candid information from "innumerable conversations with Ethiopians in the government." From these conversations, he has put together a far more complex picture than we have previously had of the highest ranking personnel of the government, their relationships with each other, and to the Emperor, and the ways in which they have shaped, and been shaped by their institutional positions.

Clapham analyses not only individual careers and clique behavior but differences among individuals of different traditional status (noble and non-noble) and of different educational generations (no education, pre-war or post-war education). Central to this analysis of the relationships between the Emperor and those around him is its developmental emphasis. Immediately after liber-

ation from the Italians, the government consisted almost exclusively of the non-educated, largely noble but with some infusion of those whose only claim to office was the Emperor's favor. Conflict and co-operation among these men was designed to win the Emperor's favor and the rewards of that favor: positions, wealth, and "power." Since this government had little impact on life in Ethiopia, the power to be attained was relatively slight.

Since that time the non-educated have been replaced by the educated, with those educated prior to and immediately after the war now holding the highest positions, and subsequent students manning their bureaucracies. Government activity and personnel have enormously expanded, reducing the ability of any individual to know of, or to control its activities. One consequence has been a limited decentralization of power from the Emperor to Prime Minister, Council of Ministers, the various ministries, and Parliament.

These changes are described in some detail, with occasional illustrative case studies. While such description adds much to our understanding of Ethiopian politics, and is extremely necessary, Clapham never transcends description. Thus, while he shows an obvious concern for questions of relative power, he does not attempt to spell out a concept of power. Nor does he explicitly assess or measure the distribution of power among the various participants, despite periodic references to the amount of power held by an individual or institution. "But in practice, these great powers (those of the Emperor) have constantly had to be made good by effective leadership, and enforced through military strength." "But the Emperor's effective powers have often been far less than his formal supremacy would lead one to suppose." "The strength of groups is reflected both in policies and appointments. As the nobility has declined in power, so has the number of noblemen in the government; and as the influence of modernising groups has increased, their numbers have been brought into the government, and some reforms have been granted in order to retain their support or acquiescence."

Another major weakness is the failure to assess adequately the relationship between Haile Selassie's government and the society it "rules." Clapham says, "... it is by no means obvious whether the undoubted changes since 1941 have gone to the foundations of the government, or whether they should be regarded, rather, as peripheral modifications, to a political system which remains basically unaltered." What he does not say, or ask, is to what extent changes in the society and economy (in particular the fairly rapid extension of elementary and secondary education) shape the answer to that question.

Finally, his methodology, "conversations with government officials," provides us with no inde-

pendent check on his findings. We don't know to whom he spoke, what he asked them, or how much agreement there was among his informants. My criticisms—the lack of conceptual clarity, the failure to treat seriously government-society relationships, and a journalistic methodology—reflect my disappointment that the first major work on Ethiopian politics in twenty years is as traditional as if it had been written twenty years ago. It shows no signs that Clapham is aware of or interested in the intellectual ferment characteristic of the study of comparative politics in general and the study of African politics in particular.—ROBERT D. GREY, *Grinnell College*.

Politics and Government in Turkey. By C. H. DODD. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1969. Pp. 320. \$7.95.)

Within the compass of a modestly sized book, the author succeeds in presenting a useful interpretation of Turkish politics, particularly since 1961. The book is concerned primarily with the analysis of governmental institutions and seeks to "lay emphasis on what actually happens, in and through the political and administrative institutions that seems significant for the making and agreeing of policy and for deciding who should exercise political power." (p. vii) In order to do this, the author provides an introductory section, which is, at best, an overview. His discussion of the Ottoman legacy offers nothing very original. However, the emphasis on Ottoman efforts at political reform serves as a backdrop to later developments which are examined in much greater detail.

Particularly thin is the coverage of the impact of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the efforts at modernization and westernization in the early years of the Republic after 1923. Additional detail in this area would have greatly benefited the ensuing study of the rise of the anti-Republican movement in the 1950's and 1960's.

The lengthy section on political organization offers a thoughtful and critical analysis of the structure and functioning of the Turkish political system with very useful sketches of the parties and their positions in the overall system. The same ability is displayed in providing an excellent, though brief, indication of the role of important pressure groups. Most useful, perhaps, is part IV entitled "Administration." A valuable examination of the Turkish Civil Service is presented on pp. 223-305. This is based in part on original survey research into the socio-economic, educational, and employment backgrounds of civil servants. The results of the rigorous field approach are clearly suitable for comparative analysis which attempts to measure and explain the behavior of civil servants in more than one country. The discussion of the administrative system is somewhat weakened

by the limited attention given village and rural administration in so far as these have to do with the total political scene in Turkey. Since villagers account for over 70 percent of the population and since there is currently great emphasis in Ankara's policies and plans on rural development (e.g. the Ministry of Village Affairs established in 1964), there would be a lot to gain from a more penetrating examination of the villagers as a political force and of the village as a unit of the political-administrative hierarchy. As it stands, the greater emphasis is clearly on the provincial administrative structures and their links with the central government.

Despite the wealth of information presented by the author, he does not seem to have had access to private and public documents other than those available to everyone. This could be explained by the political climate in Turkey which complicates research into political matters. Most of the documents referred to are Turkish language materials, mostly official and party publications. The author admits (p. vii) that he has relied heavily on materials available outside Turkey, mostly newspapers, though why this should have been so is not clear since he apparently spent some time in the country and, presumably, has a familiarity with the language.—ABBAS AMIRI, *Kent State University*.

Elements of Nordic Public Law. By Nils Herlitz. (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1969, Pp. 287. Sw. kr. 52.)

The first two volumes of Professor Herlitz' *Nordisk Offentlig Rätt* were noted in the March, 1959, issue of the *Review* (p. 242). They trace the history of public administration and explain the workings of the national legislatures in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The third volume of this series was described in the March, 1964, issue of the *Review* (pp. 157-158). It presents the constitutional law of the five countries. Both earlier reviews ended with the comment that "[m]uch more of Scandinavian letters and science should be made readily available to English speaking audiences, and not least Professor Herlitz' *Scandinavian Public Law*."

While there is no evidence that this plea was directly heeded, it is gratifying to see that Professor Herlitz has used the earlier volumes as the basis for the book presently under review, particularly for the chapters on constitutions, parliaments, governments, courts, and public administration. Some new materials are added on individual rights and on Nordic integration. Out of 54 works sponsored by the Institute for Legal Research, this is the second to be published in English.

Dr. Herlitz is Professor emeritus in the law faculty at the University of Stockholm. He writes

clearly, and is extremely well-grounded in his subject. His approach is historical and analytic, juxtaposing the salient political institutions of the four larger Nordic countries. *Elements of Nordic Public Law* provides a sound introduction to Scandinavian government. Its usefulness as a reference work is enhanced by the inclusion of a systematic survey of the literature, an index, and a glossary.

Scandinavian legal and political history is a

third current in the Western stream; it cannot be classified as common law or continental, although it shares much with each. Swedish constitutional law, in particular, has a strong indigenous quality. The unique institution of Ombudsman and the principle of public access to official documents illustrate this originality and indicate that there is much of value to be learned from the quiet northern corner of Europe.—STANLEY V. ANDERSON, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. EDITED BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 352. \$8.50.)

There is a widely admitted need to unite the conceptual frameworks of comparative and international politics. This collection of twelve papers attempts not to satisfy but to whet our appetites for such a union.

Rosenau's keynote essays correctly reprove the lack of communication between comparative and international studies. He underlines the importance of studying the impacts of external variables on internal politics, of internal variables on foreign policy. As a means to the amalgamation of the separated fields he then develops a major typology, his "linkage framework." The typology contains $9 \times 6 \times 24$ cells: it distinguishes nine types of linkage between six aspects of the international environment and twenty-four features of national politics. Four of the national-polity features were selected for examination in this volume, and the authors of the empirical studies were invited to fill $9 \times 6 \times 4$ cells with polity data. None of the cells could be filled with a simple quantitative coding of readily available data; all required a qualitative analysis, sometimes of not yet collected data.

To fill a three-dimensional block of 216 such cells on one case would have been something of an ordeal. With stoical courage, the authors agreed to attempt comparison as well: each would examine not one polity, but two, three, four, and entire region, or "underdeveloped nations" *en bloc*. These sets were selected for comparison because their members have one major resemblance, usually one extraneous to the linkage framework. Except where sets of polities belonged to one region, the authors were not usually specialist students of all their polities. These enterprising decisions multiplied at a stroke the number of data cells the authors were in principle doomed to fill. Under this burden not the authors but the cells collapsed. Instead of the nine linkages, authors took a few main ones; the six international environments

were sometimes reduced to one; the four polity features were often maintained, but sometimes replaced by others. Where the number of states for comparison was few, they were studied as faithfully as the data allowed; but "Latin America" and "the underdeveloped nations" could not be treated individually, and consequently were treated as wholes or as abstract prototypes. By these expedients the authors survived, but the unity of effort did not. The authors drew back from the full magnitude of their assigned task, not in disorder, but by different roads. The tactical retreat was clearly necessary, as Rosenau points out frankly in his introduction to the volume. But as a result, achievements, rather than intentions, must be reviewed here; and, according to the authors' expressed wishes, their efforts must be treated as preliminary.

One of the essays, by William G. Fleming, begins a quantitative scrutiny of Ghanaian and Ugandan elite attitudes and transactions with foreign states. Two more, one by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner on island nations, the other by Richard L. Merritt on states whose territories are divided (by water or by intervening states), attempt to reintroduce geographic factors into the generalizations of comparative politics: they present a number of hypotheses worthy of investigation; but their factors of "insularity" and "non-continuity" seems less salient, hence less in need of investigation, than mere location (i.e., proximity to superpowers, enemies, economically advanced or politically dynamic states, etc.).

Three more articles weigh external against internal impacts on foreign policy, and the other three examine external impacts on internal politics. Both attempts fulfil the main real aim of the editor, which is to persuade students of comparative politics to introduce "external" or "environmental" explanatory variables into their discussions of domestic politics, and students of foreign relations to accept "internal" variables as necessary instruments of their explanatory work.

Lloyd Jensen summarizes internal and external

impacts on the defense policies of the three great states defeated in World War II, and concludes modestly and sensibly that the external environment has been critical in influencing policy, with the internal "environment" of increasing importance over time except in periods of internal political instability. Michael O'Leary offers a commentary on Morton A. Kaplan's system theory, and tries to extend that theory by further differentiating types of state-actors. O'Leary hypothesizes that, while in an unintegrated system strong and stable states will find the lack of integration of the system useful to them and will hence act to preserve it, weak and unstable states will find their weakness intensified in an unintegrated system. The latter will consequently violate customary (and system-maintaining) norms, and seek to change the system. In breaking a limited amount of new theoretical ground, O'Leary also presents some unconventional insights into the foreign policies of contemporary "less developed" states.

Ole R. Holsti and John D. Sullivan compare quantitative data on the "positive" and "negative" externally-oriented behavior, physical and verbal, of two "nonconforming alliance members," France and China. They find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that nonconforming behavior in a monolithic bloc, if successful, tends more to spill over into many issue areas than similar behavior in a pluralistic bloc. The hypothesis needs to be examined in other cases: one thinks today of Rumania and Hungary, if not also Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, as limited non-conformists, and Cuba after 1959 as a thorough nonconformist in a pluralistic bloc.

In one of the studies of outside impacts on domestic politics, Bernard C. Cohen achieves a collection of brief and suggestive impressions of the particular impacts of the international environment on the origins, socialization, methods of struggling for power, and support groups of American politicians. In a second, R. V. Burks compares East European Communist states in 1952 and in 1968, with respect to Soviet influence in appointing leaders, making policies and setting ideologies. Since the conventional wisdom of East European specialists is here presented in more abstract terms, the essay is generally convincing; but it retains several conjectures palpably overthrown by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Finally, Douglas A. Chalmers presents a brief survey of widely admitted and long-standing external influences in Latin American society, political culture, political groups, political issues, and power structures. Chalmers experiments somewhat with his conceptual framework; his alternative typology will be more immediately helpful in persuading "traditionalist" students of comparative internal politics to give external impacts explicit attention in their

explanations than will the original linkage framework. Cohen's paper, although the least finished of the three, makes the boldest departure from conventional subject matter, since external impacts on East European and Latin American politics have been more widely noted than present-day external impacts on American domestic affairs.

All nine substantive essays are clearly unfinished, and are not otherwise advertised. Cohen's essay for its subject matter, Chalmers' for its conceptual scaffolding, and O'Leary's for its theoretical interest, definitely demand and deserve further research. All the rest could be carried to their conclusion with some profit; the likely novelty, relevance, salience, and rapidity of results seem much higher for some (especially Holsti and Sullivan) than for others.

As for the broader framework, it deserves to survive and to be used, and even, as a supplementary theoretical essay by J. David Singer suggests, to be enlarged. But practice should lead to amendment. Useful ideas are given distracting labels: "output" means stimulus and "input" means response; "direct" and "indirect" are substituted for "intentional" and "unintentional;" and "fused" means "reciprocal." This terminology should be overhauled. The linkage framework itself needs to be haggled over and revised in light of some of the difficulties expressed in this volume by the authors who employed it.

Collaborative work of this sort should and will increase in future, at least in international and comparative politics. But a warning whispers from the pages of this book: the architects of elaborate conceptual frameworks must give their "masons" manageable jobs. Had the substantive authors in this book been confined to one country apiece (and that one well-known to them), and had they been kept to the one-way impact of the external environment on one feature of (for instance) internal political leadership in that country, they would have had only 4×6 data cells each to fill. If the authors had then engaged, individually or jointly, to do explicit theoretical work (as Chalmers did) to cut down the cloth of the framework to fit the body of the case, this effort would have been less ambitious, but its results less preliminary.—DAVID WILKINSON, *University of California, Los Angeles*.

Vietnam: Issues and Alternatives. Edited by WALTER ISARD. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 213. \$5.95.)

Unquestionably, a collection of essays on Vietnam by social scientists is of timely interest and importance. And this volume has much to recommend it by way of suggesting original and potentially workable procedures for the resolution of the Vietnam War. However, adequate treatments

of certain outstanding issues inextricably associated with this conflict simply are not to be found in this volume, and this perhaps is its major failing.

This book is an edited volume of twelve papers delivered at the June 1968 Conference of the Peace Research Society (International). Essays in this volume range from studies of the South Vietnamese village to one involving conflict between the great powers. The book is enlivened at the outset by something of a debate on village authority structures in the form of two papers, one by Ithiel de Sola Pool, and the other by Samuel L. Popkin. Attitudes of the South Vietnamese are treated by Ralph K. White, and those of the American public are analyzed by John P. Robinson and Solomon G. Jacobson. A methodologically sophisticated analysis of the views of American social scientists on Vietnam is presented by Philip Brickman, Phillip Shaver, and Peter Archibald. The cold war is introduced in an essay by Robert Strausz-Hupé which suggests that a solution to Vietnam is dependent largely upon agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. A paper by David C. Schwartz takes Pool to task for not employing explanatory models of conflict behavior, now readily available to social scientists. More on this later.

The last section of the book on analytic models is by far the best. Nigel Howard applies his metagame theory in an analysis of the Vietnam War. Rather than using a classic game with its limitation of discrete moves in a single confrontation Howard develops a prisoner's dilemma metagame in which each protagonist is allowed to react to the other's choices. This approach has the virtue of allowing an overall analysis of policy interaction. However, as Thomas C. Schelling points out in his perceptive critique of Howard, the distinction between a game and metagame is of limited utility, for the game itself, if properly constructed, will include the policy options found in Howard's metagame. Further, Howard's analysis depends on the exclusion of certain alternatives at the outset which, according to Schelling, may constitute an oversimplification of the real-world situation. Despite these criticisms, and the additional lack of a strict isomorphism between Howard's treatment of Vietnam and his own theory, his analysis has a logical and intuitive appeal. By determining the sanctions and equilibrium conditions associated with various policy options, one may use the metagame to indicate the probable outcome of the conflict.

Walter Isard supplements the Howard approach by suggesting a step-wise disengagement of the contending forces, with each protagonist at each stage of the process having the power to veto a move to the next stage. Isard's procedure has the

advantage of specifying quantitatively (assuming appropriate units of analysis at the outset) the maximum amount of disengagement that can occur at each move. Allan E. Goodman's identification of three alternative diplomatic-strategic options for ending the war is a useful addition to the Howard-Isard analysis.

This section and the book close with a quantitative analysis of the Vietnam War by Jeffrey S. Milstein and William C. Mitchell. Using a variety of measures pertaining to the war, the authors calculate multiple regression equations and simulation models of the conflict. When the simulation are used to forecast aspects of the conflict for later periods from earlier data, approximately 50% of the variance is "explained," which is a notable achievement. And the finding of an increase in North Vietnamese infiltration when the U.S. bombings of the North were escalated, is a contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of the conflict.

The Milstein and Mitchell analysis demonstrates an impressive power of the social scientists to predict the future course of a conflict. Yet a thorough understanding of the dynamics of this conflict relies, at least in part, on those explanatory variables which pertain to the onset of the conflict. One can ask further whether prediction without causal forms of explanation maximizes the process of scientific discovery. Astronomers as early as Ptolemy were quite successful at predicting the motion of the planets, but it was not until the explanatory models of Copernicus and Galileo that astronomy could be said to have rapidly emerged into its scientific stage.

There are other questions which this book addresses only tangentially, or not at all. First, there is a lack of articulation of normative preferences in the form of ethical or political desiderata. The ethical problems associated with the American involvement in Vietnam are not dealt with sufficiently. Nor do we find an analysis of a justification for the American presence in Vietnam either from the perspectives of international law, a presumed domino effect, or the expectation of fighting a much larger and bloodier war in the future, if not for the American presence. Pool is somewhat exceptional in that he does indicate a preference for the present South Vietnamese government, the pacification of the countryside, and the viability of both. White deserves credit for attempting to handle the tacky problem of what constitutes aggression, and using survey evidence to suggest that the pro-Vietcong South Vietnamese outnumber those who oppose the Vietcong.

A final problem of omission concerns the absence of a treatment of a possible deterioration of the American power position as a result of Viet-

nam. At the risk of using the review as a vehicle for the presentation of one's own research, it must be noted that the general posture of the United States with its multifarious alliance commitments and Vietnam War involvement may constitute a net power loss to this country. The exercise of power can be defined as the process of reducing uncertainty. Yet the aggregation of a large number of alliance commitments by a major power to smaller ones may constitute an increase in uncertainty. Neither events within the smaller country nor many of its interactional interactions are subject to regulation by the major power. Certain of these events or interactions may involve the smaller country in war which then, via a formal or informal alliance obligation, may include the major power as well. One can also understand a power loss to the United States from the more traditional perspectives of a weakening of internal cohesion and a possible diminution in international prestige.

This book then, contains interesting and sophisticated methods of data analysis, and more important, certain innovative procedures for conflict resolution. A significant contribution to this volume is the excellent "Introduction and Overview" by Isard. But for treatments of critical issues such as explanatory models of the conflict, normative criteria for evaluation of the American presence in Vietnam, and the effect of the War on the United States both domestically and in international affairs, the reader will have to look elsewhere.—MANUS MIDLARSKY, *University of Colorado*.

Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's.

By LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD AND AMELIA C. LEISS. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. 421. \$8.95.)

Should the United States adopt a new strategy towards conflicts that do not involve direct confrontation between the superpowers? Yes, say the authors of this book and proceed to suggest, on the basis of their analysis of past conflicts, what such a strategy might look like. Briefly, the new strategy would replace military intervention with conflict control; the objective of repelling aggression at any cost should give way to "avoiding or minimizing violence" (p. xiii); and the means used to deal with conflict would be multilateral, long-range, political and economic, rather than unilateral, short-range, and predominantly military. In view of the less than complete success of U.S. policy toward local conflicts, it is hardly surprising that a new strategy is required and the one suggested by Bloomfield and Leiss echoes, in a systematic, comprehensive and well-articulated way, many of the suggestions made by scholars and policy makers in recent years.

However, if this book were no more than an exhortation to our national security establishment to expand its horizons, it would be relatively uninteresting to political scientists. What merits our attention is the authors' theoretically ambitious effort to understand all "small wars" and to develop specific measures to prevent, control, and terminate them.

They begin by defining "conflict" as that part of any "substantive dispute" which is "regarded in military terms by one or both parties" (p. 13). The dispute is then divided into a sequence of five phases: I. Non-military, II. Pre-hostilities, III. Hostilities, V. Post-hostilities; V. Non-military, plus a final stage, settlement of the dispute. The three middle phases constitute the conflict. In each phase, the authors claim, some identifiable factors work to push the dispute into the next phase and other factors tend to retard the transition. Consequently, they assert, conflicts can be mitigated by policy measures that counteract the first set of factors and reinforce the second.

The authors identified fifty four post-World War II conflicts in the developing world. Of those they selected fourteen for intensive study and, of these, five appear in the book: the Soviet-Iranian Conflict, 1941-1947; the Bay of Pigs, 1960-1961; the Greek Insurgency, 1944-1949; the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949; Conflict in the Middle East 1956-1967. Thus while some aggregate data are presented on all fourteen of the studied conflicts (chapter 3), the application and utility of the conflict model have to be judged on the basis of the five detailed case studies. Each case begins with a chronological narrative divided into the phases (and sub-phases) of the model. Next, the factors bearing on the transitions from phase to phase are listed and opposite them (literally) the possible control measures—at least one measure per factor. Then comes a section on the weapons available to each side; and finally, the control measures are summarized and those that were actually taken are indicated.

Clearly, if the book succeeds, it would contain not only an enormously useful technique for policy makers, but also a major contribution to the analysis and understanding of conflict. But how successful is the book in either of these capacities? Unfortunately, the success is at best highly speculative since the technique used seems to be based entirely on speculation.

Few will deny that one of the best ways to prepare for the future is to study the past—the only problem is how to do it. The authors call their approach "historic-analytic," but what they actually do is isolate certain historical events in time and space, impose a chronological structure on them, and then, by what can be called the "might-have-been" method, suggest measures that would

have changed the course of these specific events. Such measures, they hope, will serve to alter similar events in the future. This is, of course, a well-known historiographic approach, but to make it the basis for a broad-gauged strategic policy study raises many serious methodological and substantive problems, only some of which can be briefly stated here.

First, there is the matter of selecting the events to examine. In this project the following criteria were used: (1) local conflicts, (2) outside Europe (with one exception), (3) since World War II, (4) in which armed forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States were not *both* directly involved and (5) which involved a serious threat or violence or actual violence. (p. 44) The fifty-four conflicts that form this class are then further reduced to fourteen on the basis of such additional criteria as conventional and unconventional warfare; internal, interstate and colonial conflicts; superpower involvement; degree of controllability; and geographic distribution. It is not made clear what further criteria were used to select the five cases actually presented. The point is that once so many characteristics are introduced it becomes impossible to say what the cases in the book exemplify, and whether the analyses, findings and especially recommended control measures can be applied to any other conflict or set of conflicts.

Next, the process of isolating the conflicts in time, i.e., self-consciously choosing rather arbitrary beginning and end points, leads to several unfortunate consequences. The most important of these is the focusing of almost all the attention on the hostilities phase of the authors' model. Even the narratives of the events emphasize the military aspects of the conflicts, as does, of course, the section on weapons. There would perhaps be no harm in this if the authors' purpose were to offer a strategy for *winning* small wars, but their avowed goal is to suggest ways of preventing or controlling such conflicts. Consequently there exists a conceptual gap between the narrative and the list of relevant factors and control measures in each case, since the factors, and especially the measures, refer most often to non-military, long-range problems and solutions which could not possibly be handled within the time period of the conflict.

Perhaps the major methodological difficulty one has with this book, for it goes to the heart of the approach, concerns the definition and identification of "factors" and "measures." A factor is defined as a condition, perception or event that generates pressure either toward or away from violence. (p. 13) Control measures are actions that offset the first type of factor and reinforce the second (p. 30). With definitions as loose as these it becomes very hard to classify the factors or the measures and so, even though the authors have set

up some rudimentary categories of factors (e.g. degree of commitment, autonomy of action, internal cohesion, etc., pp. 25-28) and of measures (e.g. international organization, external-political, military and strategic, etc., p. 36), they do not make any serious attempt to apply these to the individual cases. The result is that factors vary so greatly and seem so arbitrarily classified that it is at times difficult to tell whether a particular factor tends to increase or decrease hostilities—the author's primary concern. When measures are then selected, their number "limited only by the imagination of the authors" (p. 30), to correspond to each factor, the confusion is simply compounded. Space will not permit an extensive sampling of specific factors and measures but the following might convey the kind of difficulties encountered:

Among the factors tending to promote the outbreak of hostilities in the Soviet-Iranian Conflict the authors list the tribal divisions in Iran, notably in the Soviet-occupied area. The relevant control measure suggested is strengthening Iran internally both politically and militarily. Another factor is the proximity and overwhelming power of the USSR vis-à-vis Iran. The relevant measure: renunciation of the concept of spheres of influence (pp. 76-79). In the case of the Greek Insurgency a hostilities promoting factor is the unchallenged control by ELAS (the insurgent army) of almost all of Greece after the German withdrawal. As appropriate control measure the authors suggest the immediate introduction of a massive counter-force of Greek government, friendly ally, or neutral troops (pp. 150-151). In the Indonesian War of Independence a factor is the hostility of Dutch internees and prisoners of war toward the Indonesian Republic, and the control measure is isolating them and denying them access to arms.

While an attempt is made to summarize and generalize the proposed control measures for each case, it remains evident that the variations in level of generality, the prevalence of contradictory and self-defeating measures, and the disconnected nature of the analysis make this a most problematic technique. No wonder then that according to the authors' calculations only 18% of the measures they propose were actually applied.

Finally it should be noted that the book is based on certain ideological assumptions that deserve to be examined. One is the notion that all conflicts in the non-European world involving violence, regardless of whether they are internal or interstate, are undesirable, and should be avoided or at least controlled and halted as soon as possible. Another is the idea that the superpowers, especially the United States, have a major role in this process. The first assumption is certainly not shared by important elements in the developing countries and the second is no longer universally

held, even in the American national security community. I therefore doubt very much that a successful strategy for the 1970's can be forged by following the recommendations of Bloomfield and Leiss. At best they might have served as useful tactics in the 1960's.—P. G. Bock, *City University of New York, Brooklyn College*.

The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose. By GABRIEL KOLKO. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. Pp. 166. \$5.95/\$1.95.)

With the publication of this concise volume and the more narrowly focused *Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1969), Professor Kolko joins David Horowitz, Harry Magdoff, J. P. Morray, Robert F. Smith and W. A. Williams as authors of first rate empirically-oriented radical scholarship on U.S. Foreign Policy.

In *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* Kolko evidences little concern for the pluralistic interaction which influences foreign policy decision-making. Thus, the author ignores conflicts over the efficacy or priority of alternative instrumentalities (e.g. allocating limited funds to either leader grants or MAP training). He is similarly disinterested in what I would term non-systemic goals such as whether we should lower tariffs on French automobiles in exchange for a reciprocal reduction for American computers. For political scientists who regard decisions on these or analogous issues to be the "important" ones, Kolko's work has little to contribute.

He is preoccupied with one assumed post-World War II foreign relations pattern: U.S. opposition to economic nationalism and socialism in the "Third World." Since his primary objective is a causal explanation of this pattern, it may be gratuitous to criticize him for failing to demonstrate that such a pattern of response exists. Impressionistically the reviewer believes that this can be done and has been in a limited way by David Horowitz in his *The Free World Colossus* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965). But there is no reference to this or similar works in the index or copious notes to each chapter. And the volume under review also lacks even a selected bibliography.

Kolko endeavors to explain America's counter-revolutionary imperative by elaborating upon an unoriginal Marxian thesis: that capitalists in this country desire investment opportunities in underdeveloped areas both for direct profits and in order to secure vital raw materials upon "reasonable" terms (i.e. at the lowest possible price). His exposition is extremely well written and appropriate statements by government and corporate officials are cited along with relevant statistical data. When considered in conjunction with the

systematic quantitative analysis by Harry Magdoff in his recent *Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), a fairly convincing case can be made for this view. Kolko may be faulted, however, for failing to adequately distinguish the forementioned investor goals from other economic objectives which would not necessitate counterrevolutionary intervention. Unlike Magdoff, he also fails to demonstrate the dependence of the American economic system upon the appropriation of surplus from underdeveloped areas.

How are these investment goals translated into an unquestioned policy consensus? Following the fashion of the past decade, the author assumes that because most policy initiatives have originated in the Executive that preponderant governmental power is also vested in that branch. He then infers a linkage between the career patterns of those who initiate policy and the foreign investment objectives which incur the hostility of nationalists and socialists in Vietnam and throughout the "Third World." After summarizing several studies indicating disproportionate upper class representation among high Executive policy makers, Kolko provides us with the results of his own research on top officials "in the State, Defense, or War, Treasury and Commerce Departments, plus certain relevant executive level agencies." Included were:

234 individuals with all their positions in government during 1944-60, comprising the lesser posts if an individual attained the highest executive level. As a total, these key leaders held 678 posts and nearly all of them were high level and policy-making.

In the aggregate, men who came from big business, investment, and law held 59.6 percent of the posts, with only forty-five of them filling 32.4 percent of all posts.

According to the author, this pattern of elite recruitment has remained stable since the New Deal era. As for officials from more humble origins, Kolko suggests that cooptation and exclusion operate to maintain consensus.

Should high status, rich men ever seek to make decisions dysfunctional to the more permanent interests of dominant power interests, even more powerful leaders would immediately purge them from decision-making roles. The point is that while such men are unlikely to make socially dysfunctional decisions so is anyone else who rises to the top of a structure with predetermined rules and functions.

Even if not initially connected with the corporate sector, career government officials relate in some tangible manner with the private worlds predominantly of big law, big finance, and big business.

In concentrating almost exclusively upon the Executive, the author ignores the veto power of Congress. His analysis would have been strengthened had he examined the dependency of many Congressmen upon the corporate-owning upper

class. And this would have reinforced his conclusion that there is no "military industrial complex." Criticizing C. Wright Mills' view that "the military" are a co-equal constituent of "the power elite," Professor Kolko convincingly documents the civilian origins of "our vital strategic assumptions."

For a variety of reasons including the almost universal dissemination of capitalist and anti-Communist values by the mass media and educational institutions, "public opinion" fails to exert any oppositional influence upon the implementation of major foreign policy imperatives. This consensus, in turn, is ultimately secured through "enforced conformity, as expressed often in this century in the . . . suppression of civil liberties."

The determined pursuit of these investment and expansionist economic goals and an uncritical acceptance of "the domino theory" are held to explain our commitment to stability and our inability to "lose face" in Vietnam for "(f)rom a purely economic viewpoint, the United States cannot maintain its existing vital dominating relationship to much of the Third World unless it can keep poor nations from moving too far toward the Left and the Cuban or Vietnamese path." Vietnam is primarily a "holding the line" buffer or protective zone.

Despite the shortcomings mentioned earlier, the book is well-written, relies upon official sources for much of its documentation, avoids redundancy and is marked by very few over-simplifications. A thought-provoking introductory work for students of American Foreign Policy that would make an excellent companion for such works as John Spanier's *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*.—MILES D. WOLPIN, *Marlboro College*.

Betrayal from Within: Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933-1940.
By JAMES BARROS. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. Pp. 285. \$10.00.)

In this volume written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, James Barros seeks to trace the political machinations of Joseph Avenol, second Secretary-General of the League of Nations. Seven chapters of detailed and copiously documented historical study are followed by a brief essay in which the author reflects upon the political role of the international secretariat.

Barros commences with a review of the subjective forces which carried Avenol to the office of Secretary-General despite the contrary counsel of his predecessor. The succession of Harold B. Butler to the directorship of the International Labor Organization upon the death of Albert Thomas required that a French national succeed Sir Eric Drummond as the League's Secretary-General.

Political accommodations among Britain, France, Germany and Italy resulted in the promotion of M. Avenol from the post of Deputy Secretary-General. But to his position Avenol brought a markedly conservative political orientation, intense anti-communism and a continental outlook, all of which prompted him increasingly to subserve the League to Italian and German policies, and to foresee a post-war Europe dominated by Germany. All of these impeded his capacity to serve the organization and its members objectively. In contrast, he used the power of his office to intrigue with the Italian Government, both directly and through Italian nationals within the Secretariat, on averting and/or reversing League action with respect to the Ethiopian conflict. On occasion he knowingly participated in Italian strategy-formulation, and exhausted procedural devices for reducing Haile Selassie's recourse to the League. He used his personal diplomacy to depoliticize the organization, and to turn its attention wholly to technical matters in order that the German Government might find it an acceptable agent of post-war European functionalism. He willingly acquiesced in the wish of the Vichy Government that he resign his post as a symbol of the diminished importance of the League in the policy of France's pro-fascist regime. He bowed to Japanese pressures to remove from China Dr. Ludwig Rajchman, Director of the Secretariat's Health Section, and generally displayed an anti-Chinese outlook. He attempted to thwart Spanish attempts to demonstrate through the League that Franco's forces were supported by Germany, Italy and Portugal.

Throughout this exposition Barros portrays Avenol as "something of a chameleon," as a man who "lacked political awareness," and who was capable of using his high office for purposes of "eroding the Ethiopian position" in order to serve the interests of Italy. Avenol is presented as a public servant whose personal theorizing and political learnings impelled him to deal in half-truths with vitally interested parties. Toward the end of his service he showed "neurasthenic" signs, frequently losing control of his emotions, fearing kidnapping, suffering episodes of ill temper, and concealing his intentions, even from those closest to him, for reason of distrust.

Professor Barros' book is of high, if somewhat inconsistent, quality. Its greatest strength appears to reside in the extensive use of archival sources which, in many instances, permit the author to substantiate his conclusions by multiple evidence. Yet some segments of his treatment stand out in terms of both clarity and depth. This is especially true of the author's examination of Avenol's handling of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, owing perhaps to his continuing interest in Mussolini's relations

with the League. (*The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations*, Princeton, 1965. Reviewed in this *Review*, vol. 60, pp. 455-456) The two chapters devoted to this issue, and the frequent reference to it elsewhere, are characterized by exhaustive research, meticulous documentation, and cautious wedding of conclusions to evidence. On no other issue is Avenol's chicanery portrayed so persuasively.

There appear, however, two major defects in the book. In the author's careful exposure of Avenol's ideological motives, other causal factors in his behavior are often insufficiently revealed. Barros notes, for example, that the Secretary-General's actions were occasionally contrived to prevent the alienation of the Axis powers from the League and, later to avoid eradicating the possibility of enticing those states to resume participation. So, too, does he note that Avenol's diplomacy with the Duce prior to 1939 was founded in part upon the hope of maintaining the Stresa front. Whatever may have been the role of these thoughts in Avenol's over-all behavior is not examined with the scholarly thoroughness given to the study of the Secretary-General's political dispositions. Thus the reader's hope is not entirely fulfilled that Barros might have separated popular perceptions of Avenol's behavior from historically demonstrable fact.

While the book offers no main conclusions, the author spends the final pages examining the "Implications for the Office of Secretary-General." His observations, while continuously relevant to an organizing world, and while realistic with respect to the political restraints upon the international secretariat, are neither profound nor original. It is the reviewer's assessment that this closing essay lends little service to a study which is distinguished in other aspects. It does not, however, diminish the considerable value of Professor Barros's book as historical evidence of the dangers implicit in the presumed political immunity of the international secretariat. Nor does it minimize the author's success in his declared intention of presenting a segmental biography of one of the most controversial actors of the interwar years.—WALTER S. JONES, JR., *Northeastern University*

Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. BY DEAN ACHESON. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969. Pp. 798. \$12.50.)

In a statesman's memoirs we look for new light on old subjects and new insights into the behavior of the man himself. In these regards former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's latest memoir, *Present at the Creation*, does not disappoint us.

It represents a meticulous reconstruction of the

forces which beat down upon the decision-makers as they sought to find solutions not only to the problems of American security but to the Chinese civil war, the Palestine question, Europe, the Cold War, the atomic bomb, Germany, and Asia. As such it constitutes the most powerful explanation of the "cold war" so far presented by one of those who had to wage it on the American side. It emphasizes the force of events and the limitations of choice dictating American strategy and diplomacy.

No review can do justice to the detail with which Acheson documents the motives of American foreign policy makers, but the thesis which emerges is straightforward and compelling. The world which America confronted at the war's end and for some time afterward was one of appalling dislocation and despair. Most of the assumptions upon which even the realists in the American government had based their thinking quickly proved illusory. Whether the United Nations and other elements of Rooseveltian diplomacy ever had any basis in reality, the inability of Russia and America to get along quickly dispelled any immediate hope in that direction. Under the circumstances the U.S. had to forge a new role in world affairs. Given the choice between doing nothing or risking bad relations with the Russians, Acheson much preferred the latter. Sooner or later it would come to that anyway under circumstances disadvantageous and potentially dangerous to the United States; common sense dictated that it come about under circumstances favorable to the West. In these situations there is no substitute for power; it has both a prophylactic and, in its economic form, a therapeutic value. The other side respects it too. From this premise flowed the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Point IV and the American response to the aggression in Korea.

Revisionists won't agree with Acheson's statement of the case but in order to demonstrate otherwise they will have to show more than economic causation; they will have to show that there were really other major alternatives than those which the statesmen adopted. In the end the worst was averted and despite the explosive potential of the Chinese civil war, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean aggression, war with Russia was carefully avoided leading on to a better day.

A great deal of the narrative is devoted to the details of persuasion and mediation to which anyone who sets out to rebuild a world must submit if the enterprise is to be successful. These details are important both to an understanding of the motives and modus operandi of Acheson's diplomacy as well as that of his opposite numbers. It does no good to criticize Acheson for over-militarizing NATO if we ignore the fact that our allies after the Korean invasion insisted upon an American military built-up in Europe.

In dealing with allies and other third powers the strength of Acheson's non-ideological and essentially strategic view of the world was a powerful asset enabling him to reassure and mobilize them in support of its objectives. The world wanted U.S. succor but it did not want war. Acheson's diplomacy of building "situations of strength" without waging an anti-Communist crusade was very appealing to Europeans who wanted to be defended not "liberated" again.

Only toward the end of the memoir where he describes his efforts to secure adoption of EDC and German rearmament do we sense that his emphasis upon military build-up is overstraining the political possibilities of the situation. It is also apparent that his preoccupation with the European situation may have led him into commitments to the French in Indochina for instance which he sensed were inherently unwise and unproductive.

Where Acheson was convinced that American power was likely to prove efficacious or where the use of military power per se was inappropriate he was perfectly prepared to cut America's losses.

America's retreat from China was the logical culmination of a half century of fumbling, uncertainty, and half-hearted efforts to make China a great power. It was never in the cards and Acheson had the strategic sense to recognize that the revolution sweeping Chiang away was to big to be contained by the U.S.

Much has been made of Acheson's failure to include South Korea within the so-called American defense perimeter in Asia. Whether that invited the attack or not it was clearly the other side that made the decision to aggress. Where the fatal decision is ours we too often pass it off as an unintended consequence. Acheson has the candor to admit that the advance to the Yalu was a misconceived policy and near fatal error of judgment on our part.

Acheson makes clear that having made one mistake he did not intend to compound it by letting MacArthur pull the Administration into a war with Red China. Such a war was neither strategically necessary nor wise politically, and it is to Acheson's credit that he never wavered in his wisdom that such a war would be an unnecessary piece of insanity. Temporizing with the Chinese undoubtedly cost the lives of young Americans, but America at least maintained its equilibrium and the support of its allies.

At home Acheson's strategic and diplomatic policies were the center of raging controversy. The controversy was fed by a two fold psychic crisis: that of the isolationists led by Robert Taft who profoundly and sincerely opposed the course of world-wide involvement on which Truman and Acheson were leading the country. The other center of psychic crisis, the American obsession with

anti-communism, was finally tapped in the spring of 1950 by Senator Joseph McCarthy.

They came together in a convulsive movement of national madness when "Taft, who had first regarded McCarthy as reckless, now decided to give him Republican backing." Acheson accepts the thesis advanced both by Earl Latham in "Communism in Washington" and William S. White, Taft's biographer, that Taft was prompted by the Republican defeat in 1948 to believe that anything "to defeat or discredit the Truman plans was acceptable" up to and including impeachment of the President.

Because of his own stoic acceptance of the vicissitudes of politics and of human nature, especially in its collective manifestations, Acheson does little more than record the more irrational forms which American behavior took during his tenure in office. But can we assume that such forces have *not* over time done more to pervert and misguide American foreign policy than Acheson lets on. International politics is not an inherently humanistic enterprise; therefore all the more reason to be sensitive to the potential for both good and evil of the American colossus. There is no guarantee that foreign policy will always be in the hands of a man as responsible as Dean Acheson.

What overall sense of American policy emerges from Acheson's voluminous and exciting narrative? The impression is that of American power, at first haltingly and then with considerable sweep and assurance, moving onto the world scene.

Under Acheson's stewardship it was less a matter of opposing the Communists, although that was an ingredient, than in giving an order to the non-Communist world shattered by two wars and the collapse of the great empires. It is the steady assertion of national power tempered by a sober awareness that a war that Russia would not do and that the U.S. must not let itself be bogged down in a hopeless war on the Asian mainland that distinguished Acheson's statecraft. Commitments were closely tailored to American economic interest and to a strategic rather than either an idealistic or an anti-Communist view of the world.—DAVID S. McLELLAN, *University of California, Riverside*.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council.

By WALTER R. SHARP. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 322. \$8.75.)

Peace and prosperity are the major purposes of the United Nations. Since the Charter entered into force, however, more than 100 conflicts have occurred with no end in sight. Perhaps this should not be too surprising. A reading of the recent record of the different organs of the U.N. shows a 1969 Assembly session not seized of such issues as

Vietnam, Nigeria and Czechoslovakia; a Security Council primarily concerned with the adoption of biased Middle Eastern resolutions and composed of members which includes those who sanction, if not encourage, aerial piracy; a Secretariat whose principal officer still maintains that his premature withdrawal of UNEF was the most correct decision he has ever made; and an International Court which delivers judgments and renders advisory opinions which are exercises in futility.

If the maintenance of peace had so far eluded the Organization has the promotion of the economic and social advancement of the peoples of the world fared differently? A fair response necessitates an analysis of the Economic and Social Council, one of the major bodies concerned with the latter objective, and this is the purpose of the study under review. To accomplish his goal, the author engaged in personal interviews and first-hand observations of two sessions of the Council spaced over a period of four years. The resulting ten chapters detail the past and include a number of controversial suggestions for the future.

Occasionally, the book makes tedious reading, due basically to the nature of the materials. Dr. Sharp nonetheless focuses on the issue with keen insight and, at the same time, relates a variety of revealing episodes. To be sure, the strong criticism which he directs at the members of the Council and in particular at their representatives is at first cautiously worded, but this modest approach is soon abandoned. The final chapter notes that ECOSOC is in need of "better men," a deficiency from which other U.N. organs suffer as well. The "so-called" general debate is regarded as a waste of time made worse by the fact that similar propaganda maneuvers occur in several committees, a comment then somewhat modified by describing the discussion as not without "any value"; it has a "certain educational utility"! Yet even on specifics, such as program priorities, no meaningful pattern exists and attempts at program coordination have at times resulted in such interagency rivalry that, as the Water Resources Development Center shows, they have had to be abandoned, although not all of these endeavors have met the same fate was witnessed by the Lower Mekong River Project.

Time and time again, however, Dr. Sharp returns to the thesis that the influx of Afro-Asian states in the early 60s placed the Council in the doldrums and that its enlargement in 1965 staffed it with unqualified and incompetent representatives. Not only are such organs as CPC and the Joint Inspection Unit regarded as inadequate for their tasks, but the most severe indictment is reserved for the decisions to establish UNCTAD, UNIDO and UNCDF which, together with the changing context of Assembly-Council relations,

seriously undermined and eroded the functions of the Council. And while Professor Sharp concludes that the developing countries now consider the Council, which they had previously viewed as an imperialist tool and which they sought to destroy, with more kindness and operational utility for their purposes, 1968 still found ECOSOC uncertain about its revitalization.

Therefore, several substantive and procedural suggestions are set forth, proposals which cannot fail but evoke considerable fruit for thought. Two basic functions are envisaged for the future: first, long range resource allocation and expansion; second, program appraisal and evaluation. These roles call for certain prerequisites which in light of past performances are not, if Dr. Sharp's own presentation is employed as a guide, readily, if indeed at all, attainable. Appointment of a Senior Under-Secretary-General or Deputy-Secretary-General for Development Affairs is the most important procedural change which is advocated. Named by the Secretary-General after consultation with other consultation with other members of ACC and subject to confirmation by ECOSOC, he would chair the Council, especially in terms of managing its procedures in a more expeditious manner, and serve as an overseer of U.S. development policy. Other plans favor a stream-lined agenda, reduction of the volumes of documents, modification of the committee structure of the Assembly and Council, shorter, and more frequent Council sessions, stronger staff support, and a more rational relationship between the Council and the Assembly, including removal from the Council of questions on Human Rights and the Status of Women. Here it might be added that for the last seven years the issue of human rights has formed a separate chapter in the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, but the suggestion overlooks instruments such as the proposed International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which assign specific functions to ECOSOC.

In sum, the book suffers from certain structural defects and several errors of commission and omission. Illustrative of these are the description of the 18th annual meeting as the voteless session of the Assembly, and failure to note that the General Assembly in 1963 approved a provisional measure to enable nine additional members to take part in the work of ECOSOC until the Charter amendment enlarging the Council had come into operation. Also, that the effective participation of the nine in the three sessional committees caused Ambassador Stevenson to testify favorably on the amendment before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even though the U.S. delegation had abstained on the Assembly resolution adopting the change. But these negative aspects are minor in

comparison to the book's value. Indeed, Professor Sharp deserves congratulations for presenting such a thorough study of a highly technical subject and for submitting a challenging course of action. Surely, this volume should be read by all interested in the field and should be placed in every course syllabus on international organization. This reviewer has already done so.—GUENTER WEISSBERG, *Colby College*.

Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union.
By DONALD C. HELLMANN. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 202. \$5.00.)

The author uses the two-year negotiations (1954–1956) for a peace agreement with the Soviet Union as a case study to illuminate the “crucial features of the new Japanese political system” as they operated in foreign policy decision-making. The approach is avowedly “simplified” and “interpretive,” based upon analysis of the role of public opinion, the political party system, and those formal governmental institutions responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. Hellmann recognizes that the Soviet negotiations were unique in some respects, but endeavors to show that fundamental features of the political process then emerging were products of “modernized-traditional” phenomena which have significant implications for Japanese and world politics.

The most important contribution of this brief study rests on its detailed analysis of the process of decision-making within the dominant Liberal-Democratic Party. Political maneuvering was characterized by the operation of four types of “modified traditional behavior,” as distinctive features of Japanese politics: personality-centered factions (*habatsu*); a “Confucian” sense of responsibility; consensual authority; and a new type of political leader—the “real power man” (*jitsuryokusha*): “comparatively young, having access to political funds, and openly maneuvering for positions of influence as a leader.”

The major component of this process was the *habatsu*, within which the issues of policy were considered primarily in terms of advancing the party position of the *habatsu* leaders rather than on their own substantive merits. The conclusion is made that this factional conflict is likely to remain as the important determinant in all major foreign policies as long as the LDP remains a strong majority.

Significantly, because of the “closed aspect” of policy-making, no meaningful foreign policy debate ensued between the government, the Diet

and the public. The formal institutions responsible for foreign affairs played only a subordinate role. The author makes a good case for his conclusion that the Japanese public was “poorly informed,” had a “very superficial understanding of the issues,” and consequently played a “rather peripheral role” in the policy-formulation process. Even more significant is his finding that the major business interests, despite their “special channels for access” and position as the “main supporting interest group,” failed to have any great influence on party decision-making. Because of the peculiar relationship existing between these interests and the LDP, it is estimated that business influence “is likely to continue to be limited” on “major Japanese foreign policy decisions.” The author views this closed aspect of decision-making, “largely limited to a party elite,” as a potential threat to the democratic process in Japanese politics:

Unless modification occurs through broadening the channels of communication and access, each major foreign policy decision will become a potential crisis in which not only policy but the viability of the system itself is called into question.

Those concerned with the forthcoming negotiations between Japan and the United States over Okinawa and the Security Treaty might well pay particular heed to the domestic components of Japanese foreign policy formulation. The author presents a useful reminder in the gesture of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, during the Soviet negotiations which “ostensibly designed to strengthen Japan’s position . . . became another unsettling element in already confused circumstances.”

The reader is provided with only a brief account of the peace negotiations per se, plus an appendix containing the Joint Declaration signed on 19 October 1956. Most of the research was completed during an eighteen month’s stay in Tokyo, where interviews with party leaders and the Japanese plenipotentiary, Matsumoto Shunichi, plus access to Japanese official documents and periodicals, provided over one-half of the sources utilized for the study. Each chapter is carefully footnoted with interpretive and comparative comment. The extensive bibliography reveals the paucity of material published in English that could be useful for sophisticated political analysis. It is to be hoped that future scholars, grounded in both the culture and language of Japan, will fill this void in American understanding of the leading democratic state in the Far East.—C. LEONARD HOAG, *Middlebury College*.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8-12, 1970, at the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California.

1970 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1970-71

The 1970 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8-12 at the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association (the particular session will be announced in *P.S.* for Summer, 1970 and in the Final Program) the Nominating Committee will propose a slate of officers for 1970-71. The Committee is composed of three members appointed by President David Easton: Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina; Duncan MacRae, University of Chicago; and Sheldon S. Wolin, University of California, Berkeley; and three members appointed by President Karl W. Deutsch: Professor Hayward R. Alker, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor John C. Wahlke, University of Iowa; and Professor J. David Singer, University of Michigan, Chairman. The Nominating Committee will propose the following officers for 1970-71:

President Elect:	Heinz Eulau, Stanford University
Vice President:	Edward Banfield, Harvard University
	John A. Davis, City University of New York
	David Spitz, Hunter College
Secretary:	Thomas R. Dye, Florida State University
Treasurer:	Donald R. Matthews, Brookings Institution
Council:	Chadwick F. Alger, Northwestern University
	Philip E. Converse, University of Michigan
	Tobe Johnson, Morehouse College
	David Kettler, Purdue University
	Joyce M. Mitchell, University of Oregon
	James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina
	Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University
	Gordon Tullock, Virginia Polytechnic Institute

FINAL REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE ON ITS PROCEDURES, CRITERIA, AND RESULTING SLATE FOR 1970-71

1. Establishment of the Committee

Three members (Cleaveland, Wolin, MacRae) were carried over from previous year, and the three new members (Wahlke, Alker, and Singer) were appointed by the President on 15 December 1969.

2. Procedures Prior to Meeting of Committee

The first step was gathering of background information: a) constitutional constraints and precedents; b) prior decisional procedures; c) administrative and budgetary arrangements; d) list of all previous officers since 1959; e) discussion of procedures and general situation with Committee members.

With the background information in, and basic ground rules identified, we began the solicitation of suggestions from the membership of the Association. In addition to the standard announcements in the *Review* and in *P.S.*, we wrote letters asking not only for specific names of potential nominees but for suggestions regarding criteria to be applied in selecting nominees, to each of the following:

Chairmen of Political Science Departments, for dissemination

Former Presidents and Vice Presidents (past decade)

Officers of various ad hoc and caucus groups

Those who had written on matters of governance in *P.S.* since its inception

These letters went out in mid-February, and during the month that followed we received

about forty separate letters of suggestion and about ten telephoned suggestions. Most of the responses merely proposed specific names, but a few also dealt with criteria and procedures.

While awaiting replies to the above inquiries, the Committee members were engaged in more personal solicitations within their several departments, regions, and circles of acquaintances. In addition, we perused back issues of the *Review*, old programs, bibliographies, etc. to compile additional lists of possible candidates.

3. Meeting of the Committee

The face to face meeting of the Committee was scheduled for the weekend of 14–15 March in Denver, and the one member who was definitely unable to attend conferred at length with the Chairman by phone on two occasions prior to the meeting. One other member fell ill just before the meeting, but he was consulted via two phone conversations during the meeting. The four remaining members convened on Saturday morning, worked through the late evening, and met until noon on Sunday.

The meeting was in two distinct parts. The first morning was devoted to a clarification of the background factors, constitutional constraints, precedents, and selection criteria. At that session, we settled on the following criteria. First, it was agreed that the dominant consideration, as in the past, would be that of intellectual excellence—a slate of scholars who would represent the best in our discipline, in terms of creativity, energy, and scientific competence. Second, we recognized the need for people who—charged with the governance of the Association—could be effective and responsible officers, and best serve the membership and the community at large.

At the same time, we realized that other factors might also be important. On matters scientific, we wanted to take cognizance of such differences as the inductive-deductive, normative-empirical, traditional-behavioral, macro-micro, basic-applied, and related issues. And on matters of public policy, we wanted to take account not only of the diverse views within the discipline but of the variety of attitudes toward the Association's role in such matters. Next, there were the emerging caucus and interest groups, and a belief that their several views should find expression in the discipline's decision making bodies. Finally, recognizing that a scholar's outlook and needs may be partially a function of the type, size, location, and mission of the institution in which he works, we thought it wise to seek some balance among such institutions.

While the need for a representative slate of officers was readily accepted, we explicitly rejected any notion of allocating seats or slots to specific groupings or viewpoints. The intention was to offer a list of nominees which would demonstrate our sensitivity to the issues of the moment, represent the best traditions of the discipline, and be able to govern wisely and effectively.

In this preliminary discussion, three issues of a procedural-constitutional issue were taken up, and while the Committee as a whole makes no formal recommendations, its chairman and individual members have communicated informally with the Constitutional Revision and Procedures Committees. These were: the multiple slate idea, the eligibility of Nominating Committee members for nomination, and the implications of a nominee's withdrawal.

Having reached tentative agreements on the above, but recognizing that they would come in for further discussion when we turned to our specific mission, we devoted the balance of the two days to the consideration of specific candidates. Eventually, we arrived—via a combination of majority vote and informal consensus—at agreed choices for all positions and for one or more alternates in the event that any potential nominee declined the invitation. But in accord with our rejection of the principle of standard seats, we developed a complex contingency plan, rather than assigning alternates to specific slots. With this tentative list of candidates and alternates drawn up, we adjourned at noon on Sunday.

4. Post-Meeting Procedures

Following the precedent of previous years, we agreed that the Chairman would contact our choice for President-elect and that the national office staff would initially contact most of the other potential nominees. At the end of one week, a large fraction of the nominees had been contacted, and had accepted our invitation to stand for office.

But given the diversity of views within the Association, the vigor with which they are held, and the consequent possibility of contending slates, not all of our nominees were able to accept immediately. Several of them requested time to consider the matter or to

consult with colleagues, and while we reiterated our position that no faction or group would be permitted to designate its own candidate (or veto those selected by us) we could not object to their consulting with groups of like-minded political scientists. Needless to say the Chairman spent a good many hours in conversation with several of the potential candidates, explaining and justifying the emerging slate, and urging the importance of seeking reform within the framework of the Association. Even though several designees ultimately declined our invitation, these conversations offered an opportunity for the sorts of lively discussion and exchange of viewpoints which are essential to a responsible and democratic governance of the profession.

5. Recommendations

Having weighed all of the above considerations, taken account of the diverse views and affiliations of the membership, and consulted widely within the discipline, we propose the slate of candidates for 1970-71 listed in the boxed announcement on page 678.

NOTICE

RESOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AT THE
ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, the attention of members of the Association is hereby directed to the provisions of the Constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting." (Article VIII)

Article IX: Amendments

"1. Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed by the Council or by fifty (50) members of the Association. The Council shall transmit all proposed amendments to the next Annual Business Meeting and may make recommendations on those amendments originating outside the Council.

"2. The Council shall have any proposed amendment printed in an official publication of the Association prior to the next Annual Business Meeting. The Council shall then place the proposed amendment on the agenda of that Business Meeting. The Business Meeting may accept or reject the proposed amendment with or without further amendments to it. Within thirty (30) days the Executive Director shall submit amendments supported by at least forty percent of those members present and voting at the Annual Business Meeting to the entire membership for vote by mail ballot. Ballots must be returned within thirty (30) days to be counted. A proposed amendment shall be ratified if approved by a majority of those voting. An amendment shall take effect immediately upon ratification unless the amendment itself provides otherwise."

The Council of the Association will meet during the morning and afternoon of Monday, September 7, and during the morning of Tuesday, September 8. The room will be announced in the Final Program.

The Constitution of the Association, as amended by the 1969 Annual Business Meeting, is printed in the Fall, 1969 issue of *P.S.*, pp. 672-674.

PROGRAM FOR THE 1971 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The 67th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association will be held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, September 7-11, 1971. The Program Committee is listed below. The members of the Committee and the Program Chairman welcome suggestions from members of the profession on specific papers, specific panels, or on the general structure of the program. We would be happy to have ideas for innovation; we would be happy to be reminded of traditions we have slighted. If you have suggestions or comments on the program, please communicate to one more of those listed below. It is important to have these communications early. More definite plans for the meetings will be taking shape in the fall.

Program Chairman: Sidney Verba, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago

I. Research Areas (Note: in designating the research areas, no distinction is made between American politics and comparative politics. Panels will deal with either or both):

- A. Political Belief Systems and their Formation
Denis Sullivan, Department of Government, Dartmouth College
- B. Technology and Politics
Todd La Porte, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
- C. New Modes of Policy Analysis
Patrick Crecine, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
- D. Law and Social Change
Herbert Jacob, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University
- E. Conflicts, Groups and Party Alignments
David Kovenock, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina
- F. Urban Politics
Joel Aberbach, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
- G. Art as Politics
Claire Rosenfield, Department of English, Brown University
- H. International Relations and Organization
Joseph Nye, Department of Government, Harvard University
- I. Political Development: New Directions
Warren Ilchman, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
- J. Public Administration: The Administration of Social Services
Paul Puryear, Department of Political Science, Fisk University

II. Philosophy, Theory and Method

- K. Ethical Theory
Richard Flathman, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago
- L. Formal Theory
Gordon Black, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester
- M. Problems of Measurement and Method
Lester Milbrath, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Buffalo

III. Political Science and Public Policy

- N. The Impact of the Social Sciences on Society: A Retrospect on Recent Major Policy Issues
Graham Allison, Department of Government, Harvard University
- O. The Impact of the Social Sciences on Society: Prospects for the Major Issues of the Future
Murray Edelman, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin

IV. Political Science: A Self-Evaluation

- P. Political Science as a Vocation
Merle Kling, Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis
- Q. Teaching Political Science
G. Bingham Powell, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

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- G. Art as Politics
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- H. International Relations and Organization
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Department of Government, Harvard University
- I. Political Development: New Directions
Warren F. Ilchman, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
- J. Public Administration: The Administration of Social Services
Paul L. Puryear, Department of Political Science, Fisk University

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ADDRESS FOR NEW MANUSCRIPTS AFTER JUNE 1, 1970

Beginning June 1, 1970, the REVIEW's Managing Editor Elect, Professor Nelson W. Polsby, will assume all responsibility for referring and making decisions on all newly submitted manuscripts and for deciding on manuscripts referred but not decided on prior to June 1. Accordingly, after June 1, 1970 all new manuscripts and all correspondence concerning manuscripts not then decided upon should be sent to:

Professor Nelson W. Polsby, Managing Editor Elect
American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720

Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 200 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

September, 1970

- Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing"
- Gordon S. Black, University of Rochester, "Some Notes on the Process of Professionalization in Politics"
- Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin, "Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public"
- John P. Diggins, University of California, Irvine, "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion?"
- Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation"
- Barbara Hinckley, University of Massachusetts, "Incumbency and the Presidential Vote in Senate Elections: Defining Parameters of Sub-presidential Voting"
- Raymond F. Hopkins, Swarthmore College, "The Role of the M.P. in Tanzania"
- Chong Lim Kim, University of Iowa, "Political Attitudes of Defeated Candidates in American State Elections"
- Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "Cross-National Dimensions of Political Competence"
- Donald Rothchild, University of California, Davis, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity"
- John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, Florida State University, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the Democratic National Convention"
- Gilbert R. Winham, McMaster University, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Tests of a Causal Model"

December, 1970

- Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology"
- Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., University of North Carolina, "A Causal Approach to Non-random Measurement Errors"
- Giuseppe Di Palma and Herbert McClosky, Uni-

versity of California, Berkeley, "Personality and Conformity to Political and Social Attitudes"

- Harlan Hahn, University of California, Riverside, "Correlates of Public Sentiments on War: The Vietnam Referendum"
- Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii, "Creating Political Reality"
- Robert Melson, Michigan State University, and Howard Wolpe, Western Michigan University, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective"
- Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support"
- Eric Nordlinger, Brandeis University, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic Change in the Non-western States"
- Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908"
- Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics"
- Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan, and Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation"
- Jerzy J. Wiatr, University of Warsaw, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland"

March, 1971

- James W. Clarke and E. Lester Levine, Florida State University, "Marijuana Use, Social Deviance and Political Alienation: A Study of High School Youth"
- James S. Coleman, Johns Hopkins University, "Political Money"
- Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago, "Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy"
- Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Harvard University, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government"
- Theodore R. Marmor, University of Minnesota, "Income Maintenance Alternatives: Concepts, Criteria, and Program Comparisons"
- Robert Melson, Michigan State University, "Ideology and Inconsistency: The Politics of the 'Cross-Pressured' Nigerian Worker"
- Donald S. Zagoria, Hunter College, "'Rice' and 'Feudal' Communism in India"

* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

GROUP FLIGHTS TO LOS ANGELES

for 1970 APSA Annual Meeting

September 8-12

The association has arranged group flights from several cities to Los Angeles for the APSA Annual Meeting, September 8-12, 1970. The group fares are the same as excursion fares, but the regulations will permit individuals to return any day of the week and in less than seven days.

The fares for these flights are based on a minimum of 25 participants on regularly scheduled airlines:

New York-Los Angeles	September 7 (Evening)	\$238.35
New York-Los Angeles	September 8 (Morning)	\$238.35
Boston-Los Angeles	September 8	\$248.85
Washington-Los Angeles	September 8	\$226.80
Chicago-Los Angeles	September 8	\$170.55
Atlanta-Los Angeles	September 8	\$193.20
Seattle-Los Angeles	September 8	\$109.20

Each group is required to depart together, but passengers may return individually according to their own wishes. The only requirement is that they reserve a direct flight back on the same airline. These flights are open only to members of the Association and their immediate families. For more information and application forms, write to:

Director, Group Flights to Los Angeles

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Professional Placement Service at 1970 Annual Meeting (September 8-12, 1970)

A Professional Placement Service will be available to members of the American Political Science Association attending the Los Angeles meeting. The service will be located in the Galleria Room of the Biltmore Hotel.

Although sponsored by APSA, this Service is entirely separate from APSA's Personnel Service and therefore requires separate registration.

A file of applicants seeking employment will be available for review by employers and descriptions of position openings will be made available to applicants. Adequate facilities for personal interviews will be provided.

If you plan to attend the Conference and utilize the Placement Service, please complete and mail the form below as soon as possible *but no later than August 3, 1970*. Applicant and/or employer order forms will be forwarded to you upon receipt of your request.

Both employers and applicants can register during the meeting but those filing in advance will receive expedited service. Pre-Convention registration is strongly recommended.

Name: _____

(Organization or Institution) _____

Address: _____

(City)

(State)

(Zip)

☐ Employer

☐ Number of Position Categories

☐ Applicant

Will you be available for interviews during the annual meeting

☐ Yes

☐ No

Mail to: Convention Placement Service
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

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For further information write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

APSA FLIGHT TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

8th World Congress, August 31 to September 5th, 1970

Munich, Germany

Members of the American Political Science Association are invited to participate in a group flight to Munich, Germany leaving JFK International Airport in New York August 22 and returning September 7, 1970. The fare will be \$245.00 on Lufthansa German Airlines.

Persons wishing to make reservations now may write directly to the Association, in care of the Director, Summer Flight Programs, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

APSA TEMPORARY AND SUMMER SCHOOL FACULTY EXCHANGE

The Association has initiated a program to act as exchange between institutions seeking temporary and summer school faculty and political scientists seeking positions. APSA welcomes notification from employers with short-term needs, and from members of the profession interested in such appointments.

Please contact:

The APSA Temporary and Summer School Faculty Exchange
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION'S

Personnel Service . . .

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a "clearing house," bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration in the service, at a \$6 per academic year fee, is open to all members of the Association. Here are the details of its operation:

Position Openings

- A Newsletter is mailed monthly to those Association members seeking positions through the Personnel Service. There are presently over 1,000 members in the Personnel Service.
- The Newsletter lists, by code number, position openings and job descriptions.

Employers Using the Service

- Any employer may use the Association's Personnel Service.
- Types of positions listed include teaching on the university level, administrative positions with professional organizations, research and administrative positions with federal, state and local government agencies.
- There is no cost to the advertising institution.

For further information concerning registration write to:

Director, Personnel Service
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036

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Registry of Retired Professors

The Association has established a Registry of Retired Professors. The Registry serves as an information exchange for those retired professors who are willing to teach one or more courses on a one-semester or one-year basis, and those institutions desiring to make such appointments. Any retired professor wishing to be listed in the Registry should contact the Association to receive an application form. Departmental chairmen wishing to inquire about the availability of retired professors in a certain specialty or geographic area should write specifying their requirements.

Director, Registry of Retired Professors
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

**Illogical
legality**

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by Robert M. O'Neil

Does government control through conditioned benefits make us all second class citizens? This searching and important new book zeros in on what happens to the constitutional rights of minority groups, government employees, welfare recipients, college students, public housing tenants, and millions of other Americans who receive some form of government aid. It also offers constructive recommendations. "One of the few really important books on civil liberties that has appeared in recent years."

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
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"Alba's new book . . . is the best introduction to Latin America now available. He has a feel for the area based on the decades he has lived and travelled in all parts of the continent. His understanding of the area enables him to describe how the geography, population and culture, as affected by outside forces, combine to create the modern Latin America. This book will be useful both as a text and as a reference book."—Harry Kantor, Marquette University. 416 pp. \$10.00, cloth; \$3.95, paper.

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INSIDE THE SYSTEM

A Washington Monthly Reader

Edited by Charles Peters and
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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KENYA'S AFRICANIZATION PROGRAM: PRIORITIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY*

DONALD ROTHCHILD
University of California, Davis

Africa's postindependence leaders are under enormous pressure. They must assume such new functions as the conduct of foreign relations and military defense and must expand developmental activities greatly, all at a time of falling world commodity prices, population explosion, and increasing indifference to foreign aid on the part of the wealthier countries. Local African expectations are rising, even though such requisites for satisfying these aspirations as capital, skills, and initiative remain in short supply. Nationwide linkages and a national identity must be built in the face of quickening ethnic anxieties and inward-lookingness. The functional benefits offered by a continued non-African presence must be secured without causing deep-seated popular frustrations; such frustrations could clearly jeopardize the regime's legitimacy should they become too extreme. The need for schools, hospitals, and welfare activities are juxtaposed against such pressing requirements as the development of power facilities, irrigation schemes, road networks, and industries. The choices are difficult and the demands heavy. No wonder Aristide Zolberg remarks that the "governments with the lowest load capability have assumed the heaviest burdens."¹

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Alexander Groth and Larry Wade for helpful comments on the original manuscript.

¹ "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," this *Review*, LXII (March, 1968), p. 73. Also see Rupert Emerson's discussion in *Political Modernization: The Single-Party System*, University of Denver Monograph

If these restrictions of international environment and resources did not impose sufficient constraints upon governments as they attempt to cope with developmental needs, their flexibility of movement is further constricted by the pulls of ideology. African countries, fresh from an encounter with powerful, privileged European states, carry over a wide range of liberal commitments into the postindependence period. They are naturally determined to continue the struggle against any remaining manifestations of colonialism on the continent—white settler oligarchies, neocolonialist military and economic arrangements, or politically-inspired alignments with powers outside of Africa. Their leaders proclaim both nationalist and pan-Africanist objectives and call simultaneously for a leveling egalitarianism and rapid economic growth. The extent to which they can reconcile these somewhat overlapping, and even conflicting, goals with the compelling claims implicit in nation-building remains a crucial question with broad implications for regime stability.

This essay focuses upon the role of the non-African communities in Kenya's economic life and concentrates upon national policy with respect to the Africanization of the public and private sectors of the economy. Conflicts in two demand situations—for Africanization on the one hand and for economic development on the other—are analyzed in the context of Kenya's politics and related to the government's present values and priorities. The likelihood of increased or decreased responses to these sometimes conflicting demands is examined with a view to pointing up possible directions which changing

No. 1 (Denver: University of Denver, 1964), pp. 9-10.

governmental priorities might take and their implications for the European and Asian minorities residing in the country.

I. INPUTS: EQUITY DEMANDS

Africanization involves a large set of demands upon government in Kenya. During colonial times, Africans performed most of the unskilled jobs in the country, Europeans held many of the management, professional, and higher technical posts in the public and private sectors, and Asians were predominant in middle-level clerical, technical, and commercial positions. The inequalities of opportunity of the colonial period appeared at every age level. Using 20-29 year-old males as a basis of comparison, the 1962 census showed 63 per cent of the Europeans having secured nine or more years of schooling, 59 per cent of the Asians, and four per cent of the Africans.² Whereas the statistics on Europeans in the key occupational groups showed 42 per cent in professional and managerial posts and 17 per cent in technical and supervisory posts, those for the Asians were 23 per cent and four per cent respectively and for Africans were approximately one per cent in the two categories combined.³ As to the distribution of earnings, a similar lopsided pattern was evident; in 1962, the small Asian and European communities earned £46.8 m. in a total annual wage bill of £88.8 m. In the private sector, 29 per cent of the regularly employed European males earned more than £1,800 per annum and another 29 per cent earned between £1,200 and £1,799. Comparative statistics for the other communities showed 18 per cent of Asian males earning £720 and over, and one per cent of the African males earning £600 or more in the 1962 period.⁴ Such glaring inequities naturally provoked African claims to greater opportunity. Jomo Kenyatta's appeal to European goodwill in 1943 was a remarkably restrained expression of African feelings on the subject:

Let the Africans have equal educational facilities with the Europeans, and leave them free to make the best use of them. Give them an equal chance of economic enterprise, equal opportunity in business and the professions, and a say in the Government of the country. If they then show themselves unequal to the strain of Western civili-

zation, they will have no right to resent being treated as a backward race.⁵

Not surprisingly, the marked inequalities of opportunity among races in colonial times carried over into the period following the transfer of power. The three-tier pyramidal structure of Europeans at the top followed lower down by Asians and then Africans was too firmly entrenched in such areas as education, welfare, and incomes policies to give way rapidly or easily to a change in the governmental power structure. The Ministry of Education, in an effort to correct the imbalances of the past, announced that by 1967 all schools which were formerly for non-Africans must enroll not less than 50 per cent Africans (increased to 65 per cent in 1968); even though the long-run implications of such a policy are great, the transformation of the skilled manpower situation is certain to be gradual.⁶ Nevertheless some significant modifications became evident at the time of independence with regard to recruitment policies. Africans quickly came to man most of the positions in parliament and government as well as the policy-making posts in the civil service; even so, the racial structuring of opportunity persisted in the technical and professional fields and in private commerce and industry generally. Data on civil service personnel as of July, 1967 showed 91 per cent of the highest administrative posts Kenyanized; however, only 24 per cent of the posts in the professional cadre, 46 per cent of the higher executive cadre, and 65 per cent in the lower executive cadre had been taken over by Kenya citizens.⁷ Moreover, as the comparison in Table 1 brings out in strong relief, the proportion of jobs held by Africans in the public sector greatly exceeded those in the private sector.

Clearly, then, non-African control over investment capital and skills was too complete to erode with the first flush of political independence. As a result, many Kenyans, perceiving little apparent change in the distribution of goods and opportunities in the society, felt dissatisfied with the status quo. No doubt the aspirations of rural Africa are more limited than in urban and peri-urban areas; yet the cumulative pressure of these claims on government is enormous.⁸

² *Kenya Population Census, 1962*, Vol. III (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1966), p. 45, and *ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 22, 51.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 27, 53, and Republic of Kenya, *Statistical Abstract, 1965* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1965), p. 115.

⁴ *Statistical Abstract, 1965*, p. 153.

⁵ Jomo Kenyatta, *Suffering Without Bitterness* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 40.

⁶ *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess. (September 19, 1968), col. 929.

⁷ Data supplied by the Directorate of Personnel.

⁸ Colin Leys, *Politicians and Policies* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 52.

TABLE I. OCCUPATIONAL AND RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT IN KENYA, 1964*

Occupational Group	Proportion of Jobs Held by Africans		
	Public Sector Per Cent	Private Sector Per Cent	Ratio Public to Private
Professional and Technical	40.6	10.7	3.79:1
Administrative, Executive and Managerial	53.4	21.9	2.44:1
Teachers	95.9	31.5	3.04:1
Clerical	70.8	33.7	2.09:1
Sales	38.0	44.7	0.85:1
Transportation and Communications Workers	90.1	89.9	1.00:1
Service, Sport and Recreation Workers	98.1	97.0	1.01:1
Craftsmen, Production Process and Skilled Workers	91.0	88.9	1.02:1
Unskilled Workers and Laborers	99.9	98.5	1.01:1
Total Wage and Salaried Employment	92.6	82.4	1.12:1

* Source: Republic of Kenya. *Kenyanization of Personnel in the Private Sector* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1967), p. 2.

The demand for Africanization was part of a larger nationalist drive for equality. Since Kenyan nationalism sought to eliminate the privileges implicit in the racial stratification of the old order, it placed greater weight upon egalitarianism than upon individual freedom and constitutional rights.⁹ As Ali A. Mazrui noted, "black people are the most aggrieved of all races in moral terms, even if they are better off economically than many Asians [in Pakistan and India]."¹⁰ The African struggle against colonialism was essentially a fight for human dignity as expressed in the form of equality between races. Thus nationalism became the battering ram of African group rights; if a conflict took place between the privileged minorities' demand for rights under the constitution and the African community's claim to corrective equity, nationalism was drawn instinctively to the African call for group rights. Nationalists might well have

⁹ These points are discussed at length in Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 99. Kenyan and Tanzanian nationalists tended to focus upon the common goal of equality in different ways. Kenyans frequently stressed the central objective of equality between races while their Tanzanian counterparts talked of achieving equality by eliminating class exploitation. For the latter, see President Julius Nyerere's remarks as reported in the *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), August 27, 1968, p. 1.

¹⁰ Ali A. Mazrui, *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1967), p. 242.

felt restrained in their actions by the important economic role played by minority peoples in the life of their country, but only reluctantly did they subordinate racial interests to the requirements of economic interests.

A survey of Kenya African attitudes toward minority groups I conducted in 1966 revealed the public to be nationalistic about its Africanization objectives and at the same time cognizant of the contribution of out-groups to the developmental process.¹¹ When asked what changes were desired in the conduct of retail trade in the country, a majority of respondents advanced various proposals for securing increased African management and ownership: more than 29 per cent of the total responses maintained that the government should hand over Asian businesses to Africans, another 23 per cent held that the government should give loans on easy terms to enable Africans to form their own businesses in order to compete with established Asian enter-

¹¹ Results are based upon 680 returned questionnaires out of a total sample of 730, or a return rate of 93 per cent. Twenty-seven of the 680 interviews were rejected as incomplete or dishonest. The interviews were conducted by 20 African men in the fall and winter of 1966; the place of interview was divided roughly evenly among urban (Nairobi), periurban, and rural areas throughout Kenya. Although this sample deliberately overrepresents urban dwellers (because I was interested in opinion data from the more politically mobilized sectors of the population), the sample nonetheless includes a more substantial proportion of rural respondents than are normally interviewed in public opinion research in Africa. Among those interviewed, 237 had completed primary school, 170 had completed secondary school, 152 had some secondary school, 47 had attended a university, and 47 were tribal elders. The following occupational categories were included: 183 teachers or students, 73 farmers, 63 government employees, and 334 non-government workers. For an emphasis on the important role of the "politically relevant strata of the population" in the political process of the African states, see Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, LV (September 1961), 467-498. Also see James S. Coleman, "Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas" in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 535-536. For companion articles based on the same survey, see Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Minorities and the African Crisis over Citizenship," *Race*, IX (April 1968), 421-437; and "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VII (December 1969), pp. 689-711.

preneurs, and yet another 4 per cent affirmed that businesses owned by Asian noncitizens should be requisitioned and assigned to Africans. Since nearly one-third of the total responses favored a take-over of Asian businesses, a cross-tabulation of these respondents yields an interesting insight into the nature of the grass-roots demand for Africanization. The pressures for such an approach came most emphatically from older, less educated Kamba, Kikuyu, and Luhya males. Although 43 per cent in the 36-46 year-old bracket, 36 per cent of those completing primary school, 60 per cent of the elders, and 34 per cent of the males responded in this manner, only 33 per cent in the 18-35 year old age group, 28 per cent of those who completed secondary school or more, and 23 per cent of females did likewise. Moreover, responses by tribal group varied significantly. Whereas a high percentage of Kamba (48 per cent), Kikuyu (45 per cent), and Luhya (44 per cent) agreed to a take-over, the Luo (20 per cent) seemed not to feel as strongly the need for such a strategy.

Some typical expressions of opinion indicate the nature of African feelings on the question of a take-over of Asian businesses:

The only thing is to ask these Asians to leave by force and then the government should give the Africans loans to build such shops.

Well what I can say about it is that these retail trades should only be held by Africans and Asians to be under Africans.

Some Asians who have been trading for a long time and getting rich from Africans and other people, should leave such trades to Africans to manage. The government should give loans to Africans and the person concerned should mention the particular shop he wishes to buy and the owner should be persuaded to sell it. If they refuse to sell they should be forced or else they can start the business together.

Indians have not changed to know that we have Uhuru. They should be asked to leave the retail trade to Africans, I mean they should be bought over as European farms.

I think some of the big shops in town (Nairobi and other towns) should be given to Africans who can do the same thing. The government should ask some of the Asians to quit their shops to be taken over by the Africans. The government can use force in the matter.

Even while some Africans were expressing strong sentiments on the need for rapid Africanization, they were also mindful of the contribution which non-Africans were making to economic development. The African majority's sophistication on this matter emerged clearly from two related questions raised in the same survey as above (see Tables 2 and 3).

TABLE 2. AFRICAN ATTITUDES: PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO REPLIED THAT EUROPEANS AND ASIANS AS A WHOLE HELPED TO DEVELOP KENYA (N = 653)

Community Affected	True	False	Don't Know; No Answer	Total
Europeans	88%	11	1	100%
Asians	51%	47	2	100%

What is most striking about Tables 2 and 3 is the divergence in attitude regarding Asians and Europeans. The majority were much more suspicious of the intentions of the middle-level Asians than of the top-ranking Europeans. Superficially one might conclude that increased social distance between groups led to a more positive interpretation of out-group activities. But such interpretations are undercut to some extent by an examination of the responses in terms of tribe, age, and education, for in each of these instances proximity led to greater appreciation of the minorities' contribution. Only eight per cent of those who were Kikuyu, had some secondary schooling, or were in the twenty-year-old age group or under replied that Europeans had harmed development. This liberal cluster of responses appeared again in regard to the role of the Asians. Here 37 per cent of the Kikuyus, 37 per cent of those who had completed secondary education and above, and 35 per cent in the below-twenty age group viewed Asians as harming the country's economic growth; this was a low percentage relative to the sample as a whole even if not low in absolute terms. Obviously the crucial factor in the determination of group attitudes was the kind of relationship that core group members had with the immigrant communities, not the fact of proximity by itself.

In general, trade union leaders, Kenya People's Union (KPU) spokesmen, and Kenya African National Union (KANU) parliamen-

TABLE 3. AFRICAN ATTITUDES: PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO REPLIED THAT EUROPEANS AND ASIANS HARMED THE DEVELOPMENT OF KENYA (N = 653)

Community Affected	True	False	Don't Know; No Answer	Total
Europeans	13%	84	3	100%
Asians	45%	49	6	100%

tary backbenchers were the most prominent champions of the public's equity demands.¹² On frequent occasions they called upon the government to act more vigorously in righting past racial imbalances. To this end, they sponsored a race-conscious definition of Africanization, sought effective controls over employment opportunities in Kenya, and urged the authorities to scrutinize applications for citizenship with greater care. All these objectives were interrelated. As Clement Lubembe, the former secretary-general of the Central Organization of Trade Unions, declared: "It is our contention that granting of citizenship must be made to look as expensive as possible so that, as time goes on, we should be able to adjust the existing imbalance."¹³ Thus, the government was constantly exhorted by these parliamentary and trade union leaders to move ahead faster in achieving its Africanization goals; the politically mobilized segments of public opinion remained deeply dissatisfied, and political stability necessitated substantial progress in meeting these African hopes and expectations.

Trade unionists and parliamentary backbenchers and opposition members, articulating their community's egalitarian impulses, tend to be skeptical of the government's more cautious estimation of the need for non-African skills. Although both governmental and nongovernmental spokesmen urge a policy of self-reliance,¹⁴ they differ noticeably when it comes to the practical task of implementing Africanization schemes.

For many an African nationalist, the attack on standards is an attack on the "colonial mentality." It is an attempt to eliminate the artificiality of European values as applied to African circumstances.¹⁵ During colonial times African

leaders voiced suspicions of high standards, seeing them as a means of restricting the common man's initiative. Thus, Tom Mboya criticized the standards maintained by municipal councils in the country in 1960 on the grounds that they inhibited healthy competition. He said:

My contention is that you cannot look forward to standards which you cannot afford, and especially if the policy is to encourage African business, I think we should be much more lenient and consider the nature of the people we are dealing with rather than merely fix standards and hope that everybody will maintain those standards, regardless of the means available and their capacity to achieve those standards. It has come to a point where some of us are convinced that, in fact, the reason for some of these restrictions on African petty traders, vegetable traders, second-hand clothes dealers and so on are being prevented from trade merely in order to meet . . . the interests, of those people who have the bigger voice in the City Council today—the Europeans, and to some extent, the Asians.¹⁶

And two years later, J. J. M. Nyagah urged a compromise in the standards applied to a veterinary diploma "even if it means we will produce a man who is lower than the present holder of a Makerere diploma . . ."¹⁷ At that time African politicians sought to break the dominance of non-Africans in the bureaucracy, the professions and business and were quite prepared to lower standards in order to increase African opportunity.

With the entrance of a number of Africans into high and middle-level positions after independence, the discussion of standards tended, in official quarters at least, to take greater account of the complexities of the question. African governmental authorities expressed pride in the post-independence period over their standards of excellence in the civil service;¹⁸ in addition, they tended more and more to discriminate between

¹² The Kenya Government proscribed the Kenya People's Union in October 1969 following a violent confrontation in Kisumu and the placing of a number of major party officials in detention or under house arrest.

¹³ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), September 20, 1968, p. 17. His successor, Denis Akumu, declared that COTU's newly-elected leadership would resolutely oppose "window Africanization." *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), March 5, 1969, p. 17.

¹⁴ For Tom Mboya, "a policy of greater self-reliance must involve the use of Kenyan manpower and enterprise which without too much difficulty can be performed by Kenyans." *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), April 11, 1968, p. 5. An important East African statement on this subject appears in *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam: Publicity Section, Tanganyika African National Union, 1967), Part III.

¹⁵ Editorial in the *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam),

August 30, 1968, p. 4, and Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 218. For a discussion of the socially-defined nature of merit, see W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 262.

¹⁶ *Legislative Council Debates* (Kenya), Vol. LXXXV, Fourth Sess. (June 1, 1960), col. 1146.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. LXXXIX, Second Sess. (May 9, 1962), col. 51. See also the comments of Senator G. N. Kalya in *Senate Debates* (Kenya), Vol. I, First Sess. (July 25, 1963), col. 493.

¹⁸ In his Jamhuri (Independence) day address of 1967, President Kenyatta proudly asserted that: "Despite this rapid Africanization, there has been no fall in the standards of efficiency." *Kenya Newsletter* No. 25, December 15, 1967, p. 3. See also, Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

areas requiring and not requiring the highest of qualifications. Even so, trade unionists and parliamentarians continued the frontal assault on colonial-inspired standards. For many of these men, the question of standards was raised as a means of limiting African advance.¹⁹ As G. G. Kariuki told Parliament:

Why can we not give these jobs to Africans? What is the impossibility in Africanizing a clerk? What is the impossibility in Africanizing a job where a person just does nothing except counting motor-cars? Mr. Speaker, Sir, what is there in an executive job? What technicality is there in an executive job? What technicality is there in Africanizing, say, a branch manager of a bank?²⁰

These men were impatient to get on with the task of Africanization. They were contemptuous of what they considered as artificial standards set up to inhibit opportunity rather than to guarantee competent service. The "myth" of high standards, as one observer described it, was seen by many as essentially a damper on African aspirations for equity.²¹

On a related question, African nationalists have also attacked lack of experience as a bar to recruitment. Such a requirement is seen as reinforcing the status quo; it leads to an intolerable situation where Africans might be restricted indefinitely from entering certain occupations. Therefore African nationalist spokesmen have been wary of experience as an important prerequisite for a post and have argued that their followers need only learn on the job.²² "For anyone . . . to imagine that Africanization/Kenyanization should be sacrificed to the bogey of 'experience' . . . is sheer racist economic sophistry," Clement Lubembe has contended.²³

¹⁹ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), July 9, 1965, p. 21. Statement by Senator Lubembe.

²⁰ *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (July 7, 1967), col. 1965. As the chairman of the East African Institution of Engineers (Kenya Division), J. F. K. Kahumbu, remarked over the lack of Asian *fundis* in the building trade, "Surely to train *fundis* will not take years." *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), November 12, 1967, p. 3.

²¹ Aggrey S. Awori, "East African University Must be Africanized," *East African Journal*, IV (December, 1967), p. 20. For a criticism of standards by a non-African, see Jill Wells, "An Original Signatory Reconsiders the Kenyanization Paper," *East African Journal*, V (May, 1968), pp. 10-11.

²² Statement by George O'Newlaw, general secretary of the African Kenya Civil Servants Union, *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), November 29, 1962, p. 4.

²³ *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), June 2, 1968, p. 8. Also see his comments in *ibid.*, May 5, 1968, p. 4.

Government leaders have gone a considerable way toward accepting the argument that experience must not block Africanization programs. In an address to the Association of East African Industries, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mwai Kibaki, requested that local manufacturers appoint distributors who lacked the normal background of experience. The question of "know how" has been exaggerated, he contended; under circumstances prevailing in Kenya, he estimated that Africans could now successfully act as agents for 75 per cent of the distributing sector.²⁴ Government officials accept the demands of equity with regard to the Africanizing of manufacturers' distributors but at the same time use experience as a basis for refusing to Africanize more specialized activities.²⁵ Substantial disagreement only arises over the importance of experience in the decision to Africanize high-level positions.

In brief, then, a considerable body of African opinion feels that non-African skills are dispensable. As Africans have moved upwards to compete effectively as civil service employees, shopkeepers, artisans, tailors, and salesmen, they have become fully aware of the fact that competence is not the exclusive preserve of any particular race. This recognition has had the effect of redoubling the demands for equal opportunity in every sphere. And the impact of this egalitarian thrust can be seen both in the crumbling defenses of those seeking to preserve universalistic criteria²⁶ as well as in the government's sponsor-

²⁴ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), June 14, 1968, p. 1.

²⁵ See the reasons given by the Minister for Power and Communications when he refused to replace the Chairman of the Transport Licensing Tribunal Court with an African. *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (June 22, 1967), col. 1272.

²⁶ In the period prior to and immediately after independence, non-Africans generally urged a policy of equal treatment under the law for all citizens. They rejected preferential treatment for the less favored majority community and pressed instead for property safeguards and recruitment policies which emphasized individual merit and achievement. By 1967, however, a significant minority had come to accept the logic of corrective equity. This conclusion is based on a separate survey of Asian businessmen conducted by this author and Peter Marris in Nairobi, Kiambu and Limuru in June 1967. Results are based on 281 completed questionnaires out of a total sample of 301, or a return rate of 93 per cent. In Nairobi and the Nairobi Industrial Area, a 10 per cent sample was obtained by means of street counting; in Kiambu and Limuru,

ship of such measures as trade licensing, work permits, land transfer controls, and loan schemes, some of which are discussed in Section III.

II. INPUTS: DEVELOPMENT DEMANDS

It is time now to turn to demands which not only act as supports for the political system but are also an essential concomitant of the drive for rapid economic growth. Because the effects of past racial inequalities of opportunity are still evident on the Kenya economic scene, these development demands are largely advanced by European and Asian businessmen and professionals. Nevertheless, this point must not be overstressed; many Africans are now assuming positions of importance in the private sector and these men are often just as aggressive as their non-African counterparts in pressing developmental priorities. Consequently, the conflict between equity and development demands is increasingly one of class interests, not simply of racial interests.

Not surprisingly, Kenya's lack of capital and skilled manpower has caused those concerned with development to be cautious about proposed schemes for rapid Africanization. They seek an expanding economy; any possibility that hasty or ill-conceived measures will be put into effect gives rise to anxieties, such as that the existing economic structure might suffer damage and the country's potential for expansion might be dimmed. Africanization is viewed as a desirable objective—even a sound business practice; yet in the eyes of these men it must remain compatible at all times with developmental goals. Sir Colin Campbell, the president of the Federation of Kenya Employers, has stated these general sentiments as follows: "We as a Federation wholeheartedly support the principle of citizens receiving job preference. . . . Our principal concern is that this process should be carried out with the minimum disturbance to the economy and without diminishing confidence in Kenya abroad."²⁷ Another employer, also espousing the

cause of Africanization, doubtlessly expressed the uneasiness of many colleagues when he referred simultaneously to "inefficiencies resulting from haste, emotion, and the throwing about [of] bad words."²⁸ Africanization, then, was considered a political necessity for business leaders. They sought to accommodate the grassroots pressures for equity within a framework of high standards and efficiency—in other words, to bring Africans into the cosmopolitan world of industry rather than to adapt industry to African values and circumstances.

The limited nature of skilled manpower resources for developmental purposes is evident to most observers of Kenya. That country's modernization, like that of the third world generally, is held back by what the late Tom Mboya described as "a gigantic shortage" of trained and experienced personnel.²⁹ Kenya's manpower shortages do not exist in every category; a substantial balance (or surplus) between supply and projected demand exists in such occupations as forestry officers (technician level), agriculture and livestock technicians, medical technicians, and radio communications operators.³⁰ However, as Table 4 indicates, shortages of middle and high-level manpower are significant, particularly in such occupational categories as engineers, doctors, teachers, librarians, lawyers, geologists, pharmacists, surveyors, accountants, and architects.³¹ Kenya lags behind such countries

Who Controls Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 145.

²⁸ Statement by the general manager of East African Cargo Handling Services, Ltd. as reported in the *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), June 20, 1968, p. 2.

²⁹ See Republic of Kenya, *A Development Strategy for Africa: Problems and Proposals* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1967), p. 23. Also see a report of his remarks at a Kenya Institute of Administration course at Nairobi in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), September 20, 1968, p. 9.

³⁰ Republic of Kenya, *High Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Kenya, 1960-1970* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1965), p. 15.

³¹ Estimates of the imbalance between projected demand and supply in these occupations are given in *ibid.*, p. 14. For critical analyses of the shortcomings of this report, see Republic of Kenya, *Kenya Education Commission Report*, Part II (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 28-40, and E. R. Rado, "Manpower Planning in East Africa," *East African Economic Review*, Vol. III (new series), No. 1 (June, 1967). Another set of projections appeared in Guy Hunter, *Education for*

the whole business population was used for purposes of a sample. When asked whether it is sometimes fair for government to give special preference to Africans over other citizens, or not, 28 per cent of the total responses to this multicoded question were in the affirmative, 66 per cent in the negative, and 6 per cent had no opinion or didn't know.

²⁷ Speech to the annual general meeting of the Federation of Kenya Employers as quoted in the *East African Standard* (Nairobi), March 23, 1968, p. 4. In 1968 he was a director of 20 companies. National Christian Council of Kenya Working Party,

TABLE 4. HIGH LEVEL MANPOWER—DEMAND AND SUPPLY 1962-70***

	Category I*	Category II**
ESTIMATED NEEDS		
Required in 1970	24,042	103,958
Available in 1962	10,434	30,639
Net Additional Needs	13,608	73,319
Estimated Wastage	4,917	12,267
Gross Number Required by 1970	18,525	85,586
ESTIMATED SUPPLY		
Form VI Output 1963/70	7,251	
Less University Entrants	4,000	
	3,251	
Universities Output	6,300	
Total Category I Supply	9,551	9,551
Form IV Output, 1963/70	59,416	
Less Those Continuing in School	12,812	
Total Category II Supply	46,604	46,604
SHORTAGE	8,974	38,982

* Professional men and technologists whose work clearly requires a university degree or equivalent training, or senior administrators and managers carrying considerable policy and financial responsibility.

** Technicians, teachers with secondary education, junior administrators and managers, supervisors of clerical staff, supervisors of skilled men, fully trained nurses, senior members of the extension services with diploma or post-school certificate qualifications or experiences and ability to hold equivalent posts.

*** Source: Government of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1964-1970* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964), p. 136.

as Nigeria where a surplus of civil engineers, lawyers and accountants is anticipated by 1970 but well ahead of a number of countries in tropical Africa whose projected out-turn of secondary school and university graduates is so small as to leave them extremely dependent on nonindigenous skills.³²

Although Kenya's manpower gaps may be filled in time by the educational system, the process is likely to be influenced by a variety of factors: the rate of the economy's expansion, the adequacy of the educational system to deal with future needs, the willingness of the population to support the necessary educational system, the level of wastage, and so forth. Clearly non-Afri-

cans, citizens and noncitizens alike, will be essential in many industries, for the foreseeable future. A premature departure of expatriates would retard development and create additional unemployment. An inkling of this came in the fall of 1967, when the exodus of many Asian artisans at the time of a building boom added to costs and caused delays. Asian artisans had been leaving Kenya since 1960 in order to find better employment opportunities elsewhere; this steady manpower drain, intensified by fears in 1967 over an early end to any chance to enter Britain, caused a drop in the numbers of skilled construction workers from 21,120 in 1960 to a low point of 9,000 in the fall of 1967.³³ As a result business firms and home builders waited longer and paid higher prices for construction.

Moreover, any future employment policy which might distinguish between citizens on racial grounds would prove expensive in terms of economic growth. Not only do non-Africans long resident in Kenya have a substantial share of existing skills, but present educational trends indicate that their potential role remains large in the highly-skilled occupations. Only 38 out of the 98 Kenya students graduating from the University College, Nairobi, in the years 1963-1966 were of African origin, the remainder consisting of 59 Asians and one European. Asian preponderance was particularly noticeable among those receiving degrees in engineering, for 88 per cent of those receiving degrees from this faculty were of Asian origin.³⁴ Statistics compiled by the University College on student distribution by race in 1967 show that 180 of the 557 students from Kenya (32 per cent) were Asians and 29 (5 per cent) were Europeans. A breakdown of these figures by faculty (Table 5) gives some insight into the important part non-Africans will play in the years ahead in such fields as design, land development, engineering, and the sciences. When the number of Kenyans of European and Asian origin studying abroad is added to those at the University College, a picture of significant non-African contribution to the country's manpower supply situation is evident. Under such circumstances, any change in recruitment policies that would make it less feasible for locally

³³ *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), October 22, 1967, p. 1. See also *East African Standard* (Nairobi), November 10, 1967, p. 17; *Reporter* (Nairobi), November 29, 1968, p. 29; and *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (June 28, 1967), col. 1533, remarks by A. J. Pandya.

³⁴ Statistics compiled from a written reply by the Minister for Education, J. J. Nyagah, to a parliamentary question, *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. X, Fourth Sess. (December 7, 1966), cols. 2523-2524.

a Developing Region: A Study in East Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 64.

³² National Manpower Board, *Nigeria's High-Level Manpower, 1963-1970*, Manpower Study No. 2 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1964), p. 19.

TABLE 5. UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NAIROBI DISTRIBUTION OF KENYA STUDENTS BY FACULTY AND RACE ON FEBRUARY 18, 1967*

Faculty	Number of Africans	Number of Asians	Number of Europeans	Number of Arabs	Total
Architecture, Design and Development	26	18	14	—	58
Arts	124	61	2	—	187
Commerce	60	15	3	—	78
Engineering	58	43	3	1	105
Science	55	38	4	—	97
Veterinary Science	22	5	3	2	32
Totals	345	180	29	3	557

* Source: University College, Nairobi, *Student Distribution by Country, Course, Year, Sex, and Race as on 18th February, 1967* (Mimeo.).

and overseas trained out-group members to participate fully in nation-building would obviously involve a significant economic cost.³⁵

Leaders in government and industry, aware of the scarcity of manpower resources, have taken development demands into account in formulating policy. Highly-placed persons in business and commerce, most of whom are non-Africans, have naturally found it relatively easy to argue for a nonracial hiring policy. But African politicians, torn by their desire to represent the wishes of their constituents and by their recognition of the need to cushion the impact of Africanization, have reluctantly become the proponents of prudence and responsibility. Noting that the paucity of scientific, technical, professional, and managerial skills constitutes a major handicap to Kenya's development efforts at this stage, Tom Mboya, for example, argued for a selective and detached approach to the problems of manpower planning.³⁶ Similarly, the paper on African Socialism is most sensitive to the problems of manpower shortages:

As with capital, we can grow rapidly now only by supplementing our meagre supply of domestic, trained manpower with large numbers of skilled people borrowed from abroad. It is a choice between rapid growth and little or none, not between rapid growth and a little less.³⁷

³⁵ E. R. Rado and A. R. Jolly, "The Demand for Manpower—An East African Case Study," *Journal of Development Studies*, I (April, 1965), p. 243.

³⁶ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), December 5, 1966, p. 7. For comments on the need for expatriate teachers, see Eric Khasakhala's remarks as reported in *ibid.*, March 6, 1968, p. 9.

³⁷ Republic of Kenya, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 21.

Despite the genuineness of their nationalistic inclinations, therefore, Kenya's rulers went far toward accepting the development demands on the utilization of non-African manpower; as indicated below, they have moved cautiously to implement the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1967, encouraging the continuing expansion of the economy by a policy which assures a ready supply of trained and experienced personnel. The alternative was seen as an equity of the many poor where Africanization would take place at the expense of growth—a situation regarded as thoroughly undesirable.³⁸

African leaders outside government were also highly sensitive to the constraints of the supply situation. Many parliamentarians of both parties recognized that a "skill drain" would intensify existing personnel shortages, thereby delaying development. An outspoken critic of the government's policies aimed at driving out the Asian middle class was the militant nationalist and leader of the Opposition, Oginga Odinga. He charged that the government's policies were "sacrificing the Asian" to relieve economic and political pressures on itself; the struggle for economic independence, he said, would require full use of all the manpower available in East

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18. In reconciling African Socialism with the ownership of a Mercedes-Benz, Tom Mboya spoke as follows: "If we are going to have African managers and professionals, we have a responsibility to create the atmosphere in which they operate. There has always been serious misunderstanding by those who think that African Socialism means equitable distribution of poverty. To me, however, it means equitable distribution of wealth." *East African Standard* (Nairobi), May 26, 1969, p. 5.

Africa.³⁹ Odinga expressed anxiety over the exodus of Asians from Kenya, fearing that it would leave a trail of African unemployment in its wake:

The Asians might be leaving today, but do we have any plans in connection with this, because the Asians who were here were employing some Africans? When they leave, these Africans will also be jobless men in the streets, and who is the person who will take the chance? It may be some of the non-Africans who have, by chance, become citizens of this country, who will take the chance of filling these places, because they have the funds to expand in business. It will only be the big salaried African, who also has money, probably only Africans who have farms, who will also fill these places. Such a person may be able to employ those Africans who are now jobless as a result of these people going, but will it really solve the problem of the jobless people who are roaming our streets?⁴⁰

In making this statement, Odinga had not altered his position regarding the need for rapid Africanization or preventing exploitation by foreigners;⁴¹ rather he was pointing to the Africans' economic interest in keeping skilled non-African manpower available for Kenya's uses. He stressed the desirability of creating a planned, socialist society, not the replacement of a non-African by an African privileged elite.

In brief, then, it is an oversimplification to contend that the demand for non-African skills is exclusively a non-African one. Africans in government and its opposition as well as in business and the professions urge the exercise of considerable discretion in determining immigration and recruitment priorities. They recognize that non-African manpower makes an important contribution to development, and, in many cases, shun Africanization programs which would jeopardize economic growth. Thus Africans also press support for development demands; however, they tend to deem that a mutuality of racial interests is present where the employment of highly skilled non-Africans does not delay Kenyanization and where it increases economic opportunity for the people of the country as a whole.

Another of the development demands involves

³⁹ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 23, 1968, p. 17.

⁴⁰ *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIV, Sixth Sess. (March 5, 1968), col. 386.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, Fifth Sess. (November 7, 1967), cols. 1809-1810, and *ibid.*, Vol. XII, Fifth Sess. (July 28, 1967), cols. 2927-2930.

the conditions for the use of private capital. Not surprisingly, such support demands come mainly from the communities having private capital at their disposal—the Europeans and Asians. Here European leadership is particularly noticeable. The presence during colonial times of a sizable European population devoted primarily to agriculture and administration created the basis for a viable manufacturing sector; because of this concentration of European expatriates, the British invested more substantially in Kenya's large-scale industries than they did in most of their other tropical African dependencies. This process led ultimately to a tight British hold over Kenya's industrial life which remained in effect even after independence had been granted. The extent of this hegemony is revealed by the preponderance of European (mainly British) capital invested in previously registered companies. In the years 1963-64, for example, European-controlled companies increased their capital by £11,091,670; comparable statistics for the other communities were £920,250 invested in Asian firms, £26,000 in African companies, and £3,481,000 in partly European, partly Asian, and partly African-controlled companies.⁴² A large amount of European capital was also invested in newly incorporated companies around the time of the transfer of power and after. From 1963 to 1966 the nominal capital each community invested in companies under its control was as follows: European, £9,150,440; Asian, £5,329,625; African, £1,788,325; and mixed, £4,616,250.⁴³

In addition, as a report prepared by the Working Party of the National Christian Council of Kenya demonstrated impressively, British capital is heavily entrenched in the most crucial industries in the economy.⁴⁴ A high proportion of major Kenya companies are subsidiaries of London-based companies which are on the London *Times* list of the 300 largest British firms of 1967. The London-based firms with subsidiaries in Kenya include such well known industrial names as Unilever, Dalgety, Mitchell Cotts, Brooks Bond, J. Lyons, Glaxo, Great Universal Stores, Unigate, British Leyland Motors, International Computers, "Shell" Transport and Trading, British Petroleum, Metal Box, I.C.I., British Oxygen, and a number of others. Kenya's association with such powerful industrial giants gives it an important potential source of development capital—a decided advantage at a

⁴² Republic of Kenya, *Registrar-General Annual Report, 1964* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 13.

⁴³ *Registrar-General Annual Reports, 1964-1966*.

⁴⁴ National Christian Council of Kenya Working Party, *Who Controls Industry in Kenya?*

time when this factor of production is in scarce supply. However, such an advantage may involve risks for a new nation determined to pursue a course of nonalignment. Moreover, the demands of large industry to repatriate profits, locate plants, set prices, and bring mergers into effect may run counter to the objectives of a nationalist regime. Those who control capital clearly make heavy demands upon government for a favorable climate for their investments.

Government, for its part, has given every consideration to the demands made by investors. It has given repeated assurances against appropriation and nationalization;⁴⁵ of particular significance in this regard is its enactment of the Foreign Investments Protection Act of 1964 which guarantees that:

No approved enterprise or any property belonging thereto shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over such enterprise or property shall be compulsorily acquired, except in accordance with the provisions concerning compulsory taking of possession and acquisition and the payment of full and prompt payment of compensation contained in section 19 of the Constitution of Kenya. . . .⁴⁶

In addition, it has placed minimal controls upon investors and has promptly issued Approved Status Certificates to legitimate foreign companies seeking permission to repatriate profits.⁴⁷

Kenya's governmental leaders, then, are fully alert to the needs and demands of the investor community. Unlike neighboring Tanzanians who assume that Africa must create most of its own capital out of its own resources,⁴⁸ they place great store by foreign private investment as a catalyst of development. The *Development Plan, 1966-1970* projects that private capital formation will consist of £180 million out of a total £325 million during the period from 1965-70, the larger percentage of these private development funds coming from foreign sources.⁴⁹ In certain areas (manufacturing, mining, electricity

and water, hotels and restaurants, and nonresidential construction) the dependence on the private sector is virtually complete.⁵⁰ For KANU spokesmen, private capital is an essential requisite of economic opportunity in their country. They seek to deal with the problem of unemployment through the long-term process of expanding commercial and industrial opportunity. Private capital is welcome provided that it actually fosters the development process. "If we have [and attract] capital," reasoned Kenyatta, "we shall have more business opportunities and employment in the country for our people."⁵¹ He and his colleagues were willing to accept the risks implicit in close links with the Western capitalist economy in order to achieve the necessary framework within which a meaningful self-reliance will be possible.

In various quarters in Kenya, suspicion is rife of this close connection with international capitalism. The debate in parliament over the Foreign Investment Protection bill showed many members to be uneasy over the possibility of manipulation by foreign capitalists and resentful of the need to give broad assurances to foreign interests. Bildad Kaggia, who subsequently became Deputy President of the Kenya People's Union until he left the party in August 1969, was particularly outspoken on this occasion. The right of certain firms to repatriate profits under the provisions of this bill would mean, he said, "that we are not getting investment in this country for our own benefit, but we are only becoming some economic colony for America and Britain."⁵² In its 1966 election manifesto, KPU went on to condemn "the Government's and KANU's capitalist policies" and promised to "extend national control over the means of production and break the foreigners' grip on the Economy."⁵³ Since such a world view has set-

⁵⁰ In the manufacturing sector, for example, £53 million out of a total of £61.7 million is to come from private sources. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁵¹ Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 344. Also see his remarks in *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 19, 1968, p. 5.

⁵² *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. III, Second Sess. (October 7, 1964), col. 3216. Also see Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's remarks at the time of his resignation from KANU in C. Gerstel, M. Goldschmidt, and D. Rothchild, *Government and Politics in Kenya: A Nation-Building Context* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), p. 145.

⁵³ Kenya People's Union, *K.P.U. Manifesto* (Nairobi: Kenya People's Union, 1966), pp. 3-4. Also see Kenya People's Union, *Wananchi Declaration* (Nairobi: KPU, 1969), p. 5. Nevertheless

⁴⁵ Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, p. 198. Nationalization, contended S. M. Balala, the Assistant Minister for Finance, would be merely to misuse scarce capital resources. *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess. (September 4, 1968), col. 166.

⁴⁶ No. 35 of 1964, p. 4.

⁴⁷ Such certificates signify that an investment is contributing to Kenya's economic development.

⁴⁸ See President Julius Nyerere's interview with George Githii in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 7, 1968, p. 11.

⁴⁹ Government of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1966-1970* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966), pp. 44, 118.

tracted much support in other lands, it stands to reason that the government's extensive reliance upon private capital's contribution to economic progress must demonstrate results or other approaches, such as radical nationalization, may be seen as more desirable by the uncommitted citizen of present times.

III. THE DETERMINATION OF POLICY

In a modernizing state such as Kenya, government inevitably plays an active role as it goes about the task of processing the equity and development demands. Like other governments the world over, its freedom of action is circumscribed. The limitations of Kenya's resources and environment as well as the somewhat conflicting pressures of ideology make the processing of these inputs a sensitive and complicated affair. Yet despite the impact of these factors, the Kenya government still retains considerable capacity to make independent decisions with respect to Africanization goals, costs, and regulations.⁵⁴ As a consequence the political elite is in a position to exercise some discretion in determining Kenya's priorities on equity and development. How has it used its power?

To answer this question it is necessary to look at policy. The objective of eventual Africanization is adhered to uniformly across the continent, but the policies of the different African regimes have sanctioned varying priorities and controls. African regimes may be dichotomized crudely but usefully in terms of their characteristic policy-making processes. One type would consist in regimes such as Kenya with reforming policy-making styles; another type would include regimes such as Tanzania with radical policy-making styles.⁵⁵ Although a greater differ-

ence is often evident in the ideological orientations of these African regimes than in their actual performance in the face of similar environmental constraints, the ordering of priorities still has considerable significance for their developmental programs.

The Kenya government's great emphasis upon developmental objectives was made explicit in its White Paper on African Socialism. The "most important" of governmental policies, this paper asserts, "is to provide a firm basis for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such as Africanization for the economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize growth."⁵⁶ In order to secure development, they plan to harness the world economy to their immediate need for capital and skilled manpower.⁵⁷ They are convinced that for the time being at least their nation's developmental interests are best served by preserving close links with international (especially British) Capitalism. As President Jomo Kenyatta has stated so clearly, "My Government has now no intention of amending or disrupting a system which is working well."⁵⁸ Such a heavy stress on

Jr. (eds.), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 5-6; Robert C. Good, "Changing Patterns of African International Relations," this REVIEW, LVII (September, 1964), 632-634; Samir Amin, *Le Développement Du Capitalisme en Cote D'Ivoire* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967), p. 265; Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York: Random House, 1967), Ch. XI; and Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 77, 99-117.

⁵⁶ *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*, p. 18. "Rapid economic growth, in all countries," commented Tom Mboya, the late Minister for Economic Planning and Development, "is a prerequisite to the extension and intensification of welfare services and to the provision of greater employment opportunities." *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. IX, Second Sess. (May 4, 1965), col. 1794.

⁵⁷ Speaking of the overseas investor, Kenyatta observed: "We must continue to merit and to encourage these injections of capital in the private sector. . . ." *East African Standard* (Nairobi), May 2, 1968, p. 5. See also J. G. Kiano's statement in *ibid.*, September 19, 1966, p. 4; and Tom Mboya's in *ibid.*, January 19, 1968, p. 1.

⁵⁸ *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), February 18, 1968, p. 1. According to a former consultant to the Kenya government, ". . . the private sector has exceeded

KPU's militancy did not blind it to the contributions of immigrants capital and skill. In 1966, KPU President Oginga Odinga stressed that in the process of transforming Kenya's economy, KPU would try to see that justice was done to those immigrants who arrived in Kenya with the capital and skill which developed "the islands of prosperity already described." *East African Standard* (Nairobi), August 10, 1966, p. 3.

⁵⁴ For David Apter, government can be treated as an independent variable insofar as it changes the character of modernization. He observes: "It is in industrial societies as distinct from modernizing ones that government as an intervening variable comes to prevail." See his book, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 252.

⁵⁵ For variants of the radical-reforming dichotomy, see James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg,

developmental objectives has not been without its effects. Kenya, with an average annual growth rate at constant prices of over five per cent, has achieved a level of economic development which is admired in much of independent Africa.

It must be stressed, however, that a policy of extensive reliance upon foreign resources does not imply satisfaction with the status quo. Such is not the case. Kenya leaders are reform-minded, intent upon applying humanistic values to the capitalistic system. They seek to use the strengths developed under a capitalist order to advance African opportunity, not be used by the system. Hence they have made what could be described as a calculated "time-investment" in the existing order. They are deferring some of the equity demands until a later date, hoping through this sacrifice to achieve a more favorable future reconciliation between equity and development.

Kenya has given expression to its reforming approach in its policy of African Socialism. The Kenya interpretation of African Socialism seeks to join the nationalist demand for African opportunity with the continuation of the capitalist system. It is a reformist doctrine because it attempts to Africanize capitalism, not to proceed toward classical socialism. Although future programs involving the nationalization of commerce or industry are not ruled out, such programs are delayed in order to spur present growth objectives. "It should be recognized," reasoned the White Paper on African Socialism, "that if the nation's limited domestic capital is used to buy existing land, livestock, buildings, machinery and equipment, the nation has no more productive assets than before—only their ownership has changed. What may be lost are the new resources that could have been purchased instead. . . ."⁵⁹ Of course such an interpretation could change with new and different ways of perceiving priorities.

For the time being at least, government is determined to bring about a smooth and effective

expectations in both capital spending and self help effort." Edgar O. Edwards, "Development Planning in Kenya Since Independence," *East African Economic Review*, 4 (New Series) (December, 1968), p. 9. The percentage rates of growth of the gross domestic product in the 1963-67 period were estimated as 7.4 per cent at current prices and 5.3 per cent at constant prices. Republic of Kenya, *Economic Survey 1968* (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1968), p. 7.

⁵⁹ *African Socialism* . . . , p. 26. Also see Duncan Ndegwa's argument in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 1, 1968, p. 13.

transfer of economic power into African hands.⁶⁰ "In general," remarked the late Tom Mboya, ". . . Africanisation of the various sectors of the economy will be pursued through a framework of growth, i.e., by enabling Africans to own new assets."⁶¹ The emphasis is upon steady and continuous progress toward "substantive rewards."⁶² Clearly the present administration does not intend to force the pace of Africanization beyond the point which the public or private sectors can absorb without a loss in efficiency or productivity.

Evidence of such pragmatism is readily at hand. One example may be inferred from the implementation of the Trade Licensing Act of 1967 which imposed some restrictions on noncitizen commercial activities. In the debate on the bill, Mwai Kibaki, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, stated that the government would consider scheduling a township under the Act when, after consultations with the county council, administration and local leaders, it had determined that there were enough local people ready to take over the businesses presently run by noncitizens.⁶³ The emphasis was upon "phasing out" the change so as to avoid costly disruptions.

When the new law came into effect, government leaders continued to stress that the transition to African dominance in the field of trade would have to take place gradually. Kibaki told a press conference in January, 1968 that the law would be applied "in a reasonable manner." Noncitizens would be removed from areas only as quickly as Africans were prepared to assume the new responsibilities.⁶⁴ In subsequent months,

⁶⁰ *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. IX, Fourth Sess. (July 15, 1966), col. 1904. Also see Republic of Kenya, *Kenyanization of Personnel in the Private Sector* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1967), p. 3.

⁶¹ "Speech by the Hon. T. J. Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development—Introducing the Development Plan 1966/1970," Nairobi Press Conference, May 5, 1966, p. 43. (Mimeo.). For his discussion of the limited utility of nationalization under Kenya circumstances, see *House of Representatives Debates* (Kenya), Vol. IV, Second Sess. (May 4, 1965), cols. 1803-1806.

⁶² For the distinction between symbolic and substantive rewards, as used in a different context, see Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *People and Politics: An Analysis of the American Political System* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 26, 68-69.

⁶³ *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIII, Fifth Sess. (November 9, 1967), col. 1972.

⁶⁴ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), January 12,

as members of the Kitale Municipal Council sought to include their township as one of the general trading areas open to noncitizen businessmen, the Minister issued a statement reassuring peoples dependent upon non-African services that no arbitrary or ill-conceived actions were contemplated.⁶⁵ Even as a stricter application of the regulations was considered in the latter part of the year, the government remained determined to see that non-Africans stayed on in their shops until an "efficient African" became available.⁶⁶ In principle, the government preferred to delay Africanization objectives where these clashed head on with business efficiency. To the extent that the priorities seemed to have changed in early 1969, this may be attributable as much to a judgment about the manpower supply situation as to the political objectives involved.

Not only are governmental officials pragmatic in their implementation of the Trade Licensing Act, but they are also careful to delineate the kinds of activities affected by the Act. As Kibaki noted in the debate on the bill, the Trade Licensing Act would apply only to trade licenses, not to manufacturing licenses.⁶⁷ His comment is indicative of the tendency on the part of government to give greater encouragement to African commerce than to African industry.⁶⁸ Apart from restrictions on noncitizen trading licenses, African traders have also been helped by redirection of commodity distribution through the Kenya National Trading Corporation. By contrast, African industrial businesses receive no preferential treatment. African sawmills have great difficulty in getting any timber allocations from the Forest Department, which gives them mostly to Asian and European mills. Government departments put their requirements out to tender with strict impartiality, and they drop African firms if they obtain a more competitive bid elsewhere. Government does nothing to restrict competition from European and Asian

companies, even when they threaten to drive African firms financed by government loans out of business. Clearly the government regards industrial growth as too urgent a matter to compromise growth rates by favoring, too strongly, the small beginnings of African entrepreneurship. It wants overseas private firms to invest large sums, thereby helping to build an industrial base. Government is then likely to Africanize gradually, perhaps pressuring firms to sell shares to the public or to appoint African directors and senior employees.

Finally, pragmatism is evident in the way in which government issued work permits. Following the passage of the 1967 Immigration Act, officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs gave assurances to noncitizens that they need not panic about securing the new work permits. No abrupt changes were intended; the Immigration Department would not act with undue haste as it called classes of people forward to apply for work permits.⁶⁹ Other signs of governmental caution came to light in the following year. Immigration officials announced further periods of grace in regard to work permits, allowing employers who had not been informed of the results of work permit applications to continue to employ their staff until informed otherwise.⁷⁰ In addition, the Minister for Home Affairs, D. T. arap Moi, gave assurances to international companies about their key employees, and farmers were told by various officials that their applications for permits would be processed swiftly.⁷¹ By September, 1968, it was announced that 8,000 of the first 9,000 applications submitted had been approved—a proportion sufficiently generous that the U. K. Citizens Committee could talk of evidence of a slackened speed of Africanization!⁷² Thus the government's over-

1968, p. 1. See also *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIV, Sixth Sess. (April 9, 1968), col. 1794.

⁶⁵ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 24, 1968, p. 5. For articles dealing with Kitale fears over the effects of the Trade Licensing Law, see *ibid.*, February 23, 1968, p. 8.

⁶⁶ *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), August 18, 1968, p. 1, and *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 19, 1968, p. 3. It is important to note that no guidelines as to competency were set.

⁶⁷ *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XIII, Fifth Sess. (November 9, 1967), col. 1968.

⁶⁸ I am grateful to Peter Marris for bringing most of the points in this paragraph to my attention.

⁶⁹ *East African Standard* (Nairobi), November 15, 1967, p. 9, and November 16, 1967, p. 4.

⁷⁰ *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), June 8, 1968, pp. 1, 24, and June 10, 1968, p. 6.

⁷¹ Republic of Kenya, *Statement on Application of the New Immigration Act in Relation to "Work Permits" and Kenyanization* by D. T. arap Moi (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1968), p. 2; *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), February 15, 1968, p. 6 and February 16, 1968, p. 4; and *East African Standard* (Nairobi), February 15, 1968, pp. 1, 4, 5.

⁷² Letter from G. S. Sandhu to J. Callaghan (Nairobi: U. K. Citizens Committee, May 29, 1968), p. 1. (Mimeo.). The government's generosity is underlined by the fact that the following middle-level categories were involved: secretaries, artisans, masons, carpenters, cashiers, office machine operators, shop assistants, and salesmen. *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess.

riding concern with the health of the economy led to only a gradual implementation of the regulations on work permits in the early period after the passage of the immigration law.

In contrast, Tanzanian leaders placed great stress upon equity objectives in the period following the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The principles set out in the second five-year development plan—social equality, Ujamaa (familyhood), self-reliance, economic and social transformation, and African economic integration—indicate the strength of their commitment to egalitarian objectives.⁷³ Such priorities coincide with doubts about attracting sufficient external resources for rapid industrialization. "We are mistaken," observed President Julius K. Nyerere, "when we imagine that we shall get money from foreign countries; firstly because to say the truth we cannot get enough money for our development; and secondly, because even if we could get it, such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our independence and the other policies of our country."⁷⁴ Continued reliance on Western finance is seen as offering no escape from colonial inequities, for development along capitalist lines will result at best in marginal benefits for the great majority of the impoverished local population. To end the drift toward what they see as "economic dependency,"⁷⁵ the Tanzanians have adopted a policy of socialism and self-reliance. They have created a sense of crisis in the populace by focusing on the unpredictability and unfriendliness of the international environment in order to mobilize the populace and reduce their dependence on external sources of capital and manpower. Nyerere's formula runs as follows:

... And the truth is that our United Republic has

(September 23, 1968), col. 1071. In July, 1969, J. H. Gitau, the director of the Kenyanization of Personnel Bureau, commented that more than half of the 18,000 applications for work permits received from noncitizens had been approved. *East African Standard* (Nairobi), July 4, 1969, p. 5.

⁷³ The United Republic of Tanzania, *Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969–30th June, 1974*, Vol. I (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 1.

⁷⁴ *The Arusha Declaration*, p. 11. See also his *Freedom and Socialism* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 166–167, and his interview with George Githii in *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), August 7, 1968, p. 11.

⁷⁵ *Freedom and Socialism*, p. 263. For discussions of how gifts and loans endanger independence by Tanzanians and others, see *The Arusha Declaration*, pp. 9–10, and *Wanachi Declaration*, p. 9.

at present a poor, undeveloped, and agricultural economy. We have very little capital to invest in big factories or modern machines; we are short of people with skill and experience. What we do have is land in abundance and people who are willing to work hard for their own improvement. It is the use of these latter resources which will decide whether we reach our total goals or not. If we use these resources in a spirit of self-reliance as the basis for development, then we shall make progress slowly but surely. And it will then be real progress, affecting the lives of the masses, not just having spectacular show-pieces in the towns while the rest of the people of Tanzania live in their present poverty.⁷⁶

Nyerere is willing if necessary to accept slow progress for the sake of independence from the grip of Western capitalism. To this end, he calls for rural development, a complete overhaul of the educational system, and a variety of puritanical measures aimed at eliminating luxury and ostentation. He rejects industrial development based essentially upon foreign initiative even while welcoming alien capital and skills which are willingly contributed toward fulfilling the government's objectives of building a socialist state. The 1969–1974 Development Plan reflects these priorities by forecasting a private sector investment of diminishing importance relative to other sources, crucial only in housing, road transport and construction.⁷⁷

Ultimately, African radicals such as Nyerere can be said to value collective action and equity more than economic growth. They and their supporters ridicule what they describe as "perverse growth," namely economic expansion on African soil which benefits international capitalism more than the local economy of the developing state.⁷⁸ Their radicalism lies in altering their relationship to the international order that they inherited and in attempting to mold an economic arrangement geared to circumstances of

⁷⁶ *Education for Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), p. 6.

⁷⁷ The sources of investment capital during the Second Plan period are projected as follows: central government, shs. 3,055 m.; parastatal organizations and cooperatives, shs. 2,300 m.; private, shs. 2,150 m.; East African Community, shs. 580 m., United Republic of Tanzania, *Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan . . .*, p. 210. On the slow growth in total number of employed people, see Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVII (April, 1969), p. 549.

⁷⁸ Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VI (August, 1968), pp. 150–151.

their own making. Their stress upon rural development and Ujamaa villages as well as their de-emphasis of wealth are indications of this new assertiveness.⁷⁹ In seeking to determine their own order, they naturally rule out or greatly minimize such reminders of old times as extensive concessions to the development demands put forth by foreign interests.

IV. POSSIBLE CHANGES IN KENYA'S PRIORITIES

Kenya's attempt to strike a balance between demands for Africanization and for optimum economic development was one among several strategies for building a political order in the immediate period after independence. For Kenyans, an imbalance of emphasis in the direction of racial equity might have achieved social justice at a possible cost in growth. An imbalance in the direction of all-out economic development would have involved social costs in terms of African opportunity; the class-racial gap between the privileged non-Africans and the underprivileged Africans might have widened, leading to a dramatic escalation of frustrations in the period just after the transfer of power had occurred. The reconciling of somewhat conflicting demands was a delicate operation at best, but it seemed to Kenya's rulers to promise significant advantages in securing a balanced development.

The transfer of political sovereignty had little initial impact upon non-African hegemony in the economic sphere; Europeans and Asians continued to predominate as a consequence of their hold upon essential skills and capital. Conscious of the increased exposure of their position resulting from the loss of political power, however, they were prepared to accept—even help guide—a limited adjustment in the economic order. They sought to co-opt some trained Africans into the free enterprise system, thereby cooperating with the government's goal of creating African opportunity within the inherited capitalistic arrangement.

Nevertheless the relationship of a strategy of development to intergroup relations must be viewed in a larger perspective than the unique response to post-*uhuru* circumstances. Development inevitably involves adjustments to changing internal conditions, specifically and currently increasing African pressures for equity at a time of moderate economic progress. With the passing of the initial postcolonial phase, unemployment has increased generally, dissatisfaction with income differentials has become more and more apparent, and the demand for Kenyaniza-

tion, if not "blackening," has become pronounced. "The people are unemployed everywhere," warned Masinde Muliro, "and this is material for disgruntled politicians. . . . Today we have revolutions in Africa because of disgruntled millions, and as long as ours is not yet disgruntled we should try to see how best we can remedy the poverty which is in our country."⁸⁰ The former Opposition party's, KPU's, attempts to capitalize upon such popular sentiments did not lead to major electoral successes; yet the appeals of its radical approach were evidently seen as a challenge during the Little General Election of 1966 and the 1969 by-election in the Gem constituency of Siaya District.⁸¹ Thus Africanization demands are being pressed with increasing intensity, and governments in developing countries, which have limited capability to cope with conflicting internal pressures, must make concessions to racial equity demands in order to ensure the persistence of the system.

Governmental priorities are likely to reflect changes in inputs in the years ahead. As equity demands grow, governments may be compelled to move in one of two main directions: to the "right" in the form of additional coercion or to the "left" in the form of more appealing radical strategems ranging from heavier taxation to nationalization. The first alternative would be evidence of the current elite's investment in the present order. It would attempt to secure a firm hold on the present situation by combining the necessary elements of force with a policy of co-opting as many able African graduates into high-level positions as the nation's development would permit.⁸² This approach would mean a

⁷⁹ *National Assembly Debates* (Kenya), Vol. XVI, Sixth Sess. (September 3, 1968), cols. 98-99. See also *East African Standard* (Nairobi), October 4, 1968, p. 17. For a discussion of Kenya's unemployed as a political pressure group, see Peter C. W. Gutkind, "The Poor in Urban Africa," in *Power, Poverty and Urban Policy*, ed. by Warner Bloomberg, Jr. and Henry J. Schmandt (Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. II; Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1968), pp. 388-392.

⁸¹ For a discussion of parochial as well as class factors in the Gem by-election, see John Joseph Okumu, "The By Election in Gem: An Assessment," *East Africa Journal*, VI (June, 1969), pp. 15-17.

⁸² This point was clarified in discussions with Professor Michael Lofchie. Moreover, as Ted Gurr notes, a regime's attempt to use coercive measures in dealing with widely perceived feelings of deprivation will necessitate the commitment of a high level of resources. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New In-

⁷⁹ Editorial, *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), May 8, 1969, p. 4, and *Reporter* (Nairobi), November 14, 1969, p. 27.

continuing emphasis upon growth over social justice; the nation's development would be used to implement Africanization objectives to the extent compatible with development objectives. The second alternative, and one that appeals in Kenya to some KANU backbenchers as well as the detained KPU parliamentarians, involves a move to the "left" to preserve the government's legitimacy. This would entail a change in the existing balance in favor of racial equity demands, reducing growth rates for the sake of social justice. Such an approach would subordinate "economic interest," defined in terms of total growth rates, to "political interest," defined in terms of broadening and deepening the regime's base of legitimacy. This would be a not unlikely response to the changing nature of political pressures in the period after the victories of independence have been consolidated.

The implications of such revisions of priorities for racial minorities can be suggested only tentatively. A move toward the maintenance of the present system through additional coercion would likely mean that rich or highly-skilled

non-Africans would continue for the time being to perform a vital role in achieving the country's economic objectives. Their security of mind might be lessened by the administration's increasing reliance upon the instruments of coercion and the steady inroads on the membership of the non-African communities brought about by accelerated Africanization policies. The functionally-significant Asian or European would still have an important contribution to make to economic growth. However, a shift from present Africanization programs and reliance upon non-African capital to a radical formula more in line with the aspirations of the politically mobilized segments of public opinion would weaken the minority hold on economic life. It would divest them of a number of presently performed functions, and thereby undermine vital immigrant claims for inclusion in African polities.

In the large, the non-Africans' increasing marginality would be a consequence of the egalitarian tendencies implicit in the industrial-commercial ethos they helped to carry into Africa. And the race-consciousness that they fostered would further weaken their position by undercutting the kind of legal-contractual environment essential to their survival on the perimeters of primarily African communities.

dices," this REVIEW, LXII (December, 1968), p. 1124.

THE ROLE OF THE M.P. IN TANZANIA*

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The study of politics in "developing" countries has tended to focus on the less formal organs of government, such as political parties, the military, the bureaucracy, and even the educational system.¹ National legislatures have often been ignored or rated of little significance in the political processes of these states.² This practice contrasts markedly with the attention paid to legislatures in Western states. The most obvious explanation for it is that legislatures in new states tend to have little influence. Important decisions and shifts in power are usually made or recorded elsewhere in the political system.

The *Bunge*, or National Assembly, of Tanzania is no exception to this general phenomenon. Nevertheless, an examination of the role of M.P.'s in Tanzania can be illuminating.³ The *Bunge* contains most of the major political leaders and has, at least constitutionally, broad authority. As a consequence, if the Assembly is to

be only a weak political body, then informal norms limiting the powers of the M.P.'s role must exist. Moreover, these norms should prescribe authority relationships between the legislature and other policy shaping bodies in the political system, particularly the Party. Thus, an analysis of the roles of these men can provide important insights not only into the functions of the *Bunge*, but also into the elite political culture of Tanzania and the pattern of politics which this culture supports.

I. POLITICAL ROLES

Roles are basic analytical units of political systems.⁴ Political roles consist of a pattern of expected behavior for individuals holding particular positions in a system. In order to understand how a political culture operates so as to regulate not only overt activity but also to influence the pattern of ideas and subjective behavior, I have focused on a political role as the key agent of translation between the broad characteristics of culture and the discrete set of acts that constitute the political process. While some role expectations are always *ad hoc* and issue centered, others are of a general nature. The latter define general boundary rules of political roles, certain acts that are clearly wrong in the minds of most individuals. The institutionalization of rules in the political system is evidenced by a structured and interrelated set of norms for role behavior. Where these norms are weak or ambiguous, institutionalization not only of political roles, but of the political system itself, is at a low level.

The norms or rules shaping durable political roles involve system-level or macro processes. These norms determine the style and stability of politics in the system. This research, however, focuses heavily upon individuals and what has been termed microscopic role analysis.⁵ Carefully examining the norms for an M.P. allows us to combine a micro analysis of a role in which the behavior of individuals can be studied, with

*This is a revised and shortened version of a paper read at the African Studies Association meetings in Los Angeles in October, 1968. I am grateful to several colleagues at Swarthmore and elsewhere whose comments have been most helpful.

¹See for example the six volumes edited by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics (published by Princeton Press, 1963-66) and Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968).

²One exception to this trend is Frederick W. Frey's *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, 1965).

³The concept of role, as used here, refers to all the principal aspects of a role: the expectations of others, the orientations of the individual occupying the position, and the actual behavior of the individual. The congruence and consensus among these role aspects is a major focus of my investigation. This essay assumes the reader is generally familiar with the concept of "role" as used in this sense. See for reference, Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, editors, *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (New York, 1966). One example of a study of legislative behavior which relied heavily upon role analysis as a tool of research to reveal patterns of politics in four state legislatures is John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962).

⁴See David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 39-57.

⁵See Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), Chapters 10-12.

a macro political analysis since the norms which operate to constrain the actions of the elite in this role are major components of the political culture and constitute some of the "rules of the game."

This study is based on interviews with M.P.'s and an analysis of their behavior in Assembly debates. It is divided into four sections: an examination of Assembly behavior, a characterization of various types of legislators, an exploration of role expectations for M.P.'s, and a conclusion. In the final section, four rules which emerge as basic norms for the role behavior of legislators are described and discussed. These rules elucidate a pattern of "closed" politics which characterizes the style of national politics in Tanzania.⁶

II. THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

In 1961 Tanzania (then Tanganyika) became independent. Its constitution, modeled on the Westminster system, was replaced in 1962 by a new republican form of government with a popularly elected President. Again, in 1965, a year after the union with Zanzibar which officially formed Tanzania, another constitution was adopted. These changes brought formal legal codes closer to the actual patterns of decision-making which evolved after independence. A strong presidency has been established, and the Tanganyika African National Union, TANU, is now officially recognized as the only legal party.⁷ The National Executive Committee of TANU (NEC) and the President's Cabinet are the main decision-makers in Tanzania; however, many members of these bodies are also M.P.'s.

The National Assembly, though originally modelled on the British parliamentary system, has never evidenced similar patterns of legislative functions. The most important reason for this is that no significant opposition organized along party lines ever existed in the legislature. From the first elections in 1958/59, a *de facto* situation of one party dominance has existed. Party control was initially exercised through

prior meetings of Parliament at closed sessions of the TANU Parliamentary Party (TPP). Since all members of the National Assembly were in the TPP, these closed meetings were often the real legislative forum.⁸ In 1965, therefore, following the introduction of the one party state, the TPP was dissolved. Sensitive issues, however, are still discussed privately with legislators, and the government has not relinquished the notion of party discipline.

Assembly Behavior. Although their work in informal discussions, committee meetings (which are private), tours of their districts, meetings with constituents, and collaborations with members of the government are all important aspects of legislators' behavior, Assembly speeches are the only aspect of role behavior readily susceptible to systematic study. Assembly voting is only recorded following a call for a division, and there was only one division—on a trivial matter—called in the first five years of independence (through July, 1966). Voting behavior, consequently, is not a fruitful field for research.

Therefore, in order to understand the role of legislators within the assembly, a content analysis of the actual debates was made. Speeches for five one-year periods beginning with October, 1961 (just prior to independence) and ending with the June budget session in 1966 have been coded. In all, 15,421 speeches were analyzed. Each speech was coded according to five characteristics: subject, national or local orientation, position vis-a-vis the government, language, and length.⁹ Since many short speeches were quick

⁶ One member, Chief Masanja, resigned from TANU to join the ANC in 1962. But this exception has proved unimportant.

⁷ All speeches in the 1961/62 and 1965/66 periods have been coded; approximately 50% of the speeches in the intervening three years have been coded. Twenty-eight different subject categories, many related to ministerial divisions, such as agriculture or education, were used in coding subjects. Orientation was either national or local. The position of a speech could be one of four types: supportive (of the government's position), critical, neutral (if the speech was balanced or there was no official government position), and "demand" question-answer. This last category was used for many of the short questions and answers expressing and responding to demands or problems, usually local, raised by backbenchers. The language was Swahili or English (or in a few instances, mixed). Three length categories were used: short (0 to 1½ minutes), medium (1½ to 7 minutes) and long (more than 7 minutes). The coding procedures and tests for reliability are reported in

⁸ This pattern of "closed" politics and the process by which it has developed are described in Raymond F. Hopkins, *Political Roles in a New State: A Study of Politics in Tanzania* (dissertation, Yale, 1968; Yale Press, forthcoming). References are to pages in the dissertation.

⁹ For a readable review of the national political history of Tanzania, see J. Clagett Taylor, *The Political Development of Tanganyika* (Stanford, 1963); and for an insightful analysis of the party and state machinery see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton, 1967).




FIGURE 1. USE OF SWAHILI

questions and answers, and, therefore, different in quality from longer, more substantial contributions, speeches were also "weighted" for length, eliminating short speeches and counting long ones twice. Patterns among speeches document the trends in Assembly debate since independence.

Trends in Behavior. One striking trend is the introduction of "national" traditions. The quaintly irrelevant powdered wigs, still found in some African legislatures, were discarded in Tanzania in 1962. The Speaker, Chief Adam Sapi, adopted a traditional costume which he wore as Chief or Sultan of the Hehe. Western business suits have generally been abandoned in favor of more functional attire known as "national dress," which is a collarless shirt often worn with matching slacks. More important than these changes in dress has been the introduction of the national language, Swahili. Figure

1 charts the conversion of debates from English, originally the only official language, to Swahili, which became an additional official language in 1962. The use of Swahili has allowed many less well educated legislators to demonstrate articulateness and express their feelings in an idiom familiar not only to themselves but also to the vast majority of Tanzanians.

A second trend is the decline of speeches dealing with National issues. At the time of independence, a vast amount of legislation was placed before the Assembly. Major legislation in agriculture, education, local government elections, taxes, citizenship, and the new republican constitution were all discussed and passed by the Assembly in the first year of independence. Ninety-six government bills were passed, forty-four based on certificates of emergency which allowed the requirements for prior publication to be waived. In the midst of these efforts, little time was left for discussions or questions related to local or regional problems. But as the pace of legislation slackened, discussion of local issues

Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-410. Inter-coder reliability indicated an average of over 92% agreement.




FIGURE 2. DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL ISSUES




FIGURE 3. SUPPORTIVE SPEECHES

increased. Figure 2 illustrates that while the large majority of speeches are still nationally oriented, there has been a fairly steady decline in the per cent of speeches on national issues, except for a slight upswing in 1963/64, possibly explained by a renewal of national concerns following the army mutiny in January, 1964, and the Federation in April 1964.

Coincident with the changes in nationally oriented speeches has been the decline in both supportive and critical speeches. Among "weighted" addresses, however, there has been a general increase in support for the government from 1961

until 1965 followed by a marked decline after the 1965 elections. This pattern in supportive speeches is exactly the reverse of the pattern for critical speeches (Figure 4). Criticism of government policies, particularly among long speeches, was frequent in the early debates of the Assembly. It dropped steadily after independence and by the 1963/64 session it reached a nadir, probably reflecting the emphasis on unity following the army mutiny and the sudden events surrounding the union with Zanzibar. Assembly debates, although never marked by an active or systematic opposition, reached a point




FIGURE 4. CRITICAL SPEECHES

during this period where the absence of criticism made sessions largely ceremonial, and, as one Member described it, "rather boring."

An important conclusion which may be reached by examining the careers of those M.P.'s who were most critical is that no Member should become identified with a pattern of opposition. Only a few Members during the first two years of independence gave critical speeches 50% or more of the time. None has since. Those who did included Tumbo and Mkello, labor leaders who were subsequently placed in detention; Masanja, who, never a serious influence in the Assembly, defected to the A.N.C. (a miniscule opposition party) and has since retired from politics; and Siyovelwa and Mbogo, who, though loyal TANU members, did not stand for reelection. Both were appointed Area Commissioners, but Mbogo has been removed and imprisoned for theft. Thus none of those who were clearly and consistently critical or who opposed the government in the first five years has survived as a popular politician or M.P. Comparatively frequent criticism by an M.P. is often an indication of political ambition. For example, three M.P.'s who were initially quite critical, Mtaki, Wambura and Mponji, were made Junior Ministers and regularly entrusted with defending the government. In 1966, all expressed satisfaction with their careers and hoped to continue in their positions.¹⁰ Two Englishmen, Short and LeMaitre, were also frequent critics. Both lost their seats in 1962 because they were not citizens.

In the new and expanded *Bunge*, elected in 1965, discussions have become considerably more lively. About every fourth or fifth speaker in the new Assembly who made a lengthy contribution was critical of the government. However, over twice as many speeches have been supportive. On balance, the legislative arena is still a forum in which the government's ideas and proposals are largely praised or defended and criticism is not systematic, let alone organized. Among those M.P.'s who were most critical according to the analysis of speeches in the 1965/66 period, nine had lost their Assembly seats for political reasons by December, 1968, either by virtue of having been expelled from the Party or due to political detention or exile.¹¹ Mwakit-

wange, for example, in July, 1968, accused the government of "tribalism," "nepotism" and slowing the pace of Africanization. He was expelled from the Party three months later.¹² Eli Anangisye, former Secretary of the TANU Youth League, and F. L. Masha, who had been national publicity secretary for TANU, were among those expelled.

The analysis of Assembly behavior indicates that while M.P.'s have adopted national dress and speech, thereby making the *Bunge* more of an indigenous institution, the role of the M.P. in the actual legislative process is quite minor. Seldom is legislation altered by committee or Assembly action. Although criticism of the government has increased following the 1965 elections, it tends not to be directed toward critical or sensitive matters,¹³ and those M.P.'s who have been noticeably or consistently critical tend to have had their political careers shortened.

to missing three sessions of the Assembly. Anangisye was in detention and Kambona in political exile. Kambona was not an Assembly critic, but in private he was often highly critical.

¹² See *The Nationalist*, July 11, 1968, and December 10, 1968, p. 1.

¹³ An analysis of topics discussed in the 1965/66 Assembly revealed that criticism and support were not evenly distributed. For instance, on many of the twenty-eight subjects into which speeches were categorized, not a single critical speech was given. The most heavily criticized legislative topics (in over ten per cent of speeches) were elections, housing and labor unions. In contrast, military affairs received no criticism and was supported in 76% of the speeches on the subject. This is in marked contrast to the first year of independence when only 40% of the speeches supported military policy and 28% were critical. The lack of criticism in these areas reflects pressures, not organized by any individual or even by the Party, but rather, generated by latent political norms which dictate that delicate and controversial subjects are either best avoided or commented upon only in a constructive manner.

A factor analysis of these debates in 1965/1966 revealed the most prominent dimension as a "Security-Sovereignty" factor including issues such as foreign policy, Party, constitutional matters, the military and questions of national unity. This factor explained 27.8% of the variance among the 28 subject variables. High loading subjects accounted for 20% of all speeches. The factor scores for legislators on this dimension correlated highly, .68 with a high frequency of supportive speeches. See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-230.

¹⁰ Mtaki, however, who had attracted attention by his flamboyant style and recitation of Marxist principles, retired from politics in 1967 to enter private business. Another frequent critic, Buhatwa, was also made a Junior Minister but he lost in the 1965 elections and became an administrator in the Ministry of Housing.

¹¹ Anangisye and Kambona lost their seats due

III. LEGISLATIVE TYPES

Individual attitudes of M.P.'s are, perhaps, the most instructive evidence as to the role which the political system in Tanzania is creating for legislators. In order to investigate the attitudes relevant to the legislator's role, a random sample of Tanzanian political elite was interviewed: 58 *Wabunge* (out of 184 then in the Assembly) and 50 high level government administrators. These interviews were conducted between April and August, 1966. The interviews with M.P.'s averaged about two hours each and covered a variety of topics, including the individual's background, his attitudes toward democracy and African socialism, his conception of his job as an M.P., and his expectations about what he or others would do in a number of hypothetical role situations.¹⁴

During the course of interviewing, I began to recognize several types of legislators. Later, by analyzing the sample carefully, four "types" of legislators were identified, based largely upon differences in career length, mode of selection, and the special obligation of those in government posts. Eighteen of the fifty-eight M.P.'s interviewed held positions as Ministers, Junior Ministers, or Regional Commissioners. Of these eighteen government members, fifteen began their political careers prior to 1958. This long involvement and the relative success of this group in politics resulted in my labeling these fifteen "Politicos." All but one served in the first parliament of independent Tanzania from 1960 to 1965.

The forty-three other legislators interviewed fell largely into three groups—"Locals," "Intellectuals," and "Silent Partners." Intellectuals were better educated, more widely read, more interested in politics as a profession and career, seem more intellectually involved with questions of national policy. Ten legislators met these criteria and nine were categorized as "Intellectuals."¹⁵ Of the remaining 33 legislators in the

sample, 26 were constituency representatives. Twenty-five were categorized as "Locals."¹⁶ Locals represented a constituency, were often from the majority tribe of their area and were usually born in their constituency. Six of the remaining seven legislators, three of whom are government members with short careers, have been labeled "Silent Partners." All of these members were appointed rather than elected to the Assembly. Their experience in the Assembly and in TANU (though not necessarily Zanzibar) politics was short, and one may conveniently think of them as quiet (for, as will appear shortly, they seldom spoke) supporters of the government, hence the title "Silent Partners." If more Zanzibaris had been sampled, this group would be larger.¹⁷

Table 1 contains basic background information on these legislative types. Differences in education, newspaper reading, type of membership, career length, and position in the government, all of which are quite different among the groups, illustrate the distinctions among these four types of legislators. Politicos and Intellectuals are the best educated and read. Except for the distinction of government membership, these two groups are the most alike. Politics is especially important for individuals in both of these groups. The greatest portion of their life activity is taken up with public matters, particularly meeting other politicians, talking and dealing with them. In contrast, Locals spend a greater portion of their time in home constituencies, often travelling and speaking with their fellow citizens or tending farms or businesses. Many Locals, while active in politics, were also occupied with some other employment prior to their election for the first time in 1965. Most Locals were born in their constituency while Politicos tend to be born outside of their constituency and not to be members of the major or majority tribe. Locals also tend to have won their seats by a narrower margin than either Intellectuals

¹⁴ Informal interviews with a number of other National Assembly Members, including Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa and Assembly Speaker Adam Sapi Mkwawa, were also used in this study. A statement of the interview format used in the interviews may be found in Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-375. Those interviewed are not identified since anonymity was promised.

¹⁵ The term "intellectual" is applied in the general sense suggested by Edward Shils in his article, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of New States," *World Politics*, XII (April, 1960), 329-368. In order to operationalize these distinctions, which emerged initially from subjective analysis of the interviews, legislators with college

degrees or post-secondary education and who read widely were selected as "Intellectuals." One M.P. with a college degree has been excluded from this typology because he did not fit the basic characteristics of either "Intellectuals" or "Locals." He did not represent a constituency, had not given a single speech in the National Assembly and had no interest in a political career. His work, in fact, often kept him out of the country.

¹⁶ The twenty-sixth, the Deputy Speaker, is the only nongovernmental member in the sample serving his second term. He was excluded from the typology.

¹⁷ The seventh legislator remaining, a National Member, did not fit this or any other category.

TABLE 1. BACKGROUNDS OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intellectuals (N=9)	Locals (N=25)	Silent Partners (N=6)	Politicos (N=15)	All M.P.s Interviewed (N=58)
<i>Age:</i>					
35 or under	44%	48%	17%	13%	34%
36-40	11	16	0	33	19
41-45	11	24	17	47	28
46 or over	33	12	67	7	19
<i>Religion:</i>					
Protestant	44%	44%	50%	47%	45%
Catholic	44	20	0	27	24
Muslim	11	24	50	27	26
<i>Education:</i>					
Less than secondary school	0%	64%	50%	27%	41%
Secondary school	0	20	33	20	19
Post-secondary	56	16	0	20	21
College or better	44	0	17	33	19
<i>Newspaper Reading:</i>					
High	100%	20%	50%	100%	59%
Low	0	80	50	0	41
<i>Terms Served:</i>					
One	100%	96%	67%	7%	67%
One and part of second	0	4	33	0	5
Two	0	0	0	93	28
Locals/Politicos $X^2=35.9^*$					
<i>Career Length:</i>					
Began political activity—					
1958 or before	44%	20%	50%	100%	47%
After 1958	56	80	50	0	53
Locals/politicos $X^2=20.9^*$					
<i>Type of Membership:</i>					
Elected	67%	100%	0%	60%	71%
National Member	33	0	0	0	9
Nominated	0	0	17	7	3
Zanzibar—Appointed	0	0	33	0	3
Zanzibar—Rev. Council	0	0	17	0	2
Regional Commissioner	0	0	33	33	12
<i>Member of Government:</i>					
Yes	0%	0%	50%	100%	31%
No	100	100	50	0	69
<i>Party Position:</i>					
N.E.C.	11%	4%	50%†	47%	21%
Party office or job	22	48	0	53	38
Just member	67	48	0	0	36
Locals/Politicos $X^2=15.8^*$					

* These Chi-squares (X^2) are significant at the .01 level.

† Two of three Members from Zanzibar had high posts in the ASP equivalent to N.E.C. positions; if these three Zanzibaris are included, the column reads: 83, 0, 17.

TABLE 2. ECONOMIC VIEWS OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intellectuals (N = 9)	Locals (N = 25)	Silent Partners (N = 6)	Politicos (N = 15)	All M.P.s Interviewed (N = 58)
<i>Pace of Change:</i>					
Too fast	11%	20%	0%	20%	16%
About right	44	72	100	47	66
Too slow	33	8	0	33	17
<i>African Socialism as a Concept:</i>					
Misleading	89%	4%	17%	20%	22%
Uncertain	11	36	17	33	28
Good expression	0	32	33	47	33
<i>African Socialism Defined:</i>					
True socialism—Good thing	56%	8%	0%	47%	26%
African tradition—Good	0	64	33	27	38
True socialism—Bad thing	33	0	0	7	7
African tradition—Bad	11	4	0	7	7
Locals/Politicos $X^2 = 10.2^*$					

Percentages do not add to 100%, indicating some respondents did not answer.

* This Chi-square is significant at the $p < .05$ level.

or Politicos. Silent Partners have no established constituencies. Outside the Assembly their efforts are largely administrative, either as agents of the government or as Party officers.

Economic Views. The responses of the various legislative types toward questions about economic issues are reported in Table 2. Intellectuals and Politicos were least content with the present rate of change. Relatively large numbers in these groups favored either a slower or faster rate of change.

Moreover, not one of the Intellectuals expressed satisfaction with the term African Socialism as a "concept"; eight out of nine disliked it. In contrast, the other three groups indicated ambivalent support for the idea. Forty-seven per cent of the Politicos, two of the six Silent Partners, and thirty-two per cent of the Locals felt the term was a useful, helpful or clear expression.

The evident distaste among Intellectuals for "African Socialism" is reflected in the different emphasis with which they defined the term. Five out of nine defined it as true or scientific socialism and saw this as a positive or desirable goal; three interpreted it similarly, but evaluated it negatively. Only one Intellectual understood African Socialism as an outgrowth of traditional African practice and he opposed such a policy. Locals, in sharp distinction to Intellectuals, tended to hold the view that African tradition is the basis for socialism and they looked favorably

on this idea. Only two of the Silent Partners elaborated their views on African socialism—largely an indication of their unwillingness to assert themselves on ideological matters. Definitions among Politicos varied widely, but were closest to those held by Intellectuals.

These "economic" attitudes among legislators further indicate the similarity among Intellectuals and Politicos. Sentiments of dissatisfaction were expressed most often by individuals in these two groups. Thus, Intellectuals and Politicos differ largely in that Politicos are the successful politicians in high government posts while Intellectuals, as openly indicated by several, are eager to acquire the power of Politicos. Such ambition can have important consequences. Since these interviews were completed, *four of the Intellectuals have been expelled from the Party and three have been promoted to ministerial positions.*

Assembly Behavior of Legislative Types. The performance of these four legislative types in the Assembly provides further clues into the role behavior of various members. Different types of members behaved differently and this suggests they were responding to different expectations—fostered either by their own personality, by differentiated socialization or by special external constraints such as apply to Politicos who are in the government.

The distribution of legislative types according to the per cent of their own Assembly speeches

TABLE 3. ASSEMBLY BEHAVIOR OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES†

	% of each legislator's speeches in 1965/66				
	Intel- lectuals (N = 9)	Locals (N = 25)	Silent Partners (N = 15)	Politicos (N = 15)	All M.P.s Interviewed* (N = 56)
<i>Nationally Oriented:</i>					
0 to 59.9%	0%	36%	20%	27%	25%
60% to 79.9%	44	40	20	33	36
80% and above	56	24	60	40	39
Total $X^2 = 6.8$					
<i>Supportive:‡</i>					
0 to 9.9%	0%	32%	0%	53%	30%
10% to 19.9%	67	32	0	27	32
20% and above	33	36	100	20	38
<i>Critical:‡</i>					
0 to 4.9%	0%	12%	60%	80%	36%
5% to 9.9%	33	40	40	7	28
10% and above	67	48	0	13	36
Locals/Politicos $X^2 = 18.6^{**}$					

† Speeches were broken into three roughly equal intervals among all 184 M.P.s.

* Two M.P.s interviewed gave no speeches.

** This Chi-square is significant at the $p < .001$ level, but see footnote 18.

‡ Supportive and Critical are only two of four possible categories for speeches with respect to the government's position. The other two are neutral and non-neutral question-answer.

which were nationally oriented, supportive and critical are reported in Table 3. Intellectuals are the most nationally oriented in their speeches, Locals the most locally oriented. Both Silent Partners and Intellectuals were supportive compared to Politicos who devoted the least per cent of their speaking time to defending or supporting the government. This relatively small proportion of time given by Politicos to government support is a strong indication of the generalized support which is expected and received from other M.P.'s, and which relieves Politicos of the need continually to defend government policy.

While the per cent of critical speeches given by M.P.'s is low among all legislators,¹⁹ Intellec-

tuals were the most critical group. Locals were also critical; few Politicos and Silent Partners were ever critical. However, two Politicos, both Regional Commissioners (a high Party and government post), are found in the highest third of those giving critical speeches. This deviation is one of the most striking instances of role ambiguity to be found among legislators. Most Regional Commissioners, including these two high scorers, were Members of the Assembly elected in 1960. As constituency representatives originally, their initial role behavior included making frequent critical comments on government positions. However, following their appointment as Regional Commissioners, a new set of role expectations was imposed. Ambiguities about their role were reflected in the differing interpretations given by the several Regional Commissioners interviewed. Four saw their principal function as legislators as similar to Ministers and Junior Ministers, namely, explaining and defending government policy. Two emphasized their spe-

equal groups. To do this, it was necessary to collapse critical percentages so that all those for whom 10% or more of their speeches were critical became the "most critical" group.

¹⁹ In most cases the N was too small to meet the standard requirements of an expected frequency of five in each cell for the X^2 test. Rather than collapse cell categories to avoid this, it seemed better to keep distinctions which I believed had analytical importance and to present only the appropriate X^2 's. However, many differences are large enough to be statistically significant if the cell size requirement were relaxed. See Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960), p. 221.

²⁰ Members were divided into three roughly

cial responsibilities as representatives of the region for which they were Commissioner. One of these suggested his job was to "help the M.P.'s from my region explain our needs and problems." Finally, one Commissioner confessed that he felt unsure about his role obligations as an Assembly Member and simply did not know to what extent he was free to express his own opinions.

These ambiguities explain why the pattern of Assembly criticism among legislators is not more symmetrical. Although Intellectuals and Locals tend to be the most critical and Silent Partners and Politicos the least critical, personal predilections, previous role experience as a legislator, and ambiguity of role definitions—most noticeable among Regional Commissioners—account for interesting variations from this pattern. Deviants are frequently found in legislative assemblies; what is interesting is how well they fare.²⁰ In the case of the two Politicos who occasionally made critical speeches, both have lost their Assembly membership, though the shift of one of these men from his role as Regional Commissioner was into another important post.

IV. ROLE EXPECTATIONS

The role orientations of an M.P. in Tanzania are affected by both official statements and by the subjective views of other *Wabunge*. These role expectations form the norms which shape role behavior. Consensus among these expectations strengthens norms. Agreement between the dominant expectations among M.P.'s and the views expressed by government officialdom would indicate low conflict over "rules of the game." In order to explore the degree of agreement or conflict between official expectations and those subjectively held by M.P.'s, official statements and interview responses have been examined and compared.

Official Expectations. The role of a Member of Parliament as envisaged by President Nyerere involves three tasks: "1) To act as a bridge . . . between people and government for transmission of ideas; 2) to deliberate on new legislation; 3) to keep the government actively devoted to the people's interest by intelligent criticism."²¹ These views, as expressed by Nyerere in a speech to the newly elected National Assembly

in October, 1965, represent one important change in the official description of an M.P.'s responsibilities outlined by Nyerere in September, 1960, prior to independence: the abandonment of a right to criticize government policy at public or private meetings in his constituency.²²

Members have been criticized by national leaders for failing to play effectively at least two of the three aspects of their role. Nyerere reminded new legislators that one of the obvious lessons in the defeat of many incumbents in the 1965 elections was their failure to keep in touch with their constituencies, to find out what their problems were, and to help people to understand what was being done and why.²³ The other criticism directed toward Members by official channels has been their failure to make more than minimal use of their prerogative to criticize in the Assembly. The Commission which studied the establishment of a one party state, for example, wrote:

With a few notable exceptions, debates in the National Assembly have tended to be lifeless and superficial. Legislation of the most complex and far reaching kind is passed rapidly through all the stages without challenge to basic principles or careful examination of detailed provisions.²⁴

Nyerere felt it was "fortunate" that a few Members disregarded the 'Party line' from time to time to express their own views, even though they were rebuked for their lapse from Party discipline. According to his conception, questions of detail, timing and priority should be openly discussed and debated in a one party state.²⁵ In-

²⁰ As cited in Tordoff, "Parliament in Tanzania," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* (July 1965).

²¹ Nyerere, "Address at the Opening of the National Assembly."

²² The report blamed practices inherited from the British more appropriate to a two party system, for the lack of vigor in Assembly debates. In the British party system, private party caucuses and party whips to enforce discipline were accepted procedures essential to maintain the unity upon which the party in power depended for its control of the legislative process. Thus the TPP and the National Executive Committee provided private forums for prior discussions of policy and legislative matters. These prior discussions, the report concluded, inevitably have "inhibited subsequent discussion on the floor of the house." *Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 20, 21.

²³ Julius K. Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System" (Dar es Salaam: the Standard Press, 1963), p. 6.

²⁴ Ralph K. Huitt has analyzed the costs of deviancy in the U.S. Senate. See his "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 566-575.

²⁵ J. K. Nyerere, "Address at the Opening of the National Assembly after the General Election," (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, October 12, 1965), no pagination.

telligent criticism, according to Nyerere, "is vital." It is possible for Nyerere to envision circumstances in which the National Assembly might disagree with the National Executive of TANU or the government.

Occasionally there will be a division of opinion about the desirability of a particular piece of legislation. In such cases, provided that both sides are honest and are able to advance arguments to support their views, people will be better served by reconsideration of the proposal than by an automatic affirmative vote.²⁶

This view, however, leaves ambiguous the question of in what situations opposition would be legitimate. Moreover, Nyerere himself has affirmed that broader questions of policy should be the responsibility of the National Executive of the Party, and not subject to legislative debate.²⁷ Thus, according to "official" views, although the legislator may express criticism, it must be constructive, and not be in opposition to policies already decided upon by the NEC.

Legislators' Expectations. In order to see how close legislators' own role expectations were to the "official" ones, the sampled M.P.'s were asked to describe their responsibilities as a Member of the National Assembly. Their responses emphasized all the role duties contained in official expectations. A few even made specific reference to speeches by Nyerere or Second Vice-President Kawawa about their duties. One M.P., for example, an Intellectual, gave this explanation about his role:

For an M.P., there are three tasks, as the President stated in his speech last October. First, I must represent the electorate, get their ideas and bring these views to the Parliament and advise the government. Second, I must get something from the government for the people. And third, I can advise the government on my own ideas and criticize constructively.

This interpretation of the President's expectations is not quite complete, since it omits the obligation of an M.P. to work in his constituency explaining government policy, but it indicates the process whereby official expectations shape expectations of role incumbents.

Most respondents mentioned several different duties. The most frequently mentioned, by 77% of the legislators, was work within the constitu-

ency. Bringing constituency needs and demands before the government was the second most frequently mentioned role task. Two other aspects of the legislator's role, as lawmaker and as critic of the government, were mentioned rather infrequently by only 21% and 17% respectively. The different frequency with which these four tasks are mentioned is an indicator of the emphasis which the political system tends to place on these duties. Participating in the legislative process or being a gadfly of the government is seldom a part of legislators' own conceptions of their role. Much more important is their work in the constituency, explaining government policy, encouraging and helping in nation building activities, and carrying problems and complaints from constituents to the government. The role emerging for an M.P. in Tanzania emphasizes his function as a communicator rather than either a deliberator or law-maker.

Those M.P.'s who participate in decision-making do so largely in their special position as members of the government. Ministers, for example, are normally involved in the preparation of legislation which is fully drafted and published before most members ever see it. In response to the question: "What is the *most important* aspect of your work?," most Politicos and Silent Partners cited either being members of the government and hence involved in planning and directing government activity, or being high officials in the Party, responsible for organizing and directing Party affairs (see Table 4). Locals tended to stress their work with their constituents; 52% felt that explaining to their constituents government policy and national affairs was their most important task, while 24% mentioned promoting their constituency interests to the government. Even among Intellectuals, five out of nine (56%) mention constituency related activity, but of these, the emphasis is on promoting constituency needs rather than on defending government policies. Intellectuals also emphasized legislative work and criticism. The following are typical replies of *Wabunge* concerning the most important aspect of their role.

The pattern of expectations and role emphasis in these responses is generally compatible with official expectations. The lack of expertise and specialization among legislators and the weakly articulated performance of legislative committees was reflected by the few legislators who emphasized legislation or criticism as the main aspect of their role.

Role Consensus. Three open-ended questions about political contingencies were used as a measure of role consensus. Each question explored some aspect of a legislator's relationship to the total political process. Responses to these questions (by both the M.P.'s and high-level ad-

²⁶ Nyerere, "Address at the Opening of the National Assembly," p. 6.

²⁷ Julius K. Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System," *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

TABLE 4. ROLE DEFINITION OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intel- lectuals (N=9)	Locals (N=25)	Silent Partners (N=5)	Politicos (N=15)	All M.P.s Interviewed (N=58)
<i>Most Important Aspect of Role:</i>					
Promote Constituency	33%	24%	0%	0%	16%
Legislate	22	4	17	0	7
Criticize	11	4	0	0	3
Explain to Constituency	22	52	17	13	33
As Member of Government	0	8	33	53	21
Party Activity	0	0	17	33	10

Promoting Constituency:

To take the people's problems and difficulties to the government and get the government to solve them. (A Local)

Legislate:

Keeping the pressure on the government for development and making sure that we go ahead. (An Intellectual)

Party Affairs:

To see that the Party is well organized, administered, and its committees are functioning well, and that people are participating. (A Politico)

Explaining Government Policy:

To tell the people government policy and make them understand. (A Local)

To get the people to obey the government and to let them know the government policy. (Silent Partner)

ministrators who were interviewed) have been grouped into three categories from weak to strong. Written responses by Tanzanian University students to the same questions are reported in conjunction with this discussion.²⁸

In an open competitive political system, controversial questions and policies may be subject to widespread debate and criticism. There is a public character to discussion, debate and political differences, and instances of corruption or internecine feuding regularly take place on a public stage in which the principal performers appeal for support for their views or findings. The extent to which politics is open and public is an important variable in Tanzanian politics. Norms which prescribe the boundaries within which the legislator may pursue his own or his constituents' interests are investigated by these three questions. The extent to which a legislator is expected to voice opposition publicly, to denounce instances of corruption, and to feel capable, in a controversy with TANU leaders, to carry the disagreement into broader national arenas are indicated by the legislators' responses.

The first question asked: "If the government

introduces a measure before the legislature which you are personally against and which you feel your constituents would not like, what would you do?"²⁹ Examples of the different types of response selected from interviews are:

Weak: He should go to see the Minister concerned and talk with him. Possibly he hasn't seen the measure correctly or perhaps people at home have concocted a story to give people fear. In this case he must explain it to them. (A Politico)

Moderate: I would oppose it, but if the majority are in favor of it I'll throw in my lot with them and then I will tell my constituency that I, with the rest of the Parliament, passed it, and give them reasons why we did so. (A Local)

Strong: Go to the relevant committee; try to stop it by convincing other M.P.'s. Then raise hell in the Parliament if I have to. Perhaps I would try to make an amendment. (An Intellectual)

²⁹ For legislators who were members of the government, and hence constrained in their M.P. role, these questions were phrased in the third person and their expectations about the behavior of a backbencher were solicited. Written versions, shown to administrators, were similarly in the third person.

²⁸ See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 376-384 for information about the questionnaire and sample.

TABLE 5. ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intel- lectuals (N = 9)	Locals (N = 25)	Silent Partners (N = 6)	Politicos (N = 15)	All M.P.s (N = 58)	Adminis- trators (N = 50)	Total Elite (N = 108)	University Students (N = 112)
<i>Response to Government</i>								
<i>Bill Felt Wrong:</i>								
Weak	11%	8%	33%	20%	14%	12%	13%	6%
Moderate	22	72	67	60	57	38	46	5
Strong	67	20	0	20	29	43	38	89
	Leg/Adm $X^2=3.9$ Elite/Students $X^2=61.8^*$							
<i>Response to Corruption:</i>								
								(N = 102)
Weak	11%	4%	0%	0%	4%	4%	4%	26%
Moderate	44	68	67	73	66	80	72	39
Strong	44	38	17	20	28	14	21	35
	Leg/Adm $X^2=3.1$ Elite/Students $X^2=31.2^*$							
<i>Response to Party Ouster:</i>								
								(N = 91)
Weak	22%	40%	17%	33%	31%	18%	25%	20%
Moderate	56	40	83	67	52	46	50	13
Strong	22	20	0	0	17	34	25	67
	Leg/Adm $X^2=4.6$ Elite/Students $X^2=39.5^*$							

* These Chi-squares (X^2) are significant at the .05 level.

The second role question asked what an M.P. would do if he suspected corruption was occurring in some Ministry. Responses to this question tended to fall into categories of passivity or hesitancy to act (weak); reporting the suspicion privately to a Minister, the President or the Commission of Inquiry (moderate); or willingness to raise the issue openly in the Assembly (strong). There was a high degree of consensus on the "moderate" response.

Party membership is a requisite of membership in the Assembly. The third question asked: "If local TANU leaders disagreed with you and informed you they had expelled you from the Party, what would you do?" In fact, local Party officials do not, according to the TANU Constitution, have the authority to expel Party members. A bare majority of legislators (52%) gave moderate responses indicating that local officials did not have this power. Nearly a third felt that they would have to accept the Party's decision, perhaps even resign (indicating a weak response). A small group (17%) gave a strong response and indicated they would fight out their differences with local officials or would publicly appeal the decision to higher and broader arenas in the national Party.

The distribution of responses to these three questions suggests at least partial agreement among elites on these important role aspects. By calculating the variance of responses on these items, a rough indication of the degree of consensus among elite was obtained. The variances

of the three items were .458, .224, and .500, indicating greater consensus than a situation of role ambiguity in which there would be equal distribution of responses and a variance of .670.³⁰

The responses for these three questions among legislative types are contained in Table 5. Intellectuals, followed by Locals, consistently gave "stronger" responses than Silent Partners or Politicos. Legislators' and administrators' role expectations were distributed in a fairly similar fashion, while students were more aggressive in their definitions of the role. The students expected a stronger, more assertive role for M.P.'s than current members of the political elite. This difference in attitude may have also been reflected in the willingness of Tanzanian students to publicly protest National Service legislation which affected them. Six months after the responses were recorded, in October, 1966, 393 students (mostly from the University College) were expelled as a result of the protest demonstrations. These students were readmitted only after several steps had been taken to insure students would conform to the prevalent political norms.³¹

³⁰ See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, for the use of variance as a measure of consensus, pp. 393-94. This measure has been recommended by Neal Gross, *et al.*, p. 107.

³¹ See Raymond F. Hopkins and Neal Sherman, "Students and Politics in Tanzania," in Seymour M. Lipset and William J. Hanna (eds.), *Students and Politics in Africa* (forthcoming Basic Books).

TABLE 6. ROLE CONGRUENCE OF LEGISLATIVE TYPES

	Intel- lectuals (N=9)	Locals (N=25)	Silent Partners (N=6)	Politicos (N=15)	All M.P.s (N=58)	Adminis- trators (N=50)	Elite Total (N=108)
<i>Legislative:</i>							
High	22%	16%	33%	60%	29%	38%	33%
Medium	33	64	50	13	41	24	33
Low	44	20	17	27	29	38	33
Locals/Politicos $X^2=11.1^*$							
<i>Average: (Three roles)</i>							
High	22%	28%	33%	53%	33%	34%	33%
Medium	11	60	50	20	37	36	37
Low	67	12	17	27	30	30	30
Locals/Politicos $X^2=6.1^*$							

* These Chi-squares are significant at the $p < .05$ level. (See footnote 18).

The question on party expulsion revealed that legislators were not clear about the possible consequences. Some felt expulsion would not affect one's status as an M.P.; others correctly foresaw this as one method to remove a deviant M.P. from the Assembly. The confusion is illustrated in the response of a Politico:

A branch official can't expel him. Expulsion is only by the National Conference and he would still be an Mbunge, although he should resign due to the lack of confidence in him. But the National Conference can't expel him from the Parliament.

This is not quite accurate since the NEC has expelled members from the Party and this does result in loss to an M.P. of his seat. However, such responses indicate that some M.P.'s conceived of an independent status for *Wabunge*—an importance apart from that of the Party. The consequences of Party expulsion were not well understood, even by some important political leaders. This confusion serves to underline ambiguity in role expectations in a new state like Tanzania. The subsequent expulsion of nine members in October-December, 1968 has no doubt clarified these expectations considerably.

Role Congruence. Average standard scores have been used as a measure of the congruence (C) of each legislator's expectations on these three items. Legislators whose expectations are near the mean of expectations among all elite received high C scores.²² Table 6 shows the rela-

tive congruence among legislative types. It also presents their congruence on ten role expectation items, which include five items relating to Presidential role behavior and two items about administrators' behavior. *Intellectuals are the least congruent in their expectations; Politicos, the most congruent.* Locals are somewhat less congruent in their expectations than the average. Differences among the groups are significant. As mentioned earlier, of the nine Intellectuals interviewed, four—all with low congruence—have been removed from the National Assembly by means of expulsion from the Party.

The responses of those who are high on both legislative and average role congruence express expectations which, according to our analysis, are "normative." These expectations clearly tend to prevent the M.P. from acting in a divisive manner. The response of one Politico with a very high C score is illustrative.

If an M.P. dislikes a particular piece of legislation, he should first see the Minister and tell him; try to get it altered. The Minister may work through the Cabinet until all are prepared to accept some other version. Finally, and only if necessary, he should raise it in Parliament. If it is passed, however, he'll just have to support it or resign.

Such expectations tend to conform to the official expectations outlined earlier. This similarity

NI = the number of items

S_j = the standard deviation of the j th item, and

X_{ij} = 0, 1, or 2 according to a weak, moderate, or strong role expectation by the i th respondent.

²² This is accomplished by the formula

$$C_i = \sum_j^{NI} [2 - |(X_{ij} - \bar{X}_j)| / S_j] / NI$$

where

suggests that institutionalization of a pattern of closed politics is occurring, and that there is little conflict over rules of the game for legislators.³³

In fact, "congruent" expectations are not only close to "officially" stated expectations but also contain somewhat more restrained role boundaries for the public behavior of M.P.'s than those outlined by the President.³⁴

V. RULES FOR LEGISLATORS

Four rules or norms for legislative behavior, based on my analysis of the role expectations for legislators, can be stated which make clear some of the major characteristics of the Tanzanian "style" of politics. These rules, along with others governing the political action of government administrators, journalists, party bureaucrats and other political actors, tend to support the emergent elite political culture of "closed politics."³⁵

RULE 1: A legislator may express criticism or opposition to a government policy only on practical grounds, not on principle.

This rule stresses the maintenance of unity and ideological solidarity. It represents a point made by Nyerere in several of his speeches. It was affirmed by a number of the legislators during their interviews, most notably the Politicos.

RULE 2: An M.P. may not publicly oppose a policy decision decided in the Party's National Executive Committee (NEC).

This rule, though closely related to the first, is an important addition. Distinguishing between practical opposition and opposition which has an

³³ Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, Chapter One, discusses the importance of coherence for political institutionalization. Congruence between sets of expectations should be an important indicator of institutionalization. See Raymond F. Hopkins, "Political Roles and Political Institutionalization," an unpublished paper read at the American Political Science Association Meetings, September 2, 1969. Moreover, the variance indicative of consensus among role expectations for M.P.'s was markedly lower, 394, than among elite role expectations for the President (.519) or for administrators (.521).

³⁴ One M.P., an Intellectual, now expelled from the Party and the Assembly, claimed that Nyerere's expectations created opportunities for dissent. He stated: "You know, I like to make a lot of noise in the Assembly and I often disagree. President Nyerere is the only one who understands the need for this. If it weren't for him, they'd never let me get away with it."

³⁵ See Hopkins, *op. cit.*, for rules regarding the role of President and administrator.

ideological bent and is flatly contradictory to government policy is not an easy task. For example, in June, 1966, the question of nationalization was suggested by several Members. In a brief debate, at least one Member who argued against nationalization pointed out that it was the policy of the government to "encourage more the establishment of private industries."³⁶ However, in January, 1967, the NEC adopted the Arusha Declaration which called upon the government to further implement "the policy of socialism," by extending its control of the major means of production.³⁷ Two weeks later, when Parliament was asked to vote on five bills which would effect the recommended nationalization, these bills received the unanimous support of Members "who, one after another, took the floor to deliver militant speeches commending the Party, the government and the correct leadership of President Nyerere."³⁸ Rule 2, moreover, is not only visible in practice but several M.P.s explicitly articulated this obligation. "If the NEC has passed it, then the Members must support it," stated one Politico.

This second rule has an important effect upon the style of Tanzanian politics. Critics of government policy who want more rapid change and abandonment of present policies are enabled to announce publicly their views. For example, Michael Kamaliza, then Minister for Labor and Secretary-General of the government-regulated national trade union, NUTA, in addressing the fifth general council on December 27, 1966, made a strong plea for the government to move forward in the study of socialism and criticized high salaries in private industry and government's policy of encouraging private investment.³⁹ His speech was a full month before the Arusha Declaration which moved the country in this direction. Once policy has been decided in the NEC, however, and specific statements are endorsed, then criticism or opposition such as Kamaliza and others declared publicly, would be considered a violation of this rule. This tends to rule out almost all criticism by "conservative" spokesmen since prior NEC decisions tend to foreclose future options in this direction. When the closed, though by all accounts stormy, NEC meetings resolve an issue, this at once becomes a signal for the end of further controversy or discussion and the initiation of praise and rededication to the Party's policy decisions.

A corollary also follows from this rule,

³⁶ *Standard*, June 24, 1966.

³⁷ *Nationalist*, February 6, 1967.

³⁸ *Nationalist*, February 15, 1967.

³⁹ *Nationalist*, December 28, 1966. Kamaliza has since been dropped from his post.

namely, that the M.P.'s role as legislator is subordinate to his role as Party member. "TANU is supreme—even above the government," Second Vice-President Kawawa told Parliament.⁴⁰

One illustration of the Party's potency compared with that of the Assembly is through a specific comparison of the NEC with the *Bunge*. In a survey among the Dar es Salaam electorate, people were asked: "Which do you think has more influence in the way our government is run: the National Assembly or the National Executive Committee of TANU?" Thirty-four per cent said the *Bunge*, 40% the NEC, and 11% felt they were about equal.⁴¹ The same question, when asked of twenty-nine M.P.'s during their interviews, revealed that every member of the government (eleven) stated that the NEC was the more important organ. One Politico, a member of the NEC, replied to this question:

It's hard to say. Legally, I suppose, the National Assembly is, but in fact, I think the NEC. These fellows can discuss and air their views here and are free to speak inside the hall; but once they step outside these four walls, they will learn that there are others who have more power. If M.P.'s aren't careful, the Party can discipline them. And they'll have to recall their decisions since the Party has control over them.

Among those not in the government, sixty-seven per cent (12 of 18) felt the National Assembly was more powerful. Reluctance to acknowledge the paramountcy of the NEC was predominantly found among Locals.⁴²

RULE 3: An M.P. may oppose government policy in Party discussions or within the Assembly before the Assembly votes, but if the policy is passed, he must support it among his constituents.

⁴⁰ *Nationalist*, June 12, 1966.

⁴¹ This study is reported in Lionel Cliffe (ed.), *One Party Democracy* (Nairobi, 1967) in chapter 12 by Kenneth Prewitt and Goran Hyden.

⁴² A revealing incident occurred on one occasion when I raised this question subsequent to an interview (since the question was added part way through the interviewing process) in the presence of another Tanzanian. When the M.P. (a Local) declared that the *Bunge* was more powerful than the N.E.C., the other Tanzanian burst forth with, "No, no! That's the wrong answer." This other Tanzanian later took me aside and explained, "Some of these M.P.'s just don't understand the way things are." The deviance of Locals underscores the often unexpressed desire among Locals to increase the power and importance of the Assembly and, as a consequence, their own power and importance.

This rule emerged directly from the role expectation concerning opposition to a government policy. It closely resembles the classic formulation by Lenin of "democratic centralism." The rule encompasses the many bills whose details have been drawn up by the government, and not the NEC. Discussion of this sort of legislation, as well as numerous embarrassing questions, may be raised in the Assembly, and, following the election of September, 1965, criticism of this nature has increased.⁴³ But once the measure has passed, the M.P. must support it. He may not publicly voice his criticism to his constituents. The possible consequences for M.P.'s violating this formal dictum were outlined by Second Vice-President Kawawa in Parliament itself. He discussed legislation which would make it unlawful for a person to foment discontent or ill will for "unlawful purposes" and pointed out that such criticisms as those contrary to government plans would "be going against TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party. . . . All members here are members of TANU and Afro-Shirazi Party, and there is a special procedure of dealing with any problem in a Party way."⁴⁴

Withholding one's own views, if they conflict with a decided policy, amounts to a type of secrecy. Thus, a necessary adjunct to Rules 2 and 3 is that information about political cleavages ought not to be discussed publicly. This secrecy is an important norm for not only legislators, but all elite.

A revealing instance of how this rule works is the case of Oscar Kambona, former Minister and Party Secretary-General. Although Kambona fled Tanzania in July, 1967, and apparently engaged in actions of a questionable nature, it was not until weeks later, when he publicly attacked other TANU and government officials, that President Nyerere and the Party press took open action against him. The sin by which Kambona finally apparently triggered official counter attacks was his public discussion of political cleavages.

Unfortunately there is an almost irrational quality to these prescriptions for a closed politics. Leaders are warned that it is sinful to reveal Party or state secrets; articles in the *Nat-*

⁴³ Debate and criticism in the Assembly meetings which occurred after the period covered by the content analysis, for at least the period of September-October 1966 until July, 1968, seem to have continued these trends. Policy initiative and criticism, judging by newspaper accounts only, appear to have increased somewhat in these sessions.

⁴⁴ *Nationalist*, June 29, 1966. The Afro-Shirazi Party is the only party on Zanzibar; it is not yet integrated with TANU.

nationalist stress the presence of Western spies eager to pry secrets from gullible leaders and civil servants and to foment divisions.⁴⁵ In contradiction to this, there are equally frequent statements by leaders that people should have nothing to fear, and that criticism is welcomed. As a consequence of these apparently contradictory norms, there amounts to what is, at least collectively, a schizophrenia about revealing information related to policy disputes. For example, committee meetings of the *Bunge* are held in camera. Some members interpret this to mean that they are forbidden to mention or discuss what occurs in these meetings. Others talk freely about committee activity, including the procedures, participation and substantive issues discussed. On a few occasions, members have even raised details of committee work in Assembly debates. This need for secrecy which arises from Rules 2 and 3 is a problem in Tanzania and a source of anxiety for at least some elite members because it is not clear what constitutes private Party or state matters.

RULE 4: An M.P. not a member of the government must consider constituency work his most important obligation.

Many members from constituencies take this dictum seriously. When Parliament is not in session, a typical M.P. spends two to three weeks each month traveling in his constituency. One M.P. estimated that he met or addressed 10,000 constituents each month. The M.P. often has a secretary, sometimes shared with another M.P. or the district Party office. Either the M.P. or his secretary is available each day to hear complaints or problems of constituents. The most frequent complaints were for better agricultural prices or involved misunderstandings between a citizen and government officialdom. The role of the M.P. in his constituency is an important extension of his general function as a legitimizer of the political system. As one legislator remarked, "People most often come to me because they think of me as their man in the government."

These four rules dictate that the M.P. who is not a member of government is above all else a communication link, a popularizer and legitimizer for the Party and the government. He is not a lawmaker. In a few rare instances, notably among Intellectuals, he may become a lobbyist.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ See, for example, statements of the Mwanza Area Commissioner, *Nationalist*, April 28, 1966, and frequent columns of "Pressman's Commentary" in the *Nationalist*.

⁴⁶ This term was actually used by one Intellectual describing his efforts to pressure the government on insurance regulation.

For instance, some M.P.'s articulate the interests of various groups such as workers and farmers. In an even more general sense, an M.P. may affect policy-making by his independent and uncoordinated criticism (as opposed to organized criticism). When such individual efforts multiply, as has occurred on a very few occasions, it has proven effective. For instance, numerous criticisms of affluence and arrogance were leveled toward Regional Commissioners and other Party leaders in mid-1966 Assembly sessions. These pressures were quite important in affecting changes such as the "voluntary" salary reduction of Ministers and higher civil servants, the withdrawal of government Mercedes-Benzes from personal use or assignment, and the stiff new rules limiting accumulation of wealth among leaders which were contained in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.

VI. CONCLUSION

This examination of the role of the M.P. reveals two things about Tanzanian politics. First, the role expectations among elites contain rules which support a pattern of closed politics. Major policy cleavages or serious leadership splits, such as the one between Nyerere and Kambona, are contained normally within the private arena of the Party structure, indeed, within the upper echelons of the Party structure. The continually stressed theme of unity both helps contain cleavages and is preserved by their containment. This fundamental principle of unity is stressed by all leaders, including Nyerere. This unity is supported by a set of rules channeling political cleavages into the Party structure to be absorbed and eventually resolved by the Party executive. These rules emerge from an analysis of aspects of the elite political culture. The role of the Assembly in this framework has been principally that of legitimization of government and Party decisions within the constitutional framework which gives Parliament supremacy over legislation.

The second conclusion which this study suggests is that in spite of "rules of the game" which foster closed politics, the National Assembly is not anachronistic or a mere showcase for propaganda purposes as may have occurred in Ghana under Nkrumah, for example.⁴⁷ M.P.'s play an important role as links between the government and the countryside, and their criticisms in the Assembly have affected some poli-

⁴⁷ Professor Henry L. Bretton in a private communication, February 22, 1969, suggested that in Ghana "Parliamentary proceedings were a form of shadow-boxing" and the institution was "impotent."

cies. The ability of the Tanzanian government to remain "responsive" depends in part on their activity.

Finally, one may ask, if M.P.'s were to exercise greater influence, comparable to the collective authority of the NEC, for instance, what effect might this have? By most criteria it would make Tanzania more democratic since it would increase the strength of the elected representatives of the people. However, it would also have, I believe, other effects which would probably be detrimental to democracy in the long run.

Frederick Frey has noted that "lawyers tend to be the largest single occupational group in parliament after parliament all over the world."⁴⁸ Yet, the Tanzanian parliament contains only two lawyers, one of whom is the Attorney-General, appointed by the President. The requisite level of legislative sophistication and skill is simply not generally found among Tanzanian M.P.'s in a degree sufficient to warrant their in-

creased participation in law-making. The expression of provincialism, idiosyncratic to legislators, is often in evidence in Tanzania, and is a singularly inappropriate goal. Increasing legislative power in Tanzania would, I believe, result in heightening regional and ethnic differences, encouraging pork-barrel bargaining and deals, and increasing the possibilities for corruption. Moreover, such a trend, although appearing to be a move toward promoting democratic practices, would eventually alienate intellectuals, technocrats and others, and spur the demise, not the growth, of representative procedures in the national governing system. Given the background and skills found in the National Assembly and the rules for role behavior embedded in the elite political culture, many M.P.'s perform an important function in the political system already as the people's surrogates, who meet in common with the governing elite and serve as a cathartic and legitimizing force in Tanzanian politics ameliorating the otherwise closed politics of the one Party system.

⁴⁸ Frederick W. Frey, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

PLURALITY MAXIMIZATION VS VOTE MAXIMIZATION: A SPATIAL ANALYSIS WITH VARIABLE PARTICIPATION*

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Spatial models of party competition constitute a recent and incrementally developing literature which seeks to explore the relationships between citizens' decisions and candidates' strategies.¹ Despite the mathematical

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¹Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). The recent theoretical developments based on Downs's work include: Otto A. Davis and Melvin J. Hinich, "A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II*, J. L. Bernd, ed., (Dallas: SMU press, 1966); "Some Results Related to a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science III*, J. L. Bernd, ed., (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967); "On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preference in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," *Public Choice*, 5, (1969); "Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," forthcoming in *Social Choice*, B. Lieberman (ed.), (New York: Gordon and Breach); with Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *This Review*, (June, 1970); Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook "Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process," *Public Choice*, 7, (1969); "Social Welfare and Electoral Competition in Democratic Societies," (School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1969); Peter C. Ordeshook, "Extensions to a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process and Implications for the Theory of Responsible Parties," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, (February 1970); *Theory of the Electoral Process*, (unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Rochester); with Peter H. Aranson, "Spatial Strategies in Sequential Elections" in R. Niemi and H. Weisberg, *Probability Models in Political*

and deductive rigor of this approach, it is only now that political scientists can begin to see the incorporation of those considerations which less formal analyses identify as salient, and perhaps crucial, features of election contests.

One such consideration concerns the candidates' objectives. Specifically, spatial analysis often confuses the distinction between candidates who maximize votes and candidates who maximize plurality. Downs and Garvey, for example, assume explicitly that candidates maximize votes, though plurality maximization is clearly the assumption which Garvey actually employs, while Downs frequently assumes that vote maximization, plurality maximization, and the goal of winning are equivalent.² Downs, nevertheless, attempts to

Science (forthcoming); Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968); David E. Chapman, "Models of the Working of a Two-Party Electoral System," *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making III*, (Fall 1967) and *Public Choice*, 5, (1969); Gerald Garvey, "The Theory of Party Equilibrium," *this Review*, LX, (1966).

²Downs, *ibid*, confuses vote maximization and plurality maximization in asserting that "each party seeks to receive more votes than any other," thus the "self-interest axiom [leads] to the vote maximizing government (p. 31)," and that all the actions of the party "are aimed at maximizing votes (p. 35)." Similarly, Garvey, *ibid*, states that "parties shift their platforms whenever such a shift will increase chances to gain a majority. Thus, each party constantly 'mobilizes' to represent the views of a larger portion of society (p. 30)." And while Tullock, *ibid*, initially identifies the comparative evaluation of a party's vote (which is implicit in the measure of plurality) as the party's objective by stating that "the party or candidate who receives the most votes will be given control" (p. 51), he apparently assumes throughout his analysis that this implies that candidates maximize votes. Perhaps the most careful investigation of the candidates' objectives is presented by William H. Riker, who offers what appears to be an additional possibility in *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale, 1962). Specifically, Riker argues that rational politicians do not maximize votes (or, conceiv-

disentangle these objectives, observing that plurality maximization is the appropriate objective for candidates in a single-member district, while vote maximization is appropriate in proportional representation systems with many parties. All subsequent spatial analysis research, however, assumes either implicitly or explicitly that candidates maximize plurality. If Downs is correct, therefore, this research may not be relevant for a general understanding of electoral competition in diverse constitutional or historical circumstances. The question then is whether those strategies that maximize votes differ from those strategies that maximize plurality.

To answer this question we extend the basic multidimensional model of the electoral process—a model which assumes that candidates maximize plurality.³ We formulate, within the structure of this model, the distinction between vote maximization and plurality maximization and we ascertain the strategic differences that the distinction logically implies. We review in Section 1 our assumptions and definitions, and we construct in Section 2 a rigorous distinction between the objective function of plurality-maximizing candidates and the objective function of vote-maximizing candidates. After identifying in Section 3 the optimal strategies for candidates who maximize votes, we conclude that although plurality maximizing candidates converge, vote maximizing candidates do not converge under some identical conditions. We also demonstrate that, for suitable conditions, if candidates maximize votes, the strategies the candidates prefer are sensitive to uniform variations in the cost of voting; if candidates maximize plurality, however, such variations in cost do not affect preferred strategies. We apply our analysis in Section 4 to some hypotheses which Downs proposes concerning the spatial strategies of candidates in multiparty systems. We conclude that the candidates which multiparty systems

ably, plurality), but that they seek minimal winning coalitions. Observe, however, that if two candidates compete the election is a zero sum game, in which case the maximization of plurality and the formation of minimal winning coalitions lead to identical results—the selection of minimax strategies. Riker's criterion yields the adoption of different strategies only if the position of one candidate is fixed, so that his opponent adjusts his position to suit his objectives with the opponent's strategy a fixed parameter of his calculus.

³ The model we seek to extend is presented in the references to Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, *op. cit.*

with proportional representation offer can provide distinct and stable strategies. But if a unimodal density describes the electorate's preference density, only three distinct strategies exist in equilibrium. Finally, we consider in Section 5 those strategies which candidates with mixed motives adopt, e.g., candidates who seek to maximize plurality while simultaneously maximizing a commodity such as financial contributions. We predicate this section of our analysis on two assumptions: (1) candidates require resources, such as finances, to alter their spatial location effectively; and (2) the calculus of voting which governs citizens' decisions is applicable to other forms of participation. We demonstrate with these assumptions that two competing candidates who maximize plurality might diverge from the mean of a symmetric, unimodal preference density. Because the proofs of our theorems are tedious and mathematically complex we relegate them to an appendix.

I. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The model we wish to generalize is a multidimensional extension of Downs's spatial framework. Hence, we assume that any number of "issues" may be necessary to characterize the citizens' preferences. To characterize the fundamentals of this model we require the following multidimensional notation:

$x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$: the representation (referred to as a vector) of a citizen's preferences for all issues. Thus, x_i is the citizen's preferred position on issue i ;

$\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2, \dots, \theta_n)$: the positions which candidate 1 advocates. The vector θ is called candidate 1's strategy;

$\psi = (\psi_1, \psi_2, \dots, \psi_n)$: the positions which candidate 2 advocates. The vector ψ is called candidate 2's strategy.

Several assumptions are either implicit in these definitions or required before the model is complete. Because we discuss these assumptions extensively elsewhere, we review them here only briefly.⁴

Assumption 1: Although an adequate description of the electorate's preferences requires several dimensions, a specific citizen may care about, and consequently estimate, a preferred position only for some of these dimensions. Thus, this citizen does not assign values to all elements of x . Similarly, it is possible that a citizen cannot specify a preferred position although the issue is salient. A citizen's awareness and concern for the issues

⁴ *Ibid.*

of Viet Nam and pollution, for example, do not guarantee his ability to identify preferred policies for such issues. We assume, nevertheless, that every citizen acts as if he estimates a preferred position on each issue (i.e., that every element of x has a numerical value).

Assumption 2: We assume that the vectors x , θ , and ψ are continuous variables. Obviously, many issues, as well as the electorate's preferences on them, can only be indexed discretely (e.g., religious preference, and partisan identification); many issues are dichotomous. The continuity assumption, nevertheless, is mathematically convenient because it facilitates the use of the continuous calculus.

Assumption 3: The candidates' strategies are not subscripted with an index for citizens: we assume that all citizens act as if they make identical estimates of θ . Thus, we interpret θ as the subjective estimate of candidate 1's strategy, ignoring the effects of perceptual distortion, imperfect information, and the possibility that no single measure can characterize a candidate's strategy. This assumption implies, moreover, that citizens estimate a position for each candidate on every dimension. Thus, we ignore the possibility that if a citizen does not care about an issue he does not bother to ascertain a candidate's policy on it.

Assumption 4: A density function, $f(x)$, characterizes the citizens' preferences, and points in the coordinate space of this density can represent the candidates' strategies. Obviously, the number of densities that might characterize preferences is infinite, but the most general results pertaining to candidates who maximize plurality follow from, among others, the assumption that $f(x)$ is symmetric.⁵ We assume, additionally, that $f(x)$ is not only symmetric, but unimodal. These assumptions, while not descriptive universally, permit tractable analysis of the strategies which vote-maximizing candidates should adopt, while allowing for conjecture about more general circumstances.

To conduct any analysis, however, we require assumptions about a citizen's evaluations of the candidates' strategies. We express this evaluation in terms of the utility loss which a citizen derives from each candidate's strategy if that candidate is elected. Symbolically, we denote the loss which the citizen associates with candidates 1 and 2 as $\phi(x-\theta)$ and $\phi(x-\psi)$ respectively.

Assumption 5: We assume that $\phi(x-\theta)$ and

⁵ By symmetry we mean that if the mean of $f(x)$ is normalized to zero, $f(x) = f(-x)$. This assumption is referred to as *radial symmetry*.

$\phi(x-\psi)$ satisfy two intuitively reasonable conditions: (1) they are zero if and only if the candidate's strategy and the citizen's preference are identical (i.e., $\phi(x-\theta) = 0$ if and only if $x = \theta$); (2) if the citizen's preference and the candidate's strategy do not coincide, the citizen derives some positive loss (i.e., $\phi(x-\theta) > 0$ if and only if $x \neq \theta$). A loss function which satisfies these conditions is the quadratic metric $\|x-\theta\|_A^2$, which in matrix notation equals,

$$(1) \quad \|x-\theta\|_A^2 = (x-\theta)'A(x-\theta)$$

This formulation implies marginally increasing loss as x and θ become more disparate. We assume, more generally, that a citizen can experience both marginally decreasing and marginally increasing loss. Thus, we allow citizens to become nearly indifferent between strategies that are far from their preferred positions. Symbolically, this is equivalent to assuming that

$$(2) \quad \phi(x-\theta) = \phi(\|x-\theta\|_A)$$

ϕ being a monotonic function of $\|x-\theta\|_A$. Since we discuss the properties of expressions (1) and (2) elsewhere, we note the simple example that if $n=2$, then the citizen's indifference contours are concentric ellipses about the point x and that the orientation of the major and the minor axes of these ellipses are all identical. We illustrate in Figure 1 the contours of a typical loss function for $n=2$.

Assumption 6: We assume that all citizens weight the issues in an identical fashion. This, perhaps the model's most bothersome assumption, requires, for example, that a citizen who prefers the mean of the electorate's density, attach the same relative importance to each issue as a citizen who prefers some extreme position. Thus, if $n=2$, then the rotation of the




FIGURE 1.




FIGURE 2.

major and the minor axes of the elliptical contours of each citizen's loss function are the same for all citizens. We portray in Figure 2 this assumption of common orientation (common matrix A) for three citizens.

These assumptions and definitions determine that if a citizen votes, he votes for the candidate who yields him the smallest loss. Not all citizens vote, however, and to the extent that the candidates' strategies affect turnout, we seek to express this relationship in our model.

Assumption 7: We assume that a citizen can abstain from voting, and that his probability of voting decreases as the loss he associates with his most preferred candidate increases. Referring to this characterization of a citizen's actions as *abstention from alienation*, we note that the condition of all citizens voting is a special case of this characterization.⁶

To formulate this assumption precisely let a citizen's preferred candidate be θ , and let R represent his reward from voting (expressed in terms of utility). If $R > 0$ the citizen votes and if $R \leq 0$ the citizen abstains. Denoting the deterministic components of this reward by $U(x, \theta)$, we assume that $U(x, \theta)$ diminishes as the loss associated with θ increases. Finally, we denote ϵ as a random variable which represents the components of R that are not

contained in $U(x, \theta)$.⁷ Summarily, we express R as

$$(3) \quad R = U(x, \theta) + \epsilon$$

Hence, if $U(x, \theta) + \epsilon$ is greater than zero, the citizen votes, and if $U(x, \theta) + \epsilon$ is less than or equal to zero the citizen abstains.

Note, however, that with the inclusion of ϵ in (3) the citizen neither votes nor abstains with certainty. Symbolically, we write the citizen's probability of voting as $\Pr[R > 0]$. To ascertain the relationship of $\Pr[R > 0]$ to θ , observe that the citizen's probability of voting is the probability that $U(x, \theta) + \epsilon > 0$; equivalently, this is the probability that $\epsilon > -U(x, \theta)$. Hence, $\Pr[R > 0] = \Pr[\epsilon > -U(x, \theta)]$, so that from our assumption that $U(x, \theta)$ decreases as $\phi(x - \theta)$ increases, $\Pr[R > 0]$ decreases as $\phi(x - \theta)$ increases.

We require one final assumption about voting and non-voting. Specifically, we wish to generate a function which expresses the probability that a citizen votes relative to any other citizen if we know each citizen's preferred position and the candidates' strategies.

Assumption 8: To simplify the exposition, consider citizens who prefer θ to ψ . We assume that any two citizens vote with equal probability if their preference vectors (x) are equidistant (as measured by the metric $\|x - \theta\|_A$) from the strategy θ . We assume, moreover, that citizen i votes with a greater probability than citizen j if and only if the

⁶ Clearly, alternative assumptions concerning the relationship of turnout to the candidates strategies are possible. For example, in Ordeshook, "Some Extensions . . .," *op. cit.*, abstention from indifference is analyzed. As yet, however, we have not incorporated this alternative assumption into our analysis of vote maximization.

⁷ Additionally, we assume that the expected value of ϵ is zero, and that it possesses a continuously differentiable density function defined in the interval $(-\infty, \infty)$. Also, we assume that ϵ is distributed independently of $U(x, \theta)$.




FIGURE 3.

distance between citizen i 's preference vector and θ is less than the distance between citizen j 's preference vector and θ .⁸

Assumption 8 allows us to define a function in the coordinate space of the electorate's preference density which completely characterizes relative probabilities of voting. We denote this function by $g(x-\theta)$ if θ is preferred to ψ , and $g(x-\psi)$ if ψ is preferred to θ .⁹ Thus, for any citizen, $\Pr[R > 0] = g(x-\theta)$ or $g(x-\psi)$. We can readily demonstrate two properties of the function g . First, g is symmetric about θ or ψ . This follows from the symmetry of citizens' loss functions. Second, g is monotonically decreasing as we move away from the relevant strategy vector, θ or ψ . This follows from the single peakedness of individual utility functions, and the assumption that $U(x, \theta)$ and $U(x, \psi)$ decrease as $\phi(x-\theta)$ and $\phi(x-\psi)$ increase. We illustrate in Figure 3 a representative form for $g(x-\theta)$ for a single dimension.

Note that the slope of g indicates the rate at which turnout decreases as we move away from the candidate's strategy. Somewhat imprecisely, we refer to this rate as the *sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy*. We illustrate in Figure 4 a function for which the sensitivity is greater than the sensitivity cor-

responding to the function illustrated in Figure 3.

Since sensitivity is an important property of $g(x-\theta)$ we indicate some of its essential features. First, we note that the rate of change of $g(x-\theta)$ is not a dimensionless quantity—its value depends on the scales employed to index x . Thus, for a single dimension the magnitude of sensitivity has little meaning since the scales which index an issue are arbitrary. Second, if n is greater than one, sensitivity is a multi-dimensional concept. But the dimensions can be measured each by a different scale so that the magnitude of sensitivity with respect to one dimension cannot be compared meaningfully to the magnitude of sensitivity on some other dimension.

To facilitate our use of this notion we introduce a mathematical "trick" which renders measures of distance and of sensitivity comparable. This trick consists of transforming the axes of the issue space so that if $n=2$, for example, each citizen's indifference contours are concentric circles (instead of concentric ellipses).¹⁰ Thus, if we make $\phi(x-\theta)$ circularly symmetric, then $U(x, \theta)$, and $g(x-\theta)$ also

⁸ This assumption does not imply an interpersonal comparison of utility, but simply that if the preference vectors of two citizens are equidistant from their preferred candidate(s), then the benefits and costs of voting, as well as the density of ϵ , stand in the same relationship to each other for both citizens.

⁹ We assume, moreover, that $\lim_{\|x-\theta\| \rightarrow \infty} U(x, \theta)$

$+\epsilon < 0$. This insures that $g(x-\theta)$ is integrable. This assumption, however, places no substantive restrictions on our analysis.

¹⁰ Recall that a citizen's loss, $\phi(x-\theta)$, is a monotonic function of the metric $\|x-\theta\|_A$, where A is a positive definite $n \times n$ matrix. If this loss matrix is identical for all citizens (Assumption 6), there exists a linear transformation of the dimensions such that A becomes the identity matrix I . Thus, with no loss of generality we can assume that $\phi(x-\theta) = \phi(\|x-\theta\|)$, where x and θ are now measured in the transformed space. And since $\|x-\theta\|$ is constant on circles, $\phi(x-\theta)$ is constant on circles. Similarly, this transformation can also be designed so that, without any loss of generality, the axes of $f(x)$ correspond to the axes of our coordinate space.

become circularly symmetric. The rate of change of $g(x-\theta)$ with respect to x , then, is the same for all issues in the transformed space.

Observe, however, that the transformation of the axes which renders $g(x-\theta)$ circularly symmetric affects $f(x)$: this transformation leaves $f(x)$ *radically* symmetric and unimodal, but $f(x)$ is not necessarily *circularly* symmetric. (We illustrate in Figure 5 some contours for $g(x-\theta)$ and $f(x)$ as they might be before and after the axes are transformed.) That is, the variance of $f(x)$ may be different for each axis. This means that if we measure the rate of change of $g(x-\theta)$ for each axis in terms of the variance of $f(x)$ on that axis, then comparative differences in this rate can be observed. And it is differences in these rates which determine differences in the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. Specifically, the intuitive idea behind sensitivity is that if it is high (low), the probability of voting decreases rapidly (slowly) as we move, say, one standard deviation (of $f(x)$ in the transformed space for a particular dimension) from θ . (Thus, sensitivity is higher in Figure 5 for issue 1 than it is for issue 2.)

Before considering the candidates' objective functions we note that an important special case of $g(x-\theta)$ occurs if the stochastic factor, ϵ , is not included in expression (3) (i.e., $R = U(x, \theta)$). R is not a random variable in this case, and a citizen either votes with certainty




FIGURE 4.

or abstains with certainty.¹¹ To ascertain whether or not a citizen votes, observe that $U(x, \theta)$ is greatest if $x = \theta$, in which case the citizen votes with certainty. As the disparity between x and θ increases, the citizen's loss increases, and $U(x, \theta)$ decreases. Disregarding those citizens who always vote, $U(x, \theta)$ eventually equals zero if this disparity becomes sufficiently great, say if the distance between x and θ is δ . Thus, if the distance between x and θ is less than δ the citizen votes with certainty; if the distance between x and θ

¹¹ An interpretation of this special case renders analysis with it less objectionable. Briefly, if the analysis is multidimensional, and if all dimensions of taste are assumed to be identified and measured then there may be little randomness in decision-making.




FIGURE 5.




FIGURE 6.

is greater than or equal to δ , then $U(x, \theta) \leq 0$, and the citizen abstains with certainty. Figure 6 illustrates a representative $g(x-\theta)$ for this special case. This function is a special case which facilitates the derivation of some results. Although we present these results in this essay, we assume the general form for deriving our central multidimensional conclusions.

II. THE CANDIDATES' OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS

We can now define rigorously the candidates' objective functions (i.e., what they seek to maximize) in order to ascertain optimal strategies. To facilitate exposition we relegate the proofs of our results for the general multi-issue case to an appendix, and we restrict our mathematical discussion in the text to unidimensional competition ($n=1$).

The first step in formulating objective functions consists of identifying those citizens who prefer candidates 1 and 2 respectively. For the case of a single dimension, we assume without loss of generality that the candidates' strategies, θ and ψ , satisfy $\theta \leq \psi$. Since the citizens' loss functions are symmetric, and since by assumption, these functions are identical for all citizens (except for the value of the preferred position), all citizens whose most preferred positions fall to the left of the midpoint between the candidates' strategies, $(\theta+\psi)/2$, prefer the first candidate. Similarly, all citizens whose most preferred positions fall to the right of $(\theta+\psi)/2$ prefer candidate 2's strategy.

The second step consists of ascertaining the probability that a randomly selected citizen votes for, say, candidate 1. If $f(x)$ is the probability that a randomly selected citizen

prefers the position x , and that $g(x-\theta)$ is his probability of voting, then $f(x)g(x-\theta)$ is the probability that a randomly selected citizen prefers the position x , and votes for candidate 1. Hence, by "adding" all those values of $f(x)g(x-\theta)$ for all those citizens who prefer candidate 1 to candidate 2 (i.e., all citizens who prefer a position to the left of $(\theta+\psi)/2$), we represent the probability that a randomly selected citizen votes for the first candidate. We denote that probability $V(\theta, \psi)$, and we observe that for continuous variables $V(\theta, \psi)$ is expressed,

$$(4) \quad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f(x)g(x-\theta)dx$$

Similarly, $V(\psi, \theta)$, the probability that a randomly selected citizen votes for candidate 2, is expressed,

$$(5) \quad V(\psi, \theta) = \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\infty} f(x)g(x-\psi)dx$$

Thus, if candidates maximize votes they seek to maximize the value of these functions.

If candidate 1, for example, maximizes plurality, his objective function, $P(\theta, \psi)$, becomes,

$$(6) \quad \begin{aligned} P(\theta, \psi) &= V(\theta, \psi) - V(\psi, \theta) \\ &= \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f(x)g(x-\theta)dx \\ &\quad - \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\infty} f(x)g(x-\psi)dx \end{aligned}$$

Simply knowing a candidate's expected vote or expected plurality, however, does not reveal whether or not the candidate can find a better strategy. But for either objective function and for any pair of strategies, (θ, ψ) , we

can ascertain a candidate's incentive to shift towards an opponent's strategy, away from an opponent's strategy, or not move. Specifically, with equations (4) and (6), we can calculate for candidate 1 the rate at which $V(\theta, \psi)$ or $P(\theta, \psi)$ (depending on what he maximizes) changes as θ changes. By convention, we denote these rates as $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$ and $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$, respectively. The notation $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta$, for example, reads: "the rate of change of $P(\theta, \psi)$ as θ increases, for the strategy pair (θ, ψ) ." Thus if candidate 1 maximizes plurality and if $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta > 0$, the candidate increases his anticipated plurality by shifting to the right, towards ψ . Alternatively, if $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta < 0$, he increases his plurality by shifting away from ψ ; and if this rate of change equals zero, he doesn't move.¹² Hence, we have the following decision rules for candidates: If candidate 1 maximizes

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{votes, and if } \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta \\ \text{plurality, and if } \partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta \end{array} \begin{cases} < 0, \text{ shift to the left} \\ > 0, \text{ shift to the right} \\ = 0, \text{ do not move} \end{cases}$$

Using equations (4) and (6), we find these rates of change by standard mathematical procedures.¹³ They are,

$$(7) \quad \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx - \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right)g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right)$$

$$(8) \quad \partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx$$

in which $f'(x)$ is the slope of the density of preferences evaluated at x ($f'(x)$ is written frequently as $df(x)/dx$). The first term on the right of the equality sign of equation (7) is a means for representing "the sum of the slopes of $f(x)$ for all values of x in the range $(-\infty, (\theta+\psi)/2)$, times the respective probability that

¹² This assumes that the candidate's plurality is not minimized if $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta = 0$. By inspection, however, we can generally eliminate such possibilities.

¹³ To differentiate $V(\theta, \psi)$ with respect to θ we apply Leibnitz's rule (see Francis P. Hildebrand, *Advanced Calculus for Applications* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 360, or any textbook of advanced calculus) and get,

$$\begin{aligned} \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta &= \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right)g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right) \\ &\quad - \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f(x) \frac{\partial g(x-\theta)}{\partial\theta} \end{aligned}$$

Integrating this expression by parts yields equation (7).

citizens vote for candidate 1." This term is common to both equations (7) and (8). The term $\frac{1}{2}f((\theta+\psi)/2)g((\psi-\theta)/2)$, which is in (7) but not in (8), is $\frac{1}{2}f(x)$ evaluated at $x = (\theta+\psi)/2$, times $g(x-\theta)$ evaluated also for $x = (\theta+\psi)/2$. This term is always greater than or equal to zero; a subtraction in equation (7); and the only characteristic that distinguishes equation (7) from equation (8). Hence, this term is the first indication that the strategies which vote maximizing candidates and plurality maximizing candidates adopt may differ.

III. MAXIMIZING STRATEGIES

We demonstrate in this section that the preferred strategies of plurality maximizing candidates can differ from the preferred strategies of vote maximizing candidates. Briefly, we: (1) review the proof of a theorem which states that plurality maximizing candidates converge to the mean of a symmetric, unimodal density of preferences if citizens abstain because of alienation; (2) prove that, if both candidates maximize votes, an equilibrium exists in which the candidates might not converge; (3) ascertain the relationship between the location of the candidates' preferred strategies and the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy, and; (4) demonstrate that uniform variations in the cost of voting affect the location of the strategies which vote maximizing candidates prefer, but do not affect the location of strategies which plurality maximizing candidates prefer.

(A) *Equilibrium and Plurality Maximization:* To evaluate a candidate's strategy, we note from equations (7) and (8) that something must be known about the slope of the electorate's preference density. Consider symmetric unimodal densities and, without loss of generality, assume that the mean of $f(x)$ equals 0. Thus, $f'(x) \geq 0$ for all $x \leq 0$, and $f'(x) \leq 0$ for all $x \geq 0$. We can now demonstrate that the best strategy a *plurality maximizing* candidate can adopt is the mean, 0, if he knows that his opponent will adopt any strategy that might defeat him. Thus, we prove that the mean is a minmax strategy; if both candidates are at the mean they are said to be in equilibrium—neither candidate has any incentive to alter his position. Stated differently, a candidate receives a positive plurality if his strategy is the mean and if his opponent adopts any other strategy; the candidates tie if they both adopt the mean.

Sketching out the proof of this result for one dimension, we set candidate 2's strategy equal to the mean (i.e., $\psi = 0$). Since $g(x-\theta)$ is positive and $f'(x)$ is non-negative everywhere to the left of the mean—the range of integration of equation (8)— $\partial P(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta > 0$ for all $\theta < \psi = 0$.




FIGURE 7.

Thus, candidate 1 increases his plurality by converging to his opponent. And, by symmetry, he obviously increases his plurality to zero so that the mean defeats all strategies that are less than zero. A parallel argument demonstrates that the mean defeats all strategies greater than zero. Elsewhere, we derive the following general multidimensional result:¹⁴

if both candidates maximize plurality, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal, multivariate density, then a pure equilibrium strategy exists at the mean of $f(x)$, which is to say that the candidates converge to the mean

(B) *Equilibrium and Vote Maximization*: Turning now to the analysis of strategies if candidates maximize votes instead of plurality, we prove that such candidates might not converge. To see this we again set $\psi = 0$ and assume that $\theta \leq \psi$. Observe now that, although the first term on the right of equation (7) is positive for all $\theta \leq \psi = 0$ —we show this in the case of plurality maximization—the second term is a subtraction and might be greater than the first for θ less than ψ . If this occurs, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta$ is not positive for all θ , and candidate 1 decreases his total vote by converging to his opponent.

To illustrate more formally that vote maximizing candidates do not converge, that the magnitude of the second term in (7) can exceed the magnitude of the first term, we assume that the abstention function $g(x-\theta)$ is the rectangular function which we illustrate in Figure 6. Second, we set candidate 2's strategy,

ψ , equal to 0 (with $\theta \leq \psi$). With these assumptions equation (7) reduces to¹⁵

$$(9) \quad \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta = \frac{1}{2} f(\theta/2) - f(\theta - \delta), \text{ with } \psi = 0$$

Thus, if $f(\theta/2) > 2f(\theta - \delta)$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta > 0$, and the first candidate increases his vote by shifting towards candidate 2. But if $f(\theta/2) < 2f(\theta - \delta)$,

¹⁵ The rectangular abstention function equals 0 for all x in the intervals $(-\infty, \theta - \delta)$, and $(\theta + \delta, \infty)$ and equals 1 otherwise. Hence, equation (7) becomes,

$$\begin{aligned} \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta &= \int_{\theta-\delta}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x) dx \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2} f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right) \\ &= f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) \left[1 - \frac{1}{2} g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right) \right] \\ &\quad - f(\theta - \delta) \end{aligned}$$

Observe now that whenever $g((\psi - \theta)/2) = 0$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta$ is positive. Hence candidate 1 should shift towards candidate 2 at least until $g((\psi - \theta)/2) = 1$. This occurs whenever the two abstention functions butt against each other or overlap. We can restrict ourselves then to strategies such that $g((\psi - \theta)/2) = 1$, in which case we get equation (9). Note, however, that if $f(x)$ is a uniform density, $f'(x) = 0$ in the relevant range of integration. This means that either the rate of change of $V(\theta, \psi)$ with respect to θ is zero or that it is negative. It is zero if the abstention functions do not butt, it is negative if they overlap. Thus, if $f(x)$ is a uniform density, the candidates do not converge so closely that the abstention functions of citizens preferring them overlap.

¹⁴ "Abstentions and Equilibrium . . ." *op. cit.*




FIGURE 8.

$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta < 0$, and candidate 1 should shift away from candidate 2. Finally, if

$$(10) \quad \frac{1}{2}f(\theta/2) = f(\theta - \delta)$$

the first candidate maximizes his total vote. We illustrate in Figure 7 a density, $f(x)$, and a threshold, δ , satisfying equation (10) with the appropriate optimal θ indicated. The pencil exercise of considering strategies to the left of this θ demonstrates that $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta > 0$, and that strategies to the right of θ yields $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta < 0$. Thus, a value of θ which is not equal to ψ maximizes candidate 1's vote, even though ψ is at the mean.

We are not interested, however, in demonstrating simply that one vote maximizing candidate does not converge necessarily to an opponent's strategy if that strategy is fixed at the mean. The question is whether or not two vote maximizing candidates, who can adopt any strategy, fail to converge and if an equilibrium exists. We prove in the appendix of this essay that:

if both candidates maximize votes, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if $f(x)$ is the multivariate normal density, then an equilibrium exists; and if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently low, the candidates do not converge

Several comments are in order concerning this result:

(1) Equilibrium strategies exist and the candidates fail to converge for a wider class of symmetric densities than the multivariate normal. The proof of our result does not assume the normal form, but its statement is simplified by avoiding complex mathematical conditions

and special cases. The theorem, nevertheless, demonstrates the dissimilarities in behavior between vote maximizing and plurality maximizing candidates.

(2) Although "if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently low" is imprecise, we can formulate the condition rigorously. A rigorous formulation, however, is mathematically complex, so we relegate it to the appendix. Nevertheless, the spirit of our result is that vote maximizing candidates may or may not converge—depending on the sensitivity of turnout. We examine this relationship more carefully later in this section.

(3) If $f(x)$ is a univariate density ($n=1$), the candidates align themselves symmetrically on opposite sides of the mean (provided that the candidates do not converge). Hence, if the mean equals zero, and if θ^* and ψ^* are two equilibrium strategies, then $\theta^* = -\psi^* < 0$. We depict this situation in Figure 8 for a rectangular abstention function.¹⁶

¹⁶ Additionally, with the rectangular abstention function we can easily illustrate the proof that for $n=1$, only one strategy pair is an equilibrium pair. First, assume that $\theta \neq -\psi$, and that $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi = 0$. Thus,

$$\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi = \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\psi+\delta} f'(x)dx + \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) = 0$$

or, equivalently,

$$\frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right) = f(\psi + \delta)$$

Now consider $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta$, which we know equals $\frac{1}{2}f((\theta+\psi)/2) - f(\theta - \delta)$. Thus, from the condition




FIGURE 9.

(4) If $f(x)$ is a bivariate density ($n=2$), the equilibrium strategies exist on the major or the minor axis of $f(x)$; the candidates align themselves on opposite sides of the mean. We must point out, however, that we establish only that local equilibria exist, and that the location of globally minmax strategies is not rigorously ascertained. Nevertheless, we conjecture that if the candidates fail to converge, they align themselves on opposite sides of the mean on the major axis of $f(x)$ (i.e., the axis of greatest variance). Hence, vote maximizing candidates might converge on one issue and diverge on another. We illustrate this possibility in Figure 9, in which θ^* and ψ^* are two equilibrium strategies, and the candidates converge on the second issue but diverge on the first issue.

(C) *Equilibrium and the Sensitivity of Turnout to Variations in Strategy*: Empirical relevance, however, requires that our result say more than that vote maximizing candidates might not converge. Specifically, if we seek to

that $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi = 0$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta = f(\psi + \delta) - f(\theta - \delta)$. But, $f(x)$ is symmetric about 0, and $\theta \neq -\psi$, so that $f(\theta - \delta) \neq f(\psi + \delta)$. Thus, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta \neq 0$, which is to say that $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta$ and $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi$ cannot equal 0 simultaneously for $\theta \neq -\psi$. This proves, for rectangular abstention functions, that only a strategy pair satisfying $\theta = -\psi \leq 0$ is an equilibrium pair. To prove that only one such strategy pair satisfies this condition for a given δ and $f(x)$, we set $\psi = -\theta$ and get,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta = \frac{1}{2}f(0) - f(\theta - \delta)$$

Obviously, this function equals zero for only one θ since $f(0)/2$ is a constant and $f(\theta - \delta)$ is monotonically increasing with θ for all $\theta \leq 0$.

predict how candidates act, we must know when they converge and when they do not converge. Hence, we must examine the relationship between the location of competitive electoral equilibria and the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy.

We begin by considering again univariate densities and rectangular abstention functions. If $f(x)$ is symmetric, if θ and ψ are in equilibrium, and if the mean of $f(x)$ equals zero, then $\theta = -\psi$. Thus if the candidates are in equilibrium, equation (7) becomes,

$$(11) \quad \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta = \frac{1}{2}f(0) - f(\theta - \delta) = 0$$

We readily see from equation (11) that the condition of equilibrium depends on the properties of $f(x)$ and the parameter, δ , of the rectangular abstention function which we termed the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy (i.e., if δ is small sensitivity is high, and if δ is large sensitivity is low). We seek, therefore, to explore the nature of this dependence.

First, we define a distance x^* , measured from the mean of $f(x)$. Assuming that $f(x)$ is symmetric and that its mean equals 0, we select x^* so that $f(-x^*) = \frac{1}{2}f(0)$. Figure 10 illustrates this distance, x^* .

We select this distance because, if $\theta - \delta = -x^*$ and if $\psi + \delta = x^*$ (recalling that we are presently setting $\delta = -\psi$), equation (11) becomes,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta = \frac{1}{2}f(0) - f(-x^*) = 0$$

But from the definition of x^* , $f(-x^*) = \frac{1}{2}f(0)$, so the candidates are in equilibrium if $\theta = \delta - x^*$ and $\psi = x^* + \delta$.¹⁷ Assuming that x^* is fixed, we

¹⁷ If θ is less than $\delta - x^*$, then $f(\theta - \delta) < f(-x^*)$




FIGURE 10.

can plot the strategy θ which maximizes candidate 1's vote against alternative values of δ —assuming that the candidates are in equilibrium—in Figure 11.¹⁸ (The use of line seg-

$=f(0)/2$, in which case $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta > 0$ from equation (11), and candidate 1 should shift towards the mean. Alternatively, if $\theta > \delta - x^*$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta < 0$, and candidate 1 should shift away from the mean.

¹⁸ Let $\delta > x^*$. Thus, since $f(x)$ is unimodal and $\theta \leq 0$, $f(-x^*) > f(\theta - \delta)$, in which case $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta > 0$ for all $\theta \leq 0$; the candidates converge to the mean. Now consider $\delta < x^*$. From equation (11), the condition for a maximizing value of θ is $f(0)/2 = f(\theta - \delta) = f(-x^*)$. If $2\delta \geq x^*$, an equilib-

rium is attained by selecting θ such that $-\theta = -x^* + \delta$ (this insures that $f(\theta - \delta) = f(x^*) = f(0)/2$). Clearly, then, as δ diminishes from x^* to $x^*/2$, θ diminishes from 0 to $-x^*/2$. Finally, if $2\delta < x^*$, equation (11) cannot be satisfied without violating the condition that the two candidates' abstention functions at least butt against each other.

Thus, an equilibrium is attained by setting $-\theta = \delta$ (observe that for $-\theta < \delta$, $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta > 0$, but for $-\theta > \delta$, this rate of change is negative). Thus, as δ diminishes from $x^*/2$ to 0, θ increases from $-x^*/2$ to 0.




FIGURE 11.




FIGURE 12.

Figures 3 and 4 the relationship of θ to δ is smooth.¹⁹)

Interpreting Figure 11, both candidates converge to the mean of $f(x)$ if $\delta=0$, or if $\delta \geq x^*$. If, however, $0 < \delta < x^*$, both candidates adopt strategies symmetrically about the mean, and the distance between each candidate increases and then decreases as δ increases. We can give this result quantitative significance by assuming that $f(x)$ is the normal density function, in which case $x^*=1.2\sigma$ (where σ is the standard deviation of $f(x)$). Thus, if citizens prefer policies greater than 1.2 standard deviations from their most preferred candidate's position vote, the candidates should converge to the mean.

It is unlikely, however, that such mathematical precision exists in reality or in our measurements of it. Nevertheless, we can infer two important conclusions from this result. First, vote maximization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for non-convergence. If the variance of $f(x)$ is sufficiently small (i.e., if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently high) both vote maximizing and plurality maximizing candidates converge. Thus, while the conclusion that candidates *do not converge* if they maximize their total vote is intuitively appealing, intuition fails to indicate that conditions exist for which such candidates converge. Consequently, intuition cannot suggest sufficient conditions for non-convergence. Our analysis specifies such con-

ditions, however, and these conditions can be formulated as an empirical hypothesis. Specifically, if turnout falls very rapidly or very slowly as the distance between a candidate's position and a citizen's preference increases (in which distance is measured in terms of the standard deviation of the density of preferences), the candidates should converge. But if turnout falls at some intermediate rate, the candidates should diverge. Thus, we hypothesize that the relationship between sensitivity and the amount of divergence is of the form of an inverted "U"—divergence increases and then decreases.

The interpretation of the relationship between sensitivity and the candidates' strategies can be extended if we consider some of the determinants of sensitivity. We can say, for example, that as the relative saliency of an issue increases the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy also increases. Thus, we can substitute the word saliency for the word sensitivity in our hypothesis. Let us consider in detail, however, a second factor—the cost of voting.

(D) *Equilibrium and the Cost of Voting:* Clearly, politicians can alter electoral outcomes by raising or lowering the cost of voting selectively through such devices as poll taxes, intimidation, and residency requirements. Consider, however, the implications of uniform variations in the cost of voting.²⁰ Specifically,

¹⁹ For example, a continuously differentiable abstention function can yield the relationship between δ and the equilibrium value of θ illustrated in Figure 12.

²⁰ The notion of a "uniform" variation in the cost of voting is defined rigorously in Hinich and Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium. . .," *op. cit.* Briefly, if two citizens are the same distance from their preferred candidates, they vote

we wish to know if uniformly varying each citizen's cost of voting can affect electoral outcomes.

We approach this query by examining the relationship between this cost and the citizen's utility of voting. Clearly, if cost increases, the utility which a citizen derives from voting diminishes. Thus, $U(x, \theta)$ varies inversely with C , the cost of voting. This means that the disparity between x and θ necessary to set $U(x, \theta)$ equal to zero decreases as C increases. And it is this critical distance—which we denote by δ for the case of rectangular abstention functions—that determines the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. Thus, sensitivity increases as C increases, *ceteris paribus*. Hence, one interpretation of our analysis is that, if the relative cost of voting is either high or low, the candidates should converge; but if C assumes intermediate values, the candidates should diverge.

Elsewhere, we demonstrate that for plurality maximizing candidates, if $f(x)$ is symmetric and unimodal, the mean of $f(x)$ is the dominant strategy for all levels of sensitivity.²¹ Thus, form our analysis of Figure 11,

if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal density, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if the costs of voting are varied uniformly throughout the electorate, then equilibrium strategies are unaltered if the candidates maximize plurality, but such strategies are altered if the candidates maximize votes

Since a high or low sensitivity of turnout dictates convergence to the mean,

if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal density, if citizens abstain because of alienation, and if candidates maximize votes, then the cost of voting can be either uniformly raised or lowered so that the candidates converge to the mean

with equal probability; and a variation in the cost of voting is said to be uniform if they continue to vote with equal probability after such costs are altered (and if the abstention function g retains the mathematical properties we assume for it). For example, if g is the rectangular abstention function we can associate a δ with each person's function. We assume in our analysis that the same value for δ is associated with all citizens functions. Changing the cost of voting changes the magnitude of δ ; and a uniform variation in the cost of voting change δ equally for all citizens.

²¹ *Ibid.* We also demonstrate, however, that if $f(x)$ is not symmetric and if the candidates maximize votes, the location of a dominant strategy is sensitive to variations in sensitivity.

Thus, the equilibria of elections in which candidates maximize votes demonstrate a greater sensitivity to variations in the cost of voting than is found in plurality elections.

IV. MULTI-CANDIDATE CONTESTS

Thus far we have analyzed only two candidate competition. If candidates maximize plurality this is an admissible assumption, but if candidates maximize votes it is more appropriate to assume that many candidates compete. Hence, we relax our two-candidate assumption, and we consider multi-candidate contests.

Downs asserts that "parties in a multiparty system try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible."²² Clearly, this is only one possibility, since the set of all distinct possibilities is,

- (a) all candidates seek to adopt distinct positions,
- (b) all candidates seek to converge to a common point,
- (c) some candidates wish to converge, but others do not wish to do so.

To examine each of these possibilities we must

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 115, 126–127. Tullock, *op. cit.*, p. 54–56, concludes for two issues, if all citizens vote, and if preferences are distributed uniformly over a rectangle or a circle, that three candidates do not converge. His illustration, however, assumes the consequence: Tullock's Figure XXXIX (p. 55) requires that candidates A and B have not adopted identical positions. If A and B are at the same point, however, then clearly candidate C should converge arbitrarily close to this point since this move maximizes both his plurality and his total vote. A careful scrutiny of this situation, nevertheless, yields some interesting observations. First, if all three candidates converge arbitrarily close to the mean, it is readily verified that such convergence is an equilibrium—no candidate has any incentive to shift unilaterally from the mean. Second, equilibria exist in which all three candidates adopt dissimilar positions symmetrically about the mean. In fact, there appear to be an infinity of equilibria triples—including convergence. This suggests that the final equilibrium triple is a function of initial conditions (e.g., the candidates' initial positions and whatever restrictions on strategies that exist) and their reaction paths. Clearly, then, multidimensional analysis of multiparty systems requires careful analysis, and this analysis undoubtedly will reveal many interesting and nonobvious conclusions. We are not prepared in this essay to conduct such an analysis, however, so we restrict our discussion to undimensional competition.




FIGURE 13.

consider the logic of Downs's analysis. Briefly, Downs asserts that parties do not converge in multi-party systems because they have little to gain by doing so. Parties which adopt positions near the extremes of the electorate's preference density do not converge toward the center because such movement succeeds in alienating voters who prefer these extreme positions. A party near the center has little incentive to converge to another party's position since such movement loses as many votes to one party as another party gains.

Implicit in this reasoning, however, are many assumptions concerning the rates at which the number of votes increases or decreases as strategies change. Specifically, we know from our analysis in the previous section that the strategic incentives of vote maximizing candidates depend upon the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy, or, equivalently, upon the cost of voting and the saliency of an issue. And conditions exist under which all candidates wish to converge to the center. To illustrate this possibility in dynamic terms, assume that three candidates initially adopt the positions α , θ , and ψ . (See Figure 13.) Observe now that if the sensitivity of turnout is sufficiently high or low, the second and third candidates, at θ and ψ , converge to the mean, while the first candidate, at α , seeks to converge to θ .²³ Thus,

²³ Throughout this section we also assume that if a citizen votes, he votes for his most preferred candidate. Thomas W. Casstevens attempts to show that this assumption follows logically from the voter's decision theoretic calculus in "A Theorem About Voting," this REVIEW, LXII (March, 1968). But Casstevens assumes that if a voter switches from candidate 1 to candidate 2, he does not affect the probability that candidate 3 wins—an assumption which does not follow logically from his structure (see Gerald H. Kramer, letter to the editor, this REVIEW, LXII (September, 1968)). Note however, that we are

all three candidates eventually converge to the mean. Vote maximization, then, is not a sufficient condition for distinct strategies.

Our illustration also reveals a potential instability in competition. New parties might form at the extremes of the distribution of preferences after the original three parties converge since no party represents these extremes. With the absence of constraints on strategies, these new parties also seek to converge to the mean, leaving the extremes unrepresented again and the cycle resumes. This is the dilemma of parties in multi-party systems: vote maximization can require converging to the mean, while such convergence leaves the party vulnerable to the formation of new parties on its flank. Clearly, this problem confronts parties in electoral systems employing the plurality formula. The ease of entry and the rewards of new parties, however, are typically greater in systems in which candidates maximize votes than in systems in which they maximize plurality.²⁴ Thus, if a party maximizes votes, its leadership is more likely to be concerned with balancing its quest for votes and the threat of new parties than is the leadership of parties in plurality systems.

This system, of course, is an idealized construct in which parties and candidates have perfect spatial mobility. Typically, such factors as ideological patterns of recruitment, the historical association of parties with specific platforms, and the preferences of candidates themselves constrain the parties and their candidates. Nevertheless, we can discern some factors for stability in the model by considering intermediate levels of the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy.

We observe, previously, that two vote-maximizing candidates do not converge for such intermediate levels of sensitivity. We conjecture, therefore, that equilibrium is possible under similar conditions if the number of competing candidates exceeds two. To see this, assume that three candidates compete and that

assuming that the candidates maximize votes, in which case the behavioral proposition that citizens vote for a preferred candidate to increase a candidate's total vote is admissible. For a decision-theoretic analysis of a citizen's calculus in multiparty systems see Richard McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting," (unpublished, University of Rochester, 1970.)

²⁴ William H. Riker, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Kul B. Rai, "A Theory of the Number of Political Parties" (unpublished, University of Rochester, 1970).




FIGURE 14.

their strategies are α , θ , and ψ . Assume, further that the candidates cannot cross each other (i.e., $\alpha \leq \theta \leq \psi$).²⁵ Finally, assume that the abstention function, $g(x - \theta)$, is rectangular (see Figure 6). With these assumptions, the necessary condition for an equilibrium in which the candidates do not converge is the system of simultaneous equations,

$$\partial V(\theta, \psi, \alpha) / \partial \theta = f\left(\frac{\theta + \psi}{2}\right) - f\left(\frac{\theta + \alpha}{2}\right) = 0$$

$$\partial V(\psi, \theta, \alpha) / \partial \psi = f(\psi + \delta) - \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta + \psi}{2}\right) = 0$$

$$\partial V(\alpha, \psi, \theta) / \partial \alpha = \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta + \alpha}{2}\right) - f(\alpha - \delta) = 0$$

or equivalently,

$$(12) \quad f\left(\frac{\theta + \alpha}{2}\right) = f\left(\frac{\theta + \psi}{2}\right) = 2f(\psi + \delta) \\ = 2f(\alpha - \delta)$$

We illustrate a case which satisfies equation (12) in Figure 14. Note that the candidates do not converge, and that they array themselves about the mean of the symmetric density $f(x)$. Additionally, observe that the non-symmetric density $f_0(x)$ also satisfies equation (12) for the same three strategies. This later observation suggests that *similar electoral outcomes may result from dissimilar densities of preference if more than two candidates compete and if the candidates maximize votes.*

This analysis produces one additional result if we consider the effect of a fourth party's formation to the right of ψ . Denoting this new party's strategy by β , the conditions for an equilibrium in which the candidates do not converge are,

²⁵ The restriction that candidates cannot cross each other is suggested by Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

$$(13) \quad f\left(\frac{\theta + \psi}{2}\right) = f\left(\frac{\theta + \alpha}{2}\right) = f\left(\frac{\psi + \beta}{2}\right) \\ = 2f(\psi + \delta) = 2f(\alpha - \delta)$$

Observe, however, that the first three terms of this equality cannot be satisfied simultaneously for unimodal densities (unless $f(x)$ is a uniform density). This result implies that the two centrally located candidates (at θ and ψ) converge.²⁶ Stated differently, *if $f(x)$ is unimodal, and if the candidates maximize votes, only three distinct positions are represented in the election.* This result also describes the strategic implication of new parties that form at the extremes of the electorate's preferences. Specifically, *if $f(x)$ is unimodal, and if candidates maximize votes, the formation of new parties at the extremes of the electorate's preference forces the central (and presumably major) parties to vie with each other at the mean.*

Of course, $f(x)$ need not be a unimodal density, in which case many parties presumably can exist in equilibrium without converging. In lieu of pursuing such innumerable possibilities, we summarize our unidimensional analysis of

²⁶ To see this assume that α and θ are fixed and let β form to the right of ψ . The rate of change in votes for ψ becomes,

$$\frac{\partial V(\psi, \alpha, \theta, \beta)}{\partial \psi} = \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\psi + \beta}{2}\right) - \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta + \psi}{2}\right)$$

Clearly, since $f(x)$ is unimodal and θ is fixed at the mean with $\beta > \psi > \theta$,

$$f\left(\frac{\psi + \beta}{2}\right) < f\left(\frac{\theta + \psi}{2}\right).$$

Thus, ψ converges to θ . It is readily shown that θ has no incentive now to shift to the left, so that with β assuming the old position of ψ the candidates are in equilibrium.

multi-party systems by reformulating Downs's assertion,

if $f(x)$ is a symmetric, unimodal density, if the candidates maximize votes, and if alienation causes abstention, then all candidates converge to the mean if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is either high or low; but if this sensitivity assumes some intermediate value, three distinct strategies exist in equilibrium

V. MIXED MOTIVES

Candidates, however, do not simply adopt a dominant position, or shift about on the issues during a campaign. Candidates bargain, cajole, and compromise as they progress through the maze of individual and conflicting demands present in a plural society. Similarly, voting is only one form of possible citizen participation. Citizens can contribute finances, ring doorbells, provide endorsements, or frequently, nominate a candidate. Thus, candidates must weight some citizens' preferences more heavily than others when formulating campaign strategy. Consequently, the strategies candidates do adopt should reflect the unequal importance of citizens. We seek, therefore, to render spatial analysis compatible with these observations.

As we note elsewhere, however, a single mathematically precise theorem cannot summarize all of the forces which affect a candidate's decision.²⁷ Instead, we must apply several theorems in concert to the explanation of complex situations. We do not propose, then, to deduce new theorems in this section, but to illustrate the implications of our analysis for the problem of candidates who maximize plurality and who seek resources such as finances to conduct their campaigns.

Considering a simple example, we assume that: (1) the electorate consists of two groups which are differentiated by the resources that their members are able to contribute to a campaign. (2) Members of the first group either vote or abstain from voting. (3) Each member of the second group, in addition to voting, can contribute a commodity, say A , to his most preferred candidate's campaign. (4) A member of the second group contributes A if his expected utility from voting is sufficiently great. (5) Each candidate values the commodity A , and each candidate seeks to maximize his supply of it. (6) The candidates seek to maximize their plurality of votes. (7) The preferences of both groups are distributed symmetrically and unimodally and with identical means.

²⁷ Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, *op. cit.*

Ceteris paribus, the candidates should converge to the mean preference of the first group; but, since the candidates maximize A , they may seek to diverge from the mean preference of the second group. Clearly, the candidates' campaigns are simplified if the strategies that they adopt with respect to each group are independent: each group may be concerned with a different subset of issues, or each group might be unaware of the policies which a candidate advocates to the other group. Frequently, however, the concerns of such groups overlap and information cannot readily be controlled. The strategic imperatives of the two groups conflict.

One approach to this conflict is to adopt some simplified decision rule such as selecting a strategy which compromises the optimal strategies of the two groups. The question is, however: What weight should a candidate assign to the demands of each group? Should a candidate adopt a position near the mean of the first group or near the optimal strategy of the second group? To answer such questions candidates must ascertain the relative value of A , which is to say that we must ascertain the rate at which A can be converted into votes. For example, a candidate may be willing to forego a secure spatial position on an issue in order to secure sufficient finances so that he can support a campaign to vary his spatial location on some other issue, or so that he can vary the relative saliency of an issue.

Unfortunately, virtually no systematic knowledge exists concerning either the production possibilities of campaign resources or how candidates calculate these possibilities. Nevertheless, in lieu of such knowledge we propose an hypothesis: The greater the degree of competition the more value a candidate assigns to such resources as finances, endorsements, and the support of activists. The logic of this hypothesis is that as competition increases, a candidate needs more resources to implement an effective campaign. A candidate, for example, might attempt to convince the electorate that his opponent supports some unpopular policy. The greater the threat which such attempts pose, the more resources a candidate requires to counteract it. Thus, in terms of our illustration, the greater the degree of competition the greater the weight a candidate assigns to the strategic imperatives of the second group. Consequently, as competition increases, the distance each candidate's strategy diverges from the mean increases.

This conclusion clearly contradicts the assertion that competition fosters middle-of-the-road candidates. It provides one explanation

for Warren E. Miller's observation that "party differences *within* [a congressional] district are heightened when electoral competition is keen and are reduced under single party domination of congressional electoral politics," and that "evenly balanced two-party competition . . . is associated with the reduction if not the total absence of direct representation of constituency policy preferences."²⁸ Briefly, two candidates may not converge if the citizens' preferences are distributed unimodally—the candidates may be maximizing valuable resources and this maximization can warrant strategies that diverge from the mean preference.

APPENDIX

The proof of our theorem consists, first, of demonstrating by a suitable selection of the dispersion of $f(x)$, that an equilibrium exists for $n=1$ in which the candidates do not converge. This technique is then applied to the more general multidimensional situation. Without loss of generality we assume that the mean of $f(x)$ equals zero, and that $\theta \leq \psi$. The expressions for $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta$ and $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi$ become,

$$(A1) \quad \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial \theta} = \int_{-\infty}^{(\theta+\psi)/2} f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx - \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right)g\left(\frac{\psi-\theta}{2}\right)$$

$$(A2) \quad \frac{\partial V(\psi, \theta)}{\partial \psi} = \int_{(\theta+\psi)/2}^{\infty} f'(x)g(x-\psi)dx + \frac{1}{2}f\left(\frac{\theta+\psi}{2}\right)g\left(\frac{\theta-\psi}{2}\right)$$

where (A1) is candidate 1's rate of change of vote, and (A2) is candidate 2's rate of change of vote. Setting $\theta = -\psi$, equations (A1) and (A2) reduce to,

$$(A3) \quad \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial \theta} = \int_{-\infty}^0 f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx - \frac{1}{2}f(0)g(\psi)$$

$$(A4) \quad \frac{\partial V(\psi, \theta)}{\partial \psi} = \int_0^{\infty} f'(x)g(x-\psi)dx + \frac{1}{2}f(0)g(\theta)$$

but, since g is symmetric, $g(\psi) = g(\theta)$ so that,

$$(A5) \quad \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial \theta} = -\frac{\partial V(\psi, \theta)}{\partial \psi}, \quad \theta = -\psi$$

If $\partial V(\psi, \theta)/\partial \psi = 0$ for $\psi = -\theta \neq 0$, then, from equation (A5), $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial \theta = 0$, and the candi-

dates are in an equilibrium in which $\psi = -\theta \neq 0$ (i.e., they do not converge to the mean).

The proof that such an equilibrium can exist consists now of demonstrating that this occurs with a suitable choice of the variance of $f(x)$. Assume that $g(x-\theta)$ goes to zero for some finite x , say x' , so that $g(x-\theta) = 0$, $|x-\theta| > x'$. Now by increasing the variance of $f(x)$ in the range $(x', 0)$, $f'(x)$ can be set as close to zero as we wish in this range. Thus, the integral term in equation (A3) can be made as small as we wish without affecting $\frac{1}{2}f(0)g(\psi)$. With a suitable selection of $f'(x)$, therefore, we set,

$$\int_{-\infty}^0 f'(x)g(x-\theta)dx = \frac{1}{2}f(0)g(\psi)$$

so that the candidates do not converge and are in equilibrium.

We now generalize our result for multivariate $f(x)$, i.e., x is a vector. We assume that a citizen's loss, $\phi(x-\theta)$, is a monotonic function of,

$$\|x-\theta\|_A^2 = (x-\theta)'A(x-\theta)$$

where A is a positive definite $n \times n$ matrix. If this loss matrix is identical for all citizens, there exists a linear transformation of the dimensions such that A is the identity matrix I in the transformed space. Thus, with no loss of generality we assume,

$$(A6) \quad \phi(x-\theta) = \phi\left(\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \theta_i)^2\right)$$

Assume that $f(x)$ possesses major and minor axes such that these axes are represented as straight lines (among the numerous densities possessing this property, for example, is the multivariate normal density function). Suppose, now, that the domain of competition between θ and ψ is restricted to the line,

$$(A7) \quad \theta = c\psi$$

which passes through the origin and is a major or minor axis of $f(x)$. By a rotation of the axis it is possible to transform this line onto one of the coordinate axes, say x_1 . Both candidates, therefore, choose the median preferred position of the population on issues 2 through n (which are normalized to zero for convenience). Let $f_0(x)$ and $g_0(x-\theta)$ be $f(x)$ and $g(x-\theta)$ in the rotated coordinate system, and let x and θ now be measured in this new system. Obviously $f_0(x)$ is symmetric if $f(x)$ is symmetric. Additionally, since the loss matrix is the identity, the rotation of the axis leaves the loss function ϕ invariant, i.e., also in the new coordinate system equation (A6) remains valid. Thus, since $g(x-\theta)$ is a function of ϕ , $g_0(x-\theta)$ depends only on $\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \theta_i)^2 = \|x-\theta\|^2$, and is sym-

²⁸ "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, ed. by E. Allardt and Y. Litunen (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1964), p. 359, 376.

metric. Simplifying notation, we drop the subscript "o".

The vote for candidate 1 is expressed in vector notation now as,

$$(A8) \quad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_R f(x)g(x - \theta)dx$$

where,

$$(A9) \quad R = \{x: \|x - \theta\| < \|x - \psi\|\} \subset E^n$$

i.e., R is a set in n -dimensional Euclidean space containing the most preferred positions of all citizens who prefer θ to ψ . To facilitate presentation we restrict our analysis now to the case of $n=2$. The method of analysis, however, is easily generalized. Thus,

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \theta = \begin{bmatrix} \theta_1 \\ \theta_2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{and} \quad \psi = \begin{bmatrix} \psi_1 \\ \psi_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

Let $y = x - \theta$ and $\xi = \theta - \psi$.

Observe now that $\|x - \theta\| = \|y\|$, and $\|x - \psi\| = \|y + \xi\|$. Thus, $R = \{y: \|y\| < \|y + \xi\|\}$, so that from (A8) and (A9) we get,

$$(A10) \quad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_R f(y + \theta)g(y)dy$$

Reexpressing R ,

$$\begin{aligned} R &= \{y: \|y\| < \|y + \xi\|\} \\ &= \{y: y_1^2 + y_2^2 < (y_1 - \xi_1)^2 + (y_2 + \xi_2)^2\} \\ &= \{y: 0 < 2\xi_1 y_1 + 2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_1^2 + \xi_2^2\} \\ &= \{y: 2\xi_1 y_1 > -2\xi_2 y_2 - \xi_1^2 - \xi_2^2\} \end{aligned}$$

And, defining,

$$y^* = -\frac{2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_1^2 + \xi_2^2}{2\xi_1}$$

we get for R ,

$$R = \{y: y_1 > y^*\}$$

Suppose now, without loss of generality, that $\theta_1 < \psi_1$. Thus, from the definition of ξ ,

$\xi_1 = \theta_1 - \psi_1 < 0$, so that (A10) can be taken out of vector notation and rewritten as,

$$(A11) \quad V(\theta, \psi) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{y_1^*} f(y_1 + \theta_1, y_2 + \theta_2) \cdot g(y_1, y_2) dy_1 dy_2$$

Our next step is to differentiate $V(\theta, \psi)$ with respect to θ_1 . We observe first that,

$$\frac{\partial y_1^*}{\partial \theta_1} = \frac{2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_2^2}{2\xi_1^2} - \frac{1}{2}$$

Thus, using Leibnitz's rule (see footnote 12), we get,

$$\begin{aligned} (A12) \quad \partial V(\theta, \psi) / \partial \theta_1 &= \int_R \frac{\partial f(y + \theta)}{\partial x_1} g(y) dy \\ &+ \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(y_1^* + \theta_1, y_2 + \theta_2) g(y_1^*, y_2) \\ &\cdot \left[\frac{2\xi_2 y_2 + \xi_2^2}{2\xi_1^2} - \frac{1}{2} \right] dy_2 \end{aligned}$$

To show that an equilibrium can exist such that the candidates do not converge and that they adopt strategies symmetrically on opposite sides of the mean on either the major or the minor axis of $f(x)$, let $\psi_1 = -\theta_1$ and $\psi_2 = \theta_2 = 0$. Thus, $\xi_1 = 2\theta_1$, $\xi_2 = 0$, and $y_1^* = \theta_1$. Substituting these identities, and $x = y + \theta$ into expression (A12), we have,

$$\begin{aligned} (A13) \quad \partial V(\theta, \psi) / \partial \theta_1 &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{\theta_1} \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_1} g(x_1 - \theta_1, x_2) dx_1 dx_2 \\ &- \frac{1}{2} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(0, x_2) g(-\theta_1, x_2) dx_2 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, by increasing the variance of $f(x)$ we can make the first term of (A13) as small as possible without affecting the magnitude of the second term. This proves that an equilibrium exists such that the candidates do not converge towards each other along either axis of $f(x)$. We now show that an equilibrium on an axis of




FIGURE 15.

$f(x)$ is at least a local equilibrium, i.e., that $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 = 0$. First, we observe that,

$$\partial y_1^*/\partial\theta_2 = -\frac{y_2 + \xi_2}{\xi_1}$$

Thus, again applying Leibnitz's rule, we get from (A11),

$$\begin{aligned} \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 &= \int_R \frac{\partial f(y + \theta)}{\partial x_2} g(y) dy \\ &- \frac{1}{\xi_1} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(y_1^* + \theta_1, y_2 + \theta_2) g(y_1^*, y_2) (y_2 + \xi_2) dy_2 \end{aligned}$$

Setting $\psi_1 = -\theta_1$, $\psi_2 = \theta_2$, our presumed local equilibrium state, and $x = y + \theta$, we have,

$$\begin{aligned} \partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^0 \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_2} \\ &\cdot g(x_1 - \theta_1, x_2 - \theta_2) dx_1 dx_2 \\ &- \frac{1}{2\theta_1} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} [x_2 - \theta_2] f(0, x_2) \\ &\cdot g(-\theta_1, x_2 - \theta_2) dx_2 \end{aligned}$$

Finally, if $\theta_2 = 0$ (i.e., if the axis of $f(x)$ is rotated to correspond to an axis of the coordinate space), we get,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x_2 f(0, x_2) g(-\theta_1, x_2) dx = 0$$

This follows from the symmetry of $f(0, x_2)g(-\theta_1, x_2)$ in x_2 . And, since $\partial f(x_1, x_2)/\partial x_2$ is an odd function of x_2 ,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_2} g(x_1 - \theta_1, x_2) dx_2 = 0.$$

so $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2 = 0$.

We illustrate in Figure 15 some contours of a symmetric density which is rotated so that the major and minor axes of $f(x)$ correspond to x_1 and x_2 . The vector A in this illustration corresponds to $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_2$; and B corresponds to $\partial V(\theta, \psi)/\partial\theta_1$. The vector C corresponds to the rate of change of candidate 1's vote as θ changes in the direction of C , and the magnitude of C can be expressed as

$$C = \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial\theta_1} \cos \gamma + \frac{\partial V(\theta, \psi)}{\partial\theta_2} \sin \gamma$$

where γ is the angle between C and B . But we have just shown that both terms of this expression equal zero, so the magnitude of C equals zero. Thus, the candidate's total vote declines if he shifts in any direction from θ , and θ is at least a local equilibrium point.

CROSS-NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE

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Political efficacy, the belief that the ruled in a political system have some capacity for exercising influence over the rulers, has been studied extensively by political researchers. A selected bibliography compiled by Easton and Dennis in early 1967 contains some thirty books and articles which have dealt in one way or another with political efficacy and its correlates.¹ And this bibliography could be updated considerably.

Substantial theoretic import has been attributed to political efficacy. Easton and Dennis consider the SRC sense of political efficacy construct to be an important determinant of the persistence of democratic regimes. They argue that beliefs in political efficacy provide "a reservoir of diffuse support upon which the system can automatically draw in normal times, when members may feel that their capacity to manipulate the environment is not living up to their expectations, and in special periods of stress, when popular participation may appear to be pure illusion or when political outputs fail to measure up to insistent demands."² A related construct, termed "subjective competence" by Almond and Verba, is based on different indicators but interpreted as substantively equivalent to the SRC construct. On the basis of their analysis of the Five-Nation data, Almond and Verba arrive at the general conclusion that "the self-confident [subjectively competent] citizen appears to be the democratic citizen."³ The concept of political competence, as formulated by Barnes, subsumes political efficacy under the aegis of an individual attribute consisting of "political skills plus the sense of efficacy necessary for effective political action."⁴ Barnes contends that high levels of political competence dispose individuals to prefer democratic styles of leadership, while low levels dispose individuals to

prefer authoritarian styles. On these grounds, he concludes that relatively high levels of political competence are a necessary condition of political democracy.⁵

Although theoretic significance has been attached to political efficacy and to the more general notion of political competence, conceptual ambiguities remain which need to be resolved. Both psychological factors and political skills are components warranting inclusion in any conceptualization of the dimensions of political competence, but the psychological factors, particularly, require careful specification.

Easton and Dennis have observed that "political efficacy appears in three separate although by no means independent guises: as a norm, as a psychological disposition or feeling, and as a form of behavior."⁶ Ambiguity has resulted from failure to distinguish between the SRC sense of efficacy construct—"the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change"—⁷ and the Almond-Verba measures of competence. The basic thrust of the SRC questions appears to be toward tapping beliefs in the extent to which the *norm* of political efficacy is actualized in a political system: the sense that the government is responsive to citizens *in general*. By contrast, psychological feelings of confidence, or beliefs on the part of the individual that he himself has the *personal* capacity to wield influence, appear to be the common core of the rather bewildering profusion of competence measures employed by Almond and Verba.⁸

Following the formulations of Barnes and

⁵ Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-83; see also Ch. 13 of Barnes' *Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

⁶ Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁷ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 187.

⁸ Their measures of *political competence*—also referred to as *citizen competence* and *subjective civic competence*—and its components of *local* and *national competence*, as well as *local subjective competence* and *national subjective competence*, all include the item pertaining to whether the individual thinks he can personally influence governmental decisions. See Chs. 7-9 in the *Civic Culture*.

¹ David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this REVIEW, (March, 1967), p. 27.

² Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

³ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 257.

⁴ Samuel H. Barnes, "Leadership Style and Political Competence," in Lewis J. Edinger (ed.), *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 60.

Easton and Dennis, political competence will be conceptualized here as involving three basic dimensions: (1) a general belief that government is responsive to citizen influence; (2) skills necessary for effective political behavior; and (3) a psychological disposition or feeling of confidence in one's personal ability to influence salient government decisions.

If political competence is to contribute to the development and maintenance of democratic patterns of government, it would seem important that the dimensions of political competence be *congruent*; that is, a pattern of moderately strong interrelationships ought to obtain among them. Conversely, incongruities, might be expected to function as a potential source of stress on democratic government.

Given some motivation for attempting to influence the political process, such as dissatisfaction with political outputs and/or feelings of socioeconomic deprivation, it would seem likely that individuals possessing the rudimentary skills which are a prerequisite for effective influence would be less likely to withdraw support if they believed the government was patterned such that, over the long run, citizen influence over the behavior of public officials was fact rather than illusion. Also, if possession of skills necessary for effective influence were not associated with personal confidence in ability to exert influence, again it might be likely that perception of lack of opportunity to in fact exert influence would contribute to withdrawal of support. Finally, if citizens did not make any connection between the degree to which the government was responsive to the membership in general and their own confidence in being able to exert influence, either set of beliefs might be more susceptible to fluctuation according to circumstances of the moment, thereby introducing a greater potential for stress, than if beliefs in the reality of the efficacy norm buttressed beliefs in personal ability to exert influence.

This research, then, will focus on two major questions. (1) Can political competence be defined cross-nationally by (a) the same general dimensions and (b) equivalent operational indicators of these dimensions? (2) And (most importantly with respect to the relevance of political competence for the functioning of political democracy) is there a cross-national tendency for individuals to generalize from beliefs that the government is responsive to influence from the membership in general, and from possession of political resources necessary for effective influence, to feelings of confidence in their own ability to influence salient government decisions?

The data base for this investigation is the revised 1968 Inter-University Consortium for Political Research issue of the Five-Nation study conducted by Almond and Verba in 1959-60. The Five-Nation interview schedule included numerous items relevant to the measurement of political competence and thus affords a useful extant source for cross-national investigation of the concept.

I. DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE

In order to answer the question of whether political competence can be defined cross-nationally by three general dimensions consisting of equivalent indicators, a principal components analysis was performed on the same sixteen items from each nation and the resulting solutions were then subjected to Varimax rotation.⁹ Of course, the samples available for this test are drawn from nations at the upper end of the socioeconomic development continuum; thus the finding can be considered as generalizable mainly to industrialized societies. Table 1 shows the results of the factor analyses of these items for the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Factor loadings lower than .300 have been excluded in order to facilitate visual interpretation.

It was hypothesized that the first seven items, measuring exposure to political communication in the mass media, attention to political campaigns, political knowledge, and discussion of public affairs, would all correlate strongly with a factor which could be labelled *Political Involvement*; also, it was hypothesized tentatively that items 8 and 9, measuring the individual's beliefs in his ability to understand local and national issues, would load with the first seven items, since these beliefs seem to be concomitants particularly of attention to politics, political knowledge, and political dis-

⁹ Initially, seventeen items were included in the analysis. Variable #127 from the ICPR Five-Nation study issue, measuring respondents' agreement-disagreement with the sense of efficacy proposition, "the way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country," did not load as hypothesized and was dropped from the analysis reported in this paper. Apparently, the belief that voting decides policy is not a component of the political efficacy dimension which is equivalent cross-nationally. The sixteen variable solutions shown in Table 1 were derived by specifying rotation to three factors. The eigenvalue for the third factor in these solutions is quite close to 1.0.

TABLE 1. DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE: FIVE NATIONS

	United States			United Kingdom			West Germany			Italy			Mexico		
	(N=970)			(N=963)			(N=955)			(N=995)			(N=1295)		
	(PI)	(AIG)	(PE)	(PI)	(AIG)	(PE)	(PI)	(AIG)	(PE)	(PI)	(AIG)	(PE)	(PI)	(AIG)	(PE)
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
1. Follow Govt Affairs Newspapers	.776			.795			.823			.833			.790		
2. Follow Govt Affairs TV or Radio	.733			.747			.792			.824			.673		
3. Follow Govt Affairs Magazines	.701			.493			.628			.839			.661		
4. Pay Attention to Campaigns	.619			.536			.641			.583			.563		
5. Knowledge of Party Leaders	.654			.661			.703			.724			.628		
6. Knowledge of Cabinet Positions	.631			.673			.637			.685			.623		
7. Discuss Govt Affairs	.595	.316		.623			.633			.733			.674		
8. Understand Local Issues	.443			.442			.502			.709			.664		
9. Understand Issues Facing Country	.588	.310	.346	.570	.394		.716			.746			.632		
10. Could Change Bad Local Regulation		.755		.695			.826			.783			.790		
11. Would Act on Bad Local Regulation		.751		.740			.818			.799			.780		
12. Could Change Bad National Law		.690		.715			.647			.793			.801		
13. Would Act on Bad National Law	.335	.703		.733			.680			.774			.838		
14. Average Man Understand Govt			.727		.638	.325	.378	.362	.369				.385		
15. Candidates Act After Election			.739		.662		.648		.718				.705		
16. People Have Say in Govt		.364	.455		.612		.622		.740				.736		

(PI): Political Involvement (AIG): Ability to Influence Government (PE): Political Efficacy

cussion.¹⁰ These rudimentary political skills consist of activities, cognitions, and beliefs which, according to Milbrath's hierarchy of

¹⁰ The items hypothesized as defining a Political Involvement dimension, as they appear in the ICPR Five-Nation study codebook, are: #23, Follow Government Affairs in Newspapers: 4-point scale, "Nearly Everyday"—low, "Never"—high; #34, Follow Government Affairs on Television or Radio: 4-point scale, "Nearly Everyday"—low, "Never"—high; #25, Follow Government Affairs in Magazines: 3-point scale, "Once a Week or More"—low, "Never"—high; #81, Pay Attention to Campaign: 3-point scale, "Much"—low, "None"—high; #99, Name Party Leaders: 7-point scale, Seven or Six Correct—low, "None Correct"—high; #135, Name Cabinet Positions: 6-point scale, "Five Correct"—low, "None Correct"—high; #26, (Do You) Talk About Government Affairs With People: 4-point scale, "Nearly Everyday"—low, "Never"—high, #31, Understand Local Issues: 5-point scale, "Very

political involvement, define the spectator stratum.¹¹

Further, it was hypothesized that items 10, 11, 12, and 13, which formed the core of the various Almond-Verba competence measures, would all correlate strongly with a factor which could be labelled *Ability to Influence Government*.¹² These items are measures of an indi-

well"—low, "Not at All"—high; #30, Understand Issues Facing the Country: 5-point scale, "Very Well"—low, "Not at all"—high.

¹¹ The hierarchy of political involvement is presented in Figure 3 at page 18 of Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965).

¹² The items hypothesized as defining an Ability to Influence Government dimension, as they appear in the ICPR Five-Nation study codebook, are: #39, Could Change Bad Regulation: 5-point scale; #40, Would Act on Regulation: 5-point scale; #43, Could You Change Law: 5-point scale; #44, Would You Act on Law: 5-point scale.

vidual's evaluation of his personal ability to influence local and national government decisions perceived as unjust or harmful.¹³

Finally, it was hypothesized that items 14, 15, and 16, similar to the SRC sense of efficacy items, would all correlate strongly with a factor which could be labelled *Political Efficacy*. In contrast to the Ability to Influence Government items, which measure the degree to which individuals believe they could and would try to influence government, the Political Efficacy items are measures of the comprehensibility and responsiveness of government to citizens in general.¹⁴

On the whole, the factor structures for the

Variables 39 and 43 were recoded as follows: "Very Likely"=1; "Moderately Likely"=2; "Likely Only If Others Joined In"=3; "Somewhat Unlikely"=4; "Not at All Likely—Impossible"=5. Variables 40 and 44 were recoded as follows: "Very Likely"=1; "Moderately Likely"=2; "Depends on the Issue"=3; "Somewhat Unlikely"=4; "Not at All Likely—Impossible"=5.

¹³ A situation was defined as follows: "Suppose a regulation were being considered by (specify most local government unit—town, village, etc.) which you considered very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do." After respondents had reported whether they could do something they were then asked: (1) "If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed"; (2) "If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually do something about it"; (3) "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision." The initial item in the series (both local and national), whether respondents believed they could do something, was not included in the factor analyses because it formed a 2-point scale; the last item, have you ever done anything, was not included because it is a measure of a more intensive level of participation than Political Involvement, and this level of participation (what Milbrath terms "transitional activities,") is not the subject of this analysis.

¹⁴ The items, as they appear in the ICPR Five-Nation study codebook, are #29, Average Man Understand Government: 3-point scale; #130 Candidates Act After Election: 3-point scale; #132, People Have No Say in Government: 3-point scale. In order to avoid performing factor analysis on unstable phi coefficients, DK responses to all these items were coded as the midpoint on these scales. These variables were recoded so that all scales would run in the same direction; in these instances "Disagree" is low, "Agree" is high.

five countries are characterized by the rather striking clarity with which the hypothesized dimensions emerge. Those items measuring rudimentary political skills consistently define the first factor. There are a few moderate loadings between .400 and .600—three in the United States, four in the United Kingdom, and one each in the remaining three countries; otherwise, the rudimentary political skills items are strongly correlated with a Political Involvement dimension.

The second factor is especially distinct in each country. Without exception, the items measuring an individual's beliefs in his personal ability to influence local and national government decisions are strongly correlated with an Ability to Influence Government dimension.

The third factor is more problematic. In the United States and the United Kingdom this factor is clearly defined by the items measuring beliefs in the efficacy norm. Among Americans, People Have Say in Government is only moderately correlated with the Political Efficacy factor; otherwise, the comprehensibility and responsiveness of government items are strongly correlated with a Political Efficacy dimension in these two countries. Among Germans, Italians, and Mexicans, the government responsiveness items show consistently strong correlations with a Political Efficacy dimension; however, Average Man Understand Government—the comprehensibility of government item—does not load very well on this dimension, and among Germans and Italians, this item shows almost as much association with the Political Involvement factor as with Political Efficacy.

In general, visual inspection of the factor solutions affirms the hypothesis that political competence can be defined cross-nationally by the same dimensions and that these dimensions are operationally equivalent phenomena. Support for this interpretation is provided by the coefficients of congruence between these factor structures. The coefficient of congruence measures the degree to which factor structures for a fixed set of variables are invariant across different populations.¹⁵ Across the five countries the congruence coefficients describing the similarity of the Political Involvement and Ability to Influence Government factor pairings are quite high: the range for Political Involvement is between .995 and .979; for

¹⁵ See Harry H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, 2nd Ed.), pp. 268–272. The coefficients are shown in Appendix A.

Ability to Influence Government the range is between .988 and .943. The congruence coefficient for the Political Efficacy factor in the United States and the United Kingdom is also quite high, attaining a value of .964. However, the majority of the congruence coefficients for the other Political Efficacy factor pairings fall between .900 and .800, indicating only moderate congruence, a reflection of the fact that Average Man Understand Government is much less a component of Political Efficacy in West Germany, Italy, and Mexico, than in the United States and the United Kingdom.

A criticism levelled at the analysis of these data by the original investigators was that their approach tended to focus exclusively on comparison between nations, leaving open the possibility that relationships found to exist between whole nations might not hold up or might be altered substantially by within-nation variation due to such factors as geographic and level of urbanization differences.¹⁶ If one is interested in examining interrelationships between dimensions of political competence across different nations, substantial within-nation variation by such variables as region and size of place would have to be taken into account in order to develop theoretically useful generalizations.

The statistical technique employed to investigate regional and size of place effects on the distribution of political competence within nations is one-way analysis of variance, useful when testing for a relationship between a quantified (measured on an interval scale) variable and a qualitative—or higher order—variable. Tables 2-4 show the variation in political competence by region and size of place for the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy (Mexico has not been included because the Mexican sample was not coded by region and is unreliable with respect to size of place).¹⁷ Political Efficacy scores range from -11 to 56; Political Involvement scores range from -05 to 72; Ability to Influence Government scores range from 0 to 55. The direction of these scales is inverse to score magnitude: the lower the score, the higher the level of competence; the higher the score, the lower the level of competence.¹⁸

¹⁶ See the review of the *Civic Culture* by Stein Rokkan in this REVIEW (September, 1964).

¹⁷ The Mexican sample only included towns with populations of 10,000 or more.

¹⁸ The methodology of scale construction is discussed in Appendix B. The Political Efficacy scales are less equivalent across the samples than the other scales because the contribution of the

Due to the inflation of F by sample size, the significance level selected for rejection of the null hypothesis is .01.

A statistically significant F indicates that there are nonchance variations between means somewhere among the groups. The interesting question involves determination of which groups are significantly different. Assuming that the estimates of the population variance for each group meet the assumption of homoscedasticity, that is, are equal, then a significant F indicates that the largest difference between group means is necessarily statistically significant. A variety of procedures exist for making other a posteriori comparisons.¹⁹ The method adopted here is that proposed by Scheffé; with regard to Type I error, it is more rigorous than other multiple comparison methods.²⁰

Table 2 shows that Political Efficacy is distributed rather evenly by region and size of place in the four countries. Statistically significant regional variation in Political Efficacy appears only among Italians; significant size of place variation appears only among Germans. Italians residing in central Italy manifest a substantially greater degree of belief in the efficacy norm ($\bar{X}=33.65$) than do their compatriots from the north ($\bar{X}=41.16$) and south ($\bar{X}=41.40$). By size of place in West Germany, Political Efficacy tends to be disproportionately located in large urban areas

Average Man Understand Government component is negligible in West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Thus, the equivalence of the Political Efficacy scales for all the countries is mainly in terms of beliefs about the responsiveness of government to the membership in general.

¹⁹ The multiple *t* test method has the least to recommend it because there is no way to determine how many of the comparisons which achieve statistical significance are due to chance alone, or to the circumstance that, since the *t* tests cannot be regarded as independent, some results dictate, others. For a useful discussion see William L. Hays, *Statistics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 375-376 and 471-472.

²⁰ The Scheffé method is relatively insensitive to departures from normality and homoscedasticity, and is applicable to groups of unequal sizes. Its drawback is that it is probably too conservative with regard to Type I error; as compensation, Scheffé recommends that a significance level of .10 be selected. A brief but lucid presentation is in George A. Ferguson, *Statistical Methods in Psychology and Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966, 2nd Ed.), pp. 295-297.

TABLE 2. REGIONAL AND SIZE OF PLACE VARIATION IN POLITICAL EFFICACY

MEAN POLITICAL EFFICACY SCORES: BY REGION						
	East(N = 249)	South(N = 312)	West(N = 409)		Mean Square	F
United States ^a	33.27	36.13	33.05	Between	950.41	3.10 n.s.
				Within	306.20	
	England(N = 811)	Scotland(N = 94)	Wales(N = 58)			
United Kingdom	36.40	39.11	40.26	Between	655.95	2.23 n.s.
				Within	294.36	
	North(N = 210)	Central(N = 564)	South(N = 181)			
West Germany ^b	38.54	37.19	39.79	Between	505.34	2.13 n.s.
				Within	237.21	
	North(N = 470)	Central(N = 191)	South(N = 334)			
Italy	41.17	33.65	41.40	Between	4480.56	23.07 $p < .001$
				Within	194.19	
MEAN POLITICAL EFFICACY SCORES: BY SIZE OF PLACE						
	20000- <20000(N = 406)	100000(N = 142)	>100000(N = 422)		Mean Square	F
United States	35.03	30.75	34.32	Between	985.97	3.22 n.s.
				Within	306.12	
	20000- <20000(N = 240)	100000(N = 299)	>100000(N = 424)			
United Kingdom	37.60	35.74	37.33	Between	299.34	1.01 n.s.
				Within	295.10	
	20000- <20000(N = 354)	100000(N = 329)	>100000(N = 272)			
West Germany	40.12	38.15	34.98	Between	2043.38	8.73 $p < .001$
				Within	233.99	
	20000- <20000(N = 324)	100000(N = 544)	>100000(N = 127)			
Italy	39.16	40.24	39.61	Between	122.16	0.60 n.s.
				Within	202.97	

^a The East includes New England and Middle Atlantic States; the South includes South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central States; the West includes East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States.

^b The North includes Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen; Central includes Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland Palatinate; the South consists of Bavaria.

(\bar{X} = 34.98) as opposed to medium-size towns (\bar{X} = 38.15) and small town-rural areas (\bar{X} = 40.12).²¹

²¹ For all a posteriori comparisons in Tables 2-4, the obtained F must be equal to or greater than 4.60 if the null hypothesis is to be rejected according to the Scheffé procedure (α = .10). In

reporting the F values for the comparisons, those which are statistically significant have been italicized. The break in Political Efficacy by region among Italians is obvious. The relevant comparisons on Political Efficacy by size of place among Germans are: <20000, 20000-100000— F = 2.89; 20000-100000, >100000— F = 6.25.

TABLE 3. REGIONAL AND SIZE OF PLACE VARIATION IN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

MEAN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT SCORES: BY REGION						
	East(N=249)	South(N=312)	West(N=409)		Mean Square	F
United States ^a	29.90	35.72	30.80	Between Within	2988.16 331.63	9.01 $p < .001$
	England(N=811)	Scotland(N=94)	Wales(N=58)			
United Kingdom	36.51	38.16	48.50	Between Within	3922.91 313.66	12.51 $p < .001$
	North(N=210)	Central(N=564)	South(N=181)			
West Germany ^b	28.07	33.80	34.45	Between Within	2871.47 327.62	8.77 $p < .001$
	North(N=470)	Central(N=191)	South(N=334)			
Italy	45.96	47.80	43.33	Between Within	1337.23 300.51	4.45 n.s.
MEAN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT SCORES: BY SIZE OF PLACE						
	<20000(N=406)	20000-100000(N=142)	>100000(N=422)		Mean Square	F
United States	34.20	30.11	30.88	Between Within	1491.63 334.72	4.46 n.s.
	<20000(N=240)	20000-100000(N=299)	>100000(N=424)			
United Kingdom	39.61	35.82	37.25	Between Within	963.97 319.82	3.01 n.s.
	<20000(N=354)	20000-100000(N=329)	>100000(N=272)			
West Germany	35.36	31.97	29.96	Between Within	2345.34 328.72	7.14 $p < .001$
	<20000(N=324)	20000-100000(N=544)	>100000(N=127)			
Italy	46.50	44.46	46.85	Between Within	571.75 302.05	1.89 n.s.

^a The East includes New England and Middle Atlantic States; the South includes South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central States; the West includes East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States.

^b The North includes Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen; Central includes Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland Palatinate; the South consists of Bavaria.

The data presented in Table 3 indicate that Political Involvement, like Political Efficacy, is generally homogenous by size of place. Only in West Germany does Political Involvement vary significantly by size of place: Germans residing in small town and rural areas, whose mean Political Involvement score is 35.36, manifest less of these rudimentary skills than

do those residing in medium-size towns and large urban areas, whose mean scores are 31.97 and 29.96, respectively.²² On the other hand, in three of the four countries the distribution of Political Involvement clearly

²² <20000, 20000-100000— $F = 15.21$; 20000-100000, >100000— $F = 1.69$.

TABLE 4. REGIONAL AND SIZE OF PLACE VARIATION IN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT

MEAN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT SCORES: BY REGION						
	East(<i>N</i> = 249)	South(<i>N</i> = 312)	West(<i>N</i> = 409)		Mean Square	F
United States ^a	30.01	33.96	32.51	Between	1089.31	5.68 <i>p</i> < .01
	England(<i>N</i> = 811)	Scotland(<i>N</i> = 94)	Wales(<i>N</i> = 58)	Within	191.63	
United Kingdom	33.09	33.46	35.72	Between	189.69	1.05 n.s.
	North(<i>N</i> = 210)	Central(<i>N</i> = 564)	South(<i>N</i> = 181)	Within	180.50	
West Germany ^b	37.47	37.25	37.29	Between	3.84	0.03 n.s.
	North(<i>N</i> = 470)	Central(<i>N</i> = 191)	South(<i>N</i> = 334)	Within	141.16	
Italy	35.70	41.38	38.25	Between	2271.31	16.20 <i>p</i> < .001
				Within	140.59	

MEAN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT SCORES: BY SIZE OF PLACE						
	<20000(<i>N</i> = 406)	20000-100000(<i>N</i> = 142)	>100000(<i>N</i> = 422)		Mean Square	F
United States	34.20	30.11	30.88	Between	1491.63	4.46 n.s.
				Within	334.72	
United Kingdom	33.88	32.18	33.72	Between	263.72	1.46 n.s.
	<20000(<i>N</i> = 354)	20000-100000(<i>N</i> = 329)	>100000(<i>N</i> = 272)	Within	180.35	
West Germany	37.31	37.75	36.90	Between	57.13	0.41 n.s.
	<20000(<i>N</i> = 324)	20000-100000(<i>N</i> = 544)	>100000(<i>N</i> = 127)	Within	141.05	
Italy	37.47	37.92	36.95	Between	56.44	0.39 n.s.
				Within	145.06	

^a The East includes New England and Middle Atlantic States; the South includes South Atlantic, East South Central, and West south Central States; the West includes East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States.

^b The North includes Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen; Central includes Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland Palatinate; the South consists of Bavaria.

varies by region. Among Americans, the difference occurs between the south and the nonsouth: Political Involvement is lower in the south ($\bar{X}=35.72$) than in the east ($\bar{X}=29.90$) and west ($\bar{X}=30.80$).²³ On the average, in the

United Kingdom the English ($\bar{X}=36.51$) and the Scots ($\bar{X}=38.16$) manifest substantially greater levels of the rudimentary political skills which define the Political Involvement dimension than do the Welsh ($\bar{X}=48.50$).²⁴

²³ East, West— $F=0.38$; South, West— $F=12.96$.

²⁴ England, Scotland— $F=0.74$; Scotland, Wales— $F=12.25$.

And in West Germany the level of Political Involvement is greater among Germans residing in the north, whose mean score is 28.07, than among Germans residing in the central and southern regions of the country, whose mean scores are 33.80 and 34.45, respectively.²⁵

Turning to Table 4, it can be seen that Ability to Influence Government is homogeneous by size of place in each of the four countries. By region, in the United States Ability to Influence Government beliefs appear to be located to a greater degree in the east ($\bar{X}=30.01$) than in the south ($\bar{X}=33.96$) and west ($\bar{X}=32.51$).²⁶ The F -ratio for Ability to Influence Government by region among Italians should be regarded with caution, since the condition of heteroscedasticity (unequal variances) obtains between these regions, and may inflate the F -ratio spuriously.²⁷ Tentatively, then, it may be inferred that in Italy the incidence of Ability to Influence Government beliefs is highest of all in the northern region, where the mean score is 35.70, lower in the southern region, where the mean is 38.25, and lowest of all in central Italy, where the mean is 41.38.²⁸

Analysis of variance thus indicates that the three dimensions of political competence are relatively homogeneously distributed by region and size of place in the four countries studied: differences clearly appear, but they do not define consistent disproportionate location of political competence either in certain geographic regions or in certain communities differentiated by degree of urbanization. The regional differences which appear in the United States on Political Involvement and Ability to Influence Government are mixed rather than

exclusively south versus nonsouth. Among Germans, size of place affects the distribution of Political Efficacy and Political Involvement, but these effects are mixed; the size of place difference on Political Efficacy occurs between small town-rural areas and medium-size towns versus large urban areas, whereas the Political Involvement difference pits small town-rural areas against medium-size towns and large urban areas. Although Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government differ by region in Italy, the effect of region is mixed, levels of Ability to Influence Government appearing to be highest in northern Italy, somewhat lower in the south, and lowest in the central region, whereas levels of Political Efficacy are greater in central Italy, as opposed to the north and south. (The findings that Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government are *not* consistently lower in south Italy than in central and northern Italy and that Political Involvement is *evenly* distributed across the whole of Italy, support Kogan's criticism of the LaPalombara-Tarrow thesis that Italian political culture is sharply divided between north and south; Kogan points out that the Five-Nation data do not show sharp differences on many political culture variables and he argues that, in general, the dualistic political culture thesis is an exaggeration.)²⁹

Since consistent regional or size of place imbalances in political competence do not appear within the four countries, subsequent analysis will focus on relationships between the competence dimensions within each country as a whole. The finding of homogeneity with respect to levels of urbanization is interesting from a substantive point of view because it is consistent with Neubauer's thesis that, among nations which have developed beyond a socioeconomic threshold supportive to political democracy (a class which includes each of these nations), factors such as urbanization will have little effect on the development and maintenance of democratic patterns of government.³⁰ As the growth of political competence

²⁵ North, Central— $F=15.21$; Central, South— $F=0.18$.

²⁶ East, West— $F=5.29$; South, West— $F=1.96$.

²⁷ Where groups are of unequal sizes and a single test is desired of the hypothesis that $\sigma_1^2 = \sigma_2^2 = \dots = \sigma_k^2 = \sigma^2$, the appropriate method is the Bartlett test for homogeneity of variance, described at pages 193-194 of Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev, *Statistical Inference* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1953). The test yields a statistic B which has a chi-square distribution with $k-1$ degrees of freedom. The B value for Ability to Influence Government by region is 27.23. This is substantially greater than the chi-square value required for rejection of the null hypothesis at the .001 level, which is 13.8. Therefore, considerable lack of homogeneity is indicated.

²⁸ North, South— $F=9.00$; Central, South— $F=8.41$.

²⁹ See Norman Kogan's review of Sidney G. Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) in this REVIEW (December, 1968). Kogan's criticism is confined to Tarrow's presentation of the dualistic culture thesis, but LaPalombara's view is apposite with that of Tarrow; see Joseph LaPalombara, "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation, and Alienation," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

³⁰ See Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions

generally is considered conducive to political democracy, Neubauer's thesis would imply the lack of relationship found here.

The finding that levels of Political Involvement do vary by region in three of the four countries is also of substantive interest, although explanation of this pattern is not a simple matter. Region is a surrogate variable; factors such as differences in levels of industrialization, communications development, education, and income, as well as differences in political history and traditions, may be reflected in the differential distribution of Political Involvement by region in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Detailed investigation of which factors are responsible for the effect of region is not a purpose of this paper. However, it may be that subcultural attitudes of regional separatism are responsible for much of the effect of region on Political Involvement in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Political Involvement scale measures mainly involvement in national politics. Regions with a history of separatist sentiment such as the southern United States and Wales might be expected to show lower levels of *national* political involvement than regions without such traditions. Separatism is still very much a part of the political history of the American South. And Welsh nationalism is distinctive in the United Kingdom. Alford states that "Welsh nationalism is apparently growing, not dying," and cites evidence pointing to the conspicuousness of Welsh separatism: "If language can be considered a crucial index of the cultural basis for regional separatism, then clearly Wales ranks higher than Scotland; for in 1931, 37 per cent of the Welsh population spoke Welsh, while only 2 per cent of the Scottish population spoke Gaelic."³¹

II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL COMPETENCE

Circularity of influence surely operates among the three dimensions of political competence. However, the presumption in the following analysis is that Political Efficacy and Political Involvement function largely as antecedents of Ability to Influence Government. Setting Political Involvement prior to Ability to Influence Government entails an assumption which seems plausible enough: that the

major path of causation involves a relationship in which the characteristics that define Political Involvement are political resources which should contribute to the individual's development of confidence in his personal ability to wield influence over salient political decisions.

The placement of Political Efficacy is more questionable. Among adults, generalization from confidence in personal political potency to confidence in the overall responsiveness of the government might be expected to occur. However, Easton and Dennis have shown that, in the American political system, a coherent structure of beliefs in the overall responsiveness-nonresponsiveness of the government to citizen influence is inculcated in children (at least white middle-class children) at an early age.³² On the basis of their findings (admittedly a flimsy empirical base at this stage—but by no means implausible), the assumption adopted here is that the major path of causation between Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government involves a relationship in which beliefs about the extent to which the efficacy norm is a reality in the political system, inculcated in children through processes of conditioned learning, affect adult confidence

³² Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 29-33. As the authors note at page 31: "The most important conclusion emerging from our principal component analysis is that by grade 3 children have already begun to form an attitude, as revealed in the five high-loading items, which we could call a sense of political efficacy. This basic orientation is likely to become crystallized early in the life of the individual and to be maintained at least through these grades. This does not say, of course, that the third-grade child has developed a *high* sense of political efficacy, nor does it assert that any particular proportion of them experience this sentiment at any level of intensity. It only says that an attitude structure has begun to take shape among the children in their early years." Data on the direction (positive-negative) of efficacy beliefs among children in the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany is reported in Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in four Western Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* (April, 1968). These authors are concerned with whether there is an upward or downward trend in the aggregate level of positive efficacy feelings among children from youngest to oldest in the four countries. Their study does not focus on the age at which children acquire a coherent structure of beliefs about the efficacy norm.

of Democracy," this REVIEW (December, 1967).

³¹ Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), pp. 143 and 142 note 26, respectively.




FIGURE 1. Hypothetical causal relationships between dimensions of political competence

in personal political potency. Also, given that beliefs in the efficacy norm are learned at an early age, it is logical to assume that these beliefs will have an important effect on the degree to which adults become motivated to acquire the rudimentary political skills which are a prerequisite for effective influence. Here, the assumption is that the inculcation of beliefs in the efficacy norm will dispose members to feel that there is some payoff in becoming politically involved.

Thus, in the following analysis a particular causal ordering is *assumed* and the purpose is to discover, given the assumed sequence, the linkages which apply to each of the five nations. Instead of utilizing Blalock's rather tedious search procedure, the method employed here is the more straightforward technique of path analysis.³³ Having assumed causal se-

quence, unmeasured variables as residual factors, and uncorrelated residuals, path analysis, as Duncan has pointed out, "amounts to a sequence of conventional regression analyses, and the basic theorem becomes merely a compact statement of the normal equations of regression theory for variables in standard form."³⁴

The set of relationships between the political competence dimensions which is assumed to be most conducive to the development and maintenance of democratic government is displayed graphically in Figure 1. The upper limit of the hypothesized gross effects between the variables has been set at .700. Beyond this level the competence dimensions would merge empirically.³⁵ The pattern of net effects, as estimated by the beta weights (β), is hypothe-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³³ See Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology* (July, 1966).

³⁵ Presumably, they would all load on one principal component.

TABLE 5. FIVE-NATION INTERCORRELATION
MATRICES (r): POLITICAL COMPETENCE

UNITED STATES		
	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.406	.337
Political Involvement		.558
UNITED KINGDOM		
	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.344	.210
Political Involvement		.330
WEST GERMANY		
	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.314	.273
Political Involvement		.380
ITALY		
	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.130	.029
Political Involvement		.358
MEXICO		
	Political Involvement	Ability to Influence Govt
Political Efficacy	.118	-.015
Political Involvement		.354

sized as follows: PE should have relatively substantial impact on PI, PI should have relatively substantial impact on AIG, and the impact of PE on AIG will be largely indirect, through PI.³⁶ The proposed model is hierarchical.³⁷ To be sure, a reciprocal model, allowing the competence variables to be both cause and

effect of each other, would do better justice to reality; however, estimation of such linkages presents a difficult empirical problem.³⁸ Presumably, the ordering adopted represents the major causal paths involved.

Table 5 presents the five-nation intercorrelation matrices for the competence variables. In the United States the correlations are relatively strong. The relationship between PE and AIG is rather weak in the United Kingdom; otherwise, a pattern of moderate relationships obtains for the United Kingdom and West German samples. A quite different pattern emerges among Italians and Mexicans. The only substantial correlation in Italy and Mexico is between PI and AIG. PE and PI are related slightly in both countries. There is no relationship at all between PE and AIG.

In the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany the correlations between the competence variables fall, with one exception, within (or almost within in the case of PE and AIG among Germans) the parameters assumed to be conducive to the development and maintenance of democratic government. Among Italians and Mexicans, only the correlations between PI and AIG are greater than the lower boundary of the parameters specified.

The lack of relationship between PE and AIG in Italy and Mexico means that in these countries individuals make no connection between their own sense of political potency and the receptivity of their governments to influence from the general membership. It may be that the phenomenon of *Clientelismo*, discussed by Tarrow with respect to southern Italy, is partially responsible in both countries for the lack of association between PE and AIG (as well as the slight association between PE and PI). According to Tarrow, under the system of *Clientelismo* "an individual is linked to the authority structure through personal ties of obligation and loyalty, rather than through the merger of his interests with others of the same social group or ideological persuasion. . . . *Clientelismo* differs from a true system of representation, although it can adapt to an electoral system, and it deals in the satisfaction of personal interests."³⁹ This type of system, to the extent that it is perceived as operative, would not encourage members to associate their beliefs in the responsiveness of government to the members in general with their perception of their own ability to influence political decisions.


³⁸ See the discussion in *ibid.*, at p. 1261, note 11 and the literature cited therein.

³⁹ Tarrow, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

³⁶ Indirect effects are computed by multiplying the path coefficients along a given chain of causation. See Duncan, *op. cit.*; also see Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), Ch. 5.


³⁷ An excellent discussion of hierarchical models, as well as causal modelling in general, is in Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," this REVIEW (December, 1968).

United States (N=970)




$R^2 = .326$

United Kingdom (N=963)




$R^2 = .120$

Italy (N=995)



$R^2 = .129$

Mexico (N=1295)



$R^2 = .128$

FIGURE 2. Causal relationships between Political Efficacy, Political Involvement, and Ability

Figure 2 shows the beta weights, generated from recursive regression equations, which estimate the path coefficients for the simple three variable model in each country.⁴⁰ The path coefficient describing the impact of a standard unit PE change on PI is numerically the same as the correlation coefficient between these variables because, for the two variable case, $\beta = r$.

Again, in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany the path coefficients fall within the parameters hypothesized as conducive to democratic political development and stability (the path coefficient of .293 which describes the direct impact of PI on AIG in the United Kingdom is quite close to the .300 value arbitrarily selected as indicative of moderately strong impact). The causal linkages between the competence variables for these three countries fit the hypothesized pattern of net effects. Examining Figure 2 in conjunction with Table 6, it can be seen that the impact of PI on AIG is sizeable and largely direct in all three countries. The net effect of PE on AIG is relatively slight. In the United States the effect of PE on AIG is largely indirect, through PI. The United Kingdom presents a slight exception to the expected pattern, since the indirect and direct effects of PE on AIG are of approximately equal magnitude. Germans are even more of an exception to the expected pattern: roughly two-thirds of the gross effect of PE on AIG is direct. In general, however, the pattern of direct and indirect effects between these variables is consistent with the hypothesized model.

Among Italians and Mexicans only the net effect of PI on AIG is consistent with the parameters assumed to be conducive to democratic development and stability. The impact of PI on AIG is completely direct; PE, of course, has no measurable impact on AIG.

Two differential patterns emerge from these

⁴⁰ The comparability of beta coefficients across different samples, because the beta coefficients share the same dimensionality as correlation coefficients, can be distorted by unequal variances. Some of the estimates of the population variance for the competence scales do show statistically significant differences among the samples, but the magnitude of these differences is not large. Examination of the partial regression coefficients, which are not affected by unequal variances, suggests that the patterns of impact inferred from the beta coefficients (standardized partial regression coefficients) are not substantively affected by any departures from homogeneity of variance among the samples.

TABLE 6. CALCULATION OF INDIRECT EFFECTS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT ON ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL EFFICACY ON ABILITY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT: FIVE NATIONS

$r_{PI \cdot AIG} = P_{AIG \cdot PI} + (P_{PI \cdot PE})(P_{AIG \cdot PE})$		
(gross)	(direct)	(indirect)
United States:	.558 = .504 + .054	
United Kingdom:	.330 = .293 + .037	
West Germany:	.380 = .326 + .054	
Italy:	.358 \approx .361 ^a + .000	
Mexico:	.354 \approx .353 ^a + .000	
$r_{PE \cdot AIG} = P_{AIG \cdot PE} + (P_{PI \cdot PE})(P_{AIG \cdot PI})$		
(gross)	(direct)	(indirect)
United States:	.337 = .133 + .204	
United Kingdom:	.210 = .109 + .101	
West Germany:	.273 = .173 + .102	
Italy:	.029 \approx .000 + .000	
Mexico:	-.015 \approx .000 + .000	

^a Discrepancies due to rounding error.

data. In the United States PE has substantial direct impact on PI: a unit change in PE (one standard deviation) will produce a .4 unit change in PI. PI has even greater impact on AIG: a unit change in PI will produce a .5 unit change in AIG. Also, PE has a slight direct, and even greater indirect, impact on AIG. Americans learn to believe that their political system is responsive to citizen influence at an early age. As adults, their belief in the reality of this norm encourages them to develop the rudimentary political skills necessary for some degree of effective influence. And possession of these rudimentary skills, as well as beliefs in the responsiveness of their government, dispose them to feel that, in situations where political laws and regulations are being proposed of which they disapprove, they have the personal potential to in some way exercise influence over the outcome of the decisional process.

Basically the same pattern is operative in the United Kingdom and West Germany. The difference between the causal linkages which apply to these two countries and those which apply to the United States is a difference of degree rather than kind. The net impacts between the variables are larger in the United States than in the United Kingdom and West Germany. And the explanatory power of the simple three variable model is considerably greater in the United States than in the other two countries. However, the causal processes are similar and the patterns of effects generally

fall within the parameters suggested as supportive of democratic government. The relatively low gross explanatory power of the model among Britons, as well as the lower than expected indirect effect of PE on AIG, through PI, may be attributable in part to attitudes of deference toward political authority which permeate British political culture.⁴¹ The fact that the gross explanatory power of the model *does* attain moderate magnitude among Germans may reflect efforts by German political authorities to promote adherence to democratic norms through political socialization processes. The largely direct, rather than indirect, impact of PE on AIG might be a reflection of the short duration of the socialization process in West Germany: many German adults may not have developed beliefs in the efficacy norm as children and then been motivated by these beliefs to acquire rudimentary skills necessary for influence: rather, their socialization to the norm, having occurred later, at a time when their levels of Political Involvement were more established, might thus have a more direct impact on their perceptions of personal ability to influence salient government decisions.

The other pattern, which applies to Italy and Mexico, is presumably less supportive of democratic government. Italians and Mexicans who possess the skills necessary for effective influence do tend to believe that they can exercise influence; and this is likely an important linkage—politically involved Italians and Mexicans at least do not feel particularly thwarted with respect to their perception of the potential effectiveness of their own efforts to influence the political process. However, as far as the inculcation of beliefs in the responsiveness of the government to citizen influence is concerned, if the Easton-Dennis findings are not just unique to the American political system, the Italian and Mexican systems are characterized by a discontinuity in the socialization process. Politically involved citizens who feel confident of their ability to influence the political process are little more likely than their apathetic and less confident compatriots to believe in the reality of the efficacy norm. And were the politically involved (and therefore politically relevant) members to find that their Ability to Influence Government beliefs did not match well with reality in specific situations, beliefs in the efficacy norm would provide little amelioration of their discontent.

Of course, actually testing the effect of

congruence between competence dimensions on democratic development and stability is not possible with the Five-Nation data. The inferences made about the effects of the different competence patterns must remain speculative. However, if the inferences drawn here are at all plausible, it would be expected that the two different patterns of congruence between competence dimensions would be reflected in rank order differences on measures of political stability-instability for the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany as opposed to Italy and Mexico. Utilizing National Political Instability Profiles for 1948–65 as a measure of stability-instability, these expectations are generally borne out. On the scale constructed by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, which ranges from a score of 1 for the most stable systems to a score of 6 for the least stable, the United Kingdom and West Germany show a score of 3, while Italy and Mexico are in an interval lower at position 4.⁴² The exception is the United States, which shows a score of 4, thus falling at the same interval as Italy and Mexico, instead of ranking with the United Kingdom and West Germany, as should be the case if the inferences made here about the effect of congruence between competence dimensions were absolutely correct. Moreover, if the stability-instability scores are averaged so as to produce a more normal distribution, the United Kingdom and West Germany rise to a score of 2 (only Luxembourg and the Netherlands receive a score of 1), Italy and Mexico rise to a score of 3, but the United States remains with a score of 4. Finally, on a cumulative 1948–61 political violence scale developed by Nesvold, West Germany and the United Kingdom rank at the low end of the continuum and Italy and Mexico rank in the middle, as would be expected, but the United States, in contrast to expectations, ranks in the middle with Italy and Mexico. (The scale scores range from 0–113; the scores for the five nations are: West Germany=8, United Kingdom=21, United States=30, Italy=32, Mexico=36.)⁴³

⁴² See Tables 18–1A and 18–1B at pages 623–25 of Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Violence in America* (New York: Signet Books, 1969).

⁴³ This scale appears as Table 7 at page 181 of Betty A. Nesvold, "Scalogram Analysis of Political Violence," *Comparative Political Studies* (July, 1969).

⁴¹ See the discussion in Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 493–494.

The United States is clearly an important deviant case. The closest fit to the hypothesized competence model appears in the American data; yet the inference drawn from the model is not supported by American stability-instability scores. The implication is obvious: variables not considered in the simple model investigated here must be taken into account in future research concerned with the stability-instability of political systems. (Such variables, it is assumed, would not substantially affect the relationships internal to the competence model.) Nevertheless, the stability-instability scores of the other four countries *are* in line with expectations derived from the competence model. This certainly suggests that there is validity in the broad generalization specifying congruence between competence dimensions as conducive to democratic development and stability.

III. CONCLUSION

In this paper three dimensions of political competence have been identified which are distinct and operationally equivalent across five nations.⁴⁴ The analytical distinction has been made, and sustained empirically, between an individual's sense of confidence in his personal ability to influence government decisions, and his beliefs in the capacity of members of his political system in general to influence government—beliefs which involve a sense of satisfaction with the responsiveness of political authorities to the membership over the long

⁴⁴ A study utilizing the same data base but with different theoretical concerns is the research reported in two parts by Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I," this REVIEW (June, 1969) and "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II," *ibid.*, (September, 1969). The Ability to Influence Government dimension identified here is similar to the construct which they label Political Efficacy; the exception is that the first two items of their scale were found to load on the factor labelled Political Involvement in this analysis. The Political Involvement dimension also includes items which Nie *et al.* used to define measures of Political Information and Political Attentiveness, as well as one item of their Political Participation construct. The fact that their Political Information and Political Attentiveness constructs are unidimensional within each sample is not surprising, and this finding is certainly useful from the point of view of parsimony in causal analysis.

run. This is a distinction which largely has been overlooked in the research on sense of efficacy and political competence, but it is a distinction which has theoretical and explanatory relevance.

When variation in political competence by region and size of place was examined, it was found that the three dimensions of competence show little tendency toward consistent disproportionate location by these variables within the four nations investigated. The overall impression is one of within-nation homogeneity.⁴⁵

The competence dimensions were found to be moderately to strongly interrelated in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. By contrast, in Italy and Mexico only Political Involvement and Ability to Influence Government show sizeable correlation; Political Efficacy and Political Involvement are correlated only slightly and there is virtually no measurable relationship between Political Efficacy and Ability to Influence Government.

When causal structure is imputed to these dimensions, two different patterns are apparent. One, which applies most strongly to the United States sample, and to a lesser but still relatively substantial degree to the United Kingdom and West German samples, involves a process wherein beliefs in the reality of the efficacy norm encourage individuals to acquire the rudimentary political skills and dispositions necessary for the exercise of effective influence: in turn, possession of these political resources affects the degree to which individuals feel confident of their personal ability to influence salient government decisions; and beliefs in the efficacy norm affect sense of personal political potency to some extent directly, but equally or to a greater extent indirectly, through the process of having acquired rudimentary political skills. Presumably, this pattern is supportive of political democracy. The other pattern, presumed to be a potential source of stress on democracy, applies to the Italian and Mexican samples. This pattern is characterized by what may be a discontinuity in the social-

⁴⁵ In "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II," Nie *et al.* report at page 819 that size of place shows a slight but consistently negative relationship with their attitude items: i.e., the greater the community size the lower the citizen's involvement and sense of personal political potency (see Appendix III). However, most of the path coefficients are less than .100 and are probably not statistically significant.

TABLE A1. COEFFICIENTS OF CONGRUENCE: FIVE-NATION POLITICAL COMPETENCE FACTOR SOLUTIONS

		United Kingdom			West Germany			Italy			Mexico		
		I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
United States	I	.988	.440	.392	.982	.471	.315	.980	.465	.166	.984	.455	.223
	II	.499	.966	.379	.519	.977	.399	.507	.963	.197	.531	.943	.237
	III	.369	.274	.964	.347	.289	.814	.369	.208	.867	.350	.213	.847
United Kingdom	I				.986	.377	.355	.979	.367	.364	.984	.379	.197
	II				.387	.988	.292	.384	.982	.212	.392	.975	.130
	III				.282	.309	.845	.150	.101	.905	.350	.199	.876
West Germany	I							.986	.415	.100	.984	.406	.163
	II							.405	.982	.103	.429	.968	.146
	III							.232	.253	.893	.222	.233	.839
Italy	I										.995	.390	.168
	II										.418	.987	.051
	III										.090	.005	.952

zation process. The politically involved and personally confident members have not developed beliefs in the reality of the efficacy norm in their system; thus, if sense of personal potency were found to match poorly with reality, among these members there would be little potential for amelioration of discontent by beliefs in the long term responsiveness of government to citizen influence.

The model examined included only three variables. Intensive investigation of antecedents and consequences of political competence is beyond the scope of this paper.⁴⁶ In general, the data reported here point to the importance, in future research, of distinguishing between beliefs in the regime norm of efficacy, and sense of personal confidence in ability to influence government decisions. Possession of political resources necessary for effective influence may, as would be expected, affect the development of confidence in personal political potency on a cross-national basis. But the development of beliefs in the overall responsiveness of government to citizen influence, presumably an attitude of some consequence for democratic government, particularly in complex modern societies, may be substantially more variable, depending upon the content and timing of socialization processes.

APPENDIX A

The Coefficient of Congruence

The coefficient of congruence ranges from +1

⁴⁶ See the two Nie et al. articles for investigation of the social structure antecedents of political competence.

for perfect factorial similarity, through 0 for the complete absence of factorial similarity, to -1 for perfect inverse factorial similarity. Harmon recommends "that each factor of one study be compared with all the factors of the other study, and be paired with the one with which it has the highest coefficient of congruence."⁴⁷ The italicized values in Table A1 represent the pairings of factors showing the largest coefficients of congruence. If a set of factor solutions obtained from the same variables for different samples are to be considered congruent, the largest coefficients should appear in the diagonals of the sub-matrices for the pairing of each factor structure against every other.

APPENDIX B

Scale Construction Procedures

Factor analysis is useful not only as a technique for identifying dimensions hypothesized to underlie sets of variables, but also as a data reduction device. Factors can be scored and the resulting constructs are then the kind of multi-item indicators most appropriate for comparative research. The method recommended by Harmon for describing factors in terms of the observed variables is the technique of complete estimation.⁴⁸ This procedure has been used here to assign factor scores to each respondent on the dimensions of political competence. The complete estimation approach employs conventional regression methods to obtain esti-

⁴⁷ Harmon, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

⁴⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 350-60.

mates of factor measurements. Harmon expressed the basic formula as follows:

$$\bar{F}_p = \beta_{p1}Z_1 + \beta_{p2}Z_2 + \dots + \beta_{pn}Z_n^{49}$$

where \bar{F} is the factor score on any one factor constituted by p variables; and the β 's are standardized factor coefficients comparable to the beta weights yielded by multiple regression. The size of the β 's is determined by the loading of the variables on the factor: variables which have the highest factor loadings will contribute the most to an individual's score on that factor, variables which show the lowest loadings will make the least contribution to his score. Such scales should prove quite useful for comparative research because (1) they are multi-item indicators; (2) they are quantitative variables with some degree of discriminatory power; and (3) they are linear combinations of items which take into account the fact that particular items can be expected to relate differentially to an underlying or latent common dimension, i.e., in contrast to such scaling procedures as the Likert method, factor scores obtained by complete estimation are not based on the arbitrary assignment of equal weight to each component item.

If there were reason to believe that, theoretically, the three dimensions of political competence should be uncorrelated, then Political Efficacy, Political Involvement, and Ability to Influence Government could be measured directly from the orthogonally rotated solutions. However, the opposite is the case; theoretically, these competence dimensions should be correlated. Therefore, while orthogonal rotation has been employed to test the hypothesis that political competence involves three distinct dimensions, in order to measure these dimensions, the items which define them have been subjected to principal components analysis separately, with the minimum eigenvalue set at 1.0. This procedure forces a maximum of the variance onto the first factor, which should be (and was in the case of these sets of competence items) the only factor

on which the variables load. The result, in each case, is a scale which is a linear combination of only those variables identified as common to one dimension by varimax rotation, and is thus uncontaminated by any secondary loadings from other variables common to other dimensions.

Of course, since it is expected that the competence dimensions will be correlated, a better approximation to simple structure could be obtained by oblique rotation. If, for instance, Carroll's Biquartimin solution had been used, with γ set at .5, the primary loadings presumably would have been somewhat higher and the secondary loadings somewhat lower, thus resulting in factors of even greater clarity. A major drawback to oblique rotation, however, is the fact that sampling fluctuations play a part in determining oblique solutions: "To some extent at least the obliqueness of the axes in any one study is determined by sampling instability and the angular separations can be expected to fluctuate from sample to sample."⁵⁰ A further drawback to oblique rotation is that factor loadings, which in the case of orthogonal rotation can be interpreted as measures of the degree to which variables are correlated with underlying dimensions, lack precision of meaning in oblique rotations.⁵¹

Primarily because of its questionable comparability across samples, oblique rotation was not deemed suitable for the objectives of this analysis. Orthogonal rotation was selected because of its invariance under conditions of sampling instability. However, regardless of which solution were used to identify the common dimensions, the best measurement procedure would still be to develop scales from separate principal components analyses of items common to each dimension; this ensures that each scale is measuring only what it is supposed to measure.

⁵⁰ Benjamin Fruchter, *Introduction to Factor Analysis* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1954), p. 195.

⁵¹ On this point see Harmon's discussion at page 290 of *Modern Factor Analysis*.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND LERNER'S THEORY: FURTHER TEST OF A CAUSAL MODEL*

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A current concern in the theory of political development is the relationship between political democracy and economic and social variables. Various writers have hypothesized, for example, that the development of democratic political institutions is related to increasing levels of education, communications, and urbanization.¹ Daniel Lerner has developed this argument further in stating that a developmental sequence occurs with increasing urbanization leading in turn to higher levels of education, communications development, and finally political development.² This theory has been tested and corroborated in research which employed statistical causal modeling methods on contemporary data gathered over a large number of nations.³ The purpose of

this paper is to test the adequacy of Lerner's model with data gathered over time in a single nation, which presents a research situation more congruent with the actual temporal processes of political development.

I. THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Political development will be used here to mean the development of democratic political institutions and processes. This definition is admittedly stipulative, and does not preclude the argument that political development could occur without increasing levels of democracy. By democracy, we will accept Lipset's formulation that:

Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.⁴

More precisely, democracy will be taken to mean a political system characterized by representative decision-making *institutions*, by mass *participation* in the selection of decision-makers, and by open *competition* in both the electoral and policy-making processes.

The conditions which bring about democratic political development have been the subject of considerable research. Since the development syndrome is exceedingly complicated, various approaches have been taken in an attempt to

Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies." p. 60.

¹ Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward A Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," this *Review*, 61 (1967), 72-79.

² Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 27.

*The theoretical considerations of this paper were discussed, and preliminary data were gathered, by students enrolled in my graduate seminar at McMaster (1968-69). I gratefully acknowledge their stimulation and assistance.

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¹ Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," this *Review*, 53 (1959), 69-105; and Daniel Lerner, "Communications Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (1957), 266-275.

² Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of the Traditional Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958). The essence of Lerner's theory can be found in the following quotation:

"The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases—literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society.

unravel it. For example, a link has been postulated between economic development and political development.⁵ Some writers have stressed the attitudinal component of democracy, and argued that a democratic system is produced and maintained through the development of a participant culture.⁶ The psychological dimension of development has been explored, with the resulting hypothesis that an increase in the achievement motivation in a society can result in increasing levels of economic growth.⁷ Finally certain socio-economic factors such as literacy or industrialization have been singled out as being an important part of the development process.⁸

Given the present rudimentary state of social theory-building, it is difficult to assess which line of inquiry is most useful in accounting for political development. However it appears that development theory has become most refined in dealing with certain socio-economic factors, perhaps because data are most easily gathered on these variables. This emphasis is likely not unjustified, given the concern for socio-economic factors by those who have dealt with the attitudinal components of political development.⁹ The remainder of this paper will concern itself with the relationship between three socio-economic variables—namely, urbanization, education, and communication—and democratic political development.

The link between the above variables and political democracy has been systematically tested by Lipset. Lipset divided a sample of 50 nations drawn from Latin America and Europe into two categories: stable democracies, and unstable democracies or dictatorships. By comparing these

two groups, he demonstrated that the democratic countries have higher levels of urbanization, educational attainment, and communications infrastructure.¹⁰ Lipset's study is very useful as a preliminary analysis, but it is limited by his operational definition of democracy as a dichotomous variable. According to his scheme, system nations are either democratic or they are not, an assumption which goes contrary to the more generally accepted notion of democracy being on a continuum. Cutright has developed a more useful measurement of democratic political development by assigning points to nations according to whether they fulfill certain criteria of democratic government.¹¹ This measurement has the advantage of differentiating nations as more or less democratic. It has the additional advantage of allowing for "backsliding" (i.e., decreases in democracy) which is an important feature when the scale is used to measure the development of democracy over time.

Cutright has correlated his political development scale with various measures of urbanization, education and communications gathered over 76 nations for the year 1960. For these measures (i.e., education, communications) composite indicators were used—for example, education was measured by combining the number of literacy and university students per 1,000 in each nation. All items used by Cutright were scored, and the composite measures were derived

⁵ *Ibid.*, see Chapter II "Economic Development and Democracy."

⁶ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁷ David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961). McClelland makes no mention of political development or democracy in his work; however, if economic growth is related to political development, then the possibility clearly exists of a link between the achievement motive and political development.

⁸ The distinction between different approaches in the theory of development, and the relative contributions thereof, was suggested by Harvey Pasis in oral discussion.

⁹ For example, Almond and Verba point out the importance of education and industrialization in creating a democratic culture. Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

¹⁰ Lipset's indicators for communication (telephones, radios and newspapers per 1,000 people) were subsumed under his category of "wealth."

¹¹ Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development," in Nelson Polsby *et al.* (eds.), *Political Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 582. According to Cutright's scale nations receive two points per year that a legislature existed in which the lower or only house contained representatives of two or more political parties and the minority party or parties having at least 10 per cent of all seats. Nations receive one point if the above conditions are met except the 10 per cent rule, and no points if the above conditions are not met. Additionally, one point per nation is awarded for each year that a chief executive held office by virtue of a direct vote in an open election in which he faced competition; or in office having been chosen by a political party in a two or multiparty system such as would gain two points on the legislative point assignment scheme. No points are assigned for years in which a chief executive existed by virtue of any other selection process. Cutright's scaling period covered 22 years (1940-1961), and it was possible for a nation to accumulate anywhere from 0 to 66 points.

TABLE 1. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF CUTRIGHT'S MEASURE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION AND URBANIZATION

	1	2	3	4
1) Communication		.71	.85	.80
2) Urbanization			.75	.64
3) Education				.62
4) Political Development				

Data taken from Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

Figures for levels of agricultural employment are omitted.

by summing the T scores for individual items.¹² The correlations derived in the Cutright study showed a strong relationship existed between the socio-economic variables and political development, as well as a strong interrelationship between the independent variables themselves; see Table 1.

The data generated by Cutright formed the basis for a further refinement in development theory. Working from Lerner's earlier conceptualization of the development of democracy, McCrone and Cnudde applied to Cutright's findings statistical techniques which are designed to test the empirical validity of alternative developmental sequences. In successive tests, these analysts found that the developmental sequence which best fit the data was the causal ordering implicit in the Lerner theory; see Figure 1. Furthermore not only was this sequence the best fit among alternative possibilities, but it was sufficiently close to corroborate the Lerner model.

The entire drift of development theory as outlined above, and particularly in the way it has been operationalized and tested, has been challenged by Neubauer in a recent article.¹³ Neubauer objects to Cutright's index of democracy on the grounds that it overweights the institutions of democracy and gives insufficient consideration to certain performance traits of democratic regimes, namely electoral equality and competition.¹⁴ A specific difficulty with Cut-

¹² T scoring is a procedure for deriving standardized measures of variables, so that scores on such disparate items as per cent of population in cities over 50,000, number of radios per 1,000 population, and per cent of population literate can be directly compared. See Allen L. Edwards, *Statistical Methods*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), Chapter 4.

¹³ Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (1967), 1002-1009.

¹⁴ Neubauer's concern for these features of de-




FIGURE 1

Numbers indicate correlation coefficients. Developmental sequence shown by solid lines.

right's scale is that it does not adequately differentiate between those nations which receive maximum scores for political development. By employing indicators such as per cent enfranchised, equality of representation, and measures of party competition, Neubauer has developed an alternative index of democracy, one which is capable of differentiating between nations generally considered "democratic."

In statistical tests employing his index of political democracy, Neubauer finds very little correlation between his index and Cutright's ($r = .182$) which confirms that these two measures are not in fact measuring the same thing. In relating his index to socio-economic variables, Neubauer found virtually no correlation between political democracy and urbanization or education, and a considerably smaller correlation between democracy and communications than reported by Cutright; see Table 2. As pointed out

TABLE 2. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF NEUBAUER'S MEASURES OF DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE, AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, AND URBANIZATION

	1	2	3	4
1) Communication		.314	.732	.424
2) Urbanization			.578	-.008
3) Education				.016
4) Democratic Performance				

Data taken from Neubauer, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

Figures for levels of agricultural employment are omitted.

mocracy is derived from the definitions of democracy put forward by Downs and Dahl. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 23-24; and Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago Press, 1956), p. 84.

by the author the latter correlation is very likely inflated since a measure of information equality (i.e., variability of communication sources) is included in the political democracy index. Thus Neubauer's findings introduce a note of uncertainty into an apparently well established social theory.

II. DATA

It appears that for at least two reasons more research is needed on political development and its correlates. First, Neubauer's research opens some question whether there is any association at all between political development and certain socio-economic variables. Second, for purposes of making causal inferences about political development, the data which have been used in previous studies contain certain limitations that have not necessarily been made explicit. Specifically, one characteristic of these studies is that they have all employed data on political development gathered over a large number of nations in the last two decades. This data-gathering process is adequate for correlational analysis in which one compares a present state of development—on which nations can differ—with certain levels of communications, urbanization or education. However to use this data to support a causal model about political development, one must make an inference about a process which occurs over time from data gathered at one point in time. Would not this inference be better supported by data gathered in separate nations over the period of their development?

The logic of the political development model derived by Lerner is that as levels of urbanization, education and communications gradually increase over time, these produce corresponding increases in the level of political development. The causal modeling technique followed by McCrone and Cnudde cannot directly test for this, but rather can only infer it through comparing differing national levels of socio-economic variables and political development in the present. By comparing these same variables in separate nations with data gathered over time, one could determine if this gradual development did in fact occur, or if there are sharp discontinuities in the development process which might not be accounted for in the Lerner theory.

To test Lerner's theory over time, it was necessary to select nations which were already developed, and for which there were sufficient historical data on the variables under consideration. Four nations were originally chosen for analysis: Canada, Great Britain, France, and the United States. These nations all had high scores on Cutright's index, and were also included in Neubauer's index of 23 democratic

countries.¹⁵ Only in the United States were data regularly collected over a sufficiently long time span to permit a test of the model.

The index of political development used in the time study attempted to operationalize the definition of democracy given earlier. In practice this index adopted Cutright's basic scoring procedure.¹⁶ A score for democratic political development was assigned to the United States for each decade over the period 1790-1960 ($N = 18$). The score for each decade was derived by assigning two points for each of the previous ten years that the United States had a directly elected legislature in which the minority party had 30 per cent of the seats; or one point per year if the minority party had less than 30 per cent of the seats. The total sum receivable for the legislature in any decade was 20 points. Similarly one point per year was assigned for a directly elected chief executive, with 10 points being the maximum receivable per decade.

The above scoring procedure accounts for the *institutional* and *competitive* aspects of democracy, but provides no measure of electoral *participation*.¹⁷ Participation in elections, and, more important, the right to participate in elections, is unquestionably a fundamental aspect of democratic political development. In the history of the United States, democratic institutions were established relatively early in the period under consideration, but it can be argued that the franchise has not yet become effective for the whole population. Thus it was felt some measure of participation, and implicitly the right to par-

¹⁵ Canada, Great Britain and the United States received the top score of 66 on Cutright's index, while France received 59 points. On Neubauer's index Great Britain and France received the highest rankings with 236.3 and 231.4 points each. Canada and the United States were 15th and 16th with 196.8 and 190.9 points respectively.

¹⁶ Cutright's method was used rather than Neubauer's because it seemed most consistent with the definition of democracy provided here. Furthermore Cutright's index appeared more appropriate for differentiating between conditions of low and high democratic development. Finally Cutright's 30 per cent rule does in fact measure competition, which was one of the two major criteria of democratic performance in Neubauer's analysis.

¹⁷ Electoral participation was a feature of Neubauer's index, and has been incorporated in Cutright's later work. See Cutright's communication to the Editor, this Review, 62 (1968), 578-580. See also, Phillips Cutright and James A. Wiley "Modernization and Political Representation: 1927-1966," *Studies in Comparative International Development (Monograph Series)* 5 (1969-70).

ticipate, should be included in the development index.

Participation was accounted for by multiplying the political development score for each decade by a value of one (1.00) plus the percentage (averaged over the previous decade) of the total population who voted for the chief executive. This information was available beginning in 1824, at which time the proportion of the population voting was 3.8 per cent.¹⁸ For the four decades prior to 1824, the figure of 3 per cent was arbitrarily selected. The actual percentage for these decades was very likely less than the 1824 figure, and was obviously greater than zero—hence the figure of 3 per cent was chosen as the likeliest estimate. In any case it is quite improbable that an error here could significantly bias the overall results of this study. The index derived from the above procedures is shown in Table 3.

In deriving the multiplier for electoral partici-

TABLE 3. INDEX OF U.S. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1960

Decade	Legisla- tive Score	Execu- tive Score*	Participa- tion Multiplier	Political Develop- ment Score
1781-1790	10	4.0	1.030	14.4
1791-1800	20	3.5	1.030	24.2
1801-1810	14	6.2	1.030	20.8
1811-1820	15	5.6	1.030	21.2
1821-1830	15	8.0	1.075	24.7
1831-1840	20	9.6	1.128	33.4
1841-1850	20	9.6	1.158	34.3
1851-1860	20	9.8	1.161	34.6
1861-1870	14	9.9	1.132**	27.1
1871-1880	20	9.9	1.173	35.1
1881-1890	18	10.0	1.189	33.3
1891-1900	20	10.0	1.188	35.6
1901-1910	20	10.0	1.167	35.0
1911-1920	20	10.0	1.197	35.9
1921-1930	20	10.0	1.280	38.4
1931-1940	14	10.0	1.351	32.4
1941-1950	20	10.0	1.340	40.2
1951-1960	20	10.0	1.380	41.4

* Fractional points were assigned on the basis of the percentage of states which chose the chief executive in a direct election over the whole decade. See *Historical Statistics of the United States* (complete citation in footnote 20). Series Y 1-26 "Methods of Electing Presidential Electors: 1788-1936", pp. 679, 681.

** This figure is likely biased downward since the voting total in 1864 did not include the Confederate states.

Data for this table were taken from Robert E. Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 19; World Almanac, 1968; and *Historical Statistics of the United States*. The raw scores for political development were T scored to be consistent with the procedures followed with other variables.

¹⁸ This information is presented in tabular form in Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 19

pation, a theoretical question arose as to whether one should measure actual participation as evidenced by the percentage of the population voting, or measure the right to participate as indicated by the percentage of the population legally enfranchised. Measuring the right to participate would directly reflect the extent of the suffrage, which surely is an indicator of the democraticness of the system. Measuring actual participation, while it also takes the right to vote into account, tends to be biased by voter interest which can change without regard for the right to vote. It is a contentious normative issue whether actual participation apart from the right to participate is an indicator of a democratic polity. This question aside however, data concerning the percentage of the population actually voting are perhaps a more meaningful measure of the *effective* extension of suffrage than are data on the percentage of persons legally enfranchised. On this point Robert Lane notes that the major increases in voter participation in the United States followed periods when voting restrictions were removed (e.g., property and sex restrictions). Conversely, the enfranchisement of former slaves during the Civil War produced little change in the voting behavior of these individuals, a fact generally corroborated by the findings of historians and by the small change in total participation figures immediately following the 1860's.¹⁹

Data were gathered on the socio-economic variables (urbanization, education and communications) in a manner consistent with the Cutright study wherever possible, although data limitations necessitated some alteration on the communications index. Urbanization was measured by the percentage of the population in cities over 50,000. This information was available without omission from 1790.²⁰ Education was a combined variable and was made up of the summed T scores of the percentage of the population literate and the number of persons enrolled in institutions of higher learning per 1,000 population. Data on this variable were gathered only since 1840, as there appears to be no official record either of literacy rates or university enrollments prior to that date.²¹ Figures on enroll-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-22.

²⁰ Urbanization data were taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960).

²¹ Literacy rates and enrollment figures since 1870 were taken from *ibid.* Data on enrollments for the period 1840-1860 were taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Report on Education in the United States*, Eleventh Census, 1890.

ments can be estimated to 1790 by multiplying the number of institutions in existence per decade (for which data are available) times the estimated average enrollment per institution over this period. However these data cannot be used in the combined education index without corresponding data on literacy rates, and a thorough search provided no reliable method of estimating such rates prior to 1840. Consequently correlations between education and other variables are derived over the period 1840-1960.

The communications index was constructed from the summed T scores of the five following indicators: post office expenditures per capita; total number of newspapers and periodicals per capita; and telephones, radios, and television sets per capita.²² Data on postal expenditures and newspapers and periodicals were available from 1790. For the latter indicator it was necessary to interpolate to derive figures by even decades. The raw figures that were used for total newspapers and periodicals by decade are shown in Table 4. Data on telephones, radios and television sets were available in each case from the date they were invented and first used by the public. In order not to bias the scoring procedure, raw scores of zero were assigned for each indicator for each decade prior to its invention and dissemination (e.g., prior to 1940 in the case of television sets).

III. FINDINGS

The theoretical test which was performed on the U.S. time-series data can be divided into two

TABLE 4. TOTAL NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 1790-1960

Decade	Number	Decade	Number
1790	103	1880	11,314
1800	150	1890	17,710
1810	359	1900	24,486
1820	679	1910	28,556
1830	1000	1920	16,346
1840	1403	1930	14,760
1850	2794	1940	14,250
1860	4257	1950	13,845
1870	6314	1960	12,867

Data taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *A Century of Population Growth in the United States: 1790-1900* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 32; and *Historical Statistics of the United States*, p. 500.

²² Data on communications were taken from *Historical Statistics of the United States*.

parts. First is the question whether there is any relationship between urbanization, education, communications and political development. For the causal links of Lerner's theory to be maintained, there must be positive and significant correlations between the dependent variable and the various independent variables. The correlations for this study are shown in Table 5 and accompanying Figure 2.

TABLE 5. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF U.S. MEASURES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION AND URBANIZATION

	1	2	3	4
1) Communication		.913	.871	.723
2) Urbanization	.001		.975	.711
3) Education	.001	.001		.682
4) Political Development	.001	.001	.05	

Numbers below the diagonal indicate the level at which the corresponding correlation would be statistically significant. For intercorrelations with education. $N = 13$.




FIGURE 2.

The data presented in Table 5 show that there is a strong relationship between the four variables, a finding similar to Cutright's conclusions. What is interesting is the similarity between Cutright's correlations and ours. On each of the three correlations with political development, and on the correlation between education and communications, the difference from Cutright's coefficients is less than 0.1. The remaining two correlations with urbanization (UE and UC) are higher for the U.S. data, a fact which suggests that the hypothesized close interrelationship between these socio-economic variables

in the process of development is revealed more clearly in time-series rather than cross-national data.²³ Finally the internal structure of the correlations is comparable between the two studies. Cutright showed the variable most strongly related to political development was communications, with urbanization and education following in order. Data on the United States indicate the same. Similarly the correlation between education and communications was higher than the three correlations with political development in both studies. Only the two correlations with urbanization (UE and UC) reflect any appreciable difference.

The second theoretical question involved the time ordering of the variables. To uphold Lerner's theory, it must be demonstrated that variables he posits as independent precede in time the dependent variable or variables. While conceptually simple, this test is very difficult to apply in the real world, especially when dealing with a complicated social phenomenon for which there is no clearcut beginning or end. In the cross-national data gathered by Cutright there is no way to test for the temporal ordering of the independent and dependent variables. In time-series data, one can approximate a test by introducing time lags into the correlations.

With data collected over time, one variable can be lagged behind another by correlating the score of the independent variable in time t (e.g. 1790) with the score of the dependent variable in time $t + 1$ (e.g. 1800); and so forth throughout all time periods. If there is a causal relationship between these variables such that an increase or decrease in the independent variable would produce a corresponding change in the dependent variable, this relationship should be reflected in an increasing correlation. Conversely, if the causal relationship as posited is valid, lagging the independent variable behind the dependent variable could be expected to reduce the correlation between these variables. Thus in a multivariate causal model, there are a number of independent tests that can be made for the validity of the model, depending on the number of causal links posited and the number of time lags introduced in either direction.²⁴

²³ With regard to this close interrelationship, Schnore finds a unidimensional structure emerging from a factor analysis performed on 12 national measures of modernization. Among the variables loading heavily on the single factor were newspaper circulation (.94), literacy (.89) and urbanization (.86). See Leo F. Schnore, "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development," *Land Economics*, 37 (1961), 229-245.

²⁴ For further discussion of this method, as well

In the present study, the fact that historical data were available only at ten-year intervals limited the time-lag procedures. Both the established theory on development, and the high correlations achieved here, suggest that the variables in the development syndrome are tightly interconnected—that is, changes tend to occur simultaneously in these variables. If this is the case, one would not expect the time lags in the U.S. data to be very large between an independent and dependent variable. For this reason it would have been useful to have data for periods shorter than even decades, such as five-year intervals. In the analysis here, time lags will be limited to one and two decades in either direction; see Table 6.

The data in Table 6 generally confirm the Lerner theory, but with some reservations. The most striking confirmation is seen in the correlations of political development with education and communications. Lerner held that the independent variable most closely linked with political development was communications, a finding upheld by subsequent studies. This same finding occurs here, as the correlation between development and communications clearly increases as development is lagged, and decreases when communications are lagged. The same result appears generally for the correlation between development and education, although an expected increase in this correlation occurs only after development has been lagged by two decades. It is especially unfortunate that shorter time periods were not possible, since they would provide more correlation coefficients and hence facilitate a more careful assessment of the causal relationship between political development and educa-

as limiting assumptions, see D. Pelz and F. Andrews, "Causal Priorities in Panel Study Data," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (1964), 836-848.

One difficulty with time lag correlation analysis suggested by these authors occurs when variables are highly autocorrelated. By their argument, if lagged self-correlations approach unity, then all lagged inter-correlations approach the same value, thus preventing any causal inference. In this study, autocorrelation was assessed over the two time periods used, and the following coefficients were obtained: DD .698, CC .832, EE .988, UU .524. For at least two variables, autocorrelation was not extreme. One would expect the high autocorrelation for education to restrict analysis on this variable, although this obviously did not prevent the predicted change from occurring in the relationship between education and political development (see Table 6).

TABLE 6. TIME-LAG CORRELATIONS BETWEEN URBANIZATION, EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1790-1960

Variables	t=0	t=+10	t=+20	Variable Lagged	Lerner Prediction
CD	.723	.765	.780	Dependent	Increase
CD	.723	.670	.554	Independent	Decrease
ED*	.682	.647	.723	Dependent	Increase
ED	.682	.575	.581	Independent	Decrease
UD*	.711	.686	.682	Dependent	Increase
UD	.711	.688	.584	Independent	Decrease
EC	.871	.893	.871	Dependent	Increase
EC	.871	.910	.921	Independent	Decrease
UE	.975	.976	.971	Dependent	Increase
UE	.975	.979	.961	Independent	Decrease
UC*	.913	.849	.835	Dependent	Increase
UC	.913	.953	.940	Independent	Decrease

* No direct causal link is posited in Lerner's theory or in the McCrone and Cnudde analysis for the relationships between these variables. However since the theory holds that these variables are related in a developmental sequence, a likely result would be some rise in the correlations as the variable occurring later in the sequence is lagged.

tion. There is an element of randomness in the correlation coefficients produced by any time lag, since each lag reduces the N of the correlation. This is an especially difficult problem when dealing with a low N, since the results can be more easily biased by changes in the data. What was done here is to determine whether the two successive time lags, taken together, confirmed or disconfirmed the hypothesized relationship. The time-lag correlations of political development and education tend to confirm that education is one causal determinant of development.

The relationship between urbanization and development appears less clearcut from time lag analysis than it was from causal modeling procedures. Lagging the hypothesized independent variable does produce a falling correlation as predicted, but there is no increase—rather a decrease—in the correlation when the dependent variable is lagged. Admittedly the decrease is not great, and it remains stable over two lags. One possible explanation is that the effect of urbanization is filtered through other intervening variables, and thus changes in urbanization are not sufficiently closely related to changes in development over time to result in increased correlations when time-lags are introduced.

The time lag correlations of urbanization with education and communications suggest some deviation from the Lerner theory. The correlation

for urbanization and education does not react generally the way the theory would predict. However because of the near-perfect linear relationship between these two variables, and the fact that the most substantial change (.961) does occur in the predicted direction, the hypothesized causal relationship between urbanization and education cannot be rejected. However, for urbanization and communications, the opposite is true. The U.S. data unequivocally suggest that the causal path between these variables is from communications to urbanization. This contradicts Lerner and others who posited a developmental sequence from urbanization to education to communications.²⁵

Finally, the relationship between education and communications appears indeterminate in the U.S. data. Time-lag procedures do not identify a clearcut temporal ordering between these variables, although it would appear the case is strongest for identifying education as the dependent variable. What is very likely the case, and the same is true for urbanization and education, is that the relationship between these two variables is one of reciprocal causality, where changes in one variable produce changes in the second which then affect the first. The possibility of interaction between variables, which was mentioned by Lerner in the passage quoted earlier, was omitted by assumption in the McCrone and Cnudde analysis, but it is more likely to be the rule rather than the exception when dealing with complex social processes.²⁶

IV. CONCLUSION

The findings presented here show that for the United States the Lerner theory is with some modifications essentially accurate in its analysis of political development. Obviously these findings would be more valid were the test performed over more than one nation, but data limitations prevented this. On the other hand, over the period considered the United States was indeed a developing nation, and on some indicators such as participation and direct election of the executive it progressed from relatively low to relatively high development. If the theory

²⁵ It should be noted that the variation in the U.S. data may be accounted for by explicit qualifications in the Lerner theory. For example, Lerner suggested that the degree of urbanization affected the relationship between urbanization, literacy rates and media growth. Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

²⁶ For a discussion of the limitations of the causal modeling methods applied by McCrone and Cnudde, see Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 1258-1264.




FIGURE 3

were valid, one would *prima facie* expect it to be valid in the United States.

The U.S. findings also tend to uphold the Cutright analysis, which suggests that differences between low and high political development (as measured by Cutright's index) are correlated with certain socio-economic variables. With relatively minor changes to allow for participation, Cutright's index was used for the United States, and similar correlations with socio-economic variables were obtained. Neubauer may have a point that once a certain level of democratic political development is achieved that socio-economic variables are no longer related to political development, but this does not overthrow Cutright's argument that there is a relationship in the earlier stages of development.

Some alteration to the causal links established in Lerner's theory are perhaps indicated by the U.S. study; see Figure 3. The essential links from education and communications to development are maintained by the time study. Also the developmental sequence from urbanization to education to development appears to be upheld. However the findings open the possibility of a

reciprocal causal relationship between urbanization and education. This appears to be a reasonable conclusion, since it is probable in U.S. development—and perhaps in development elsewhere—that rural education developed skills and expectations in the population that led people to migrate to urban areas.

The most important revision suggested by the U.S. data is the causal ordering between communications and urbanization. These variables are strongly related but it seems that the independent variable in the relationship is communication, and not urbanization. If so, this makes communication a more isolated variable in the development syndrome than was suggested either by Lerner or by the McCrone and Cnudde study. The question of explaining the causal relationship from communications to urbanization seems somewhat difficult, since Lerner's argument that industrial and urban development enables a society to develop its communications media seems plausible enough. On the other hand, as Lerner himself suggested, communications could have been an agent in the urbanization of society through the process of providing information to rural populations about new opportunities and a new way of life. It is very likely that both the early press in America, as well as personal communications, served this function. Finally, after the development of telephones and radios this function could have been served without the requisite need for literacy, and hence could have operated without further increases in the levels of education. This is an important fact to consider in "developing" nations today, since verbal and visual communications bulk much larger in the total communications process now than they did in the history of the United States.

SUPPORT FOR THE INSTITUTION OF ELECTIONS BY THE MASS PUBLIC*

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The institution of elections is a significant feature of most present day political systems and is one of the most widely used of all of the political inventions of mankind. Rose and Mossawir have recently remarked that, "Elections are among the most ubiquitous of contemporary political institutions, and voting is the single act of political participation undertaken by a majority of adults in a majority of the nations in the world today."¹ The importance of elections is especially high in democratic systems. Both earlier and more contemporary discussions of the concept of democracy have employed elections as a primary definiendum and requisite feature of democracy.² Indeed, if any single institution serves as popular democracy's *sine qua non*, it is that of elections.³

The general argument that elections are

"those most essential events in the democratic process"⁴ is often posed from the perspective of the importance of the functions they perform in the political system. The most widely remarked of these functions is to provide a mechanism by which the great mass of members of the system are able to choose their leaders—thus giving majority approval to the exercise of leadership.⁵ This is important both from the standpoint of solving the problem of legitimate leadership succession and as a means of potential relief from abuses or inadequacies of a present set of rulers.⁶ Secondly, elections may serve as an indication of public choice among government policies—although this function is probably less frequently performed than once was thought to be the case. In referenda, the function is direct; but even in the elections of candidates for public office there is on occasion a question of public decision among the broader aspects of policy programs.⁷ Furthermore, belief by future candidates in the possibility that voters may reject them at the next election because of their policies may lead

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¹Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," *Political Studies*, 15 (1967), 173-201, at page 173.

²See, for example, Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 73; W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Free Elections* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 11; Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 229; Graeme C. Moodie, *The Government of Great Britain* (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 188; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this *REVIEW*, 53 (1959), 69-105.

³This is not to say that elections are sufficient for the maintenance of popular democracy. The many totalitarian regimes where elections are held without free choice belies that judgment. One may suggest, however, that they are necessary to the existence of what is commonly understood by the concept in majoritarian, populist and participant senses.

⁴D. E. Butler, *Elections Abroad* (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 9.

⁵Discussion of this and other system functions of elections is found in Rose and Mossawir, *op. cit.*, and in Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968).

⁶Protection of the people as a central role of elections was put forcefully by James Madison: "As it is essential that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the [legislature] should have an immediate dependence on, and intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which the dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured": *The Federalist*, No. 52, p. 343; quoted in Gerald Pomper, "The Concept of Elections in Political Theory," *The Review of Politics*, 29 (1967), 478-491, at p. 480.

⁷We do not need to go so far as to endorse the idea of "electoral mandates" to observe that in some elections policy issues may be of importance for the outcome. See, for example, Leon D. Epstein, "Electoral Decision and Policy Mandate: An Empirical Example," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (1964), 564-572.

them to anticipate public feeling, thus allowing indirect influence of elections upon policy formation. The latter may operate even in the absence of more direct control by the electorate.⁸ A third central function of elections is legitimization of a regime. An election serves as a device of public endorsement—or occasionally, of repudiation—of the system of government. This pertains even in the many nations where leadership choice and policy influence aspects of elections have atrophied.⁹ Thus, whether or not an election fulfills other purposes, it may allow the voter to reaffirm his faith in the validity and legitimacy of the political order.¹⁰ Elections therefore link the citizen to his government by involving him in important political choices of leadership and policy and in evoking his attitude toward the wider institutional pattern under which elections are provided.¹¹

I. ELECTIONS IN AMERICA

Given such major consequences for the political system—particularly for the democratic system—it would not be surprising to find that elections have become well established in American political practice. There is much that supports such a conclusion. Unlike political parties, elections were given original constitutional status; and the basic principles of the current system of elections date from very early in the life

of the nation.¹² Not only have elections existed from the beginning of the republic, but they have penetrated all levels of government and a wide range of offices—from President of the United States to member of the local school board. This has meant very frequent elections and opportunities for voter participation. As Lane has observed, “. . . over a four year period, there are probably more votes per capita cast in the United States than in any other country. . . .”¹³ By the criteria of constancy of operation and unchallenged constitutional status, frequency of opportunity for participation, and pervasiveness among types and levels of offices, elections may be regarded as a well-founded, ultra-stable feature of the American political landscape.

What this conclusion leaves out of account, however, is that, like all other institutions of political society, elections are subject to what Huntington has termed “political development and political decay.”¹⁴ The experience of the wider world beyond the American system suggests that neither democratic regimes nor their chief institutions should be taken as givens. As Mackenzie has noted: “The world is strewn with the wreckage of electoral systems.”¹⁵ Indeed, only a minority of countries today have free and frequent elections based on mass suffrage. “Only about a quarter of the nations of the world hold elections in which the adult population chooses among competing candidates.”¹⁶ Even in those nations that have free elections, the scope of the electoral process may be severely limited by those in power or distorted through gerrymandering, malapportionment, suffrage restrictions and the like. Electoral systems often favor those already in power and nearly always favor, for example, stronger over

⁸ See, for example, the discussion of the way this “law of anticipated reactions” operates in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes in “Constituency Influence in Congress,” in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 351-372.

⁹ The legitimization function is especially prominent in the elections of Communist nations. See, for example, Z. Pelczynski, “Poland, 1957,” in Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-179, at p. 119, where he says that once power has been consolidated, the election’s function “is to legitimise the revolution and to secure for the regime a stamp of popular approval.” Also see Jerzy J. Wiatr, “Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland,” in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 235-251; and Howard R. Swearer, “The Functions of Soviet Local Elections,” *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5 (1961), 129-149.

¹⁰ Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 47.

¹¹ See V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961) for detailing of this linkage—especially pp. 458-480.

¹² DeTocqueville traces some of these developments to the turn of the nineteenth century. He observes, for example, “The state of Maryland, which had been founded by great lords, was the first to proclaim universal suffrage in [1801 and 1809] and introduced the most democratic procedures throughout its government.” *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper, 1966), Vol. I, p. 70.

¹³ Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

¹⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” *World Politics*, 17 (1965), 386-430.

¹⁵ Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁶ Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, *The Politics of American Democracy*, Fourth Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 289.

weaker political parties.¹⁷ There are indeed so many types of departures from the norms of free and universally participant elections that one needs a complex set of categories to describe them.

We thus observe the possibility of variance in the persistence of the institution: external variance in that some systems, offices and matters of policy decision employ elections—more or less frequently—while others do not; and internal variance in the extent to which elections are permitted to operate freely and without distortion within a given system and category of political choice. The purpose of the present investigation is to begin to test this variance: to see how firmly the electoral institution is rooted in American public consciousness, and thus to illuminate its prospects for withstanding future stress. Radical critics of American political institutions have recently called American elections into question as a device of democratic government. The question then is, do elections enjoy sufficient public confidence to be maintained into the indefinite future, even in periods of high stress?

Let us begin this assessment by asking how do elections fare in general on the balance sheet of institutional change? In these terms, there is evidence in the United States to suggest development, failure to develop, and decay. On the side of development, there is a record of progressive removal of suffrage restrictions based on such criteria as property, sex and race. There has been also a vigorous, recent movement to reduce malapportionment among legislative districts and other constituencies on the "one man—one vote" principle. In addition, we are seeing currently new pressures to reform the financing of campaigns, to eliminate the Electoral College, and to lower the voting age uniformly to eighteen.¹⁸ All of these changes, if effected, would

generally be regarded as developmental in character, in that they serve to perfect, extend and enhance the political significance of the institution.

Balancing these developmental tendencies, however, are some instances of institutional decay. Pomper observes, for example, that the introduction of the "short ballot," the growth of appointment and merit systems for chief executives such as city managers, the lengthening of tenure of elected officials and declining public trust in the devices of direct democracy such as the initiative, the recall and the referendum, are all instances of electoral-institution decay in America.¹⁹ Thirdly, on the side of retardation of the institution's development, one still observes continuing restrictions on suffrage based on registration to vote, length of residence in the constituency, and age. More generally, it is well known that the diffusion of power through the federal system, separation of powers among the branches of state and federal government, and encouragement of the principle of minority rights to access—manifested especially in the free operation of political interest groups—often upset whatever influence the majority might have had through elections. The forecasts of observers such as De Tocqueville, who believed that elections would lead to unfettered majority rule, are, by American practice, therefore contravened.²⁰ Furthermore, as Lane points out, "The Constitution, and the American system of government generally, serve in certain respects, to discourage the electorate from voting. This is not by accident; it is by design of the framers who feared factions and uninhibited majority rule."²¹

whereas only 37% preferred an electoral vote: Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion 1935-46* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 189. In a 1967 Gallup Poll, 65% of a national sample said they would approve of an amendment to the constitution which would do away with the Electoral College and base the election of a President on the total vote cast throughout the nation. Only 22% disapproved of such an amendment: Gallup Poll Report, *The Capital Times* (Madison, Wisconsin, No. 27, 1967), p. 11. By November, 1968, approval of the latter amendment had risen to 81%: *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 52, October, 1969, p. 22.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 7

²⁰ DeTocqueville's estimates of American hyper-majoritarianism can be found, for example, in *op. cit.*, pp. 68-71

²¹ Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

¹⁷ See Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 134.

¹⁸ On reform of campaign financing, see, for example, Alexander Heard, *The Costs of Democracy* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). Electoral College reform has been proposed anew in the aftermath of the 1968 election. One must bear in mind in classifying this as an area of possible development, however, just how resistant to change this part of the system of elections has been—in spite of wide public support for reform for over 30 years. For example, in answer to a Gallup Poll question, "Do you think the president should be elected by popular vote or by electoral vote as at present?," 63% of a national sample in June, 1936, preferred a popular vote

Because of such voter discouragement, one might suspect that the system of elections in the United States would be subject to long-term decay on the level of voter participation. The evidence is somewhat mixed and scholarship is therefore not unanimous on this question. Although voter turnout in elections as a proportion of the population has risen with the easing of suffrage restrictions, Burnham's data suggest that the percent of eligible electors who avail themselves of the privilege is lower than it once was, in comparison with voting levels in the nineteenth century.²² On the other hand, other data, covering 1920-1964, show a distinct upturn in turnout.²³ In an important sense, therefore, the mass public may have withdrawn some of its support from the institution of elections over the long term, but at this point we are uncertain about the overall trends.

This leads directly to the main question of the research to be reported below. If there has been a drop in voting by eligible electors, does this indicate some loss of public confidence in the institution of elections? Do the recent criticisms of the American electoral process by militant students, blacks, and others simply give voice to an erosion of favorable public sentiment that has been in evidence for many years?²⁴ To begin

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 16-26; and Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 7-28. There is some disagreement about how contemporary turnout levels in the United States compare with other Western democracies. The Report of the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) observes, for example, that, "Even with adjusted figures, the plain fact remains that citizens of other democracies vote in greater relative numbers than Americans. The United States, leader of the free world, lags behind many other free countries in voter participation." [page 8]. By contrast, William G. Andrews concludes on the basis of his calculations that, "This means that about 83.2 percent of the eligible, able electorate voted in 1960—a figure nearly 20 percent higher than the one generally used to indicate voting participation in the United States. One can reasonably conclude that between 80 and 85 percent of the American electorate voted in 1960": "American Voting Participation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 19 (1966), 639-652, at p. 651.

²³ William H. Flanagan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 16-19.

²⁴ The kind of observation one meets increasingly in the press and elsewhere is exemplified by this statement on the demonstrations in Chicago at the

to answer these queries is the purpose of the present analysis. Before we can proceed, however, we will first need to indicate briefly some categories of appropriate evidence for testing public confidence in the institution of elections.

II. MEASURING SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM OF ELECTIONS

While the extent to which those allowed to vote avail themselves of the opportunity to do so is a possible indicator of the mass public's confidence in elections, it is a not wholly satisfactory one. As the literature on voting has shown, potential electors may participate out of a sense of partisan loyalty, ideological preference, attraction to particular candidates, reaction to immediate social pressure, feelings of contentment or discontent with general socioeconomic conditions, etc. Elections, as noted above, are primary vehicles of mass political choice behavior and manifestation of partisanship; and voting may also be a response denoting approval of the regime at a more general level. Thus, the intention if not the effect of turnout is only in part an expression of approval of the institution of elections *per se*.²⁵ What is needed therefore is a more direct measure of public feeling about the institution of elections as such.

To measure public sentiment regarding the system of elections, we focus in particular upon what in previous studies of this kind has been referred to as *diffuse support*.²⁶ Diffuse support

time of the 1968 Democratic Party Convention: "The protesters never seriously sought to influence events inside the International Amphitheatre. From the start most of them regarded the Democratic Convention as rigged and the entire electoral process as bankrupt": F. Richard Ciccone, "Anatomy of Protest: Daley vs. New Left," *The Milwaukee Journal*, Part I, September 1, 1968, pp. 1 and 4, at p. 4.

²⁵ Equally, non-voting, abstention, boycotting, elections, voiding ballots, and the like are all imperfect indicators of feeling about the electoral process in that they may as often result from political apathy, disapproval of the regime, disgust with the present party system, the candidates or the issues at hand, than from disaffection from the electoral process.

²⁶ The concept of diffuse support has been proposed and explicated theoretically by David Easton. See, for example, his *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965). Empirical applications of the concept include: Jack Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 600-615; David

is an orientation of good will toward an object which does not depend upon specific benefits derived from the object—in this case, the institution of elections. Because a diffusely supported institution of elections would be valued for its own sake, the effects of displeasure with a particular electoral outcome upon diffuse support would be marginal. Of course, repeated failure of the institution to provide acceptable outcomes is one of the conditions that undermines diffuse support and, in the long run, weakens the institution itself. The data to be presented below result from an initial inquiry into contemporary levels of diffuse support for the institution of elections in the United States.

The Data

In an earlier report dealing with levels of public support for the institution of political parties, a number of interview questions were posed to a sample of Wisconsin adults in 1964.²⁷ Responses to these items were then factor-analyzed to determine the basic attitudinal dimensions which they gauged. In the present investigation, a similar approach is used to measure support for the electoral system, using initially a series of agree-disagree items from a 1966, area-cluster probability survey of Wisconsin adults. Thus, one of the major purposes of this survey is to provide the basis for devising a measure of support for elections similar to that constructed earlier to determine levels of collective support for the party system.

Using such a measure, one is able not only to determine the present levels of support for the institution but also to categorize and compare available collateral data, and thus to see how public support has varied over time and across political cultures. In what follows therefore the steps will be: (1) to test the extent to which there is an empirically definable orientation of diffuse support toward elections which is discriminable from diffuse support for the party

system; (2) to present and interpret levels of public support for elections on such a measure or measures; (3) to compare the Wisconsin findings with other relevant data; (4) to investigate the relation of support for elections to other variables, demographic and political.

An Hypothesized Dimension of Support

In order to construct a measure of support for elections that would be meaningful both to the general public and for the theoretical purposes of political science, items of several types were included in the survey. Broadly, these items have to do either with the judgment of the worth of the institution in its own right or with relative approval of the present operation of the electoral process. Let us view each of these in more detail.

One of the most general regime norms of democracy, derived from a belief in consent of the governed, majority rule, and free competition for public office, is that elections are a worthwhile institution of popular participation and that individual members ought therefore to vote. The duty to vote is of special, indeed of paramount, interest in this connection. The expectation that the citizen of a democracy will vote in popular elections is a crucial norm because it links his own behavior directly to the institution. Such an expectation and its corresponding role-behavior has significance in that it gives symbolic expression to the more general principles that undergird the role, for example belief in the necessity for majority rule.²⁸ Such an expectation applies, therefore, even when the choice aspects of voting are perceived by the potential voter to be negligible. Internalization of the duty to vote, if not fully synonymous with raising the level of the individual's diffuse support for the institution, is nonetheless one of its necessary ingredients. The member becomes obliged by such a sense of duty to contribute his own resources of time and effort even when particular elections are anticipated to be unfavorable or trivial to his own interests.

But something else is involved. Not only should the member come to have sentiments about the worth of and necessity for participating in elections, but he should also become generally oriented to the way they operate. While he may not like what goes into or results from a particular election, he should, if diffusely sup-

Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this Review, 61 (1967), 25-38; G. R. Boynton, Samuel C. Patterson, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (1968), 163-180; Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court," *Law and Society Review*, 2 (1968), pp. 357-384; David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1969).

²⁷ Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," *loc. cit.*

²⁸ That majority rule is endorsed in general by the mass public at a nearly unanimous level is indicated in data found in James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 276-294.

TABLE I. COMPONENTS OF ELECTORAL AND PARTY SYSTEM SUPPORT

Item	Rotated Factor Matrix				
	I	II	III	IV	h ²
1. "It would be better if, in all elections, no party labels were put on the ballot."	.14	.01	.57	-.02	.34
2. "More often than not, the political parties create conflicts where none really exist."	-.10	.06	.67	.16	.49
3. "Voting is the only way that people like me can have a say about how the government runs things."	.10	-.10	.24	.72	.60
4. "Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in."	.52	.26	.11	.04	.35
5. "Our system of government would work a lot better if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties altogether."	.13	.36	.52	.33	.52
6. "The parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide a clear choice on issues."	.06	.45	.54	.11	.50
7. "The conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it."	.12	.43	.44	.30	.48
8. "Legislators and other elected officials should be held responsible for the promises they make campaigning for office."	-.06	.41	.27	.13	.26
9. "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win."	.71	.07	.01	.13	.52
10. "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country."	.05	-.02	-.14	.73	.56
11. "Most of the effort, time, and money spent in political campaigns could be better used some other way."	.12	.67	.12	-.03	.48
12. "I generally get a feeling of satisfaction from going to the polls to cast my ballot."	-.69	.01	-.09	.17	.51
13. "We have far too many elections for public office in this country."	.39	.34	.20	-.04	.31
14. "Most election campaigns are silly or ridiculous."	.23	.61	.14	-.03	.45
15. "We should make a lot more of our government officials go before the people as candidates in general elections than we do now."	-.09	.31	-.06	.52	.38
16. "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."	.77	.10	.12	.11	.63
17. "A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out."	.52	.15	-.14	.04	.31
18. "It is impossible for most voters to make informed and intelligent decisions when they go to the polls."	.31	.51	-.18	-.05	.39
19. "Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examinations rather than by elections."	.14	.62	.08	.10	.45
Percent of total variance	13.3	13.2	9.7	8.7	44.8
Percent of total factor variance	29.6	29.4	21.6	19.3	100.0

portive, be convinced that the overall results of elections are beneficial. On the input side, we ask whether he thinks the campaign process represents a worthwhile expenditure of social resources, for example. On the side of outputs and outcomes, does he regard elections as making a real difference in the way leadership is exercised and policy is directed, or does he perceive that it has only ritual, symbolic functions to perform?

To tap these various aspects of diffuse support for elections a series of agree-disagree items was employed. The hypothesis was that together these items would form an empirically-observable attitude dimension distinct from the orientation of diffuse support for the party system operationalized earlier. If there were such an empirically defined dimension, it would provide a basis for assessing the relative value of individual item indicators in measuring such an orientation; and thus, it would make possible meaningful comparisons with items from other surveys in order to give historical and comparative depth to the analysis.

III. FINDINGS

The Observed Support Dimensions

We find, upon principal component analysis of the matrix of correlations among nineteen items pertaining to the party and electoral systems (reproduced below in Table 1), that three election system components rather than one is the empirical result; and that these three components are distinguished in large part from the dimension of support for the party system.

Factor I defines an area of public feeling having to do with the felt obligation to participate in elections (items 4, 9, 16 and 17) and with the satisfaction that one obtains from discharging such an obligation (item 12). I will refer to this dimension simply as "voting duty"—which I take to be a primary indicator of diffuse support for elections as discussed above.

Factor II concerns broadly the member's reactions on the input side of the electoral process: his relative approval of resources expended in election campaigns (item 11), whether such campaigns are to be taken seriously (item 4), whether the principle of submitting leaders to the test of popular choice is worthwhile (item 19), and whether voters are able to perform their electoral role with competence (item 18). To a lesser degree, some of the items on political parties load on this component (items 6, 7, and 8), a slight overlap in public perception of the two institutions which makes excellent sense given the central role of parties in much electoral competition.

Factor III is support for the party system in that all of the highest loading items (1, 2, 5, 6,

and 7) are concerned with the parties; and none of the election system items is weighted above .27 on this dimension. Thus attitudes toward parties are clearly separable from those toward elections in the public mind. This empirical distinction will prove significant when we attempt in a preliminary way to compare below the relative magnitude of public support for the two institutions.

Factor IV concerns mainly the efficacy of elections in giving the people influence in "running the country" (items 3 and 10). It also involves to a lesser extent the idea of extending the principle of electoral competition for public offices (item 15). For sake of simplicity, this dimension will be called "efficacy of elections" in that its main emphasis is upon the belief that elections result in increasing popular influence on government.

Levels of Public Support for Elections

With these dimensions of support thus empirically defined, the discussion can proceed next to assessing the relative degrees of public support for the system of elections. We shall also want to interpret such levels of support or non-support in comparison with public feeling at earlier points in time, with mass opinion in other Western democracies, and with public regard for the party system.

1. *Voting Duty.* As we turn first to voting duty, we are fortunate in that earlier work in the field of voting behavior has revealed much of interest for present purposes. The work that originally gave clearest empirical expression of the sense of voting duty was *The Voter Decides*. Voting duty was there termed "a sense of civic obligation to vote" or, more simply, "sense of citizen duty."²⁰ The present terms of measurement draw heavily upon items from that original effort; and the data generated at that time, and in the subsequent national surveys of 1956 and 1960, will be used below to evaluate possible trends in the collective sense of voting duty in the American public. Before viewing these data, however, let us first consider a more general issue.

An impression that one is apt to gain from close acquaintance with American culture is that the duty to vote ranks high among all of the civic obligations recognized by Americans. Some evidence that supports this impression has been reported by Milbrath. A survey conducted among the general citizenry of Evanston, Illinois, in 1960, showed that 79% of the respon-

²⁰ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), pp. 86, 194-199.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE TO VOTING DUTY ITEMS, WISCONSIN, 1966*

Items	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							Total %
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree- Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not As- certained	
16. "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."	.77	1%	7	1	68	21	1	1	100%
9. "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win."	.71	1	4	2	68	23	1	1	100%
12. "I generally get a feeling of satisfaction from going to the polls to cast my ballot."	-.69	15	71	4	5	1	3	2	101%
4. "Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in."	.52	2	17	7	58	14	2	1	101%
17. "A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out."	.52	2	27	3	51	14	2	1	100%

* Only items with factor weights $\geq .50$ are included. Some rows do not sum to 100% due to rounding error. N = 607.

dents agreed that one fulfills his civic duty if he votes regularly.³⁰ A similar consensus was discovered in data from a later survey in Buffalo, New York. From the latter study, Milbrath reports that:

Certain inputs are almost universally believed to be a citizen's responsibility: vote (93%), keep informed (80%), teach children good citizenship (87%), pay taxes (98%), have undivided loyalty to the country (93%). The percentage doing each of these things at least "fairly often" holds up quite well: vote (82%), keep informed (72%), teach children good citizenship (75%), pay taxes (93%), have undivided loyalty (93%).³¹

The extent of societal emphasis upon voting duty as a primary civic role is therefore high in America. Indeed, it is probably more highly ranked here than for many other democracies, even those generally regarded as having higher turnout rates than does the United States.³²

³⁰ Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1965), p. 62.

³¹ "The Nature of Political Beliefs and the Relationship of the Individual to the Government," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 12 (1968), 28-36, at p. 33.

³² See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 171. Their five-nation data show

That voting duty should be so prominent among expected civic virtues suggests that powerful sources of social reinforcement are present to maintain it, especially political socialization. What Rose and Mossawir observe for Britain and other free societies can probably be applied strongly in America: "In Britain and other free societies, the duty to vote, through a process of

Americans to be especially high relative to Britons, Germans, Italians, and Mexicans in mentioning voting as a response to the question of what role the ordinary man ought to play in his local community. This is not to say that the sense of obligation to vote is not high in these other democracies. Rose and Mossawir found, for example, in their Stockport, England, sample that "82% replied that they thought voting a duty," when asked "whether you don't have to vote unless you feel like it, or whether voting is a duty." [*Op. cit.*, p. 189.]. Edinger presents data, moreover, which suggest that voting is at the top of the list of citizenship obligations felt by West Germans: Lewis J. Edinger, *Politics in Germany* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 106. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that voting is apt to be conceived more as a duty than as a right (and perhaps not as an effective means to influence public policy therefore). Some older American data (1944), showed in answer to the question, "Do you regard voting more as a duty you owe your country, or more as a right

TABLE 3. TRENDS IN VOTING DUTY: COMPARISON DATA

(a) "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."

Percent Disagree	U.S., 1952 ^a	U.S., 1956 ^a	U.S., 1960 ^a	Wisconsin, 1963 ^b	Wisconsin, 1966
	86%	89	89	89	89

(b) "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win."

Percent Disagree	U.S., 1952 ^a	U.S., 1956 ^a	U.S., 1960 ^a	Wisconsin, 1966
	86	89	90	91

(c) "If a person doesn't care (about) how an election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it."

"A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out."

Percent Disagree	U.S., 1952 ^a	U.S., 1956 ^a	U.S., 1960 ^a	Wisconsin, 1966
	45	52	53	65

^a From the Codebooks of the 1952, 1956 and 1960 Election Studies of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. These data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

^b From a state-wide survey of Wisconsin adults in April and May, 1963, by the University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory. The question in this instance was worded: "So many other people vote in presidential elections that it doesn't really matter whether or not I personally vote." Two other surveys conducted by U.W.S.R.L. in spring and fall, 1963, show the collective stability of this sentiment even under different item wording. In the spring, 1963 survey (March and April), 89% disagreed with the statement, "Why bother to vote when you can do so little with your one vote." In the fall, 1963 survey, 88% disagreed that, "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not."

socialization, becomes a response to an internal compulsion."³³

The impression of general public adherence to the norm of voting duty is forcefully reaffirmed when we turn to the 1966 Wisconsin data. Table 2 presents the distribution in response to the five highest loading items on the voting duty dimension.

A very high public endorsement of the duty to vote appears on these items. Diffuse support for elections is on this level, very firmly based. And, when we take account of comparable data from earlier national surveys—where the same or very similar items were used—we reach the same conclusion. Table 3 shows these comparison data.

to use if you want to?", that 59% chose *duty* and 36% *right*: National Opinion Research Center national sample; data available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. A quite similar distribution was found in a 1953 national survey in France. See Jean Stoetzel, "Voting Behavior in France," *British Journal of Sociology*, 6 (1955), 104-122, at p. 120.

³³ *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

On the first two items—where the wording is the same as in the present survey—we obtain nearly identical results for Wisconsin and the nation as a whole. The figures are remarkably close, suggesting that Wisconsin is not unrepresentative for items of this kind. On a third, comparable, but not identical item, we find a roughly equivalent level of public endorsement in Wisconsin and the United States as a whole (item c). Furthermore, looking at the national data from a time perspective, one observes that the trends on these three items though slight are up without exception.³⁴ When we put this small rise together with the fact that the American sense of duty to vote is relatively high, and probably higher than in many other comparable systems,³⁵ we can infer that a profound resource

³⁴ These trends were pointed out earlier, using the Michigan Survey Research Center election study data, by Robert E. Lane. See "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 874-895, at p. 894.

³⁵ Present day Americans are high in sense of duty to vote, not only in recent historical, but also comparative, contexts. For data on the latter, see Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

exists on which to base the future of the institution in America.

Before we conclude that the foundations are perfectly sound, however, we should also consider how the general public perceives the institution at the level of its operation, i.e., in terms of Factors II and IV as defined above.

2. Approval of the Electoral Process. Factor II, perception of the operation of elections on the side of electoral input, shows a rather more mixed state of public opinion than is the case for voting duty. Table 4 presents these data.

A majority of the 1966 respondents agree that resources are wasted in political campaigns relative to how such resources could otherwise be expended (item 11). Rather substantial minorities also agree with the other three, negatively pitched items. Only on the proposition that most election campaigns are silly or ridiculous is there a clear majority supportive of the electoral institution at this level.

Other available evidence would tend to support these findings. Data from the Almond-Verba five-nation study suggest a similarly mixed state of opinion in a series of questions on campaigns and voting. Their U.S. sample was highest of all five nations in agreeing that campaigning is needed (74% U.S., 63% U.K., 60% Mexico, 42% Germany, and 39% Italy) and in agreeing that election campaigns are "often" or "sometimes" pleasant and enjoyable (66% U.S., 52% U.K., 38% Germany, 34% Mexico, and 28% Italy). On the other hand, the U.S. sample was also highest in finding elections "often" and "sometimes" silly or ridiculous (58% U.S., 46% Germany, 37% U.K., 32% Mexico, and 19% Italy), and in "often" and "sometimes" getting angry at some of the things that go on in election campaigns (57% U.S., 46% Germany, 42% U.K., 26% Mexico, and 20% Italy).³⁶ Americans thus give a rather uneven reception to the campaigning aspects of the electoral process—more so than for any of the other four nations.

On the issue of public perception of its own members' electoral competence, there are also a number of suggestive earlier data. Prothro's and Grigg's evidence showed that less than a majority disagreed with the statement, "In a city referendum, only people who are well-informed about the problem being voted on should be allowed to vote."³⁷ McClosky's 1957-58 national sample revealed that only 48% agreed that "People ought to be allowed to vote even if they can't do so intelligently." In addition, 62% of

McClosky's general electorate agreed that "Issues and arguments are beyond the understanding of most voters"; and 48% agreed that, "Most people don't have enough sense to pick their own leaders wisely."³⁸ We find from these earlier studies therefore that a rather high proportion of people are critical of the ordinary man's electoral capacities. That there is a relatively low collective evaluation of voters is confirmed by the 1966 Wisconsin data. Less than a majority disagree that, "It is impossible for most voters to make informed and intelligent decisions when they go to the polls." (Table 4). The public is critical of itself, or more precisely, its members are as often critical of each other's capacities as they are willing to believe in the rationality of the common man.

Our conclusion at this point must therefore be that high support on the plane of civic obligation to vote is not matched by equally high approval of the campaigning and other aspects of the input side of the electoral process, particularly in according one's fellow man any substantial measure of voter intelligence. What then of electoral output?

3. The Efficacy of Elections. Factor IV defines an attitudinal orientation toward the operation of elections with regard to outputs. Are elections perceived as giving the mass public a chance to participate in government? Table 5 presents the pattern of response to the items loading highest on this dimension.

What we observe is a situation of support intermediate between those discussed above. There are clear majorities on each of these items supporting the operation of elections in government. But the level of public belief is considerably lower than for voting duty. While a majority of the public is confident that elections have participatory results, such belief is clearly not consensual.

The first (and best) item indicator on this dimension has also been used in national surveys (and this earlier use inspired its employment in the Wisconsin survey). We observe for the latter indicator some possibility of a decline in this variety of support since 1952. In the 1952 Michigan election study, 77% agreed that "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Prothro and Grigg, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

³⁸ Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 361-382, at pp. 365 and 369. For comparative perspective, we might note that Rose and Mossawir's study in Stockport, England, similarly revealed a not high majority (57%) who judged that "most people do think about how they vote": *op. cit.*, p. 187.

TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL PROCESS ITEMS, WISCONSIN, 1966^a

	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							Total Percent
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree- Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not As- certained	
11. "Most of the effort, time and money spent in political campaigns could be better used some other way."	.67	9%	50	22	15	1	2	1	100%
19. "Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examinations rather than by elections."	.62	4	26	18	40	7	5	1	101%
14. "Most election campaigns are silly or ridiculous."	.61	2	21	18	51	6	1	2	101%
18. "It is impossible for most voters to make informed decisions when they go to the polls."	.51	3	31	17	42	4	2	1	100%

^a Only items with factor weights $\geq .50$ are included. Some rows do not add to 100% due to errors of rounding. $N = 607$.

things are run in this country."³⁹ In the Almond and Verba U.S. survey of 1959, however, such agreement was 71%, an ostensible drop in support.⁴⁰ We might note also, although the comparison is rather speculative, that only 57% agreed with this statement in the 1966 Wisconsin survey; but a substantial 18% availed them-

selves of the agree-disagree option. When the latter are partitioned proportionately into agree or disagree categories, agreement then rises to 70%, which is still below the 1952 national figure (unlike the items on voting duty reported in Table 2, where Wisconsin was as high or higher than the national figures).

The evidence at this point is incomplete, but I nevertheless draw the tentative inference that there has been a net decline in valuing elections for their participatory effects. This is contrary to the trend of valuing participation on the level

³⁹ Codebook of the 1952 Election Study, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

⁴⁰ Codebook of the Five-Nation Study, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE TO EFFICACY OF ELECTIONS ITEMS, WISCONSIN, 1966^a

Items	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							Total Percent
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree- Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not As- certained	
10. "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country."	.73	5%	52	18	20	2	2	1	100%
3. "Voting is the only way that people like me can have a say about how the government runs things"	.72	9	49	10	26	4	1	1	100%
15. "We should make a lot more of our government officials go before the people as candidates than we do now."	.52	4	61	12	17	—	4	2	100%

^a Only items with factor weights $\geq .50$ are included. $N = 607$.

of voting duty. In comparative context, moreover, both Britain and Germany in the Five-Nation study scored higher than the U.S. on the level of support manifested by the first of these Factor IV items.⁴¹ Thus, belief in elections as an effective instrument of participatory democracy is apparently lower in America than the belief that one should vote—something which would tend to increase the ritual aspects of electoral behavior. The belief in electoral efficacy is also possibly lower than it was in 1952; and it suffers by comparison with some other Western democracies. This is an obvious area for further analysis, using a broader and perhaps more incisive range of questions than was possible in this very limited and preliminary analysis. Before we leave the question, however, there is one further comparison to make and that is with support for the allied institution of political parties.

Support for Elections versus Support for Parties

Popular and representative democracy has generally required that parties and elections should be interdependent. Once elections are allowed under the legal and structural terms of a regime, the stage is set for the creation of political parties to organize and contest elections. Without political parties, elections more often than not become emptied of meaning and the choice situation facing the voter becomes difficult and often uninterpretable.⁴² But parties and elections are not necessarily of equal status as institutions. However important might be the interrelationships between the two institutions, elections in America have probably been accorded greater legitimacy than have the parties,

⁴¹ *Ibid.* U.K. agreement is 83%, Germany 78%, U.S. 71%, Mexico 65%, and Italy 62%.

⁴² The interdependence of party and electoral systems is seen in such statements as this, by James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., in *Political Parties and National Integration in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 3, "As noted elsewhere, however, formal political parties in the narrow sense defined herein did not appear until constitutional reforms were introduced providing for (1) the devolution by the imperial government of a sufficiently meaningful and attractive measure of power to induce or to provoke nationalist leaders to convert their movements into political parties and (2) the introduction or refinement of institutions and procedures, such as an electoral system, which would make it technically possible for parties to seek power constitutionally." They add in the footnote to this statement: "The immediate point is, that with few exceptions, African political parties initially emerged through electoral competition."

particularly at a formal level. Our question then is how legitimate is each in the contemporary public mind? As they are complementary institutions, one might hypothesize that feelings toward the one would spill over to attitudes toward the other; and levels of support would therefore be comparable. Let us look at the available evidence.

Table 6 presents the 1966 Wisconsin data on diffuse support for the party system.⁴³

Only on the most extreme of these items—the proposal to strike party labels from the ballot—is there a majority in support of the parties. The remaining four items show that more respondents oppose the parties than favor them, which was also true for a similar survey in Wisconsin in 1964 using the same items. We conclude again that support for the parties is relatively low; and this is especially the case when we compare response on these party system items with the high consensus levels in favor of voting duty (Table 2). On the efficacy-of-elections dimension, public support also appears to be higher than on the political party items (Table 5). Thus, only on the dimension of approval of the electoral process do we find support for elections to dip to levels approaching sentiment about the parties—and even here the comparison favors elections (see Table 4). In no case in Table 4 do those disapproving various aspects of elections outnumber those who favor them—which is not true in the case of the parties (Table 6). These comparisons are indeed very rough, given the differences in object and item content. Yet the general thrust is clear: even on the least favored aspects of the electoral institution, public estimation is higher than for the parties.

Some external evidence from national surveys relevant to this question provides much more direct comparisons and documents the same discrepancy between parties and elections. The Five-Nation study respondents were asked: "We know that the ordinary person has many problems that take his time. In view of this, what part do you think the ordinary person ought to play in the local affairs of his town or district?" The American predisposition for connecting citizenship and voting comes to the fore: 40% of the Americans, but only 18% of the British, 15% of the Germans, 2% of the Italians, and 1% of the Mexicans volunteered "vote."⁴⁴ The contrast with "taking part in ac-

⁴³ See Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," *loc. cit.*, pp. 603 and 605, for presentation of the diffuse support for the party system factor in the 1964 study.

⁴⁴ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 171. For two

TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE ON PARTY SYSTEM SUPPORT ITEMS, WISCONSIN 1966^a

Items ^b	Rotated Factor Weight	Percent							Total Percent
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Agree-Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Not Ascertained	
2. "More often than not, the political parties create conflicts where none really exists."	.67	9%	60	11	13	—*	6	1	100%
1. "It would be better if, in all elections, no party labels were put on the ballot."	.57	4	30	8	50	6	3	—*	101%
6. "The parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide a clear choice on them."	.54	6	48	23	18	1	3	1	100%
5. "Our system of government would work a lot more efficiently if we could get rid of conflicts between the parties altogether."	.52	8	35	11	33	8	3	2	100%
7. "The conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it."	.44	4	37	17	36	3	3	1	101%

^a Some rows do not add to 100% due to errors of rounding. N = 607.

^b Items are presented in order of rotated factor weights.

* Less than 1%.

tivities of political parties" is especially great for Americans: only 6% of Americans gave the party activity response, which is not much greater than several of the other countries: 5% Mexico, 4% U.K., 4% Germany, and 1% Italy. In all of these countries, parties are less salient means of participation than elections, but the differential between the two institutions is much the widest in the United States.

The 1964 Election Study by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center posed two further, highly relevant questions to their respondents:⁴⁵

1. "How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?"
2. "How much do you feel that political parties help to make the government pay attention to what the people think?"

other items which show a similar, if less extreme difference among countries, and between elections and parties as a perceived mode of influence, see *ibid.*, pp. 191 and 203. Also see Milbrath, "The Nature of Political Beliefs . . .," *loc. cit.*

⁴⁵ Codebook of the Survey Research Center 1964 Election Study, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

Table 7 presents the response to these questions.

We observe a marked difference in the way the mass public attaches representative significance to the two institutions: elections stand considerably higher.

The rough comparisons of public support for parties versus that for elections as derived from the 1966 Wisconsin data are supported therefore by other relevant data; and the conclusion is that the public finds elections more agreeable to

TABLE 7. RELATIVE EFFICACY OF PARTIES AND ELECTIONS, U.S. 1964

Make the government pay attention:	(Percent)	
	Elections	Parties
A good deal	65%	40
Some	25	39
Not much	6	13
Don't know	4	7
Total %	100%	99%
N =	(1450)	(1450)

TABLE 8. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CORRELATES OF SUPPORT FOR THE INSTITUTION OF ELECTIONS

Independent Variables ^a	Factor Score I Voting Duty		Factor Score II Approval of Electoral Process		Factor Score IV Efficacy of Elections	
	Partial r	r	Partial r	r	Partial r	r
Political Party Preference Index	.00	.03	.08	.10 ^b	.11	.07
Frequency of Religious Attendance	-.11	-.06	-.08	-.05	.02	-.03
Age	-.22	-.09 ^b	-.22	-.08 ^b	.15	.01
Race	-.08	-.08	.07	.07	.06	.06
Sex	.00	.01	-.04	-.03	.00	.00
Ideology Index	-.01	.03	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.03
Occupational Prestige Index	.24	.07	.18	.02	-.21	-.03
Education	.31	.18 ^c	.26	.15 ^c	-.34	-.25 ^c
Income	.18	.03	.21	.10 ^b	-.18	-.04
Percent of Life Spent in Present Place of Residence	-.01	.01	-.02	.01	.02	-.01
Multiple R	.35		.33		.36	

^a Political Party Preference is scored as: strong Republican = 1 . . . strong Democrat = 7; Race is scored: black = 1, white = 2; sex is scored: male = 1, female = 2; ideological self-identification is scored: strong liberal = 1 . . . strong conservative = 5; occupational prestige is scored according to the Otis Dudley Duncan Socio-economic Index as reported in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *et al.*, *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: The Free Press, 1961). Housewives are given their husband's occupational prestige score.

^b Significant at the .05 level using the t distribution (two-tailed test); partial correlations reported are controlled for all other independent variables in the series.

^c Significant at the .01 level or better.

their needs than it does the parties.⁴⁶ The average member of the public will more likely have internalized the norms of electoral participation than those of partisan competition. The member's cathexis with each will therefore differ—perhaps along the lines expressed by one of Rosenberg's respondents. When asked what part

the average man played in politics, he replied, "not much of a part. The little man votes and that's all . . . the party usually takes over pretty much. They don't think too much about the little man."⁴⁷ Voting and elections are "us"; parties are "them."

⁴⁶ This contrast leaves out of account whether or not the two institutions are interrelated in the public mind. To test for such a relationship, a separate factor analysis of the party and electoral support dimensions was performed using oblique rotation. The latter indicates the degree of relationship obtaining among factors, and thus among dimensions of orientation. What we observe is the following set of correlations:

	Party System Support	Voting Duty	Approval of the Electoral Process
Voting Duty	.28		
Approval of the Electoral Process	.46	.36	
Efficacy of Elections	.32	.20	.27

These correlations constitute the oblique primary

factor pattern matrix, using an independent cluster solution. Their item definitions vary slightly from those reported above, in that a 28 item matrix was used which included 9 items on general political efficacy and trust. Six factors were obtained in the principal component analysis, including the four above. These data show that there are, to a greater or lesser degree, some mutual effects among these various orientations to parties and elections. For example, party system support and approval of the electoral process covary to the highest degree, whereas voting duty and efficacy of elections are least associated.

⁴⁷ Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (1954-55), 349-366, at p. 356.

Correlates of Support for Elections

One further step of data analysis needs to be taken before we leave this subject. This concerns the question of demographic, political or other correlates of these attitude dimensions. Are there systematic variations on these attitudes among people who differ according to demographic or political attributes of other kinds? Using the 1966 Wisconsin data, we can begin to make some initial estimates. In Table 8, ten independent variables that could be thought to influence the level of affect for elections are correlated with factor scores on each of the election support dimensions.

What we find in general is that the correlations of the independent variables and the factor scores are relatively low. The low magnitude of these correlations means that none is a weighty influence upon support for elections.

A few significant correlations do appear, however, with education being the most prominent. Greater educational attainment improves one's sense of voting duty and approval of the way the electoral system operates; but it decreases one's faith that elections are effective. Almond and Verba's data showed that one of the items used here to measure voting duty, namely satisfaction when going to the polls, evoked a response which was correlated with education in four of the five countries studied. Thus, the first of our findings supports earlier research.⁴⁸ Age is also correlated significantly with the first two factor scores, if negatively. Thus, the youngest adults feel their obligation to participate most strongly and more fully approve of electoral processes. Together the age and education effects in our data suggest the possibility of preadult political socialization influence—something that should become a focus of future inquiry. The only other correlates of note are party preference and income. They correlate significantly in one case each with the electoral support components. In general, our capacity to account for the electoral attitudes by using these ten predictors is limited. We account for 13% or less of the variance in the factor scores by use of these predictor variables in each case.

Another correlational question that we might raise concerns possible effects of these electoral sentiments upon behavior. One behavior of interest here is individual turnout rate over a series of elections. Do our electoral support factors relate significantly to frequency of turnout, when other variables are held constant? Table 9 presents data pertinent to this question.

The table begins, in the top portion, with two more general orientations, political efficacy and

TABLE 9. CORRELATES OF TURNOUT:
SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS AND
OTHER VARIABLES

Correlates	Turnout ^a	
	r	Partial r
Political Efficacy	.16	.02
Political Trust	-.05	-.09 ^b
Voting Duty	.36	.35 ^c
Approval of Electoral Process	.04	.05
Efficacy of Elections	.00	.02
Support for Party System	.10	.08
Political Party Preference Index	-.04	-.01
Frequency of Religious Attendance	-.16	-.16 ^c
Age	.14	.30 ^c
Race	-.05	.02
Sex	-.06	-.03
Ideology Index	-.01	-.04
Occupational Prestige Index	.19	.09 ^b
Education	.11	-.01
Income	.20	.16 ^c
Percent of Life Spent in Present Place of Residence	.15	.14 ^c
Multiple R =	.53	

^a Turnout is scored on participation in three elections: 1964 November election, 1966 September primary, and 1966 November election. Scores range from 0-3.

^b Significant at the .025 level, using one-tailed t distribution.

^c Significant at the .001 level using one-tailed t distribution.

political trust, which have been scored on the basis of a separate factor analysis of nine additional survey items.⁴⁹ Political efficacy is rather similar in construction here to the index of the

⁴⁹ The major items are:

Rotated Factor Weight	Political Efficacy
-.73	"Government officials don't care much about what people like me think."
-.71	"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
-.69	"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."
-.63	"The people who really run the country do not even become known to the voters."

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

same name employed by the Survey Research Center studies of voting behavior. The latter constituted one part of the political involvement dimension reported in *The American Voter*.⁵⁰ The other long-term portion of political involvement is "sense of citizen duty"—which, in the present context, is "voting duty." One of the first questions we might raise is which of these two aspects of political involvement better accounts, in the Wisconsin data, for the variance in extent of voting participation.

Looking at Table 9, we find that voting duty is of considerably greater importance for turnout than is political efficacy. Indeed, when the effects of other variables, such as education, are controlled, the turnout—political efficacy correlation approaches zero. Voting duty on the other hand is the strongest of all of this list of correlates ($r = .36$; partial $r = .35$), and is approached in magnitude only by age ($r = .14$; partial $r = .30$).⁵¹

What does not correlate here is perhaps as interesting as what does. That voting duty, mobility, and age should be positively associated with turnout is hardly surprising given past research. Lack of correlation with political efficacy on the other hand is unexpected on these grounds. *The American Voter*, for example, presented data from the 1956 election that showed a very marked relationship between turnout and politi-

cal efficacy.⁵² We might also have thought that the election support factors other than voting duty would show higher correlation than they do. However else these latter sentiments may serve to differentiate behavior, attendance at the ballot box is not much affected by them.

IV. CONCLUSION

Both those who are concerned about the fate of the regime of democracy in America and those who pitch their theoretical interests at the level of system persistence and transformation are apt to be intrigued by the state of popular opinion regarding that most characteristic institution of popular participation, the election. Certainly the spate of electoral studies of the last generation in political science would suggest such an interest. What the latter studies have not dealt with directly, however, is the condition of elections in popular thinking at the level of the institution. It is the purpose of the present inquiry to initiate that enterprise.

The 1966 Wisconsin data, even when supplemented by the excellent and suggestive research of others, as above, are limited and preliminary to the tasks of measurement and theory construction in this area. If we grant that this initial excursion is only able to be suggestive, we nevertheless obtain thereby some sense of the broad contours of public support for elections. Particularly when we compare earlier American national data, cross-system data, and evidence pertaining to the sister institution of political parties, are we able to sharpen considerably the dim outlines of these preliminary inferences.

The general conclusion is that the institution of elections enjoys a broad base of popular support, most strongly at the level of personal commitment to the norm of voting obligation. Aggregate sense of citizen duty to vote is improving, moreover, rather than decaying, if the slight trends we find are indicative. The future of institutional support on this level looks bright. This is also true when we take account of the correlation of voting duty with education and (negatively) with age. Rising levels of educational attainment and increasing proportions of young people in the adult population should reinforce this trend in coming years. While support is distinctly lower on perception of how elections operate in America, it is nonetheless probably high in comparison with public backing for the parties.

There is a problem which could develop, however, from the gap between the level of feeling of an obligation to participate in elections and the relative perception of the value of the elec-

Political Trust

- .75 "The government in Washington can usually be trusted to do what's right."
- .75 "Almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing."
- .65 "Most political candidates seem to really mean what they say."
- .42 "Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked."

⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 101-110.

⁵¹ Other variables showing significant correlation with turnout are frequency of religious attendance—which shows that those who go to church more often vote less, and vice versa—and lack of mobility (percent of life spent in present place of residence). The latter is no doubt explained by the legal obstacles present for those who move their residence, and by the tendency of those who remain longest in a community to translate their greater stake in its affairs into higher participation. It is perhaps also interesting and surprising to see in this instance that those who are more mistrustful of politicians and government turn out to vote at a higher rate—perhaps to protect their interests in what for them is a more dangerous and uncertain political world.

⁵² *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

toral process. The problem is that a possible erosion of public confidence in the institution could come about if people increasingly disbelieve that campaigns are worthwhile expenditures of social resources or that elections have an impact on leadership and policy. Under the latter circumstances, a collective sense of obligation to vote could lead increasingly to an overemphasis upon the ritual behavior aspects of voting.⁵³ The smallish negative trend on the efficacy of elections dimension together with the counter-trend on voting duty suggests that we could see an increase in the gap between expectation and perception, or between perceived electoral input

and output. The present small degree of fragility of the electoral institution could become magnified if this gap is increasingly perceived. Future work should turn more directly to this question.

I propose, therefore, that scholarship continue to devise and take such measurements as these. Nation-wide, periodic surveys are particularly desirable if we are to understand more comprehensively and reliably the nature of the processes of development or decline of public sentiment toward this major institution of democracy. While the foundations of diffuse support for the institution of elections appear to be relatively firm for the present and able to withstand considerable stress, the centrality of elections in the democratic scheme of things and in the life of many major political systems make raising the hypotheses tentatively tendered here a matter for continuing empirical concern.

⁵³ For discussion of the symbolic and ritual aspects of voting, see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

INCUMBENCY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN SENATE ELECTIONS: DEFINING PARAMETERS OF SUBPRESIDENTIAL VOTING*

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I. THEORETICAL SETTING

Compared with the recent substantial strides in presidential election analysis, research on congressional elections has only begun. The majority of studies have been cast within the presidential-election context, with the relationship between the presidential and congressional vote the phenomenon to be explained.¹ The present attention to presidential contests is understand-

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¹ See V. O. Key's analysis of Senate and House elections in relation to the presidential vote, *Parties, Politics, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964); Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Congressmen and the Electorate* (New York: The Free Press, 1966); Barbara Hinckley, "Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's 'Expected' Loss of Seats," this REVIEW (September, 1967), 694-700; Charles Press, "Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails," this REVIEW (December, 1958), 1041-1050, and "Presidential Coattails and Party Cohesion," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (November, 1963), 320-335; Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter, 1955-56), 353-368; and Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," this REVIEW (June, 1957), 293-312.

One study of House elections on their own terms is to be found in Charles Jones, *Every Second Year* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1967), pp. 45-71. And see Jones, *The Republican Party in American Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 76-90. See also Robert A. Schoenberger, "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision-making in the 1964 Congressional Elections," this REVIEW (June, 1969), 515-520.

able because of the inherent interest in such races in a presidential-centered political system and because reliable survey data have been limited to nationwide samples, severely restricting analysis on a state or district basis. And yet without some comparable advances at the congressional level, we cannot assess bases of electoral support nor the numerous assumptions of behavior in Congress as linked to this support, nor attempt a theory of voting behavior that does not consider voting at the subpresidential level. Put simply, the state of research is such that we have only begun to identify and measure the key variables affecting congressional voting outcomes. It is this basic task to which recent research in the field has been directed.

Consider as the core phenomenon for explanation the sharp fluctuations over time in the partisan division of the vote for Senator and Representative. Since studies of voting behavior indicate the stability of party loyalties over time, evidence of sharp shifts in voting outcomes suggest factors other than party cues influencing the vote decision. Among the lines of inquiry opened, studies by Cummings, Press, and Hinckley, following the work of Key, have utilized aggregate election statistics to measure the substantial impact of the presidential vote on House election outcomes.² Donald Stokes has employed a variance components model to measure the relative impact of national, state, and district influences on the vote for Representative in the 1950's. Using aggregate election data and measuring the variation in congressional vote from the national mean congressional vote, Stokes finds that "national," "state," and "district" influences can explain 32%, 19%, and 49%, respectively, of the variation from the mean. He concludes that the large size of the district component "strongly suggests the importance of the congressional candidates, their party apparatus, and issues having a focus in the individual constituency."³ A study by Harvey Kabaker mea-

² See citations, note 1.

³ Donald E. Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, ed. John M. Claunich (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1965).

asures the impact of turnout on voting for Representative and finds it minimal (i.e., capable of explaining less than 10% of the deviation from "normal" voting, defined as the mean percent of the two-party vote in the district for a twenty-year span).⁴ Each study, it might be noted, treats elections to the House; Senate elections have received no attention. Each is in some way concerned with isolating and measuring major non-idiosyncratic factors affecting congressional voting. And each, necessarily, relies on aggregate election data.⁵

Within this context of inquiry, two related problems of conceptualization and measurement can be identified by comparison against presidential-election studies—problems which can partially explain the lack of advances in the field. For one point, presidential-election analysis has been able to employ a relatively clear-cut tri-partite scheme of "party, candidates and issues" to separate long-term (party loyalty) and short-term (candidates and issues) components.⁶ By contrast at the subpresidential level the conceptualization of variables is considerably more complex since parameters of voting may be linked to the office contested. At the *presidential* level, a turn away from party cues—as evidenced by considerable deviation in voting outcomes from a normal party vote—points toward the short-term factors of a particular election and election year. Whereas at the *congressional* level, a turn away from party cues need not necessarily mean a turning toward such particularistic factors, but rather the existence of congressional incumbency or presidential voting parameters affecting the congressional vote independently of the particular congressional candidates, campaigns, or issues salient on a state or district basis. And clearly it is of considerable interest to students of legislative behavior to assess how much the individual congressman owes the strength of his election to his actions in Congress, the impact of his campaign, or the issues

of the time and place, on the one hand, and how much to the simple fact of his incumbency, on the other.

For a second point, it would seem important to derive a reliable measure of a "normal" or baseline" (minimum) party vote against which to measure and explain deviations in the vote for Senator and Representative. Such a "normal vote" concept—pointing to that stable percentage of voters in a population identifying as Democrat or Republican—has been found useful for presidential-election analysis, but has not been operationalized at the congressional level due to the absence of survey data on a state or district basis. The measures employed by Stokes and Kabaker are efforts in this direction. But in offering a baseline to measure fluctuations derived from averaging the fluctuations themselves, these measures do not permit isolation of the party loyalty factor. It would seem particularly important for congressional-election analysis to separate party loyalty from other stable electoral cues which, by the use of aggregate data alone, could not be distinguished. Thus stable voting for a Democratic Representative over a decade may include both Democratic partisan and House incumbency components. Similarly the strong positive relationship between presidential and congressional voting outcomes which has been noted may combine both partisan and presidential voting components.

II. ANALYTICAL METHOD

One partial solution to this second problem may come from the use of survey-derived estimates of party identifiers on a state or district basis. Recently Ronald Weber and Frank Munger have calculated from nationwide samples the percentage of statewide "participating electorates" for 1956 through 1964 identifying with one or the other of the two parties.⁷ The "participating electorates," in contrast to "eligible electorates," represent the proportions most likely to

⁴ Harvey M. Kabaker, "Estimating the Normal Vote in Congressional Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (February, 1969) 58-83.

⁵ For initial studies of voter attitudes in congressional elections, based on nationwide survey studies, see Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influences in Congress," this REVIEW (March, 1963); "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter, 1962); and *Representation in the American Congress*, forthcoming.

⁶ For utilization of this scheme and the concept of a "normal vote," see Angus Campbell *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).

⁷ Ronald E. Weber and Frank J. Munger, "Party Identification and the Classification of State Party Systems," paper represented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1968. The technique for making these calculations—generally analogous to the procedures employed in the MIT Simulations project—calls for synthesizing state electorates by subdividing them into voter-types whose party identification scores are then determined through an additive formula from national survey data. A detailed description of the procedures can be found in Ronald E. Weber, *Public Opinion in the States: A Simulation Approach* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, 1969).

vote. From these estimates a base line or minimum "party vote" by states can be derived against which deviations in the actual vote outcomes can be measured. While this base party vote by states permits analysis of Senate elections only, similar estimates could be conducted on a district basis; and for purposes of congressional research, the same questions may be asked of Senate and of House elections. Due to the experimental nature of the Weber-Munger estimates, results need to be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, the usefulness of a measure of statewide party identification would seem to justify the experiment; and further, when checked against the few state surveys which include a usable party identification question, the Weber-Munger estimates seem well in line with survey results.⁸

Utilizing the Weber-Munger estimates to isolate the party loyalty factor on a statewide basis, it should be possible to identify and measure major variables affecting Senate election outcomes. It would seem important first to determine how much of the fluctuation in Senate voting—here measured by deviations in actual vote outcome from the base party vote—can be explained by such nonidiosyncratic factors as incumbency and the presidential vote. Then and only upon that basis could one define and interpret the range of short-term variability—i.e., the importance of "candidates and issues" in particular senatorial elections. (1) How much of the fluctuation in vote for Senator is explainable by the "pull" of the presidential vote—constitutionally staggered so as to affect alternating Senate elections? Voter turnout regularly and

sharply declines from presidential year to off-year elections and that smaller portion of off-year voters—of measurably stronger party loyalty—may be expected to follow party lines more faithfully than the larger electorate reacting to the stimuli of a presidential campaign.⁹ Indeed, the greater volatility of the congressional vote in presidential years compared to off-years has been widely noted. (2) How much of the fluctuation in vote for Senator can be explained by the impact of Senate incumbency? One stable characteristic of American voting behavior is the tendency to reelect not only House but also Senate incumbents—a fact which merits a wider acknowledgment than it currently enjoys. Given this incumbency advantage, to be documented subsequently, one would expect fluctuations in senatorial vote depending on the presence or absence of an incumbent ticket. Thus states where an erstwhile second or minority party gained the majority support over some time span could appear to shift dramatically in senatorial vote from strong support for one party to the other simply by the retirement of the former majority party's incumbent.

With the Weber-Munger estimates of base party vote by states for 1956 through 1964, one can calculate for each Senate election in the time period the deviation in actual vote outcome from the base party vote. The subsequent analysis is based on all regularly scheduled Senate contests for 1956 through 1966 in the 34 states sufficiently competitive on the statewide level to have elected at least one Senator or one Governor from both parties during the time period. The data base parallels the Weber-Munger estimates and permits comparison of three presidential-year and three off-year elections. Data from simultaneous contests for President and Governor on a statewide basis are supplied for comparative purposes.

⁸ Percentages of Democratic Party identifiers are as follows:

Survey Results	Weber-Munger Estimates	
	"Eligible" Electoralates	"Partic- ipating" Electoralates
California (Roper '58)	54.8	49.8
Minnesota (Roper '56-'64)	44.4	41.1
Ohio (Harris '58)	42.0	42.5
Iowa (Roper '56-'64)	40.1	38.7
		43.1

Party identification results for 1968 from the 13 states of the University of North Carolina's Comparative State Elections Project should soon be available.

III. FINDINGS

Table 1 presents a summary distribution of deviations from the base party vote for the ten-year period. Since this base vote represents a minimum core of statewide party identifiers, the normal pattern in voting outcomes, as would be expected, shows a plus-Democratic deviation. The mean is +5.6; the standard deviation, 9.3. Considering Senate outcomes separately first, the overall pattern is one of dispersion, with con-

⁹ Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics* (November, 1964), 745-757; and Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in *Elections and the Political Order*, p. 19.

TABLE 1. ELECTION OUTCOMES MEASURED BY DEVIATION FROM DEMOCRATIC BASE PARTY VOTE
(Percentage Points)

Elections	Extremely Strong Democratic ($\geq +15.0$)	Strong Democratic ($+14.9$ to $+10.0$)	Moderate ($+9.9$ to $+5.0$)	Moderate ($+4.9$ to 0)	Strong Republican (-0.1 to -4.9)	Extremely Strong Republican (≤ -5.0)
Senate (n = 140)	16	16	19	19	16	14
President (n = 70)	20	11	10	23	19	17
Governor (n = 97)	10	15	25	29	13	7

^a The mean of the Senate distribution is +5.6, close to the midpoint of the two "moderate" categories above. Outliers $+14.9$ or more or -14.9 or less (i.e., larger negative numbers) are beyond 1 standard deviation of the mean and are reflected by the "extremely strong Democratic" and "extremely strong Republican" categories above.

tests spread fairly evenly across the range of categories, with this pattern holding for election-by-election and state-by-state analysis. Twenty-seven of the 34 states exhibit a range of deviations in the ten-year span of more than 10 percentage points; 17 of the 34, more than 15 percentage points; 9, more than 20 percentage points. What these figures mean, of course, is that states have shifted in senatorial voting from Democratic to Republican or back—often from strong Democratic voting to strong Republican and back in a relatively short span of time. To take a particularly clear illustration, New Jersey shifted in Senate contests from close to the base party vote in 1958 (+2.7) to 5.5 percentage points below in 1960, to 13.2 percentage points above in 1964, to 11.7 points below in 1966, for a total range of deviations of 24.9 percentage points. Comparing elections for the three offices, state electorates appear to diverge more frequently from moderate voting patterns in the vote for Senator than for Governor. Senate patterns are considerably more similar to the presidential than the gubernatorial pattern. The comparison can be seen more clearly by collapsing the categories from 6 to 3 into strong Democratic, moderate, and strong Republican deviations and noting the percentage of contests in each category:

Election	Strong Democratic ($\geq +15.0$ to $+10.0$)	Moderate ($+9.9$ to 0)	Strong Republican (-0.1 to ≥ -5.0)
Senate (n = 140)	32%	38%	30%
President (n = 70)	31%	33%	36%
Governor (n = 97)	25%	51%	25%

Incumbency

One stable characteristic of American voting behavior is the tendency to reelect not only House but also Senate incumbents. Figures supplied by Lewis Froman, Jr., suggest similar 85%

success rates for both houses.¹⁰ Senate incumbents' average performance at the polls, measured by percentage of two-party vote, is stronger in both parties compared to victors and nonincumbents. And comparing election-by-election, Senator and Governor in simultaneous contests in these 34 states for the past two decades, state incumbents win a considerably higher percentage of their contested races (80% compared to 64%),¹¹ and as Table 2 shows, Senate in-

¹⁰ Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *The Congressional Process* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 170. Data on House incumbents, see Jones, *Every Second Year*, pp. 63-68.

Such a similarity may surprise some who hold to the traditional view that the Senate—representing whole states rather than small homogeneous districts—is a much more electorally competitive body. One explanation may be that the incidence of electoral mortality commonly cited for the Senate to show its comparative "competitiveness" are drawn from a very few large urban states marked by highly competitive, active parties. Incumbent success rate for New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio is substantially lower than the overall rate. Of 11 Senate contests in those states, incumbents won 12 of 19 or 63%—still a definite edge, but not as strong performance as the overall pattern. In these are only 6 of 50 states. The general situation for Senate incumbents is one of electoral safety.

¹¹ The percentages are based on the 167 simultaneous contests between 1948 and 1966 in 14 states sufficiently competitive to have elected at least one Senator or Governor from both parties. The turnout differential between Senate and gubernatorial contests, by state for each section, is found to be virtually nil, supporting the assumption that the election results are produced by substantially the same electorate.

The Senate incumbency advantage is not merely a "second-term" advantage, as it might be thought, since after two full terms or 12 years of Sen-

bents (but not Senate nonincumbents) tend to lead their gubernatorial running mates, whether incumbent or not.

TABLE 2. EFFECT OF INCUMBENCY ON VOTE LEADER: SENATE AND GUBERNATORIAL RACES COMPARED^a

Incumbency	Total Simultaneous Contests	Number of Contests Senator Leads	Number of Contests Governor Leads
Incumbent Senator	27	17	10
Incumbent Governor			
Incumbent Senator	38	30	8
Nonincumbent Governor			
Nonincumbent Senator	13	3	10
Incumbent Governor			
Nonincumbent Senator	29	15	14
Nonincumbent Governor			
Total	107	65	42

^a Based on the 107 simultaneous contests, 1948-1966, where the same party won both Senate and gubernatorial contests. One contest (Wisconsin, 1960) was excluded, with no percentage difference between the candidates.

With this electoral advantage enjoyed by Senate incumbents of both parties, can incumbency help explain the sharp fluctuations in Senate voting? Dividing the Senate deviations reported above into incumbent and nonincumbent elections, one finds a statistically significant relationship between incumbency and strong versus moderate deviations from the base party vote, with this relationship holding for both presidential-year and off-year elections.¹² The shape of the two distributions is reversed with Senate nonincumbent contests distributed similarly to the gubernatorial results presented earlier and Senate incumbent contests considerably more dispersed and similar to the presidential voting

service, the advanced age of incumbents compared to more youthful opponents might depress their success rate. But the data show no decline in success rate for third- or fourth-term tries. Based on all Senate contests in the period in the 34 states, incumbents trying for a second term won 77%; for a third term, 78%; and for a fourth term (37 tried), 81%.

¹² As reported in the text, $\chi^2 = 7.9$; significant at .01, 1df. For presidential years, $\chi^2 = 7.31$, corrected for continuity, significant at .05, 1df; for off-years, $\chi^2 = 4.10$, significant at .05, 1df.

For this study, an incumbent is defined as any Senator *in office* at the time of the election. Thus the category would include some small number of Senators previously appointed and not previously elected.

distribution. (The comparative data for governors indicates no similar effect for incumbency in explaining deviations in gubernatorial voting).

	Strong Democratic	Moderate	Strong Republican
Senate Elections			
Incumbents (n=95)	37%	31%	33%
Nonincumbents (n=45)	22%	53%	25%
Gubernatorial Elections			
Incumbents (n=32)	28%	47%	25%
Nonincumbents (n=65)	23%	52%	25%

Such a clear difference between the two kinds of Senate contests supports the hypothesis that Senate incumbency can help explain the sharp fluctuation found in Senate voting. To illustrate from the New Jersey case cited above, in an election with no incumbent victory, the state held close to the Democratic base party vote; twice when Republican incumbents won, it shifted sharply below (-5.5 and -11.7); and with a Democratic incumbent victory, shifted sharply above (+13.2).

Presidential Vote Deviations

It is also possible that the widely noted "pulling power" of the presidential vote exerts an additional impact on Senate outcomes in presidential election years, producing strong performances for Senate candidates in states where the affiliated presidential candidate also ran strongly, and less strong Senate performances where the affiliated presidential candidate ran only moderately well or poorly. If such a relationship exists, it would be marginal at most, since sharp deviations in Senate voting were found as frequently in off-years as in presidential-election years.

Relating the presidential voting deviation from the base party vote in all presidential-year elections by states to the deviation for affiliated Senate candidates yields a strong positive relationship ($r = .70$) which has been summarized in Table 3. The stronger the presidential candidate ran in a state, the stronger the affiliated Senate candidate ran, as measured against the state's base party vote. The implications of this point in relation to earlier research should be noted. Past studies by Key, Cummings, and others have documented the close relationship between presidential and congressional voting, but it was never possible to control for the underlying partisan division in a state or district to observe the *separate* impact of presidential voting on congressional races. This investigation corroborates the earlier studies by pointing to a

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATE VOTING MEASURED BY DEVIATIONS FROM THE DEMOCRATIC BASE PARTY VOTE

Presidential Vote Deviation ^a (in percentage points)	Num- ber of Con- tests	Senate Vote: Mean Deviation from BPV
Extremely Strong Democratic ($\geq +15.0$)	14	+16.0
Strong Democratic (+14.9 to +10.0)	8	+12.4
Moderate (+9.9 to +5.0)	7	+ 5.1
Moderate (+4.9 to 0)	16	+ 6.0
Strong Republican (-1 to -4.9)	13	+ 3.2
Extremely Strong Republican (≥ -5.0)	12	- 2.6

^a The mean deviation for the presidential vote is +4.7; standard deviation, 19.0. As reported earlier, the distributions for presidential and Senate voting are quite similar.

strong relationship between presidential voting over and above the effect produced by stable party loyalties.

The explanatory power of these two variables on Senate fluctuations can be summarized more generally. Correlation analysis—a mode of statistical analysis suited to the exploratory nature of the inquiry—indicates for presidential-year elections a strong relationship ($r = .60$) between Senate Democratic incumbency, no incumbency, and Republican incumbency and deviations in the Senate vote. Combining both variables, the multiple correlation coefficient $R = .81$ indicates that 66% of the variation in the Senate vote over and above the base party vote can be statistically explained by these two variables.¹³ For all elections—presidential-year and off-year—incumbency is strongly related to deviations in Senate voting ($r = .67$) and presidential-vote deviations register an independent though less strong relationship ($r = .40$). A multiple R of .80 indicates that of all the Senate voting fluctua-

¹³ Incumbency was quantified by assigning a "3" to Democratic incumbent victories, a "2" to non-incumbent victories, and a "1" to Republican incumbent victories. The partials for incumbency and Senate deviations controlling for presidential-vote deviations are .42 and for presidential-vote deviations and Senate deviations controlling for incumbency, .58.

tion exhibited in the ten-year time span, 64% of this fluctuation can be statistically explained by these two nonidiosyncratic variables.¹⁴ Of course some considerable variation remains unexplained and this may well be an area for investigation of regional, demographic, or campaign-based influences.¹⁵

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The findings indicate that one cannot take the simple datum of fluctuations in vote as a measure of electoral response to idiosyncratic or campaign-based factors—the "candidates and issues" of particular campaigns and election years. Senate incumbency appears to be a stable factor affecting outcomes regardless of the year or the particular candidate involved; and a similar effect exists for the impact of presidential voting in Senate elections, although this vote may itself vary with presidential-election short-term forces. And so only by first isolating the fluctuations which cannot be explained by incumbency and the impact of the presidential vote could one begin to investigate the ways and the conditions under which candidates and issues affect congressional contests. Judging by the present findings, it is possible that some large proportion of Stokes' "district" component registers the impact of House incumbency rather than the idiosyncratic effects of candidates and issues.

The Senate incumbency advantage has wider implications for legislative behavior research. The explanation—in voter attitude or information—for this electoral advantage is not yet known. It may simply be that an incumbent is more widely known than his opponent—due to the publicity available as a member of the Senate, the franking privilege, etc.—and that with

¹⁴ In order to conduct correlation analyses for all elections, "presidential-vote deviations" for the off-years was quantified as the mean presidential vote deviation for presidential years (+4.7) rather than 0, which would have indicated a pro-Republican deviation. Thus a +4.7 deviation for off-year elections should indicate neither a pro-Republican nor pro-Democratic pull of the presidential vote operating on the Senate election results. The partial for presidential vote and Senate vote deviation controlling for incumbency is .35.

¹⁵ All 34 states were somewhat competitive by definition during the time period, but a check was carried out by ordering the states from high to low Democratic base party vote (thus in order of increasing two-party competition) following the Weber-Munger scheme, with no relationship observable between this ordering and the amount of deviation.

generally low levels of voter interest and information about Congress, voters will tend to vote for the more familiar (less unfamiliar) name. Or it may be, as Joseph Schlesinger suggests, that Senators accumulate electoral support with increasing years of service, in contrast to Governors who accumulate grievances,¹⁶ an interesting hypothesis of difference between legislators and executives. The claim to "experience," the promise of the advantages of seniority, the remembrance of past favors received, may contribute to the accumulation of voter support. It should be noted that these alternative explanations presuppose different levels of voter interest and information. The Schlesinger explanation points toward voter awareness of Senator X and his senatorial activity whereas the first explanation presupposes no understanding of the Senate or of the advantages of seniority but simply points toward either the recognition of a less unfamiliar name or of the fact that X is a "Senator." Since this incumbent advantage holds on a nationwide basis, more intensive research on the linkage between voter interest and incumbency would seem possible through existing survey facilities and well worth pursuing. To the extent a Senate or House incumbent is reelected mainly

by virtue of his incumbency and not by his behavior in Congress or his constituency relationships or the attributes of a particular congressional campaign, then, these latter factors—stressed in journalistic analysis of congressional elections—are considerably reduced in importance.

Further, the contrast between Senate and gubernatorial results raises a key theoretical point—that voter behavior varies with the office contested. Incumbency is a key variable for understanding Senate and House elections, but preliminary analysis suggests less explanatory power as applied to contests for Governor. Incumbent governors enjoy a considerably lower success rate than incumbent senators. And incumbency, which helps explain deviations in Senate voting, does not hold similarly for gubernatorial contests. The presidential vote similarly may have a varying impact by office. Recent survey studies suggest a stronger relationship between presidential-congressional contests compared to national (presidential)-state contests. These two points in turn suggest that party loyalty itself may vary in salience as a cue-giver for electoral choice depending on the office contested. Continuing studies of subpresidential elections should provide evidence for assessing the impact of office on election results. And with the development of a measure of base party vote by states which can facilitate aggregate data analysis such studies would now seem possible.

¹⁶ Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 68, 69.

COMMUNITY STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION: THE CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING*

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Innovation can be defined as "... the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, products, or services."¹ We mean here an activity, process, service, or idea that is new to an American city. We do not restrict it to mean only the first appearance ever of something new (i.e., an invention) or only the first use by one among a set of social actors.² We are concerned neither with the diffusion of innovation nor with internal stages in the adoption process, but rather with the characteristics of cities that have successfully implemented innovations in federally financed public housing. We focus on three aspects of community innovation: (1) the *presence or absence* of a federally

financed public housing program in the city; (2) the *speed* of innovation of such a program; and (3) the level of *output* or performance of the innovation activity.

Most of the studies of innovation have used as units of analysis either individuals or organizations, and little attention has been given to innovation in community systems, although community systems are continually introducing new ideas, activities, processes, and services. For example, the form of government may be changed from a mayor-council to a city-manager type. In fact, two studies of such innovations were carried out prior to World War II, but these were primarily concerned with describing the rate of diffusion of this social invention among American cities, not with characteristics of innovative cities.³ The addition of a new planning department to the city administration or a decision to fluoridate its water system are community innovations as we have defined the term.⁴ But innovations are not limited to actions of city government, although these may be the most frequently observed types of innovations. A Chamber of Commerce may innovate by creating an economic development agency, or a community may enter the "War on Poverty," neither of which necessarily involves the formal machinery of municipal government, at least not at the outset.

We are interested not only in the incidence of innovations, but also in the speed of the innovation. For example, among communities that have instituted planning departments, there may be significant variation in the speed with which the innovation took place. The community attributes associated with the incidence of an innovation may be quite different from those that account for the speed with which it is adopted.

Still a third aspect of community innovation is the level of output or performance of the innovative activity. Some community innovations involve repetitious and cumulative activity. Af-

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¹ Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 10 (June, 1965), p. 2. Also see Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969); Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," this REVIEW, 63 (March, 1969), 111-126; and Jack Walker, "The Adoption of Innovations by the American States," this REVIEW, 63 (September, 1969), 880-899.

² For reviews of much of the literature on innovation, see Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovation* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); and Elihu Katz, Martin L. Levin, and Herbert Hamilton, "Traditions of Research in the Diffusion of Innovation," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (April, 1963), 231-252.

³ F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change* (New York: Century, 1928); and Edgar C. McVoy, "Patterns of Diffusion in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 5 (April, 1940), 219-227.

⁴ Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald E. Rosenthal, *The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

ter successfully entering the public housing program, a community may implement a succession of discrete housing programs. After establishing a Community Chest agency, the amount of money contributed by citizens may vary from year to year. Not all community innovations involve this kind of performance or outputs. For example, changes in laws regulating zoning, traffic control, or liquor licenses may be innovations, but they need be neither cumulative nor repetitious. Thus the characteristics of level of output or performance of innovations in community systems are not common to all innovations.

Political scientists have shown concern for certain aspects of what we call community innovation, often using the term "policy outputs." Salisbury explicitly raises the question of the conditions under which policy innovation, as distinct from merely incremental additions, occurs.⁵ He suggests, as we do, that the several dimensions of adoption or nonadoption of an innovation, its speed, and the volume or quantity of outputs may be usefully distinguished and analyzed. Similarly, Lowi distinguishes three types of public policies—distributive, regulatory, and redistributive—which differ in the level of disaggregation of benefits.⁶ At one extreme are distributive policies in which groups come into no direct conflict with each other; there is "something for everyone," and there are multiple points of access to decision making. At the other extreme are redistributive policies which are essentially zero-sum policies. While he does not concern himself with innovation *per se*, what we have called innovation in public housing could be considered to be a distributive type of public policy.

Froman's distinction between areal and segmental policies may also be related to the incidence, speed, and output of innovation in a community.⁷ Those issues which directly affect only a few people, affect different people at different times, and are continuously or repeatedly raised (segmental policies) may be much easier to innovate than the opposite types of issues.

Several scholars have tentatively accepted the

⁵ Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 151-175.

⁶ Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (July, 1964), 677-715.

⁷ See Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (February, 1968), 94-108, for still another classification of public policies.

proposition that "governmental policy making is incremental in nature; sharply innovative decisions are rarely made,"⁸ basing this judgment on expenditure studies which find that the previous year's expenditures are the best predictor of this year's expenditures.⁹ While this may be granted, the fact that there are sharp variations from city to city (or state to state, in Sharkansky's study) means that aggregate expenditures might better be regarded as a mosaic of past innovations which have become embedded in continuing commitments to varying levels of outputs or performance. If we are interested in explaining the great differences in the substance of innovative policy making, we must take into account the historical processes which have led some political systems to innovate in the past and not others. Many innovations are not simply discrete decisions with no impact on the future, but policies with cumulative consequences.

Our study does not deal with all of these theoretical and methodological issues. We are primarily concerned with the underlying structural properties and community processes that explain why some communities moved quickly to enter the public housing program and have built a great number of housing units, while others were slow to innovate this program and still others have never participated at all in this federal program.

In this paper we link a study of public housing innovation to theories of a variety of studies on policy outputs—urban renewal, fluoridation, voting on bond issues, desegregation, and the like.¹⁰ This paper is one of a series by the authors on different federal programs.¹¹

⁸ Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of the Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 30 (May, 1968), 510-538. See also Salisbury, *op. cit.*

⁹ Ira Sharkansky, *Spending in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).

¹⁰ For general discussions of policy outputs and urban politics, see Jacob and Lipsky, *op. cit.*; Robert R. Alford, *Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); Michael Aiken, "The Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences," in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), *The Structure of Community Power: Readings* (New York: Random House, 1970).

¹¹ See Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (August, 1970); and Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and the

Some Theories of Community Innovation

Nowhere have the various explanations of community innovation been brought together. In part this lack of theoretical integration is due to diverse concepts, since what we have called innovation has been called community decision making, community decision outcomes, and policy outputs. The five theories explaining innovation are:

(1) *Political Culture*: Cities with majorities holding "public-regarding values" are hypothesized to be more innovative with respect to policies benefiting the community as a whole than cities dominated by groups with "private-regarding values."¹²

(2) *Concentration or Diffusion of Community Power*: There are three aspects to this argument: concentration of systemic power,¹³ diffusion of power through mass citizen participation,¹⁴ and centralization of elite power.¹⁵ In each case the hypothesis is the same, namely, the greater the concentration of power, the greater the degree of innovation. Conversely, the greater the diffusion of power, the lower the degree of innovation.

(3) *Centralization of Formal Political Struc-*

War on Poverty: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations," in Mattei Dogan (ed.), *Studies in Political Ecology* (Paris, 1970), for parallel data on different federal programs, and more extended theoretical and methodological interpretations. The model cities program will be the subject of a future paper.

¹² Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887; and James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, Communication to the Editor, this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 998-999.

¹³ Amos M. Hawley, "Community Power Structure and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January, 1963), 422-431.

¹⁴ Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision-Making," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (December, 1967), 970-984.

¹⁵ Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure and Decision-Making," in Terry N. Clark (ed.), *Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 91-126; and "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (August, 1968), 576-593.

ture: Cities with centralized administrative arrangements and a strong mayor, that is, cities with city manager or partisan mayor-council governmental structures are hypothesized to be more innovative.¹⁶

(4) *Community Differentiation and Continuity*: Older and larger cities have been hypothesized to be more bureaucratic and consequently less receptive to policy innovations, suggesting that younger and smaller cities should exhibit higher policy innovation.¹⁷

(5) *Community Integration*: Cities in which community integration breaks down or is extremely low have a lower probability of innovation or other collective actions. Consequently innovation should be highest in integrated communities.¹⁸

We have presented these five explanations separately because it is possible to conceive of them as five independent factors in the innovativeness, speed of innovation, and intensity of outputs in a community political system. One or more of these factors may be either spurious or intervening variables for the operation of another, more fundamental factor. We shall return to the logic of the interrelationships of these explanations later.

The indicators of the theoretical variables of interest to the various investigators have been quite diverse, overlapping, and sometimes used for quite different concepts. City-manager government, for example, has been used both as a direct measure of governmental centralization and as an indicator of "public-regarding" values. The educational level of the community has been used both as a measure of a propensity for high political participation and as a measure of need. This diversity in the use of the same empirical indicators is partly a result of the great "distance" which the data from available sources such as the U. S. Census and the *Municipal Year Book* are from the theoretical variables of greatest concern to most scholars.

¹⁶ Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*; see also J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), *City Politics and Public Policy* (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 267-292.

¹⁷ Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 4 (December, 1968), 141-165.

¹⁸ James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1957). Also see Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: A Case of a Fluoridation Referendum," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March 1963), 513-526.

Most of the data we shall use are no better, but we have the advantage of bringing together most of the different types of indicators used in the previous literature, rather than considering only two or three of them. But we have several measures in addition which, while they possess defects of their own, have the merit of being considerably closer to the theoretical variable to which they refer.

We turn now to a description of the various measures of innovation in public housing which we shall use in this paper, a brief discussion of sources of other data on community characteristics, and the methodology employed here.

I. DATA AND METHODS

The findings of this study are based on the universe of 646 incorporated urban places of size 25,000 or more in 1960 that were also in existence in 1930. Thirty cities which did not appear in the census volumes in 1930 have been excluded.

Participation in the federally financed housing programs, beginning with the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, is our indicator of community innovation. An understanding of this program requires some background in the history of public housing legislation in the United States.

*History of Public Housing in the United States*¹⁹

Public housing in the United States was a child of the Great Depression, with the exception of a small-scale housing program during World War I. The fact that "... millions of people had left the middle class for the subsistence level or worse ... created a tremendous pressure for government housing. ..."²⁰ But this pressure did not produce a program which fused slum clearance with adequate public housing, something which still does not exist. The Public Works Administration (PWA), created by the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, began to buy land, clear houses, and build public housing. Under this legislative mandate of the NIRA, the PWA constructed 21,000 units in 50 low-rent housing projects in 37 cities, and

the Resettlement Administration constructed another 15,000 units in a number of resettlement projects and "Greenbelt" towns. But the housing and other activities of the NIRA were stopped by a federal court decision in 1935 which held that eminent domain could not be used to clear slum property and to then "... construct buildings in a state for the purpose of selling or leasing them to private citizens for occupancy as homes." This decision was never appealed, possibly because "... the outlook for the New Deal programs before the Supreme Court looked dismal in 1935. ..."²¹

The next significant commitment to public housing by the federal government occurred on September 1, 1937, when the United States Housing Act (USHA), under Public Law 412, was approved. It was the purpose of this legislation

... to provide financial assistance to the States and political subdivisions thereof for the elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing conditions, for the eradication of slums, for the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, and for the reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of business activity. ...²²

Local housing authorities were responsible for the construction, ownership, and operation of these federally assisted low-rent housing programs. However, state enabling legislation authorizing and empowering these local public agencies had to be enacted in states not already having such legislation.²³ In this federal and local government partnership, the federal government made loans (not to exceed 90 per cent of the development costs) and provided annual subsidies for such projects. Local municipalities were required to pay the equivalent of 20 per cent of the federal contribution (although their contribution was often in the form of a tax exemption). In 1940, Public Law 671 applied the provisions of the USHA to defense housing. By 1948, a total of 189,000 low-rent housing units had been built in the United States, 168,000 of

¹⁹ Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

²⁰ Much of the information in this section has been abstracted from "The Public Housing Program," Section 7, Part I, *Local Housing Authority Management Handbook*, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1963.

²¹ Lawrence M. Friedman, *Government and Slum Housing* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), p. 100. This book reviews the entire history of these programs. See also *Journal of Housing* for many details on the administration of the programs.

²² "United States Housing Act of 1937," *Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development* (as revised through January 15, 1968), Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 177.

²³ It is, and has been, possible for the tribal housing authorities on Indian reservations located in states not having state enabling legislation to develop low-rent housing projects.

these having been built under USHA of 1937.

Perhaps the most significant and far-reaching commitment to public housing by the federal government occurred with the Housing Act of 1949 (Public Law 171) which was signed into law by President Truman on July 15, 1949. The preamble of this legislation follows.

The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, thus contributing to the development and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation.²⁴

Numerous amendments to this legislation have been made in the ensuing years, although the structure of the program remains basically unaltered. The federal government's major role has been in the creation of a revolving loan fund to aid local housing authorities in the construction and development of low-rent housing projects and the provision of grants which are limited to the amounts and periods necessary (annual contributions) in order to assure the integrity of the low-rent nature of these housing programs.

In addition to having a local housing authority (which of course assumes that the state in which the city is located has passed appropriate enabling legislation), the local housing authority must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the federal government that there is a need for such low-rent housing not currently being met by private enterprise, must obtain the approval from the local governing body of its application for a preliminary loan from the federal government,²⁵ and must sign a formal contract with the local

governing body which grants a tax-exempt status to the low-rent housing project.

There are a number of distinguishable steps that a local community goes through in the "conventional bid method" of participation in the low-rent housing program as established by the United States Housing Act of 1937. Some of the major steps in this method are as follows: (1) the application for a program reservation (which of course can be made only by a local housing authority), (2) the approval by the federal government of the application for a program reservation, (3) the execution of a preliminary loan contract for surveys and planning (which requires the approval of the local governing body but which is an optional step), (4) the execution of the annual contributions contract between the local housing authority and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (which can be signed only after the local housing authority and the local governing body have signed a cooperation agreement granting tax-exempt status to the project and, as of 1956, only if the community has a workable program outlining plans for the eradication of slums), (5) site acquisition, (6) the advertising, opening, and awarding of construction contracts, (7) the start of construction, (8) the final completion of construction, and (9) the full availability and occupancy of the housing project. Some other programs under USHA 1937 such as the "flexible formula" for acquisitions and the leasing programs do not require the negotiation of each of these stages, however. Other programs, such as the "turnkey" program, were administratively implemented after 1965, based on already existing powers.

There have been a number of important amendments and additions to the provisions of the Housing Act of 1949 and the basic authorization in USHA 1937. For example, the 1954 amendments made it mandatory that the local housing authority make payments to the local governing body in lieu of taxes, usually at the rate of ten per cent of shelter rents. The amendments of 1956 were such that the annual contributions contract could not be executed without the local governing body having a workable pro-

²⁴ "National Policy and Purpose: Excerpt from the Housing Act of 1949," *Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

²⁵ It is not required that all housing authorities participating in the programs as authorized and amended under the Housing Act of 1949 obtain a preliminary loan for surveys and planning. Some housing authorities have sufficient resources to do such surveys and planning on their own. In addition, the leasing program that was established by the 1965 amendments requires neither a preliminary loan, cooperation agreement, tax exemption, nor workable program. These, however, do not apply

to leasing or privately owned accommodations. For three of the 646 communities in this study, the first program the community developed was a leasing program. Two (Amsterdam, New York, and Lansing, Michigan) had previously executed a preliminary loan with the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the third, Vallejo, California, had not, however. The procedure used for taking this into consideration is described below.

gram for the prevention and elimination of slums. The 1959 amendments also permitted low-income single persons aged 65 and older to become tenants of low-rent housing programs, changed the general age requirements to conform to the Social Security Act, and granted greater control to the local housing authority for establishing income limits and rents. The 1961 amendments were concerned to a great extent with provisions for low-rent housing for the elderly. The 1964 amendments eliminated the requirement (established in the Housing Act of 1937) that the local contribution should be at least 20 per cent of the amount of the federal contribution. Among other things, the 1965 amendments established a new program, the leasing program, which permits the local housing authority to lease low-rent housing units from private owners. The turnkey program, also developed in 1965 (but based on the prior legislation), permits local housing authorities to purchase low-rent housing units from a private developer or builder after construction or rehabilitation is completed. On December 24, 1969, Public Law 91-152, Section 217, did away with the "workable program" requirement previously described.

A number of states have their own public housing programs. It is possible that some findings might be accounted for by the presence of large state housing programs in cities which have thus not had the incentive to seek federal funds. However, most of the states with state public housing programs are also those states containing cities with a higher level of federal funding for housing: New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and others. It may be that the same factors which are conducive to a city undertaking housing programs also further state programs, but, in any case, it cannot be argued that state housing compensates for or obviates federally supported housing.

It is important to note that federal legislation did *not* require the establishment of new governments or new agencies to implement the housing programs, although in many cases a special housing authority was created. "While this has frequently been the end result of the federal legislation, the reasons for it . . . are not reflective of federal 'coercion' or even of strictly federal influences."²⁶ Thus, the "local organizational response" is not simply a function of federal requirements, but rather something influenced in major respects by local conditions. Also, the

state enabling legislation does not define the conditions under which communities shall or shall not act. We shall assume, therefore, that within fairly well-defined limits set by the state and federal statutes and administrative rulings, local communities are free to apply or not apply for federal housing funds. We also assume that the various modifications of the original legislation did not significantly alter the differential incentive from city to city to obtain these funds.

Indicators of Community Innovation and Other Variables

The incidence of innovation we measure by whether or not a community has participated in any public housing program since 1933, i.e., the NIRA of 1933 or the USHA of 1937 and amendments to it, including the Housing Act of 1949. Of the 646 cities included in this study (30 cities that did not exist in 1930 were excluded), 393 (or 61 per cent) had innovated a federal public housing project. Only 33 cities had first entered a public housing program under NIRA while an additional 151 cities first began a federal public housing project under the USHA of 1937, but prior to the Housing Act of 1949. Finally, 209 additional cities began a public housing project for the first time between 1949 and June 30, 1966, the cutoff date of this study. There are, therefore, 253 cities in our study which had not initiated a public housing project as of June 30, 1966.

The speed of innovation is measured by the number of years after 1933 before a community began construction on its first housing project. The degree of skewness of the distribution toward the lower end was not sufficient to warrant a transformation of this scale.

Since a local community could not participate in a federal public housing program unless the state in which it is located had first enacted appropriate enabling legislation, there is some question of whether or not this measure reflects local initiative alone. Ohio was the only state that had appropriate enabling legislation for public housing in 1933. In 1934, seven additional states enacted such legislation, and the following year ten more followed. By the end of 1937, 30 states had such laws on their books, and by 1940, the total was 39. But the remaining 11 states were slow to enact such legislation. As of 1949, only five additional states had enacted this enabling legislation, bringing the total to 44. All states with exception of Utah and Wyoming had such legislation as of June 30, 1966, but as the reader has observed, there was a great disparity in dates at which communities could legally have entered the federal programs in public housing.

²⁶ Daniel J. Elazar, "'Fragmentation' and Local Organizational Response to Federal-City Programs," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 4 (June, 1967), 32.

TABLE 1. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG INDICATORS OF COMMUNITY INNOVATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING

	Presence of Innovation	Speed of Innovation		Level of Output
	Presence of Innovation in Any Public Housing Pro- gram Since 1933	Number of Years After 1933 Before Construction Began on the First Housing Project	Number of Years It Took After State Enabling Legislation was Present	Number of Public Housing Units Con- structed per 100,000 Population (Natural Logarithm)
Presence of innovation in any public housing program since 1933	X	-.73***	-.60***	.99***
Number of years after 1933 before construction began on the first housing project		X	.88***	-.77***
Number of years it took after state enabling legislation was present			X	-.64***
Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population (natural logarithm)				X

*** P < .001

Note: The number of cases is 646 except for the proportion of registrants voting, which is 411. The presence of participation in any public housing program and two of the political structure variables were treated as "dummy" (binary) variables for purposes of correlations and regression analyses. The natural logarithms of four highly skewed variables were used for correlation analysis, in order to produce an approximately normal distribution.

In an attempt to account for this, a second speed of innovation measure was constructed: the number of years it took a community to begin construction in its first public housing project *after state enabling legislation was enacted*. This distribution was also skewed toward the lower end of the scale, but again a transformation was not called for.

The *level of output* of this type of community innovation is the number of low-rent public housing units constructed since 1933 per 100,000 population. This variable was transformed into its natural logarithm, because of its degree of skewness.

The relationships among these various indicators of community innovation are shown in Table 1, and, as shown there, they are quite high.

The various measures of community structure were taken from the *Municipal Year Books* of 1963 and 1964, the 1950 Census of Housing, the 1960 Census of Housing, and the 1967 *County and City Data Book*. The information for coding the various innovation measures described below was taken from Report S-11A, *Consolidated Development Directory*, Statistical Branch, Housing Assistance Administration, De-

partment of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1967, and from information provided by the Office of Counsel, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.

We employ correlation coefficients to express relationships among variables and statistical tests of significance to establish the strength of association. Since the cities that are included in this study constitute the population of all the incorporated urban places of size 25,000 or more that were in existence in 1930, one may question the appropriateness of using statistical tests of significance. We use statistical tests of significance for two reasons. First, even given that we have exhausted all units in the universe, statistical tests are still appropriate since there is the possibility that the observations here were produced by errors of measurement. Second, in the absence of any other systematic criterion to establish the strength of a relationship, statistical tests of significance can be used.²⁷

²⁷ See David Gold, "Statistical Tests and Substantive Significance," *American Sociologist*, 1

TABLE 2. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF INNOVATION IN LOW-RENT PUBLIC HOUSING AND VARIOUS MEASURES OF COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

Theoretical Categories and Empirical Indicators	Presence of Innovation	Speed of Innovation		Level of Output
	Presence of Innovation in Any Public Housing Program Since 1933	Number of Years After 1933 Before Construction Began on the First Housing Project	Number of Years it Took After State Enabling Legislation Was Present	Number of Public Housing Units Constructed per 100,000 Population (Natural Logarithm)
<i>Political Culture</i>				
Per cent of native population of foreign or mixed parentage ^a	-.05	.12**	.17***	-.08*
Per cent of elementary school children in private schools ^a	-.04	.06	.12**	-.05
Median family income ^a	-.43***	.43***	.44***	-.47***
Per cent voting democratic, 1964 ^b	.21***	-.20***	-.13**	.22***
<i>Concentration and Diffusion of Community Power</i>				
MPO ratio ^a	-.28***	.22***	.16***	-.30***
Per cent of adult population with four years of high school education ^a	-.47***	.43***	.31***	-.51***
Per cent of registrants voting ^d	.17***	-.12*	-.06	.17***
<i>Political Structure</i>				
Presence of a city-manager form of government ^c	-.18***	.14***	.11**	-.18***
Presence of nonpartisan elections ^c	-.18***	.10*	.03	-.18***
Per cent of city council elected at large ^c	-.03	-.03	-.05	-.01
Number of members of the city council ^c	.11**	-.09*	-.01	.09*
<i>Community Differentiation and Continuity</i>				
Age of the city (census year city reached 10,000 population) ^a	-.38***	.43***	.39***	-.40***
Size of the city (natural logarithm)	.30***	-.46***	-.44***	.30***

* $P < .05$ ** $P < .01$ *** $P < .001$ ^a U. S. Census of Population, 1960.^b *County and City Data Book*, 1967. The Democratic vote is the county presidential vote in 1964. The two cities for which data were not available (Washington, D. C., and New York) were assigned to the mean category.^c *The Municipal Year Book*, 1963 (International City Managers' Association, 1963). Four or five cities with missing data on one or more of the measures of political structure were assigned to the mean category. The categories for the number of members of the city council were collapsed as follows: 3-4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-50. Means for this table were based on the full distribution.^d Data are from a survey taken by Eugene C. Lee, Director, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California at Berkeley.

TABLE 2.—(Continued)

Theoretical Categories and Empirical Indicators	Presence of Innovation	Speed of Innovation		Level of Output
	Presence of Innovation in Any Public Housing Program Since 1933	Number of Years After 1933 Before Construction Began on the First Housing Project	Number of Years it Took After State Enabling Legislation Was Present	Number of Public Housing Units Constructed per 100,000 Population (Natural Logarithm)
<i>Community Integration</i>				
Per cent unemployed ^a	.34***	-.31***	-.25***	.36***
Per cent migrant ^a	-.23***	.20***	.08*	-.24***
<i>Poverty</i>				
Per cent of housing dilapidated, 1950 ^a	.31***	-.36***	-.34***	.36***
Per cent of families with less than \$3,000 income per year, 1959 ^a	.40***	-.46***	-.44***	.45***
Per cent adults with less than five years education (natural logarithm)	.52***	-.52***	-.40***	.55***
Per cent 14-17 year olds in school ^a	-.40***	.41***	.36***	-.44***
Per cent of population that is non-white (natural logarithm)	.43***	-.49***	-.44***	.48***

We include in our analysis cities which have innovated and those which have not, because we are concerned with the conditions under which innovations take place, not primarily with the conditions affecting the intensity and scope of outputs after innovation has occurred. If those cities without any federally financed housing are excluded, the relationships found are attenuated, but remain in the same direction in almost all cases. The magnitudes of the correlations for the speed of innovation remain most similar to the original ones.

II. FINDINGS

The data testing the various theories of community decision making or policy outputs as they are related to community innovation in public housing are found in Table 2. Although there is some overlap in the indicators of the different theoretical variables, a given indicator

(February, 1969), 42-46; and Robert F. Winch and Donald T. Campbell, "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance," *American Sociologist*, 4 (May, 1969), 140-143. For a recent dissenting view, see Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, "Significance Tests Reconsidered," *American Sociologist*, 4 (May, 1969), 131-139.

has been classified under only one theoretical concept, usually the first time it is discussed.

First, *political culture*: Voters holding "public-regarding values" are hypothesized by Banfield and Wilson to be more supportive of policies benefiting the community as a whole than voters with "private-regarding values." Banfield and Wilson used voting behavior in local bond and other expenditure referenda in several American cities as indicators of policy choices, and they used ethnicity, Protestantism, and income level as measures of groups likely to hold public- or private-regarding values. They predicted that public-regarding voters would be more likely to favor metropolitan reorganization, "reform" governmental structures, regional planning, and fluoridation.²³ It should be noted that their work focused on comparisons of voting behavior differences in wards within several American cities. In a supposed testing of their hypotheses, Wolfinger and Field compared policy outcomes for issues such as urban renewal in larger American cities, and they strongly criticized, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, the work of

²³ Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-46; and Wilson and Banfield, *op. cit.*

Banfield and Wilson, although Wilson has maintained that the thesis developed and tested by Wolfinger and Field was not theirs.²⁹ In spite of the question of authorship of the Wolfinger and Field statement about political ethos and policy outcomes in cities, it remains an important and provocative hypothesis which merits testing with other kinds of public policies and with additional, and perhaps better, measures of the independent variable. Our assumption is that the more voters with characteristics presumably predisposing them to hold public-regarding values, the more likely a city should be to make public-regarding decisions.

Therefore, cities having a low proportion of foreign stock, a small proportion of Catholics (as measured by the proportion of elementary school children in private schools), and a high proportion of the population that is middle class (as measured by median family income) should be more influenced by public-regarding values, and, hence, should have higher levels of performance on policies which do not directly benefit the persons voting. Such cities should presumably have more federal public housing.

Democratic presidential voting in the county in 1964 can be utilized as an additional indicator of private-regarding values. Cities that are heavily Democratic are likely to have greater ethnicity ($r = .34$), have many Catholics ($r = .23$), and be heavily working class in terms of proportion blue collar ($r = .22$), but there is no relationship with median family income ($r = -.03$). Although one might debate the use of Democratic voting in this way, if this line of reasoning is accepted, then we should find that Democratic communities are less likely to have public housing.

In Table 2 are shown the 16 relationships between the four indicators of political culture and the four indicators of community innovativeness. The political culture hypothesis is weakly confirmed for the two indicators of ethnicity and religion since cities with few persons of foreign stock and few children in private schools were more likely to innovate public housing. However, these relationships either become insignificant or reverse when they are computed for cities within the North and South separately.³⁰ The original relationships are thus due to the

great differences between North and South in ethnicity and religious composition. In the case of the two remaining indicators of political culture, median income and Democratic vote, the findings are clearly in the opposite direction from the public-regardingness hypothesis. These relationships remain the same in both North and South, with only one exception. In the South, there is no relationship between the Democratic vote in the county and the second measure of speed. The political culture hypothesis is thus not supported.

Second, *concentration or diffusion of community power*: We refer here to three related explanations of community structure and consequences for the distribution of power: (1) the ecological or systemic theory which sees power as a property of dominant institutions, (2) a citizen participation theory which argues that structural features which increase mass participation will as a consequence diffuse power, and (3) an elite participation theory which argues that the smaller the number of elite participants and the more homogeneous their interests, the more concentrated the power structure. We can test all but the last theory with quantitative data parallel to those already presented. While they differ in the feature of community organization which they single out as the critical measure or cause of concentration of power, they share the general assumption that the fewer the actors, whether citizen or elite, or the fewer the number of managerial functions, the more concentrated the power. The further inference that diffused power arrangements lead to less innovation is not always explicitly stated, but we believe that it is a justified extension of the theories to be discussed.

In his study of urban renewal, Hawley argued an *ecological* or *systemic* theory that communities with a greater concentration of power will have a high probability of success in any collective action affecting the welfare of the whole.³¹ He postulated two types of power: (1) functional power which is required to execute functions and (2) derivative power which spills over into external relationships and regulates interactions between parts (units) of the system. In relatively routine issues, he suggested that power is exercised through established and well-worn channels. But for nonroutine decisions affecting the entire system (such as public housing), the way in which derivative power is distributed is critical. If derivative power is con-

²⁹ Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 306-326. Also see James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, Communication to the Editor, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Southern cities are those in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, and

Tennessee. The data are not presented because of limitation on space.

³¹ Hawley, *op. cit.*

centrated, he argues that the community should be able to act as a unit in almost any emergency; if power is widely dispersed, successful coordination leading to collective action is less assured. Hawley used participation in urban renewal programs as his measure of a collective community success, and he used the MPO ratio (the proportion of the employed civilian labor force that are managers, proprietors, or officials) as his measure of the degree of concentration of community power. He reasons that the higher the MPO ratio, the greater the dispersion of community power, and the less the successful implementation of urban renewal.

Table 2 would seem to confirm Hawley's hypothesis for the policy area of public housing. Cities with high MPO ratios are less likely to innovate in all respects than cities with low MPO ratios. This is also true for each of the four innovation measures when correlation coefficients are computed for northern and southern cities separately. The relationships in the South are somewhat attenuated, but remain statistically significant.

Other data drawn from case studies question this interpretation of the MPO ratio, however. Aiken classified 31 case studies of community power (which are among the 646 cities studied here) on a four-point scale of concentration of power ranging from "pyramidal" to "dispersed power" arrangements using qualitative judgments of the number of groups involved in major issues in the community as the measure of degree of dispersion of power.³² The results show, first, that communities with diffused power (many power groups) have somewhat higher levels of innovation and outputs, and that cities having high MPO ratios have higher concentrations of power (i.e., fewer power groups) than cities with low MPO ratios.

According to Hawley's own data, cities having low MPO ratios are more likely to have the following characteristics: mayor-council form of government, a manufacturing labor force and large manufacturing plants, low educational achievements, and low median income.³³ A persuasive argument can be made that attributes such as these are more likely to be characteristics of cities having diffused power arrangements, thus raising more questions about Hawley's interpretation of this measure.

Thus, our empirical findings are that cities with high MPO ratios have less public housing, as an extrapolation of Hawley's reasoning would suggest, but few active power centers if

the results from the 31 case studies are correct. But it should be remembered that concentration of power for Hawley referred to the distribution of systemic power while the meaning here refers to elite participation.³⁴ It is still logically possible that systemic power could be highly dispersed, yet there could be few actors or power centers active in such cities. Still, this inconsistency does raise important questions about the meaning of the concept of concentration of power and about the ways in which such apparently contradictory findings might be reconciled.

The second theory associated with the hypothesis that concentration of community power leads to greater innovation refers mainly to *citizen participation*. It has been argued by Crain and Rosenthal that the higher the level of education in a community, the higher the political participation, which in turn leads to higher conflict, producing stalemate and low innovation.³⁵ Thus, the hypothesis links a high level of educational attainment with a low degree of community innovation and output, and posits an intervening process of heightened political participation and consequent community conflict and blockage. The hypothesized relationship between the per cent of adults with a high school education and the four measures of innovation gives strong support to this hypothesis (see Table 2). These correlations are approximately the same when they are separately computed within the North and the South.

While the empirical relationship between these variables is as they predicted, some questions can be raised about the meaning of this educational variable and the intervening process. Does a high level of educational attainment in a community reflect the presence of a politically informed and active middle class? Or does it reflect merely the absence of a poor and needier population, or at least a sufficiently small one?

³² This same point can be made with respect to urban renewal decisions, as we have in "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," *op. cit.*

³³ Crain and Rosenthal, *op. cit.* Their argument is more complex than this, however. For decisions about urban renewal and school desegregation, they found a negative relationship between level of education and success. However, they found a curvilinear relationship between educational level and success in an issue such as fluoridation. Since the public housing decision is most comparable to urban renewal, we have discussed their theory only as it applies to this kind of decision. We have not included their discussion of a curvilinear relationship between educational level and policy outcomes in which cities with the very highest educational

³² Aiken, *op. cit.*

³³ Hawley, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

that has few political resources? The correlation coefficient between the proportion of adults with four years of high school or more and the upper extremes on the education and income distribution—per cent of adults who have completed college and per cent of families with incomes of \$10,000 or more per year—are .70 and .69 respectively. The correlation coefficients between the proportion of adults with four years of high school or more and the lower extremes on the education and income distributions—per cent of adults who have completed less than five years of education and per cent of families with incomes of less than \$3,000 per year—are -.75 and -.44 respectively. The interpretation of educational level depends to a great extent on which end of the stratification scale one wants to emphasize, whether the level of poverty and poorly educated citizens or the presence of an articulate and active middle class.

In the analysis of the 31 case studies of community power it was found that cities with high educational levels had more concentrated power arrangements (i.e., fewer power groups) than those with low educational levels, although the relationship was not a strong one.³⁶ Similarly, Clark found a positive relationship between the median educational level and the degree of centralization of power (i.e., fewer elites participated in decisions about urban renewal, the election of the mayor, air pollution, and the anti-poverty program in high-education cities).³⁷ Cities with high educational levels evidently have less elite participation, although it is still possible that such cities have greater citizen participation, as Crain and Rosenthal argue. They, like we, lack direct data on the key intervening variable of participation, and, unfortunately, such data do not exist for a large sample of cities. If voting turnout can be regarded as a crude indicator, a recent study has shown that better-educated cities have *lower* voting turnout than less well educated cities.³⁸ We find, as shown in Table 2, that among the 411 cities in our study for which data on voting turnout are available, *higher* voting turnout is associated with greater innovation in public housing. While the relationships are small, it should be noted that they re-

main approximately the same when correlation coefficients are computed within northern and southern cities, despite considerable differences between the regions on voting turnout.

The same questions that can be posed about the meaning of this education variable can also be posed about the meaning of the MPO ratio because of the extremely high relationship between per cent of adults with four years of high school and the MPO ratio ($r = .65$). Both of these are also strongly related to the per cent white collar ($r = .88$ and $.77$, respectively), although it should be noted that MPO is one component of the white-collar variable. These can be regarded as measures of the degree of middle-class domination of a city, and in each case we find that middle-class cities have more centralized power arrangements (i.e., fewer active power groups and actors) and less public housing, but how do we account for this? If low centralization implies high *citizen* participation (as measured by voting turnout) or dispersed systemic power (as measured by the MPO ratio), then we find that there is less public housing in decentralized cities. If low centralization implies *elite* participation, then we find that there is less public housing in centralized cities. There appears to be an inconsistency here for which there is no readily available explanation. Our comments are not intended to imply that the well-reasoned theories of Hawley and Crain and Rosenthal are incorrect. We simply do not have the evidence to demonstrate that, and it is logically possible that all explanations are correct. Still, it is important to note the different usages of the concept concentration or centralization of power and to distinguish carefully among them. There are a sufficient number of questions about both the Hawley and Crain and Rosenthal hypotheses to argue that they constitute incomplete and less promising theoretical explanations, even though our zero-order correlation coefficients are consistent with their hypotheses. We have moved toward a different type of explanation which is discussed later in this paper.

These remarks have not discussed in sufficient detail the third aspect of the concentration of power thesis: *elite participation*. The hypothesis here is that the fewer the number of influential persons in a community (and by definition the more concentrated power is in the political system), the easier it is to innovate. Although the community power literature has not dealt directly and systematically with innovation or policy outputs, the implied hypothesis by defenders of *both* the pluralist and the reputational schools is that the more centralized the political system, the greater its capacity to act. While

levels have more success than cities with intermediate educational levels.

³⁶ Aiken, *op. cit.*

³⁷ Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," *op. cit.*

³⁸ Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," this REVIEW, 62 (September, 1963), 796-813.

Hunter³⁹ stressed the role of a few heads of large corporations and banks as the source of coordinating leadership, and Dahl⁴⁰ stressed the role of a few political and public leaders as the moving force within an "executive-centered order"—without systematic data and without presenting this general hypothesis except indirectly—both assume that a centralized community system will be more able to make decisions and to make them faster.

Dahl, for example, concludes from his study of urban renewal in New Haven that "during Lee's tenure as mayor, control over urban redevelopment became much more highly centralized in the hands of the mayor and his redevelopment team than it had been in the previous administration." This "new redevelopment coalition . . . enabled him and his collaborators in redevelopment to assume influence over local policies on redevelopment and renewal."⁴¹ And Hunter concludes that "policy decision tends to center in the actions of a relatively few men in the community."⁴² Hunter's study was neither comparative nor historical, but the clear implication of his work is that no major innovation in Atlanta could be carried out without the direct involvement of the relatively few men who constituted the power structure.

We must not make too much of the relevance of the community power literature for our present argument. Both Hunter and Dahl stress the limitations on possible actions created by existing commitments to institutional arrangements, divisions of powers, and allocation of resources. But they, as well as we, essentially restricted their discussion of community decisions to those which are well within the range of the politically feasible at any given time. Federal programs such as public housing challenge few established economic or political interests, if any, and thus do not constitute a radical innovation.

Both Hunter's and Dahl's studies focused upon single cities. Few systematic comparative studies have been done of the concentration of community power which examined the number of actors in different issues and the consequences for community innovation. Clark's study of 51 cities found that the greater the decentralization of community power as measured by the number of persons involved in decision making in

four issues (urban renewal, air pollution, poverty programs, and the selection of the mayor), the greater the number of urban renewal dollars per capita secured from the federal government. Clark concluded that more decentralized communities had higher policy outputs and advanced the hypothesis that "fragile" decisions were more susceptible to blockage.⁴³ The point that is relevant here is that decentralization (i.e., few elites participating) was associated with higher outputs. And as we have already seen, Aiken's coding of 31 case studies of community power into four levels of centralization (i.e., number of groups participating) came to the same conclusion.⁴⁴

Third, *centralization of formal political structure*: This argument has two aspects, one based on centralization of formal power, the second related to the political culture argument. In the first case, the thesis in the literature is that the more centralized the formal political structure, the more innovative in policy making it should be. The indicators of centralization are ambiguous, however, since the usual conception of "reform" government is that its structural devices—the city-manager form, nonpartisan elections at-large elections, small city councils—were intended to centralize power in the hands of a small executive and a professional manager at the same time that potential power in the hands of citizen groups was fragmented and dispersed by removing the instruments of the political party and the ward organization. On the other hand, some have argued that strong political parties were the most effective device for centralizing power. But in either case, there was agreement that administrative or political centralization should lead to greater innovation.⁴⁵

The second aspect of political structure is related to the political culture argument, because it has been argued that reform political institutions are part of the array of policies favored by groups with public-regarding values, and presumably the instruments of such values should produce consequences similar to that of sheer demographic composition.

In most respects, the predictions of innovation which would be made by either the administrative centralization or political cultural interpreta-

³⁹ Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

⁴⁰ Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Power and Democracy in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

⁴¹ Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁴² Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

⁴³ Clark, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ Aiken, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ The most recent statement of this hypothesis occurs in a study of fluoridation by Crain, Kaiz and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, and one on poverty programs by Greenstone and Peterson, *op. cit.* The somewhat more complex argument of Crain, Kaiz, and Rosenthal will be discussed in detail below.

TABLE 3. INDICATORS OF COMMUNITY INNOVATION AND OUTPUT BY INDICATORS OF FORMAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

	(N = 78)	(N = 127)	(N = 41)	(N = 126)	(N = 274)	(N = 646)
	Com- mission	Partisan Mayor Council	Partisan Council- Manager	Non- partisan Mayor- Council	Non- partisan Council- Manager	All Cities
Presence of innovation in any public housing program since 1933	76%	73%	71%	61%	49%	60%
Speed of innovation: Number of years after 1933 before the city began construction on its first public housing project	19.2	21.1	24.2	23.6	24.9	23.2
Speed of innovation: Number of years it took after state enabling legislation was present	12.4	17.9	21.2	19.7	19.8	18.6
Level of output: Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population	1,080	751	684	645	520	668
Level of output: Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population (natural logarithm)	5.36	4.94	4.68	4.07	3.30	4.11

tation of differences of formal political structure would be the same. The prediction is ambiguous only in the case of the form of election. If nonpartisan elections are considered to reflect decentralization and high citizen participation, then, according to this line of reasoning, they should be associated with low innovation. But if they are regarded as instruments of groups with public-regarding values and as political mechanisms which reduce citizen participation, then nonpartisan elections should be associated with high innovation.

Table 2 displays the correlations between four aspects of the formal political structure of American cities and four measures of innovation in public housing. The centralization argument is supported by none of these indicators, unless one wishes to accept the argument that partisan elections lead to administrative centralization, less citizen participation, and therefore higher levels of innovation. The data support only the latter proposition. Cities with city-manager governments, nonpartisan elections, at-large elections, and small city councils are either less likely to innovate in this public policy area than cities with mayor-council governments, partisan elections, ward elections, and large city councils, or there is no relationship. Again, the same pattern is found in both northern and southern cities. Some significant relationships drop to insignificance,

especially in the South, and the one reversal (per cent elected at large and the second speed measure in the South) is not statistically significant. As a corollary, the political culture argument also fails, since the reform institutions are not more innovative than the nonreform institutions.

In Table 3 we examine the degree of innovation among each of five types of city government, in order to test the more complex hypothesis of Crain, Katz and Rosenthal that cities with both low political participation and high executive centralization (which would be maximized by the city-manager form of government and partisan elections) should have higher rates of innovation, although their rationale for such hypotheses is too complex to present here.⁴⁶ They found that administrative adoption of fluoridation was greatest in cities with city-manager government, followed by those with partisan mayor-council, nonpartisan mayor-council, and lowest in those with commission form of government. We find that innovation in public housing is greatest in cities with the commission form of government; such cities had the *lowest* rate of innovation (administrative adoption) in fluoridation, however. Like the fluoridation findings,

⁴⁶ Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-205.

innovation in public housing (as well as in urban renewal and the war on poverty) is greater in partisan mayor-council cities than in the non-partisan mayor-council type. But unlike the findings for fluoridation, we find that nonpartisan council-manager cities have the least innovation in public housing; administrative adoption of fluoridation was found to be greatest in council-manager cities.

As Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal suggest, some community systems can make certain kinds of innovations with dispatch while other cities can make other types of decisions only with great difficulty. Evidently, the contrasting findings about innovation in public housing and fluoridation are one example of their conclusion. Although there are some findings in these data about public housing to support in part the predictions of Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, the inconsistencies in findings as well as the low zero-order relationships of political structure with innovation, at least in comparison to some other relationships with innovation, lead us to conclude that such a theory is perhaps not the most appropriate for an explanation of innovation in public housing.

Fourth, *community differentiation and continuity*: Larger and older cities have both greater structural differentiation and greater continuity. In the literature on community decision making, it has been argued that larger and older cities are both more innovative and less innovative in two different studies. Each of these studies has focused on innovations in different issues and provided differing and contradictory theoretical explanations. Thomas Dye, studying desegregation in 55 northern and southern cities, found that larger and older cities tended to have more segregation than smaller and younger ones.⁴⁷ He argued that larger cities were likely to be more bureaucratic and that "... large bureaucracies have many built-in mechanisms to resist policy innovations." Older cities were immobilized because "... over time persons and organizations adjust themselves to circumstances as they find them." And he did find greater segregation in older and larger cities, at least in the North, as the hypothesis would suggest.

On the other hand, a recent article dealing with public health organizations in 93 cities located in four midwestern states and Ontario by Lawrence Mohr found that public health organizations in larger cities were more innovative. He explained this by arguing that a community decision organization such as a public

health organization was larger in big cities, had more resources available, and, in such circumstances, innovative leadership was more likely to be effective.⁴⁸

The interpretations of the meaning of the age and size of cities are thus contradictory. On the one hand, it has been argued that older and larger cities are more rigid, more set in their ways, more complex and differentiated and, therefore, more incapable of action. On the other, such cities should be more adaptable, more experienced, and more flexible.

The data in Table 2 show that older and larger cities are in fact considerably more likely than younger and smaller cities to have innovated in public housing. When correlation coefficients are computed separately for northern and southern cities, the relationships differ only slightly from those reported in Table 2. Whether or not age and size are merely a reflection of a high level of structural degradation of the housing and building stock which cannot readily be replaced by the private market for low-rent housing is an important question for the interpretation of these relationships and will be taken up later.

Fifth, *community integration*: The argument here is that more highly integrated communities, i.e., those with highly developed networks of communication and contact among social groups, should suffer less from paralyzing conflict in the case of a new issue requiring decision, because on the one hand, channels of communication to work out compromises exist, and, on the other hand, isolated factions standing fast on their own position would not be present.⁴⁹

The indicators of community integration used by Pinard are quite diverse, and include several already mentioned here under other headings. Positive fluoridation decisions were hypothesized to be associated with low ethnicity, many middle-class persons, low voting turnout, small population size, low unemployment, and low in-migration. As already seen, three of these—low ethnicity, middle-class composition, and small size—are associated with less innovation in public housing, not more as would be predicted by the integration theory.⁵⁰ In the case of unem-

⁴⁸ Mohr, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Pinard, *op. cit.* James Coleman, *op. cit.*, has provided the theoretical argument which he illustrated by case studies, and Pinard has applied the theory in his study of fluoridation decisions.

⁵⁰ While we cannot summarize Pinard's complex argument here, it may be noted that his data do not support his hypothesis about the effects of middle-class composition. Middle-class cities are less likely to decide to fluoridate their water than

⁴⁷ Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 4 (December, 1968), 141-165.

ployment and in-migration, the thesis is that high unemployment levels will produce disintegration of community life by reducing attachments to community institutions and increasing conflict. High levels of in-migration will reduce integration by disrupting long-standing networks of communication and interchange among groups and organizations in a community. Contrary to expectation, low unemployment is associated with less innovation in public housing, not more. The only indicator among these six that works in the predicted direction is the degree of in-migration. Cities with high levels of in-migration (which are hypothesized to be less well-integrated) do have less success in public housing. When correlation coefficients are computed for northern and southern cities separately, the relationships for the two additional variables discussed here are hardly changed.

To summarize, few of the hypothesized relationships drawn from the literature discussed here are borne out completely, and we have raised some questions about the theoretical interpretation of those that were as predicted. The main findings thus far are that older and larger cities, those with lower levels of education and income, fewer managers and officials, higher voting turnout and Democratic voting, a lower degree of in-migration, and higher unemployment levels have participated more in public housing, entered it faster, and have higher performance levels. The question which these results immediately raises is whether or not public housing is simply a response to poor housing stock and higher levels of need and dependency.

The factor of community need might be regarded either as an independent variable or as a control variable, depending on the specific problem in which one was interested. If the need of the community for welfare programs—as measured by unemployment, poverty, low education, etc.—accounted for all or most of the statistical variation between communities in the degree and level of a particular type of innovation, this would be an extremely important finding, because it would show that need, whether manifest in political demands by the needy or in autonomous responses to need by political leaders regardless of demands, was the major source of in-

working-class cities, contrary to the integration hypothesis. Pinard then argues that a large middle-class city is more likely to have a divided elite, thus decentralized power arrangements, more conflict, and, therefore, less innovation. Although his postulates about the meaning of his indicators are inconsistent with ours, his data are consistent, at least with respect to the effect of middle-class composition.

novation and policy outputs, regardless of the values of key groups, the concentration of power, or the integration of the community.

Table 2 thus includes some additional measures of the poverty and housing conditions among these 646 cities. Cities with more dilapidated housing in 1950, many poor families, many poorly educated adults, more high school dropouts, and many nonwhites were indeed more likely to have entered the public housing program, entered it faster, and have higher performance levels as reflected by the number of housing units per 100,000 population. These relationships, as with most of those previously discussed, are approximately the same when computed separately for northern and southern cities.

Given these strong and consistent relationships between city size and these need measures and innovation in public housing, we may pose the question whether or not many of the previously discussed relationships, regardless of the concepts they were alleged to represent, are not simply functions of a high degree of community need for public housing. In an attempt to answer this question, we first computed a series of partial correlations for most of the variables in Table 2, controlling for level of dilapidated housing and city size. As shown in Table 4, the relationships between the variables that were strongly related to innovation measures in Table 2 still have relatively strong relationships with the innovation measures even when the effect of city size and the amount of dilapidated housing are removed statistically. Step-wise regression analyses which introduced the need variables first also supported this finding.

Clearly factors other than simply reflections of a needy population are efficient predictors of community innovation, and clearly the two measures of centralization of power that were consistent with predictions—per cent of the adult population with four years of high school or more and MPO ratio—do not hold up when other variables are controlled.

But to point out the consistencies in these empirical relationships does not solve the problem of understanding why and how some communities enter the public housing program and others do not. The mind is not set at rest by discovering that poorer, more needy cities have greater participation in this federal program or that older, larger, more heterogeneous cities are also more innovative. In the first place the relationships are not unusually strong. In the second place, these "ecological" correlates do not tell us anything about the intervening processes which enabled some cities to mobilize local resources sufficiently to provide relatively high levels of

TABLE 4. PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND SPEED OF INNOVATION (AFTER ENABLING LEGISLATION) AND LEVEL OF OUTPUT, CONTROLLING FOR SIZE OF COMMUNITY AND PER CENT OF HOUSING DILAPIDATED IN 1950

	Speed of Innovation in Housing (After Enabling Legislation)	Log N Number of Housing Units per 100,000 Population
<i>Political Culture</i>		
Per cent of native population of foreign or mixed parentage	.01	.08*
Per cent of elementary school children in private schools	.04	.10*
Median family income	.29***	-.28***
Per cent in the county voting Democratic, 1964	-.05	.17***
<i>Concentration and Diffusion of Community Power</i>		
MPO Ratio	.10*	-.27***
Per cent of adult population with four years of high school	.18***	-.41***
<i>Political Structure</i>		
Presence of a city-manager form of government	.08*	-.16***
Presence of nonpartisan elections	.01	-.09*
Per cent of city council elected at large	-.02	.02
Number of members of the city council	.07	-.01
<i>Community Continuity</i>		
Age of city (year city reached 10,000 population [Log N])	.20***	-.31***
<i>Community Integration</i>		
Per cent unemployed	-.13***	.24***
Per cent migrant	.04	-.25***
<i>Poverty</i>		
Per cent of families with less than \$3,000 income per year	-.29***	.34***
Per cent of adults with less than five years education (Log N)	-.19***	.36***
Per cent of 14-17 year olds in school	.17***	-.31***
Per cent of population that is nonwhite (Log N)	-.18***	.31***

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

public housing for its needy citizens while others did not. What do these and other available data tell us about the political and organizational factors and processes that enabled some cities to mobilize effectively for this particular structural and policy innovation, and others not? Both a reinterpretation of the data already presented and a more complex analysis of them may cast some light on this question.

Structural Differentiation and Community Innovation

Cities that appear to be most heterogeneous,

differentiated, and decentralized—as indicated by ethnicity, a large working class, nonwhite composition, size, and the qualitative data on centralization (i.e., degree of elite participation) in the works of Clark and Aiken—are most likely to have innovated in public housing. An alternative theory of community innovation—at least for innovation in programs such as urban renewal, low-rent housing, the war on poverty, and model cities—must begin with the proposition that successful innovation in such programs is more frequently attained in fragmented, differentiated and heterogeneous community systems. The demographic data just described offer only indirect support for this proposition. More important are the data from Aiken and Clark already cited which show that the more groups and actors participating in current decisions, the higher is the level of innovation and outputs.

Several other bodies of data can be used to support this proposition, however. The sheer size of a city is only a crude indicator of the degree of structural differentiation and organizational complexity of a community. A more direct way of measuring organizational complexity would be a count of the number of organizations of various types which play some role in community life, i.e., the richness of organizational life.⁵¹ We have data on the extensity of three types of organizations—manufacturing firms, banks, and trade unions—although for only a sub-sample of cities in each case. Unfortunately, we lack data on other more crucial types of organizations such as political parties, voluntary associations, or the local government.

Not only is the sheer number of organizations important, but also the number having sufficient resources to affect critically the course of community innovation. For this reason we have chosen the number of manufacturing establishments with 100 or more employees and the number of independent banks with assets of at least ten million dollars as our measures of organizational complexity and differentiation. Unfortunately, the unionization data cannot be treated in exactly the same way. But because larger firms are more likely to be unionized and because the data include all establishments in which a majority of the plant workers are unionized, we believe that this measure too is an appropriate indicator of the organizational complexity of a community.

The data relating structural differentiation and community innovation are presented in Table 5. Because the level and character of union-

⁵¹ Cf. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 142-193.

TABLE 5. DIFFERENTIATION OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION
IN PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICAN CITIES

	Manufacturing	Banking	Unionization	
	Number of Establishments of Size 100 or More	Total Number of Indepen- dent Banks	Per Cent of Plant Workers Unionized, Among All Industries	
			North	South
<i>Innovation</i>				
Presence of innovation in public housing since 1933	.18**	.14*	.08	.41*
<i>Speed of Innovation</i>				
Number of years after 1933 before construction began on the public housing project	— .40***	— .27***	— .19	— .05
Number of years it took after state enabling legis- lation was present	— .34***	— .30***	.15	— .18
<i>Outputs</i>				
Number of public housing units constructed per 100,000 population (natural logarithm)	.22***	.17*	.08	.43***
N =	(217)	(217)	(76)	(35)

Source: Manufacturing and banking data are available for the 217 nonsuburban cities in the size range 25,000 to 250,000 population which had 20 per cent or more of their labor force in manufacturing in 1960. The unionization of manufacturing establishments is available for 84 metropolitan areas, which provide an estimate of the trade union level of 112 cities within them. See Michael Aiken, "Economic Concentration and Community Innovation," unpublished manuscript, 1969, for details on the construction of the measures. The banking data were taken from *Polk's Bank Directory* (Nashville: R. L. Polk and Co., March, 1966). The data on unions are drawn from Bulletin No. 1465-86, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., October, 1966, titled *Wages and Related Benefits: Part I, 84 Metropolitan Areas, 1965-66*. The measure is the approximate per cent of all plant workers employed in establishments in which a union contract covered a majority of workers during the period July, 1964, to June, 1966. We have assigned the degree of unionization in the SMSA to the urban place, as the best estimate we have of the unionization of the city itself.

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

ization can be presumed to be different in the North and the South, the data for that variable are presented by region. These results are consistent with our expectations. The cities with more manufacturing establishments of size 100 or more, with more independent banks with assets of ten million dollars or more, and with more unionized plants are most likely to have innovated in all respects.

These measures of structural differentiation can be regarded as ways of more precisely spelling out what it means to be a large city, as far as capacity to innovate is concerned. Large cities have a greater diversity of social organizations, and apparently one consequence is greater innovation.

This deceptively simple and obvious statement can be generalized, but before doing so, we should

point out that this whole line of interpretation of the data in Table 5 is inconsistent with most of the previously discussed theories. Among the 112 cities for which unionization data are available, highly unionized cities are more likely to have fewer working-class persons ($r = -.50$ with the MPO ratio), to have fewer well-educated citizens ($r = -.24$ with per cent high school graduates), to have higher political participation ($r = .37$ with the per cent of registrants voting), and to be in more Democratic counties ($r = .27$ with the per cent Democratic vote in 1960). According to the ethos theory, such cities should be more private-regarding, and therefore have less public housing. According to Hawley's argument, they should be more decentralized and therefore should have less public housing. According to the integration argument, they should

have more conflict, and therefore less public housing. None of these is the case.

The manufacturing and banking data also contradict the centralization argument, since we would expect that a power structure of executives and bankers should be more homogeneous in a context of fewer and larger firms. Instead, the greater the number of such organizations, the greater the innovation and the outputs.

What these disparate findings suggest is that the independent variables explaining community innovation must be disaggregated. The concepts normally used to explain community behavior may reify the diversity of community structures which sponsor and carry through actions. Global concepts such as centralization, integration, or ethos may hinder the comparative analysis of urban political and governmental processes. Concepts recognizing the fundamental diversity and differentiation of cities should be incorporated into the basic analytic framework.

Unfortunately, the data we have reported here may efficiently predict community innovation in public housing (regression analyses of 17 of the variables shown in Table 2 explain 30 to 40 per cent of the variance in the four innovation measures), but they cannot directly test our ideas about the processes which lead to community innovation. Before turning to a brief alternative theoretical sketch, we believe that some comments on the relation of theory to methodology in this area will be useful.

III. SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Quantitative ecological analysis raises certain methodological considerations related to the *indicators* used, the *unit of analysis*, the difficulties of analyzing complex *causal processes* which are essentially historical in character and national in scope, and, lastly, the use of the data as a *sampling frame*. We shall use our previous substantive findings as examples illustrating these problems, also discussed elsewhere.⁵²

The difficulty of obtaining satisfactory empirical *indicators* of theoretical variables such as centralization, differentiation, complexity and the like is primarily due to two problems: lack of easily and cheaply available data and lack of resources to obtain better data. The Census Bureau and agencies such as the International City Management Association which collect the only easily quantifiable data do not obtain those data which may be most useful for purposes of causal explanation, and better data are extremely time-consuming and costly to collect. It is for this

reason that students of urban decision making have emphasized case studies, which provide richer and more complex information about the detailed processes and events involved. But if one begins with the assumption that comparative quantitative studies provide an invaluable framework of basic findings and parameters, one must attempt to make the most careful and logical inferences from the crude ecological data that are available.

Our previous discussion of the problems of interpreting the meaning of the MPO ratio, the level of education, and the form of government has illustrated concretely the problem of selection and interpretation of indicators. The general implication which we draw is that single indicators of complex theoretical variables are not sufficient, *if* the indicator is several inferential steps from the phenomenon of real concern. Multiple indicators provide simultaneously a check on the consistency of the patterns of relationships presumed to be found with other variables and some assurance that several dimensions of meaning of the theoretical variable are being tapped. This principle holds for both independent and dependent variables. In this article, for example, we have analyzed four different indicators of the dependent variable. Sensitivity to the problem of the gap between indicators and theoretical variables will also avoid easy resort to the statement: "This variable is operationalized as follows. . . ."

The problem of the *unit of analysis* arises essentially because of ambiguity about the location of causal agency for the processes represented by the data available. Whether or not the observed phenomena of innovative outputs can be best explained by the actions of community organizations and officials, by the operations of cultural values, by ecological and economic forces at the level of the urbanized area, or by political configurations and traditions at the state or regional level, is not obvious from the data themselves. To some extent this problem can be regarded as one solved by seeing the operation of causal forces in a way which parallels the "nesting" of units of analysis within each other: decisions, men, organizations, urban areas, states, regions, nations. Organizations shape and select the men who make the decisions; urban areas grow in ways which shape and select the organizations within them; states and regions develop in ways which shape the urban areas within them. But this way of seeing the units of analysis merely redefines the problem in a possibly clarifying way; it does not solve the problem of selecting the appropriate unit of analysis or of interpreting the resulting data.

⁵² Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969).

Generally, the reasoning about our data leads us to an eclectic approach to this problem, one which does not rule out *a priori* the operation of causal forces at any level of social or political organization. We suggest in our theoretical section following that many of the properties usually assigned to the community as a whole can be reduced to properties of organizations and interorganizational relationships, which might seem to opt for a smaller, more "micro" unit of analysis. But we do not offer this as a methodological principle. Rather, it seems to us that the analyst should not prematurely assume, just because his *data* refer to cities, for example, that the theoretical concepts appropriate for an adequate explanation must also be defined in terms of the city as the causal agency. The basic causal forces may be at a larger, more macro level (the state, region, or nation as a whole), or at a more micro level (organizations, individuals), or perhaps at all three levels.

This point brings us to a last and related problem: the location of complex *causal processes* which are essentially historical in character. Most of the variables which we have found to be related to innovation are closely related to the region in which a city is located. Cities in the Northeast tend to be larger, older, have more out-migration and more persons of foreign stock. If three dummy variables representing region are used in a regression equation, they alone explain approximately eight per cent of the variance in the innovation measures. The empirical relationships are clear; the way to handle them methodologically in order to make a theoretical point is not at all clear.

Cities differ along many dimensions which are related to the stage of industrialization during which they grew, the period in which certain ethnic or racial groups were migrating to specific regions, and the period of time in which certain innovations of structure and function were being diffused and adopted. Such complex historical processes cannot be isolated into separate "factors" by any conceivable multivariate statistical procedure. If this is true for American cities, the same methodological problem will appear even more sharply once systematic comparisons of cities are attempted on a cross-national basis. Again, we can only raise some of the problems and issues, not solve them.

The statistical "effect" of regions (or international differences, which are logically similar) can be handled in two ways, if one wishes to approach the problem quantitatively. The regional units can be broken into two categories and treated as "dummy" (binary) variables for the purpose of correlations and regression analysis. The other way is that of contextual analysis

which we have followed in this paper: repeating the correlational analysis separately within different regions. This procedure has the advantage—if it works, as it did in the data we report—of greatly strengthening the tests of hypotheses if the same patterns are found in different regions, or if deviations can be readily explained. If the procedure does not work—if, that is, relationships become wild and random (at least in terms of any theoretical framework available at the moment)—one cannot be sure whether or not one has artificially destroyed real relationships by the "control" for region via the contextual analysis procedure. This point deserves a bit of emphasis with an example.

We know that the proportion of persons who are of foreign stock differs greatly from region to region in the United States, being highest in the Northeast and lowest in the South and Far West. By separating the nation's cities into four regions, and examining correlations within each, we are tacitly assuming that the meaning of the "ethnicity" variable is the same from region to region. Yet if the mean proportion of persons of foreign stock is sharply different from region to region, we are not really dealing with the same variable at all since a high of 15 per cent in the South may be equated with a high of 60 per cent in the Northeast. Failure to find similar relationships of this variable with others may be an artifact of the procedure employed. On the other hand, if we use the "dummy" variable procedure in a regression analysis, we are ignoring the problems of the temporal causal ordering of the variables by throwing into one matrix variables causally prior to others in the same matrix. Not only that, but region is by definition a complex summary or proxy variable which "stands for" a multiplicity of processes of migration, age, ethnic composition, and the like. If these variables are also in the regression equation, it is very difficult to interpret the outcome. The severe problems of multicollinearity which occurred whenever we attempted to use region as a dummy variable underlines this difficulty.⁵³

Lastly, the data and findings reported here could be used as a *sampling frame* for a comparative community study in which the intervening process of community decision making is the key focus of the research. In such a research enterprise, the data and findings in the present study

⁵³ See Robert R. Alford, "A Critical Evaluation of the Principles of City Classification," in Brian Berry (ed.), *Classification of Cities: New Methods and Alternative Uses*, forthcoming, for an elaboration of these methodological points with special reference to the factor analyses of city characteristics.

could be used to select a sample that is not only characteristic of given region or size categories, but also a sample of cities having high and low structural potential for outputs as well as high and low actual performance. The study of the deviant cases could be particularly fruitful.

Another procedure that could be used in sampling would be based on the calculation of residuals in regression analysis. Within a given size or region category, for example, at least three types of cities could be identified: a) "over-performers," b) "under-performers," and c) "normal performers," at least as predicted by a set of key independent variables in a regression analysis. These are only two possible ways of establishing a sampling frame. The data and findings could be used in designing comparative research projects on American communities, and might also be fruitfully applied to research on communities in other societies.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Our tentative alternative approach is that community innovation of the kind examined here must involve a two-level analysis. First, an explication of the kinds of community attributes which create the conditions for the development of certain types, numbers, and qualities of organizations that are critical for innovations for the type under discussion here, and, second, the kinds of attributes of organizations and their environments—or organization sets to use the term of William Evan⁵⁴—that facilitate the speed of implementation and subsequent performance of the innovation. To some extent these levels are the same thing examined from two points of view, but we believe that the concepts may be usefully distinguished.⁵⁵

With respect to the first, our findings point to three kinds of concepts as the most important: the quality and stability of interorganizational ties, the accumulation of experience and information in a community system (continuity), and structural differentiation. Interorganizational networks are conceived as properties of community systems that are developed historically through the experience of organizational units and their leaders with each other. If the population of a community is relatively stable, these interorganizational networks are not likely to be disrupted by the continuous influx of new citi-

zens and organizations, and thus there is the greater potential for increasing their capacity for coordination over time.

The degree of historical continuity in a community structure—especially as it affects inter-organizational networks—may also influence innovation. Presumably older cities have had a longer time for existing organizations to have worked out patterns of interactions, alliances, factions, or coalitions. In such communities the state of knowledge in the community system about the orientations, needs, and probable reactions to varying proposals for community action is likely to be quite high, thus increasing the probability of developing a sufficiently high level of coordination in order to implement successfully a community innovation.

The degree of structural differentiation and complexity of a community may also influence innovation for two reasons. First, larger cities are likely to have more organizations devoted to specific kinds of decision areas—i.e., more likely to have a redevelopment agency, a housing agency, a community action agency, a city development agency for model cities, welfare councils, and other community decision organizations. Such organizations are likely to have larger, more specialized, and more professionalized staffs to provide the technical, administrative, and political knowledge required to innovate successfully not only within their organizations, but also in those areas which require activating interorganizational relationships and establishing critical coalitions. Secondly, it is precisely in the larger, more structurally differentiated communities that coalitions that can implement an innovation will be easiest to establish. If we assume that all organizational units in a community do not have to be mobilized in a decision such as public housing, but rather that only a limited number of organizational units can suffice to bring about a successful innovation, then it follows that in large, highly differentiated communities a lower proportion of organizations will participate in such decisions, and that there will be wider latitude in selecting organizations for these critical coalitions. The more highly differentiated or specialized a community system, the higher the proportion of decisions that are likely to be made by subsystems and the less likely the entire system will be activated.

We thus suggest that these three properties of communities—structural differentiation, the accumulation of experience and information, and the stability and extensiveness of interorganizational networks—may contribute to the capacity of a community to generate the kinds of social resources necessary for innovation. While we

⁵⁴ William M. Evan, "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganization Relations," in James D. Thompson (ed.), *Approaches to Organizational Design* (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966).

⁵⁵ The research by Mohr, *op. cit.*, is suggestive of the appropriateness of this two-level approach.

have no direct measures of these properties and while these suggestions are only inferential, such imagery about the process of community innovation does appear to be consistent with our findings about the characteristics of communities that have been most successful in innovating in public housing.⁵⁶

In our larger study of community innovation and decision making, similar relationships have been found for participation in other federal programs such as urban renewal, the war on poverty, and model cities. What is common to each of these programs is first, resources come from outside the community, second, each of these programs has a sponsor—a community decision organization,⁵⁷ and, third, the decision to innovate is made in most cases by representative agencies—the city council, the community deci-

sion organization, and other representational units. Many of the decisions examined in the previous studies—fluoridation, desegregation, and school bond and other referenda—involved few external resources, did not usually have the sponsorship and legitimization by a community decision organization, and were characterized by a high degree of citizen participation. Such factors are likely to be critical in determining whether one theory or another best explains different policy outcomes. It may be that the centralization or integration theories, if appropriately modified, can best explain policy outcomes for issues with a high potential for citizen participation, but for issues which are more likely to be insulated from popular participation—such as public housing or urban renewal—the model alluded to here, which conceives of a community subsystem as the key unit of analysis, which considers organizations as the key actors, and which views their interrelationships and degree of coordination as critical, may be a more appropriate model.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ See Aiken and Alford, *American Sociological Review*, *op. cit.*, for a more extended theoretical statement.

⁵⁷ See Roland L. Warren, "Interaction of Community Decision Organizations: Some Basic Concepts and Needed Research," *Social Services Review*, 41 (September, 1967), 261-270; and "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 12 (December, 1967), 396-419, for a discussion of the meaning of the concept.

⁵⁸ See Paul E. Mott, "Configurations of Power," in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), *The Structure of Community Power: An Anthology* (New York: Random House, 1970), for one example of this approach.

A THEORY OF PROFESSIONALIZATION IN POLITICS*

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Professionalization, in customary usage, refers to the assimilation of the standards and values prevalent in a given profession. Every profession, including politics, tends to have some set or sets of values that are widely held and which define what it means to be a "professional" within that field. These values are important because they affect the likelihood that the individual will achieve success in his profession. If the values are widely held, those that deviate from them are likely to be sanctioned by their colleagues, and people who fail to maintain the minimal standards of their profession are not likely to obtain professional advancement. Those who do behave according to the dominant values of their profession, however, are likely to be accorded the status of "professional" in the eyes of their colleagues, and that designation will contribute to the success of their careers.

In the profession of politics, as in other professions, there is seldom one set of standards and values that prevails in all places at all times. These normative elements are likely to vary from political system to political system, to vary within a political system, and to vary within the profession of politics over time. In a highly centralized local political organization, for example, the achievement and maintenance of a position is likely to depend upon such values as deference and loyalty to the leaders of the political hierarchy.

In a more decentralized political system, however, a different set of professional standards is likely to be predominant. In the "pluralistic" political system, the politician is a principal broker in the process through which collective decisions are made. The man who is able to develop successful coalitions and who can work out acceptable compromises is critical to the decisional process where interest conflict abounds. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom have described the prevalence of such individuals in the political process of the United States:

... social pluralism facilitates the rise of political leaders whose main skill is negotiating settlements among conflicting social organizations. Thus the

whole cast of the political elites is modified by pluralism; the fanatic, the Messianic type, the leader whose aim is to consolidate the supremacy of some small group tend to trip themselves up on the barrier of groups and group loyalties. The Federalists, concerned with maintaining the domination of eastern financial and commercial interests, were unable to compete with the Jefferson alliance; they died out as a party. All important politicians have been excellent negotiators of group alliances, from Jefferson and Jackson to Roosevelt and Truman.¹

Dahl and Lindblom point to what may be the most critical of the political skills required for success in American politics, a skill at bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. Explicit bargaining pervades the entirety of the political process, from the development of electoral alliances to the formation of legislative coalitions, and at the center of these processes stands the politician. To be successful, the politician must first forge a winning coalition from the kaleidoscopic variety of interests present in most constituencies. But it does not end there. The ability to bargain also determines to some extent the success of the representative in his legislature, whether at the Federal, state, or local levels of government. The ideologue who is unwilling to bargain or the "citizen-politician" who is above such behavior are not likely to be sought out for alliances.²

Although there are undoubtedly many other skills required of the successful politician, the ability and willingness to bargain would appear to be a necessary requirement for success in politics in the pluralistic political system. But the ability to bargain presumes as well that the politician has a positive view toward the processes of bargaining and negotiation. One feature of American politics has been a widespread distrust

¹ Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), p. 304.

² For a more detailed analysis of the attitudes and orientations of "citizen-politicians," see Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970). This study and the Prewitt study utilize data from the same source; the City Council Research Project, directed by Heinz Eulau.

* The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under grants GS 496 and GS 1898.

of the politician, a distrust that probably stems in part from the particular requirements of the political role; for example the requirement that the politician bargain with the diverse groups and individuals around him.³ For some reason, "bargaining" seems to be viewed as slightly "unethical" to many people, particularly those segments of the population that have accepted the grand myth of the Progressive Era that in every conflict situation there exists a "right" decision.⁴

✓ I. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENTERING THE POLITICAL ARENA

If there does exist a widely held antagonism toward "politicians" and toward "bargaining," one wonders how it is that some people develop skills and values congruent with the requirements of politics. Do they enter into politics because they are skilled at bargaining and compromise or do they develop these skills after they enter the political arena? And what accounts for the variations in norms and values among those active in politics? Clearly not all politicians are

equally skilled at bargaining; not all politicians are even favorably disposed toward bargaining. Why is it that some individuals seem to learn the norms, values, and attitudes of the pluralistic political process more easily than others?

One answer to these questions may come from an understanding of the motivations of the men who enter the political arena. Some men appear to seek offices in order to enhance their nonpolitical careers, others may enter politics because of a sense of civic obligation, while still others may not have sought their office at all—they may have been thrust into it by their friends. These and many other motivations are common in politics, but they are not the kinds of motivation that one would associate with those who seek political careers.⁵

This study is concerned with one type of motivation that may be related to the socialization of potential politicians; the desire for political advancement. Although many people enter politics in order to enhance their nonpolitical careers, other individuals seek success through politics where success is measured in terms of political advancement. According to Joseph A. Schlesinger:

The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals. Or, to put it another way, the politician as office seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office.⁶

³ Dahl and Lindblom, *op. cit.*, 333-334. William C. Mitchell, "The Ambivalent Social Status of the American Politician," *Western Political Quarterly*, 12 (June, 1959), 683-698. Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," in Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), *Ethics and Bigness* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

⁴ The ideology of the "municipal reform movement" is an important component in local politics. The thrust of the arguments was for "good government," the "public interest," and a kind of Burkean politician who could stand above the conflict and who would reach the "right solution" to a problem rather than pandering to "selfish interests." These reforms were to come about through the adoption of such institutional changes as at-large elections, city manager plans, and nonpartisanship. The importance here is that the ideology of the municipal reform movement specifically rejected the "pluralist" view of the decisional process; and this point of view has been extremely popular in California where this study was conducted. This is reflected in the fact that all of the cities in this study operate under nonpartisanship, nearly all have at-large elections, and most have either city managers or city administrators. For a review of the history of the municipal reform movement, see Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, LV (October, 1964), 157-169. On the Progressive Movement in California, see George E. Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 86-104.

⁵ One classic study of political motivation is Max Weber's "Politics as a Vocation." He distinguishes between the men who are involved in politics on a marginal basis, as an avocation, and the men who either "live for" or "live off" politics, those whose politics are a vocation or a "calling." *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 77-128. In addition to Weber's work, this study relies heavily on three recent studies of political motivation: James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965); Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); and James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁶ Schlesinger, *ibid.*, 6. Wilson distinguishes between "amateurs" and "professionals" with the same factor of ambition; the office goals of the individual. He argues that: "The professional, for whom politics primarily has extrinsic rewards, is preoccupied with maintaining his position in party

This motivation, the desire for political advancement, should be related to an individual's commitment to politics in general, to his willingness to assume the risks and to pay the costs of furthering his career, and perhaps, as we shall explore in this study, to the extent to which he internalizes norms and values congruent with his political aspirations. The decision to seek political advancement rests on the political ambitions of the individual; and although it may be valuable to know what forces or experiences in the past of the individual produce political ambition, we suggest that the presence or absence of ambition itself is the critical intervening factor between an individual's political past and his political future and between his initial political values and those of the professional politician.

Two Levels of Political Commitment

Although the arguments presented here are not restricted to any single set of political officeholders, the data are based on a study of the city councilmen of the San Francisco Bay Area.⁷ As part of that study, 435 city councilmen were interviewed from eighty-seven cities. The interview was quite lengthy and included both open and closed questions. The tables in this paper employ questions from this interview along with some additional data on the cities themselves. *It is important to remember that these respondents all were officeholders at the time of the interview.*

The decisions that "potential politicians" make reflect their level of commitment to politics relative to other alternatives. Politics is, more than many other pursuits, a risky venture, particularly for the officeholder. Although the severity of the risk is different for different politicians, the fact of political defeat is a fact that many aspiring politicians are forced to live with continuously. Even if one has been relatively successful for a time, many budding careers have been ended with a single defeat.

For those individuals who hold office, it is useful to distinguish between two different levels of political commitment; commitment to the position the individual currently holds (in this case, the office of councilman) and the commitment

to seek other political or governmental positions. The former will be referred to as *positional commitment* and it reflects the value the officeholder places on the achievement and retention of the position he currently holds. The latter will be referred to as *progressive commitment* and it reflects the generalized aspiration of the officeholder for other political or governmental offices.⁸

These two types of political commitment need not be highly correlated; that is to say, those who are progressively committed to politics need not necessarily be high on positional commitment. With regard to the case at hand, a councilman may have run for the council, not because he was particularly concerned with local politics, but because he wished to use the council as a springboard for other political offices. Likewise, a councilman who places a high value on his job as a councilman may see that as the limit of his involvement in politics.

One method of measuring the commitment of councilmen to their office and to the achievement of other offices is simply to ask them about their commitment, i.e., about the value they place on these offices. A second measure of an individual's commitment to a given alternative (or career) is the extent to which the individual is willing to invest in that alternative relative to other alternatives. Every position in a prospective career has a set of investment costs attached to it. These costs might include the fulfillment of a skill requirement through prolonged education, the cost of expensive equipment, or other types of investments. The common denominator of all investments is that they entail some element of risk; and this risk is the cost that will be sustained if the individual fails to achieve benefits commensurate with his investment.

Although it is impossible to aggregate all the investment costs for the individual, we do have two factors which would seem to be related in a rough fashion to the relative investments that these councilmen have made in politics. These are the size of the city and the extent of the competition for office in the city. City size is important for two reasons: the larger the city, the larger will be the electorate to which the councilman must appeal and the more costly in general will be his campaign. Also, the larger the city, the more time and effort will the duties of the position of councilman require. For both reasons, an individual's investment in politics would appear to be associated with the size of the political unit in which the individual serves.

⁸Schlesinger makes a similar distinction between *static* and *progressive* goals in his ambition theory of recruitment. *Op. cit.*, 10.

and elective offices. Winning is essential, although sometimes electoral victory must be subordinated to maintaining the organization." *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under contract GS 496 and GS 1898.

In addition, those who run for office in cities in which the elections are closely contested are likely to have to campaign more vigorously for their office and thereby pay higher costs. Thus, the councilmen from the larger and more competitive cities are likely to have made a greater investment in politics than those who come from the smaller and less competitive cities,⁹ and this variation in their investment in politics should be related to their commitment to politics in general.

Therefore, we are employing three estimates of the councilman's commitment to politics: (1) two surrogate measures for the initial investment of seeking the councilmanic position, the size of the city and the average closeness of the vote in city elections; (2) the councilman's expressed desire for the office of councilman; and (3) the councilman's expressed intention of seeking other political and governmental offices. The first reflects the *risk* the councilman sustained in seeking the councilmanic position, the second reflects his *positional commitment*, that is to say, the value he places on his current position, while the third reflects his *progressive commitment* to politics.

II. POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND THE SOCIALIZATION OF POLITICIANS

What is it that sets the "politician" apart from other participants in the political process? If we were to conduct a study of professional politicians, we would probably locate a large number of attitudes and values that are somewhat distinctive of politicians as a group.¹⁰ In this study

⁹ Both the size of the city and the closeness of the vote in elections are related to the cost of running for office, the amount of time and effort the councilman puts into his campaign, and some of the psychic costs of electoral contesting. Both relationships are positive and strong; and these results can be seen in Gordon S. Black, *The Arena of Political Competition* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, forthcoming).

¹⁰ Although there are a large number of studies that explore the attitudes and values of politicians of various kinds and a large number of studies that explore the attitudes and values of the general public, only a few studies actually compare the attitudes of politicians with the attitudes of the general public, and these restrict themselves to attitudes on public policy. See Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 45-56; Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 66-72.

we are concerned with two general attributes that probably differentiate politicians as a group from other individuals in the society.

The first involves the councilman's definition of his role on the council and the manner in which he believes others define that role. An officeholder need not see himself as a "politician," especially at the local level. He may define himself and his work on the council in strictly non-political terms, and he may perceive that politics is irrelevant to his activities on the council. At the same time, he may perceive that the citizens in his community do not define his role as that of a politician. He may believe that they simply see him as another citizen, or perhaps as a public servant, but not as a politician. In fact, many local officeholders are probably loath to consider themselves as "politicians" because of the negative connotations of that term for so many people.

One element, therefore, in the politician's socialization process is the extent to which the individual defines his activities as "political," or sees himself as a "politician." But an individual's role is not entirely self-defined; a role is also defined by the expectations of others.¹¹ Of equal importance, then, is the extent to which the officeholder believes that the citizenry of his community defines his role as "political." These two sets of expectations form one dimension of the politician's socialization process.

A second element in that process has to do with what many students of American politics believe to be the dominant skill in politics in this country, a skill at bargaining. While we do not know the actual extent to which these councilmen engage in bargaining, we do have information on their perception of the extent to which bargaining occurs on the council and on their attitude toward bargaining in general. If a councilman is going to acquire some skill at bargaining, it seems safe to presume that he must begin to see bargaining in a positive light. If a councilman engages in bargaining behavior on the council, it also seems safe to presume that he

¹¹ Robert K. Merton suggests that the occupant of a given *status*, in this case the councilmanic position, has a role-set that is the "... complement of role relationships which persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status." For the councilman, the public is a "significant other" with which he interacts, and what we are examining here is the councilman's perception of how the public defines his role in the position he occupies of councilman. *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), pp. 368-370.

will perceive that bargaining occurs on the council.

These two elements probably precede the acquisition of skill in political bargaining. In a sense, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for becoming a skilled bargainer. While those who are favorably disposed toward bargaining may, of course, never acquire the skill to bargain, they are much more likely to acquire that skill than those who are antagonistic toward bargaining.

Returning to our earlier argument, then, we should expect to find that the three components of political commitment are related to the likelihood that an individual will internalize the political attitudes and role definitions outlined above. We can summarize these hypotheses in the following set:

Hypothesis Set I: The larger the city and the more intense the electoral competition in the city, (1) the more likely is the councilman to see himself as a "politician," (2) the more likely is the councilman to believe that the citizenry defines his job as that of a "politician," (3) the more likely is the councilman to perceive that bargaining occurs on the council, and (4) the more likely is the councilman to have a positive opinion about the importance of bargaining.

Hypothesis Set II: The higher the *positional commitment* of the councilman; (1) the more likely is the councilman to see himself as a "politician," (2) the more likely is the councilman to believe that the citizenry defines his job as that of a "politician," (3) the more likely is the councilman to perceive that bargaining occurs on the council, and (4) the more likely is the councilman to have a positive opinion about the importance of bargaining.

Hypothesis Set III: The more intense the *progressive commitment* of the councilman to seek other political or governmental offices; (1) the more likely is the councilman to see himself as a "politician," (2) the more likely is the councilman to believe that the citizenry defines his job as that of a "politician," (3) the more likely is the councilman to perceive that bargaining occurs on the council, and (4) the more likely is the councilman to have a positive opinion about the importance of bargaining.

These three sets of hypotheses link the *risk* that councilmen sustained to obtain the council seat, the commitment they have for their position on the council, and their ambition for other offices to the various perceptions, attitudes, and values discussed above. Although we will examine these variables two at a time, the important

issue is the pattern that exists across all of the variables. Each of these empirical propositions examines a slightly different aspect of the broader theoretical hypothesis that an individual's commitment to a given career, in this case politics, is related to the extent to which the individual internalizes the norms and values associated with his profession.

The Role of the Councilman as a Politician

On the whole, the city councilmen in this study do not see themselves as "politicians." Over half of the councilmen (54%) define the councilmanic position in strictly "nonpolitical" terms, i.e., that the position requires no political skills whatever. When asked how the citizens viewed their position, only 10% of the councilmen indicated that the citizens in their communities tended to view them as "politicians." Of the remainder, 62% believe that the citizens think of the councilman as a "public servant" while 28% of the councilmen believe that the citizens of their community simply think of them as another "citizen."

These views, which tend to subscribe to the position that local politics is apolitical in character, disguise a considerable amount of variation in the pattern of attitudes. As a part of our first hypothesis set, we suggested that the councilmen in the "large" cities with "closely contested" elections would be the most likely to define their own role in political terms, while the councilmen from the "small" and essentially non-competitive cities would be the least likely to think of themselves in political terms. In addition, the effect of the two variables should be *cumulative*, that is to say, both variables should have a positive effect on the likelihood that a councilman will see himself as a "politician."

In order to test this proposition we divided the cities into two categories, those above 30,000 in population and those below.¹² The measure of competitiveness for the city was the closeness of the vote among the various candidates for office. This measure was obtained by calculating the *Mean Deviation* of the vote among all the candidates who received more than 15% of the vote, and then the scores (Mean Deviations) for

¹² The selection of 30,000 as a cutting point was an arbitrary decision on my part. I do not suggest that this particular cutting point has any special virtue that sets it above other cutting points in the same general range of cities. My only real concern was to choose a point that seemed large enough to separate out the cities in which the costs of running for office were significant, but small enough that I had sufficient councilmen in the large cities for the analysis.

five elections in each city were averaged to obtain a measure of the closeness of the vote for the city over a ten-year period.¹³ The councilmen were then divided according to whether the city in which they were elected was "high" or "low" on the measure of the closeness of the vote.¹⁴ In Table 1 these two variables are correlated with the councilman's view or role definition of his job as a councilman.

TABLE 1. THE COUNCILMAN'S ROLE DEFINITION OF HIS POSITION BY THE RISK OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN HIS COMMUNITY

Position's Requirements ¹⁵	Large Population			Small Population		
	Average Closeness of Vote			Average Closeness of Vote		
	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Politician or political skill	70	—		46	32	
Nonpolitical	30	—		54	68	
Respondents	(73)	(12)*	(85)	(136)	(114)	(250)

* Too few cases to analyze.

¹³ These cities are all, in effect, multiple member districts. There were, on the average, more than two candidates for every office, and there were always more than two councilmanic positions at stake. The *Mean Deviation* (or Absolute Deviation as it is sometimes called) is computed by determining the sum of the absolute deviations from the mean number of votes per candidate and then dividing that sum by the number of deviations. The *Mean Deviation* is a measure of dispersion around the mean, but it differs from the standard deviation in that it weighs every deviation the same, rather than weighing extreme scores more heavily. In almost all cases, the measure of the closeness of the vote, the *Mean Deviation*, was determined from five elections in each community, and the average was taken and is used here.

¹⁴ The cutting point was a score of 13% for the average of the *Mean Deviations*. The range of the variable was from 8% to about 18%, but there were four cities that never had contested elections. This cutting point was chosen because it stood at the middle of the range.

¹⁵ The question for this variable was: "Which of the following would you say comes closest to your conception of the requirements of the job of City Councilman? The councilman then chooses between four statements; the first indicated that the job was a "tough political job" that required the councilman to be a "real politician," the second suggested that the job required "some political skills," the third indicated that the job required the

TABLE 2. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD BY THE CITIZENS IN HIS COMMUNITY BY THE RISK OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN HIS COMMUNITY

Perceived Citizens' View of Position	Large Population			Small Population		
	Average Closeness of Vote			Average Closeness of Vote		
	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Politician	32	—		11	6	
Public Servant	56	—		66	59	
Citizen	11*	—		23	34*	
Respondents	(62)	(11)**	(73)	(122)	(108)	(230)

* Rounding error.

** Too few cases to analyze.

Among the "high risk" cities, i.e., those that are "large" and closely contested, 70% of the councilmen define their job on the council as that of a "politician," or at least they indicate that the position requires political skills. Among the "low risk" cities, however, only 32% of the councilmen describe themselves as "politicians" or indicate that their job requires political skills. Thus, there is a 38% increase in the number of councilmen who define their position in political terms as one increases the risk attached to running for the council. Although the small number of cases in one column makes it impossible to determine whether the two variables have a fully cumulative effect across the whole table, an increase in the closeness of the vote among the small cities does show a corresponding 14% increase in the percentage of councilmen who define their position in political terms. The relationships here seem fairly clear: the greater the investment risk in running for the council, the more likely is the councilman to define his position in political terms.

This same pattern is observed when the dependent variable is the councilman's perception of how the citizens in his community view his role as the councilman. (See Table 2.)¹⁶

"ability to get along with people," but was not political, and the fourth statement suggested that a City Councilman was a "public servant." In dividing the Councilmen, the Councilmen who chose the first two statements were grouped together and the Councilmen who selected the second two statements were grouped together.

¹⁶ This question was: "In your opinion which of the following best describes the way the people in your community view the job of being a City Councilman?" The responses were "a real politician," a "public servant," or "as just another citizen and by no means a politician."

Among the "high risk" cities, 32% of the councilmen think that their constituents view them as "politicians" while only 11% of the councilmen believe that their constituents view them as "just another citizen." In the "low risk" cities, the pattern is just the opposite; only 6% fall in the "politician" category while 34% of the councilmen believe that the citizens in their community view them simply as a "citizen." And, as in the previous table, an increase in the closeness of the vote, i.e., risk, is associated both with an increase in the tendency of councilmen to answer "politician" and with a decrease in the tendency to respond with "citizen." The net increase across the columns is 26% as opposed to a 38% increase in the previous table.

One might argue that the positive relationships between size and competition, and the two variables of role perception are a function of some other factor besides investment risk. The differential willingness to incur the risk of running for office reflects only one dimension of commitment, and we need not rely on these two variables by themselves.

The other two dimensions of commitment are, in this case, the councilman's positional commitment and his progressive commitment to politics. As a measure of the councilman's commitment to his position on the council, they were asked how much they wanted the office of City councilman during their last campaign for the council.¹⁷ Their answers reflect the value the councilmen placed on their office at the time of their last election. In addition, the councilmen were asked whether or not they intend to seek other political or governmental offices, i.e., the councilman's progressive commitment to politics. Councilmen were divided on this question into those who *may* seek other offices and into those who *will not* seek such offices.

The pattern of relationships in Table 3 is similar to that found in the previous two tables. Among those councilmen who are both positionally and progressively committed to politics, 75% indicate that they think of themselves as "politicians" or see their position as requiring "political skills." Among the least committed

¹⁷ *Positional commitment* was measured with a scale item that asked the Councilman to estimate his "desire and efforts to be elected to the Council during (his) last campaign." *Progressive commitment* was determined by asking the Councilman whether there were "any other political or governmental positions—local, state, or federal—which you would like to seek?" Councilmen who indicated any interest in such positions were grouped together.

TABLE 3. THE COUNCILMAN'S ROLE DEFINITION OF HIS POSITION BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY HIS ORIGINAL DESIRE FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

Position's Requirements	(Desire for Council Seat)					
	Considerable			Some and Little		
	Desires	Other	Offices	Desires	Other	Offices
	Prob. %	No %	N	Prob. %	No %	N
Politician or political skill	75	52	—	47	38	—
Nonpolitical	25	48	—	53	62	—
Respondents	(60)	(58)	(118)	(75)	(142)	(217)

group of councilmen, those who had only "some or little" desire for their position and who do not intend to seek other political or governmental offices, only 38% consider themselves to be politicians or see their position as requiring political skills. Some 62% believe that the councilmanic position is entirely nonpolitical in character. The pattern across the table is also similar to the previous two tables: both of the variables of political commitment are related to the councilman's definition of this role, and the effect of the two variables is cumulative. In Table 4 the same pattern of effects occurs again.

Among those councilmen who are the most committed to politics, those who placed a high value on obtaining their present council seat and who may seek other political and governmental offices, 35% think that the citizens in their community define their role as that of a "politician" while only 6% believe that the citizens look upon the councilman simply as another "citizen." The pattern is reversed among the least committed councilmen with 6% choosing the "politician" category and 28% selecting the "citizen" response. Again, as before, the percentage of councilmen who believe that the citizens in their communities think of the councilman as a "politician" increases as the councilman's commitment to politics increases, from 6% to 17%, to 20% and then 35%. There is a corresponding decrease in the percentage who respond with "citizen."

The pattern of relationships in Table 4 is common to all of the previous tables and the relationships are about the same in each case. In each case, the percentage of the councilmen who either see themselves in distinctly political terms or who believe the citizens in their communities see the councilman in these terms increases with the level of commitment of the councilman. The more extensive the councilman's political commitment, the more likely is he to begin to define

TABLE 4. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD BY CITIZENS BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY HIS ORIGINAL DESIRE FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

Perceived Citizens' View of Position	(Desire for Council Seat)					
	Considerable			Some and Little		
	Desires	Other	Offices	Desires	Other	Offices
	Prob. %	No %	N	Prob. %	No %	N
Politician	35	20	—	17	6	—
Public Servant	60	56	—	59	66	—
Citizen	6*	24	—	24	28	—
Respondents	(52)	(55)	(107)	(63)	(129)	(192)

* Rounding error.

his role as that of the "politician." These findings tend to confirm all of the hypotheses stated earlier.

Discussion

On the whole, the councilmen in the San Francisco Bay Area *do not* think of themselves as "politicians," nor do they believe that the citizens in their communities think of the councilman as a "politician." When offered a choice, they prefer to think of themselves as "public servants" or as just another "citizen," and a majority of the councilmen specifically reject the notion that the job of the councilman might either be political or call for political skills.

In general, Americans appear to hold curiously ambivalent views about the "politician" in this society. On the one hand, certain political roles such as the President, Senator, or Mayor are rated very favorably when compared with other occupational roles.¹⁸ On the other hand, the profession of politics is not so highly esteemed; in fact, a large segment of the public apparently thinks that politics is necessarily corrupt and dishonest.¹⁹ One reason for this view has been suggested by Dahl and Lindblom:

¹⁸ See "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, 9 (September 1, 1949), 3-19; Mapheus Smith, "An Empirical Scale of Prestige Status of Occupations," *American Sociological Review*, 8 (1943), 185-192.

¹⁹ Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion 1935-46* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 584; Mitchell, *op. cit.*, 683-698; National Opinion Research Center, *The Public Looks at Politics and Politicians*, Report No. 20, March, 1944.

... the role (of the politician) calls for actions such as compromise, renunciation, face-saving of oneself, which are morally ambiguous or even downright immoral to people with morally rigorous standards.²⁰

If the role of the "politician" is viewed as negatively as the evidence suggests, this may account for the majority of the councilmen in this study who prefer to define their job and its activities as nonpolitical. The city council is relatively low on the hierarchy of political positions in most instances, and these cities are not only small, but they are nonpartisan as well. Nonpartisanship was intended as a means of insulating the local polity from influences from the partisan political environment, and although that insulation appears to be less than complete in most cases, the existence of nonpartisanship probably does segregate the nonpartisan community somewhat from the surrounding partisan polity.²¹ All three factors, the small size of most of the communities, nonpartisanship, and the nominal status of the councilmanic position probably contribute to the recruitment of councilmen who have attitudes and values that are less "political" than those found in partisan politics.²²

At the same time, however, a sizable number of the councilmen tend to deviate from the rest of their colleagues and from the general public in that they are willing to think of themselves as "politicians." While the arguments above might explain why most of the councilmen think of their role as "nonpolitical," we must seek alternative explanations why a minority nevertheless deviate from the general pattern. Our initial hypotheses suggested that the factors of differential risk and political commitment may be related to the likelihood that councilmen will

²⁰ Dahl and Lindblom, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

²¹ See, for example, Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," *Western Political Quarterly*, XII (June, 1959), 452-457; A. Clarke Hagensick, "Influences of Partisanship and Incumbency on a Nonpartisan Election System," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVII (March, 1964), 112-119; and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics under the Nonpartisan Ballot," this *Review*, 53 (December, 1959), 1056-1066.

²² Although we have no data with which to compare these councilmen to councilmen elected under a partisan system of elections, these councilmen are quite antagonistic toward partisan politics at the local level. Over 90% believe that the community would be worse off with partisan elections, and nearly 90% believe that "better people" are elected under nonpartisan elections.

adopt norms and values congruent with the larger political environment, and the tables tended to confirm these hypotheses. In each case, the adoption of the "political" role was positively and cumulatively related to the risk the councilman was willing to sustain to obtain his seat, and to his positional and progressive commitment to politics.

In each table, however, a sizable proportion of the councilmen do not conform to the general pattern within the table. In the lowest risk cities and among the least committed councilmen, some of the respondents still think of their job as "political." Conversely, some of the more committed councilmen think of themselves in "apolitical terms." One plausible explanation for this is that we are not tapping the full range either of the risk undertaken by officeholders or of the commitment that politicians have to their positions and to political careers. For this reason, the variables of risk and commitment as *measured here* should not be expected to account for all of the variance in the role definitions of the councilmen. This factor will be discussed later.

III. THE COUNCILMAN AND THE BARGAINING PROCESS

Bargaining as a means of reaching decisions pervades the American political system. It is the *modus operandi* within virtually every major political institution in the society such that the very term "politics" is analogous with bargaining for many people. Although this prevalence of bargaining is seen by many students of politics as one of the most important positive characteristics of this society, it is doubtful that the general public views bargaining in such a favorable light. Bargaining appears to connote to many people "behind the back deals" in "smoke-filled rooms" or the pursuit of "private gain" at the expense of the "public good."

At the same time, however, the city councilman is called upon to reach decisions among conflicting demands; and although such policy conflicts are limited in scope to the confines of his community, they may be just as important to the participants as the broader issues of public policy that arise at the state and federal levels of government. And like other governmental decision-makers, and perhaps unlike decision-makers in business and industry, the city councilman can seldom act independently and authoritatively in reaching his decision. He is forced, instead, to bargain and negotiate among the conflicting interests in his community.

In order to determine the councilman's perception of and attitude toward the bargaining

TABLE 5. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF WHETHER BARGAINING OCCURS ON THE COUNCIL BY HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BARGAINING PROCESS

Amount of Bargaining	Attitude Toward Bargaining		
	Positive %	Negative %	N
Some	90	22	
None	10	78	
Respondents	(145)	(179)	(324)

process, the councilmen were asked: "City councilmen sometimes talk about decisions in terms of bargaining—do you think this goes on in your Council?" This question was employed to determine whether or not the councilman perceived that bargaining occurred on the council; while his attitude toward bargaining was determined by coding his responses to a series of probes about the bargaining process. Table 5 shows the relationship between these two items; the councilman's perception of whether bargaining occurs on the council by his attitude toward bargaining as a technique of decision-making.

The councilman's attitude toward bargaining is clearly related to whether he perceives that bargaining occurs on the council, and the extent of the relationship is striking. Although alternative hypotheses are possible, it appears to be the case that a councilman's attitude strongly affects the manner in which he defines the behavior that occurs on the council. If he believes that bargaining has positive consequences for council decision-making, he tends to define at least some of the interaction that occurs as "bargaining behavior." If he does not hold this view, the councilman, who may be observing similar behavior to those who hold a positive view of bargaining, defines the behavior that occurs as something other than bargaining.

What is more important for this analysis, however, is whether the councilman's view of the bargaining process, both his attitude toward bargaining and his perception of the extent of bargaining, is a function of the variables of risk and political commitment. In Table 6, the councilman's evaluation of bargaining and his perception of the extent of bargaining on the council are correlated with the two variables of electoral risk, the size of his city and the closeness of the vote in city elections.

In both parts of the table the pattern is almost precisely the same. In those cities with substantial electoral risk, the large and competi-

TABLE 6. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE AMOUNT OF BARGAINING ON THE COUNCIL AND HIS JUDGMENT AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF BARGAINING BY THE RISK OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN HIS COMMUNITY

Amount of Bargaining	Large Population			Small Population		
	Average Closeness of Vote		N	Average Closeness of Vote		N
	High %	Low %		High %	Low %	
Some	60	—		47	37	
None	40	—		53	63	
Respondents	(90)	(16)*	(106)	(161)	(132)	(292)
Evaluation of Bargaining	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Positive	59	—		48	35	
Negative	41	—		52	65	
Respondents	(71)	(15)*	(86)	(114)	(98)	(212)

* Too few cases to analyze.

tive cities, about three-fifths of the councilmen have both a positive attitude toward bargaining and believe that bargaining occurs on their councils. At the other end of the continuum, the cities with the lowest electoral risk, only about one-third of the councilmen believe that bargaining occurs on the council and evaluate bargaining in positive terms. A second common element in both parts of the table is the increase in the perception and positive evaluation of bargaining that is associated with an increase in the electoral competitiveness of the city, in which the councilman holds his office. Electoral competition has the effect of increasing the cost, and thereby the risk, of seeking the councilmanic position; and those councilmen who were elected in the small cities that were competitive seem to have a more favorable view of the bargaining process than those councilmen elected in the less competitive small communities.

The pattern of relationships found in Table 6 is congruent with the results of earlier tables. The variables of electoral risk, i.e., city size and the closeness of the vote in city elections, were related *both* to the role expectations of councilmen and to their attitudes toward the bargaining process in their communities. In each instance the councilmen who are elected in high risk cities are more likely to hold "politicized" attitudes about their role in the local political process. But electoral risk only reflects one aspect of the politician's commitment to politics; and in Table 7 the measures of positional and progressive commitment are correlated with the

TABLE 7. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE AMOUNT OF BARGAINING ON THE COUNCIL AND HIS JUDGMENT ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF THAT BARGAINING BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY HIS ORIGINAL DESIRE FOR HIS SEAT ON THE COUNCIL

Amount of Bargaining	(Desire for Council Seat)					
	Considerable			Some and Little		
	Desires Prob.	Other No	Offices N	Desires Prob.	Other No	Offices N
	%	%		%	%	
Some	68	52		55	37	
None	32	48		45	63	
Respondents	(60)	(58)	(118)	(76)	(143)	(219)
Evaluation of Bargaining	High %	Low %	N	High %	Low %	N
Positive	57	46		54	37	
Negative	43	54		46	63	
Respondents	(51)	(46)	(97)	(59)	(103)	(162)

two measures of the bargaining process.

In the first part of the table, the councilman's perception of whether bargaining occurs on the Council is related to both measures of political commitment. The more committed a councilman is to his office, i.e., his positional commitment, and the more committed the councilman is to seek for other political or governmental offices, i.e., his progressive commitment, the more likely is he to believe that bargaining occurs in the councilmanic decisional process in his community.

The relationships in the second part of the table, however, deviate somewhat from the general pattern that has been observed throughout this analysis. The variable of progressive commitment follows the predicted pattern: the more committed councilmen are more likely, on the whole, to have a more positive orientation toward bargaining; but the variable of positional commitment is only slightly related to the councilman's attitude toward bargaining. Although the relationship between the councilman's desire for his position and his attitude toward bargaining follows the predicted positive direction, the strength of the association is very small and is not significant at the .05 level.²³ The argument

²³ Tests of significance and measures of association have not been presented with the data for two reasons. All of the tables with the exception of this one show associations that are significant at the .05 level with the Chi-square test of significance. For that reason, the presentations of significance levels is redundant. Also, the argument rests on a

in this paper, however, is based on the results of a number of hypotheses and a number of tables, and a separate interpretation for this case does not seem warranted, especially because the direction of the effect that does occur is positive, even though it is small. At the same time, it does suggest that positional commitment for the councilmen may not be as strong a measure of the councilman's generalized commitment to politics as is the councilman's desire to seek other political and governmental offices.

With the exception of the case just discussed, the results of these and the earlier tables seem to confirm the general hypothesis that the socialization of the officeholder is linked to his generalized commitment to politics and to a political career of sorts. But before turning to a discussion of these findings, there is an alternative hypothesis that requires examination.

IV. SOCIAL PLURALISM, RISK, AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT

In the analysis above, the variable of community size has been employed as a measure of electoral risk. For most of the councilmen and for most officeholders in general, the avenue of advancement is via the electoral arena, and that arena has a set of costs attached to it that all potential officeholders must at some time pay. These are fixed costs and they must, in varying degrees, be paid by every candidate whether or not the candidate wins. They constitute a *risk* for the candidate in the sense that the candidate will lose all or at least part of these costs if the candidate loses. Although the risk of seeking office will vary considerably from candidate to candidate, depending upon a large number of individual factors, we have argued that these costs will, in general, be an increasing function of the size of the city and the degree of competition in city elections.

At the same time, however, the variable of city size reflects a second dimension of commu-

nity life, the extent of the social pluralism in the community. From Madison to the present, students of political life have recognized that the size of a political unit is highly related to the diversity of groups, factions, and interests that will be present in the unit. In this study the cities range from several that are less than 2500 in population to the largest, San Jose, which is over 400,000 in population. We have employed 30,000 as the dividing point for dichotomizing the variable of city size, and although the size of a city is not a perfect indicator of social pluralism, it seems obvious that the cities over 30,000 are, on the whole, considerably more socially pluralistic than those under that size.²⁴

The importance of social pluralism in this instance derives from its relationship to bargaining. Where a community is highly pluralistic such that no one group, faction, or interest can dominate a community, bargaining becomes a necessity. Thus the size of a city may be related to the councilman's perception of and attitude toward bargaining through the intervening effect of social pluralism and not because of the factor of risk. In an empirical sense, both the variable of social pluralism and the variable of risk are multi-dimensional constructs, and it is not at present possible to establish a single indicator for each variable; and for that reason, it is not possible to test which of the two variables, social pluralism or risk, is responsible for the shift in the councilman's attitudes toward the bargaining process.²⁵

Although we cannot establish which of these two factors associated with city size is producing the effect on the councilman's orientation toward bargaining, it is possible to show that a primary dimension of political commitment, the councilman's desire to seek other political or governmental offices, is related to the councilman's attitudes and orientations even when the effects of size are controlled. In this manner the

set of relationships, rather than a single relationship, and the test of significance for all of the tables is significant at less than .0001 level. Measures of relationship such as the tau-beta or tau-c would be misleading because we only have a limited range of the independent variables of commitment. Obviously, political commitment extends down to people who have little or no interest in politics and upward to people who make politics their exclusive career. Restriction of the range of the independent variable, as in this case, would naturally lower the measures of relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables in the study.

²⁴ See, for empirical evidence, Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, *American Cities: Their Social Characteristics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). They show correlative evidence that size is strongly related to the social, demographic and ecological diversity within a community.

²⁵ The cost factors in electoral politics cannot be cumulated because it would involve making interpersonal comparisons of utility. The variables of social pluralism cannot be aggregated because we know of no theoretical method of integrating the characteristics of social pluralism. For these reasons, the factor of size, which is roughly related to both risk and social pluralism, is employed as a surrogate measure that approximates the variables.

TABLE 8. THE COUNCILMAN'S DEFINITION OF HIS OWN POSITION'S REQUIREMENTS AND THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE VIEW OF HIS JOB HELD BY THE PEOPLE IN HIS COMMUNITY BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE FOR OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE CONTROLLING BY THE SIZE OF HIS COMMUNITY

Position's Requirements	Large Population			Small Population		
	Desires	Other Offices		Desires	Other Offices	
	Prob. %	No %	N	Prob. %	No %	N
Politician or political skill	73	63		46	33	
Nonpolitical	27	37		54	67	
Respondents	(52)	(41)	(93)	(80)	(164)	(244)
Perceived Citizen's View of Position	Desires Prob. %	Other Offices No %	N	Desires Prob. %	Other Offices No %	N
Politician	43	37		21	4	
Public servant	50	50		56	65	
Citizen	7	13		23	31	
Respondents	(42)	(38)	(80)	(73)	(149)	(222)

influence of political commitment on the politician's socialization process can be established irrespective of the effect of social pluralism.

Both of the independent variables, city size and the councilman's ambition for other political or governmental offices, are positively related to the councilman's role orientations, but the important consideration here is that the councilman's progressive commitment to politics is related to his role orientations even when the variable to community size is controlled. Thus, even if we cannot distinguish between the effect of city size as a measure of social pluralism from the effect of city size as a measure of electoral risk, it is possible to show that one of the other measures of the councilman's commitment to politics is related to his orientations toward his role as officeholder. We can obtain additional evidence for this finding by examining these two independent variables with regard to the councilman's orientations toward bargaining.

In Table 9, as in the previous table, both of the independent variables are related to the councilman's orientations toward the bargaining process. Thus when size is controlled, the councilman's ambition is still related to his perception of and attitude toward the bargaining process. In fact, of the 29% net shift across the whole table with regard to the extent of perceived bargaining, about 19% is associated with the councilman's ambitions while 11% is associated with the size of the community. Of the 26% net shift in the councilman's evaluation of

TABLE 9. THE COUNCILMAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE AMOUNT OF BARGAINING ON THE COUNCIL AND HIS JUDGMENT AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF BARGAINING BY THE COUNCILMAN'S DESIRE FOR OTHER POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES CONTROLLING BY THE SIZE OF HIS CITY

Amount of Bargaining	Large Population			Small Population		
	Desires	Other Offices		Desires	Other Offices	
	Prob. %	No %	N	Prob. %	No %	N
Some	66	47		54	37	
None	34	53		46	63	
Respondents	(61)	(51)	(112)	(94)	(190)	(284)
Evaluation of Bargaining	Desires Prob. %	Other Offices No %	N	Desires Prob. %	Other Offices No %	N
Positive	60	50		53	34	
Negative	40	50		47	66	
Respondents	(50)	(44)	(94)	(76)	(135)	(211)

bargaining, about 15% is associated with the councilman's ambition while 11% is associated with the size of his city. This means that, on the whole, the councilman's ambition is more strongly related to his perception of and attitude toward bargaining than is the variable of city size.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The issue of political ambition, or political commitment, has been with us for some time, but we still know very little in any precise fashion about the relationship between the politician's ambitions and the values and attitudes he adopts towards the political process. Max Weber, for example, examined the emergence of the "professional politician" in a number of countries, and he then proceeded to relate this new type of political participant to a number of aspects of the political system.²⁶ More recently, James D. Barber, in his study of the Connecticut legislature, explored the relationship between the state legislator's involvement in the legislature and his attitudes and orientations toward the political process.²⁷ And James Q. Wilson has

²⁶ Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 83, 87.

²⁷ Barber divides his respondents into four groups on the basis of two variables; the legislator's willingness to return three or more times to the legislature and his activity as a legislator. Both of these variables are similar in character to those of this study in that both variables reflect the willingness to invest in politics, and the findings of his study are similar to the findings in this study. For ex-

suggested that the "amateurs" in the political club movements of California, Chicago, and New York have quite different styles, attitudes, and values than the "professional politician" and that these differences are, in part, a function of the different motivations of "amateurs" as opposed to "professional" politicians.²⁸

But perhaps more than anyone else, Joseph A. Schlesinger has elevated the variable of political ambition to a central place in the study of the political process, particularly the recruitment process. In his seminal study of the opportunity structure in the United States, Schlesinger suggests:

To slight the role of ambition in politics, then, or to treat it as a human failing to be suppressed, is to miss the central function of ambition in political systems. A political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as much in danger of breaking down as one unable to restrain ambitions. Representative government, above all, depends on a supply of men so driven; the desire for election and, more important, for re-election becomes the electorate's restraint upon its public officials. No more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for the political futures.²⁹

The findings of this study, although limited in scope to city councilmen, suggest the politician's ambition, or more broadly, his political commitment, are not only related to the recruitment of politicians, but to the socialization of councilmen as well. What we found in nearly every case was that the more committed councilmen, those who were willing to take the greatest risk and who expressed the most desire to proceed to other political or governmental offices, were also the most likely to express attitudes and values appropriate for success in a decentralized and pluralistic political system.

One possible implication of these findings is that both the recruitment process and the socialization process for politicians may be evaluated

in light of the utility calculus of the politician.³⁰ When one examines the ambitions and political commitment of prospective politicians, we are in fact examining the rational calculus that the political actor makes, with respect to a given set of alternatives. To say that a man is politically ambitious is to say that he places a high value on the alternatives within a sequence of political roles. In this case, we asked the councilmen to evaluate both their current position and the next position they may seek. In addition, we constructed a rough estimate of the amount of *risk* that they had to sustain in order to obtain the councilmanic position that they held at the time of the study. All of these elements are components of the utility calculus.

What is less obvious, however, is that attitudes and values may be also a part of the rational actor's utility calculus. Suppose, for example, that some attitudes will increase the probability of success in a given career sequence while other attitudes might have the converse effect; they might make it much more difficult to achieve success in a given career. The rational actor, if his desire is to move up the career sequence, is likely to adopt those attitudes which increase his probability of success in that career, unless of course, the set of attitudes in question is very repugnant to him such that adopting them would involve a very high cost. But if he refuses to adopt the attitudes, he may well have to pay the cost of being less successful than he might otherwise wish. In either instance the net result would seem to be the same, and an examination of higher levels in any career line should show increasingly greater homogeneity of attitudes and values, either because individuals adopted the attitudes in order to be a success or because the individuals who refused to conform were screened out at lower levels in the career line.

The findings of this study seem to conform to such an interpretation. On the whole, the more ambitious councilmen, those willing to sustain a substantial electoral *risk* and who also wish to go on to other offices, tend to have role orientations and attitudes towards bargaining that are congruent with the demands of the larger political environment. They are the potentially "professional" politicians.

In one sense, these results are more significant than the data seems to suggest. The reason for

ample, among the most committed of his subjects, those willing to return to the legislature and who have a high activity level (Law-makers), 55% identify themselves as "politicians" and 82% have engaged in major negotiations. Among the least committed group, those not willing to return three times and low on legislative activity (reluctants), only 33% identify themselves as "politicians" and only 47% have engaged in major negotiations. *Op. cit.*, pp. 25-26, and 166-167.

²⁸ Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-31.

²⁹ Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³⁰ Running for office is a form of political participation. For an analysis of voting behavior using utility analysis, see William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 25-42.

this is that the empirical indicators of risk and political commitment only measure a limited range of these variables. This study is of city councilmen, and, as such, the distribution of respondents only cover a small range of either risk or commitment. Neither the uncommitted individual nor the highly committed, professional politician is found among our subjects. Because the distribution of respondents only covers a small range of the independent variables, we should only be able to predict a portion of the attitudinal distribution of political activists. If the subjects of the study had shown a greater range of political commitment, we should have found an even stronger set of relationships than we found in the tables.

The findings here, however, are limited and they will not permit an examination of some of the broader issues in the recruitment and socialization of politicians. Our data strongly sug-

gest that the ambitions of politicians are related to at least some of the attitudes and orientations that politicians have toward the political process. Apparently, the city councilmen in the study are involved in the process of professionalization, and the more ambitious of the councilmen are learning a set of orientations and attitudes that will aid them in their pursuit of future political goals. Although it is not possible with this data to show whether they are recruited because they had these attitudes originally or whether they were socialized into these attitudes after they came on the council, we did confirm our hypotheses that the presence of "politicized" attitudes is a function of the measures of electoral risk and political commitment. The consistency of the findings suggest that the relationship between the ambitions of politicians and the process of professionalization is both positive and strong.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF DEFEATED CANDIDATES IN AN AMERICAN STATE ELECTION*

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Electoral victories and defeats occur repeatedly. This is especially true in democratic political systems where key governmental roles are filled through periodic elections. The attitude of defeated candidates toward the regime norms directly affects the system stability, because disaffected by defeat, these candidates may withdraw their support for the regime and may also translate such disaffection into radical political action. Despite the potential threat the defeated electoral candidates can pose to democratic stability, their political attitudes have rarely been investigated systematically in political science literature.¹ Do defeated candidates exhibit an attitude toward the democratic rules and norms governing electoral competition significantly different from that of winning candidates? Do defeated candidates become politically less active after the election than they were before? Under what conditions do they become disaffected with the democratic rules and norms? This paper attempts, first, to compare the political attitudes of both winning and losing candidates, and second, to explore the variables which might account for differences in such attitudes.

The data used in this paper are derived from a larger study of political recruitment in Oregon.² Structured interviews were conducted with

both winning and losing candidates who ran for the Oregon House of Representatives in the 1966 election. The samples were interviewed at three different times: before and after the primary, and after the general election. This research strategy permits us to analyze the effect of the outcome of the election on the attitudes of the candidates. Data were collected on the candidates' degree of support for the democratic rules of competition, their expected changes in political activity as a result of participation in the election, their career ambitions, and the perceived reward-cost, i.e., the material and psychological gains or losses which accrue to the candidates as a direct result of their participation in the election.

I. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF KEY VARIABLES

Dependent Variables

The candidates' support for the democratic rules and their expected changes in political activity are the two dependent variables used in this study. Support is defined in terms of the extent to which a candidate considers the formal and informal rules and procedures governing electoral competition as adequate. The operational measure of support is based on a candidate's feelings about the legal and practical requirements for getting elected, the degree of perceived fairness in the election outcome, and his feelings about the overall fairness in the political opportunity structure.³ Responses to these three

election and 92 winners and 17 losers in the primary election. For further details on the samples and sampling procedures, see Lester G. Seligman, Michael R. King and Chong Lim Kim, *Political Recruitment: Winning and Losing in American Politics* (forthcoming).

³ The support items are (a) "In general, do you feel that the legal requirements in getting elected in the election give each candidate the same chance of winning or do some have an advantage?" (b) "In general, do you feel that the practical requirements in getting elected give each candidate the same chance of winning or do some candidates have an advantage?" (c) "In running for office in this district, do you believe that a person can succeed primarily on the basis of ability and initiative or are other things important for success in politics?" and "Is this the way it should be?"

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¹ A few exceptions must be noted: John W. Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," this REVIEW, LXI (March, 1967), 137-145; Jeff Fishel, "Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969), 1213-1232; and Lester G. Seligman, *Political Recruitment* (Boston: Little, Brown, forthcoming).

² This study includes three samples: (a) a quota sample of 68 candidates interviewed before the primary election, (b) a mixed-stratified sample of 109 post-primary election candidates, and (c) 77 completed interviews from a total population of 110 general election candidates. The present analysis is based on 46 winners and 31 losers in the general

interview items are cumulatively scaled and a single support scale is obtained ($CR = .92$). Our measure of expected changes in political activity is derived from a candidate's responses to three questions: does he intend to follow issues more than before the election? Does he intend to discuss politics more frequently than before the election? And, given the election outcome, does he still intend to continue a political career? Whenever a candidate gives a positive answer, a score is assigned and these scores are summed to form a simple index of expected changes in political activity.

Independent Variables

(A) Perceived Reward-Cost

The conceptualization and measurement of rewards and costs attendant upon electoral victory and defeat present a complex problem. The term "reward-cost" will be defined in terms of both material and psychological gains or losses that result directly from election participation.⁴ The reward is great when a victory in political competition insures high prestige, wealth, influence, and opportunity for career advancement. Conversely, the cost is severe if a political defeat results in the loss of all these. Any attempt to measure the reward-cost of winning and losing confronts at least three kinds of measurement problem. First, the candidates may have different hierarchies of values, and may therefore estimate the reward-cost attendant upon electoral victory and defeat differently. Second, winning a public office does not necessarily mean a career advancement, for it is relative to one's previous social status.⁵ Candidates enter political competition from varying status positions, and it would seem possible that the outcome of an election produces varying degrees of satisfaction or deprivation for different individuals. Finally, measuring the reward-cost is further complicated by two types of incentive associated with public offices.⁶ One of these is the "extrinsic"

⁴Hereafter, the term 'reward-cost' will be used in the singular, for our concern is with the *amount* of perceived reward or cost. But, for some other purpose, we can presumably speak of rewards or costs since there may be different kinds of these.

⁵James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 36.

⁶See James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 4; Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 6 (September, 1961), 134-137; and John C. Wahlke *et al.* *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative*

reward-cost, which may be defined in terms of the gains or losses in income, occupation, prestige, influence, and career opportunity. The other type is the "intrinsic" reward-cost that a candidate derives from participation itself, such as a sense of fulfillment of civic duties or community service.

Our operational measurement of reward-cost is based on a battery of questions designed to determine the effect of electoral victory and defeat on a candidate's social esteem, income, occupation, career opportunity and political influence. Obviously, some reward-costs are more important than others but for the purpose of this analysis each reward-cost item is assigned the same weight.⁷ Nine such items are used and the responses to these questions are coded into positive, neutral, and negative categories.⁸ For example, our respondents responded to: "As a consequence of the election, do you anticipate any change in your circle of close friends?" Responses are coded: (a) gained more friends, (b) no change, or (c) lost some friends. A summated scale of the reward-cost is constructed: each respondent who gives positive and/or negative response is assigned a score based on the arithmetic sum of his coded responses.

(B) Career Ambition and Expectation about the Election Outcome

Both Eulau and Schlesinger have argued that analysis of a politician's ambition illuminates his behavior because ambition "probably molds a

Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 113-119.

⁷I am presently engaged in a more detailed analysis of the various types of reward-cost attendant upon electoral victories and defeats in order to determine their relative importance to candidates.

⁸The following items are used to measure the reward-cost: (1) As a consequence of the election, do you anticipate any change in your job, (2) As a consequence of the election, do you anticipate any change in your circle of close friends, (3) Do you anticipate a change in your income as a consequence of the election, (4) Do you feel that your esteem among your colleagues in your occupation has gone up or down, (5) Do you feel that your esteem among members of your religion has gone up, (6) Do you feel that your esteem among your neighbors has gone up, (7) Do you feel that your esteem in your family has gone up, (8) Do you expect that your loss in the election will help or hinder your chances if you decide to run again for the House, and (9) Do you feel that your political influence has increased as a consequence of the election.

good deal of political behavior."⁹ Career ambition is defined by the level of office a candidate wishes to achieve in his career. It is accordingly measured by classifying level of office desired into four categories: national, state, local, and "no ambition." The measure of expectation about the election outcome is derived from a candidate's own assessment of his chance of winning at the beginning of the electoral campaign. For instance, a candidate might at the outset have described his chance of winning as "excellent," "good," "fair," or "poor." It might be expected that defeat would imply a serious career setback for an ambitious candidate—one who hopes to go a long way in politics—and that this might lead to attitudes significantly different from those of candidates with less ambition. By the same token, the differential assessment of chance of winning might also affect the attitudes of the candidates.

(C) Types of District and Election

Districts are classified into safe, competitive, or unsafe, given a candidate's party affiliation. The degree of party competitiveness (measured by the ratio of the registered Republican and Democratic voters and the percentage of time each party has been successful in electing its candidates) and each candidate's party label served as the basis of this classification. The types of election simply refer to the primary and general elections. Our assumption is that types of election and district might account for the variations in the attitudes of the defeated candidates because a candidate running in the safe district, and therefore relatively sure of his victory, may find it more difficult to face up to an unexpected defeat than others running in competitive or unsafe districts. In the same vein, a defeat in the primary election may be considered of less consequence than a defeat in the general election, and if this should be the case, we would then expect significant differences in the attitudes of the primary and general election losers.

(D) Occupation, Income and Education

These stratification variables are included primarily because of two theoretical considerations. The first stems from the general findings of research on the effects of stratification on political

⁹ Heinz Eulau, *et al.*, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.) *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 254; and also see Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966).

TABLE 1. POLITICAL SUPPORT OF WINNER AND LOSER
(In Percentage)

Support	Primary Election		General Election		X ²	P
	Winner N=84* (A)	Loser N=17 (B)	Winner N=46 (C)	Loser N=31 (D)		
High	64.2%	58.8%	65.1%	25.9%	A&B	0.72 NS
Medium	33.5	41.2	28.4	64.4	C&D	11.75 .01
					A&C	1.57 NS
Low	2.3	0.0	6.5	9.7	B&D	6.01 .05
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%		

* 8 cases are excluded because of the lack of information on their support.

opinions, voting behavior, political participation, and support. Secondly, as Seligman has succinctly stated: "the ousted politician cannot fall below the level his skills and training ensures."¹⁰ Therefore, a candidate's occupation, income, and education may cushion the cost of defeat.

In addition to the eight variables cited above, the incumbent status of candidates at the time of the election may influence subsequent attitudes, for the adverse effects of defeat may be greater for incumbents than for others. We cannot take this potentially important variable into account, however, for lack of data. Out of 60 possible winners for election to the Oregon House in 1966, 47 were incumbent winners and the remaining thirteen were nonincumbents. There were a total of four defeated incumbents and all refused to be interviewed.

II. FINDINGS

Support and Activity of Winners and Losers

Table 1 shows the level of support that the candidates accord the democratic rules of competition after having participated in the primary and general elections. Winners in both primary and general elections exhibited a greater degree of support than did the losers. The difference is not as pronounced for the primary election as for the general election, which suggests that the outcomes of the primary election probably do not change the supportive attitude of the candidates as much as the outcomes of the general election. This point is reinforced when we confine our comparison to the losers. Note that 59

¹⁰ Lester G. Seligman, "Political Leadership: Status Loss and Downward Mobility," (unpublished paper delivered at Annual American Political Science Association meeting, New York, 1966), p. 24.

TABLE 2. CHANGE IN SUPPORT OF THE GENERAL ELECTION WINNER AND LOSER

(In Percentage)

Support Change	Winner N = 44	Loser N = 28
Increase	22.6%	11.2%
No Change	63.8	44.4
Decrease	13.6	44.4
No Response	(2)	(3)
Total	100 %	100 %

N includes only those interviewed twice.

$X^2 = 9.03$, $p < .01$.

percent of the primary election losers reported high support, as compared to only 26 percent of the general election losers ($X^2 = 6.01$, $p < .05$).

Of course, such a difference in support for the democratic rules of the game between the winners and losers may not result from the election itself. It is possible that a greater percentage of the winners might have been supportive from the outset. Since we repeated the support items at various times of the election, we can determine whether this was the case by comparing a candidate's support over time. Table 2 shows that almost one half of the losers, in contrast to only 14 percent of the winners, reported a decrease in support. And this difference is statistically significant ($X^2 = 9.03$, $p < .01$). Thus, it seems safe to conclude that the losers are more likely to be less supportive of the democratic rules than the winners, and that the former are more likely than the latter to reduce their support as a result of participation in elections.

Equally significant is the finding that only a small number of the candidates manifested low support for the democratic rules of the game, regardless of the outcome of the election. Roughly 10 percent of the losers in the general election and none of the losers in the primary election registered low support. It thus appears that winning or losing does effect some changes in support, but does not produce enough disaffection to induce low support for the democratic rules among the losers.

With respect to the expected changes in political activity, Table 3 shows that the winners indicated a significantly higher intention to remain politically active than did the losers. Almost 83 percent of the winners, as compared to only 39 percent of the losers, said that they would spend more time following issues after the general

election than before it ($x^2 = 14.3$, $p < .001$). Similarly, over one half of the winners expected that they would discuss politics more frequently after the general election than before it, while only one-third of the losers reported the same intention. The difference between winners and losers in their intention to continue a political career after the general election is not statistically significant, even though the winners tended to give positive responses slightly more than the losers.¹¹

Factors Influencing the Supportive Attitude and Intention for Future Political Activity of the Defeated Candidates

The analysis in this section is confined to some selected variables which affect political attitudes of the defeated candidates. Table 4 summarizes relationships between the dependent and independent variables discussed earlier.¹² The level of political ambition of the defeated candidates is very strongly associated with their intention for political activity. This evidence suggests that the losers with high political ambition are more likely than the less ambitious losers to exhibit a high intention for political activity ($\text{Gamma} = .75$). The candidates' expectation about the election outcome correlates negatively with support and intention to continue political activity. Those candidates who initially gave an optimistic assessment of their chances of winning seem to manifest a less supportive attitude toward the rules of the game and are less likely to continue political activity than are the other losers who went into the election with less optimism.

Whether a loser ran in a safe or unsafe district appears to make a difference in terms of how politically active he would be after the

¹¹ There are two possible reasons why some candidates wish to continue a political career in spite of electoral defeat. One reason is their belief that they would have a better chance of winning in the next election because they have gained some name familiarity in their districts as a result of the unsuccessful campaign. Another reason is that many of our candidates are what Barber might call "advertisers." Their main motive for running for an office is not because they want to win it but to promote private interests such as legal practice through electoral participation. See Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-115

¹² Both cross-tabulations and between item rank-order intercorrelations are also examined. Although *tau* values are generally smaller than Gammas presented in Table 4, basically the same pattern is observed.

TABLE 3. EXPECTED CHANGES IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE GENERAL ELECTION WINNER AND LOSER

(In Percentage)

Activity	Response	Winner N = 46	Loser N = 31	X ²	P
1. Do you intend to spend more time thinking about politics and following issues in mass media than before the election?	More Time	82.6%	38.7%	14.24	.001
	No Change	15.2	48.4		
	Less Time	0.0	3.2		
	No Response	2.2	9.7		
		100%	100%		
2. Do you intend to devote more time to discussing politics with your friends and associates than before the election?	More Time	56.5%	25.8%	7.13	.05
	No Change	36.9	51.6		
	Less Time	4.4	12.9		
	No Response	2.2	9.7		
		100%	100%		
3. In the light of your experience in the election, do you wish to continue your political career?	Yes	58.7%	48.4%	3.23	NS
	Undecided	32.6	25.8		
	No	6.5	19.4		
	No Response	2.2	6.4		
		100%	100%		

election. The losers from relatively safe districts showed less enthusiasm for future political participation than did other losers from competitive or unsafe districts. The type of election in which a candidate was competing is also strongly associated with support for the rules of the game and political activity. The primary election losers are more likely than the general election losers to be supportive of the democratic rules and to engage in politics actively.

Contrary to my expectation, a candidate's education is virtually unrelated to either support for the democratic rules or intention for future political activity. Occupation and income variables are weakly associated with support and activity. Compared to the ambition, expectation, and types of election, our stratification variables appear to have far less effect on the attitudes of the defeated candidates.¹³ I will, therefore, exclude them in the following analysis.

¹³ One possible reason why our stratification variables turned out to be weak predictors of the attitudes is the candidates' highly homogeneous social background characteristics. For example, 79% of our respondents have college or advanced degrees, 71% of them have prestigious occupations such as lawyers, doctors, and proprietors of large or medium sized business, and 66% of these candidates make an annual income of \$15,000 or more.

The Perceived Reward-Cost and the Attitudes of the Defeated Candidates

The data in Table 4 reveal that the amount of perceived reward-cost is very strongly associated with both support for the rules of the game and intention for future political activity (Gamma = .56 and .61). The analysis also shows that ambition, expectation, type of district and type of election affect the attitudes of

TABLE 4. SOME CORRELATES OF SUPPORT AND ACTIVITY

(Gamma)

Variables	Support	Activity
Level of Ambition: national, state, local	.05	.75
Expectation of Election Outcome: excellent, good, poor	-.45	-.36
Type of District: safe, competitive, unsafe	-.08	-.25
Type of Election: primary, general	.41	.39
Occupation: prestige ranking	.22	.16
Income	.26	.06
Education	-.02	-.12
Reward-Cost Score	.56	.61

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN REWARD-COST AND THE ATTITUDES OF THE DEFEATED CANDIDATES WITH AMBITION, EXPECTATION, TYPE OF DISTRICT AND ELECTION CONTROLLED
(Gamma)

Support Control Group I ($N=20$)	.63
Support Control Group II ($N=28$)	.53
Activity Control Group I ($N=21$)	.65
Activity Control Group II ($N=27$)	.60

the defeated candidates. Therefore, it seems appropriate to control their effects before we proceed to interpret the observed relations between the perceived reward-cost and the attitudes of defeated candidates.

Due to the small sample size ($N = 48$), we cannot opt for the conventional partialling technique. Instead, an *index formation technique* is employed to control simultaneously for political ambition, expectation about the election outcome, type of district, and type of election. The method is "based on the relation of each control classification to the dependent variable. On the basis of these relationships, weights are assigned to each category in control classification and each individual in each category receives the designated weight. These weights are summed for each individual to yield an index based on all of the controls. Finally, the index is used as a control classification in the usual sense."¹⁴

Treating the amount of perceived reward-cost as the independent variable and level of support for the rules of the game as the dependent variable, an index score for each candidate is computed based on four controls (ambition, expectation, type of district and type of election). Then, these index scores are dichotomized to form support control group I and II respectively. Finally, the relationship between the perceived reward-cost and support is examined within each control group. Again, a similar procedure is used to yield control groups for political activity.

Table 5 shows the relationships between the perceived reward-cost and the attitudes of the defeated candidates within each of these control groups. The data clearly indicate that the amount of reward-cost perceived by the defeated candidates as a result of their participation in elections strongly correlates with both support for the rules of the game and intention

for future political participation, even after controlling for the effects of their ambitions, expectations, type of district, and type of election.

It is evident from the above analysis that the amount of reward-cost perceived by a defeated candidate is a powerful predictor of his supportive attitude toward the democratic rules and his intention for future political activity. The higher the perceived reward, the more likely is a defeated candidate to become supportive of the rules and active in politics after the election. Conversely, the higher the perceived cost of defeat, the more likely he is to become disaffected with the accepted rules of the game and further political participation.

The Reward-Cost Attendant Upon Electoral Victory and Defeat

What difference does it make to win or lose an election in terms of the reward-cost? Table 6 presents the data on the reward-cost as perceived by the winning and losing candidates. It is quite apparent that the losing candidates in both primary and general elections perceived a significantly lower reward than the winning candidates. This leads us to believe that the winners and losers are rewarded differently by their respective participation in the election. It is, however, important to underscore the fact that most of our respondents, regardless of the election outcome, are found on the positive side of the reward-cost scale. Among the losers, roughly 82 percent of the primary and 81 percent of the general election candidates reported some rewards. This evidence clearly suggests that the electoral competition analyzed in the present paper is not a winner-take-all type of contest. In spite of electoral defeat, a predominant majority of the losing candidates gained in their social esteem, occupation, career opportunity or political influence.

The finding that the difference between winning and losing is rather moderate in terms of reward-cost (no one reporting "great cost") points to what is probably a significant feature of competition in the American political system. Given the relatively small differences perceived by the winning and losing candidates, the system can be described as a "low risk system."¹⁵ A low risk system exists where the reward of political victories is modest and the cost of defeats minimal. By contrast, a high risk system is char-

¹⁴ Sanford I. Labovitz, "Methods for Control With Small Sample Size," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (April, 1965), 243.

¹⁵ For an elaboration of the concept of low risk system, see Seligman, *Political Recruitment* and also my "Some Effects of Political Status Loss: A Comparative Approach," The Laboratory for Political Research, Report No. 17 (The University of Iowa, 1968).

TABLE 6. PERCEIVED REWARD-COST AS A RESULT OF WINNING AND LOSING
(In Percentage)

Amount of Reward-Cost	Primary Election		General Election		X ²	P
	Winner N = 92 (A)	Loser N = 17 (B)	Winner N = 46 (C)	Loser N = 31 (D)		
Great Reward	10.9%	17.6%	30.5%	6.4%		
Some Reward	33.7	17.6	36.9	38.7		
Little or No Reward	55.4	47.2	32.6	35.6	A&B	18.16
					C&D	14.09
					A&C	10.19
Some Cost	0.0	17.6	0.0	19.3	B&D	3.27
Great Cost	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		NS
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%		

acterized by political competitions which result in immense gains for winners in status, wealth and influence, and in extremely severe deprivations for losers.

Speculatively, many new states of Asia and Africa appear to be high risk systems. The potential rewards for victory are immense, for political positions traditionally confer high social prestige and give control over access to wealth. The ladder for upward social mobility is therefore often concentrated in political offices.¹⁶ The cost of political defeat in many of these states is devastating, for political competition tends to be very much warlike and often results in a total victory or defeat. Various factors account for such warlike competition. Among them are the deep cleavages between elites concerning the system goals and the methods of their implementation, a set of mutually reinforcing antagonisms that run along ethnic, tribal, religious, or regional lines, and widespread anti-governmental reflex which Shils has aptly described as an "oppositional syndrome."¹⁷ Moreover, the dominance of a single authoritarian party in many new states makes the emergence of political op-

position constitutionally and practically impossible and thereby increases the potential cost of being a member of a counter-elite.¹⁸

The high cost of political defeat in some of the new states may also be attributed to the fact that many of the political leaders have only limited occupational skills. What little evidence there is indicates that these leaders are "professionals" in the sense that they have no occupation other than politics.¹⁹ Therefore, as Apter has put it, "for them to go out of office is, in effect, to be unemployed."²⁰ And sometimes going out of office means going into exile as well. Because of the great reward associated with political vic-

¹⁶ David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 179-222; Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa," in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 267-301; and Ruth Schachter, "Single Party Systems in West Africa," this REVIEW (June, 1961), pp. 294-307.

¹⁷ The author's exploratory study of the defeated candidates in Korea revealed that 37% of the sample interviewed were unemployed at the time, which was two years after their electoral defeats. This appears to suggest that the defeated candidates had neither other occupational skills to return nor the wish to pursue non-political occupations. See my "Some Effects of Political Status Loss."

¹⁸ David E. Apter, "Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New Nations," in his *Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 73.

¹⁶ See Lester Seligman, "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Political Leadership," in Lewis J. Edinger (ed.), *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* (New York: John Wiley, 1967), pp. 304-306, and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Elites in French-Speaking West Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No. 1 (May, 1965), p. 17.

¹⁷ Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 353-355.

tory and the severe deprivations inflicted by defeat, political competition in these new political systems tends to be less constrained by the accepted rules of the game than in low risk systems such as the United States.

III. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION

The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the attitude of the defeated candidates toward the democratic norms of competition and their inclination to future political activity. Another research objective was to explore the variables which might account for the differences in such attitudes. Major findings and their theoretical implications are discussed as follows.

1. The evidence presented indicates that the defeated candidates in both the primary and general election exhibit a lower support for the democratic rules of competition than do the winning candidates after the election. With respect to their inclination to political activity, the losers showed significantly less enthusiasm than did the winners. It seems, then, quite clear that the winners and losers differ significantly in their supportive attitude and inclination to political activity.

2. However, it is highly important to note that despite the differences between the winners and losers, very few respondents reported low support for the democratic rules of competition after the election. In fact, differentials in support were not between high and low support but between *high* and *medium support categories*. This evidence strongly suggests that the losers do reduce somewhat their level of support as a result of defeat and yet remain basically supportive of the democratic rules governing electoral competition.

3. The result of primary elections appears to have less impact than general elections on the attitudes of candidates. Defeat in the primary election discouraged less candidates than defeat in the general election to continue political activity. Similarly, the candidates defeated in the primary election did not reduce their supportive attitude as much as those candidates defeated in the general election. Where a competitive party system is operative, thereby making general elections meaningful contests, the outcome of general elections is therefore likely to have a greater effect on the attitudes of candidates than that of primary elections.

4. Focusing on the variation in the attitudes of the defeated candidates, we found that their career ambition, expectation about the election outcome, types of district and election in which they ran have some effects on their post-election

attitudes. Those defeated candidates who had initially a high ambition showed a higher inclination to continue political activity after the election than did others who had a low or no ambition. The candidates' expectation about the election outcome is also strongly associated with their supportive attitude toward the democratic rules and inclination to political activity. Those who made an optimistic assessment of their chances of winning before the election, reacted to defeat by decreasing their level of support and their inclination to political activity, while others who assessed their chances of winning less favorably did not react in this manner. Our data also indicate that the type of district in which a candidate is defeated is related to his post-election attitudes. For example, the candidates who were defeated in safe districts manifested considerably lower inclination to political activity than did others defeated in competitive and unsafe districts.

5. The most important finding is perhaps the direct association that we discovered between the amount of reward-cost perceived by the defeated candidates and the manner in which they adjust to the election outcome. The losing candidates who perceived a high reward indicated a visibly higher support for the democratic rules of competition and a higher inclination to political activity than did others who perceived a low reward. This relationship is sustained even when the effects of other variables such as career ambition, expectation about the election outcome, types of district and election are accounted for. Thus it seems quite reasonable to assert that the amount of reward-cost perceived by the defeated candidates is one of the key determinants of their supportive attitude toward the democratic rules and inclination to political activity after the election.

6. The analysis of the amount of reward-cost as perceived by both the winning and losing candidates makes it evident that (1) the winners gain higher rewards than the losers in terms of occupation, social prestige, influence, and career opportunity as we would expect, but (2) a preponderant number of the losers also gain considerable rewards. This clearly suggests that the political competition analyzed in the present paper is a low risk system because the winners did not take all the rewards and the losers did not lose too much.

The findings summarized above have important theoretical implications. Because the withdrawal of support by defeated candidates can be one possible source of political instability, their adherence to the accepted rules of the game is a critical variable for the system maintenance. If

a large proportion of the defeated candidates become disaffected as a direct result of their participation in electoral competition and decide to challenge the legitimacy of the accepted rules, stability will obviously be weakened to that extent. As our evidence indicates, the losers accorded less support as a result of electoral defeat than they did before the election and also exhibited lower support than the winners, and yet, they remained basically satisfied with the rules of the game. Although our data were gathered in one state election, there is reason to believe that the defeated candidates rarely become totally disillusioned with the democratic rules in American political system. Thus, political competition in the United States, unlike that in the high risk systems of Asia and Africa, does not appear to produce many disenchanted losers who can threaten system stability.

Knowledge about why defeated candidates in one political system remain largely supportive of the rules of the game while defeated candidates in another become disaffected can add to existing theories of democratic stability.²¹ Easton has

²¹ A perusal of some existing theories of democratic stability proposed by Eckstein, Lipset, and Almond-Verba, indicates that they have not included the reward-cost dimension of political competition and its relation to stability in their theoretical formulations. See Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) and also, *A Theory of Stable Democracy*, Research Monograph No. 10, Center of International Studies (Princeton University, 1961); S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 45-96; and Gabriel A.

suggested: "Since today's loser in an electoral campaign or policy has an opportunity to become tomorrow's victor [in a stable democracy], differences do not have to be fought out to the knife, unlike those systems where the winner takes all."²² The essence of this argument is that the maintenance of the democratic norms of temperance and moderation in political competition depends in a large measure upon a modest difference between the reward of political victory and the cost of defeat, that is, a low risk system. Where the reward of winning is immensely great and the cost of losing exorbitantly high, political competition tends to be warlike and, therefore, is disruptive of stability.

The direct relationship that we discovered between the amount of perceived reward-cost and the manner in which the defeated candidates adjust to the election outcome is entirely consistent with Easton's contention. The higher the cost of defeat, the greater the likelihood that a losing candidate withdraws his support for the democratic rules of the game and shows a low inclination to political activity. Because a moderate difference between the reward of winning and the cost of losing induces favorable attitude toward the rules of the game among defeated candidates and thereby eliminates one potential source of instability, a low risk system is one important condition of democratic stability.

Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 337-374.

²² David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 201.

AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS: A STUDY OF DELEGATES TO THE 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION*

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I. THE "AMATEUR DEMOCRATIC" AND THE NEW LEFT

Several years ago James Q. Wilson studied the members of the three amateur Democratic clubs in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.¹ He intended his study, by his own admission, to be interesting rather than theoretical, but we have found its theoretical portions to be intriguing. The amateur politicians studied by Wilson primarily concentrated their energies in local politics, although their ambitions extended far beyond local campaigns and issues. Indeed, they expressed a clear desire to alter fundamentally the character of the American party system and, accordingly, all governing institutions.

Wilson's task of identifying and characterizing the political motives and tactics of amateur Democrats was facilitated by the existence of political clubs.² He had only to identify the clubs he wished to study and survey their members. Future researchers were left the responsibility of identifying similar political motives and tactics in less well-defined groups. We attempted to do this for a sample of delegates to the Democratic National Convention in 1968, and, following Wilson's criteria, we were successful in identifying a substantial proportion of amateur Democrats.

The amateur Democrat described by Wilson was not set apart from the more conventional party activists by his liberalism, his age, education or class. He was not a dilettante or an inept practitioner of politics, nor did he regard politics as an avocation or hobby. Rather the amateur found politics intrinsically interesting because it expressed a conception of the public interest. The political world was perceived in terms of policies and principles which were consistent with the amateur's theory of democracy. Internal party democracy and the acceptance and en-

couragement of the largest possible base for participation were given unequivocal acceptance by amateurs. In this sense, intra-party democracy was a salient factor in the motivation of amateur Democrats. Policy goals for the party were conceived to be largely programmatic and were intended to offer clear alternatives to the opposing party. The amateur placed his highest political priorities on intra-party democracy and the party's commitment to specific substantive goals. In sum then, the amateur Democrat described by Wilson was one who perceived politics as the determination of public policy in which issues are settled on their own merits and not simply on the basis of partisan advantage. Thus, the amateur was most reluctant to recognize the necessity of compromising issues for party advantage.³

In contrast to the amateur, whose chief rewards for political participation tend to be somewhat abstract and intangible, the conventional or professional party activist wanted to win elections and thus provide the inducement which followers require for participation. The professional was not concerned with taking positions on controversial and abstract public policies. His preoccupation with winning allowed him to compromise substantive programs more easily than the amateur, although he may have been as liberal ideologically as the amateur. Intra-party democracy was by no means denied by the professional, but it was valued extrinsically for the purpose of creating party unity (i.e., to forge as broad a coalition as possible), rather than for its own intrinsic worth.

Several psychological characteristics of amateurs which appear to determine their general orientations toward politics deserve special attention, as well as some systemic consequences which follow from these orientations. First, there are parallels between the amateur's conception of politics and that of the New Left. The amorphous and ideologically elusive New Left movement, which has captured the attention of the nation also placed great value on participatory democracy. "Participatory democracy is offered as the solution for bridging the gap be-

³ The characteristics of the amateur and professional are described by Wilson in Chs. 1, 10 and 11, *Ibid.*

* This Project was funded by the Political Research Institute at Florida State University.

¹ James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

² *Ibid.*, ch. 1. We have relied heavily on Wilson's study in designing our own and hereby acknowledge our intellectual debt to him. Henceforth only specific references from *The Amateur Democrat* are noted.

tween the perceived desire by individuals to shape their own destiny and the power to do so."⁴ In this regard, the Port Huron Statement, which outlines the principles of the Students for a Democratic Society, is enlightening. This statement posited democracy *per se* as a value, and not as a mechanism. Its analysis of contemporary society was blunt:

America rests in national stalemate . . . its democratic system apathetic and manipulated rather than 'of, by and for the people' . . . We seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation governed by two central aims: that the individual share in these societal decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.⁵

In the decade which has followed since Wilson's study of the amateur Democrats we have seen an upsurge of political activism on the part of the New Left. News coverage has provided a great deal of visibility for political dissent and it is not going too far to suggest that contemporary amateur politicians draw practical and theoretical sustenance from some New Left activities. Similarly, New Left people were attracted initially to the programs and candidates backed by amateur Democrats.⁶

Secondly, the conception of democracy held by amateurs clearly implies that citizens are

⁴For examples of this theme, see: Martin Openheimer, "Alienation or Participation," paper read at the 1965 Meetings of the Pennsylvania Sociological Society, and reprinted by the Students for a Democratic Society; Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, *The New Radicals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); Andrew Kopkind, "Of, By and For the Poor: The New Generation of Student Organizers," *The New Republic*, June 19, 1965.

⁵Commonly known as the "Port Huron Statement," this document exists as a statement of principles of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1962.

⁶New Left members have been characterized as being totally alienated by rejecting the contemporary two-party system, thus making comparisons between them and avid partisan amateurs fallacious. See Jacobs and Landau, *op. cit.*, chs. 4 and 5. No doubt there exist many New Left people who completely eschew conventional partisan activity. But these individuals appear to represent what Keniston has labelled the "uncommitted" as contrasted with the "committed" or "radicals." The latter, while nursing an abiding suspicion of political parties and their leaders, are still willing to engage in party activities when they believe there exists an opportunity for achieving some goals.

equipped to operate issue-oriented parties by democratic means in the interest of a common good. The amateur's theory of government stipulates that the electoral choice between candidates in the general election is an insufficient guarantee of democracy, hence the amateur's demand for intra-party democracy. This "town meeting" orientation held by amateurs is rooted in their presumption of an interested and enlightened citizenry which is willing and eager to participate actively in policy formation. Voting behavior research by social scientists raises questions about the validity of these assumptions and has provided support for the conception of democracy in which most of the citizens' interests are better served by a non-programmatic party system in which the electorate is required simply to make a single dichotomous choice between parties rather than to participate in the development of a policy itself.⁷

A third consequence which follows from the amateur's position involves the role of political parties. Wilson has previously pointed out in his study of amateurs that should they triumph over the party professionals, which he viewed as doubtful, parties would serve a divisive function rather than acting as a force for political integration.⁸ This inference stems from the ama-

During the Chicago convention delegates and supporters of Senator Eugene McCarthy often joined New Left protestors outside the convention hotels. One chant in particular, "You killed the party, you killed the party . . ." which was directed at Humphrey delegates, reflects some affinity between amateur Democrats and New Left supporters. See Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals: Note on Committed Youth* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968) and also *The Uncommitted* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965).

⁷Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, David Apter (ed.) (New York: Free Press, 1964); Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), ch. 9; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, LVIII (June, 1964) 361-382; Murray B. Levin, *The Alienated Voter* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

⁸Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 359. It should be noted, however, that a good deal of diversity exists even within locally based party organization both in terms of motivational and value perspectives. See Samuel J. Eldersveld's insightful study, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

teur's demand for programmatic parties and their relative unwillingness to compromise their positions. Some observers see this demand and its consequences as a virtue—others do not. Even if intra-party democracy is assumed, the age-old problem still exists of how to handle a situation where the majority of a party has decided upon a programmatic course which a minority cannot conscientiously accept. The amateur's philosophy assumes that a party consensus would emerge after the rational consideration and debate of party programs and candidates. The feasibility of this, however, is highly questionable.⁹

II. THE STUDY DESIGN

Following Wilson's study of amateur Democratic clubs, we have described certain perceptions and psychological traits which distinguish amateurs from professional party activists; we have outlined briefly what appear to be the roots of the amateur's political orientation and the probable political consequences of that orientation. The questions this study was designed to answer are: (1) To what extent can Democrats to the 1968 Democratic National Convention be distinguished with respect to amateurism criteria? (2) What background characteristics distinguish between amateur and professional delegates? (3) What kind of political socialization and recruitment experiences have professionals and amateurs undergone? (4) Does amateurism aid us in predicting the decision-making strategies and candidate-preferences of delegates?

It should be emphasized, that our definition of amateurs and professionals does not include ideological classifications, leadership positions (e.g., being a public office holder), or length of service to the party. Amateurs and professionals are distinguished psychologically by their style and orientation toward politics. It is a separate empirical question whether amateurs hold elected public offices, have a long history as party activists, or are ideologically distinguishable. The distinguishing differences have been

outlined in our previous description. It was with some caution that we operationalized amateurism as a variable to include three categories: amateurs, semiprofessionals (or semi-amateurs), and professionals. The specific summated items used to delineate Democratic delegates are listed below. The underlying theme which each item was designed to capture appears in parentheses:¹⁰

- (1) My party leaders often make too many arbitrary decisions without consulting with sufficient numbers of party workers. (intra-party democracy)
- (2) As a convention delegate basically my only job is to choose a candidate who will win in November. (preoccupation with winning)
- (3) The principles of a candidate are just as important as winning or losing an election. (willingness to compromise)
- (4) Party organization and unity is more important than permitting free and total discussion which may divide the party. (intra-party democracy)
- (5) I would object to a presidential candidate who compromises on his basic values if that is necessary to win. (willingness to compromise)
- (6) Controversial positions should be avoided in a party platform in order to insure party unity. (programmatic parties)
- (7) A good party worker must support any candidate nominated by the convention even if he basically disagrees with him. (willingness to compromise)
- (8) Party platforms should be deliberately vague in order to appeal to the broadest spectrum of voters. (programmatic parties)
- (9) Part-time volunteers play a more important role in the party's campaign than any other segment of a party. (citizen's role)
- (10) Would you characterize yourself as someone who: (a) works for the party year after year, win or lose and whether or not you like the candidate or issues; or (b) works for the party only when there is a particularly worthwhile candidate or issue. (self-characterization)

Respondents were asked to strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree to each item. The actual classification involved a cross tabular

⁹ More programmatic, internally democratic and responsible parties were recommended by the American Political Science Association Committee on Political Parties in 1950. This report has been subject to some of the identical criticism raised here concerning the amateurs conception of parties. See, V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, fifth edition, 1964), chs 9, 12, pp. 662-665; and Austin Ranney, "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System: A Commentary," this REVIEW, XLV (June, 1951), 448-500.

¹⁰ When these items were factor analyzed, four factors emerged. An examination of the four factors indicated that preoccupation with winning, willingness to compromise, intraparty democracy and programmatic parties appeared to be the dimensions underlying the concept "amateurism." Although we have statistically treated amateurism as a unidimensional variable, it can be broken down conceptually into correlated components.

comparison between the delegate's general stylistic preferences (willingness to compromise, relative importance of the electoral victory, and intra-party democracy) and the general self-characterization provided by the response to question number 10. (See Figure 1.)

The Sample

A team of five interviewers gathered data on 187 Democratic delegates and alternates over the four-day convention period at Chicago in August. Our strategy at the outset was to conduct interviews with a pre-selected random sample but the unusual circumstances of the Chicago Convention necessitated a change in this strategy. A quota sample consisting of a proportionate number of delegates and alternates from each state was interviewed successfully by the painful method of seeking out the respondents in hotel lobbies, personal suites, cocktail parties and state party receptions. This method worked well and we met the quota for each state, although on some occasions interviews were terminated before being completed.

In order to allay our doubts about the representativeness of our sample, we obtained an almost complete catalogue of aggregate statistics collected by the CBS News Bureau.¹¹ The CBS data dealt with education, sex, occupation and the number of previous conventions attended. Chi square tests revealed that our sample of 187 delegates were not significantly different ($p > .10$) on any one of the four comparisons. These calculations permit us to have some confidence in the representativeness of our sample, at least along several demographic dimensions, and we accordingly report tests of significance as well as measures of association in analyzing our data.

III. FINDINGS

Social and Economic Correlates of Amateurism

Of the 187 Democratic delegates who were interviewed 180 respondents were classified along the amateurism dimension. Subtotals of 42 amateurs, 52 semiprofessionals and 82 professionals were identified who also answered our questions dealing with age, education and annual income. Contingency tables were generated with amateurism and each of these background variables. The correlations between age groupings and amateurism was .32 (gamma) with the amateurs being younger (not shown in tabular form). Twenty-six percent of the amateurs were

¹¹ We wish to thank the CBS News Bureau for providing us with the *CBS News 1969 Democratic National Convention Handbook*, copyright: Columbia Broadcasting System.

FIGURE 1

	Self Characterized as (see Q. 10):	
	Amateurs	Professional
Responses to more than 6 items in the amateur direction	Amateurs	Semiprofessionals
Responses to from 4-6 items in the amateur direction	Amateurs	Professionals
Responses to 3 or less items in the amateur direction	Semiprofessionals	Professionals

under 30 years of age compared to nine percent of the professionals; five percent of the amateurs were over 50 compared to 30 percent of the professionals.

No relationship was found between amateurism and level of education. There was a slightly larger number of amateurs who held post graduate degrees, but the overall correlation observed was low (gamma = .09). Eighteen percent of the professionals not gone beyond a high school education as to eleven percent of the amateurs (not shown in tabular form).

When income level was cross tabulated with amateurism, we found 52 percent of the amateurs earn more than \$20,000 per year compared to 33 percent of the semiprofessionals and 38 percent of the professionals. The overall correlation indicated that amateurs tended to have higher annual incomes but that the relationship was very weak and insignificant (not shown in tabular form).

Of the three background factors considered, age appears to be the best predictor of amateur status. Although none of the variables revealed striking differences between amateurs and professionals, the differences that were observed are generally consistent with those described by Wilson in amateur Democratic clubs.¹² By precise standards these background variables are very crude proxy variables for socialization experiences. We turn now to the examination of several more precise indicators of political socialization and recruitment to party activities and eventually to the 1968 convention.

Political Socialization and Recruitment of Amateurs and Professionals

In this section, we are concerned with the questions of why, when and how the delegates initially became interested in politics. The delegates were asked if they were raised in a family setting in which politics was an active concern. Table 1 shows that semiprofessionals and professionals have nearly an even probability of being

¹² Wilson, *op. cit.*, 13.

TABLE 1. AMATEURISM AND FAMILY'S
POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Political Activity	Amateurs (N=42)	Semiprofessional (N=52)	Professional (N=82)
Active	35%	53%	47%
Inactive	65	47	53
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = -.12, P > .05.

reared in either a politically active or inactive family. Only 35 percent of the amateurs, however, are drawn from politically active families. The remainder (65 percent) represent the first of their line to participate actively (beyond voting) in partisan politics.

Our data also revealed that professionals and semiprofessionals tended to be younger when they first became active in partisan politics.¹³ Thirty-eight percent of the professionals became active in politics before their twentieth year, as compared to 28 percent of the amateurs. Similarly, 23 percent of amateurs were over thirty when they first became active. Only 15 percent of the semiprofessionals and 14 percent of the professionals delayed this long before becoming active in the party. Those persons who eventually become party professionals tend to develop political interests early in their lives, and then spend years in apprenticeship working within the organization. Further evidence of this is shown in Table 2. Forty-two percent of the professionals reported that their family was the most important influence leading to their involvement in politics. Only 22 percent of the amateurs reported similar experiences. Again, the semi-professionals fall between these two groups. The high school and college experience does not reveal any noteworthy difference between the groups. Adult peer group influence tends to be a more important factor in the socialization of amateurs into party politics. Thirty-nine percent report that their friends and associates were the most important factor contributing to their political involvement as compared to only 22 percent of both the semiprofessionals and professionals who cited this factor. Professionals were also less likely than semiprofessionals and amateurs to be affected by public events (e.g., wars, depressions, and assassinations) which contributed to their entrance into politics. Again, this suggests the importance of

¹³ Not shown in tabular form.TABLE 2. AMATEURISM AND AGENT OF
INITIAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION*

	Amateurs (N=42)	Semiprofessional (N=52)	Professional (N=82)
Family	22%	37%	42%
School Experiences (High School and College)	12	10	16
Adult Peer Group	39	22	22
Events (War, Depression, Assassinations, etc.)	27	31	20
	100%	100%	100%

 $\chi^2 = 9.13$, $P < .20$, ** V (Craemers V) = .16

* The question asked was, "who would you say was most important in getting you interested in politics?" This was a closed question.

** While Craemers V is not a commonly used measure of association in social science literature, it is a chi square based statistic which is equivalent to phi in a 2×2 case, and is preferable to Tschuprow's T because its upper limit can be unity when the number of rows and columns are unequal. See Hubert Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960) 229-230.

early familial experience in the political socialization of the political professional.

In Table 3 we consider partisan longevity, or the years spent active in the party. There are few surprises in this table. The largest category in each group includes those delegates who have been active in the party more than ten years. But, longevity is closely associated with amateur-professional status. Professionals and semiprofessionals have been active in the party for the longest periods of time. This relationship is striking in the 1-2 year category where 24 percent of the amateurs, 4 percent of the semiprofessionals and none of the professionals are represented.

We have shown here that there is a temporal difference in the political socialization of amateurs and professionals. But, what are the political implications of these different experiences? Since the professional's induction into politics occurred early, we may speculate that party identification as transmitted by the family was a most salient concern. We are suggesting that the professional learned that the party was not only a means to certain substantive ends, but that it assumed some intrinsic value—i.e., party loyalty and confidence in the party made it less imperative that the professional be concerned with substantive issues. In short, the professional has confidence in the party. A victorious party meant that issues could be resolved in the best way possible. Such an orientation led to a more

TABLE 3. AMATEURISM AND YEARS
ACTIVE IN THE PARTY

Years Active	Am- ateurs (N = 42)	Semipro- fessional (N = 52)	Pro- fessional (N = 82)
1-2 Years	24%	4%	0%
3-5 Years	9	12	5
6-10 Years	31	23	20
Over 10 Years	36	61	75
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = .50, $P < .01$.

pragmatic approach to the substantive concerns of the party.

The later introduction of the amateur suggests a major modification in this process. The authors of *The American Voter* have suggested that ideology develops later in life and is a function of the intellectual maturity of the individual. In their words,

... in the bulk of cases, the individual is committed to a party at a time when he is least likely to have the wherewithal to bring ideological considerations ... into play.¹⁴

Further evidence of this phenomenon is found in a study of the development of political ideas among adolescents, which concluded that "there is a gradual increase with age in the use of philosophical principles for making political judgements."¹⁵ The amateur's idealism may possibly be explained by the fact that ideological concerns rather than the more direct family socialization experiences led to his entry into partisan politics. If so, we would expect the amateur to view the party in instrumental terms, i.e., as a means to certain ends, rather than an end in itself.¹⁶

These results provide some basis for the following inferences about the adult socialization of Democratic amateurs: The highly articulate yet abstract rationalization of the amateur's participation in party politics which Wilson described¹⁷ may be a function of the amateur's being politically socialized after reaching intellectual matu-

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁵ Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, IV (1966), 295-306.

¹⁶ When we speak of the party being an "end," we mean that party loyalty ranks near the top of a person's hierarchy of political values.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*

TABLE 4. AMATEURISM AND SELECTION PROCESSES
FOR THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

Method of Selection	Am- ateurs (N = 42)	Semipro- fessional (N = 52)	Pro- fessional (N = 82)
Appointed	50%	64%	67%
Elected	50	36	33
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = -.20, $P < .05$.

urity. The professional, who was exposed to politics at an earlier age, may have been attracted by less complex concerns. We may speculate that the professional's concern for the party rather than more abstract ideological issues may be a result of his earlier political socialization.

Thus far, we have considered only the informal and frequently less proximate temporal aspects of the political socialization process. In Table 4, we consider the more formal and immediate process of political recruitment, i.e., the method by which delegates were selected for the 1968 Democratic Convention. Although the differences are not striking, both professionals and semiprofessionals are more likely to have been appointed as delegates rather than elected. This tendency is consistent with our earlier discussion of professionalism in which we indicated that organizational loyalty was an inherent part of our definition of professionalism. Since this is the case, it is not unusual in those states which do not require elections for the appointments of delegates to go to those who have served the longest, remained most loyal, and contributed most to the party organization. The more recent entry into partisan activity precludes the recruitment of many amateurs by party appointment.

TABLE 5. AMATEURISM AND NUMBER OF PREVIOUS
CONVENTIONS ATTENDED

Number of Conventions	Am- ateurs (N = 46)	Semipro- fessional (N = 52)	Pro- fessional (N = 86)
1 (1968 only)	72%	65%	52%
2	26	15	20
3 or more	2	20	28
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = .32, $P < .01$.

TABLE 6. AMATEUR-PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES

Items (liberal response in parenthesis)	Percentages Expressing Liberal Response				
	N	Amateurs	Semi-professionals	Professionals	Gammas
1. Communism today has changed greatly and we must recognize most wars and revolutions are not Communist inspired. (Agree)	184	44%	42%	31%	.19*
2. Viet Nam is historically and geographically an Asian country and should be allowed to develop autonomously within the Asian sphere of power. (Agree)	181	71	73	54	.30*
3. The U.S. should give help to foreign countries even if they are not as much against Communism as we are. (Agree)	185	80	83	75	.13
4. The best way to deal with people who break the law is to punish them so they fear the consequences of breaking it again. (Disagree)	185	44	54	48	.01
5. People who advocate radical changes to our way of life are over-protected by our laws. (Disagree)	185	59	75	59	.06
6. Law enforcement agencies should be allowed limited eavesdropping by wiretapping and other devices. (Disagree)	187	59	45	47	.12
7. Public employees should not have the right to strike for higher wages. (Disagree)	185	59	71	72	.15
8. School children should be bussed to achieve racial balance in elementary and secondary schools (Agree)	179	36	35	31	.09
9. One has a moral responsibility to disobey laws he believes are unjust. (Agree)	186	29	23	7	.52*

Gammas with asterisks indicate a level of significance less than .05. Gammas were computed by considering the responses elicited by each item (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree) and amateurism-professionalism as two ordinal variables in a contingency table. See Linton Freeman, *Elementary Applied Statistics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965) 79-89, 162-175.

Another aspect of longevity—convention attendance—is reported in Table 5. Here again, the data support our earlier findings and, on the surface, include no surprises. For most delegates this is their first national party convention. There are two possible explanations for the data shown in Table 5. First, it is possible that amateurs are mobilized for a particular convention and their absence at subsequent conventions is volitional. Given the nature of the amateur's participation based on more immediate circumstances (e.g., issues, candidates, events), rather than organizational loyalty, it is conceivable that convention attendance is a one-time affair. For example, some delegates, who were committed to McCarthy rather than to the Democratic Party, may choose not to participate in presidential politics in 1972 because the selection process is no longer salient. It is also possible that because of their tenuous commit-

ment to the party, some delegates may be excluded involuntarily by the regular party organization. An alternative speculation is that a conversion process occurs in which amateurs are re-socialized as a result of their involvement in national party politics. That is, they lose some of their idealism and become political "realists" who learn to compromise, and accept the professional's view that the overriding goal of the party is to win elections. This hypothesis is also given some support by our finding that older delegates tended to be professionals. Although it is not possible for us to accept or reject either explanation, we can safely hypothesize that these explanations are not mutually exclusive. An accurate explanation probably includes elements of both.

Ideological Correlates of Amateurism

In this section, we attempt to answer the

TABLE 7. AMATEURISM AND SUMMATED LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM*

	Am- ateurs (N = 46)	Semipro- fessional (N = 53)	Pro- fessional (N = 88)
Conservatives	15%	17%	16%
Moderates	22	17	34
Liberals	63	66	50
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = -.03, $P > .05$.

* Respondents answers to each of the items presented in Table 9 were summed together in Likert fashion and then classified as Liberals, Moderates and Conservatives. "No responses" were given the neutral score of 3 on 1-5 scales, hence accounting for the inclusion of all 187 respondents.

question of whether a delegate's amateur or professional orientation is associated with his views on a number of foreign and domestic issues. An examination of Table 6 reveals that there are only three issues which significantly distinguish amateurs, semiprofessionals, and professionals. Amateurs and semiprofessionals are more likely than professionals to agree that "Communism has changed greatly," and that "wars and revolutions are not Communist-inspired." Similarly professionals are more likely than either of the two other groups to take a more aggressive stand on Vietnam.¹⁸ Item 9 most clearly discriminates between amateurs and professionals. Amateurs and semiprofessionals are much more likely to accept the principle of civil disobedience than professionals (gamma = .52). In this case, however, a larger majority of all groups disagree with this basic tenet of civil disobedience. What finally emerges from our examination of Table 6 is not the differences between these groups, but rather the similarities. On six of the nine items there were no significant amateur-professional differences.

Another view of this relationship is shown in Table 7. Here amateurism is associated with the summated liberalism-conservatism scores.¹⁹ The relationship is weak and suggests that amateurs, semiprofessionals and professionals are not distinguishable along ideological lines. This should not be surprising when we recall that the differences between amateurs and professionals ap-

¹⁸ It should be noted here, however, that a majority of all groups agreed with the Vietnam statement, which is a direct quote from a speech by Senator Eugene McCarthy.

¹⁹ See note, Table 10.

TABLE 8. AMATEURISM AND DELEGATES' PARTISAN AREAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS*

Roles	Am- ateurs (N = 40)	Semi- fessional (N = 50)	Pro- fessional (N = 83)
Local	25%	26%	39%
State or region	40	38	37
Nation	35	36	24
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = -.21, $P < .10$.

* The closed question used to elicit which geographical segment of the party the delegates felt most responsible to was "To what segment of the party do you feel most responsible as a delegate? (a) my local party organization, (b) my state party organization, (c) my regional party, or (d) my national party."

pear to be procedural and stylistic. They have relatively similar attitudes toward substantive issues that might be summarized along a liberalism-conservatism continuum. This finding, however, does not necessarily indicate the salience or the intensity of the expressed opinion and, as we shall show later, when amateurs are put into a compromise situation, which requires flexibility, they react quite differently from professionals holding the same substantive attitudes.

Amateurism and Decision-Making

The effects of amateurism are considered here by examining the responses to three questions concerned generally with party loyalty and candidate preference. First, we asked about the geographical segment of the party to which they felt most responsible as a delegate. The responses to this question are reported in Table 8. The differences are not dramatic (gamma = -.21). But, there is an observable tendency for amateurs and semiprofessionals to define what might be called their areal roles²⁰ in terms of representing or being responsible to state, regional or national constituencies rather than local constituencies.

This tendency is consistent with earlier notions of the professional in politics. Both Merton and Wilson have suggested that the professional politician "is pre-occupied with the local community to the exclusion of his affairs outside his

²⁰ John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York: Wiley, 1962), Ch. 13.

TABLE 9. AMATEURISM AND DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES IF DELEGATES' FIRST CHOICE FAILS

Strategy	Amateurs (N = 43)	Semipro- fessional (N = 48)	Profes- sional (N = 82)
Vote for another candi- date with whom I agree	95%	83%	63%
Vote for the apparent winner to promote party unity	5	17	37
	100%	100%	100%

Gamma = .63, $P < .01$.

community."²¹ They describe the amateur as a "cosmopolitan" who has minimal ties to the locality and a much stronger attachment to a larger constituency.²²

Another question asked was, "If it appears your first choice cannot win the nomination, what would you do?" In Table 9, we have divided the responses into two groups—those whose support is contingent upon their agreement, in principle, with a candidate and those who would simply vote for the apparent winner in order to promote party unity. It appears that while a majority of all groups intend to adhere to some principle of ideological compatibility professionals are much more likely to compromise that principle for the sake of party unity (gamma = .63). These findings provide support for the notion that the professional is more inclined to compromise certain attitudes in order to achieve party unity, and likewise underline the amateur's relative unwillingness to compromise for the sake of partisan consensus.

Finally, we turn to a consideration of the relationship between amateurism and candidate preference, the latter being the most important factor in assembling the Democratic delegates. An unmistakable relationship exists between amateurism and support for Vice President Humphrey and Senator McCarthy (Table 10). Seventy-one percent of the professionals in our sample threw their support to Humphrey as contrasted with only eight percent who favored McCarthy. The amateurs, on the other hand, divided their support more evenly between the candidates with McCarthy being favored by 41 percent.

In order to assess the relative capacity of the

²¹ Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Revised Ed.; Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), pp. 387-420; and Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

²² *Ibid.*

TABLE 10. AMATEURISM AND CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

Candidate Preference	Am- ateurs (N = 42)	Semipro- fessional (N = 49)	Pro- fessional (N = 79)
Humphrey	33%	51%	71%
McCarthy	41	24	7
Other*	26	25	22
	100%	100%	100%

$X^2 = 24.5$, $P < .001$.

V (Craemers V) = .26.

* Kennedy, McGovern and favorite sons.

amateurism variable to predict candidate preference we chose another commonly used variable in analyzing political decision-making for comparison. Liberalism-conservatism (See Table 7) has been used on numerous occasions by political scientists, and although there exists little agreement on operational grounds,²³ the variable has been found to have some predictive utility for political decision-making. The usefulness of ideological variables appears to be greater in studying so-called "elites" or highly politicized groups than for citizen groups. McClosky was able to differentiate Republican from Democratic convention delegates on policy positions, as well as show substantial differences between the policy positions of party leaders from both parties and the rank and file of the respective parties.²⁴ McClosky's findings, nevertheless, revealed significant intra-party differences between party leaders. Thus the question of ideological consensus, and its presumed impact on convention decision-making has yet to be empirically demonstrated.

Data in Table 11 show that ideology and can-

²³ See David W. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 5 (November, 1961), 317-331; and Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, David Apter (ed.) (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

²⁴ See Herbert McClosky, *et al.*, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review* 54 (June, 1960) 406-427; and "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review* 58 (June, 1964) 361-379. In addition to McClosky's studies which dealt with positional issues, a host of other studies too numerous to list here have found ideology to be correlated with political decision-making.

TABLE 11. IDEOLOGY AND CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

Candidate Preference	Conservative (N = 26)	Moderate (N = 44)	Liberal (N = 100)
Humphrey	58%	81%	44%
McCarthy	0	3	34
Other*	32	16	22
	100%	100%	100%

$X^2 = 33.6$, $P > .01$.

V (Craemers V) = .32.

* Kennedy, McGovern and favorite sons.

didate preferences are strongly related. The more liberal respondents supported McCarthy while the more conservative favored Humphrey and other candidates. Given this finding we again turned to our primary interest in amateurism, which has previously been shown to be virtually unrelated to liberalism-conservatism (see Table 7). Therefore, we hypothesized that amateurism represented a variable that could predict candidate preferences independent of ideology. Table 12 shows the correlation coefficients between amateurism and candidate preference controlling for ideology, and ideology and candidate preference controlling for amateurism. This procedure is essentially a partialing process assuming nominal level measurement of the variables. The capacity of both amateurism and ideology to predict candidate preference independent of each other is demonstrated by the substantial V values that remain when controls are imposed. When amateurism and ideology are combined, the multiple association with candidate preference increases ($V = .63$).

To recapitulate, the liberal amateur delegate was the most typical supporter of McCarthy, while Humphrey's most consistent supporters were conservative professional delegates. Amateurs are not necessarily liberal. They were ranked as conservatives almost as often as professionals. We have shown in Table 12 that ideology and amateurism are significantly and independently related to candidate preference.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

James Q. Wilson, whom we have relied upon for our conception of the amateur Democratic delegate, has suggested that "It is not age, education, or class that sets [the amateur] apart and makes him worth studying . . . Rather, it is his outlook on politics, and the style of politics he practices."²⁵ Our results are in general

²⁵ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

TABLE 12. PARTIAL AND MULTIPLE ASSOCIATIONS INVOLVING THE EFFECT OF AMATEURISM AND IDEOLOGY ON CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

	V (Craemers V)*	X^{2**}
<i>Ideology and candidate preference</i>		
Original (Table II)	.32	33.6
<i>Controlling for amateurism</i>		
Professionals	.26	11.3
Semiprofessionals	.33	9.5
Amateurs	.44	14.8
<i>Amateurism and candidate preference</i>		
Original (Table 10)	.26	24.5
<i>Controlling for ideology</i>		
Conservatives	.41	9.9
Moderates	.31	8.5
Liberals	.33	22.8
<i>Multiple association</i> (Amateurism and Ideology)		
	.63	68.6

* See note, Table 2.

** All X^2 values are significant beyond the .05 level.

agreement with Wilson's earlier description. We have inferred from our findings that the amateur's outlook on politics is determined, in part, by his later (adult) socialization experiences. We have suggested the ways in which the earlier (childhood) socialization experiences of the professionals may have contributed to their concern with party unity, their willingness to compromise and their primary desire for electoral victory. Further, we have suggested that the political socialization process cannot be evaluated in terms of crude background characteristics such as age, education and income. Finally, we have identified two dimensions of candidate appeal. First, we have shown that the perceived policy position of the candidate, defined along a liberal-conservative continuum, were an important determinant of his appeal to convention delegates. The second dimension, and the dimension we have been most concerned with, which we have labeled amateurism, has been shown to have a significant impact on candidate preference— independent of ideological or policy concerns.

Commenting on the relationship between ideology and amateurism, Wilson has stated:

. . . it is not their liberalism that is their chief distinguishing characteristic. They [amateurs] can

be found in the Republican party as well, and there they are likely to be extremely conservative. What is necessary is a definition that distinguishes the new [amateur] from other politicians but which is applicable equally to liberal and conservatives.²⁰

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2. It is interesting to speculate about the extent of amateurism present among Republicans especially when we recall the Goldwater nomination in 1964. See for example, Aaron Wildasky, "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians

Perhaps the most important result of this study is that we have successfully operationalized a definition of amateurism which is drawn largely from Wilson's earlier work. Beyond this, we have demonstrated that this measure meets the criterion Wilson suggested, i.e., it is not related to ideology and, to that extent, represents an important independent dimension of political decision making and candidate appeal.

and the Future of the Two-Party System," *Review of Politics*, 27 (July, 1965), 386-413.

IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM: PHILOSOPHY OR PASSION?

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In "Politics, Ideology, And Belief Systems"¹ Professor Sartori has undertaken the Sisyphean task of drawing up conceptual schemes to distinguish the political mentalities of the pragmatist and the ideologist. His "Hypothesis" poses the curious proposition that "ideology and pragmatisms qua 'political cultures' are related, respectively, to the 'cultural matrixes' rationalism and empiricism." (p. 402) When political scientists put forth hypotheses, students of history are usually not far behind with their arid facts and pale negations. Sartori's hypothesis is an intriguing theoretical formulation of a central issue in twentieth century politics; whether it is historically valid is the concern of this article. For the question that remains uppermost as I read his article is simply who are the ideologists and who are the pragmatists? Historically considered, if we were to apply Sartori's defining characteristics to a specific context it may very well be that the totalitarian "ideologies" of communism and fascism would have to be judged "pragmatic," while the mentality of American political behavior may even have to be considered "ideological." Since I am sure Professor Sartori did not have this ironic interpretation in mind, perhaps some elaboration is in order.

When Marx turned Hegel on his head he not only gave a materialistic base to German idealism but imputed an activist impulse to political theory. Dialectical materialism is the "actualization of philosophy," the extension of contemplative thought into real life. And whether regarded as a "knowing-process" or as Sartori's "belief system," Marxism represented a rejection of both the deductive rationalism of Descartes and the sensationalist rationalism of Locke.² In this respect I doubt if Marxism—which Sartori cites as "the outstanding current example" of an ism conceived in a "cultural area qualified by the notion of rationalism" (p. 402)—can be subsumed under his following syndrome of "rationalist ideologies":

The *rationalistic* processing-coding tends to ap-

proach problems as follows: i) deductive argumentation prevails over evidence and testing; ii) doctrine prevails over practice; iii) principle prevails over precedent; iv) ends prevail over means; and v) perceptions tend to be 'covered up,' doctrine-loaded, typically indirect. Hegel's famous sentence 'the rational is real' goes to the very heart of the rationalistic mind, for the rationalistic attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray, there must be something wrong with the practice, not with the theory. (p. 402)

This is a tidy list of mental traits but I fail to see where it applies to the communist as an ideological personality. More specifically, a Marxist who accepted Engel's bastardization of dialectical materialism and evolutionary positivism would have to deny many of these very dualisms.³ And a Marxist who followed Lenin's advice would have to accept a code of conduct that would be decidedly empirical, concerned primarily with realizing doctrine not through deduction but through action, with unifying theory and practice and joining means and ends. Sartori tells us that "Oakeshott equally makes a good point when he writes that 'Rationalism is the assertion that . . . practical knowledge is not knowledge at all.'" (p. 402) Significantly, Lenin made a similar assertion when he attacked the "rationalist" Machists, whom he mistakenly believed to have been foreshadowed by Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, and then went on to emphasize the overriding importance of practice as the sole criterion of knowledge.⁴ Since the kernel of Marxist epistemology is "*praxis*," it would seem that for a communist practical knowledge is the only real knowledge. Cognitively, then, Marxism as a system of thought would have to be judged "empirical" rather than "rationalist." Translated into politics, it is this empirical or "scientific" nature of Marxism which probably ac-

³ George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger University Series, 1961), pp. 234-258. For a specific rejection of rationalism and empiricism as "invalid" epistemological categories, see Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," in Arthur P. Mendel (ed.), *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York, 1961), pp. 499-513.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, XIV, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), pp. 19-39, 138-143, *passim*.

¹ This REVIEW, 63 (June, 1969), 398-411.

² Gustave A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Study of Philosophy in the Soviet Union*, trans. Peter Heath (New York: Praeger University Series, 1963), pp. 3-41, 256-267, 488-517.

counts for communism's highly pragmatic and opportunistic mode of action; and, it seems appropriate to add, it was this "experimental" ethos which explains the "Americanization of Marxism" by the Old Left of the thirties, especially by those intellectuals who were nurtured on the pragmatism of John Dewey.⁵

In the example of fascism it is also difficult to understand how ideology and pragmatism can be treated as "polar opposites." Can fascism, particularly "classical" Italian fascism, be interpreted as indicative of a "rationalistic" state of mind and thus a doctrinal ideology? To answer this question we merely have to go to the horse's mouth itself, to the famous essay "The Doctrine of Fascism" signed by Mussolini but probably ghosted by Gentile. Here we are informed that fascism is not a doctrine of words but "an act of life" whose "pragmatic veins" are "its will to power" and "its will to be."⁶ Similarly, Gentile elsewhere maintained that fascism was opposed to doctrinal reasoning because "intellectualism" meant "the divorce of thought from action, of knowledge from life, of brain from heart, of theory from practice."⁷ By breaking down the anti-naturalistic dualisms between thought and action, fascism became something of a mirror-image of Marxism. But fascism actually went further than Marxism in demanding that action prevail over theory, in making practice a transcendent end in itself, an ecstatic "premise" in the case of Italian fascism, a sublime "fulfillment" in the case of German National Socialism.⁸ Clearly fascism represented at once an amalgam and distortion of various philosophical traditions; nevertheless it strains historical credibility to regard the fascist mind as a rationalistic mentality in which theoretical knowledge is paramount. On the contrary, Italian fascism conceived itself as an endless movement unencumbered by any teleological fixations, an adventurous experiment in which the only approach to political

knowledge must be pragmatic. After all, Mussolini claimed William James as one of his leading "mentors."⁹

Carrying this admittedly brief survey up to date, one may also wonder how the "New Left" can be categorized under the rubric of "rationalism." For the New Left reason is the enemy, doctrine is a delusion and theory a snare. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the political mood of the rebellious young is based on emotion and spontaneity, a "soul politics" where style substitutes for content and engagement for inquiry. Professor Sartori states that "an important feature of the ideological mentality that neatly flows from its rationalistic matrix is that the central elements of an ideological belief system are necessarily 'ends,' not 'means.'" (p. 403) This generalization is doubly ironic. For aside from the existential subjectivism of today's youth—which defies Sartori's philosophical points of reference—it seems fair to say that the New Left's demand for sheer power rather than specific program reveals a concern for means rather than ends, and that its tactic of confrontation politics suggests an interest in the innovating forms of protest rather than in the deductive content of thought. Can this recent and, in historical perspective, totally unanticipated phenomenon of radical dissent be explained as an expression of the axiomatized rationalism which Sartori believes is the mark of the ideological psyche? Indeed the irony is compounded as we stop to consider that when the anti-ideological liberal opposes the desperate antics of the New Left his characteristic response is: "I agree with your goals but not your methods." If the liberal and radical do agree on common ends (a skeptical assumption at best) and differ only on means, what remains of the distinction between the "pragmatist and "ideologist"?

Apparently Professor Sartori's answer to this question is provided in the second section of his essay where he draws the distinction between ideology as a mentality and ideology as a passion. In many ways this is the most convincing part of his article; yet I am still in doubt as to how ideological mentalities and ideological emo-

⁵ Sidney Hook, *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx* (New York, 1933); see also Max Eastman's criticisms of Hook in *Marxism: is it Science* (New York, 1940), 299-348.

⁶ Reprinted in Carl Cohen (ed.), *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations*, (New York, 1962), pp. 349-364.

⁷ Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophical Basis of Fascism," *Foreign Affairs*, 6 (January, 1928), 290-304.

⁸ Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York, 1966), pp. 243-271, 365-425.

⁹ William K. Stewart, "The Mentors of Mussolini," this REVIEW, 22 (November, 1928), 843-869. Although the pragmatic content of Italian Fascism appealed to American liberals, Stewart's claim that Mussolini was familiar with James's philosophy is doubtful. See this author's "Flirtation With Fascism: American Pragmatic Liberals and Mussolini's Italy," *American Historical Review*, LXXI (January 1966), 487-506.

tions relate to one another. Discussing the "emotive status" of the ideologist and the pragmatist, Sartori argues that the former's "belief system" is based on "fixed elements" deeply held by a "closed cognitive structure," while the latter's is based on "flexible elements" loosely held by an "open cognitive structure." (p. 405) But here we are dealing with personal inclinations and social awareness, with inner passion and external perception; in short, with nothing less than morality and mind, axiology and epistemology. Sartori admits that "beliefs are inextricably value-laden—they precede the analytical distinction between value and fact"; and because of the unresolvable predicament in value theory he states that "I propose to search for structural elements of differentiation bearing on *how* one believes." (p. 401) By focusing on the "how" Sartori is content to describe the process of belief, not its purpose; and by concentrating on "how" he avoids the more telling question of "why" people believe what they believe. The upshot is that since Sartori is not interested in the intellectual or psychological genesis of belief he is unable to show a precise causal relationship between his philosophical categories and his political patterns of behavior. As such, the argument is neither logically compelling nor empirically convincing. Why, for example, should a "rationalist," who supposedly derives political knowledge from universal truths and values which are grasped only by reflection, be any more prone to ideological extremism than an "empiricist" who, assuming values "given" in the natural world, realizes political knowledge not in reflection but in action? In short, if Sartori's categories are to have any validity the questions we must ask are essentially these: Is there some inner-connection between ideology and rationalism on the one hand and pragmatism and empiricism on the other? Can social beliefs be inferred from philosophical dispositions? Does metaphysics govern politics?

Such issues, of course, are only implicitly germane to Sartori's contemporary study, and it would be petty to criticize him for not addressing his learned essay to these unanswered questions in intellectual history. But one purpose of the present essay is to suggest that historically the affinity between philosophical mentalities and political beliefs is not as simple as Sartori's models imply. If we followed Sartori's conceptual illustrations we would be hard pressed to explain why similar philosophical systems of reasoning have led to diametrically opposite political conclusions. To cite a familiar example, if philosophy shapes politics how can we explain why John C. Calhoun was able to draw upon an

empirically-reasoned, Marxist analysis of history and society and arrive at a comprehensive, ideological defense of slavery?¹⁰

Perhaps the riddle could be explained if we acknowledged that political commitments are more often based on personal ideals and value judgments that are not logically tied to philosophical schools of thought. But in Sartori's analysis, confined to "*how* one believes" rather than "*why*," there is no dialectical interplay between thought and values. As a result we remain in the dark as to the motives of political beliefs. About all we can legitimately infer is that the possession of a similar philosophical mentality is no guarantee that the mode of political behavior will likewise be similar. This was the conclusion reached by the doubting-Marxist Henry De Man, who nearly a half century ago declared: "Socialism is a *passion*, not a *cognition*."¹¹ It is precisely this personal dimension, this mystery of character and ethical intuition, this sense of the human mind responding to a concrete situation, that is lacking in Sartori's analysis. Without this inner-dimension and external context I fail to see how we can fully understand anything about the behavior of an ideologist or a pragmatist from the anonymity of abstract models. Moreover, in light of the recognition on the part of both American pragmatists and European Marxists that value judgments cannot be deduced from empirical evidence,¹² it is difficult to accept Sartori's hypothesis that the empirical mentality distinguishes the pragmatist from the ideologist. Rather than resort to the matrixes rationalism and empiricism, it seems more valid to suggest that it is not the philosophical meth-

¹⁰ Richard Hofstadter, "John C. Calhoun: The Marx of the Master Class," in *The American Political Tradition* (Vintage edition, New York, 1954), pp. 68-92.

¹¹ Henry De Man, *The Psychology of Socialism*, trans. Eden & Cedar Paul (New York, 1927), p. 497.

¹² Sidney Hook, "Marxism and Values," *Marxist Quarterly*, 1 (January-March, 1937), 38-45; Leszek Kolakowski, *Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today* (New York, 1969), pp. 58-66. To a behavioralist, of course, the fact-value dichotomy is a non-problem since ideology serves to "rationalize" value-selection whereby "the cognitive conviction of truth and 'moral' conviction of rightness are merged." (Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* [Glencoe, Ill., 1951], 351.) But Sartori rightly rejects this functional description of ideology as "far too broad" and "almost nil" in its discrimination of the "value dimension" of behavior. (p. 400)

od of thought but the overwhelming power of moral vision, psychic turbulence, identity anxiety, or social malaise that determines cognitive tendencies and world outlook. Sartori acknowledges the function of "ideological heating," but since he offers no causal explanation of this emotional factor it is impossible to understand why ideology waxes and wanes. Why do embedded values subtly erode away? Why should a crisis of conscience suddenly erupt? Why the "alienation" of the intelligentsia? If we could answer these questions we might begin to understand why the ideologist is "loosed upon the world/full of passionate intensity" and why the pragmatic "centre cannot hold." These are crucial questions for political scientists and historians, as well as psychologists and poets.

Of course "why" problems may be regarded as the agony of the historian, not the political scientist. Yet it seems that Sartori promises more than he delivers. Although he states that "for the present enquiry ideological doctrines are givens" (p. 399), he also admits that ideology "does belong to the concepts that are supposed to have broad and far-reaching causative significance. Hence, if the eminence attributed to the notion of ideology is justified, it must be justified because the term *explains*, not merely because it abridges and/or provides a regressive stopper. Therefore, as the discussion proceeds the focus will be progressively shifted to the *explanatory value* of the various meanings of ideology, for my ultimate purpose is to probe and single out the conceptualizations that are cognitive instruments, that do have explanatory-causative potency." (p. 400) As one follows Sartori's figures and quadrants (up to and including number six on the "End of Ideology Hypothesis") it is hard to tell where the "regressive stopper" is unplugged and when the "explanatory-causative potency" begins to flow. For example, Sartori's graphic illustrations apparently are designed to establish the conditions under which the "end of ideology" will be realized. To fulfill these conditions Sartori argues that it is not so much the emotive but the cognitive status that must change from (I) "fixed elements [which] are rigid, dogmatic, impermeable to argument and evidence," to (III) "firm elements [which] are firmly held, but are open to evidence and/or argument." (pp. 404-406) According to this pattern, would Mussolini's transition from doctrinal socialism to dynamic Fascism be interpreted as presaging the end of ideology? Similarly, would not Stalin and Togliatti, who were always willing to adapt theory to new evidence, have to be regarded as "pragmatic," while Wilson and Roosevelt, who possessed "fixed" ideas about Europe's political future, have to be characterized as "ideological"?

And how would we include in this "explanatory-causative" schema Lenin and Lincoln? Can Sartori's distinction between ideology and pragmatism explain their paradoxical behavior? Lincoln, who opposed Polk's precipitating war by sending troops into a disputed territory and then himself dispatching troops to disputed Fort Sumter; Lenin, who used war to seize power in the name of world revolution and then withdrew Russia from the war thus adhering to the very "revolutionary defensism" he previously denounced; Lincoln, who was passionately devoted to individual freedom and yet forced to suppress civil liberties for reasons of military expediency; Lenin, who with equal passion called for "no enemies on the Left" and then crushed the Kronstadt anarchists for the sake of revolutionary success. Both leaders, it would seem, could operate with "fixed" historical "ends" in mind and yet respond to the flux of experience and change with the course of events while at the same time trying to guide events. To be sure, the comparison is superficial: Lincoln desired to conserve a country by restoring the union; Lenin wanted to transform the world by realizing the revolution. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to use Sartori's models to judge who was the rationalist and who was the empiricist for the simple reason that both men brought human will to bear upon history not merely by comprehending it but by trying to change it. And in a sense both were successful. They correctly read the movement of history and thereby emerged victorious over their opponents. Is then the pragmatic thinker by definition the historical victor, the one whose very position proves that his ideas had accurately gauged the pace and direction of history? Whatever the answer to this question, Sartori's categories are of little help. Indeed, when one tries to compare the actions of an "ideologist" like Lenin to a "pragmatist" like Lincoln the meaning of political pragmatism begins to seem like nothing more and nothing less than the content and agony of men in power.

Sartori's distinction between rationalism and empiricism also explains very little about the vaunted pragmatism of American liberalism. Empiricism as a scientific philosophy may have inspired a pragmatic mentality, but the intellectual groundwork of American politics was nourished in a "cultural matrix" that would have to be described as rationalistic. One need only peruse *The Federalist* to appreciate the extent to which the axioms of Newton and the "maxims of geometry" influenced the Framers.¹³ Moreover,

¹³ The best expression of these deductive axioms is in Hamilton, *The Federalist*, No. 31; for a per-

throughout much of our history the American mind was paralyzed by such concepts as natural law, rationalistic theories that were later transmuted into scientific laws like Social Darwinism. It is true that a school of pragmatic philosophers ultimately revolted against this abstract "formalism" in American thought, but the naturalistic metaphysics eventually developed by America's most influential philosopher, John Dewey, had the effect of obscuring the very dualisms which Sartori believes to be the defining earmarks of rationalism and empiricism, and hence of ideology and pragmatism.¹⁴

To be more precise, let us return to Sartori's categories. His hypothesis maintains that "the rationalistic attitude is to argue that if practice goes astray, there must be something wrong with the practice, not with the theory"; whereas the "empirical attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray, something is likely to be wrong with the theory, not with the practice." (p. 402) This is a well-wrought distinction; but once again, how are we to apply the model to pragmatism where, as Dewey emphasized, there is no fundamental dualism between ordinary practice and prescriptive theory?¹⁵ And how are we to apply it to American history where, as Daniel Boorstin has argued, it was assumed that all theoretical speculation was needless since the descriptive (the "is") and the normative (the "ought") fused into an unspoken national faith in the "givenness" of values?¹⁶ Indeed, can we apply Sartori's model to America's past political behavior? Can it be argued, for example, that when political practice went "astray" during a crisis as profound as the Civil War Americans

questioned the "theory" of the republic?¹⁷ Have Americans ever seriously challenged the theoretical foundations of their government? On the contrary, when practice seems to deviate from theory Americans have shown a tenacious capacity for either reaffirming earlier theoretical ideals or for creating myths and symbols to reconcile the contradictions between the mundane exigencies of practice and the hallowed images of theory.¹⁸

Giovanni Papini once observed that pragmatism is a philosophy of doing without a philosophy. In politics it could be said that pragmatism is a theory of doing without a theory. And without a sense of theory how can the political pragmatist discern whether it is practice or theory that has gone "astray"? Indeed, inasmuch as the pragmatist assumes that ideas are immanent in the texture of experience, that precedent gives rise to principle, that ends are embodied in means, and that theory is implicit in practice, one can only conclude that pragmatic behavior embraces both of Sartori's rationalistic and empirical paradigms. Applied historically and examined philosophically, Sartori's models are operationally meaningless.

¹⁴ No major American political thinker reexamined the theoretical assumptions of the federal republic as a result of the Civil War crisis, at least not in the terms Sartori has laid down. While southern legalists like Alexander Stephens appealed to the Constitution to vindicate the cause of secession, northern statesmen like Lincoln appealed to Providence only to discover that the causes of the war remained inscrutable—"The Almighty has his own purposes." (See Edmund Wilson, *Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War* [Galaxy edition, New York, 1966] pp. 99-130, 380-437.) At the same time many intellectuals blithely welcomed the war as a purification of the body politic—Whitman even drew upon Hegel to rhapsodize about a "general soul" that would reveal itself dialectically through the struggle of opposites. (See George M. Fredrickson, *The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union* [New York, 1965].)

¹⁵ The value conflicts, moral antinomies, cultural tensions, and political contradictions between belief and behavior in the history of the American mind have been explored in the works of John Higham, R. W. B. Lewis, Leo Marx, Marvin Meyers, Charles Sanford, Henry Nash Smith, and William R. Taylor. For a review of a portion of this scholarship, see David Brion Davis, "Some Recent Directions in American Cultural History," *American Historical Review*, 73 (February, 1968), pp. 696-707.

ceptive analysis of Madison's theoretical premises, see Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Phoenix edition, Chicago, 1963), pp. 4-33; for the philosophical implications, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of Counterpoise," in *Reflections on Human Nature* (Johns Hopkins paperback edition, Baltimore, 1968), pp. 37-65.

¹⁶ Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (Beacon paperback edition, Boston, 1957); see especially White's Critique of Dewey's ethical theory, pp. 203-219.

¹⁷ *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action* (Capricorn edition, New York, 1960), pp. 192-194, 281, *passim*.

¹⁸ *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1953). See also my "Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The Burden of Daniel J. Boorstin," which will appear in the *American Historical Review*, February 1971.

Historically, past experience may very well show that Sartori's formulations result in a paradox. Can a people enjoy a pragmatic political culture and at the same time question the theoretical basis of its political system? Would not much constant scrutiny force the public into interminable debates over the proper "ends" of government, into the divisive issue of *telos* instead of the innocuous matter of technique? If American history is any guide, the record seems to suggest that only when a society takes its "ends" or "theory" for granted can pragmatism flourish. In this respect pragmatism means the cessation of theoretical reflection and the mystification of process as an end in itself. Studying this mindless, anormative behavior, Louis Hartz concluded that America's "irrational Lockianism" became "one of the most powerful absolutisms in the world."¹⁹ Indeed to have a reciprocal dialogue between theory and practice might require an intense degree of social or cultural conflict, the presence of those very elements who would challenge the political foundations of society by articulating fresh values and outspoken ends, thereby undermining the pragmatic consensus. Hence the paradox of Sartori's empirical syndrome. Hence, too, the dilemma of political pragmatism: a consensualized society cannot analyze itself in view of theoretical norms without ceasing to be pragmatic; without, that is, ceasing to believe that values are "given" in the nature of experience.

Philosophically, Sartori's argument is also questionable. For it is possible that pragmatism and Marxism alike overlap the distinction between rationalism and empiricism since both Dewey and Marx never quite shook off Hegel's influence. Dewey recalled that "Hegel's thought . . . supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy. . . . Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation."²⁰ Marx also drew upon Hegel to absorb the classical conflicts of philosophy, the dichotomies between thought and action, being and doing, theory and practice.²¹ Because both the pragmatist and the Marxist (and

the pragmatically-oriented fascist like Gentile) share Hegel's anti-dualist assumptions, Sartori's distinctions between rationalism and empiricism are of little value in explaining either ideological or pragmatic behavior. Sartori writes that "the ideologist cannot have it both ways, he cannot claim at the same time an intellectual and a practical primacy." (p. 402) Why not? To the extent that a pragmatist and a Marxist believe that knowledge is realized in action and theory fulfilled in practice, there is no reason why they both cannot claim the best of all epistemological worlds.

The ideologist and the pragmatist can claim not only a common epistemological premise but a common ontological premise as well. Years ago Mannheim was the first, I believe, to notice that the controversy over ideology brought about "a decisive turn in the formulation of the problem of reality." When the ideologist was accused of entertaining only utopian visions he was forced to demonstrate his ideas were useful and consequential in the real world. For once it was granted that ideas could be "regarded as futile when it came to practice," it followed that "the only reliable access to reality is to be sought in practical activity." Ironically, the concept of ideology negated itself as the ideologist came to accept a pragmatic definition of reality. The locus of political reality thus shifted from contemplation to realization, and the ideologist himself soon forsook the life of theory and became caught up in the debate over practice. Thereafter the validity of political ideas was no longer solely a matter of ends but also of means. And since even the ideologist would have to prove his wisdom in the realm of experience. "The inevitable and appropriate outlook" for "modern man" became that of "pragmatism."²²

Not long after Mannheim made this shrewd observation the pragmatist Dewey and the Marxist Trotsky debated one another. Significantly, Dewey agreed with Trotsky that "increasing the power of man over nature" and abolishing the "power of man over man" was the proper "*end-in-view*," but he disagreed over the "*means that are judged to be most likely to produce that end*."²³ Accepting Trotsky's thesis

¹⁹ *The Liberal Tradition in America* (Harvest edition, New York, 1955), pp. 11, 58.

²⁰ "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *The Golden Age of American Philosophy*, ed., Charles Frankel (New York, 1960), pp. 389-390.

²¹ Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx* (Ann Arbor edition, 1962), pp. 15-76; Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of*

Social Theory (Beacon edition, Boston, 1960), pp. vii-xiv, 3-29.

²² *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (Harvest edition, New York, n.d.), pp. 72-73.

²³ This debate, which first appeared in the *New International* in 1938, has been reprinted in the pamphlet *Their Morals and Ours: Marxist Versus Liberal Views on Morality*, ed. George Novack (Merit Publishers, New York, 1966), 57.

on the "interdependence of ends and means," Dewey also endorsed the Marxist position on the historical relativity of morality by admitting that "the only alternative position to the idea that the end justifies the means is some form of absolutistic ethics." But what Dewey objected to was the assumption that the specific strategy of "class struggle" could be deduced from the universal goal of human liberation. Now insofar as Dewey charged Marxism with the "Hegelian" notion that empirical means could be derived from moral ends, Sartori may take some satisfaction in his rationalist paradigm. In this connection, however, three comments seem appropriate. First, the charge had little foundation in Trotsky's "empirical" reading of Marxism, a reading which offered "no such automatic answers" to the problems of ends and means since only the "living experience of the movement under the clarification of theory provides correct answers to these problems."²⁴ Second, the major thrust of Dewey's critique was to accuse Marxists, and rightly so, of relying on "historical laws" as a guide to social action. The "assumption of a *fixed law* of social development is not relevant" to the issue of means and ends, wrote Dewey.²⁵ In this respect the American philosopher was not attacking Marxism for its rationalistic mentality but for its pseudo-scientific empiricism and positivism. Finally, Trotskyists themselves were just as disposed to reason pragmatically when they accused American pragmatists of becoming "hypnotized by abstractions" in their puristic "search for truth." Using Dewey's own vocabulary, the Trotskyists declared: "Simply to claim 'we seek truth' is not enough. Even in the highly developed physical sciences, the concept of truth, the adoption or rejection of the whole method of inquiry, must be in the end related to the purposes which the inquiry is designed to serve. . . . Historical and political inquiries do not occur in a social vacuum; they are immediately and crucially related to the political ends and aims of individuals, parties and classes, and function actively as weapons in the political struggle."²⁶

This illuminating encounter between American liberals and Marxists, between pragmatists and ideologists, suggests that Sartori's paradigms must be qualified by Mannheim's prescience. For when we observe both sides maintaining that their opponents are "mystical" and

"abstract," and both sides professing to be "empirical" and "historical"; and when we see that the debate was essentially over means, over scientific method rather than moral ends; and when we note that each group used the language of instrumentalism and claimed their rivals were blinded by the concepts of rationalism, then the only conclusion to draw is that Mannheim shrewdly predicted that "pragmatism" would be the "inevitable and appropriate outlook" in modern political dialogue.

Assumptions can move models as well as mountains. Professor Sartori's hypothetical assumptions were constructed in the inviting spirit of "awaiting contrary proof." (p. 399) Whether he regards historical evidence and philosophical argument as sufficient proof remains to be seen. Nevertheless, after defining ideology as a rationalistic mentality it was curiously ironic that Sartori himself proceeded to study ideology rationally; that is, to set up conceptual models from which patterns of behavior are to be deduced with graphic-like precision. Given the intractable nature of the subject it would seem that when an over-arching word like "ideology" fails us, and when the concept itself resists systematic analysis, perhaps our only recourse is to study the history of the idea in all its manifestations and try to discover whether the various concepts of ideology have had any binding effect on political conduct.²⁷ Turning to history, of course, inevitably means focusing upon the rich tapestry of the particular and unique; the existential situation where, as historians and political scientists have learned from novelists, political behavior may be penetrated in its full individuality and ambiguity.²⁸

But even granting Sartori's methodological premises, the crux of my reply is to suggest that the matrixes rationalism and empiricism are, when applied to the historical "ideologies" communism and fascism, more apparent than real; and that the absolute polarity ("polar opposites") between ideology and pragmatism is, when considered in view of Sartori's criteria and in light of the historical record and philosophical

²⁴ For a masterly synthesis of the various historical expressions of ideology, apart from its behavioral implications, see George Lichtheim, *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays* (Vintage edition, New York 1967), pp. 3-46.

²⁵ See, for example, Allen Bullock's comments on Proust and Dostoevski in "The Historian's Purpose: Historian and Metahistory," in *The Philosophy of History In Our Time*, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (New York, 1959), pp. 292-299; and the recent anthology, *The Political Imagination in Literature*, eds. Philip Green and Michael Walzer (New York, 1969).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41; see also Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940*, Volume III (Vintage edition, New York, 1965), pp. 438-444.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁸ James Burnham and Max Schachtman, "Intellectuals in Retreat," *New Internationalist*, 5 (January, 1939), 6.

implications, more modelled than true. Too often, I'm afraid, we American pragmatists tend to regard an ideologist as anyone on the wrong side of the barricades. Sartori's otherwise insightful study does little to clarify the situation. The very word itself is so shot through with terminological confusions and semantical traps that it has almost ceased to have meaning in political discourse.²⁹ What to do? Perhaps we should ei-

ther develop a new vocabulary and a new set of conceptual tools to distinguish the pragmatist from the ideologist; or, in the ecumenical spirit of "awaiting contrary proof," admit that we are all pragmatists and we are all ideologists.

cites regarding this problem, see also the debate among Daniel Bell, Carl J. Friedrich, and George Lichtheim in the *Slavic Review: American Quarterly of Soviet and East European Studies*, XXIV (December, 1965), 591-621.

²⁹ In addition to the excellent references Sartori

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

I hesitated before writing to comment on the review of my book by Professor Macridis and Mr. Schell (this REVIEW, March 1970, pp. 234-235) on the grounds that reviewers are entitled to their opinions and should not have to anticipate dealing with howls of rage from the authors impaled. I decided to allow myself the luxury of reply because my complaint has less to do with the opinions of the reviewers than with the description they provide of what I say.

According to the review, I think that industrialization and affluence "induce inevitably" a decline of ideology, that political cleavages have "dissipated," that people vote on the basis of "increased knowledge." It is stated that I accept generalization about industrial societies "*in toto*," and that I "believe that the end of Ideology had come." Thereafter, I am accused of a "somewhat uncritical application of the 'decline of ideology' theory."

A capsule summary of what is already a survey of a wide range of materials is a hazardous business. To review what is already a review of some very controversial theses must be all the more trying. Nevertheless, this is a caricature that I cannot leave unchallenged.

My book was conceived as an attempt to assess the claims of the end-of-ideology/depoliticization/growing-consensus literature in a case study of a recalcitrant subject: France. I tried to look at countertrends, to distinguish a variety of groups, to avoid statements about inevitability and the foolish notion that all visible trends were likely to point in the same direction. I emphasized the particularities of the French case and said they might indefinitely impede the kind of political arrangements that had arisen elsewhere in the West.

The book in question, *Political Change in Contemporary France*, is, indeed, more sanguine about prospects for political stability than is currently fashionable, though it makes many qualifications unmentioned by the authors of the review. In

particular, it does not come down in support of many of the most familiar "decline of ideology" arguments, arguing that abstraction will become *more* apparent in the political thought of contemporary Western nations, that the Communist Party shows no sign of disappearing in France, that while there are signs of change, the style of politics in France is not yet very different from what it was, though some issues have declined in salience, that depoliticization has not occurred.

Unfortunately, the reviewers' interpretation of the character of the book leads to their treating it as though it were a polemic, which it was not meant to be. This affects the tone of the review. For example, we are informed that "Waterman discovers in his Epilogue a student subculture," whereas the subject is dealt with, even emphasized, in earlier chapters as well.

The book undoubtedly raises some difficult intellectual issues and has provoked disagreement elsewhere on substantial questions of political sociology (See Frank E. Myers, "Social Class and Political Change in Western Industrial Systems," *Comparative Politics*, 2 (1970), 389-412.). I would hope that future debate will also center on the important questions of social structure, political protest and socio-political change in the West and not on the dead horse of whether or not there has been an "end of ideology."

HARVEY WATERMAN

Douglass College, Rutgers University

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Waterman has written a good book and the review Mr. Schell and I wrote indicates that we thought so. He is unduly sensitive to the caveats and qualifications that a reviewer has the right—justly or unjustly—to bring forth. I do not think the matter calls for a long reply—the whole subject related to the "decline of ideology" continues to lend itself to many misunderstandings both for authors and reviewers!

ROY C. MACRIDIS

Brandeis University

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As of January 1, 1971, the Book Review Editor of the American Political Science Review will be Professor Philip Siegelman of San Francisco State University. All correspondence pertaining to book review matters (except that pertaining to the December 1970 issue) should be sent to Professor Siegelman at the following address:

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa. BY W. HOWARD WRIGGINS. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 275. \$10.00)

Howard Wriggins has written "An Advice to Princes in the New States". He deliberately avoids effort at "grand theory" and "inclusive schemes", and self-consciously employs a morally neutral vocabulary like his Florentine model. In his own words, his book "... is ... an attempt to look out of the president's or prime minister's window, to see his problems as he sees them. It centers attention on the ruler's search for allies and his effort to rally support for himself so that he can stay in power long enough and with sufficient capability to get certain things done. It assumes that every leader has some choice in the way he tackles his job, for no two leaders would deal with their problem of aggregating and using political power in exactly the same way. It is, in sum, a study of alternative strategies leaders have used in their efforts to gain or to sustain control, and to use that control to effect their will or whim on the polities they 'rule'."

This is a valuable book. It will find its way into courses, both graduate and undergraduate, dealing with developmental problems. It may also find its way to the desks of statesmen and politicians, both in the new nations, and the older ones, who need a lucidly written book of this kind. While it avoids "theorizing", anyone familiar with the theoretical literature dealing with development themes will find in *The Ruler's Imperative* traces of frameworks and concepts which have been formulated in the last ten or fifteen years.

The study begins with an enumeration of the kinds of problems which confront the leaders of the new nations, the kinds of goals which these new elites tend to seek, the significant social groupings and competing elites which constitute some of the materials with which the leadership of the new nations must deal. Wriggins then turns to what he calls eight strategies for aggregating power. These include: one, projecting the personality; two, building an organization; three, promoting an ideology; four, rewarding the faithful and the susceptible; five, intimidating the opponent and wavering ally; six, developing the economy; seven, expanding or contracting political participation; and eight, using foreign policy. In the final chapter he deals with the problem of the interdependence of these strategies, conflicts among them, strategic mixes,

how these strategic mixes can contribute to short and long-run goals, and a few illustrations of the development strategies of a number of leaders in the new nations.

A number of problems arise in attempting to use this book to illuminate problems of development policy in Asia and Africa. While Wriggins constantly refers to the variety of kinds of nations in Asia and Africa, he never breaks them down into groupings which would significantly effect the kinds of policy options which leaders in the new nations have. Here he diverges from the Machiavellian model which offers special advice to the rulers of hereditary, conquered, civil, ecclesiastical and mixed principalities, among others. The seventy-odd countries which are to be found in the various parts of Asia and Africa differ radically one from the other according to their size, level of economic development, the complexity of their traditional cultures, ethnic and linguistic composition, previous colonial and political experience, proximity to cold war conflicts, and other aspects of *fortuna* and *necessita*. Needless to say, these gross differences in the characteristics of the many nations about which Wriggins is generalizing effect the kinds of goals that the leaders of these nations can reasonably seek, and the strategies and strategic mixes which are appropriate for these goals. From this point of view Wriggins has seriously over-generalized his advice to princes. Sorting these countries out by relevant variables and combinations of variables would enable us to locate the particular country or kind of country which concerns us in an appropriate class or type. This would have made it possible for us to speak with more focus to the question of developmental goals and strategies.

The treatment of the notion of strategy and strategic mixes also creates some analytic problems. The eight strategies which Wriggins treats are laid out side by side as though the leaders of the new nation had relatively free choice in selecting among them. Actually every leader of a new nation will have a problem of rewarding the faithful, and intimidating the opponents, developing the economy, doing something about political participation, and developing some kind of foreign policy. While I share with Wriggins his concern with excessive theoretical formalization, just a bit more theorizing, classifying, connecting and differentiating would have helped the leader of the new nation apply these valuable materials and discussions to his own peculiar fate.

In an effort to avoid the deterministic overtones of some of the theory in the developmental field, he has exaggerated the freedom of political leaders in the new nations. The demonstration effects of the modern world and the diffusion of products and ideas across borders, the cultural level, economic resources, social structure and political organization in particular countries all have the effect of defining and limiting options. A realistic advice to princes would have to come closer to the real crunches and constraints of everyday life. How much real freedom does a leader have in the choice of form of political organization, extent of political participation, the development of ideology, the use of rewards and penalties, if he chooses a policy of economic development? How much real freedom does he have in the broad area of economic and social modernization? What are the consequences for leadership choices of the rapidly widening gaps between the modern and the non-modern world? Failure to confront these larger issues contributes to a certain blandness of tone particularly in parts III and IV of the book.

It avoids the abstraction of much of the theoretical work in the field. It is full of interesting and valuable illustrations and illuminating anecdotes. The price it pays for this is getting lost in detail, and dealing with problems and processes out of context. But we owe a debt to Wriggins for bringing the important theme of developmental leadership into focus.

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

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Politics and the Social Sciences. EDITED BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 328. \$7.50; paper, \$2.75.)

This is not the first nor is it likely to be the last symposium on the relations between the study of politics and the other social sciences. But editor Lipset has brought together ten fine essays by distinguished practitioners of cross-disciplinary political analysis. Thus the volume provides a guide to many of the contemporary dilemmas in the field.

Because the authors are conspicuous contributors to both the substantive and polemical literature on the subject there are few surprises. Fred Greenstein and Arnold Rogow find psychology not only useful but essential to the understanding of politics. Scott Greer sees the study of politics as an application of sociological theories, particularly within the context of organization theory. Far more sceptical of the sociological explanations is Giovanni Sartori who argues for a "political sociology" in which political

variables would be given more independent weight than they are in "the sociology of politics." William Mitchell examines his own semi-defection from Parsonian sociology to "political economy" while Mancur Olson demonstrates how truly antithetical economic theory is to Parsonian sociology.

With the exception of Sartori, the authors mentioned see the study of politics on the receiving end of the disciplinary theoretical exchange. There is evident among the political scientists, however, an enhanced self-confidence that studies in the political arena might also improve psychiatry and economics. It is a measure of the theoretical pecking order of the disciplines that the historian Richard Jensen and the anthropologist Ronald Cohen are most concerned with the aid which they can receive from the more systematic political science. The symposium concludes with Hayward Alker's tour of advanced techniques in the use of statistics in causal analysis.

In a symposium of such diversity the points at issue revolve around approaches and theories. No one, of course, finds any theory or method unique to the study of politics. What does differentiate the authors is their thinking on how the social sciences can or cannot be joined. The question is sometimes raised explicitly, but more often it is implicit in the discussion. The dominant viewpoint among the authors and one shared by most behaviorally oriented political scientists is that a natural harmony prevails among the disciplines. As Greer indicates, "... there are really only two basic analytical schemes in the study of human behavior—the psychological and the sociological. . . ; their explanatory theories . . . are cognate." While no single theory reigns, no great difficulty exists in bringing them together. Certainly political scientists have moved blithely from notions of political culture to group theories, role theories, personality theories, communications theories, structural-functional theories, and then to systems theories, all with little intellectual strain. Even when a concept such as the group retreats from its original pretensions as the explanation of all political behavior, it nevertheless remains an important tool in subsequent political analysis. In effect there is a general social science, pluralistic in its explanations, and the study of politics is the application of these explanations in a specific context.

This is the central thrust of Fred Greenstein's well thought-out defense of the use of psychological variables in political analysis. Greenstein recognizes the limitations, but he argues that as long as we can explain the actions of a Wilson or

a Kennedy in psychological terms we must include the psychological interpretation in our analysis. Psychology does not have to explain everything, just something in order to justify its worth to political science. And of course Greenstein is right—in a pluralistic social science all variables deserve equally to be heard and tested.

A strikingly different view is that of the economist Mancur Olson who argues that the social sciences rest on two different and frequently opposing preconceptions and methods. At one pole lies the rational calculus, closely associated with economic theory, but applicable in any situation in which men "have determinate wants or objectives but at the same time do not have so much of the means to achieve these ends that all their desires are satiated." At the opposite pole is the preconception, "... that people do what they are brought up to do," characteristic of the dominant modes of thinking in sociology and psychology (and one might add political science). The latter preconception finds its explanations of political behavior by studying how wants are derived. The former focuses on the means by which wants are satisfied.

I am, of course, oversimplifying what Olson already admits is an oversimplification; nevertheless I think his argument is correct. The differences between rational calculus and social psychology are differences not of subject matters but of method and theory. One can find representatives of both approaches in every social discipline. Those who ask how man's wants arise tend to use diffuse, plural, functional explanations. Those who focus upon the means of satisfying wants tend to work from logical-deductive theories. In political science in recent years there has been a growing literature of game theory, party theory, choice theory, and exchange theory, all of which seek to reduce and hold constant the "want" side of the equation, to explore the logic involved in satisfying a few narrowly defined or assumed political wants.

The importance of Olson's distinction lies in the assertion that rational calculus and the social psychological approach do not blend easily. They tend to produce conflicting not additive explanations. For example Olson dissects the problem of political integration. The functionalist sees political unity as a product of common needs, a consensus of values. The proponent of rational calculus, Olson argues, explains integration as the product of differences, of a situation in which men with different needs and wants find satisfaction in coming together for purposes of exchange.

The extent to which rational calculus and the social-psychological approach are at odds is not

widely understood. The pluralistic assumptions of general social science lead us to expect that the conclusions reached by rational calculus are merely additional variables. Yet this expectation causes social scientists to talk past each other and perhaps past themselves. For example, when V. O. Key raised the possibility that the electorate might be responsible he treated it as a question of evidence, and the subsequent controversy has tended to center upon the evidence. In reality what Key demonstrated was that even where the evidence is the same the rationalist perspective (to which Key was addicted in all his work) leads to explanations opposed to those based on social psychology.

The reactions of Sartori, in the symposium, to sociological explanations of voting are similar to Key's. Although it is not explicitly stated, I think Sartori's scepticism flows from the rationalist bias inherent in politics itself. As much a game of rational calculation as economics, politics calls out for theories of rational behavior. The complaints that contemporary political science isn't about "politics" would be echoed in Economics if that field were to devote itself primarily to the differential spending habits of classes and groups, the economic socialization of consumers and producers, and personality differences among corporate executives. Such questions may be interesting to economists, but only within the framework of rational theory.

It is, of course, possible that the truths of social psychology can be wedded to those of rational calculus to produce a truly unified political or social science. But if theoretical unity is ever to come, we must first recognize how different the two approaches are. By making us sensitive to the differences this symposium makes a real contribution.

JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER

Michigan State University

The Role of the Congressman. By ROGER H. DAVIDSON. (New York: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. 220 \$7.00 cloth; \$2.25 paper.)

Roger Davidson's, *The Role of the Congressman*, is one of those few books on the national legislature that can be recommended to both students with a general beginning interest in Congress and scholars with an extensive background in the field. Starting with the same sample survey of 116 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, completed in 1963-1964, that served as the basis for the earlier volume by Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966) Davidson uses the role concept to

develop a relatively comprehensive picture of the Congressman and his environment. The author extends the classification of legislative roles applied by John Wahlke and his associates in their four state survey, *The Legislative System* (N.Y.: Wiley, 1962), to the House of Representatives with frequent comparisons between legislative bodies at these two levels. He integrates in a tightly written and highly readable analysis a wide range of previous studies of the Congress.

Those readers familiar with the Congress will find an accurate, recognizable description of the House, as well as a rich variety of new insights drawn from the survey data. For the newcomer, Davidson's treatment cuts through many of the stereotypes of Congress posing basic value conflicts in the interpretation of Congress. The survey results on Congressional attitudes summarized in an appendix are in themselves a revealing self-portrait of the House.

The overriding conclusion of the study, that "the legislator is a divided soul" as a member of both a prestigious national institution with task- and work-group-oriented norms and as a spokesman for external constituency interests, is not new. Davidson goes beyond this general Insider-Outsider dichotomy of members however to demonstrate "coherent and consistent patterns of role-taking" within the House. He finds for example that "the Tribune is an instructed Delegate, a Local, and a party Loyalist; he is slightly more receptive to interest groups than the average Congressman." In contrast the Ritualist is the classic "House man." His pattern of role cognitions are Trustee, National, neutral toward party and slightly less receptive to interest groups than his average colleague. The author suggests a comprehensive map of role cognitions in his concluding chapter.

The most interesting parts of the analysis are Davidson's explorations of some of the patterns he finds. He suggests, for example, why partisan role orientations decrease with seniority, why Republicans are more district-oriented than Democrats, why purposive and partisan role orientations vary by geographical region. He cautions the reader that the strong local strain among members should not be equated with "parochialism." To the Congressional reformer who prefers competitive seats to safe districts, Davidson notes that "whatever the benefits of electoral competition, it does not tend to produce Congressmen who are Trustees or who are free to take a national view of things. And whatever the vices of safe districts, they *do* tend to produce just such members."

Within the conceptual framework he has adopted and the data available to him, the au-

thor's analysis is carefully and methodically developed. He offers only "a limited perspective drawn from a narrow range of findings." He is aware that he is pushing his data to the limit and sometimes beyond and that his limited sample-size precludes sophisticated multivariate analysis. On the other hand, he tends to accept uncritically the role classifications of *The Legislative System* and to sidestep the question of how role cognitions bear on enacted roles and outputs of the legislative system. Do role cognitions vary for example with issue scope? The author's own estimate of the utility of further applications of role theory would have been instructive.

Davidson raises some interesting questions about trends bearing on Congress that he might have explored at greater length. In a highly suggestive analysis of legislative careers over ten selected Congresses he finds that contrary to expectation, in recent years, the general trend has been toward younger first-term Congressmen and that prior formal officeholding seems to have decreased perceptibly within both parties. One possible explanation is that "the career ladder to Congress has become more distinct from career ladders to other public offices," a point well worth developing.

One of the most important issues raised by Davidson is the relative salience of internal and external role expectations over time. Contemporary Congressmen are more firmly "House men" than their nineteenth century predecessors in his estimate. The implied strengthening of Insider or Trustee and National orientations has been balanced by a secular decline in the competitiveness of districts which has probably served to moderate external role-expectations. Davidson concludes that "internal and external roles are probably in greater equilibrium today than in the past." He acknowledges one potential conflict however. Insofar as we know anything about *public* expectations for the performance of legislators "citizens apparently expect their Representatives to follow instructions rather than exercise independent judgment." This conflict is not normally serious as long as it is limited to a fairly narrow range of issues. If "attentive publics" grow in number and size the duality of the legislative life could become increasingly uncomfortable. Beyond these general observations Davidson does not attempt to project future trends in representation or changes in the size and nature of the Congressional constituency.

The Role of the Congressman is more than a restatement of conventional and non-conventional wisdom about Congress. It is a valuable point of departure for both layman and scholar

as we fashion a contemporary statement of political representation for the American democracy.

JOHN S. SALOMA III
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis.

By CHARLES F. HERMANN. (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1969. Pp. 234, \$8.50.)

Hermann presents several models of crisis decision making and tests them against data from an international simulation series and U.S. foreign policy cases. The first model proposes that a crisis is a situation characterized by high levels of threat, time pressure and surprise. While the author defines threat as blocking of goals, his operations in the simulation and participant perceptions seem to suggest that the communication of possible use of force is a more critical semantic aspect of threat.

Hermann argues that this combination of three traits produces unique behavior as opposed to any combination of less than three traits. His analysis proceeds to study behavior in crisis situations as compared with behavior in high threat plus time pressure (with surprise controlled) or other combinations of his traits. In so doing one tends to lose sight of possible interconnections of these factors. One also tends, of necessity, to think of only linear relationships.

For instance, Hermann proposes that crisis induces action. This hypothesis is based on cases and research such as that of North's group; but puts aside work such as McClelland's which strongly suggest that inaction follows crisis. By using the dichotomy—crisis vs. non crisis—Hermann must discount either North's or McClelland's results. However, the simulation results are unclear on action in crisis. He then distinguishes among types of action and hypothesizes that crisis induces hostile and exploratory action but suppresses cooperative action. The simulation data support this hypothesis.

However, it appears that "non-crisis" situations such as those with both high threat and time pressure produce even stronger tendencies to avoid cooperation and to try exploration but have no connection with hostile action. Hermann sees this as supporting the idea that crisis has "unique" effects.

Another approach is to follow Hermann's provocative suggestion that variables in the definition may interact. Using a model of decision process developed by Driver and Streufert ("Integrative complexity: Individuals and groups as information processing systems," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, June, 1969) one can pro-

pose that a) Surprise can be viewed as amplifying threat since no plans for coping with the threat exist and b) short time compresses information, as Hermann notes. In our model information density and threat are jointly termed *environmental load* and interact to induce common effects on the general complexity of decision making systems. This view then would see Hermann's crisis situation as a high environmental load situation. Combinations of threat and time pressure or threat and surprise might be moderate load conditions, while only one trait could describe low load conditions.

This view proposes a curvilinear relation between the complexity of decision making and load. An examination of the types of action reveals that in low load situations, the predominant response to input was *simple* cooperative acquiescence. In moderate load (e.g., high threat plus time pressure) simple acquiescence is avoided, the more complex exploratory response is increased—but simple hostility is avoided. Finally in high load (crisis) the simpler hostility action increases and exploration is less strong.

In the next portion of the book, Hermann suggests that action in crisis will be moderated by intervening variables within the decision unit such as perceptions of hostile intent by the threatening agent. While the conceptualization in these chapters is quite insightful and the case material is well employed, I found some difficulty with the statistical analysis. The statistics compared the incidence of an intervening variable for only cases of action in crisis vs. non-crisis. For instance, the data say that action takers in crisis see the other party as more hostile than action takers in non-crisis. It is not clear that this result means that in crisis (as opposed to non-crisis) *if* the other party is seen as hostile, action is more likely. The data could mean that in both action and inaction cases, crisis induced more perception of hostility than non-crisis, i.e. no necessary connection of hostile perception with action probability. This uncertainty plus the use of the unclear action-in-general variable will preclude any extended review of this section.

In the final chapters, Hermann proposes an ingenious elaboration of his model: crisis increases pressures to act while decreasing evaluations of successful action. A decision taken under such incongruous conditions induces low confidence and a compensating search for support which generates a flurry of communication. The simulation data generally confirms this model. However, here again the use of unrelated traits and dichotomous categories yields some odd results, which might be more meaningful if

examined from an environmental load point of view.

For instance, Hermann argues that crisis produces a decrease in search for definitional information and for alternatives, number of alternatives discussed and amount of participation in the group process. Each of these phenomena can be seen as aspects of integrative complexity in decision process. Complexity will be highest in moderate load and decline in crisis or low load. The simulation data clearly support the curvilinear hypothesis with respect to all variables except amount of participation. Actual participation increased to a maximum under crisis, but subjective perceived involvement declined; suggesting that group integration, i.e. people *influencing* policy as opposed to merely talking, declined in crisis. Thus, all of these factors reflecting integrative complexity do decline in crisis—including effective integrating of people and information, yet the high values of these variables in high threat plus short time situations is not so baffling.

Similar clarifications of puzzling results relating to post decision confidence and search for support in "non-crisis" (moderate load) settings could be presented. However, the above examples illustrate sufficiently the difference between a linear, categoric approach to crisis and a curvilinear, dimensional approach.

Hermann has conducted an exemplary simulation-experiment which yields both provocative findings and a stimulating post hoc model. Exceptional care and insight characterized the design of this study. This simulation had all the usual exciting, motivating characteristics of simulations, all the relevance to actual foreign policy settings, yet was not deficient in control. In fact, each type of threat, surprise and time pressure was introduced in controlled sequences. The data are free of much of the usual complaint that simulation runs are not comparable. Hence, the support derived therein for both Hermann's model and my rudely superimposed model is unusually well founded. This study should be used as a primer for simulation-experiment design.

A final note concerns validity. How far can one generalize from a set of Navy Petty Officers in the Internation simulation? As one answer Hermann well illustrates how Cuba and other cases reflect his hypotheses; and he does point the reader to useful sources (e.g. Guetzkow) on this problem.

M. J. DRIVER

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Theory of Voting. By ROBIN FARQUHARSON.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.

Pp. 83. \$5.00.)

This short work, which received the 1961 Monograph Prize of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in the field of the social sciences, has gone unpublished for more than ten years. The delay is most unfortunate, for *Theory of Voting* is an elegant and thoroughly charming little book. It is, in addition, a major contribution, which may well rank among the most important contributions to analytical political theory to date.

The scope of Farquharson's work is relatively narrow; it comes closest to Black's *Theory of Committees and Elections* in this respect. Within this scope, however, it achieves a number of important results and insights. In precision of thought and analytical depth, the work with which it most invites comparison is Arrow's *Social Choice and Individual Values*, yet Farquharson manages to perform his analysis without the somewhat forbidding technical apparatus employed by Arrow; the reasoning, though rigorous, is expressed with clarity and elegance, and is illustrated by numerous examples. (Though a number of unfortunate misprints do mar the exposition.) Understanding *Theory of Voting* will require genuine intellectual effort on the part of the reader; but it will not necessarily require extensive background in technical mathematics.

The central part of the analysis—comprising some 51 pages, many wholly or partly covered with diagrams or footnotes—is an analysis of committee voting. The framework is game-theoretic, the members of the committee being viewed as players in a non-cooperative, n-person game. There are m possible outcomes (such as alternative amendments to a bill, or candidates for a particular office), and n voters, each with his own preference ordering or ranking of the outcomes. Aside from the rather innocuous assumption that there are no ties in any of the preference orderings, there are no special restrictions (such as single-peakedness) on individual preferences. The committee must select one of the outcomes for adoption, and must do so by means of some procedure in which outcomes are progressively eliminated from consideration by a succession of votes, until finally only one is left. Most of the analysis is concerned with *binary* procedures—that is, procedures such that at each stage of voting the committee is confronted with only two possibilities (subsets of outcomes) to vote on. The usual committee procedure for successively voting on alternative amendments to a single bill is a binary procedure in Farquharson's sense. A three-candidate election in a single-member district, on the other hand, would normally

not constitute a binary voting procedure, since under usual electoral arrangements (e.g., simple plurality rule, or absolute majority with runoff), members of the electorate can vote more than two on the first ballot.

Each voter is interested in casting his votes so as to achieve the most favorable final result possible. Only rarely will "sincere" voting be best for this purpose; often a committee member will find it advantageous to vote against an outcome he really prefers, but which has no chance of being adopted, in order to improve the chances of some second-best outcome. Thus in deciding how to vote each member must weigh various possible voting strategies. Typically, there are many such strategies available to the individual voter; with only four outcomes, for example, there will always be at least eight distinct strategies for each member, and depending on the particular binary voting procedure employed, there may be as many as one hundred and twenty-eight. Since the final result depends on the joint strategy choices of all n committee members, the number of contingencies to be considered is substantial, and the strategic calculations facing the individual voter as he attempts to determine his "best" strategy are hardly trivial. Indeed, in game situations of this sort, it can easily happen that there is no "best" strategy—as in a two-person zero-sum game which has no saddlepoint.

As Farquharson shows, there are indeed "best" strategies for committees employing binary voting procedures, which are "best" in the sense that when all members of the Committee employ their "best" strategies, no single member can secure a better final outcome by switching to some different strategy. (In game-theoretic terms, this amounts to showing that the Nash equilibrium points of such games are pure strategies.) In general, however, there are many such sets of best strategies; and to reduce this "somewhat embarrassing" (28) plethora of equilibrium points, the concept of "sophisticated" voting is introduced. Very roughly speaking, a "sophisticated" voter is one who uses his knowledge of the preferences, strategic opportunities, and sophistication of his opponents to predict their behavior (more precisely, to predict the strategies they will *not* employ), and who uses this information in making his own strategy choice. If all members of the committee are sophisticated in Farquharson's sense, and all aware of each other's sophistication, then this type of "hyper-rational" reasoning leads to a unique result; by successively eliminating the dominated strategies of each voter the original game is progressively reduced until each voter is left with only a single strategy—his "sophisticated" strat-

egy. In this sense, every binary voting procedure is shown to be determinate.

In a second general result, Farquharson provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a voter to have a strategy which is "best" in the much stronger sense of remaining "best" even when some or all of the other committee members play "irrationally", by using non-equilibrium strategies. As one might expect, however, such strategies—termed "straightforward" strategies by Farquharson—typically exist for only a few (or no) committee members.

In addition to these general results, a number of interesting insights are also provided by means of an example which is laid out in detail in Appendix I. In a committee whose members vote "sincerely", for example, "the later a proposal is voted on, the better its chance;" and, a voter who also possesses a casting vote (i.e. can break ties) "gets his way more often than a voter with only a deliberative vote." (p. 62) Yet, interestingly, in a committee whose members vote strategically, both of these conclusions are reversed. "Therefore, to get your way, seek extra power in a sincere committee, but shun extra power in a sophisticated committee." (p. 63)

Appendix II outlines a framework for the study of ordinal, n -person games without transferable utility. This work, while interesting, is somewhat dated, since a good deal has been done on such games since those pages were written. Appendix III presents a game as a "model" for Rousseau's *Du Contrat Social*. By analyzing the game, Farquharson secures "a rationale by which to explain Rousseau's hostility to the existence of political parties, and a means of interpreting his assertions which permits many of his apparent inconsistencies to be reconciled." (p. 80)

Such are the contributions of *Theory of Voting*. The limitations should also be pointed out: all results are for binary voting procedures, and do not apply to trinary or other procedures. Coalitions are not allowed; the analysis is non-cooperative. (In a subsequent collaborative paper, however, Farquharson managed to relax these restrictions to some extent. See M. Dummet and R. Farquharson, "Stability in Voting," *Econometrica*, 29, 1961.) One and only one of the alternatives confronting the committee must be selected; hence, unlike the situation of a legislature voting on a series of independent bills, where none, one, or all might eventually be adopted, such phenomena as logrolling or vote trading cannot really arise. To say all this, however, is to say only that a great deal of theoretical work remains to be done in voting (as in most other areas of political science).

It is still too early to say how important these contributions will prove to be. The author, however, is unequivocal as to his aims:

"the theory . . . is intended to be of use. Though its conclusions are reached by logical deductions, its assumptions are not logical truths. As an interpreted theory, it makes synthetic assertions about particular voting procedures and particular modes of behavior. Since these assertions are not analytic, they may be wrong. At least, they are testable. And if they are not confirmed, it will be certain that (logical slips aside) the explanation lies in some aspects of these assumptions. Then the way will be clear for these to be re-examined, and a more fruitful model constructed." (p. 4)

A personal guess is that Farquharson's results, properly understood and digested, will eventually prove to be quite useful, both in the study of how actual committees and committee members behave, and perhaps more importantly, as a starting point for the construction of more elaborate analytic models of political mechanisms. However that may be, *Theory of Voting* is still a little gem to read; and no serious theoretically-inclined political scientist can afford not to have mastered its contents.

GERALD H. KRAMER

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Human Nature and History: A Study of the Development of Liberal Political Thought. By ROBERT DENOON CUMMING. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 2 Vols., Pp. 809. \$20.00.)

This is a massive, rich, and at times curious work. Cumming introduces his reader at the outset to John Stuart Mill as *the* characteristic liberal and defines liberalism as a philosophy of "adjustment" in an age of "transition." In Mill's case the adjustment is three-fold: "scientific" in the sense of attempting to construct an ethology of human character based on a model of the physical sciences; "historicist" in the sense of recognizing the importance of time, place, and circumstance in political development; and "moralistic" in the sense of concern for man's inner self and individual diversity. Cumming professes not to write a history of ideas, but to deal with political philosophies as "structures of knowledge." This involves placing any political thinker in "topological" context with reference to "other studies"—not only the sciences and history, but economics, poetry, and rhetoric as well. His still broader frame of reference, however, consists of what he considers the two great traditions of Western political philosophy: the socio-historical tradition in which po-

litical problems are fitted into the context of history and the moral-psychological tradition in which they are dealt with in a context of human nature.

In turn, understanding Mill requires going "some distance back" to the genesis of these traditions and arguably involves the very history of ideas which Cumming has disavowed. For ultimately he traces the two traditions not simply to Polybius and Cicero, but to their differing interpretations of Plato's *Republic* and *Statesman*. In fact that part of the study could stand as a small but fascinating book in its own right. From there Cumming moves forward through Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Bentham to Mill and what he regards as the desecration of political philosophy.

He presents Mill's first or scientific adjustment as having shattered the rough frame of reference of human nature within which most earlier British thinkers had managed to contain political philosophy. For Mill's resort to the method of the physical sciences fails in the end to yield any substantive ethology; the result instead is a radical split between logic and psychology which leaves us with empty method. But can Mill's historicist adjustment save us? Mill on occasion does suggest that with each succeeding generation man becomes "better adapted for study" by scientific method. This possibility that history will somehow reunite logic and psychology is quickly subverted, however, by Mill's moralistic adjustment. If Mill accepts after a fashion the Saint Simonian-Comtean view of history, he refuses to accept the levelling enslavement of man's inner self by such massive facts of history as American democracy. His antidote is of course his concern with the seemingly endless diversity of individuality and the fragmentary quality of any one individual's perspective. But that compounds the failure of his first adjustment by defying the possibility of any frame of reference within which the individual can take himself as being representative of universal human nature.

If other critics have made these same points in one way or another (without returning to Polybius and Cicero), Cumming is perhaps more original and certainly devastating in his closing treatment of Mill's *Autobiography*. There he finds liberalism in microcosm: not only Mill's acute awareness of transition around him, but his conviction that the human mind must still have "a certain order of possible progress" and that a given individual can both represent his age and get a bit ahead of it by "always pressing forward." But all this proves to be, in Cumming's judgment, nothing but a narcissistic es-

cape from Mill's failure as a philosopher. For his compulsion to demonstrate that he was always making "mental progress" leads Mill to distort in the *Autobiography* what we know from other sources about his mental history. More than that, his adjustments with his predecessors, other studies, new ideas, and history become so increasingly "slack" that Cumming uses that word or a variation repeatedly in his last several pages.

But the ultimate charge against Mill is that in failing as a philosopher he becomes little more than an historian of ideas—and of course of his own ideas. That makes him not just an heir of the dead tradition of political philosophy, but the "guiltiest of heirs—the heir who would disfigure the corpse." "There is no structure of knowledge left when the historian of ideas finds any thinker relevant insofar as his thinking was transitional—that is, insofar as it was composed simply of adjustments . . ." And that is an indictment which clearly stands in the case of a thinker whose ultimate concern is his own ideas. How about the case of Cumming himself? He covers himself somewhat by again disclaiming to be an historian and also by concluding that his very "selection of Mill to represent liberalism" was dubious. Apparently in the end Mill is not "relevant."

As for British political philosophy and liberalism, one wonders what T. H. Green or the early Laski would say about ending matters at this point. Both tried interestingly to weave new fabric from some of the loose ends left by Mill, and in a study of liberal thought it seems curious to exclude both the idealist and pluralist variations. One is also likely to be troubled throughout by Cumming's refusal to define liberalism in terms of substantive doctrine rather than as a process of adjustment per se—and especially so when Mill in the end turns out somehow not to be truly representative of liberalism. Self-government, for example, is a process, but surely liberalism's perennial commitment to that concept in one form or another has substantive significance which deserves attention. Again, if Millite liberalism fails as a "structure of knowledge," is that not a charge which can be levelled broadly at most modern political thought, without seeming to single out one ideology or culprit? And if the substantive doctrine usually identified with liberalism is not to be taken seriously, then perhaps an interpretation of liberalism in terms of social class ought to be confronted more straightforwardly. Although Cumming mentions fleetingly the possibility of Locke's "class bias," it is disappointing that he does not deal with C. B. MacPherson's telling

dissection of both Hobbes and Locke. For that dissection not only helps sort out some problems which trouble Cumming in those two thinkers; it is also relevant to Mill himself.

Nor does Cumming deal with the provocative revisionist interpretation by Maurice Cowling and W. M. Simon, who suggest that behind Mill's commitment to libertarian diversity there was always the long run expectation of some new, true, futuristic orthodoxy of moral belief and practice which would be virtually religious in quality. They document that argument in part, incidentally, with other works by Mill which Cumming very much neglects—e.g., the essays on Comte, utilitarianism, and religion.

That omission is all the more surprising when one recognizes that Cumming is sensitive all along to the basic problem in liberalism to which this interpretation of Mill responds. He spots it early in dealing with Locke when he notes the dilemma of liberalism in maintaining political tenets without postulating a total, holistic view of the world. It is not simply that liberalism has often held forth a promise of individual and group freedom which is arguably intolerable in any real society without the assumption of some frame of reference within which freedom is to be exercised. More bluntly, the problem is that the promise of freedom is almost invariably explicit, while the assumed frame of reference or orthodoxy is usually tacit, hidden, or admitted only in the footnotes of liberal theory. That of course is the gist of the charge of "hypocrisy"—whether witting or unwitting—which liberalism has faced so often of late. And in the end, perhaps that charge, rather than that he desecrated political philosophy, is the fairer one to bring against Mill himself. As for being an historian of ideas, it is difficult for me to see that Cumming deserves that description any less than Mill. But I should hasten to add that I happen to consider the history of ideas an honorable, creative calling. And Cumming's own extraordinarily thoughtful study, laced as it is with more than a little brilliance, surely confirms that judgment.

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The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's. By NUMAN V. BARTLEY. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969, Pp. 390. \$10.00.)

The author attempts to document the reaction of the white South to the push for integration during the 1950's, and to present this information within a conceptual framework which facilitates analysis and interpretation. On the first count, documenting white resistance, he succeeds

in presenting an exhaustive narrative of the rise and demise of massive resistance as the primary strategem of the white South. On the second, developing a conceptual framework, he is not as successful. His conceptual scheme flows from the somewhat convoluted 'race relations' perspective of southern politics rather than from a more realistic one incorporating the incontrovertible truth that the study of race and politics in the South is the study of an oppressed people arrayed against an oppressor bent upon maintaining that oppression. Because of this inappropriate conceptual scheme the author's analysis leaves something to be desired.

The narrative begins with an analysis of race and southern politics during the decade immediately prior to the *Brown* decision and moves through the years of unbridled massive resistance to integration and up to the period when "never" and interposition gave way to token integration. En route the author discusses the reactions of forces such as the White Citizens' Councils, third parties, community power structures, churches and labor unions to the integrationist movement. Some of the most important civil rights battles—Little Rock, New Orleans, Mansfield, Texas, and Clinton, Tennessee—are revisited. The roles of prominent southern politicians such as Faubus, Earl Long, Harry Byrd, and Leroy Collins are the subject of careful analysis. To be sure, this is familiar territory and much of it has been covered elsewhere. Still the author has made a worthwhile contribution in bringing these events together under one cover for by doing so he forces the reader to deal with their cumulative impact on southern politics. The wealth of well documented facts provides useful insights into a number of sub-areas of southern politics. For example, while much has been written about the pathological impact of segregation and discrimination on the personality of Blacks very little is known about their impact upon white personality. This in depth study of white resistance provides sharp insights into the pathological condition of white personality as regards race and politics. We see, for example, school boards firing presidents emeritus because of heretical views; state legislatures passing with gusto superfluous interposition and nullification measures; and aspirants for public office being required to respond to questionnaires to prove their unflagging racism in order to gain community support.

The narrative also provides us with a sobering historical perspective from which to view contemporary developments in southern politics. The discussion of the rise and decline of the Dixiecrat party is useful for understanding the

contemporary Wallace movement. Similarly, the discussion of the use of violence and economic pressures in tandem by white racists to maintain segregation throws in clear relief the contemporary law and order movement. Indeed we are given at least an intimation of what law and whose order are involved.

Unfortunately the full implications of the data are not developed, as indicated earlier, because of an inappropriate frame of reference. The author employs what amounts to a group approach and seeks to explain the rise and demise of massive resistance by focussing on conflict among three white groups, neobourbons, neopopulists, and business conservatives. In a brief statement which cannot give justice to the author's thesis, his argument is that the politics of race during the fifties was a struggle between neobourbons who wanted to maintain undisturbed the oppressive racist order of the South, on the one hand, and the other two groups who were somewhat more progressive, on the other. The neobourbons are defined as the politicians and political activists, primarily from the black belt, who led the massive resistance campaigns. Neopopulists are persons characterized by feelings of frontier independence with an inclination to defend liberty and democracy, bait interests, support the underdog, and favor bread and butter issues over race. Business conservatives are from the urban middle class and though segregationists show signs of being influenced "by the modern redefinition of human equality and by their urban environment."

While this triadic scheme may be useful in sorting out patterns of goal directed activity among southern whites it tends to over emphasize conflict among them on the question of white supremacy and Black subjugation. Their relationship on this score is more a consensual one than one of conflict. They differ on race only insofar as their position on it affects their pursuit of other goals. The author indicates some awareness of this when he argues in his concluding chapter that the give and take of the political process occurred "within a white supremacy context." Nevertheless, he is content to use his conflict model. This leads to contradictions in his analysis, and it mitigates against raising forthrightly questions concerning collusion among these three groups to maintain white domination. Neopopulists and business conservatives turn up playing roles assigned to neobourbons. For example one neopopulist Governor is quoted lecturing on the best strategy to maintain "maximum segregation," while another is quoted threatening to register "every damn nigger in Macon county" to punish an adversary.

Governor Coleman, Mississippi's business conservative, is recorded as defending the confinement of a Black professor who applied to Ole Miss to the insane asylum because "if he were not a lunatic" he would realize that there would be no integration in Mississippi.

The author's contribution would have been greater had he given more consideration to his assertion that the give and take of the political process occurred in a white supremacy context. Had he done so he would have perforce begun with the question "What strategies were used by various white groups to maintain white oppression?"

MACK H. JONES

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Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization. BY FRED I. GREENSTEIN. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 200. \$5.95.)

As the sub-title to his new book indicates, Fred Greenstein wishes to sort out the methodological and theoretical problems associated with research into psychology and politics. His enterprise is worthy. After all, the personality and politics literature has been the discipline's stepchild for a very long time. Greenstein rightly notes that this literature's shapelessness, its dubious methodological assumptions, and its paucity of supported conclusions have combined to discourage political scientists from drawing upon it for enlightenment. He also believes, correctly I think, that without some understanding of the impact of personality on politics, theory building in political science will suffer. Therefore, he attempts to rescue the study of personality and politics from unmerited oblivion by providing it the form and theoretical foundation it presently lacks.

We could desire no more accomplished, knowledgeable, or judicious Vergil than Greenstein to conduct us through this mottled landscape. He has been charting the geography of the area for many years; indeed, much in this present book has appeared elsewhere, though in altered form.

The author pursues a three-fold strategy. He reviews the pertinent literature, ordering it into clear and manageable categories. He confronts the criticisms of those who have derogated the personality and politics enterprise; in the process he offers his own theoretical rationale for research. Finally, he proposes guidelines for useful future inquiry in the area. Greenstein specifically disavows (p. 152) any desire to prescribe research practices, but the pains he takes to reconstruct the logic of personality and politics inquiry, when added to the specific suggestions

he proffers, belies his disavowal. Is Greenstein's effort successful? I believe the first aspect of his strategy clearly succeeds, but I see only limited success for the other two.

Greenstein proposes to group the personality and politics literature into two sets of categories. The first set is defined by the size of the population to which personality attributes are imputed. Thus, studies are made of individuals, personality types, and large aggregates, including whole societies. Greenstein argues persuasively that there are distinct theoretical and methodological problems associated with study in each of these domains. He next divides the literature by the tasks it undertakes. The tasks are also of three sorts: descriptive or "phenomenological," "dynamic," and "genetic." Again Greenstein has hit upon useful categories. Describing accurately the situation in which personality is presumed to have an impact upon politics is manifestly different from describing the way the personality structure in question actually operates. Therefore, the dynamics of personality functioning should be distinguished from the phenomenology of personality impact. Similarly, uncovering the origins of personality is quite different from describing personality dynamics themselves. Greenstein's analysis of the authoritarian personality in terms of these three analytic tasks provides one of the highlights of the book. His clear exposition will undoubtedly reduce the number of future students who will confuse dynamism with genesis, a mistake rife in both current scholarly literature and popular parlance.

Once having arranged the literature into these categories, Greenstein pursues the second phase of his strategy: establishing the viability of personality and politics research. In this effort, he is less successful. Part of the problem lies in his occasional inability to address the difficulties associated with assessing the impact of personality on politics. For example, he believes that once one demonstrates the possibility of individual impact on political events and also proves variability in individual response to situational constraints, he has made a case for the impact of the individual personality on the political process. But his argument does not take account of a logically prior problem. The only way one can demonstrate the impact of a particular leader, say, on a political event is by proving that another leader would have had a different impact. This proof is impossible to offer, for history provides us no opportunity for the necessary experimental manipulation of events. This dilemma (usually designated the contrary-to-fact conditional) is unresolved by Greenstein's analysis.

One of Greenstein's methods for establishing the viability of personality analysis in political science is to turn the objections leveled against such analysis into a series of empirical propositions, which, if investigated, could yield a range of situations within which personality has political impact. This method, while ingenious and defensible, is marred by the triviality of the hypotheses Greenstein offers to guide the necessary research. Thus, to the objection that individual actors rarely influence political events, Greenstein replies that impact will be greater "... to the degree that the environment permits of restructuring." (p. 42, italics his). Who would have thought otherwise?

Moreover, Greenstein's method focuses mainly on malleable characteristics of the political environment. Consequently, his hypotheses are addressed primarily to political scientists whose major interest lies not in personality at all, but in the more traditional stuff of politics. Greenstein's propositions thus hold the study of personality in abeyance, by implication accepting the contention he means to question: that personality studies are a residual category in political analysis.

Greenstein makes a second attempt to establish the validity of personality research in the study of politics. He aims to remove from the field its reliance upon Freudian assumptions about personality structure and dynamics. Greenstein points out that these assumptions have frightened off many potential investigators. But again he encounters some knotty theoretical problems. For example, he argues that one of the difficulties with the literature on the authoritarian personality is its foundation in Freudian ego-defense. In some cases, he argues, authoritarianism is a rational, cognitive response to a restrictive environment. This is an important point to make; yet it does not necessarily do what Greenstein wishes it to do. It does not establish the utility of personality research in the cognitive or ego psychology mold. Unless it can be shown that a non-Freudian theory produces personality structures which are resistant to the environment we have not established the utility of non-Freudian assumptions. Greenstein apparently assumes general knowledge of such proof, for he ignores the problem. Yet, at least at first glance, a non-Freudian psychology leaves the individual comparatively vulnerable to environmental stimuli. If so, why study personality? This crucial omission will leave some readers with the unfortunate option of either continuing to rely upon Freudian theory or of forgetting about personality in politics. Moreover, as Greenstein himself hints (p. 146), demonstra-

tion of the utility of non-Freudian assumptions may be difficult, because even distinguishing ego-defensive from other behavior is problematic.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the guidelines Greenstein offers the future researcher must remain in some animated suspension. However, most of the suggestions he offers should prove useful whatever the resolution of these theoretical dilemmas. This section on Greenstein's work profits by its close attention to the few true successes in the personality and politics literature. But again Greenstein occasionally fails to examine the theoretical implications of positions he takes. For example, each of his strategies for personality research involving large aggregates, while perhaps useful in themselves, assumes some position on the tie between individual personalities and the functioning of such aggregates. These positions are not addressed or explicated in the text, thus leaving the utility of the guidelines uncertain.

These criticisms should not detract from the many strengths of the book. Any analyst of this subject would encounter the problems which plague Greenstein. Few would clarify them so well or confront them so candidly. This book will be welcomed for its capacity to introduce advanced students to the problems and literature of this field. Certainly Greenstein's bibliographic facility rewards us all. It is perhaps fruitless to ask for more, given the state of our knowledge. I suspect, however, that advances in the analysis of personality and politics will come less from trying to follow any particular program, and more from the creative efforts of future investigators unwilling to abide by the strictures of friends or foes.

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The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. By MICHAEL H. ARMACOST. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, Pp. 304, \$10.00.)

This is an admirable case study of the controversy over research, development, production and deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) during the 1950's era of the "New Look" in military policy. The Thor-Jupiter controversy's importance in the history of postwar American defense policy would be assured by its substantive aspects alone; it was a central focus in conflicts over how best to exploit technological and strategic opportunities for long-range, nuclear-armed weaponry in meeting a dangerous and growing Soviet challenge to American superiority. Conflicting propriety and budgetary claims of the Army and

Air Force gave the controversy added importance. The decision to allow both services to develop IRBMs, the further decision to produce and deploy both the Army (Jupiter) and Air Force (Thor) systems, and the putative obsolescence of both systems before they even became operative, all served to reinforce common suspicions that the controversy was a major example of wasteful inter-service rivalries. So the Thor-Jupiter controversy became a major stimulus to the Defense Department reorganization in 1958, and to the more extensive revolution in weapons selection and other defense policy processes in the McNamara era. Finally, having failed to anticipate the consequences of the IRBMs dependence on overseas bases, American planners were unnecessarily surprised to discover that our NATO allies' security interests are not always compatible with our own. The ensuing conflicts over Thor and Jupiter deployments helped to uncover a malaise in NATO strategy which still plagues the alliance.

Professor Armacost recounts these and other aspects of this controversy, and also offers to explain them. He builds his analysis around a pressure-group model of policy-making, treating the military services as institutional interest groups. Exploring the implications of this model about as far as possible in a one-case study, he raises and partly answers important questions about how closed is the relatively closed process of converting innovations in weapons technology into hardware to serve policy ends. He offers illustrations and a partial synthesis of findings by Hammond, Hilsman, Huntington, Schilling, Snyder and other contributors to the series sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; this study, like the others, emphasizes the highly political character of national security policy-making. The pressure group model is, he concludes, a better explanation of how military-technological innovations are incorporated into policy than is C. P. Snow's picture of a secretive and uncommunicative dialogue between politicians and experts.

Beyond explanation, Armacost also attempts some judgments on the process. How reasonable, he asks, are decisions likely to be in a decision system that weights lateral bargaining among component elements at least as heavily as the central coordinative pressure of the ostensible decision-makers? Much of the justification for the decisions in this case, he argues, must be found in the pressures that activated the decision process, rather than in the character of that process itself. Thus the decision to pursue two lines of research and development instead of one, to create production facilities concurrently

with development, and to deploy the missile systems despite their obsolescence, all derived largely from pressures to produce an interim long-range capability as quickly as possible. To a point, rivalry between the Army and the Air Force was a positive factor, opening up the decision process to consideration of alternative solutions; and both inter-service and inter-industry rivalries helped spur new and potentially valuable innovations in missile technology.

But his judgments on decision outcomes are not all positive. The yield in technological innovations was a "haphazard" by-product of rivalry between development programs in the two services, for there was no clear understanding at the center of how this yield might be maximized. Limited production of both missile systems was not decided on the basis of any careful cost analysis; apparently it was just easier to authorize this than to write off one or the other development program, with its parallel production capacity, against the cost of producing a single capability. Perhaps most difficult to justify is the decision to produce an IRBM capability at all. It will not do to justify production of an obsolescent weapon system on the *post hoc* grounds that parts of the product proved valuable in the space program; that was a fortuity, not a planned result. The justification must lie in the interim character of the IRBM capability; but all that was really considered in this regard were the pressure of time and the possibility of achieving an intermediate range capability well ahead of the production of inter-continental missiles. "There is little evidence to suggest that comparable attention was paid to equally important design criteria such as the political suitability of highly vulnerable, slow-reacting, intermediate-range missiles in Europe" (p. 263).

For these and other shortcomings in the decisions, Armacost faults weakness at the center—in the Secretary's office, in the budgetary processes, and in the conciliar and Presidential realms of national security policy-making. Strengthening coordination at the center would be no panacea; but neither, he concludes, does mutual adjustment among partisan rivals yield perfectly coordinated programs. Armacost also records some important changes in the weapons selection process during the 1960's, changes increasing coordinative power at the center of the defense community and enhancing the rigor and quality of analytical inputs. He raises important questions about these changes, but of course cannot answer them within the bounds of a single-case study and a single-model view of the policy process. Needed now are comparative studies, over time and among cases, and a more

rigorous attempt to define and classify the stakes perceived by participants in the decision process as they analyze, persuade, and bargain their way to policy decisions. The most important contribution of this study to that larger effort is its demonstration of the quantity and quality of data available in the public record, a consequence of the openness in the decision process that the study reaffirms.

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The Behavioral and Social Sciences: Outlook and Needs. A Report by the BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES SURVEY COMMITTEE, under auspices of the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY and the SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL'S COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS AND POLICY. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp., 320. \$7.95.)

For several reasons, this report is likely to be regarded as a landmark document. It presents the first systematic, empirically-based, collective self-portrait of ten recognized social science disciplines, framed in a policy context of how professional social scientists, as distinguished from promoters and amateur sympathizers, appraise the resource-potential of the behavioral-social sciences for dealing with the problems of society. The picture of their growth and present state of development is painted as far as possible in quantitative terms: (1) membership, degree production, university research organization (governmental, industrial, and nonprofit-corporate research are passed over lightly), facilities and costs; (2) an estimate of the requirements in dollars for maintaining this existing national asset over the next ten years, exclusive of new, large-scale programs; (3) a series of policy recommendations, directed mainly but not exclusively to the federal government, designed to foster such progress.

The overall study-report constitutes a symbolic act of integrated planning for the behavioral and social sciences. The full implications of the decision by an official committee of the National Academy of Sciences to sponsor its publication jointly with the executive committee of the Social Science Research Council may take years to realize. One obvious implication is that the social sciences have finally joined the natural sciences in pursuing methods the latter have used successfully since the 1944 Bush report to persuade Congress and the public to visualize science as a vital national resource, whose maintenance and expansion is a public purpose to be achieved through investment in annual

budgets and appropriations. Another is that the natural sciences have finally recognized that the methods and attitudes of *science* (sic) have been extended to the sciences of man. Still another is awareness and acceptance by all the sciences, natural, biological and human, of the need to apply the full range of scientific knowledge and analysis to the problems besetting contemporary and emergent societies.

Lastly the NAS-SSRC report is important because it is the product of a voluntary, pluralist-federalistic exercise in representative self-government by qualified representatives of the behavioral-social sciences themselves. The manner in which the NAS-SSRC project was set up and carried through is instructive. A Survey Committee, consisting of six to ten-member panels for each of the ten designated disciplines (more than 80 social scientists) was appointed jointly by the Academy's Science and Public Policy Committee and the Council's Problems and Policy Committee. It does not appear precisely how the nominations and final appointments were arrived at, but one may infer the pattern of extensive informal consultation, clearance and cooptation, that characterizes so much of the relationships between confederate peak-scientific organizations and autonomous, constituent scientific societies, was followed. From each of the six major social science panels (anthropology, economics, history as social science, political science, psychology and sociology) a panel chairman and co-chairman was appointed by the SSRC Problems and Policy Committee; from the other four panels (geography, linguistics, psychiatry and statistics) a single chairman was chosen. These sixteen plus two other co-opted members, and a Central Staff composed of a Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Survey Committee, both named by the SSRC, and an Executive Officer from the NAS staff, made up the 21-member Central Planning Committee which designed the study, reviewed and approved the final report drafted by the Central Staff. Begun under the administration of Pendleton Herring at SSRC, the final document clearly bears the imprint of his successor, Henry Riecken, who was co-chairman of the Planning Committee, Ernest Hilgard, the chairman, and Stephen Viederman, the Executive Officer. Harvey Brooks, chairman of the Academy's Science and Public Policy Committee, also seems to have been a key figure in the entire project.

An outstanding feature of the study was a questionnaire survey of behavioral and social science research units (departments, centers, institutes, libraries, laboratories, professional schools, computer centers and central financial

coordinators) at 135 universities, whose responses provided much of the data used not only in the overall report under review, but in the *ten separate reports on each of the disciplines* prepared contemporaneously by the panels composing the Survey Committee. The political science study, drafted by panel chairman Heinz Eulau, has already been published by Prentice-Hall, and deserves major attention by the discipline, along with the two Somit-Tanenhaus studies for comparison.

Space limitations prevent evaluation of the authoritative findings and related recommendations of the NAS-SSRC report. No less than seven chapters (1-5, 16-17) are devoted to a remarkably readable, descriptive explanation of the social sciences for the citizen, public official or legislator seeking a realistic understanding of what they do, how they do it, and what they can be expected to contribute toward the formulation of public policy. The Planning Committee's six major recommendations and supporting documentation may be summarized as follows:

- 1-2 (Chapter 6). The Committee associates itself with efforts under way to develop a *system of social indicators* revelatory of basic trends in the structure and processes of society, and endorses the principle of Congressional legislation to encourage this objective. Pending and preparatory to official, public assumption of this responsibility, behavioral and social scientists outside the government are urged to start work on the problems connected with the publication of an *Annual Social Report to the Nation*, identifying and measuring fundamental changes in the quality of life for all people.
- 3-4 (Chapters 7-8). To support the analytical and interpretive tools envisaged in the first two recommendations, the Committee proposes the establishment of a *special technical commission* to investigate and recommend procedures for a *national system of statistical data reporting designed for social scientific purposes*, and a *continuing high-level governmental body* including nongovernmental members to investigate and prescribe policies for *protecting the anonymity of respondent-contributors to the national data pool*.
- 5 (Chapters 9-13). The Committee presents a critical analysis of existing research organization, primarily within universities, and emerges with a recommendation that *universities should consider the creation of new, broadly-based, programs of interdisciplinary training and research, outside the established disciplines, symbolized by the organizational concept of a Graduate School of Applied Social Research*. This organizational unit should

combine commitment through research both to basic understanding of human relations and to solution of persistent social problems.

- 6 (Chapters 14-15). The Committee concludes from its analysis of research funding from all sources that *an annual increase of from 12-18 per cent in federal support of basic and applied research is necessary to sustain normal growth of the behavioral and social science through the 1970's*.

To a reviewer located on the outer periphery of the academic, foundation and governmental circles whose thinking is reflected in this document, the recommendations scarcely seem controversial. Perhaps this is because they are deeplying and fundamental, far below the popular-ideological level of present-day political controversy. This very quality may lead observers less oriented toward the academic-scientific-administrative elite to question their "policy relevance." Persons accustomed to thinking about poverty, urban decay, crime and environmental pollution on the intellectual level of TV-reporting are not likely to get "involved" in improving our census, welfare, police, housing, health and education statistics. The role of scientific information in shaping the objects of public controversy, as for example in how inflation should be controlled, or how to channel low-income and educated people into constructive participation in local community-improvement programs, is scarcely touched on in this report. The reasonable rejoinder by the Committee that "this was not our problem" highlights the fact that the report was prepared primarily by university social scientists and research administrators interested in fostering the progress of basic social science, on the premise that such progress is a prerequisite for improving our understanding of how to tackle basic social issues. The "new politics" of the 1960's challenges exactly this presupposition, without necessarily refuting it. In support of the committee, however, is the feeling that public funds would be better spent on social research than weapons development, and, far from being radical, the Committee's proposal of an annual increase in federal social science funding of 12-18 per cent for the 1970's is conservative compared with the 20 per cent average that was in fact experienced from 1959-1968.

Within the university community, the most interesting and controversial proposal is for a new Graduate School of Applied Social Research. It is not clear whether the Committee had in mind the model of a School of Social Engineering, to train experts in "social bridge-building," specialists in labor and race relations,

in industrial, political, financial and community organization, urban planning, the administration and control of violence in local, national and international affairs, etc. Its thinking is focussed on what it calls "applied" research into such problems. But the conceptual connection between applied social research and social engineering-development, and the institutional relations between the basic social science disciplines and a School of Research in Public Policy Applications, surely deserve resuscitation and widespread re-examination in the academic community, already watching experiments under way at Yale, Buffalo, Irvine, and Pennsylvania State University, not to mention Syracuse, Cambridge, Princeton and Berkeley.

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Political Science: The Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey. EDITED BY HEINZ EULAU AND JAMES G. MARCH. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. 148. \$5.95.)

The Making of a Political Scientist: An Empirical Analysis of Ph.D. Programs. BY NORMAN LUTTBEG AND MELVIN KAHN. (Carbondale: Public Affairs Research Bureau, Southern Illinois University, 1969, Pp. 72.)

Both of these books are largely based upon questionnaire-response data; both occasionally touch on the same topics, since the Eulau-March volume considers certain aspects of graduate training and the Luttbeg-Kahn study, its title notwithstanding, is concerned with more than just Ph.D. programs. There, however, the similarities cease. *The Making of a Political Scientist . . .*, the work of two young political scientists, is really little more than a pamphlet published by a University "bureau." *Political Science*, edited by two of the profession's senior members (speaking for a panel of eminent colleagues), is one of a series of studies covering the social sciences being done under the prestigious auspices of the National Academy of Science and the Social Science Research Council. More importantly, the two volumes are addressed to different audiences and are intended to serve quite different purposes. For this reason, I will consider them separately, rather than in relationship to each other.

In early 1966, Professors Luttbeg and Kahn sent a questionnaire to the chairmen of some seventy political science departments then offering the doctorate degree. Beyond their desire to secure information about Ph.D. programs, graduate student recruitment policies, placement practices, etc., the authors sought to answer two

questions: First, how do these departments fall on a "behavioral-traditional" scale? Second, as the chapter heading puts it, "Departmental Status: Does It Make a Qualitative Difference?" The answers to these questions will be of interest, I suspect, largely to fellow political scientists.

The authors found (on the basis of fifty-six replies) that 46% of the departments are (or were) "behavioral" in orientation, 37% are "traditional," 11% can be classified as "eclectic," and only 14% are strongly committed one way or another. Some of those who have followed the interminable discussions of this issue may share my skepticism that these terms have any useful, let alone consistent, meaning. These classifications, moreover, were based entirely on the chairmen's evaluation—and I am reluctant to accept any one man's opinion as a reliable guide in this matter.

Are there measurable differences in the quality of graduate training offered, respectively, at "status" and "non-status" institutions (Carter's ratings are the basis for this distinction)? The hypothesis on which the authors proceeded was that there would not be significant differences with regard to "empirical orientation, admission and retention policies, curriculum content, language and research tools, testing procedures, and placement efforts" (p. 25). This hypothesis was confirmed. The authors report a "... remarkable absence of any relationship between status and *graduate training characteristics noted in this study*" (p. 41, italics mine). These findings are undoubtedly correct—if these are the proper "characteristics" by which to measure the "quality" of graduate training. Messrs. Luttbeg and Kahn, I should add, admit that other criteria could be equally—or more—relevant.

To summarize: I am not altogether sure that the first of their two questions was really meaningful and, in any event, am unhappy about the evidence on which their conclusions were based. The second question was defined in such a fashion that, in my opinion, it skirts rather than directly confronts the matter of quality. Still, if they have not been able to accomplish their major objectives—and as competent professionals they are fully aware of these difficulties—Professors Luttbeg and Kahn have brought together some very useful information. Given recent changes in graduate programs, their findings may no longer tell us where we are now, but they do provide valuable base-line data for subsequent studies.

The Eulau-March volume, we are immediately informed, was "... written not for our col-

agues who practice political science as a profession, but for those on whose good will and understanding the future of the discipline greatly depends—governmental and educational policy makers, members of the Congress and the state legislatures, foundation officials, university administrators, and other interested citizens" (p. 1). The purpose of the book is to persuade this audience that the "discipline's research and research training needs" should be supported in more generous fashion than has been the case to date.

The volume, then, is essentially a proposal, and its organization and contents are necessarily shaped by its basic objective. In a truly admirable opening section, the authors drive home the point that "the further development of a science of politics will have important consequences for the training of tomorrow's leaders, for understanding society's needs and wants, for the development of sound policy analysis and public policy itself" (p. 2). This theme is repeated in Chapter 1, entitled "What Political Science is About" and, perhaps to resolve any remaining doubts, Chapter 2 deals with "Relevance for Public Policy." The remaining five chapters describe, respectively, "Changing Frontiers of Theory and Research," "Personnel: Status and Trends," "Financing Research and Research Training," "Education for Research in Political Science," and "The Prospects of Research in Political Science." These last-named chapters follow a common format: First, the current situation is described, with substantial reliance on data derived from a 1968 questionnaire survey. This done, the authors advance recommendations aimed at improving and strengthening the discipline. In almost every instance, the recommendation specifies the amount of money needed for its implementation.

There is a wealth of information about the profession here. Some of it amplifies and updates earlier studies (i.e., field distribution); some of it is quite original (i.e., per faculty dollar support of research, by status of department). The spatial limits of this review compel a selective treatment and I will accordingly comment only on the projections of Ph.D. output (p. 70). I think these are mistaken in two respects. First, they do not include either international relations or public administration doctorates. Second, they are much too conservative. Thus, they estimated that political science output alone (sans the aforementioned two sub-fields) for 1967-68 would be 391 doctorates. The reality was 452—and the total for all three areas a whopping 561. These technical matters aside, I regret that the

panelists did not consider the longterm consequences to the discipline of a doctoral output now running close to 700 annually and one likely to hit the 1,000 mark by 1975-76.

Eulau and March advance some fifteen separate proposals (unfortunately, the volume does not provide a summary of these). Since many of them cannot be briefly restated, selectivity is again in order. I find it difficult to muster much enthusiasm for the suggestion that we establish a "national training program in psychiatry for young political scientists" (p. 51). This may have been a fresh and exciting idea at the Science of Politics meeting forty-five years ago but there are many other fields (economics, mathematics, ecology, biology, even sociology) where training programs would be far more useful for *tomorrow's* political scientists.

Having established my critical independence, let me promptly say that there are a number of imaginative and potentially fruitful suggestions: for "national study centers," (p. 131), for expanded NSF funding for political science research (p. 140), for increasing the number of "strong" departments (p. 74), for new training programs at the post-baccalaureate and doctoral levels (pp. 119-121) and, though I have my reservations, for "explicitly preprofessional undergraduate programs for behavioral and social science" (p. 114).

Are Messrs. Eulau and March correct in claiming that they have advanced some "bold proposals"? I think so. Not only are several of their suggestions imaginative but it would cost almost seventeen million dollars *annually* to fund their recommendations—and for political science this is very bold thinking indeed. They have been equally bold, many will agree, in their view of the contribution which political science can make to policy formation, now or in the immediate future.

On balance, the members of the panel have done all that could be asked of them. They have provided us with a great deal of information about the profession—more, I suspect, than most political scientists want to know. But this is of secondary importance. The panelists were charged with the task of developing proposals which would lead to expanded public support for political science and they have responded with some (hopefully) attractive ideas. Whatever comes out of their efforts operationally (in terms of actual funding), the profession owes them a vote of thanks.

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BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY

Ideologies and Utopias: The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought. BY ARTHUR A. EKKIRCH, JR. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. Pp. 307. \$8.50.)

This is Professor Ekirch's eighth book. It is interestingly written and neatly organized—a pleasantly readable study. The book does not pretend to be a general intellectual history of the thirties for, as the author makes clear, the focus is on that complex whirl of ideas, alternating in hope and frustration, that were at the intellectual center of the New Deal. The author's skill in framing various and changing images of FDR from the recommendations and responses of intellectuals to the New Deal deserves note. The book draws upon fresh materials in the National Archives, the Roosevelt Papers at Hyde Park, and important private collections. The reader will find stimulating commentary and well-chosen quotations from and on the social and political thought of leading New Dealers and anti-New Dealers such as Wallace and Tugwell, Arnold and Thomas, MacLeish and Edmund Wilson.

However, the main interpretative themes of this historian's analysis of the role of the New Deal in American life and thought are not new. This reviewer finds most of these themes or perspectives on the New Deal present in the Professor Ekirch's previous works. *Ideologies and Utopias* elaborates these perspectives, develops them in some depth, and gives them a forceful synthetic statement. Ekirch's general thesis is that the "nationalism or statism of the New Deal," the "wave of the future" carrying us "further away from the individualistic heritage" of our past, "inaugurated the real revolution in modern American life and thought." (p. viii, 262, 265) The author is clearly inclined to view the New Deal as a "revolutionary era in American thinking." The bold outlines of this image of the New Deal and its impact begin to fade, however, when we perceive them from the interpretative milieu of Ekirch's 1955 book *The Decline of American Liberalism*. In other words, when we pick up the historian's telescope in the 1955 study it is as if we can see the "wave of the future" building up from afar, whereas in the current study the same instrument seems at times to have caught a sea monster looming into view. The conceptual pattern used in *Ideologies and Utopias* is continuous with that developed in the earlier work. The concept of liberalism is at the heart of the matter.

The reader is advised to consider the 1955 study (available in paperback since last year), for the New Deal is here one of the latest chapters in a long story: the decline of American liberalism. If we accept Ekirch's 1955 construction of the concept "liberalism" (which he admitted was "rather precise and rigid") and his corollary idea of "the progressive tradition" running from the Square Deal to the Fair Deal, then the role of what his new book calls the "nationalism of the New Deal" in constituting a "new departure in American thought," even a "new public philosophy" may appear enormous indeed. In relation to the particular terms of Ekirch's norm, "historic" or "classical" liberalism, the stress in *Ideologies and Utopias* on the New Deal's "nationalistic concepts of planning and collective social action" as "[s]ingularly modern" (p. 264) appears logical. The reader may wonder if it is the soundest historical logic.

However, the prospective reader of the book deserves from the reviewer a more substantial account of Professor Ekirch's chosen perspective on the New Deal. Perhaps some readers will be inclined to challenge the Ekirch definition of liberalism as leading to a concept of "conservatism" unfit for coping with the complex realities of a "modern pluralistic democracy." In the foreword to his 1955 book, Ekirch suggested that probably "it would be fairer if modern liberals would agree to being called progressives, socialists, nationalists, etc. . . ." The reviewer suggests that there is substantial merit in viewing Ekirch's "modern liberals" as nationalists and as part of the progressive legacy. But the reviewer proposes that most of these same liberals would legitimately claim that they are "pluralists" and not "socialists" and that, correlatively, the New Deal which is so central to their self-image as well as to their image of American society was not "nationalistic" in some of the ways Ekirch contends in *Ideologies and Utopias*. (The reviewer commends his development of this thesis in chapter 7 concerning the dispute among the intellectuals on the role of education in a general period of war).

Specifically, Professor Ekirch's interpretation of the New Deal's "statism," while it points up some very serious problems (as in the field of education), may have some notable shortcomings. The reader is advised to consider Ekirch's notion of the singular *modernity* of the New Deal's "nationalistic concepts of planning and collective social action" (present also in the 1955 book) in light of

Andrew Shonfield's *Modern Capitalism* (1965), Chapter XIII, and the last chapter of Grant McConnell's *Private Power and American Democracy* (1966). McConnell's study shows how a strong American tradition of decentralization has fostered the development of an array of elite-based power structures which by various means have acquired a significant degree of control over major areas of public policy. McConnell writes of the "tradition of the virtuous small constituency" and, like Lowi more recently, he criticizes the illusion "that the surrender of public authority to private hands results in democracy." (p. 367-368) Shonfield's comparative analysis shows both the New Deal's alleged commitment to natural planning and the role of public power considerably more uncertain than does Ekirch. Shonfield says of Roosevelt that he responded "to a national instinct to break up government into many small parts, an instinct which seems at times to be guided by some eccentric model of a system of administration in which a lot of independent bodies engage in furious competition with one another—the nearest thing in fact to a market place." (p. 318)

The point is certainly *not* that *Ideologies and Utopias* tends to be a right-wing diatribe against a "socialistic New Deal." Rather the book's author deliberately steers the reader away from the conclusion and emphasizes that the new political economy that emerged was "an amalgam of private enterprise and government controls, an American version of state capitalism and social democracy." (p. 104). It is almost as if he were suggesting to a large portion of his audience: "I won't interpret this 'socialist' if you won't call the interpretation 'reactionary'." According to Louis Hartz, it is the game that good, tolerant American Lockean play. At times Ekirch offers support to the pluralist view of the political impact of the New Deal, but it almost seems that for every concession to what Lowi calls the new public philosophy of interest-group liberalism a cost is marked, e.g. by a reference to the "paternalism of the modern bureaucratic state." (p. 263) Roosevelt preserved capitalism but capitalism has become an "adjunct of a welfare-warfare state" (p. 104, 262) Ekirch quotes Vernon Louis Parrington in 1929: "We must have a political state powerful enough to deal with corporate wealth, but how are we going to keep that state with its augmenting power from being captured by the force we want it to control?" Ekirch goes on to write that what Parrington and others did not anticipate was that "the depression would go far to destroy the political influence of big business and to restore to the people the political power they appeared to have lost in the twenties." (19-20)

The reviewer's point is not that the New Deal, in terms of actual achievements, made a smaller

impact on American society than the progressive movement. Quite the contrary! Neither is the point to castigate Ekirch's deference to pluralism with a Millsian "power elite" argument. Rather, as the use of the Shonfield and McConnell studies would have made clear, the problem in Ekirch's interpretation is his inclination to confuse the American bureaucratic politics of small constituencies with "national planning." For example, he holds (unlike Shonfield) that "there was a continuing element of national economic planning which gave to the later New Deal, as Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, 'a social-democratic tinge never before present in American reform movements'." (p. 107) Actually, both Hofstadter in the *Age of Reform* (1955) (pp. 305-306) and Michael Rogin in his critique of pluralism, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy* (1967) (p. 204) indicate that this "social democratic tinge" was related to the mass working-class base on which the New Deal depended and to which it reacted. Hofstadter's "new departure" thesis on the New Deal did not stress planning, but Ekirch obscures this somewhat and perhaps because concepts of "planning" and "nationalism" are central to his own thesis of a "new departure in American thought" which he argues was manifested in the New Deal itself (105-108).

The support for the pluralist view of the New Deal's impact combined with the thesis on the New Deal as a "revolutionary era" in Ekirch's book need not be seen as contradictory if we consider Rogin's analysis (following Hartz) of the dialectical interplay of pragmatism and moralism in Lockean liberalism. (194-195) Perhaps Hartz's concept of the liberal, fragment society is more useful than Ekirch's concept of liberalism developed and employed in terms of the tradition itself. To quote Hartz in *The Founding of New Societies* (1964) (p. 117): "What is centrally involved is the entire obscurantist attitude of the New Deal tradition itself which, in its pragmatism, has not dared to disturb the national absolute." The doctrinal connections between the New Deal and the progressive movement are well-known. "Progressivism introduced administrative liberalism into American politics" (Rogin, p. 205) and the New Deal institutionalized it, the process feeding on war-related tensions as Ekirch brings out well. Contemporary pluralist theorists of the new industrial state, are in many ways, part of that progressive tradition which has done so much to bureaucratize the reform impulse. In Ekirch's friendly study they have the pragmatic achievements of the modern technological ego balanced by the moral claims of the traditional liberal super-ego: a new departure perhaps but the pattern of ideological ambiguity seems familiar.—HERBERT REID, *The University of Kentucky*.

The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western System of Power. BY RALPH MILIBAND. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969. Pp. 292. \$6.95.)

Ralph Miliband is a Marxist—no slavish toady of cant—but, as befits Harold Laski's intellectual successor at the London School of Economics, an unfettered practitioner of socio-economic analysis who can be as disconcertingly unsentimental about the socialist pretensions of the British Labor Party (see his *Parliamentary Socialism*, 1961) as he is caustic about the democratic pretensions of pluralist ideology. Neither the labor movement, the pluralists, nor the Western system of power come off very well in this important new study, characterized by Miliband as "a general sociology of advanced capitalism." In place of the 'postcapitalist' pluralist model (dismissed as "... a profound obfuscation of reality"), Professor Miliband offers an updated marxism which although intended to overcome traditional deficiencies accepts that

The economic and political life of capitalist societies is *primarily* determined by the relationship between . . . the class which . . . owns and controls and the working class . . . The political process in these societies is mainly about the confrontation of these forces. (p. 16)

Free from the sterilizing ambitions of 'value-free inquiry', Miliband pursues this relentless sociology beyond the irrelevancies of empirical functionalism (which in its Simonian treatment of values as instrumentalities must swallow uncritically the non-instrumental ends dictated by the status quo) to a radical posture in which the empirically dysfunctional can be treated as the socially necessary.

Professor Miliband proceeds concretely, undertaking a comprehensive survey of power relationships in France, Italy, Japan and other selected 'advanced capitalist' nations as well as in England and America. Within systems Miliband distinguishes the state from its several organs—permitting comparative analysis of such putatively 'neutral' institutions as the judiciary, the civil service and the military, and allowing scrutiny of the legitimizing roles played by schools, churches and mass media; purportedly classless ideals like nationalism and the public interest are convincingly depicted as guises for class interest and elite rulership.

Miliband does not, however, conjure up a monopolistic ruling elite in direct control of the state, but portrays rather a dominant economic class into whose hands is concentrated a radically disproportionate share of wealth, giving it an irresistible advantage in the theoretically egalitarian competition which legitimizes democracy in the pluralist pressure system. It is this capacity for indirect rule that allows capitalism to flourish in the

absence of overt repression.

Compelling as this vision is, the perspective from which it issues is not without conceptual and methodological difficulties. Conceptually, Miliband must rely on the inflexible economic categories of historical materialism. But when uprooted from the European environment and applied to the peculiar exploitative variations of American capitalism, notions like 'class struggle' or 'class consciousness' lose much of their explanatory power—seem almost quaint and antiquarian, as if the standards of "Aida" were being employed to judge the aesthetics of "Hair."

European unions may still fall victim to government-business conspiracies, and a 'socialist' government in England is foisting wage restraints on a reluctant T.U.C., but in America unions are more often found black-mailing timorous city governments or intimidating defensive oligopolies. European poverty has been class-conscious, but American poverty is race-conscious. The spectre which haunts America is not worker's revolution but racism, urban blight and ecological mayhem. Indeed, when Miliband promises that "sooner or later . . . the working class and its allies will acquire the faculty (for ruling a nation . . .)" (pp. 276-277), one feels constrained to ask whether this is likely to happen in America under a red hammer and sickle, or a gray Confederate flag.

Economic determinism also appears to be an unrewarding perspective from which to view the psychological costs not only of capitalism's human failures but its material success. Pervasive consumerism, for example, has enabled capitalist society to neutralize values which threaten it by embracing and merchandizing them; like his liberal counterpart, however, the coercion-conscious Marxist is unlikely to perceive that a *Vogue* feature celebrating anarchism or a *Time* Essay pondering Black nationalism can do far more to emasculate "treasonous" ideas than censorship or repression. Nor is he apt to feel obliged to account for such symptoms of bourgeois malaise as alienation, anomie or ennui indicated in soaring rates for middle class crime, alcoholism, divorce and suicide—despite the fact that in many capitalist societies the middle class constitutes over half the population. The young Marx of the Paris manuscripts might have been able to respond to this class of issues, but Miliband reflects the concerns of the mature and cynical Marx of *Kapital*.

Here Professor Miliband will object that such problems as these are symptoms of decadence rooted in the capitalist mode of production and its attendant economic relationships, and are to be fully apprehended only in the context of economics and history. In a compelling passage enumerating some of these symptoms, he writes:

Opponents of capitalism believe it to be a system whose very nature nowadays makes impossible the optimum utilisation of resources for rational human ends; whose inherent character is one of compulsion, domination and parasitical appropriation; whose spirit and purpose fatally corrode all human relations; and whose maintenance is today the major obstacle to human progress. (p. 73)

But this raises the second more methodological set of difficulties facing Miliband: how to establish cause from historical evidence? How to demonstrate the validity of the Marxist interpretation as against some other? As Miliband concedes, "bourgeois politicians and governments view the system [described in Marxist terms above] in precisely opposite terms—as most closely congruent with human nature, as uniquely capable of combining efficiency, welfare and freedom . . . (etc.)." If marxism is to be something more than a self-evident and closed philosophical system within which everything becomes explicable and nothing predictable, it must in rejecting bourgeois explanations adhere to some notion of evidence and proof. Yet though cumulatively persuasive, Miliband's reasoning does not display a careful regard for rules of evidence. Terms like "often," "primarily," "mainly," or "generally" are allowed to serve purposes which belong properly to sociological or economic data. And where changes in social structure or simple material progress have beclouded traditional class models, Miliband seems to rely on the irrefutable proposition that the non-exploitative exception is but proof for the exploitative rule. If major concessions are made to unions they are to be understood as the 'ransom' or 'price' paid by capitalism to insure its preservation. Though civil liberties may be real and may even "help to mitigate the form and content of class domination," one can nevertheless be certain that "this mitigating function does not abolish class rule and even serves, at a price, to guarantee it." (p. 266) But surely at some point mitigation becomes transformation, attenuation becomes abolition; at some point capitalism's "concessions" annihilate capitalism and the exception becomes the rule.

This is not to say that such a point has been reached, only that there must be such a point. Otherwise, like the pseudo-Freudian who 'proves' all behaviour is sexual by treating apparently non-sexual behaviour in terms of sexual inhibition or repression, the pseudo-Marxist can explain away every kind and degree of equality, freedom and abundance by treating them as so many "concessions" made in the name of preserving hierarchy, servitude and poverty. Even the Dictatorship of the Proletariat can be understood as a concessionary tactic of a temporarily dispossessed bourgeoisie to insure its eventual return to power. Professor Miliband is certainly no pseudo-Marxist, but he does veer dangerously close to this logic when

he avers that "to achieve the dissolution (of class divisions) or even their serious erosion would take rather more than working-class access to refrigerators, television sets, cars or even 'tahitian' bungalows on the Riviera;" (p. 28). Class conscious or not, property-owning workers ensconced in tahitian hideaways on the Riviera have a great deal more to lose than chains.

Yet for all of its problems, the Marxist perspective comes far closer to capturing the relevant realities of the Western system of power than the sublimely complacent fixations of the pluralists. Its very vulnerability to rejoinder is one of its chief strengths, for its judgements inspire thoughtful controversy, its conjectures invite relevant criticism, and its profound humanity guarantees that politics will not be subordinated to methodology and that stability will never be mistaken for justice.

This reviewer's particular American prejudices make Professor Miliband's analysis suggestive rather than definitive; but the enterprise in which he is engaged can truly be called *political science*. This makes *The State in Capitalist Society* a rare book.—BENJAMIN R. BARBER, *Rutgers University*.

Revolution and Church: The Early History of Christian Democracy 1789–1901. By HANS MAIER. Translated by Emily M. Schossberger. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969. Pp. 326. \$10.00.)

The first edition of this book, written by the occupant of the chair for Political Science at the University of Munich, was published in Germany in 1959; it covered the origins and development of the Christian democratic idea in France during the period 1789 to 1850. The second edition, enlarged by a chapter that takes the story to the end of the 19th century and the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII, has now been made available for the English reader. The translation is competent and the documentation ample, yet this is a curiously uneven book. Some chapters are well organized and readable while others are rather confusing. The book as a whole will be of interest more to the historian of ideas than to the student of the Christian Democratic parties that flourished in Western Europe in the years after World War II.

The reader may want to skip the first chapter in which Professor Maier toils valiantly at elucidating the meaning of terms such as "Conservative Catholicism," "Democratic-social Catholicism," "Liberal Catholicism," "Political Catholicism," "Social Catholicism," "Democratic Catholicism," "Catholic traditionalism," and "Catholic politics." Since this chapter lacks a chronological or topical structure the author's trains of thought much of the time are rather difficult to follow. The next

three chapters, on the other hand, are interesting. They deal with the encounter between French Catholicism and the French Revolution and the aftermath of this collision—the attempt on the part of some French Catholics to achieve a reconciliation of church and revolution. The latter task, Professor Maier argues, was indeed the overriding aim of Christian Democracy in France.

A substantial segment of the French clergy at first was sympathetic to the French Revolution. It has been estimated that about one half of the secular (parochial) and about one third of the entire clergy swore the oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy of July 1790. A member of this so-called "Constitutional Church," Mgr. M. Lamourette, the Bishop of Lyons, was the first to use the term "Christian Democracy." Addressing a parliamentary committee, the progressive bishop contrasted the moral principles of the early church, founded by "the wise man of Nazareth, the true friend of the people," with the later corruption that made Jesus into an aristocrat and "opened the eternal abyss under the steps of whoever would think of breaking the chains of servitude." But the spokesmen of a "holy alliance of Christianity and Freedom," as Professor Maier shows in an informative chapter, soon lost ground and the amalgamation of church and democracy ended in failure.

In the next two lengthy chapters the author treats of the political thought of the traditionalists, de Maistre, de Bonald and the early Lamennais, as well as the reemergence of more liberal currents during the years 1830–50. While this discussion does not break any new ground it is, nevertheless, carefully executed and highlights a good many interesting details. The last chapter, on the other hand, dealing with the years 1891–1901, fails to live up to the same standards of thorough scholarship and readability. The Paris Commune and, more importantly, the laic laws of the Third Republic are barely mentioned with the result that the discussion of the *Ralliement*, the attempt on the part of Pope Leo XIII to reconcile French Catholicism and the republic, badly lacks historical context.

As Professor Maier himself notes at the end of his book, it was not French Christian Democracy but the political Catholicism of Belgium, Holland and Germany that pointed the way to the later Christian Democratic parties of Europe. This being the case, the subtitle of this book is just a bit misleading. The work represents less a contribution to the history of European Christian Democracy than the generally thoughtful treatment of an important chapter in the history of French Catholicism.—GUENTER LEWY, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*.

The Critique of War: Contemporary Philosophical Explorations. EDITED BY ROBERT GINSBURG. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1969. Pp. 360. Clothbound, \$12.50; paperbound, \$3.95.)

Ginsburg has selected 18 of 192 essays submitted by philosophers of many countries. One comes away from it all with two vivid impressions. First, war is senseless, horrendous folly. Second, Philosophy can surely do better than this.

The first impression jumps out at the reader constantly—reminding him of Calvin Coolidge's fabled report of the morning sermon. "He talked about sin. He was agin' it." Indeed, there is so much *agin'ness* here that one longs for the constructive analysis promised in the editor's introductory essay: "Since war is human activity, philosophy must propose plans of action to counteract war. To denounce war does not suffice. Philosophy must lead to the practice that will defeat war." (p. xiii).

Alas, the denunciations of war's immorality, and the proofs of its irrationality, go on and on, but the plans of action do not arrive. Even the analyses which might serve as the basis for policy are frustratingly vague. The familiar "causes of war" are all trotted out here or there: irrationality, frustration, necrophilia, anarchy, ideology, fear, social injustice, colonial rivalry, moral decadence—but none is pursued to the sticking point of coherent theory. The corresponding cures are also to be found—world government, a new humanity, nonviolence, a resort to reason, a federation of friendly states, an explosion of man's will to live, the expansion of civil liberties, the abolition of the department of Defense—but with corresponding vagueness on how to get from here to there.

Is it professional parochialism to expect the philosopher to come to grips with the scholars of one's own (and other) disciplines? Not, I think, if the philosopher claims to chart the way to peace. In fact, contributor Steinkraus writes that philosophers should "review the ethical and value presuppositions of the so-called conventional wisdom of military deterrence," and "assist in promoting constructive ideas for meeting conflicts creatively and without violence." Yet one looks in vain, amid the haystack of sweeping diagnoses and prescriptions, for a needle pertaining to the vast literature on arms control and international order. Other than Herman Kahn, who of course receives several barbs, Quincy Wright and Karl Deutsch are the only political scientists cited in the volume—and they are smuggled in by the panel's one political scientist, Carl Friedrich. Nowhere does one encounter either the names or the leading associated ideas of Aron, Bloomfield, Bull, Claude, Falk, Morgenthau, Kissinger, Osgood (whether Robert or Charles), Schelling, Singer, Stone, Tucker,

Ralph K. White. Have these men contributed *no* "constructive ideas" for "a practice that will defeat war?" Has the philosopher nothing to say about their "ethical and value presuppositions"?

One suspects that this massive inattention to next steps, or even to middle axioms, can be traced to the rationalistic presuppositions of the editor. Mr. Ginsburg is apparently able to believe that "armed with reason man ought to be able to master himself," and that "if we can instruct men to do what they ought, then we will prevent war" (pp. xvi, xx). If the need of the hour is for a reiteration of the irrationality of war, we need look no further. If the need is for more thought the intermediate and immediate range of problems, in a world where reason is often the servant of passion, the search must go on. Perhaps, indeed, it will be furthered by the second volume of essays, which is promised but not described.

Four essays struck this reviewer as especially valuable. There is much to savor in the late Robert Merton's brilliant commentary on the denaturing of our political (and commercial) language. Some of the contributors would benefit from Risieri Frondizi's emphasis on the ideological component of contemporary conflict. John Somerville's exploration of communist doctrines of war and revolution is a salutary corrective to American stereotypes.

Finally, the imaginative conscience, dulled by a quarter century of latent terror, is properly stirred by Robert Hartman's devastating analysis of the firepower statesmen now possess, and its implications. In fact, Hartman's profoundly sobering essay forces one to wonder whether it is not wiser, upon the appearance of any dovish book on war, simply to doff one's hat and wish it well.—GORDON L. SHULL, *The College of Wooster*.

The Politics of Affluence: Ideology in the U.S. Since World War II. BY JAMES P. YOUNG. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. 241. \$2.25.)

This book is an essay on the intellectual basis of a number of current public-policy positions. By examining the setting of ideological conflict in America and its political tradition, Young hopes to determine what in that tradition is of use in meeting new realities. American political tradition emphasizes consensus with a narrow spectrum of conflict. Both the conservative and the liberal tradition in America have common roots in a highly individualistic conception of the nature of society but they have differed largely over the means by which the individual is to be served. The dilemma in American political thought is the "transitional period" it is passing through. According to Young, "the United States is faced with a set of issues un-

like any it has ever faced before." Perhaps most important concerns are reflected by changes in international life characterized by the rapid decolonization since the end of World War II, the rise of powers to challenge America's supremacy and the threat of nuclear destruction.

The premise from which liberalism proceeds is individualism. Faith in reason but rejection of the state as a natural institution has led today's liberals into a state of philosophical disarray according to Young. Also, most modern philosophy has been characterized by a belief in the relativity of values to culture. Niebuhr provides a systematic re-examination of liberal beliefs. Young contends Niebuhr is an important figure in American thought for two reasons; first, as an important symbol of an intellectual mood widespread in the United States and entire Western world; and second, because he is a significant source of that mood. The humanists have criticized both Niebuhr's conception of original sin and his view of the nature of liberalism. Young draws two conclusions; first, the alternative to a disbelief in the doctrine of original sin need not be a surrender to babbling optimism about the future; second, Niebuhr's theology is separable from his politics.

To understand American liberalism, it is necessary first to understand the New Deal which represents a synthesis of older reform ideas and some that are entirely new. The New Deal was pragmatic in nature, relied on "an ideology of the status quo" and lacked consistency. How liberals assess the basic character of the American economic system is a key question that Young answers largely through the work of John Kenneth Galbraith. Young concludes; "The task of American liberalism must be to find ways to integrate a high degree of respect for the dignity of the individual with the complexities of a highly industrialized economy . . . A renewed attempt to define the content of public interest is called for."

Young's review of major conservative writers clearly illustrates the problems inherent in creating a viable American conservatism. Young concludes that Burkean conservatives have no permanent political home in the United States i.e., the aristocrats of American politics have been and seem to be getting fewer. The dominant characteristic of conservative policy has been its close relationship to the business world, stemming from the twin doctrines of laissez-faire and social darwinism. Young maintains that the major themes of American conservatism are here: the rejection of egalitarianism (especially in its economic form) and a determined resistance to the further growth or centralization of the national government. The most important point at issue is the compatibility of democracy with economic planning. The con-

temporary American conservative ideologist is in a difficult, if not impossible position. He tacitly accepts a good deal of the liberal program of the twentieth century even while he rejects the ideological foundations on which the program rests. He resists further change in the direction the country has been moving—they find themselves in opposition to the liberals *and* conservatives—who at least consider a change in the status quo. This is a high price to pay for adherence to the dogma of *laissez-faire*.

Young argues the near-irrelevance of traditional right-left conservative-liberal categories in connection with foreign affairs. Instead, Young examines the beliefs of Hans J. Morgenthau in "realism" in H. Stuart Hughes in "utopianism" (*An Approach to Peace*). Young concludes that Morgenthau and Hughes are similar on some assumptions. They share a belief in the disutility of nuclear weapons and agree that the weapons are a handicap rather than help in the conduct of foreign affairs. The first major difference between them concerns a course of action; Morgenthau would create a supernational power strong enough to control nuclear weapons. Hughes's only hope is that unilateralism will not be necessary—if disarmament and a reduction in international tension occurs in the national interest of both major nuclear powers. A second major difference occurs when Morgenthau defines enemy in terms of attitude toward the United States with hostile countries checked by an arms control scheme. Hughes would oppose arms control and strive for leadership of a regional power bloc. Young suggests it would be difficult for the United States to abdicate the large role it presently plays in foreign affairs and assume a leadership position of a regional bloc. This is further complicated by the increasing role of foreign policy in domestic affairs.

"American political thought is passing through a transitional period. The period of ideological quiescence appears to be ending; at the same time, the traditional analytical categories are hard put to be of help in analyzing the change." With cross-sectional concern for equality, serious questions arise as to the applicability of a liberal-conservative continuum to the analysis of contemporary American politics. Politics has hitherto been largely concerned with disturbing the relatively scarce benefits of industrialization. In an age of affluence this problem is no longer so acute. Ideologies may have certain positive functions, and failure to perform them can lead to a period marked by political sterility. "What is needed is a revival of *programmatic* thinking about American society and politics aimed at a reconstruction of the American consensus." Young maintains that failure to understand the practical and moral limi-

tations of power lead to the corruption of the intellectual both in his actions and his failure to act. —FRED KRINSKY, *University of Southern California*.

The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. By DAVID McLELLAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 170. \$8.50)

The meaning of a man's words must be understood in the context of his other words, the words of his friends and foes, and the social and economic and political conditions that may have affected him.

It is to the understanding of Marx in the context of his contemporaries that David McLellan begins to make an important contribution; that it is not more of a contribution may be due, one suspects, to the heavy hand of an editor who may not have seen the potential of this book as permitting more than 160 pages of text—with the result that innovating arguments consistently break off just when they become intriguing and demand greater demonstration. The price of the book—\$8.50—is similarly outrageous: those who really could make use of the book will be students who can't afford it, while the specialists on this subject either have access to the treated works in the original German or should give up such specialty if they are educated under the latest fad of substituting statistics for language training.

Substantively, McLellan develops the problem of the debt which Marx may be said to owe to four Young Hegelians: Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner and Moses Hess. In doing so, he corrects some misconceptions of other commentators and suggests a new configuration of the parameters of meaning within which the thought of the early Marx must be evaluated.

Marx's debt to Feuerbach's transformation of Hegelian thought from Idea-orientation to greater Man-orientation is perhaps the best-known connection between Marx and any other follower of Hegel—and, according to McLellan, an overemphasized one. By the time Feuerbach produced the first edition of *Das Wesen des Christentums* (to which, McLellan points out, Engels attributed a great deal too much influence on all the Hegelians), Marx had already come under the influence of Bruno Bauer who helped make Marx an atheist and whose statement that the religious question is "eliminated for all time" Marx echoes in his well known beginning of *Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*.

McLellan certainly seems justified in arguing that at the time Marx was more impressed by Feuerbach's "humanism" and that it was Engels who emphasized unduly Feuerbach's materialism while the latter was still trying to maintain a ten-

uous balance between idealism and materialism. A critical reading of the *Theses on Feuerbach* tends to support this. Further, there are some useful indications here as to the origins of Engels's later scientific materialism in *The Dialectics of Nature* which lays the groundwork for a transformation of Marxian anthropology culminating in the Soviet endorsement of Pavlovian behaviorism.

It is in his treatment of Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner in separate chapters that McLellan focuses on two major previous commentaries with which he disagrees: that of Sidney Hook and R. Tucker, respectively.

Stirner, it is well argued by McLellan, forced Marx to go beyond Feuerbach, substituting a praxis-oriented humanism that actively transforms the world in man's image for Feuerbach's more quietist view of the sensible world as composed of mere objects of observation. By contrast, Tucker, as McLellan avers in his disappointingly bland way, ignores Stirner's influence, while Hook similarly scants Stirner's impact on *The German Ideology* by seeing Feuerbach as the last influence preceding Marx's formulation of his historical materialism in that work.

Similarly, McLellan takes Hook to task for what McLellan demonstrates to be a lopsided view of Marx as merely reacting against Bruno Bauer—lopsided because it ignores Marx's earlier debt to Bauer whose rapid shifts in intellectual development are as politically comprehensible as they are philosophically indefensible.

In his *From Hegel to Marx*, McLellan points out, "Hook takes the intellectual position that Marx had accepted by 1844 or 1845 and contrasts with this position the various ideas of the Young Hegelians . . . especially . . . Bruno Bauer." (McLellan, pp. 50-51, fn. 1.) In essence, McLellan argues that Hook's treatment is "vitiating" by his inability to view Bauer's writings in terms of their changes over time, overlooking for example that what Marx viciously attacks in 1845 as Bauer's rejection of a philosophy of action happened to be enthusiastically espoused in 1841-43 by the younger Bauer. Given such a radical shift, even the earlier Bauer would have taken up cudgels against the later Bauer. If, as McLellan holds, Marx had already been influenced by the earlier Bruno Bauer it is quite understandable why he later seeks to disassociate himself from Bauer's subsequent intellectual metamorphosis.

Disappointingly brief is McLellan's last chapter in which he treats of the influence of Moses Hess on Marx and Engels. Particularly intriguing, especially in view of Bolshevik attacks on the early Marx's still idealistically philosophical humanism, is McLellan's emphasis on the difficulties Hess encountered in converting Marx to a communistic

viewpoint in those early days of collaboration on the *Rheinische Zeitung* in contrast to his earlier and greater success with Engels.

In summary, it may be said that this is a useful little book for the groundwork it lays toward a more complete understanding of the meaning of Marx's ideas especially in his early writings. What is missed here, because of both blandness and brevity, is the creative grand sweep so typical of earlier commentators and of members of the Marxian tradition themselves as well as the incisive if sometimes vicious polemics of some of these. As a result it may be possible for some readers to coast smoothly through this present book without being shocked enough to recognize the truly innovating seed-work that this may be.—RALPH P. HUMMEL, *Fordham University*.

The Reach of Politics: A New Look at Government. BY JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN. (New York: Horizon Press, 1969. Pp. 302. \$10.00.)

Speculation about politics is admittedly old, says Professor Feibleman, and mentions the names of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Marx. He implicitly requests inclusion on this list with his attempt " . . . to determine the nature of politics." (P. VII.) This takes the form of a speculative exploration of the "reach of politics, a theme which he pursues well beyond the presently known political forms, tracing politics from their traditional beginning point in human nature almost literally *Per Ardua Ad Astra* to the edge of the metagalactic universe. The entire book is an effort to sustain the argument that only by accepting such a conception of the reach of politics will it be possible for mankind to survive.

James K. Feibleman is a professor of philosophy (Tulane University) and believes that philosophers have something to contribute to the political welfare of mankind. His reason for offering *The Reach of Politics* now is that " . . . there are new facts to be adduced; and whenever there are new facts there is apt to be a new theory lurking somewhere in the background needing to be brought forward for examination." (P. VII.) He denies that the kind of theoretical speculation that produced *The Republic*, *The Politics*, *The Prince* and *Kapital* are either impossible or unnecessary in our age. The more abstract the theory, the greater will be the impact, though it may take some time before practical means of application are found.

The "new facts" to which the author refers are those of human aggressiveness. They may be "ugly" facts, he concedes, but in order to be cogent, a theory must not go against them and must account for them. Their interpretation requires the abilities of the detached thinker, but the facts them-

selves are most commonly found in the marketplace. (P. 6.) If the interpretation does conform to the facts, we can confidently anticipate application since:

If the statement—"there is an abstract truth"—is true, then the statement—"there are concrete situations to which it can be applied"—is an analytic truth; that is to say, the truth of the second is contained in the truth of the first. (*Ibid.*)

We have to concern ourselves with facts, abstract truths and applications.

Professor Feibleman sums up the facts of human nature in seven characteristics, ranged under three general attributes. The three general attributes are: I. authenticity; II. incompleteness; and III. aggressiveness. Under I, the characteristics are: 1. historicity; 2. infinity; and 3. improbability. Under II, we find: 4. privation; 5. discontinuity; and 6. inequality. Finally, under III, man is: 7. intolerant of opposition. (Pp. 21-23.) Since this is not the most usual way of stating facts, Professor Feibleman's own language may serve, if not to clarify, at least to amplify his meaning. Thus, he explains improbability:

The existence of the individual is highly improbable. If we reckon with the number of circumstances which must have had to occur, and occur together, in order than an individual could exist precisely as he does, such concurrence, and consequently the individual himself, is, on any calculation, unpredictable. Yet the fact is he does exist.

Or, again, consider privation:

Privation, fourth of the individual's characteristics, is the absence of value where value could legitimately have been expected. Instead of fullness in this regard there is emptiness; instead of perfection, want . . . (P. 21.)

Except for historicity, all the characteristics are formulated negatively, making it difficult to grasp their significance as facts about human nature. From this negative matrix, however, professor Feibleman draws some inferences that are important for his theory.

These seven characteristics in the particular configuration both explains and justifies the pervasiveness of human aggression. He concludes, "The individual is intolerant of opposition and hence aggressive because his authenticity gives him the right to be so and his incompleteness, the necessity." (P. 23.) Aggression is directed against the environment in order to achieve the reduction of the individual's needs, ranging from the ordinary physiological needs to the need for ultimate survival. But, total needs reduction is only possible through the total domination of the environment. By himself, an individual cannot achieve much and even what he can achieve brings him into conflict with others, and out of this conflict of aggressive individuals emerges the need for the state. The state comes into existence through the trans-

fer of individual aggression, and its task is to facilitate needs reduction and maintain the conditions in which the individual may do so for himself. This analysis of the origin of the state forms the cornerstone of Professor Feibleman's abstract truth. The elaboration of it may be omitted, for it is the application that interests him.

The state is not the final level or organization necessary to provide for man's needs reduction. As the custodian of individual aggressiveness, it is itself aggressive and, while its aggression affords some indirect gratification for the individuals who have surrendered their own right to exercise it, international conflict now threatens annihilation. If the state can no longer provide the necessary framework for needs reduction, we must ask what the author regards as the "prime question of the reach of politics." "How far in his political connections," he asks, "does the individual have to extend himself in order to reduce his needs?" (P. 280.)

The answer has a familiar ring:

There can be no hope for mankind without the establishment of a global superstate, and there can be no global superstate until men learn how to reach beyond local organizations and affiliations, beyond the family, the community, the nation, the international hegemony, and on to the very boundaries of a common humanity (P. 277.)

The concluding section of his book even invites us to consider the extension of our political connections beyond this to a possible "cosmic superstate." He almost seems to hold out to us the hope of ultimate survival by the prospect of a total domination of this expanded environment.

This is the elevated perspective from which we are asked to take "a new look at government" and the Archimedean point from which we are to apply leverage to alter our present politics. I think he is right to believe that the differences which are important to us from where we stand would vanish, but the price we pay for that distance may be a certain dizziness rather than clarity. This level of abstraction is not likely to assist the working political scientist and might prove even less useful to the working politician. Some vision may be necessary for politics, but this extended reach of politics is more likely to seem like hallucination.—JAMES S. NYMAN, *Trinity University (San Antonio)*.

Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy. BY CHARLES WELLBORN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. Pp. 200. \$6.50.)

Charles Wellborn's *Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy* is a valuable and, as the saying goes, "much needed" treatment of the philosophy and political thought

of an important American figure. Unlike Rossiter and Lare's brief introduction to *The Essential Lippmann*, which leans to a consideration of recent writings, or the Childs and Reston collection, *Walter Lippmann and His Times*, which largely considers Lippmann the journalist and foreign policy expert, this work attempts to consider the whole of Lippmann's thought over the past half-century and to analyze (and briefly to evaluate) his basic assumptions and values.

Wellborn examines Lippmann's thought in regard to four central topics: the nature of man, the nature and problems of democracy, the meaning and function of law, and the role of religion in (political) life. The author also provides an insightful biographical sketch, and concludes with an extended discussion of Lippmann's understanding of the "public philosophy." Wellborn attempts to show how Lippmann's thought has developed in each of these areas, usually avoiding a simple tracing of ideas from book to book and considers the relations between the various topics as well as the internal coherence and consistency of the various works. Wellborn also professes an interest in Lippmann because "in a strikingly coherent way he has been able to articulate the times" and because "he has consciously encountered, accepted, been influenced by, reacted against, or aided in formulating virtually every major movement in American philosophy and politics in this century." So we are promised an examination not only of Lippmann's thought but of his relation to the times.

Several of the topics the author discusses are very well handled. Most important, the treatment of Lippmann's concept of the public philosophy, his version of natural law, is quite illuminating. Wellborn states, correctly I think, that Lippmann "has failed to deal with his own natural law theory in any truly definitive way . . ." and goes on to provide just such a systematic treatment, showing how the concept developed in early works, notably *The Good Society* (1937), and amplifying the terse argument of *The Public Philosophy* (1955) in a convincing fashion. Several criticisms of Lippmann's theory are also considered at length, and an attempt is made to show how Lippmann would answer the criticisms. Those hostile to natural law theory are not likely to be won over by Wellborn's reformulations, but the public philosophy does emerge as a less dogmatic, more flexible argument for the need of continuing principles in public life. The inherent conservatism often imputed by critics is also brought into question.

Related points which are discussed perceptively include Lippmann's changing and yet partially consistent interpretations of human nature and his conception of the role of elites in society. The bio-

graphical sketch also struck me as a particularly good in its brief discussion of Lippmann's socialism (brought to an end by a job with the Socialist administration of Schenectady in 1917), his experiences in and disillusionment after World War I, and the relation of these experiences to his later works, particularly *Public Opinion* (1922).

In most instances, however, the author falls short of his professed intention to treat Lippmann as commentator on as well as a participant in the events of his time. He concedes that "almost all of Walter Lippmann's numerous writings are *livres de circonstance*," but fails to treat the implications of this statement, as well as to provide adequate detail the relation between many of Lippmann's political positions and his political theory. Lippmann's oppositions to the New Deal and to the war in Viet Nam, for instance, receive only passing treatment. In a few instances, Wellborn's unwillingness to relate Lippmann's more abstract ideas (usually expressed in his books) to the social and economic conditions on which he was commenting (in books but primarily in articles and editorials) affects, I think, his understanding of Lippmann's intention. For example, Wellborn discusses *Drift and Mastery* (1914) largely in terms of a reaction against Lippmann's early liberalism. But surely "mastery" at the time implied not only the primacy of reason but a concern with social events, which many progressives including Lippmann felt were outdistancing political institutions. Lippmann is a particularly fascinating thinker because, as Wellborn suggests, he has been extremely sensitive to social currents, has written on immediate political controversies, and he has attempted to develop a systematic political theory. The failure of this work to develop a sustained treatment of the relation between Lippmann's various levels of thought leaves important gaps in our understanding of his place in American political thought.

Wellborn is also often reluctant to press Lippmann in another area of political theory, that of conceptual analysis. Thus Lippmann's definition of freedom as "knowing [and doing] what we ought to do . . ." is let slide, and his virtual equation of democracy with majority rule is treated much too kindly. Such historical generalizations as the deriving of modern totalitarianism from the Jacobins à la Talmon, are also presented rather uncritically.

Finally, Wellborn's emphasis on Lippmann's religious positions seems to me to be somewhat strained and perhaps exaggerated. The author argues that Lippmann has made a "pilgrimage" from an early humanism to "semi-theological invocations," in which he has come to rely on the Christian faith as the main support of the public philosophy. But at the same time it is admitted that

Lippmann has personally never endorsed Christianity. Wellborn's closing argument that Lippmann has come to accept the Christian view of man, but not yet the Christian view of God, capped by the phrase, "the pilgrimage continues" is perhaps an unwarranted conclusion to this part of his study.

Twentieth Century Pilgrimage thus strikes me as an uneven book. It is too short to pursue many of the questions raised, and the treatment is sometimes uncritical. Yet the analysis of Lippmann's philosophic positions is often perceptive. Herbert Croly, his mentor on the *New Republic*, foresaw (when writing to Learned Hand in 1930) that Lippmann might fail to tie his thoughts together: "Unless he stops journalism soon he will only continue to write introductions and prefaces as long as he lives." Charles Wellborn has made a useful contribution towards a systematic understanding of the wide-ranging and pervasive thought of Walter Lippmann.—EDWARD A. STETNER, *Wellesley College*.

Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century. By J. A. W. GUNN. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. Pp. 337. \$8.75.)

Tracing the development of the expression "public interest," Gunn basically limits his context to political thought in England from the threshold of the Civil War to the early Eighteenth Century. Believing that sophisticated recent studies of the concept are too remote from its employment in actual political controversies, this political scientist turns to history to "break the circuit of that academic discussion which feeds upon itself . . ." (p. 327). If study of usage can clarify the public interest, Gunn has chosen the appropriate setting. The term "interest" rises from its pre-Interregnum function as a tag of abuse to its modern status of respectability in the vocabulary of political appeals. Similarly, the increasingly popular expression "public interest" gradually displaces rival expressions such as the "common good." Half the book documents the genesis of the individualistic understanding of the public good in pre-Restoration polemics, including extended coverage of Hobbes and Harrington. The second half examines post-Restoration usage of the public interest in religious and economic policy debates and in selected formal political treatises.

As a novel understanding of the public good confusedly moves toward orthodoxy, Gunn overwhelms us with detailed analyses of an impressive range of writers. To disentangle key developments, we can employ a distinction which Gunn finds convenient yet often obscures: Usage of the public interest can be examined with two broad questions regarding first, how it should be described (its essential content) and second, how it is to be

attained or preserved (its discovery and implementation). Although brevity distorts the account, we can now synthesize Gunn's illuminating remarks on the rivalry between the traditional and individualistic understandings of the public good.

Often expressed as the "common good," the traditional understanding was popular with those contented with their political roles in a status quo: if royalists in the political wilderness were drawn to individualistic positions, royalists in power "soon forgot such language" (p. 53). Traditionalists described a common good which was quite remote from the qualitatively inferior plane of the assignable interests of private men. Since the good of the organic whole defined the measure of private interests, the ordinary man should be satisfied in sharing in that good—without presuming to project his awareness of private wants (e.g., relief of the Leveller's pinching shoe) to his unaided capacity to discern the common good in public policy. Usually described in terms of domestic order and international power, attainment of this good required specification by rulers enjoying state secrecy, insulation from private interest pressures, and a broad prerogative. Implementation especially required that both rulers and ruled be socialized out of selfishness by means of moral training of youth and persuasion of adults.

Malcontents found comfort in a rival understanding of the public good. Their preference for the expression "public interest" reflected an unblushing intent to bring it closer to private interests, thus accommodating domestic political grievances such as insecurity of lives, liberties or estates. Initially cautious in redefining the public good in terms of private interests, pamphleteers insisted only that the public interest "be construed in a manner that was inclusive of the interests of private men." (p. 32) Yet, their meaning approached the often discredited description of the public interest as the "sum" or private interests. Clearly sympathetic, Gunn emphasizes that "an individualistic rendering of the public interest was not as muddled an idea as has usually been claimed." (p. xi) Far from being naïve optimists, individualists did not say that all individuals could always follow their own understanding of their interests and spontaneously converge to a "natural" harmony with the public interest. Only some sorts of private interests were legitimate components of the public interest. This was especially intelligible when this public interest consisted in generalizable rights: "Each man's concern for preserving his own rights necessitated certain general conditions to be shared by all citizens." (p. 337)

Implementation now required a system that would gratify all legitimate private interests (or

rights), yet control all wants divergent from the public interest. But such control now stressed linkages to selfishness more than cultivation of selflessness. The new task required first, analysis of the political arena in terms of "interests," and second, manipulation of the environment to channel self-interested calculations and activities of rulers and ruled toward identities of interest. Pessimistic of man's altruistic capacities, writers turned away from efforts to control the *causes* of selfishness to focus on salutary redirection of its *consequences*. For Gunn, this evidently reflects their more realistic perspective rather than a change in the reality of political motivations.

Gunn's Hobbes advances a model of "beneficial royal egoism" (p. 70) in which the self-interested policies of an average monarch approach the public interest by "the action of one, and not many egos." (p. 78) When Harrington builds a republic for basically Hobbesian man, a legislature representative of all interests expresses the public interest, while institutional engineering steers the many public and private egos toward its attainment. Gunn uncritically admires Harrington's "feat in raising political discussion above fatuous [?] pleas for good men . . ." (p. 116) Later, William Penn advocates toleration on what he called a "concord of discords" (p. 182): United in support for the regime, tolerated Nonconformist and Catholic "interests" could be "balanced" by Anglicans against each other. The review of economic debates argues that even mercantilists substantially shared the liberals' solicitude for private economic interests in describing and attaining the public interest. Pursuing the emerging orthodoxy in post-Restoration treatises, the final chapter confines Locke to about four pages for his reticence and conventionality on the public interest.

Notwithstanding lengthy coverage of obscure pamphlets and forgotten books, Gunn's interpretations and generalizations on usage expand our understanding of the concept. But since Gunn forsees no consensus on proper predications of the public interest, he could have improved a competent book by expanding his observations on opportunistic biases in interest appeals.—TERRENCE E. COOK, *Washington State University*.

The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government'. BY JOHN DUNN. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 290. \$10.00.)

Mr. Dunn appears to take the lowest opinion ever expressed by a Locke scholar of the intellectual quality of the *Treatises* and their author: they are the "incoherent and carelessly written work" (p. 64) of a man who remained "for his entire life

profoundly and exotically incoherent" (p. 29). In accordance with its antithetical vein, three chapters of Dunn's book bear the title "The Coherence of a Mind." In virtue of "a series of theological commitments" many of Locke's statements become intelligible (p. xi) and indeed "make a simple enough sense" (p. 213). Incoherence seems to become coherent because Locke's "expansive moral insensitivity" and the apparently "corrupt motives for writing the *Treatises of Government*" (p. 260), did not induce him to abandon "the majority of mankind to the careers of naturalistic deprivation." Strauss and Macpherson deserve well for having exposed a Locke who had the courage, however decorously veiled, "of his own filthy morality" (p. 205). The appropriate historical question is still: "Why should Locke have chosen to cast himself as the ideological hangman of the new [capitalist] order" (p. 213) and have based property on labour (p. 211)? The true answer is: "The ferocious moralism" of Puritanism was still consistent in Locke (p. 228).

With the help of evidence from outside the *Treatises*, Dunn relates Locke's outlook to the Protestant ethic of "the calling," reflecting a "Puritan egalitarianism" according to which "men were equal as Christians" as well as on "the level of energy and commitment" required in each particular role (p. 226). Gross social inequality is unaffected by this egalitarianism, but the latter becomes meaningless because the coerciveness of wage labour is insignificant in comparison with "the boundless repression demanded by the calling" (p. 264). Such an apologia for the existing order does not amount to "an unequivocal charter" for a minority (p. 236). In denying "authority which is both intrinsically human and legitimate" (p. 127), Locke conferred "on the individual a moral status" which alone in his time "would enable him to call into question the moral legitimacy of his society" (p. 261). In practice, this means no more than the *duty* to resist the imposition of a particular interpretation of religious duties, "the forcible appropriation of real physical goods," and the use of "religious sanctions for the corrupt desires of the powerful" (p. 246).

An interpretation is not necessarily impaired because it reflects its author's ideological outlook. One kind of ideological perspective often highlights what other kinds obscure. Here, however the distortion attendant upon the author's perspective is at once revealed by the fact that he turns into a mutilated adjunct what is the predominant thematic concern of the *Treatises*: the foundation on rational principles and the delineation in practice of the exercise of the specifically political rights and duties which men and governments have towards each other. Dunn bluntly asserts that

Locke's treatment of sovereign power is "notably inconsequential" (p. 13); that his constitutionalism is "facile" and "evasive" (p. 12) and that it "muddies much of the already opaque exposition of the *Second Treatise*" (p. 14). The verdict that Locke's constitutionalism amounts to no more than "a few genteel pieties" (p. 206) is far from being borne out by Dunn's disparagement of Locke's concern with parliamentary control "of a kind" (p. 53) by means of the rule "no taxation without parliaments" (p. 54)—a disparagement based on Locke's (admittedly considerable) concessions to executive prerogative. Dunn seems to overlook that even the discretionary power to suspend laws is effectively counterbalanced if the executive is not permitted to legislate alone. Locke clearly endorsed in II, 94 this principle as the inevitable lesson of history. He was, indeed, the apologist of existing institutions as well as the purveyor of principles to call into question their performance and further adequacy. But much as these principles might owe to his religious convictions, they reflect even more his observation of the political process and aim at elevating its moral status by securing the rule of law "in its true notion." (II, 57).

His criticism of positive law does not indicate that the divine purposes are necessarily predicated on "corrupt legal orders" (p. 220), or that his thought "is in essence wholly opposed to the legalistic perspective" (note 2, p. 149), but that, to be just, positive laws must conform to natural law. To achieve this the better, Locke justified, alongside the mutually checking interplay of constitutional powerholders, also that between them and the extra-constitutional, that is revolutionary, authority of the people at large.

No doubt, formally, the argument of the *Treatises* rests on a theological premise. Given that God, the creator of man, has prohibited suicide, political authority as such can only derive from God because it involves power over other men's lives (p. 88). Dunn himself admits that the mature Locke no longer invoked God's positive law (p. 98) for the embodiment of divine purposes which alone legitimate political arrangements (p. 93). Nevertheless, Lockean society is only "formally de-christianized") its evaluation in the *Treatises* is "saturated with Christian assumptions" (p. 99). This too, however, is obscured by the "explicit procedures in the *Treatises* . . . to a considerable extent," for "Locke claims to be considering the human condition . . . in terms of reason" (p. 98). Yet Dunn rejects the assumption of esoteric writing (p. x) and stipulate that "a rigidly conventional background" needs no elaboration (p. 88). He thereupon proceeds coolly as if that which is not elaborated were attested by the text as it

stands. Dunn extrapolates from II, 54 and 57 that "the duties which . . . [men] owe to God demand that they possess a certain sort of freedom" (p. 121), although neither God or any religious duty are mentioned there. He also contends that in II, 11 the right to resist the aggressor is not argued in terms of a "plausible naturalism" but in terms of securing against the violation of "the Hebraic unity of the tribal family" (p. 168). The text quoted in note 3 shows that the biblical injunction serves as an exemplification of a rule of reason. Where the disclosure of the "theological matrix" is not concerned, Dunn likewise makes his points less by detailed textual analysis than by summary reference to sections or mere quotation. The same applies to his ascriptions of a normative, sociological, logical, legal, or jural character to statements. (For some examples where it is far from self-evident that the text he relies upon bears him out, cp. p. 133 and II, 121, lines 16-7; p. 52, lines 4-6, has no foundation whatsoever in II, 158 [or elsewhere]; cp. also pp. 134-5, note 3 and II, 120, lines 4-5; p. 115, lines 18-22, the two following quotations in the text and that in note 2, p. 116; p. 128 and note 2; p. 145 and note 2; p. 168 and note 3; cp. also note 2, p. 181, lines 12-3 and lines 29-33 for one instance in this reviewer's self-defense and lines 24-6 for the unproved dismissal of Laslett's reading of II, 219.) Dunn not only disregards textual evidence, like I, 86, 112, which contravenes his assertion of Locke's "overwhelming, immediate and unhesitating acceptance of biblical commands" (note 1, p. 94). He equally ignores the *Treatises* (I, 41-3) when he quite correctly, affirms that, for Locke, charity remained a component of justice (p. 214).

Lack of exhaustive consideration and analysis of the text (not to mention his treatment of other interpreters) is accompanied by the often erratic quality of the author's exposition. A particularly striking example is to be found in the statements about the state of nature. Despite its "ahistoricity" (p. 103), it "may appear in history less often in its purer forms . . ." (p. 110) and its practical relationship with the state of war would not seem to be precluded by the logical impossibility of this relationship (p. 165 and note 2, p. 181).

Thus, not all the shortcomings of this book emanate from the attempt to foist a social theology on the *Treatises*. Yet it is this unconvincing attempt which ultimately outweighs the fact that in accordance with the title of the book and the subtle *aperçus* about the interplay between ideas and social history (pp. 208 ff.), Dunn occasionally throws light on some puzzling passages and, citing evidence from Locke's private papers, places in correct perspective views expressed in the *Trea-*

uses such as those concerning "the industrious and the rational." It is all the most regrettable, therefore, that Dunn should not have contented himself with using his finding about the social significance of Locke's religious outlook (whether or not it deserves the adjective "puritan") to give proper weight to all those aspects of the argument of the *Treatises* in which this outlook demonstrably reverberates and which lend themselves in principle to the conception and realization of social welfare policies. Indeed, Dunn himself prejudices, at least indirectly, his more ambitious target when he says that "... there has as yet to be a synthetic study which re-examines Locke's intellectual life from the perspective of his religious concerns. It is an astonishing lacuna." (Note 2, p. 195). In view of the peremptory presentation of his thesis, this is an astonishing aside; it perhaps augurs that we may still expect from John Dunn a no less scintillating but an in every sense more balanced study of the subject—hopefully, clad in more moderate language.—M. SELIGER, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*.

Casyndekan Machiavelli. BY THE STAFF OF CASYNDEKAN, INC. (Colorado Springs: Casyndekan, Inc., 1969. Pp. 154. \$3.75.)

Any new treatment of Niccolo Machiavelli is likely to evoke the interest of traditional political theorists if not most political scientists. If "Machiavelli has been computerized" is given as a description of the "treatment," initial interest is even more keen—given the profession's recent experimentation with computerization in methodology. Indeed, the publisher's first words to a reader of *Casyndekan Machiavelli* tend to enhance the excitement: "Congratulations. You are now involved in the newest breakthrough in computerized learning and information retrieval."

The work consists of 146 pages of computer printouts, six printed pages at the end under a heading of "Conceptual Framework and Definitions," besides the XIII pages of introductory and explanatory material. On p. IX it is stated that the system "is designed to assist a reader to identify quickly the most relevant ideas contained within an author's work." It is then explained that 27 conceptual categories are established under which the most relevant ideas will be gathered. These relevant ideas consist of 116 statements ("information items"), 76 of which have been gleaned from Machiavelli's *The Art of War* and 40 from *The Prince*. Those items selected to fall within each of the 27 concepts are also designed to fall in the chronological order of priority as mandated by "computer synthesis" as having "the most definition weight under the particular heading" (p. XI). On p. 149 it appears that it was the

staff which found 116 information items "to be applicable" to the selected concepts, but it was the computer by unexplained decision-making which assigned the "definition weights" within each category as well as assigning the statements to the various categories.

After examining the plan and design and description of the system, one may be forgiven the impulse toward frustration when one wonders what standards that computer used to select items for each category and what kind of scales it used to arrive at "definition weight." For example, under the category "capability," one wonders why the statement "whoever engages in a war must use every means to put himself in a position of facing his enemy in the field, and beating him there if possible" is given such great weight as to be the fifth entry while the light-weight 99th item under "capability" is: "A prince . . . must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful . . ." Leaving aside the problem of the enigma of category selection and definition-weighting by the computer, one may proceed, nevertheless, to the impressionistic reading of the narratives appearing under the categories. After a few such readings, the impression of "repetition" is all-pervading, and the impulse to do scalograms and to look for coefficients is strong. This impulse may be resisted even while applying a slight dose of old-fashioned analysis.

Perhaps the most obvious finding is that there was one statement by Machiavelli which the computer found to be powerful medicine indeed, i.e., "Some princes have not immediately sent an army to oppose the enemy when their territories have been invaded, but made an incursion into the enemy's country, thereby obligating him to return and defend himself." Of all the 27 categories, this statement appears in 25. It is also given great weight: In 15 categories it is statement number one, in 6 categories it is number two, and it finds its lowest weight as number five under the concept "security." In 2 categories the statement does not appear at all, and how can that be explained? For these two categories are: "Decision-Making Environment" and "Leadership."

Another old-fashioned analytical approach is somewhat productive. Forty of the "information items" are taken from *The Prince*. Of these 40, 39 are recorded under the concept "Objective." Which one is missing?—Statement Number 113: "There are three different kinds of brains. The one understands things unassisted, the other understands things when shown by others, the third understands neither alone nor with the explanation of others." A guide may perhaps be imagined which would exclude this statement from

the category "Objective," but one wonders how such a guide would *include* the following: "Towns and fortresses . . . may be strong either by nature or by art." If the latter is "a decision-making situation," as definitionally stated on p. 151, why isn't the former?

Of the 40 *Prince* statements, 30 appear under the concept "Energy" and 31 appear under "Means." The same 22 appear under both, and the "definition weights" do not vary greatly. Again, 23 of the 40 appear under "Leadership," and 22 under "Economy," with 14 of these identical.

To old Machiavelli hands it may be of interest to note a sampling of Machiavelli's *Prince* statements which were not selected by the staff as "information items: (1) "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who

abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather bring about his own ruin than his preservation"; (2) ". . . some things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear vices result in one's greater security and wellbeing"; (3) "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by doing so it would be against his interest . . ."; (4) ". . . the only question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the country"; and (5) no allusion is made to the lion and the fox.

The publisher asserts that the value of *Casynde-kan Machiavelli* in the classroom "is apparent." This reviewer does not find it to be apparent, and even doubts the value of that computer as an objectifier of Machiavelli.—ELBERT M. BYRD, *University of Maryland*.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Judging Delinquents. By ROBERT M. EMERSON. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 278. \$8.95.)

Judging Delinquents is a surprisingly provocative book. Juvenile courts are not at the center of the political arena nor have they been studied by political scientists interested in the judicial process. But this is an important book because it raises fundamental questions about American justice and illuminates promising but untouched areas of research. Although Emerson is a sociologist whose work is almost entirely descriptive and in the social anthropological tradition of Ervin Goffman, political scientists interested in courts and the distribution of justice have much to learn from him. Despite the fact that Emerson studies only a single court in an unidentified metropolitan center, his book is full of hypotheses begging systematic examination.

The opening chapters describe how the court structures its relationships with its political environment and the other governmental and social institutions with which it must work. These chapters are unusually sensitive to the opportunities as well as constraints imposed by the court's political and organizational context. Emerson is happily innocent of the silly arguments about a non-partisan judiciary and notices that the judge's past political connections help him in obtaining certain resources for his court while also making him sensitive to only some currents of community opinion about juvenile crime.

The heart of the book deals with the process by which juveniles are judged. Emerson sees it as a process involving the assessment of "moral character." On one side are "pitches"—arguments by

adult sponsors like parents and ministers in favor of the defendant. Opposing them are "denunciations" mostly by the police but occasionally by private complainants. The court seeks to establish the moral character of the juvenile to determine whether he is normal and therefore safe to be left on the streets or whether his moral character is hopelessly flawed and therefore requires commitment to a juvenile detention center or, if a psychiatrist will vouch for the juvenile's psychotic state, to a mental institution. In the assessment, the specific act of which the juvenile has been accused is less important than his background, his prior actions, and his demeanor in court. If he is penitent he is more likely to be treated leniently than if he vigorously denies his guilt or impugnes the motives of the police and other authorities. Most of the ritual surrounding in- and out-of-court processing is interpreted by Emerson to be aimed at assessing the defendant's moral character and degrading his status rather than for determining the truth of the accusation against the juvenile.

Emerson's description of this juvenile court's operation bears a striking resemblance to Soviet justice (see Harold J. Berman, *Justice in the USSR*, N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1963 and George Feifer, *Justice in Moscow* N.Y.: Delta Books, 1965) although the author does not seem to be aware of the parallel. In both court systems, the objective is to assess moral character rather than guilt for a specific misdeed. In both, confession and moral degradation play a major role in the court-room ritual. In both, denunciation is a core technique and the court is protective of the denouncers.

Emerson's book raises many questions which

ought to be on our research agenda. One concerns the conditions which have led to this focus on character assessment rather than guilt. One possibility is that it is a peculiarity of this or all juvenile courts which seek to "treat" and to help juveniles rather than punish them. Court personnel realize that commitment to penal institutions will reinforce the delinquent's criminal tendencies rather than save him from further wrongdoing. But they have neither the resources nor the methods to "treat" wrongdoers. Social science does not yet provide certain enough diagnoses to winnow the chronic from the acute cases of delinquency or to separate those requiring one kind of treatment from those requiring another. Consequently, the court attempts a crude form of moral assessment that can lead to a justification of its decisions to "help" by probationary supervision or commitment to a penal institution those beyond help.

However what Emerson describes is not an insignificant fragment of the judicial process. Much of the criminal process resembles elements of the juvenile court's work. Almost all accused are put to a crude test of moral character when judges decide to release them on bail or recognizance. More thorough examinations of character are made when sentences are imposed. Since the charge to which many defendants plead guilty has little relation to the acts allegedly committed, criminal courts do not typically spend much time searching for the truth through the adversary process but rather attempt to assess the moral character of defendants in an effort to determine what sentence (or probation) to impose.

The book points the way toward more systematic research. Emerson has shown us some of the dimensions of court behavior that exist. His description is like a telescopic picture of a planet—it reveals irregularities which we need to examine more closely in order to measure their frequency and the conditions which are associated with their existence. We have no indication of how the process Emerson describes varies with size of community with the degree of court specialization, with variations in legal codes providing more or less flexibility to the court for handling juveniles or adults. We do not know whether more active intervention by defense attorneys makes a significant difference in the process or its results. Other significant variables which ought to be examined include the normative culture of the community, the attitudes and backgrounds of participants in the process, and the range of criminal offenders subjected to such proceedings.

Emerson consequently opens a field of inquiry which few sociologists and almost no political scientists have examined. His book is a rich lode of researchable propositions; it should have a wide

audience.—HERBERT JACOB, *Northwestern University*.

Making Federalism Work. BY JAMES L. SUNDQUIST WITH COLLABORATION OF DAVID W. DAVIS. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1969. Pp. 293. \$6.95.)

Making Federalism Work should become "must" reading for all concerned with problems of the poor in rural or urban settings. It is a carefully prepared treatise on the anti-poverty war, not totally devoid of political innuendos but sound in substance and seemingly accurate in historic fact.

As a basic resource document on the action phases of the poverty program and model cities, it must be heralded as among the most informative, current publications available.

Early in the Kennedy administration when I went to Washington to work with one of the fore-runners to the poverty program I soon learned to appreciate the wisdom in the words, "orderly governments are very rarely creative; and creative governments are almost never orderly." This quotation (source unknown) was brought to mind as the author traced the legislative and administrative programs of the poverty war. A sample of his subtle wisdom is illustrated in his statement, "to coordinate is not necessarily to simplify."

The name of the game in Federalism is 90% coordination. Everyone in Washington does it; but few, if any, can define it. Every program has several centers of coordination with as many officials responsible as there are centers. The author brings this point to light in each discourse on Federal programs running the risk of appearing to be adversely critical when, in fact, he is being constructively descriptive.

The author spends little time bemoaning the growing gaps between the affluent and the poor, black and white, establishment types and the "forgotten man." As a result, his product is not a philosophic discourse on the inherent contradictions in American society. It is, rather, an analytical treatment of the inherent contradictions in American federalism. The "knot hole" through which he views the process of federalism is "coordination" which he says, "In terms of result, coordination means consistency, harmony, mutual reinforcement, the absence of conflict and duplication . . . Coordination may be spatial . . . It may be sequential . . . It may pertain to both space and time . . ." Recognizing the breadth and depth of meaning of coordination, he identifies the tools to use, draws the blueprints and constructs the models. Then, as must be the case in pursuing elusive goals, recognizes that perfect coordination is non-existent; that systems of relationships evolve out of the pressures of interaction among segments of

the bureaucracy; and that there is an identifiable rationale to the confusions of government administration.

If I were to find fault with the author I would choose his attempts to enunciate "principles" for the conduct of the Model Cities programs and the structure of its administrative arrangements. These attempts were vague at best. Their value lies in the implied message—that even the best of mind's cannot comprehend the depths of confusions we face in our Federal confrontations with poverty in the midst of affluence.

Three of the "principles" can be cited as illustrative: (1) "The model cities mechanism must be a reasonably balanced bicameral structure."

(2) "... the city demonstration agencies and the neighborhood resident organizations must be non-operating."

(3) "... the representative character of the neighborhood resident organizations must be rigorously protected."

While it is a noble gesture to enunciate principles and recommendations after having conducted a thorough study of urban and rural poverty circumstances and programs, no model cities program has lived long enough to produce proven principles of operation. Many observers feel that the "jury is still out" on the bi- versus unicameral systems. And, with the diversities, contrasts, and conflicts of interest in poverty neighborhoods, the question of who is representative can be considered moot.

In the second principle, it is axiomatic that the farther one moves from control of operations, the greater is the dilution of power—a key essential in the coordination process.

From experience in working with agencies having responsibility for coordination, this reviewer is convinced that much depends on authority, defined responsibility and lines of communication between the coordinating agent and the services being coordinated.

Largely because of stresses between cooperating agencies in Federal, state and local administrative and political structures, coordinating agents have found it difficult to keep pace with changes in community organization, at the local level, dictated by rapidly shifting power bases in federally funded anti-poverty programs. One consequence is that the hiatus between service systems and consumers of service persists and the author properly calls for different, imaginative uses of instruments of coordination buttressed with more appropriate legislative policy.

Making Federalism Work reaches for clarity in thought, policy and action to strengthen the federalism which, as a nation we need increasingly. In the author's words, "The federal system is too impor-

tant to be left to chance." I agree—SHELTON B. GRANGER, *Macalester College*.

Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and Veterans During World War II. BY DAVIS R. B. ROSS. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, Pp. 315. \$10.00.)

The nation's veterans' organizations have long been known as one of America's most powerful and astute lobbying groups. For today's veterans, this reputation was established in bruising battles with the White House in the 1930's, when overwhelmingly Democratic Congresses were induced to override the vetoes of a popular Democratic President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Since World War II, however, the character of veterans politics has changed dramatically. Acknowledging that this change may be partially explained by an overall shift of political power, and thus the focus of group efforts, to the Executive, Davis R. B. Ross suggests that it may also result from a better reintegration of World War II veterans into civilian society.

Professor Ross contends that, up to World War II, nations tended to follow a basic pattern. Soldiers were sent gloriously off to war; but, with the peace, deeds of valor were forgotten, feelings of gratitude were discarded, and mutual animosity arose between veteran and citizen. The archetype for this pattern is the experience of Ulysses and the suitors, which provides an integrating thread for Ross' presentation.

The rapid reintegration of World War II veterans into American society breaks the Homeric tradition. Dr. Ross' political history is both an attempt to explain why the tradition is broken and an episodic description of policymaking between 1950 and 1946. His explanations, unfortunately, are weak. Without sociological insights, he speculates only that a strong economy and a huge package of benefits combined to make the transformation from military to civilian life easier. One might suggest that such speculation should also have considered the proximity of the First World War to the Second and the effects of the older veterans' attitudes—as evidenced by their organizations' extensive recruitment efforts—on reintegration. Indeed, since the efforts of the existing groups in behalf of the new veterans were unique to the American experience, they might help to explain the unique reintegration of well over ten million men.

Still, such explanation is not Professor Ross' major emphasis. He prefers instead to dwell on descriptions of policy-making events which he presents with considerable insight. His chapter on the G. I. Bill of Rights is particularly good, clearly demonstrating the interrelationships of many different personalities in the policy process. The idea

he traces to the President. The American Legion wrote the bill and shepherded it through Congress, working hard to gain support from other veterans' organizations and congressmen alike. The details were rewritten by the House committee, on the floor of the House, and by the Conference committee. The G. I. Bill was a product of many minds. Here, as in other of the policy confrontations described, the author is able to identify two basic philosophies operating to shape the program: the New Dealers who believed veterans should be treated like other citizens and broad new programs should be created for a whole society, and the veterans who believed in programs exclusively for veterans. The former tended to be the administration position, the latter, the congressional.

In developing his descriptions, Ross has referred to a broad range of source materials, including interviews with participants, correspondence among the principals, news reports of the period, public documents and a variety of scholarly sources. His use of news reports is especially effective in setting the public mood behind the events (See, for example, pp. 134ff. on VA Administrator Frank T. Hines' relations with President Truman). While generally Ross does an excellent job of utilizing his sources, he is occasionally guilty of misrepresenting data in ways that support his biases. In one instance, he reports that John Rankin's amendment to the G. I. Bill "passed with a narrow ten-vote margin (87-77)." (p. 115.) A footnote, however, indicates that the subsequent teller vote proved more favorable to Rankin (111-80).

Dr. Ross' descriptive efforts are extremely useful in the area of administrative decision-making. His account of the creation and implementation of the point system used to determine priority for discharge (pp. 166ff.) is unusually instructive as is the insightful analysis of General Hines' leadership problems as Veterans Administrator and Retraining and Reemployment Administrator.

Much of Ross' analysis is still applicable. The orientation of the Veterans Administration has not changed noticeably. Professor Ross describes the VA's role as that of a "service agency." (p. 121.) "The VA," he writes, "stood not as a partisan of specific policies, but as a highly skilled legal adviser to the real policy-makers—the Legion and Congress." (p. 120.) In his conclusion, the author notes that the groups have influence but that their influence diminishes as controversy increases. He fails, however, to point out that for most lobbies considerable difference exists between positive and negative influence. While veterans' groups have very limited power to get laws passed, their ability to block veterans' legislation is considerably greater.

Ross' conclusions about Congress' role also fail to note an important distinction. He writes, "... although Congress altered proposals for veterans prepared by the Executive and interest groups, the national legislature played a reactive rather than initiative role." (p. 283.) These proposals from the Executive, however, did not come from the VA and usually pertained to other agencies—mustering out pay, for example, was a concern of the Defense Department. New programs for the VA were suggested by interest groups and initiated in Congress. Veterans' affairs was and is an area of congressional initiative.

On the whole, the book, although at times cluttered with detail—a paragraph is devoted to explaining General Omar Bradley's activities immediately prior to receiving a telegram telling him of his appointment to head the VA (p. 140.)—makes a significant contribution to our understanding of intricate policy processes and some of the pitfalls of bureaucracy.—WILLIAM H. HARADER, *Indiana State University*.

With All Deliberate Speed. ED. BY JOHN H. MCCORD. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. 205. \$7.50.)

This book is a collection of essays (by law students and practicing attorneys) dealing with legal aspects of racial discrimination. It originally appeared as an issue of the *University of Illinois Law Forum* and has now been published in book form, apparently without additions or changes.

The emphasis of the selections—dealing with such topics as discrimination in education, public accommodations, housing, and employment—is upon analysis of legislation and cases and upon prescription of new ways of interpreting legal doctrine.

Two of the selections struck me as particularly interesting. Robert Carter's analysis of the school segregation cases is closely reasoned and persuasive. His basic argument is that the logic of the *Brown I* opinion involves a constitutional obligation on the part of the state to alleviate racial segregation in schools regardless of its cause. "Whether the state commands the segregation, builds upon it, or merely accepts it, the same invalid classification, the injury, or inequality takes place" (p. 61). As he further indicates, though, "unfortunately *Brown* has been read otherwise. Instead of an expansive reading, courts have sought to limit and restrict its impact" (p. 63). He documents his arguments about the ought and is of the *Brown* decision in terms of court decisions and statistics indicating the relative degree of non-compliance in the South.

The question that immediately occurs is why *Brown* had such a limited impact in solving the problems of *de jure* and *de facto* school segrega-

tion. The answer clearly involves, among other things, the decision-making patterns in lower federal and state courts, the activities of the President and Congress, the relationship between changes in legal doctrine and changes in attitudes and behavior in the American political system. Carter is aware that these issues are relevant to the problem he is discussing, but excludes them from his analysis:

The question arises why what is recognized as a public and personal necessity [equal education] is not yet within reach of large numbers of our citizenry. The answer to that question would require an analysis of all the complex social and political forces that shape this society—a task obviously beyond the scope of this article. (p. 59)

This emphasis upon legal doctrine—the absence of relevant materials from the social sciences—is a point to which I wish to return.

The selection by Blumrosen dealing with an apparently successful agreement remedying racial discrimination by the Newport News Shipbuilding Company is also very instructive, for it seems to suggest a pattern by which the federal government, by effective mobilization of its resources and bargaining, can deal with discrimination by some large private employers. Blumrosen says: "If we use this [the Newport News agreement] as a model for changing industrial relations systems, we can move quickly throughout the land to end employment discrimination" (p. 99). Unfortunately, as the author himself admits, certain characteristics of the situation made it exceptional, if not idiosyncratic: the company had not, like most southern firms, generally followed the practice of restricting black employees to low-skilled jobs; the company lacked any highly structured seniority system for promotions, and hence changes in promotion practices to end discrimination did not encounter strong resistance from an entrenched seniority system or from a powerful union; finally, the company was at least 75% dependent upon government contracts, and hence highly susceptible to the pressure of threatened contract termination. In addition, Blumrosen notes that the successful negotiation of the agreement "consumed an important part of the time of the entire office of conciliation [of the EEOC] during the 1966-67 year." For all these reasons, the generalizability of the case, rather confidently suggested by the author, seems somewhat questionable.

Overall, the volume is highly policy-oriented, prescriptive, and at times polemical. The general impression that a political scientist gets is that of how little lawyers and social scientists talk to one another. The general thrust of the volume is upon "the role of legal institutions in securing the civil rights of the black minority" (p. v). Yet the growing literature by political scientists and sociolo-

gists dealing with such topics as the means by which litigation is developed and pursued, courts are lobbied, the process of judicial decision-making, the problems of implementation that are encountered both within the legal system itself and in dealing with other public and private institutions and individuals, the role of attitude structures in the implementation phase, and the potentialities of and limitations upon the use of law to change attitudes are almost completely ignored. The kinds of issues discussed in this research are certainly not unknown to many of the authors of these pieces—indeed their activities have been the subjects for some of the research. At the same time, such research by social scientists, and some of the issues it raises, is relegated to the realm of "complex social and political forces" that are "beyond the scope" of many of these articles.

Lamentations about the lack of dialogue between lawyers and social scientists are by no means new. But the difficulty is exemplified by many of the works that appear in this volume. The stress in the articles upon the analysis of cases and legislation both makes it of limited interest to political scientists and greatly reduces the utility of the material for understanding the potentialities and limitations of the law and legal institutions in promoting social change.—JONATHAN D. CASPER, *Yale University*.

American City Planning Since 1890: A History Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the American Institute of Planners. By MEL SCOTT. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 745. \$17.50.)

As twentieth century American cities began to experience the complex problems of large-scale urbanization, city officials and businessmen turned to urban planners for advice and help. The resulting involvement of urban planning specialists in city affairs has become a matter of great interests to political scientists. The most recent major exploration into the urban planning process is Mel Scott's *American City Planning*. This important work deserves careful consideration from political scientists and will undoubtedly serve as background reading in many urban affairs courses.

Scott's work is a perceptive, well-written history of American city planning since 1890. The American Institute of Planners commissioned the study for their fiftieth anniversary which was celebrated in 1967. Although the volume failed to meet AIP's deadline and was twice as long as originally envisioned, the final product is an impressive distillation, analysis and review of an important field of local government activity. It is not an official history of the American Institute of Planners or the planning profession; it is a broad study of the ma-

jor period, events, influence, persons and trends in city planning since the reform era and the city beautiful movement.

The chief virtue of *American City Planning* is its scope and comprehensiveness. Scott undertook the difficult task of considering all major, relevant factors in the development of city planning in the United States. His task was formidable simply from the standpoint of reviewing all that has taken place in the name of city and metropolitan planning. Scott identifies and brings together the many disparate factors into a meaningful analysis which will serve as an important resource for urban affairs professors, researchers and students. Combining the perspectives of the urban planner and the social scientist with sensitive treatment of materials, he successfully synthesizes an amazing amount of information and a large number of viewpoints.

Although *American City Planning* is a remarkable achievement, the general historical approach and the effort to encompass all that was done in city planning in chronological order place fundamental limitations on the work. Perhaps this is to say that it is impossible to satisfy all audiences in a single volume on such a subject. The author's own comments on the development of the book reflect the frustration of such an undertaking. However, in reviewing the book from the perspectives of political science and public administration, it seems that the project should have been narrowed in order that fuller attention could have been paid to specific issues of particular importance.

As a result of the strong focus upon the chronology of planning developments, some issues important to political scientists receive little attention. For example, Robert A. Walker's thesis that planning was ineffective because it was an autonomous function separated from the political leadership of cities receives little treatment and is submerged in a section dealing with wartime planning. Although Walker's work was published in 1941, it does not seem appropriate to have it discussed as part of wartime events. The issues surrounding planning organization certainly deserve more attention than they received. Furthermore, political scientists would appreciate Scott's observations on the exercise of political influence in planning organizations. A related criticism is that Scott's own ideas on the nature of planning are not explicit. They must be drawn from the lengthy treatments of the several chronological periods in planning. In fact, the first chapter takes the reader immediately into the reform era without any conceptual or introductory analysis of critical ingredients of planning.

Another weakness of the chronological approach

is that more than two-thirds of the text examines planning prior to the 1950's. It was not until after 1950 that planning first began to grow at a remarkable pace and the federal government started investing important amounts of funds into planning. One wonders whether the weight given to the early periods was appropriate when relatively little planning was being carried on during those periods. The final chapter attempts to consider all planning in the United States during the 1960's, a ten-year period of immense activity. It seems that Scott should have given more attention to the past twenty years in order to achieve a better balance in the total presentation of planning history.

Mel Scott's *American City Planning* is a significant achievement which should receive wide attention. Criticisms of the work stem largely from the fact that it is a history of planning, and as a history, it organizes analysis around periods of time rather than critical issues or topics. *American City Planning* deserves praise because it is a meaningful contribution on an important topic. It gives life and meaning to the early days of city planning and provides many insights into the nature of the planning process. Political scientists interested in urban affairs will find it an indispensable work for both teaching and research.—B. DOUGLAS HARMAN, *The American University*.

Sparks at the Grassroots: Municipal Distribution of TVA Electricity in Tennessee. BY VICTOR C. HOBDAV. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1969. Pp. 266. \$8.50.)

Intergovernmental relationships have comprised a major product of American governmental organization for two centuries and are implicit in the federal system. While these relationships are not a unique phenomenon to the American system, they are a significant and apparently ever-growing aspect of this polity. For this reason, perhaps, the literature of American intergovernmental relationships has expanded tremendously, aided by both the nature of current governmental problems—pollution law enforcement, poverty, and all the rest—and by the degree of institutionalization afforded these relationships through specific federal programs and agencies.

The literature of intergovernmental relations is neither solely recent nor limited in scope. It obviously includes the *Records of the Constitutional Convention* and *The Federalist Papers* as well as W. Brooke Graves' *American Intergovernmental Relations* (New York: Scribners, 1964). It also embraces numerous studies of specific aspects of federal-state, federal-local, state-local, and local intergovernmental relations. *Sparks at the Grassroots* falls into this latter classification and is essentially a study of the relationships arising

from the electric power sales of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The book derives its importance from the sense of realism it imparts as it examines the relationships between the TVA, the local electric power boards, and the municipal governments of Tennessee in the distribution of electric power.

Sparks at the Grassroots is not a history of TVA, though one chapter supplies what amounts to a historical background. Thereafter, however, it raises questions relevant to electric power distribution, including such matters as the implementation of a basic policy of local autonomy through local distribution; the rate structure and concept of lowest possible rates; service conflicts both of areas and types of users; and the not to be unexpected problem of tax equivalents to local governments.

Although Victor Hobday handles these issues with considerable objectivity, there is strong indication that the decades of TVA power distribution have not been ones of universal happiness. For example, there is the central theme that TVA's theory of partnership between the Authority and local governments—the issue of local autonomy and decentralization—has in fact tended toward superior-subordinate relationships rather than a partnership. No doubt TVA could have created an organization for electric power distribution directly to the consumer. At its beginning there were those who favored such a course. Instead the Authority sought to decentralize distribution by a policy of power contracts between TVA and specially established and appointive local power boards which then distributed power to the consumer.

Sparks at the Grassroots stresses that these boards operate outside the context of the general municipal governments and that they are agencies "largely autonomous and more amenable to TVA control than politically chosen bodies might be." Doubtless this arrangement has made for more efficient administration of the power program, but it has done little to strengthen the municipal governments or to implement at a local level—as contrasted with the overall performance of TVA—the democratic ideals for which the agency is so widely admired. Certainly TVA has encouraged, assisted, and cooperated with state and local governments in the region in areas such as community planning, tributary area development, industrial promotion, planning, and recreation. These efforts Dr. Hobday does not deprecate, but finds that in power distribution the effort toward democracy has been less marked.

The decision to structure distribution of electricity through appointive local agencies appears to this reviewer to have had some impact upon many of the federal-local relationships outlined in the

book. For example, power contracts with the local agencies are written not only to provide the lowest rates, but also to preclude diversion of electric power revenues to nonelectric municipal purposes. It seems implicit in conflicts between cities and cooperatives over service to suburban areas, though not in the conflict over TVA service to large industrial users. It is inherent in the sparks produced by tax equivalents which are rather vaguely defined as "a fair share of the cost of government to be borne by such [local power] system."

The author argues that "The idea that TVA and the municipalities are partners tends to break down under scrutiny. The guidelines and limitations laid down in the comprehensive power contracts leave small room for local power systems." If this conclusion is valid, it would seem likely that the contribution "for faith in democratic institutions" of which C. Herman Pritchett wrote a generation ago is less evident in application to TVA power distribution than for the overall programs of the Authority. Certainly it would indicate a reluctance, perhaps with reason, to attempt to achieve efficient distribution of electricity through a traditional governmental framework.

Yet, when all is said the Tennessee Valley Authority has made a strong case for itself in both power and nonpower programs. In the former it has brought into being a unified power system of 110 municipal systems, 50 cooperative systems, and one private company. It has provided electricity at "yardstick rates" in the region, and its efforts have seen the enormous expansion of power use and consumers. It has assisted effective flood control in its region, contributed to rehabilitating and conserving land, and encouraged regional resource use planning. Dr. Hobday recognizes this contribution: "... the Authority merits a high rating for efficiency in accomplishing its primary objectives," and "The TVA power program has been a success story that provides an outstanding example of government for the benefit of people . . ." This volume deserves a wider audience than it may have. It is a careful if concise analysis of one segment of the development and maintenance of an enduring federalism.—ROBERT B. HIGHSAW, *University of Alabama*.

A Strategic Approach to Urban Research and Development: Social and Behavioral Considerations. COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL URBAN RESEARCH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1969, Pp. 100. \$3.50.)

Long-Range Planning for Urban Research and Development: Technological Considerations. Committee on Urban Technology, NATIONAL RE-

SEARCH COUNCIL. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1969. Pp. 94. \$3.50.)

In 1967 the Department of Housing and Urban Development made a contract with the National Academy of Sciences in which NAS was asked: 1) to suggest how industry could utilize "new technologies" toward the end of overcoming urban problems; 2) to specify long-range social, scientific and institutional research and development questions; 3) to examine HUD's research role; 4) to consider the "behavioral and social science" research role of the colleges and universities; and 5) to give thought to "the applicability of a 'total systems approach.'" (COSBUR, pp. 81-82.) The committees decided that the first of the directives should be the primary concern of the Committee on Urban Technology (CUT), and the remaining four ought to rest with the Committee on Social and Behavioral Urban Research (COSBUR). Since it would be virtually impossible to summarize both reports in the space provided, the focus of the following remarks shall be upon the COSBUR Report and its findings relative to HUD directives four and five above.

COSBUR's major premise appears to be rejected in its expressed notion that

The social and behavioral sciences . . . can provide a sounder basis than now exists for dealing rationally . . . with social problems that preoccupy and oppress the nation. . . .

COSBUR is certainly optimistic regarding the abilities of social and behavioral science, but its optimism is somewhat diluted. Indeed, the Committee is very quick to indicate the inadequacies of the social and behavioral sciences. "It would be incorrect," according to the COSBUR Report, "to assume that

. . . the methods of rational analysis and the structure of knowledge developed in the behavioral and social sciences can contribute powerfully in the formulation of policies aimed at the attainment of national aspirations . . . Yet . . . the Committee see(s) no realistic alternative . . . Scientific knowledge and the habits of tough-minded, systematic analysis are not substitutes for wisdom, but they can serve as powerful handmaidens to sound policy thinking and judgment. (COSBUR, p. 11)

The CUT Report goes considerably further than COSBUR. The latter takes the position that the social and behavioral sciences can (within certain limitations) rationally arrive at descriptions and explanations of socio-economic-political phenomena, thus permitting the formulation of various viable policy alternatives; the former suggests that once these alternatives are established the universities, municipal governments, and HUD should give the "highest priority" to the development of the "social engineer," who will apply the "understanding and knowledge gained from the social and behavioral sciences." (CUT, p. 2)

Systems theorists will find great comfort in the Reports, especially in the COSBUR document. The Committee utilizes a rather broad notion of the systems approach—"An urban system is the total set of urban units among which there are more or less orderly flows of raw materials, finished products, information, and people"—contending "There is little doubt that it should be applied to urban problems." (COSBUR, pp. 19, 18) However, the Committee fully realizes that the "Various parameters of social units and the variables by which the parameters are made operational are interconnected . . . (and it is imperative that a multidisciplinary social science research effort be made) to search for those linkages and to assess their interactive effects." (COSBUR, p. 18)

The Committee boldly suggests "it is quite possible that urban programs (today) may be designed for the population of the last decade rather than for the next." After succinctly posing other inter-related problems, such as in-migration, within-migration, and natural increase of population, the Report suggests that HUD should encourage research which will develop a "typology of cities in terms of . . . age . . . family . . . racial and ethnic characteristics of the population." (COSBUR, p. 28)

There are many additional research problems posed both implicitly and explicitly, such as those concerning fertility, mortality and morbidity, probability of rapid demographic changes, neighborhoods, family life, the character of local governments, discovering and measuring needs and preferences, fiscal policies and public services, the effects of legal controls, and the social and institutional settings of housing program. (COSBUR, pp. 28-44) Specifically COSBUR asks that we direct our attention to the

behavior of political leaders, voters, professional administrators, and special interest groups in situations in which local government is called upon to create or administer new resources with the intention of producing desired social change.

Relatedly the Committee poses the very complex but exciting question: What is known about how these same actors "articulate their perceptions of the necessary and desirable . . . ?" Also, it asks: how do "variations in local government structure, community history, and social values facilitate or frustrate the ability of individuals and groups to make their preferences influence public policy?" (COSBUR, pp. 36, 37)

There appears to be a strong strain of concern running throughout the Reports that, to the extent possible, HUD should examine its goals in such a way that the assumptions and propositions underlying those goals can be isolated and restated in empirically testable terms. In this way

HUD would be able to gauge the effectiveness and wisdom of the means it employs, as well as the ends themselves. What COSBUR and CUT seek is a movement away from intuitive guessing toward empirical testing. (See COSBUR, pp. 17 and 12; CUT, p. 11)

The Committees (COSBUR in particular), however, have too casually observed a very fundamental question. Both COSBUR and CUT are vitally concerned with the problems of goal identification and goal attainment (see CUT, p. 11, and COSBUR, pp. 12-14), but they do not struggle with the problem of determining legislative intent. They do not suggest what HUD ought to do when faced with a grossly ambiguous set of legislative goals. Since HUD's actions will be judged from time to time from the standpoint of upholding legislative intent, it is incumbent upon HUD to determine the nature of that intent. Somehow some systematic procedures must be worked out and employed by social and behavioral science for administrators by which reliable and valid approximations can be made of the true intent of Congress.

HUD did not specifically direct the National Academy of Sciences to study problems of legislative intent (see Appendix A in COSBUR). However, failure to attack the problem of goal ambiguity is the major disappointment in an otherwise powerful and probing study.—RONALD C. GREEN, *Indiana University of Pennsylvania*.

The Quality of Urban Life. EDITED BY HENRY J. SCHMANDT AND WARNER BLOOMBERG, JR. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc. 1969. Pp. 590. \$20.00.)

The earliest urbanologist, Aristotle, remarked that men come together in cities in order to live, but they remain in these cities in order to live the good life. This insight has been frequently repeated in the mass of recent literature which deals with the quality of urban life. The social indicators movement, the ecology revolution, post-behavioralism: each of the phenomena are in their own way indicative of a growing concern with the special qualitative problems which face us as we begin rounding out the twentieth century. Desiring to stimulate and involve more people in the argument about the quality of urban life, Schmandt and Bloomberg have gathered a series of diverse essays on this diverse subject. All but a few of the essays appear here for the first time. The collection is Volume III of the *Urban Affairs Annual Review*, a series which earlier has covered the general question of urban research and the specific problem of poverty.

Following an introductory overview by the editors, the volume presents nineteen chapters di-

vided into four major sections. Three essays look at the issue of urban life quality from an historical perspective. Four essays attack the problems of the criteria for urban quality and the relationship of planning and technology to the question of control over the urban environment. There are seven essays which focus more narrowly upon specific areas of urban quality problems—mental health, performing arts, mass media, education—and upon the issues of political leadership. The last five essays, grouped under the broad heading of "urban order: present and potential," discuss some political and institutional issues related to the enhancement of the quality of urban life. Each section is briefly introduced by the editors.

The general quality of the essays is very uneven. As might be expected in a volume which covers so wide a range of subject matter, uniformity of approach or continuity of development is absent. The editors admit that they have not attempted to offer a "tightly knit, cohesive group of contributions unified around a central theme" (p. 22). In a newly developing field such as this one, however, such an effort would have been particularly worthwhile. Another absence, also acknowledged by the editors (p. 248), is any detailed, explicit discussion of the relation of a city's architecture, zoning, and physical layout to the quality questions. While it is true that this discussion can be found in several other places (notably in the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*), the volume would have been notably improved by the inclusion of at least one essay dealing in detail with this question.

At least three of the essays can be singled out as being of particular interest to the political scientist (at least to *this* political scientist). In one, H. L. Nieburg presents a provocative analysis of the growing influence of technological approaches to urban social problems, and criticizes the support for status quo power which these approaches frequently provide. He sees emphasis upon systems analysis, R and D, computers, gaming, etc., as attempts to side-step the real political issues which face us in the challenge of the poor and oppressed. According to Nieburg, the "tech-fix" approach to urban problems is illusory because it fails to take seriously the pressures for power and political participation among segments of society previously exploited and excluded.

If these pressures are to be taken seriously, the quality of urban leadership becomes a crucial subject. This subject is explored in a sketchy essay by Charles R. Adrian. Relying upon typologies which he has developed elsewhere, Adrian outlines various motivations for leadership (professionals, hobbyists, ideologues, etc.) and various images of local government functions (booster, caretaker,

broker, etc.). Two factors emerge from his analysis which indicate directions for future change. First, the quality of Negro community leadership will markedly improve as the political implications of "Black Power" are more widely comprehended. Second, more and more applicants for municipal government positions are young persons basically insympathetic to traditional bureaucratic values and dedicated to changing the system.

According to James Q. Wilson, the central issue for urban dwellers worried about the quality of life is a concern for improper behavior in public places. Expressed in various ways (crime, violence, indecency, etc.), this concern deals with the sense of a failure of community. Wilson's essay (which originally appeared in *The Public Interest*, Summer, 1968) explores the meaning of urban community and some of its political implications for patterns of segregation, local control of neighborhoods, poverty programs, and "Black Power." He notes that the central city is increasingly "coming to be made up of persons who face special disabilities in creating and maintaining a sense of community" (p. 463)—affluent whites without children, poor whites (frequently elderly) unable to flee

to the suburbs, and blacks. Wilson is particularly insightful in discussing the reciprocal relations between politics and community.

Other essays which deserve particular notice include a listing of criteria for judging the quality of urban environment, by Hans Blumenfeld; a study of the role of mass media in affecting urban quality, by Gene Burd; a disappointingly abstruse analysis of urban management, by Nathan D. Grundstein; and a novel, suggestive discussion of the role of private foundations as urban reformers, by Leslie Paffrath.

A final word deserves to be said about the price of this volume. Though the topics covered are of significance, and though at least several of the essays are meritorious, twenty dollars for less than six hundred pages does seem a bit unreasonable. A fine bibliographical section is included, but not a much-needed index. If Sage Publications intends wide distribution of their *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews*, they will have to strive harder to make their volumes more competitive with professional journals and other anthologies—in both quality and price.—PETER J. HENRIOT, *Seattle University*.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Communist Party-States: Comparative and International Studies. Ed. by JAN TRISKA. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. Pp. 392. \$9.00.)

The study of Communist political systems has not found the path into the discipline of political science an easy one. Like many "area studies" it has been set aside from the movements affecting the rest of the discipline. The questions asked, the theory employed (if any), and the methods used were in most cases relevant only to the narrow problem under investigation. Little attempt was made to integrate the questions or the answers into the broader study of political science.

While such statements apply to other "area studies," they are most pertinent in the field of communist studies. Communist political systems have been considered unique and essentially incomparable. The totalitarian concept as it was often used implied by definition that such systems could not be studied in terms used in other areas of the discipline. Consequently, the study of communist political systems was assigned to the theoretical and methodological backwaters of the discipline.

In the 1960's, increasing attempts were made to apply the concepts and methods of political science to the analysis of communist systems. It would be an overstatement to say that the results obtained were earth-shattering; however, scholarly

investigation was moved off dead center and new insights and possibilities for further investigation appeared. It is in this perspective that the book *Communist Party-States* should be evaluated.

The book, edited by Jan Triska, is a product of Stanford Studies of the Communist System. The thirteen articles, written by both faculty and graduate students at Stanford between 1963-67, are new material for most readers. Some of the studies have received circulation in mimeograph form, but the audience has been limited.

Most edited works lack any real theoretical focus; few such works apply consistently throughout the study a particular methodological approach; one rarely finds a collection of articles that are integrated. These comments also apply in a superficial way to the book under review. However, to say these things without proper qualification would be to create and attack a straw man. In essence, as laudable as these goals are, they were not the objectives of this book. The objective as succinctly stated by Triska was to "develop and build theory and methodology in political science into the study of communist affairs." The goal therefore, was one of utilizing varied approaches and testing various theories in order to examine the relevance of the wider discipline of political science for communist studies.

Although it was not the intention of the authors

to orient their work toward a common theoretical or methodological problem, six of the articles are concerned in some fashion with interaction between and the integration of the party-states. The theoretical fathers of this investigation are Deutsch, Etzioni, Haas, and Russett. The principal approach is to look at various indices of interaction or transaction between the states. Such a focus reflects the availability of data, but it more or less limits investigation to the process of integration as opposed to the condition of integration. To focus on the latter aspect would require attitudinal data which is not readily available. The authors, particularly Maurice Simon, are aware of this methodological and conceptual problem. However, no effective solution is presented for dealing with it.

The articles dealing with integration and interaction approach it from various directions. David Finley examines the role of Comecon, the Warsaw Pact and the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research as vehicles for the integration of the party-states. Edward Miles and John Gillooly examine the processes of interaction among the party-states by looking at various economic, social-cultural-technical, formal treaty making, and political-military-diplomatic indexes of interaction. Charles Cary focuses on the role of treaty-making and the development of complete and congruent treaty networks as mechanisms for the system's leader to provide more effective integration of its system. In a very interesting article Bruce Sievers examines the integrative capacities of political communities both national and international. He does so by focusing on both attitudinal and transaction orientations of the four split nations: Germany, China, Korea, Vietnam. David Ronfeldt and Daniel Tretiak study the extent of Cuba's integration into the communist political system by analyzing the increase in shared values and mutual responsiveness between the two. Finally, Maurice Simon attempts to find consistent and persistent patterns of interaction between the Communist system and developing Afro-Asian states by examining various measures of economic, legal, military and cultural interaction between these states and the communist system.

This series of articles provides some interesting insights into how integration theory can be fit into the framework of communist studies. Also, they are suggestive of the various ways that data can be used to test hypotheses based on such theory. Despite this, however, the results obtained from such endeavors are not outstanding or surprising. Scholars using other, more impressionistic, methods and lacking the theoretical sophistication of these authors have suggested and marshalled arguments to support many of the hypotheses tested in this

book without forcing their efforts into integration theory. For example, it comes as no great surprise that the communist international system is composed of two sub-systems or that Yugoslavia is not a fully integrated member of the system (Miles and Gillooly). Moreover, one would suspect that somewhere in the depths of "Foggy Bottom" there is recognition of the fact that some of the underdeveloped states have very consistent patterns of interaction with the communist states and others do not (Simon); it comes as no great surprise that Cuba has increased its level of alignment with the communist states generally and with the Soviet sub-system particularly even though the latter relationship has undergone difficulties at times (Ronfeldt and Tretiak). In short, the value of these efforts is not to be found in the results obtained but in the attempt to apply theory and collect data to communist studies in an innovative way.

Even though integration studies provide the major concern of this book, several other topics were examined as well. Two of these works—one by Dennis Pirages and the other by Ole Holsti—deserve special comment. Pirages, utilizing hypotheses generated from studies of the effects of modernization on the political system by Lipset, Deutsch, and Lerner, attempts to determine whether an increase in the level of socio-economic development in communist party-states is, in fact, associated with greater responsiveness of the decision-making structure and a less coercive compliance structure. He finds that the more developed party-states—Czechoslovakia and East Germany—have less responsive elites and a more coercive compliance structure while the less developed states—Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland—have the opposite access patterns. He further seeks to show that those states that have not developed increased access capability in relation to their high level of socio-economic development will be faced with a declining rate of economic progress and, indeed, by economic stagnation. From the data presented and from the obvious impressionistic news out of Czechoslovakia this seems to be the case.

Holsti looks at the relationship between intra-bloc conflict (specifically Sino-Soviet conflict) and inter-bloc conflict. He hypothesized that the former will be greatest when the latter is least and vice-versa. The study is particularly interesting because of its effort to correlate internal attitudinal orientation with certain objective external events. To examine the former, Holsti used content analysis of official documents during the relevant periods. Content analysis as an approach will undoubtedly be used more and more; it provides one way of measuring micro-level phenomena in communist systems. The data generated in the

analysis tend to confirm the hypotheses, but Holsti urges caution since other variables such as personality, ideology or domestic politics may affect the phenomena under study.

In conclusion, the book is a useful one for students of communist political systems. It systematically attempts to employ theory developed in political science generally to communist politics specifically; the authors attempted to test the hypotheses developed and operationalize the concepts employed in a scientific manner. On the other hand, the results obtained from the analysis are not very surprising. The work in this regard more or less confirms, by empirical investigation, hypotheses that have been suggested by more impressionistic methods earlier. However, this is probably more the fault of our inadequate development of theory in political science than it is the fault of any of the authors.

In short, this book as Triska implies is useful more for what it attempts to do than what it actually produces. It will be a valuable source for students studying various empirical approaches to the study of communist politics.—ROBERT BLACKWELL, *Emory University*.

Elections and Political Stability. BY A. J. MILNOR. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969. Pp. 205.)

The subject matter of this interesting and accessible book is less inclusive than its title may suggest. It is mostly about legislative election systems and contains descriptions of the major kinds of systems, several case studies of their operation, numerous propositions about their consequences for "representativeness" and "stability," and some general theorizing about relationships among electors, election systems, and systemic properties of political aggregates.

The most innovative ideas in the book appear in the first chapter where the author conceptualizes elections as exchange processes. Two classes of exchanges are proposed. The first is called "instrumental," occurs between voters and parties, and is relatively straightforward. The second is not defined clearly but appears to refer to the systemic implications of the voting choice and perhaps also to voters' attitudes toward a political system as they affect partisan choice. The exchanges are further defined as "commitments" by the participants and related to "demands" upon and "capacities" of governments.

These concepts are used to form a classification of states and a number of hypotheses of which the following is an example: "... if the voter casts his ballot for parties whose proposals lead away from the political system, his vote becomes a form of negative systemic exchange and his particular pol-

icy interest becomes less specific." (p. 7) The hypotheses may or may not be logically undisprovable since it is not always clear what the author intended to include in the definitions of the concepts. However, the exchange model is interesting enough to make one regret that it is very rarely mentioned after the first chapter.

Most of the book contains relatively concrete discussions of the plurality, majority and proportional representation systems. Each of these is analyzed in comparable fashion. Arguments of "advocates" and "critics" are exhaustively described and evaluated. Detailed and generally clear descriptions of the mechanics of the systems are presented and supplemented with case studies. The study of Britain makes especially effective use of data from recent elections to illustrate distortions produced by the plurality system in translating votes into seats. Unfortunately, case studies for other systems lack such numerical examples which would have been especially useful to clarify the complexities of proportional representation. An instructive use of data from the 1962 election in France, recast in the 1951 electoral system, is mysteriously placed in an appendix at the end of the book where its impact is minimized. There is also an interesting comparative analysis of Soviet and Western elections and very interesting case studies of Tanganyika and Malaya in the chapter on developing states.

Besides the descriptions and illustrations, the author makes valiant efforts to sort through a staggering variety of propositions about the consequences of each system. Some of these recast familiar arguments, such as the reduction in number of parties and legislative moderation produced by plurality systems. But the author usually qualifies these and concludes that each electoral system may produce quite different results under different conditions. Sometimes these qualifications create clarification and sometimes not, since the qualifications are not always completely clear. An example may illustrate how Milnor proceeds.

Initially, the author says that "the single-member district forces the representative to pursue a moderate course . . . In the process of representation a moderate politics does indeed result." (p. 35) But a "precondition" is added that "no crystallized segment systematically be able to exclude from power sharply dissident but less cohesive elements." (p. 37) Indeed, "in a divided system a single member district system . . . might not produce a legislature much more united than that provided by proportional representation," (p. 61) and he concludes that "in the long run" a plurality system may be free from "dissenting ideological movements" because the political system was moderate at its inception (p. 103)

In general, the descriptions of the electoral systems and the case studies are the strongest parts of the book. Efforts at theory building and proposition formation are less successful, including less abstract efforts than the "exchange" model. The logical status of the frequently mentioned "pre-conditions" for election systems are particularly ambiguous. They do not seem to be necessary conditions for the existence of different systems, but are associated with phrases like "successful application of the system" (p. 23) or "essential . . . to work effectively and efficiently." (p. 90) Yet these phrases require much more refinement than the author provides if the associated propositions are to have testable consequences.

Finally, some mention should be made of the models of electoral behavior which lie behind the traditional dialogue about "representativeness" of electoral systems which the author discusses. These models, if not too murky to be identifiable, can be considered highly suspect on empirical grounds. They usually posit such characteristics in the general electorate as high levels of political information, relatively fixed "interests" to be converted into policy, consistent "ideological" positions on a liberal-conservative dimension, responses primarily to policy alternatives presented by candidates, and so on. Unfortunately, Milnor does not provide an explicit model of his own, does little to revise older models in light of contemporary research, and cites very little of the recent survey literature on electoral behavior. He does, however, make numerous statements about public attitudes and behavior which are rather questionable. We find a suggestion that elections in the United States "seem largely candidate oriented" (p. 77), a proposition about consequences of "a breakdown in the linkage between the coalition in the legislature and the popular ideological distribution," (p. 189), another proposition that "in normal elections voters will cast their ballots for the party that comes closest to their own policy preferences," (p. 191) and others. Perhaps one cannot blame the author for failing in something he did not undertake to do. In any event, re-evaluation of the "debates" over electoral systems in light of current knowledge of voting behavior remains to be done.—THEODORE W. MECKSTROTH, *Ohio State University*.

Politics in Modern Greece. BY KEITH R. LEGG. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. Pp. 367. \$10.00.)

The advent of the military regime in Greece has put to the test the small fraternity of American scholars, many of them of Greek origin, who write on Greek political affairs. Some of those scholars, shocked by the military takeover of April 1967, have chosen a more or less partisan stance

which, however justified ideologically, has served very poorly the need for a sober, unemotional and, to the extent it is humanly possible, objective assessment of an admittedly complex political reality. Keith Legg, of Greek origin in spite of his Anglicised name, has largely resisted the temptation.

Politics in Modern Greece evidences the detachment which is the mark of the true scholar. Legg, observing that "the Greek political system simply cannot be understood using any single model of political development" (p. 3) has followed an eclectic course which bypasses the rigid application of theoretical models and typologies having little relevance to the Greek political system. Still, his familiarity with contemporary political theory enables him to identify correctly the structural weaknesses of the system as it existed before the military coup. He discusses with almost savage candor the shallow organization and the feudal character of the political parties (pp. 130-132), the clientage and patronage relationships between politicians, voters, and bureaucrats (166-168), the structural deficiencies of the legislature (170), the superficiality of the legislative process (170-171), the preoccupation of the Deputies with patronage-oriented activities (176-185), the "combative" nature of parliamentary control (173), the heavy representation of "traditional occupations" in the Greek legislature (278-283), the imprecision of crucial constitutional provisions (95), the lack of basic consensus "on the meaning of Greece or the nature of the regime" (82), or the penetration of the political system by foreign powers (70-77). By and large, this criticism is factual and valid.

On occasion, Legg appears overly harsh or too dogmatic. For example, his analysis of the economic system (168-170) does not show that he has taken into account the progress registered during the Karamanlis years (1955-1963); his emphasis on "mistrust" among Greeks (35) is somewhat overdrawn; and his discussion of the language and religion as dividing elements between rural and urban, privileged and underprivileged, the small literate elite and the large majority (85-92) is highly misleading if taken literally by an unfamiliar reader. On some rare instances, Legg allows some chaff to go through this sieve as on p. 245 where he asserts that the new Greek Constitution includes "a means 'to prevent politicians from making mistakes'" and identifies as his source an article of the *New York Times*. One might have expected a more direct reference to the related articles of the Constitution, if indeed there are such articles.

Legg's book makes a very strong case—albeit unintentionally—for the need to set in motion the long-delayed process for political modernization. After reading his book one can hardly doubt that

such a need existed prior to the military coup as the present regime also claims. Legg makes a further observation of truly cardinal significance: "Both the Left and the military are concerned with policy, especially with modernization and economic development" (187). He implies that the "traditional patterns of personal politics" could not accommodate "the growing marketization and urbanization of Greek society" (186). In his view, "the military establishment and the left-wing political organization, the EDA" were the two extraparlimentary structures which espoused the objective of political modernization. This reviewer tends to agree largely with Legg's observation, although several political leaders, most notably Karamanlis since 1961, had been conscious of the need for political modernization as a companion process to that of economic development. The author, however, does not explore adequately the implications of his identification of the "Left and the military" as the two most likely agents of modernization.

Since the early twenties, the Left in Greece has been identified with the pro-Communist, pro-Soviet orientation in politics. There has never been a broad, popular movement of the Social democratic persuasion. Modernization by the Left in Greece meant all along a non-democratic, Soviet-type system. This alone would have made the Left an unwelcome agent of modernization for a large number of Greeks. But the Left in Greece has been burdened with other liabilities, especially since the Second World War: the excesses committed during the Occupation, the December 1944 Communist uprising, and the 1946-49 Communist-led guerrilla campaign; the pro-Western orientation of the majority of the Greeks within NATO; the fear of the "Slavs"; the control over EDA by the exiled leaders of the Communist party. Andreas Papandreou, the son of the veteran liberal statesman, who returned to Greece after a distinguished career as a professor of Econometrics in the United States, grasped the quest for political modernization and moved to gain the necessary power for carrying out such a program. From among the two potential agents of modernization—the Left and the Army—he opted for the first. Considering the liabilities burdening the Left, his was a serious political error. To win the allegiance of the Left, Andreas had to take a hostile stance against the Left's familiar targets, namely the Palace, the "Establishment," NATO, the CIA, the "Americans," and the "Army." This alignment of an important liberal (bourgeois) politician with the Communist-dominated Left introduced a disturbing element which further weakened the traditional democratic system. Eventually, the disintegration of the democratic process opened the way for the second ex-

traparlimentary agent of modernization—the Army—to move in and try its hand.

As noted earlier, the Left as the agent of modernization suffered from several liabilities. The Army, by contrast, has many assets as a traditionally highly-respected institution. But, it too has several liabilities; among them one may list the inexperience of its leaders with the nuances of politics, or their over-experience with command-compliance relationships. But the most serious liability is the dictatorial nature of the regime they have imposed, because such a regime goes against the principles and the emotional preferences of the great majority of the Greek people.

Legg's book may not answer all the questions it raises or tackle all the issues it touches; but it is a treasure-house of illuminating data and insights, and a must for those who wish to understand the postwar political developments in Greece.—D. GEORGE KOUSOULAS, *Howard University*.

Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics. By CARLOS A. ASTIZ. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 316. \$12.00.)

This book is an ambitious attempt to relate social class to political influence in Peru. The basic theme is that a coastal plutocracy of sugar and cotton landowners, real estate developers, financiers, owners of small mining corporations, guano profiteers, and producers of fish meal, in alliance with the large landowners of the Sierra have dominated politics to the extent that they can protect their interests and prevent social reform. This theme is developed by two chapters evaluating class in Peru and by separate chapters on political parties, the military, the church, United States economic and political interests in the country, the possibilities of change, and on how the classes actually articulate their interests through the national and local governments.

In many ways Professor Astiz has written an exceptionally stimulating book. It is a depth study of who gets what, when, and how, and why in Peru. The writing is realistic, always directed to the central inquiry, and demonstrates methodological sophistication in relating class to political decision making. The author deliberately avoids a sterile description of institutions and a chronological listing of historical events. The book instead is analytical throughout and written with a sense of objectivity that has been hard to come by in books on Peru.

A book of this type, however, does raise the difficult question about how much research needs to be done before a conceptualization of a political system is completely accurate. The fact that the book results from a doctoral dissertation goes part of the way to make it satisfactory on this count.

The author did his research in Peru, exhausted Peruvian sources, embellished his ideas with references from all types of books and articles on Latin America, painstakingly laid out his chapters, and approached his subject matter with methodological zest. The complexity of topics is not glossed over, and the demands of a dissertation and the author's sophistication prevents him from adopting a completely static and deterministic viewpoint of Peruvian society.

The carefulness of Professor Astiz is seen in many chapters. He devotes considerable attention to describing the importance and interest articulation of the coastal plutocracy, the Sierra landed aristocracy, the industrial upper class, the middle classes, the Sierra rural Indians, the coastal landed workers, the urban workers, and the shantytown urban inhabitants. The discussion of political parties perceptively describes and accounts for the increasing conservatism of the APRA party, and also related how Acción Popular and the Unión Nacional Odrista parties have either been related to or been effectively neutralized by the ruling elites. Most important, the author describes historically the complex relations between the military and the coastal plutocracy, and recognizes that the military has at times gone its own way, especially due to the influence of the Center of High Military Studies.

With all this said, however, Professor Astiz has been proven wrong in his basic conceptualization that the enormous political strength of the coastal plutocracy and Sierra landed aristocracy would prevent social reform. Since the publication of the book, General, Juan Velasco Alvarado, the leader of Peru since the military coup of October, 1968, has decreed the governmental nationalization of coastal sugar and cotton plantations and has taken other measures that would indicate a revolutionary fervor on social problems. This raises the question of what was deficient in the book.

Some ideas can be mentioned. First, this reviewer would question the author's premise that the coastal plutocracy is so solidly united and that it has co-opted all of the important military men, party leaders, industrialists, mass media directors, and important bureaucratic leaders into its way of thinking through interpersonal connections, plush clubs in Lima, marriages, etc. Professor Astiz develops this idea in his important Chapter 9 by stating that the ruling elites themselves formulate policy in key interest groups (National Agrarian Society, etc.), then informally work it out with those who have been co-opted in the three plush clubs of Lima, and finally disseminated the policy in a biased way through the controlled media. Professor Astiz makes this assumption on the membership lists of the three plush Lima clubs. This

doesn't go far enough, and what is needed is a sophisticated power elite study, and an exhaustive study of how the interest groups, which are barely mentioned, actually work. Chapter 9 should have been the beginning chapter of the book and a springboard for everything that followed. A power elite analysis perhaps could have combined a reputational study approach with a depth analysis of a few key decisions. The author does have a few pages on the land reform bill and the devaluation of the Peruvian soil, relating it to his premise of control by the ruling elites, but these cases are not developed with the methodological sophistication one finds in the usual power elite studies.

A power elite study would have also enabled Professor Astiz to determine whether the institutions of the presidency and congress have any independent influence in their own right. This idea is basically rejected since the two institutions are ignored in the book. Yet, Professor James Payne in *Labor and Politics in Peru* sees the office of the presidency as the center of political power and argues that oligarchical influence is absent on labor and many other issues.

A second criticism is that the study of the military is not specific enough in respect to factionalism, the class background of officers, and the role of the Center of High Military Studies. General Velasco Alvarado, for example, may be an unusual case in that he came from a working class family (Professor Astiz stresses the middle class origins of the military), but this has been one factor affecting his motivation. Finally, the importance of nationalism is not really foreseen by the author, even in his postscript chapter on the military coup and the nationalization of oil. Yet Velasco is riding a nationalist wave that he helped to create, and is using it to undercut the opposition and to build up support for further social reforms and his own popularity.—ROBERT D. TOMASEK, *The University of Kansas*.

The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba.
By RICHARD R. FAGEN. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. Pp. 271. \$8.50.)

Social science research on Latin America often appears superficial and irrelevant. Political scientists seem especially guilty of focusing upon marginal issues. All too often we devote our time and talents to such projects as the analysis of laws that are never implemented. These and similar studies may contribute to "theory-building," but they do not shed much light on the major political developments of contemporary Latin America. The leading example of scholarly neglect is the Cuban Revolution, surely the most fascinating yet least understood development in Post-War Latin America. Fortunately, as the Revolution enters its sec-

ond decade, we are beginning to get some very good social science studies to add to the uneven blend of journalism, descriptive history, and Cold War polemics which have been the primary sources of information and misinformation about Cuba. Richard Fagen, a political scientist at Stanford, may be included among those scholars determined to take a serious, systematic look at this radical experiment in social change.

The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba is more than another attempt to classify the Revolution and explain why it took the path that it did. Fagen deals with these issues, but his interests lie deeper. In this book, he is principally concerned with a critical examination of what is, perhaps, the most distinctive and significant aspect of the Cuban Revolution—the sustained drive to create a “new Cuban man” and a communitarian society.

By focusing upon the transformation of political culture, the book not only goes to the essence of the Cuban experience, but it may also tell us a great deal about what is occurring in China. In fact, Fagen seeks the broadest possible comparability by placing his study in the framework of political socialization. In an introductory chapter he reviews the basic ideas and concepts of the socialization literature. He then argues that many of these are not directly applicable to the Cuban case. In the first place, the possibilities of survey research are severely limited, if not nonexistent. But even more important is the nature of socialization in Cuba. “Political socialization under the Revolutionary Government has not been used primarily for settling citizens into the ongoing system. It has been a directed learning process through which the elite seeks to create a new political culture.” (p. 6) Thus, Fagen analyzes not subjective political orientations but several revolutionary programs designed to “. . . forge the new political culture in the crucible of action.” (p. 7) The bulk of the book is devoted to studies of the campaign against illiteracy, the Committees for Defense of the Revolution, and the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction. Data for these case studies come principally from Cuban newspapers, periodicals, and public documents. While recognizing the limitations of such sources, the author so carefully analyzes his data that the reader has confidence in the validity and reliability of the inferences. To supplement information collected in the United States, Fagen made three trips to Cuba between 1966 and 1969. The appendix contains an elaboration of field notes taken on one of these visits as well as translated selections from three of Castro’s speeches relevant to the programs studied.

The 1961 campaign against illiteracy was more

than an adult literacy program. To begin with, the 700,000 newly literate Cubans learned of the Revolutionary government in a positive manner. Furthermore, over 300,000 young Cubans participated directly in the Revolution as literary instructors. Fagen speculates that, “. . . it is probably safe to say that the campaign affected in some real way the lives of most Cubans who by 1961 were old enough to have even minimal political awareness.” (p. 55) Finally, such a massive effort, challenged the leadership capabilities of the revolutionaries. From it evolved a leadership style unique to contemporary Cuba.

The educational content of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) and the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction (EIR) was explicitly political. Outside of Cuba, the CDR are known as neighborhood security organizations. Fagen examines their surveillance role, but he also finds that the CDR system is an important instrument of mass integration, socialization, and mobilization. While cognizant of the excesses and opportunism of some CDR officials, he evaluates their accomplishments as follows:

One has only to compare the situation in 1960 with the situation eight years later to be convinced that the CDR have contributed very significantly to protecting the institutions and property of the revolution, to teaching citizens what is expected of them in the new Cuba, to mobilizing the population for participation in revolutionary activities, and to bringing together under a common organizational umbrella persons of the most diverse political and social characteristics. (pp. 99–100)

From 1960 until 1967, the EIR trained selected revolutionary cadre in the official ideology of the Revolution. Fagen skillfully traces the relationship of these schools and their curriculum to the struggle for power within the revolutionary movement, a struggle culminating in the ascendancy of both Marxism-Leninism and the Communist party. In dealing with the EIR, he also analyzes the nature of social science research in revolutionary Cuba.

The concluding chapter assesses the Revolution’s progress toward its goal of creating a new political culture. Clearly the program has encountered obstacles, but Cuba is making strides toward replacing a traditional Latin American society with one based upon radically different norms. Furthermore, the demonstrated ability of the revolutionary leadership to mobilize the masses in support of this new society is itself a significant achievement. In Huntington’s institutional terms, Cuba has already reached an advanced level of political development.

Richard Fagen’s book does not give the final word on the change in Cuban political culture. In fact, it deals with only selected aspects of the transformation process. Nevertheless, Fagen transcends the narrowness of the Latin American area

specialist, Cold War Scholar, and empirical technician to initiate earnest consideration of the truly radical component of the Cuban experiment. Can the Cubans succeed in their attempt to build a genuinely communitarian society? Only time and honest scholarship will tell. Richard Fagen has taken the question seriously. For this he is to be commended.—TERRY L. MCCOY, *The Ohio State University*.

Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development.

By JAMES PETRAS. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 377. \$8.50.)

Scholars who seek to understand why Chile, unlike most of Latin America, has enjoyed political stability and elected governments will wish to carefully study this new book by James Petras. Relying heavily on data generously provided by Maurice Zeitlin (degree of overlap and integration between landowners and businessmen), Dale Johnson (sample of Chilean managers conducted in 1964 and 1965), and Eduardo Hamuy (Santiago sample survey conducted before the 1958 presidential elections; 652 employee sample of a universe of 68,000 public functionaries), Mr. Petras examines industrialization and the attitudes of industrial managers, the roles of the right wing, the middle class (including detailed consideration of the programs and behavior of the Popular Action Front (FRAP) and the Christian Democratic Party), the peasantry, and the bureaucracy. The author concludes that the primary factor which explains the exceptional stability of Chile's political development in contrast to most of Latin America is the special role and function of the bureaucracy in maintaining the political system.

Mr. Petras notes that bureaucracies are often characterized as having "traditional" outlooks, but in the Chilean bureaucracy a fusion of modern and traditional values has taken place. He writes: "Since the bureaucracy draws its members from almost all strata of the social structure, and since its political attitudes are neither traditional nor modern, but a mixture of the two, the Chilean bureaucracy has served to stabilize the political system by moderating political antagonisms. While parties and personalities in government have changed, and interest-groups have periodically intervened in politics, the bureaucracy has continued to be involved in political life for many decades. It has been the political anchor of the Chilean system, moderating the effects of frequent changes in government ministries, government coalitions, and party strength in the legislature." (p. 288)

The reader will find Chapters 2 (Industrial Managers and Industrialization), 4 (The Middle Class), 6 (Christian Democracy), and 8 (The Bureaucracy: The Politics of Integration) deserving

of special attention—particularly as they relate to the final chapter of the book where Mr. Petras isolates "three keys" for explaining Chile's political stability (unified and organized ruling class; organizationally fragmented labor movement; and the political socialization of new political leaders).

For example, in Chapter 2 the author examines the degree of overlap and integration between the landowners and businessmen elites. Mr. Petras finds there is extensive overlap between the two sectors which "considerably weakens the thesis of sector conflict in Chilean development." (p. 53) [that the two sectors are represented by distinct groups] He continues: "It is safe to conclude that the Chilean economic elite is a very integrated group, which is probably one of the main reasons why serious conflicts have not emerged between large landholders and businessmen. It may also account to a large extent for Chilean stability. . . ." (p. 55) Petras also points that there is a lateral linkage between the state and the large corporation in Chile. The result is that state interventionism signifies "socialism for the rich" (p. 50). [the state protects national industry and helps to eliminate risks] Referring specifically to the Christian-Democrat administration led by President Frei (Chapter 8), the author contends that the government has done very little to ingratiate itself with the industrial labor movement and the peasants in the countryside. Instead, "In the cities the PDC throws a smokescreen over its socioeconomic links with the business elite by attacking organized workers striking for economic benefits" (p. 252) and "alienating militant peasants." (p. 223)

Although many of Mr. Petras' conclusions and assertions seem plausible and may be supported by forthcoming research by other scholars, at times the author exceeds the limits of his data. For example, Mr. Petras finds that there is a "high degree of concentration of economic power" (p. 51) in Chile and that the "economic elite is a very integrated group." (p. 55). First of all, one may question his rather loose definition of an economic elite ("those who wield decision-making power over more than one enterprise" [p. 51]). Even if the reader is prepared to accept this definition, the data presented in Table 20 (p. 52) hardly substantiate his concentration of power thesis. Less than one-half of the large firms' directorates serve on more than one firm and only 38 percent serve on more than two.

Similarly, Mr. Petras cites Ricardo Lagos' findings in *La concentración del poder económico* which show that 4.2% of the Chilean corporations control 59.2% of the capital of all corporations. Besides the fact that the book is nearly a decade old and Petras misspells the title (footnote 16, p. 52), Constantine Menges has questioned Lagos' findings, noting that

"... the author's bias prevents him from seeing the limitations and pitfalls of his data." (*Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1966, p. 344.) When Mr. Petras discusses the degree of overlap and integration between landowners and businessmen, Table 22 (p. 54) indicates that only 25 percent of big businessmen own one or more large farms—hardly a shocking revelation.

One can cite numerous other shortcomings with Mr. Petras' data base which sharply limit the validity of his conclusions (e.g., Mr. Petras relies on Eduardo Harmuy's survey sample for several of his conclusions about the attitudes of the middle class. This survey was confined to Santiago and conducted over a decade ago; Dale Johnson's interview sample of manufacturing firms was almost entirely confined to Santiago offices. Even Mr. Petras concedes in his appendix that Mr. Johnson's findings are "tentative and exploratory" [p. 357]). Nevertheless, overall the book is well written and presents several provocative hypotheses worthy of careful consideration and further study.—WESTON H. AGOR, *Wisconsin State University*.

Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America: A Study of Chilean Political Culture. BY FRANCISCO JOSÉ MORENO. (New York: New York University Press, 1969. Pp. 197. \$6.95.)

As the title indicates, this is a study of Chilean political culture which attempts to use the Chilean case to develop a theory of the conditions of political stability in Latin America. Professor Moreno, like many other students of Latin American politics, is struck by the persistence of constitutional government in Chile in contrast to the frequent and irregular changes of government in most other Latin American countries. Unlike nearly all others, however, he attributes this not to a tradition of tolerance and democratic pluralism but to the high degree of concentration of power in the Chilean presidency. He coins the ugly neologism "authoritism" for "a system in which there is a single center of legitimate political power the legal supremacy of which is sanctioned in the name of justice and whose actions are, therefore, not to be bound by written regulations." (p. 24) This is distinguished from authoritarian systems in which the concentration of power is not supported by any notion of legitimacy. "Authoritism" characterized the Spanish colonial regime, and it was because Diego Portales saw the necessity of investing the Chilean president with a similar high degree of power that the Chilean system has been relatively stable and successful.

To support his argument, Moreno traces the origin of the Latin attitude toward law from Roman origins through the Spaniards to colonial Latin America. Law is an ideal to be asserted but not

necessarily observed. The ruler is freed from the restraints of law. (Here Moreno cites a passage of Thomas Aquinas which actually asserts the reverse.) A single center of authority with a monopoly of legitimacy held the Spanish colonial empire together with remarkable success, and its collapse was attributable more to Napoleon's violation of the principle of legitimacy than to any other single factor.

After an initial period of instability following Chilean independence, Portales recreated Spanish "authoritism" by establishing a strong presidency in the constitution of 1833, and the system continued to work as long as the presidents could control elections (through methods never explained in the book). It only ran into trouble when the Congress, influenced by liberal ideas, began to assert itself, leading to the Civil War of 1891, and to constitutional weakness which was not remedied until a new constitution reestablished a strong president after 1925. Even today, President Eduardo Frei has been less successful than he might have been because he has refused to use his "authoritistic" powers to overrule Congress when it has opposed him.

The reference to Frei's reluctance to violate constitutional norms suggests what is a principal weakness in the above analysis. How can one have *constitutional* stability and at the same time support the violation of "written regulations" (i.e. the constitution) by an "authoritistic" strong man in the interest of "an abstract concept of justice that takes precedence over written laws?" (p. 176) As Frei recognized when he was tempted to override the Chilean Congress on the issue of his trip to the United States in 1967 (one of the examples cited by Moreno), once the principle of the supremacy of the constitution is violated, we are back in a Hobbesian world where the strongest, in Latin America usually the military, wins out. Moreno alludes at one point to Vallenilla Lanz's book, *Césarismo Democrático*, in support of his thesis, but a look at the history of the rise and fall of "Democratic Caesars" in Venezuela which that work was intended to explain does not argue that this is a system to be widely imitated. It was only through the institutionalization of constitutional democracy in the last twelve years that Venezuela has been able to achieve stable effective legitimate government. A strong executive is necessary in the modern world, particularly in developing countries, but Chile has demonstrated that this is not incompatible with the rule of law and democratic constitutionalism. An interpretation which does not take in to account this strong commitment to and pride in constitutional democracy ignores an important element in Chilean patterns of legitimacy.

One cannot deny that the demand for a "dictatorship with popular support" (to use the recent expression of Juan Bosch) is a persistent one in Latin America—and Professor Moreno, a former Cuban citizen, seems to imply (but does not state) that Castro is closer to the "authoritistic" Latin American tradition than is constitutional democracy. Yet the argument for the populist strong man is not heard only in countries influenced by Spain. It appears wherever constitutional democracy is incapable of producing effective government. Chile thus far has been able to do so under democratic auspices and the fact that its president is stronger than most helps to explain this, although other factors seem to this reviewer to be more important.

The question of authority patterns in Latin America clearly merits empirical investigation and Professor Moreno's book suggests areas of possible research. However, this provocative but impressionistic book does not produce sufficient evidence to convince this reader that this is the crucial variable to account for Chilean stability in the past, nor that a good dose of "authoritism" is the answer to the problems of Latin America today.—PAUL E. SIGMUND, *Princeton University*.

Political Administration in Mexico. BY JULIO A. FERNÁNDEZ. (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1969. Pp. 80.)

The Peruvian Administrative System. BY RUDOLPH GÓMEZ. (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1969. Pp. 78.)

These two short monographs were written with the objective of providing a broad overview of politics and administration in Mexico and Peru. Their scope, therefore, was deliberately restricted to an analysis of the existing literature rather than to a presentation of new data or interpretations based upon detailed empirical research. Given these self-imposed limits, how successful are they? To answer this question in general terms, a distinction should be made between the two studies. Professor Fernández' analysis of Mexico undoubtedly is the stronger work and, in many ways, it provides an excellent summary of contemporary Mexican politics. Although it concentrates much more upon the general political setting and policy-making process than upon administration as such, it does draw upon an extensive body of literature and integrates that material in an effective manner. The Peruvian study by Professor Gómez, on the other hand, tends to be disappointing for several reasons. While it rightly focuses upon the interplay between military and civilian politics, the study as a whole seems unnecessarily limited in terms of the literature upon which it is based and

its sketchiness in several important areas detracts from its overall usefulness.

On a more substantive level, however, a criticism that might be made of *both* studies is that their reliance upon recent developmental models leads to analyses that often seem unnecessarily confining and sometimes confusing. It is not that the seminal works of Gabriel Almond and Fred Riggs, used here to provide conceptual frameworks, are trivial or unproductive of real insights. Quite to the contrary. But I would argue that such models often tend to disguise as many important issues and relationships as they illuminate. At least two major difficulties arise from establishing relatively static classifications of behavior which are seen to define a single continuum stretching from "tradition" to "modernity."

The first difficulty is how to classify a given system or behavior pattern within the set typology. Terms such as "rationality," "efficiency" and "secularization" are ambiguous at best. More importantly, perhaps, behavior itself is usually "mixed." This forces the analysis into a discussion of differences of degree, which are not only hard to distinguish but often superficial when placed within a larger context. Gómez, for example, characterizes the Peruvian administrative system as one in which certain bureaus receive more than they "need" (pp. 49-52), employees use the security of their position to adapt the administrative setting to their own benefit (p. 55), and many bureaucrats resist suggestions for reform (p. 58). Obviously, none of these statements is wrong. But they also characterize the American system and, Gómez admits this in part, the admission simply raises the question as to whether other models might not be more discriminating. Fernández seems to raise equally thorny problems to the extent that he concentrates upon the general question of political modernization rather than upon the more specific impact of Mexico's "dominant non-authoritarian" party upon the system.

A second difficulty relates to the question of change. There is a tendency in both studies (as well as the literature in general) to confuse the *appearance* of change (i.e., sheer motion) with fundamental change itself. Deep-seated change undoubtedly is taking place somewhere in Mexico and Peru, but it is not terribly helpful to speak about an entire nation being "in a constant state of flux" (Fernández, p. 21) or "in the process of becoming" (Gómez, p. 44) without carefully distinguishing between *adjustments* to behavior and the *basic alteration* of established behavioral patterns. For example, in spite of certain qualifying remarks, Fernández tends to speak about the "consequences of modernization" (p. 12) as if every modernizing force from industrialization to urbanization carries

with it an inevitable challenge to traditional modes of behavior. This may or may not be. Likewise, Gómez speaks of social change in Peru and cites increasing school enrollment from the slum areas as an example. That the school system is *different* in one sense cannot be doubted. But whether this has led to a basic change in the underlying complexion of the school system or, more importantly, in the larger political system is an open question. In both cases the authors are making statements about relationships that are implied by the models; they are not, however, relationships that have been empirically verified. Indeed, if a good deal of evidence from Latin America is to be believed, many so-called modernizing forces have not brought about any fundamental alteration of the existing systems.

A more useful model might have been one that concentrated less upon "transitional" politics, with all of its problematic implications, and more upon what is fixed or stable in many Latin American countries: namely, the essentially closed, often coercive and illegitimate nature of the systems involved. Such a model has its own limitations. Yet it would avoid the problem of trying to classify and weigh the importance of traditional, as against modern, behavior patterns and would focus attention upon actual power relationships. In particular, it would tend to stress the extent to which both traditional and emerging elites have acted rather consistently, and often by force, to maintain a fundamental distance between themselves and the vast majority of the population. Gómez does recognize these factors in various places but his actual discussion of specific elites and their relationship to the system is extremely limited. The Church, for example, is dismissed in two paragraphs, the economy is briefly outlined but virtually no mention is made of the large landowners, and the APRA party is seen as providing a basic "cleavage" within society rather than as a force tending to maintain the status quo. The result is to omit from consideration important environmental forces which often fuse with and reinforce the *elitist qualities of the administrative system itself* and consequently to place that system in a kind of political limbo.

These points are less applicable both to Mexico itself and to Fernández' study. It could be argued, however, that Mexico is less open and adaptive than presented and that greater attention could have been devoted to the continued or increased disparity between social classes, the close interplay between private and public power, the often alienative impact of administration at the local level, and the sharply repressive response of the Mexican government to the 1968 student riots.

Both studies would seem to be best suited for

undergraduate use. The Mexican study is well recommended, the Peruvian analysis less so.—GILES WAYLAND-SMITH, *Allegheny College*.

Republican 'Iraq: A Study in 'Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958. BY MAJID KHADDURI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 318, \$8.50.)

The changing kaleidoscope of Iraqi politics has often been considered a frustrating blur of complexity by observers and scholars of the Middle East. A fluctuating and fractionating myriad of military leaders, cabinets, constitutions, coups, ideologies, tribes, and sects have interacted with one another in an atmosphere of apparently consistent contradiction. Few observers and fewer scholars have attempted to unravel systematically this shifting web of social forces and personalities. The most successful attempt was Majid Khadduri's *Independent 'Iraq, 1932-1958* published in 1951 and revised and reissued in 1960. *Republican 'Iraq* is a sequel to this classic volume and is a study of Iraqi politics since the revolution of 1958.

Republican 'Iraq presents a detailed and well-ordered taxonomy of Iraqi politics during the dynamic decade, 1958-1968. Important data unavailable in any other source are presented in a systematic (primarily chronological) fashion. Examples include the names of the members of the various cabinets and military groups, comprehensive biographies of key political leaders, and careful translations of major documents and proclamations. Documentation is meticulous and there is a pronounced and sound reliance upon primary sources. Invaluable information derived from personal correspondence and oral interviews has been thoroughly cross-checked and re-examined to insure accuracy and reliability. And there has been a conscious and singularly successful attempt at objectivity. The tendency to sensationalism and spectacularism increasingly present in studies of societies caught in the midst of rapid and disruptive sociopolitical change is admirably absent from this work.

Sprinkled throughout the study are highly perceptive insights into recent Iraqi political events. For example, the widely-publicized and frequently misunderstood Mahdawi Court (People's Court) "served as a safety-valve at a time when the public, or at any rate the mob, was still angry with the leaders of the Old Regime." (p. 81) In confronting problems of popular uprisings and social unrest, the traditional political elite reacted "by strengthening the police force, without dealing with the root cause of the problem." (p. 49) With regard to the scope and depth of the July 1958 Revolution, the author points out that it "could hardly claim that it had completely replaced the Old Re-

gime by a new one. It took the Revolutionary regime a long time before it began to embark on the second or the constructive stage of revolutionary change." (p. 85) This kind of analysis, which was somewhat lacking in *Independent Iraq*, stems from the author's greater sensitivity to social forces and social change in the present study.

The volume under review is at its best in the sections of exceptionally fine and fair analysis of key Iraqi political leaders such as 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, and Tahir Yahya. The description of Qasim is particularly incisive and refreshing, especially when compared to earlier studies and evaluations. A surprising number of more and less reputable scholars have persisted in studying the leader of the Iraqi revolution from an essentially pseudopsychological stance. Qasim has not fared well in such analyses for he has been portrayed as everything from a "demented lunatic" to a "cowering paranoiac." Khadduri sensitively portrays Qasim as a leader who was in some ways ill-prepared and in other ways well-prepared to lead a revolution and a society. He emphasizes the buffeting Qasim received in the midst of a continuing and intense power struggle and his inability to control the social forces and processes of the day. The author points out well that Qasim:

. . . applied so much energy to the cause of the Revolution that he scarcely had time to sleep. The aims of the Revolution, as he saw them, began to change from the aims of his fellow officers, as they understood them, and they began to turn against him. He thus became involved in a struggle for power, and his method was to play off one group against another. In the spare moments that he could afford to spend on other matters he turned to internal reforms. . . . At heart, he sympathized with the underdog, but he was unable to control the social forces which were shaping the development of the country. (p. 79)

The only reservations of this reviewer stem from the absence of any conceptual framework or theoretical emphasis. In the Preface, the author tells us that he intends "not merely to give a narrative of events but also to sketch the social background of the new leaders and to discuss their ideas and aspirations and the new social forces at work." It is extremely difficult to move beyond narrative without introducing some degree of conceptual rigor and theoretical emphasis. An example of difficulties arising from conceptual vagueness is the strong assertion that the "new generation" in Iraq cannot be identified as middle class. The justifications for this position confuse class origins with class existence, bourgeois and professional middle classes, and objective and subjective views of class. (pp. 6-7) The elusive, but critical, concept class is nowhere defined. Terms such as "ruling class," "feudal class," "ruling elite," "upper class," "governing elite," "ruling oligarchy," and "Arab ruling

class" appear constantly and indiscriminately. It is not certain whether or not these important terms are all synonyms. Also, to exactly what group of individuals each term refers is unclear.

Perhaps a more explicit concern with theory would have revealed a series of more general Iraqi political patterns. A persistently personal and balancing conflict between individuals, factions, and groups may be suggested as a case in point. Khadduri's excellent discussion of "Qasimism" as a "policy of balancing forces" can perhaps be extended to other periods of Iraqi politics. Shifting and competitive tension marked not only Qasim-'Abd al-Salam 'Arif relations, but also Chadirchi-Hadid, Mulla Mustafa-Shaykh Ahmad, Sa'di-Jawad/Shabib, and Bazzaz-'Abd al-Rahman 'Arif relations.

Despite these brief suggestions, this study by the leading scholar of Iraqi political processes will long stand as the best analysis of these processes. Majid Khadduri has presented us with a solidly documented piece of research which should effectively and finally clarify much of the confusion and bury many of the myths that have come to obscure and distort Iraqi politics.—JAMES A. BILL, *University of Texas at Austin*.

Bürger und Politik. By JÜRGEN STEINER. (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969. Pp. 292. DM 35.)

This book is Volume Four in the *Politik und Wähler* series edited by Ferdinand A. Hermens, René König, Erwin Scheuch, and Rudolf Wildenmann. This particular volume is concerned with the general concept of political participation in democracies and uses Swiss and West German survey data to test hypotheses about the relationship of political participation to social and psychological factors. Steiner's goal is to produce a theory of the ways that communicating about politics with others, voting, and holding political office are affected by the individual's integration in the society, sense of political efficacy, geographic and social mobility, and social status.

While Steiner has produced a far more modest work than his title suggests, it is one which is substantively valuable to students of Swiss, and, to a lesser extent, West German political behavior. It is also an informative work to those interested in German-Swiss survey research procedures and to those concerned with the general topic of political behavior theory.

Steiner's methodological section contains an especially interesting refinement over previous voting studies since Swiss voting records allow researchers to determine if a particular respondent actually had voted when he said that he had. By determining who actually voted and who did not,

Steiner provides evidence as to the extent of misrepresented voting in the Swiss sample as well as offering some possible reasons why the people who erred in reporting their vote erred by a nine to one margin in the direction of too high a report.

On another methodological point the Swiss records are also interesting. Individuals who refused to be interviewed or could not be successfully interviewed were found to have a voting rate approximately ten per cent lower than those contacted who were successfully interviewed. A significant distortion in the direction of higher participation being reported for the sample than actually occurs in the population therefore results from this reluctance to be interviewed. When this sampling distortion is combined with the error produced by the twenty-five per cent of the sample who reported participating in the four votes of the Swiss data more frequently than the official records indicated they had, one becomes more appreciably more suspicious of the validity of survey results where there are no checks on respondent's veracity. Steiner thus indicates an area where many researchers have been content to accept past assumptions without being sufficiently critical of some serious possible errors.

Steiner's study, although quite brief (only 172 pages in the body of the text), is among the most methodologically explicit ones on hand. Steiner acknowledges it to be a research report and thus considerably reproduces his earliest hypotheses along with the refinement procedures he used. His detailed account of how he operationalized the concepts should be of particular interest to methodologists. After extensive preparation and thorough pretesting, Steiner conducted 823 interviews in three large and five small Swiss cities among the male population age 20 to 35. These Swiss interviews are used along with the results of a 1965 West German election survey to indicate the kinds of political participation that occur among the different types of respondents.

Steiner's substantive findings will contain few surprises to the reader of earlier works on political behavior research done by Americans. In fact, Lane's *Political Life*, Lipset's *Political Man*, and Milbrath's *Political Participation* are the three books most heavily relied on for evidence of his Swiss and German findings being applicable in other democracies. Some may be disturbed by a circularity of reasoning here since Steiner's original hypotheses were based on his readings of these preceding three, as well as other, books (cf. p. 21). In any event, as Steiner hypothesized, political participation with respect to voting is higher among those Swiss and German respondents: who are mentally involved in politics, whose social milieu supports the norms of voting, who feel their per-

sonal lives influenced by political events, and who feel both politically efficacious and less political cross-pressures. The preceding factors are interrelated with one another so as to have a mutually reinforcing effect. Finally, higher social status, lower geographic and social mobility, stronger social and political integration—all of these factors increase the influence of the mutually reinforcing factors affecting participation.

While recognizing that institutional differences exist among various democracies, Steiner feels that these differences can be treated as variables in his rudimentary theory of democratic political participation, which concludes his report. These first steps toward a theory of democratic political participation consist of relating his individually verified hypotheses to one another through both narrative and diagrammatic means.

There are minor difficulties involved in Steiner's study which make provisional acceptance of his rudimentary theory somewhat problematical. The bulk of his data, for example, is reported by simple cross-tabulation with neither explicit treatment of alternative explanations to his hypothesized findings nor with controls for third variables employed. The technical data on his scale and index constitution is not included in this volume and the curious reader is referred to a book in preparation by other members of the research team for such data. His use of statistics (only of the order of chi-square) is not as rigorous as some desire for even experimental work. Findings with a probability as large as .10, for example, are considered of "weak significance." Furthermore, the actual differences among the variable categories are frequently not of very large magnitude and no explanation, or even mention, is made of these being relatively small actual differences in voting, discussing politics, etc. Steiner hops from data he collected in earlier studies to data based on the present research and then to German and other democratic systems in a way that is frequently suggestive rather than conclusive. His prose treatment is frequently a "bare bones" one that leaves several relevant questions unanswered.

His work, though, is of importance and should be of interest to several groups of political scientists. The students of Swiss politics will find a great mass of original evidence about Swiss political attitudes and behavior, organized in a clear, straight-forward fashion. The methodologists should gain from Steiner's evidence as to the dubious nature of many of the responses to voting frequency questions when checks on the respondent's veracity are missing and from Steiner's systematic elaboration of his assumptions and techniques. The student of general political attitudes and behavior, and election time participation in particu-

lar, will probably find Steiner's rudimentary theory of political participation to be another small step forward on the way to a general theory of participation.—PAUL J. CASSIDY, *University of Denver*.

Nation-Building and Community in Israel. By DOROTHY WILNER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 478. \$10.00.)

Israel like many other new States became a state before it became a society. In the making of that society an extensive program of rural land settlement was carried out, designed to integrate new settlers into the social structure and to teach them the values of society. The program was carried out by a series of interlocked public land settlement agencies that attempted to make farmers out of immigrants with no background in farming. Unlike the pre-statehood villages, they lacked the ideology of land settlement that the early pioneers had. Yet, land settlement government officials made of these early pioneer villages models that new settlers were expected to emulate. The relationship between the public bureaucracy and three villages that were set up to settle immigrants from Asia and North America are the subjects of the book.

Anthropologist Dorothy Wilner has given us an excellent analysis of rural development in the state of Israel in the first decade of its development. Israel has always shown some unique aspects of political development. The State began as a political movement before it acquired territorial base. Once on the land, Israel proceeded to convert a predominantly middle class people into a rural farming population and urban proletariat. Trade unionism as a movement was transplanted from Eastern and Central Europe and flourished as an ideology before a working class emerged. But of all these, the establishment of a class of farmers, which was not in the tradition of the people, was the most unique transformation. The social units of rural settlement assume importance as vehicles of social, political and economic integration. Among rural developments the Kibbutz as a type of organization has been studied; but other types of rural settlement, for example, Moshvei Ovdim, have received less attention.

Moshvei Olim were villages set up by the government to settle new immigrants on the land. The Moshav Ovdim was a hybrid form of rural settlement, representing a mixture of cooperative marketing and purchasing, common insurance and village credit while leaving a good deal of autonomy of the individual about production and consumption. The family is the basic unit in the Moshav organization, which tried to achieve a balance of family freedom and cooperative endeavor.

For reasons more ideological (the return to the land was not without a Physiocratic mystique), groups of immigrants from the Atlas Mountains in Morocco, who had not been farmers were settled on the land and trained to be farmers. It is open to question as to whether the acculturation of these immigrants was facilitated or accelerated by making farmers of former tradesmen and craftsmen from a simple, isolated culture. The problems of acculturation of these families in the Moshav and the tensions which arose with government administrations are discussed in this book.

For political scientists one of the values of this study lies in the emphasis given to the role of political movements and political parties as instruments of legitimation. It was because village settlers were identified with movements and parties that they became motivated to accept their transformation into farmers. Students of new nations will welcome this study, which illustrates how one sector of society, land settlement passed through a phase when it was conducted by social movements, then entered a phase controlled by party organizations and finally, came under the aegis of the government. The bureaucratization of hitherto voluntary sectors became the mechanism for social integration. The operation of land settlement bureaucracy also illustrates some of the problems of center and periphery which have concerned students of political development. This is a finely wrought work, with a richness of insight and detail that merits high scholarly commendation. Regrettably, it suffers from an awkwardness of style that robs it of greater "life," when the subject itself is so "alive." This work deserves close attention from students of political and social change in the new nations.—LESTER G. SELIGMAN, *University of Oregon*.

Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power. EDITED BY MAX HAYWARD AND WILLIAM G. FLETCHER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 200. \$6.50.)

Once firmly in power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was never able to tolerate the existence of organized opposition for both ideological and practical reasons. After all, the legitimacy of one-party rule derived from the party's interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. Moreover, the party's thorough grasp on power was ensured and perpetuated through a consistent application of the principle of democratic centralism not only to the party but to virtually all other officially sanctioned organizations in Soviet society.

Yet, for a variety of reasons, and however reluctantly, the party found it advisable to establish an uneasy *modus vivendi* with the various orga-

nized religions in the country, all of which were in fundamental disagreement with the party's world outlook and some of which were organized upon principles very far removed from democratic centralism. In the heyday of Stalin's rule, therefore, a compromise arrangement was worked out whereby much of the earlier pressure was taken off the religious bodies in return for their submission to a measure of formal governmental control.

The collection of articles presently under review analyzes the post-Stalin era in terms of what seems to be the following argument: The painfully obvious ideological vacuum created in the Soviet Union over the past decade or so has in turn given rise to a good deal of intellectual ferment and some nationalist stirrings, both of which have often included taking a favorable attitude toward religion. Just how the party will finally cope with that at least worrisome and potentially explosive congruence of forces constitutes the dilemma of power.

An introductory essay describes the general socio-political setting by neatly summing up the major institutional, attitudinal, generational and foreign policy challenges to which the party has had to respond since Stalin's death because of pressures for change arising from within and outside of the Soviet Union. The very titles of the initial essays succinctly suggest the line of analysis and the thematic concerns growing out of the above considerations: "The Declining Role of Ideology and the Dissent," "Spiritual Elements in Recent Soviet Literature," and "Religious Ferment among Soviet Intellectuals."

In the ensuing articles attention is given to individual organized religions starting with an amazingly terse history of Russian Orthodox-State relations. Then follows a fascinating examination of the relatively recent split within the Baptist church occasioned by an unwillingness on the part of some members to tolerate the price paid by that denomination in making the earlier compromise with the State—in effect, State interference and control. A similar problem is next looked at within the Russian Orthodox context, where a much smaller manifestation of protest centered on the subservience of that body's leaders to the powers that be. Needless to say, such demands for subsystem autonomy strike at the very root of the party's concept of its role and function, so it comes as no surprise that the Baptist dissenters were imprisoned and the Orthodox protesters were disciplined by their church superiors for treading upon such dangerous ground.

Zvi Gitelman's contribution is entitled, "The Jewish Question." The focus here is almost entirely on religious observance, and it becomes convincingly clear that the practicing Jew suffers greater

disabilities than any other believer as a result of the evidently discriminatory manner in which Soviet religious policy is administered. Of them all, this article is the most pessimistic with regard to prospects for the future inasmuch as Prof. Gitelman feels that the Jewish religious battle was lost as far back as the 1920's, in other words, even before the already noted compromise was worked out.

The last two pieces, dealing with the Caucasus and the regions where Islam predominates, zero in on the complex relationship of religion and nationalism there and anticipate a lengthy prolongation of the far from dismal status quo as far as religion is concerned. This brace of essays is suggestive of the serious analytical and heuristic problems posed by the dearth of a substantial literature on the Soviet nationality question in general.

The latter point conveniently leads into an overall evaluation of the book. While the earlier treatments of religion-State relations in the Soviet Union are either dated or rather narrow in their analytical purview, this volume is very up to date (dealing as it does largely with the 1960's) and is hopefully the first of many monographs to apply an interdisciplinary approach to the subject. In part, of course, that approach is but a reflection of the increasingly complex context in which the Soviet religious communities have come to find themselves over the past fifteen or so years.

In this volume one finds the beginning of a sociology of religion in an anti-religious State which nevertheless advocates a secular religion of its own. It will be interesting to see what kind of result will issue from this rather strange mix—
RICHARD M. MILLS, *Fordham University*.

Migrants in Europe: Problems of Acceptance and Adjustment. By ARNOLD M. ROSE. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969, Pp. 194. \$7.50.)

The ultimate achievement of the political integration of Western Europe will depend not merely upon the reaching of agreements among statesmen but upon the willingness of the people of each of the composite states to accept the inhabitants of the other states as fellow citizens rather than as foreigners. In this posthumously published work, a foremost sociologist explores the impact—negative and positive—that the recent interstate migration of European workers is having upon European integration. In doing so, he tests three postulates concerning the ingredients of successful integration. He hypothesizes that successful integration (1) is directly correlated with the relative openness of the host society as manifested in the policies of its government, businesses, unions, and voluntary associations, (2) is inversely correlated with

the degree of attachment that the migrant feels toward the society he has left, and (3) is directly correlated with the degree of similarity between the cultures of the states of immigration and emigration. The author systematically introduces a great deal of data reflecting on each of the above, and, on the basis of comparative performance, assigns to each state a weighted value. He concludes that the first correlation is proven, but that numbers two and three are not.

No reader will be more aware than was Professor Rose of the questionability of many of the indices that he employs. On a number of occasions he acknowledges the lack of precise data and the subjectivity involved in the assigning of weighted values. He clearly considered his work exploratory, not definitive, and he carefully conditioned his statements throughout. Yet, perhaps precisely because of the author's impeccable integrity in drawing attention to the absence of directly pertinent data and to the often resulting need for arbitrariness, there is—at least in the mind of this reviewer—some doubt concerning the validity of approaching the subject so quantitatively.

One example of the lack of directly pertinent data involves measuring the openness or receptivity of the host society. The author related a society's openness to policies of various organizations, and yet he noted that the key element is not a matter of policy but of what he termed "the true opinion" that the host population popularly harbors toward minorities. Many might therefore have been tempted to rely on attitudinal surveys. But Professor Rose, with insight acquired through many years of analyzing minority problems, presents a trenchant critique of the validity of such polls and concludes that "the distinction between attitudes and behavior occurs in most areas of life, and not least in the public attitude toward minority groups." He therefore falls back upon policies as an index of societal receptivity. The danger is that while policies and programs may reflect "true opinion" and public behavior (and vice versa), they need not. Indeed, as Professor Rose points out in the case of the Netherlands, "true opinion" and policies may point in opposite directions.

An example of the danger of assigning weighted values based upon subjective considerations is offered in the matter of assessing the effect that similarities between one's former and present cultural environment will exert upon adaption. After noting that most European migrants came from predominantly Catholic cultures, the author assumes that a host state which is nearly totally Catholic will offer the least problem to integration, while a state that is nearly totally Protestant will offer the greatest problem. The former assertion may be true and the latter false. As indicated by the case

of Switzerland, the greatest friction may well occur within states which are relatively balanced, and in which an influx therefore materially affects the state's overall composition.

It might also be noted that Switzerland furnishes significant evidence that integration is related to the degree of cultural similarity between the states of immigration and emigration. Thus, it is the German areas of Switzerland from which have come the loudest demands for severe limitations upon the number of foreigners. By contrast, the French-speaking Swiss have apparently perceived no threat of similar magnitude in the presence of their fellow Latins from Italy and the Iberian Peninsula.

But in any event, quite aside from methodology, there is much to recommend this work. The author has compiled an impressive amount of data on immigration and emigration policies, statistics, and attitudes. He has much of wisdom to say concerning the reinforcing matters of acceptance by the local people and the adjustment of the newcomer, the pertinence of which is not limited to Europe. Particularly incisive are his comments concerning the nature and importance of "decompression chambers" (i.e., institutions which permit the immigrant to make the transition from one culture to another in a number of small steps). His forementioned distinction between attitude and behavior, and his forthright treatment of the xenophobic traits of various European people should not be overlooked by anyone interested in nationalism.

As to the larger question which was raised by the book—What impact has interstate migration had upon a common European identity?—the author did not find any substantial willingness to think of the migrant as a fellow citizen, although he did find substantial distinctions in this regard between, for example, the Dutch and the Germans. Moreover, he did not feel that migration had increased hostility but had slightly decreased it. Looking to the future he opined that "integration and acceptance among Europeans, to the extent that it exists among Americans, will probably not occur without substantially more political and economic integration backed by cooperative intergovernmental policies." The belief that integration will follow closer economic and political ties is fully compatible with the prevailing thesis of the relationship between nationalism and social communication and will therefore be shared by many. However, even within those states which fall within the purview of this book there are data that cast doubt upon the contention. Is not a contrary trend indicated by the increasingly particularist orientation of the Scottish and Welsh people of the United Kingdom; the Bretons of France;

e Flemish of Belgium; the French-speaking people of Berne in Switzerland; the Basques, Galicians, and Catalonians of Spain; the German-speaking South Tyrolians of Italy (who recently on important concessions); and the Slovenes, Croats, and Shiptars of Yugoslavia? In terms of factor analysis, it would seem that the more powerful force is away from the multinational polity. WALKER CONNOR, *Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute*.

migrazione e comportamento politico. BY STEFANO PASSIGLI. (Bologna: Società Editrice Il Mulino, 1969. Pp. 251. L. 4,000.)

A significant development has been the creation of multilateral treaties for a variety of purposes. Many of these agreements have provided for the difficult goal of European integration and consequently, certain aspects of life in the member nations have been modified. In Italy one result has been a new type of emigration, substantially different from the traditional pattern toward other European nations, which particularly evolved in the early 1960's.

Professor Passigli's main objective is to evaluate the political implications of this population flow and especially its impact on the political behavior of the migrants and their basic attitudes toward national politics, as well as toward those of the host society and the nascent European community. In affirming his goal to formulate hypotheses worthy for research the author notes certain limits of his study such as the lack of a scientific literature, the difficulty of adequately quantifying the various aspects of the migrations, and the difficulty of identifying significant elements of the political behavior of a heterogeneous social aggregate. In order to differentiate this new type of population movement the author develops a typology which takes into account several variables and dividing distinguished between traditional transoceanic emigration, traditional European emigration, internal emigration, periodic (seasonal) emigration and new European emigration, Professor Passigli discusses the major characteristics of each of these classifications in a historical perspective. The focus of his analysis—i.e. the new European emigration—is unique in that as a movement it is less directed toward France and more toward Germany and Switzerland. It is more southern in origin, younger and, for the most part, wholly masculine. Also it may be characterized as mobile, heterogeneous and urban oriented.

The point of interest for the author is not as much the political behavior of the migrants itself as much as the influence that migration—a consequence of the process of European integration—exerts on political behavior. Migrant political be-

havior is taken as an indication of the influence which the process of community formation has on political phenomenon at the European level. In order to carry out his intentions Professor Passigli deems it opportune to examine in detail three elements: electoral behavior, political and associational participation, and values and attitudes, particularly toward the host society.

Traditional notions equate the migrants' vote with the Communist vote and it is assumed that the population flow is the cause of this phenomenon. The author discards this claim by showing that there is no direct correlation between emigration and the Communist vote and that the Communist Party vote has increased less in zones of emigration than in the rest of the country. He attributes the augment in the Communist vote to other causes such as rapid social and economic transformation caused by industrialization and other concomitant factors. Thus he hypothesizes that this vote is an expression of earlier tendencies and a gain for all parties of the left.

The migrants take with them the traditional Italian low level of participation. Concerning political and associational participation it is claimed that politically homogeneous groups accept politics as an element of the group culture while politically divided groups express the opposite attitude. However, it is not enough to accept traditional concepts. It is necessary to extend the study of political behavior to include an analysis of fundamental attitudes and values. In an examination of studies in this field concerned with internal migration the author claims that the conclusions can be applied to the new European emigration with some reservations. There is a substantial acceptance of the new culture and, in a sense, a type of pre-socialization can be identified.

There are certain major hypotheses that emerge from this work. First of all, the population flow toward European countries is not homogeneous. Emigration does not generate a radical modification of the political behavior of this group, but merely reinforces prior tendencies. This is especially evident in a consideration of electoral behavior. Orientation toward the political realm reflects heterogeneity and participation through small groups. There are also causes for different political behavior and these especially influence the basic orientation toward politics. Bearing in mind all of these factors the author hypothesizes a series of relationships.

As for interactions with the new culture occupational roles and the extent of permanence in large concerns influence extensively the integration process. Lastly, it may be claimed that there is no direct relationship between political behavior and the degree of acceptance of the new culture.

Therefore, radical political behavior is not directly attributed to the fact of emigration, but it is compatible with a substantial acceptance of cultural values of the host society. In conclusion, the author recognizes that these hypotheses are plausible in varying degrees and that further work is necessary in this too little known field.

It seems that Professor Passigli might have given more depth and breadth to his perspective. He speaks of rapid transformation in Italy and a net gain for all parties of the left. Yet he does not place his subject-matter in the conceptual framework of the arrival of social democracy in Italy, nor does he deal with the *Centro-sinistra* governmental experiment. Also he might have discussed the historical and other reasons which explain the low level of political and associational participation in Italy.

It takes the author quite awhile to arrive at the heart of his study and, in many instances, throughout the work he shows a propensity to overquote (for example, pp. 214-225). His text is burdened with long and tedious footnotes (which, if so important, should have been included in the text) and tables which might have been incorporated into an appendix. The author shows familiarity with the literature in English as well as in Italian. Unfortunately, the citations in many cases contain errors in form as well as content and in a few instances, the author relies too heavily on the authority of basic textbooks. In spite of these shortcomings Professor Passigli has broken ground in a most significant and fertile field.—SONDRA Z. KOFF, *State University of New York at Binghamton*.

Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development 1899-1956. BY MUDDATHIR 'ABD AL-RAHIM. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 275. \$8.75.)

The Sudan has always been something of an anomaly. Although an Arab state, only about a third of the Sudanese claim Arab descent and barely half speak Arabic as their mother tongue. It has never been a focal point of either Arab or Islamic history. As a result, the Middle Eastern scholar tends either to ignore the Sudan altogether, or relegate that country to the periphery of his intellectual interests. The student of Black Africa, however, takes note of the Arab-Islamic character of the Sudanese political culture and immediately shifts his attention elsewhere. The largest country in Africa, therefore, has received scant attention from political scientists, particularly American. Fortunately, the British and now the Sudanese, themselves, are publishing a few worthwhile studies on the Sudan. This book, written by the head

of the political science department of the University of Khartoum, is one such example. Concisely written, well organized, and thoroughly documented, Al-Rahim's book is a revealing case study of British imperialism in East Africa. As a Sudanese, Al-Rahim is naturally biased; but the evidence he presents is overwhelming—British rule in the Sudan was self-seeking, mendacious, and exasperatingly paternalistic.

After a brief, but adequate, introduction covering the geographical and demographic features of the Sudan, Al-Rahim examines carefully the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899. To the author, it is totally incorrect to call this a "Condominium Agreement." The question of sovereignty over the Sudan was not mentioned in the 1899 agreement and Egyptian participation in Sudan's government was always a function of British, not Egyptian, policy. In fact, "by 1932 Egypt seemed finally to have withdrawn [from the Sudan] (115)." Of course, Sudan's future relationship with her northern neighbor would dominate Sudan's politics right up to the day of her independence. But Great Britain, not Egypt, was the unqualified colonial power in Khartoum.

The most unfortunate byproduct of British colonial rule, according to Al-Rahim, was the infamous "Southern Policy" introduced by the British to keep southern Sudan separate from the Arab north. In fact, the author argues that Sudan's current difficulties in the southern region stem in large part from the implementation of this policy. Instead of integrating the south with the north, the British forbade Islamic and Arabic studies from the southern schools, favored Christian over Islamic missionaries, and fostered economic and administrative decentralization throughout the southern region (70-83).

While Britain was supporting this separatist policy in the south, she gave support to a policy of "Sudan for the Sudanese" in the north (in this case to weaken Egyptian influence in Khartoum). Thus British policy was to (a) separate Sudan from Egypt (b) foster Sudanese unity as a countervailing force to union with Egypt and (c) encourage separatism of southern Sudan from the northern provinces!

When the Sudanese national movement did emerge, it did so, therefore with considerable British support. As Al-Rahim writes, the task for the British was "to implement its policy of separating the country from Egypt and, at the same, demonstrate to Egypt and the world that this was in accordance with the wishes of the Sudanese people" (98).

If any party is responsible for the development of an indigenous "Sudan for the Sudanese" movement, however, it appears to have been

Egypt, rather than either Great Britain or the Sudanese nationalists. The refusal of Egyptian troops to support their Sudanese colleagues in the abortive revolt of 1924, the weakness exhibited by Egyptian nationalists when confronting the British in the inter-war period, Egypt's role as willing party to the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Nile Waters Agreement, and then, later, Nasser's policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood, his dismissal of half Sudanese Naguib, and Nasser's suppression of Egyptian communists all combined to strengthen the independence movement even, eventually, including Ismail al-Azhari, Sudan's first Prime Minister and leader of the National Unionist Party.

It was the threat of the Axis Powers, however, that moved Great Britain to begin decolonization in the Sudan. Much of Al-Rahim's book is taken up with this development, particularly with the establishment and operation of the Advisory Council and its successor, the Legislative Assembly. The book concludes with the formal transfer of power to an independent Sudan. An additional forty one pages is devoted to nine appendices and a select bibliography.

This reviewer finds no fault with this book, *insofar as it goes*. It is not a study of political development, of course, but who is to quibble over a sub-title? Originally a doctoral thesis for the University of Manchester, the study is to be praised as indicative of Al-Rahim's craftsmanship and scholarly ability.

The weakness of the book lies in the lack of any real theoretical or comparative effort. While this was not Al-Rahim's stated purpose, this reviewer feels it incumbent on any political scientist to write as a political scientist, which, since Aristotle anyway, has involved comparison. What is the comparison of the Sudanese Ansari to the Libyan Sanusiyyah? Was the British "Southern Policy" in the Sudan comparable to the 1930 French-imposed Berber *dahir*? In terms of both of the above sentences what theoretical propositions may one derive to the role of religious movements in politics, or the effects of divide and rule colonial policies? Only in a footnote (2, p. 133) does Al-Rahim venture into the comparative realm. Even here, however, the reader can only squeeze out of the author the meager and well-trod statement, "it seems that there is in fact a high degree of correlation between traditional patterns of allegiance and in the Sudan but throughout the Middle East" modern-type movements and associations not only (134). Al-Rahim has built a firm base. Now the question is, can he build upon it?—RICHARD H. PRAFF, *University of Colorado*.

The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries.

By CHARLES K. WILBER. (Chapel Hill: The Uni-

versity of North Carolina Press. 1969. Pp. 241. \$7.50.)

In his preface, Wilber announces that he has written a book about economic development. But with the further indication that he has sought to analyze the strategy of development followed by the Soviet Union, it becomes clear that this work is really concerned with the complex amalgam of economic, political, and social forces which go into a national development program. He early expresses the hope that "the Soviet experience will provide some useful lessons, both negative and positive, for policy-makers in underdeveloped countries."

The first half of the volume identifies the Soviet model of development. That he is using the term "model" only in the sense of a rough abstraction is evident from his disclaimer: "Because the very essence of economic development is rapid and discontinuous change in institutions and the value of economic parameters, it is impossible to construct a rigorous and determinate model of the process." But he insists that the model he has found, far from being an irrational construct of Marxist theorists, "does in fact possess a definite economic rationale. He describes this Soviet model as one opening a new chapter in world economic history—"the era of forced economic growth in agriculturally overpopulated countries."

Wilber gives early attention to the element of social change essential to the Soviet model of development, and notes that the USSR was successful in establishing the necessary institutions to bring about this social change. He credits the Soviet system with great accomplishment in developing facilities for education, health, and social services. In assessing the social cost of such developments, he notes that there may have been over five million deaths in the ruthless collectivization of agriculture, and the famine which resulted. While critical of this program, he reminds us that even in the United States there has been high human cost associated with economic development: he contends that in the nineteenth century solution of the problem of the American Indian who stood in the way of capitalist expansion, "a policy that can only be called genocide was embarked upon," and for good measure he also reminds us of the high human cost in the institution of Negro slavery.

The Soviet strategy of development from the beginning singled out industry as the leading sector in the program, which led to minimizing investment in agriculture. This strategy became one of "dual technology," in which certain key sectors used to the maximum the most advanced technologies available, while auxiliary operations in the field of industry made greater use of available labor, thus saving scarce capital in the total pro-

gram. Wilbur notes here the heavy emphasis upon vocational and technical training, in the formation of "human capital."

The second half of the book is concerned with the application of the Soviet model to the development of Soviet Central Asia—the five republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan. It is undoubtedly true that these Asian portions of the Soviet Union had, in 1928, all of the characteristics of an underdeveloped area. And the statistical evidence cited also supports the conclusion that the subsequent "development of Central Asia by the Soviet regime is an excellent example of substantial economic development produced quickly and under governmental auspices." But this reviewer has difficulty finding *this* experience very relevant to the development problems found in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for whom it presumably is being cited as an application of the Soviet model of development.

The Soviet Central Asian development experience discussed in detail took place under the direct sponsorship of the national government of the Soviet Union, and so involved the complex structures of a powerful, developed state in dealing with its remaining frontier areas. It may be hardly more relevant to the vast problems of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, than would be a study of the economic development of Alaska, Puerto Rico, West Virginia, and other underdeveloped portions of the United States. The story Wilbur tells is an interesting one, but it may tell very little to the "Underdeveloped Countries" which form the second part of his title. After all, central ministries in Moscow bring to bear quite different forces in development than are possible in Jakarta, Lagos or Brasilia.

With this major reservation, one can understand Wilbur's conclusion that his study has shown that "the Soviet model provides an alternative (to capitalist development) which is not only feasible for underdeveloped countries, but also possibly attractive to their leaders." In pointing out questions for further investigation, he feels the most important of these is whether it has to be a Communist party that operates the Soviet model. His tentative conclusion is that "A halfway democratic socialist regime could probably supply whatever compulsion was necessary to implement the model."

More intriguing are his questions in the area of what this all implies for U.S. foreign policy. Should the United States accept social revolution in the underdeveloped world? "Or is the Alliance for Progress approach of evolutionary reform and capitalist development more in the long-run interest of the United States and the peoples of the world?" George Lodge and others have begun to

wrestle with these important questions, in recent articles and books. The Wilbur book is strongly recommended background reading for such inquiry.—VERNON L. FERWERDA, *Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute*.

Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics. EDITED BY GHITA IONESCU AND ERNEST GELLNER. (New York: Macmillan. 1969. Pp. 263. \$6.95.)

In early stages of modernization the rise of a central authority is accomplished at the expense of inherited intermediary authority, as men transfer loyalty from the latter to the nation. The new political center in turn presses for their emancipation from corporate tutelage. Reflecting this process the ideology of nationalization glorifies the little man in his new equality, damning the old feudal shackles. Since societies undergoing this phase are still mainly agrarian, the model citizen is the yeoman and agrarian reform is usually the battle-cry and often also a fact.

Early economic development is served by political development, but subsequently conflicts with these early needs. Industrialization makes some little men economically autonomous, but many more become "wage-slaves"; many are threatened and even wiped out by "modern feudalities," the new corporate powers of finance and manufacturing. Since it is simple folk whom such distant abstractions jeopardize, conspiratorial explanations of their calamity naturally arise. Nostalgia for a pristine rural (though not feudal) past is aired. Conceiving "interests" are contrasted with the "people," good and undifferentiated. Little men look to their historical ally, the central government, for relief and salvation. Not opposed to capitalism, so much as to overbearing private power; oriented toward the central government, but still addicted to the nativism and parochialism of simple folk; these men are on a left-right political see-saw, sliding both ways, though remaining ambiguous in these conventional terms to the end.

This strain between political and economic development was broadly manifested in early nineteenth century Western Europe, particularly in France, taking the historical forms of Radicalism and even Socialism, under Proudhon, Ledru-Rollin, and other far from obscure spokesmen. In fact, by mid-century, something of a "Radical international" already existed, possessing a common ideological language and symbolism, even in the New World. Unfortunately for social science, historiography discovered "populism" only in the 1860's and in Russia—of all places—where intellectuals, not little people, reacted to economic development (and ideological reactions to it) abroad, not at home. Rediscovered once again in an offshoot set-

ting, though in a more authentic form otherwise, later in North America, populism came into use in ever more adumbrated manner in this century, to denote almost any popular assertion in politics, from Peronism to Maoism and negritude and beyond.

Probing the conceptual meaning of such a term would be difficult under any circumstances, and especially so if the historical prototypes are lodged in somewhat esoteric variants of the real thing. The contributors to *Populism* do rather well under the latter circumstances. The first five contributions are studies of specific historical variants; they illuminate such phenomena as the Greenback and Granger movements (Richard Hofstadter); "urban populism" in contemporary Latin America (Alistair Hennessy); *Narodnichestvo* (Andrzej Walicki); Eastern Europe's *peasantism* (Ghița Ionescu); and post-independence African politics (John Saul). If these studies do not much encourage broader conceptualization, the remaining five essays do just that, on various levels of abstraction and from several theoretical perspectives. As ideology, populism is conceived as assertions by predominantly agricultural segments of society, threatened by modernization, of faith in community and *Volk* against elites (Donald MacRae). From a basic premise, that "virtue resides in the simple people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions," are extrapolated a number of traits commonly found in many creeds and movements termed populist (Peter Wiles). As a political movement, populism appears as expressive of "a collective awareness of disadvantage in relation to wealth," the point about the location of populist movements being not that they are rural, but that they are peripheral to economic power (Kenneth Minogue). The various forms of populism are similarly seen to have in common an "encounter between a small-producer social order and the superior power of large scale (usually capitalist) industry and commerce (Peter Worsley, who keenly suspects that historians may indeed have made rather arbitrary terminological choices in this area). An analysis of the social roots of populism discovers "a unity of situations" in recurrent patterns of social relationships. "Populism emerges as a response to the problems posed by modernization and its consequences. These problems are most importantly those of economic development and of political authority . . . [It] derives its particular character from two such tensions . . . the tension between backward countries and more advanced ones, and . . . the tension between developed and backward parts of the same country" (Angus Stewart). With insights like these, how much longer can arbitrary historical models of populism obscure the truly

classic ones?—GIL CARL ALROY, *Hunter College of the City University of New York*.

Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations. By E. J. B. ROSE AND ASSOCIATES (London, Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 815. \$12.50.)

Readers on this side of the Atlantic have been made very much aware of the fact that there exists a color problem in Britain. The strictures of Enoch Powell, the Conservative Member of Parliament, racial disturbances and more recently, the plight of Asians from East Africa, attempting to immigrate to England, have all contributed to this general awareness. What also may have caught the eyes of the general reader were the specific policies of the British with respect to non-white citizens of the Commonwealth: namely the Commonwealth Immigrants Bills of 1962 and 1968 which virtually put an end to the entry of non-white citizens of the Commonwealth.

Now a huge tome, the product of five years of research has made its appearance, describing and analyzing the entire racial problem in Britain. Published under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, London, the Report is written by E. J. B. Rose, former Director of the International Press Institute at Zurich, who is "fully acquainted with the English scene," in association with eight British scholars. It must be said here and now that the Report is a landmark in the study of British race relations, and is for Britain what Gunnar Myrdal's, *An American Dilemma* was to the United States. In fact, the authors have admitted to finding Myrdal's approach "appropriate" for their study although the situations in Britain and the United States were not identical.

Whatever differences may prevail historically and otherwise between the racial situation in the United States and Britain, a striking similarity can be noted in both countries, namely, the gap between theory and practice which constitutes the dilemma. In the case of the United States, the contradictions of the American Creed, espousing the liberty and equality of men enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, and the unequal treatment meted out to black people; in the British case, "the tension between the ethic of fairness embedded in our culture and system of law and the failure to live up to those standards in practice" (p. 11)—of course, again involving non-whites at the receiving end.

Although possessing thirty-three chapters divided into nine parts with four sections—(a) a de-bok falls basically into four sections—(a) a description of the host society into which the immigrants are about to enter (b) the description of the sending societies, the history of the migrations

and their development within Britain (c) the interaction of the British and immigrant communities and finally (d) the recommendations of the report which the authors hope will be converted into public policy.

The sending societies are the west Indies, including Guyana, India, Pakistan, and West Africa. Contrary to the general hue and cry from certain quarters in Britain that that country was being deluged by non-white peoples, the Report indicates that at mid-1968, there was a shade over a million immigrants, a word that has increasingly come to bear the connotation "coloured" in Britain, and predicts a total of two million by 1986. That the volume lays to rest many misconceptions on the part of the host society, is one of its merits. Even more meritorious is the wealth of hard data presented, especially in the areas of housing, employment and education. The weight of the data so illuminates the plight of non-whites immigrants in a white society that the report might well have been sub-titled, "A Chronology on the Suffering of Non-White Peoples."

Of special interest to American social scientists would be the attempt to measure the incidence of prejudice against non-whites in Britain. Four attitudinal questions were provided to respondents in five local government units known to contain relatively large proportions of colored Commonwealth immigrants. One question dealt with avoidance of immigrant neighbors, two with the denial of renting private and public housing to immigrants, and the final question asked respondents if they felt superior, equal, or inferior to colored people in Britain. Respondents who gave non-hostile answers on all four questions were classified as tolerant; those with one non-hostile reply, tolerant-inclined; those with two hostile replies, prejudiced inclined; and those with three or four hostile replies, prejudiced. The final tabulation according to this measurement, found 10% prejudiced, 17% prejudiced-inclined, 38% tolerant-inclined, and 35% tolerant.

When this Report appeared in *The London Times* of July 10, 1969, it carried the headline: "Only 10% have strong prejudice" as if to congratulate British society on its 'fairplay.' Even the authors of the volume fall into the error of placing too much faith in quantitative measurements of this type by stating that government's policies should be fashioned to concentrate on the 55%—those prejudiced-inclined and tolerant inclined. The authors should have been more aware of the gap after separating attitudes from acts. Non-whites are concerned with acts and the seemingly inspiring percentages are not likely to impress them. This is so because non-whites are more concerned with the problems of everyday existence, and experience tells them that the percentages

and their experiences are incompatible.

The authors' recommendations are manifold and in the best intentions—among them integration as the goal (equality of opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity); special training for individuals dealing with non-whites, e.g. policemen, social workers; more assumption of powers by the central government; a clearer policy distinguishing immigration policy from race relations; etc. Lack of space prevents detailed comment on these recommendations but the success of any policies must be influenced by the actions of the non-whites, since the latter (like many elsewhere) have decided to take their destiny into their hands. A criticism of the Report, therefore, is that it is another case of well-intentioned white liberals making recommendations for non-whites as if the latter were inert masses.

As the Report is an indispensable reference work in the area of race relations, its bibliography could have been amplified and made more convenient by including those references at the end of each chapter. In addition a glossary of terms for the host of abbreviations of British organizations and committees would have been most useful, especially for American readers. American scholars will find the work of vital importance as a comparative reference in the study of race relations.

Although this reviewer cannot share the authors' guarded optimism about the solution of Britain's racial problems, it cannot be denied that by presenting the facts of the case to the British public, this book has stimulated serious debate. It is hoped that it is not to become an ornament on the mantel-piece like its American counterpart.—BASIL A. INCE, *University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez*.

A Tibetan Principality: The Political System of Sa sKya. BY C. W. CASSINELLI AND ROBERT EK-VALL (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 425. \$15.00.)

This revealing book goes into great detail describing the government of Sa sKya, which was, prior to the Chinese Communist takeover in 1950, a politically autonomous unit of about 16,000 people in the western-central section of Tibet. The primary source of material for this volume was obtained through interviews with four influential Tibetans who were intimately involved with both the political and social life of Sa sKya. This work deals primarily with the structure of the Sa sKya government and its policy. It demonstrates how the political phenomena within the country was correlated with the environment within which it occurred.

For historical background, the authors trace events from the invasion of Tibet by the grandson

of Ghenghis Khan in 1239 up to 1950. Throughout the polity's entire history, the authors clearly demonstrate that the Sa sKya society and governmental structure remained unchanged even as the rest of the world began to modernize. By quickly touching on the geographic characteristics of Sa sKya, the authors show that the governmental power was based on its subjects' acquiescence, and facilitated by the small size of the domain. The beliefs and attitudes of the Sa sKya people are then dealt with as the authors attempt to show that the relationship between the governed and the governors was an integral part of the general belief system of the polity. The average member of the Sa sKya society viewed the government as a force external to society required to maintain harmony. Therefore, Sa sKya may have been typical of societies that have passed the stage where religion and government are identical but have not yet reached the stage where government is recognized as a useful instrument for innovation.

The central government of Sa sKya was rather centralized with a simple structure. It consisted of the ZHabs Pad and the Steward of the Religious Establishment, aided by a number of assistants who had little or no power. The whole system was highly centralized and allowed for only a minimum of innovation. However, it operated successfully because of the modest function assigned to it. On the local level, virtually no official had any measurable power. The only function the local officials served was to bring the concept of government much closer to the people. Be it central or local government that the people had contact with, the average member of the Sa sKya citizenry viewed the basic function of the government as that of maintaining order among subjects who were supposed to take care of themselves.

As the authors move more into the political aspects of the polity, the legal principles and practices of Sa sKya are examined. The legal system had a definite structure. All disputes were handled by the Law Officials. The recurring theme that appears in Sa sKya's body of laws was the life indemnities were to prevent feuds in general. If, however, a dispute did occur, one party would petition the government, and the Law Officers would aid in its settlement.

As mentioned, the ZHabs Pad governed Sa sKya. He had about two dozen assistants and in all his actions he was directly responsible to the KHri CHen. The governmental structure was very autocratic. But the power of the KHri CHen was in a sense limited by such things as Sa sKya's primitive conditions of technology, the people's attitudes towards the government, and the beliefs

held by most of the people. The actual day to day governing was done by the ZHabs Pad. In general, the government was run rather efficiently primarily because it had very little to do anyway. The monasteries of the North and South also comprised another power base within the Sa sKya society. But, for the most part, they left the governmental functions in the capable hands of the KHri CHen and the ZHabs Pad.

The authors also treat such topics as the hereditary nobility found in Sa sKya, different aspects of property and land use and the general condition of the polity's economy. These subjects are dealt with in a comprehensive manner and further provide the reader with an appreciation of the undeveloped condition of Sa sKya.

Governmental policy and power are the last but perhaps the most important subjects covered by this volume. The authors point out that the policy followed by any government include not only the actions it takes but also those that it does not take. The political leaders of Sa sKya were indifferent to many things of a problematic nature such as expressions of ideas and the operation of the economy. Government officials were always fair game for public criticism although little could ever be heard. Indeed, the leaders of this polity were extremely tolerant in many respects. Their main concern appears to have been that the standard policies of the past be continued. But it should be noted that the basic presumption underlying the Sa sKya society that governmental power was to be used sparingly greatly weakened the influence of any political or religious power centre.

The authors are to be complimented for their tedious efforts in amassing the information for this volume. Their hours of untiring interviews have uncovered much interesting and original information concerning the functioning of this undeveloped polity called Sa sKya. Throughout the entire book, the authors have successfully shown how the belief system of Sa sKya, from its metaphysics to its concept of government, implied an acceptance of things as they were. In this respect, the book presents a very readable account of the history of an undeveloped polity. However, the authors still have a host of unanswered questions. For example, would Sa sKya have been able to have leaped or crawled into the twentieth century and still have maintained its belief system; or, was it indeed worthwhile that a polity like Sa sKya should exist as it did for such a long period of time? In this respect, the book must be applauded as an interesting descriptive work but by no means analytical.—PETER S. H. TANG, *Boston College*.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Die anachronistische Souveränität. Ed by ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL. (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969. Pp. 304. DM 30.00.)

This collection of original papers reports on the progress and accomplishment of the international politics work group of the German Political Science Association. The papers are the product of a series of meetings and seminars held between 1966 and 1969 to explore theoretical and empirical aspects of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.

Three articles of a theoretical character open the volume. Klaus Faupel proposes a general systems frame of reference with interactions between nation-states viewed as a system and with those within nation-states viewed as sub-systems. He advocates measuring sub-system characteristics through aggregate indicators which in turn may be used to explain variation in interaction patterns of the international system. Karl Kaiser examines the transnational character of Western society as it has developed since World War II and arrives at the same general hypothesis as Faupel, thus confirming the general tone of the whole volume as suggested by its title: national sovereignty is an inadequate and indeed "anachronistic" concept with which to describe and explain international relations in today's world.

The third theoretical article is the most ambitious and the most controversial of the essays included in the volume. Its author, Klaus Jürgen Gantzel tries to develop a formal mathematical model of arms races based on the work of Lewis F. Richardson and Kenneth Boulding. Fully aware of the limitations and inherent shortcomings of such model building, particularly with regard to the operationalization of some of its more abstract concepts such as level and intensity of hostility, he is convinced that it can nonetheless serve as a meaningful starting point for research by generating empirically testable hypotheses (p. 137).

The remaining papers attempt to apply some of the concepts suggested in these theoretical efforts to specific case studies of the relationship between national and international systems and policies. Gerhard Lehbruch and Gerda Zellentin examine relationships between certain types of political systems and the international context in which they operate. Lehbruch looks at *Konkordanzdemokratien* (democratic political systems where decisions are made not on the basis of majority or party competition but rather cooperative bargaining as in Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium) and comes to the conclusion that the foreign policies of these systems exhibit common characteristics

which can be traced directly to the nature of their domestic decision-making processes. Gerda Zellentin reaches similar conclusions in her study of economic and international interactions among East European communist nations.

The last four contributions deal with various aspects of the interdependency of internal and external policies and policy making. Kurt Tudyka and Peter Seibt examine the impact of interest groups on international embargos in West Germany and the United States, respectively. On a more general level Heino Kaack and Carl Christoph Schweitzer discuss the international interests and relationships of domestic political groups and their impact on foreign affairs in an effort to demonstrate the complexity of the interaction between domestic and foreign policy issues.

The papers contained in this volume are remarkable in many respects. They demonstrate, for example, the extraordinary influence of the American literature in the field on German scholars, as attested by the fact that well over 90% of the citations in the first three articles refer to American publications. At the same time, the volume reveals solid accomplishments in empirical theory and research by a predominantly young group of political scientists in a branch of the discipline that only recently has come into its own at German universities. Finally, the volume shows that sustained cooperation and coordination in research can lead to a homogeneous collection of essays of sufficient quality to contribute significantly to the development of an important branch of the discipline.—GUENTHER F. SCHAEFER, *State University of New York at Binghamton*.

Britain Faces Europe. By ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. Pp. 228. \$6.00.)

Great Britain's role in world politics may have changed drastically since 1945, but she is still accorded "great power" status by political scientists, if the volume of works analyzing and agonizing over her uncertain fortunes in any index. The political science literature on, say, Sino-Soviet relations is somewhat less extensive than that on Britain and the Common Market, a fact that confirms one's suspicion that Britain is still every American political scientist's second country.

Robert Pfaltzgraff's contribution is a workmanlike survey tracing the evolution of British opinion, primarily elite opinion, towards membership in the Common Market. It is a story of early hostility or indifference to the Common Market changing into support for British membership by

the mid-1960's, only to encounter French rebuff. Beyond this specific policy consideration, Pfaltzgraff's aim is to document the manner in which Britain carried out a dramatic reorientation of policy, from the global involvements of the past to concentration upon regional—i.e. European—interests. The evolution of opinion on the Common Market is, in other words, a case study of political reconciliation to middle-power status.

It is a painful story, the general outlines of which are well-known. Pfaltzgraff fills in significant details which point to confusion and even political ineptitude on the part of the political leadership as sharing with Gaullist intransigence the responsibility for the failure of Britain's initial application in 1963. As Pfaltzgraff sees it, Britain's first application for EEC membership was rejected by France because the French Government believed, quite rightly, that British elite and mass opinion was itself divided over the issue of whether to join the Six. Britain's second application was rejected on more strictly economic grounds: Britain's economy contained structural weaknesses that would cause her to be a disadvantage to the Common Market, and British trade patterns, particularly with the Commonwealth countries, were incongruent with her newly avowed role as regional, as opposed to global, power.

Analysis of the complexity of Macmillan's position in the 1957-61 period in attempting to shape public opinion on British participation in the EEC constitutes the most interesting part of Pfaltzgraff's book. Macmillan's position was ambiguous in the extreme. He was forced to argue that Britain's economic health required participation in the EEC in the aftermath of an election victory in 1959 built around the slogan "You never had it so good." If eight years of Conservative rule had so benefitted the economy, why was it suddenly necessary to reverse long-standing foreign and economic policy in order to prevent economic disaster? Macmillan had to develop a favorable British opinion to support his application for membership without, at the same time, giving the Six the impression that Britain was eager to join, which would encourage the Six to stiffen the terms of entry. Finally, Pfaltzgraff shows that elite opinion in Britain had come to support EEC membership partly on the ground that this was a necessary step toward reducing Britain's excessive dependence on the United States. And yet Macmillan's Government applied for membership only after the Kennedy Administration had urged it to do so as part of a change in American priorities. Macmillan was unable to surmount these ambiguities and consequently failed to obtain the decisive support of either British public opinion or of the Six. Indeed, Pfaltzgraff shows that, in the period between

the first application in 1961 and de Gaulle's veto in 1963, British opinion actually became less favorable to joining the EEC.

The failure of the application of the Wilson Government is less dramatic; what surprises one is that the application should have been made in the first place, in view of Labour's greater ideological hostility to the EEC and its insistence on conditions regarding agricultural policy that were even more beneficial to Britain than those requested by the Tories. From Pfaltzgraff's account, it appears that Wilson, desperately seeking a solution to Britain's by now critical economic woes, vainly hoped that verbal criticism of U.S. policy would allay de Gaulle's suspicion of Anglo-Saxons.

Pfaltzgraff, in his last paragraph, indirectly identifies Britain's failure to gain admission to the EEC as a failure of leadership. Unfortunately, his case study lacks the focus that might make this observation theoretically interesting. No general analysis of leadership in Britain, or in democratic systems more broadly considered, is offered. *Britain Faces Europe* is a case study that illustrates or tests no explicit theory either of leadership, opinion formation, international integration, the politics of negotiation, or any other relevant dimension of the subject. The existence of some relevant formulations (those of Haas, Deutsch, etc.) is acknowledged in the preface and then ignored.

The reader is also disappointed in Pfaltzgraff's exclusive reliance on documents and secondary sources. Since so much of his volume concerns the formation and change of political attitudes, survey analysis using interviews would seem appropriate.

Moreover, Pfaltzgraff considers the politics of the Common Market decision without relation to other aspects of British political life. This gives an abstract quality to the discussion and even leads to some inaccurate statements. For example, he asserts (page 202) that "The study of British Common Market attitudes reveals the absence of mass involvement or interest in the re-evaluation of Britain's international position." But this period was also the heyday of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the largest mass movement in twentieth century Britain—a movement concerned explicitly with the re-evaluation of Britain's international position.

Finally, the style of the book is pedestrian. Wordy tautologies abound. (E.g. "In supporting or opposing Common Market membership, domestic groups sought to enhance, defend, or preserve certain cherished interests and values." Page 202.) The pace is tedious. (Chapters 2, 3, and 4 conclude with nearly identical sentences to the effect that the Macmillan Government faced an unenviable and challenging task in trying to establish public support for its policies. See pages 59, 77, and 115.)

All of which is regrettable, since the subject of Pfaltzgraff's book is inherently interesting and he has done a good deal of research about the details. For those who seek more than details, however, either in the way of theoretical sophistication and insight or in the way of well-written political history, other sources will have to suffice.—FRANK E. MEYERS, *State University of New York at Stony Brook*.

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance.

By ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969. Pp. 216. \$2.45.)

The broad sweep and up to date coverage of this book make it useful as an introduction to the problems of the Atlantic Community. Nevertheless, this breadth, as well as the author's own policy positions, make it desirable to approach it with some care.

Professor Pfaltzgraff attempts to sketch in broad outline the present state of political, military, economic and technological relations between the Atlantic nations. Particular chapters discuss "the crisis of the West," "the strategic 'dissensus,'" "the technology gap," "Atlantic economic relationships," "Eastern Europe and the West," "The United States and Western Europe in the 1970's," and "a new Atlantic relationship." More specifically, the author takes up the connection of national strategic concepts with each other and with the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; hardware and non-hardware solutions to the problem of Allied participation in the control of nuclear weapons; technological disparities, their social and economic causes, and the possibilities of collaboration. He also treats Atlantic patterns of trade, investment, payments, monetary problems, and relations with developing countries; the nature of change in Eastern Europe, exchanges and transactions between East and West, the impact of the Common Market and NATO on East-West contacts, and the state of European integration.

This wide concern brings with it minor penalties in the form of distortions of implication and emphasis. When he says that "the Alliance acquired an integrated command system and supply infrastructure," (p. 40) Pfaltzgraff implies a much broader and deeper scope of hierarchical authority and cooperation than has actually ever existed. Although the Kennedy administration adopted the theory of the "pause," it was hardly responsible for its "introduction," (p. 33) which could be traced at least as far back as General Gruenther's concept of a "cushion of time" and which owed a great deal to the thought of General Norstad. The statements that, "by and large, European strategic

doctrines have not placed great emphasis on the use of conventional forces against a Soviet attack in Europe," (p. 37) and that, "for the most part, the smaller European NATO powers have not found fault with basic U.S. strategic concepts," (p. 49) give short shrift to the European resistance of the mid-1950's to American doctrines of massive retaliation and the possible costs of nuclear warfare in central Europe. Although European positions changed following the Kennedy administration's adoption of the perspective of flexible response, President de Gaulle was not alone in his position that the American government had moved too far in the other direction. While these are matters of a different order and larger magnitude, Pfaltzgraff's attitudes toward Eastern European detente and German reunification are exceedingly cautious.

At a more general level, a major thesis of the book is that many Atlantic disagreements are the result of "Atlantic technological, military, and economic imbalances," (p. 212) with imbalance conceived mainly in terms of disparities in size and dependency relationships. Such imbalances can be largely righted, Pfaltzgraff believes, through a series of expanded Western European and Atlantic institutions which will create a more fitting European partner and bind it to the United States.

These proposals heavily emphasize the areas of political and military affairs, armaments, and defense technology. For this reason it may be doubted that they can carry the burden which Pfaltzgraff lays upon them. As late additions to an already voluminous literature, they contain little which is new, and a number of the Atlantic recommendations have indeed already been tried, in one form or another, in NATO, e.g. "periodic meetings . . . of foreign, defense, and finance ministers" (p. 200) (the NATO Council of Ministers), "NATO operations analysis groups" (p. 199) (various NATO working groups of advisors and experts), a NATO armaments agency and an "Atlantic technological agency" (pp. 195, 203) (the various structures of NATO's armaments and science programs). Such programs have not produced "spill-over." Although the results might be different in the "new Europe," the early fate of EDC, later results in WEU, and the present state of flux in the EEC, all would seem to advise a high degree of caution in moving into what promises to be very rocky territory. As Pfaltzgraff says, "the European integration movement has never stemmed primarily from motivations based upon military considerations." (p. 177) This is true and may well be one of the important factors contributing to the degree of success it has so far enjoyed.

The new institutions, Pfaltzgraff believes, might be assisted by American sharing of advanced tech-

nological knowledge with the European allies. At the same time, however, he urges an increased "European commitment . . . to provide aid and capital to developing areas" (p. 207) and to produce additional defense capability. This seems paradoxical since he presents figures showing that development aid by many European nations is already a higher proportion of Gross National Product than is true for the United States. (p. 104) Furthermore, he takes little account of the fact that, in spite of proportionately larger defense expenditures, a substantial part of American military capability is being used in ways large numbers of Europeans disapprove.

Pfaltzgraff concludes that there has been a "shift of European concern from the alleged Soviet military threat to the industrial-technological-economic challenge supposedly posed by the United States." (p. 70) and that the United States' "most immediate task is to restore European confidence in U.S. leadership." (p. 190) If this is true, then the United States might well turn from policy recommendations with pronounced political-military emphases to larger contributions of resources for modern industrial technology. Without such action, America's allies are likely to take their time in expanding the domain of Atlantic partnership, if not European unification. Given the nature of existing imbalances, the weak may increasingly do as they will while the strong do as they must.—FRANCIS A. BEER, *University of Texas, Austin*.

Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods. BY DAVID O. WILKINSON. (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 191. \$2.95.)

This book is written for the teacher of political science or the graduate student studying to be a teacher. It is the parent-book and key to the "Comparative Foreign Relations Series" edited by David Wilkinson and Lawrence Scheinman and published by the Dickinson Company. Beginning with three books on the foreign relations of the United States, China, and France, a total of nine country studies will eventually appear in the Series, according to the publisher. The book reviewed here consists of an outline, careful adherence to which was intended to make the country studies in the Series both parallel and comprehensive. It is, therefore, a means by which one political scientist can compare notes with others on methods of studying foreign policy and also a means for showing students how to write papers on foreign relations. The author of the first country study in the Series, Michael Armacost (*The Foreign Relations of the United States*) adhered closely to the outline of the editors. But the second one by Robert North (*The Foreign Relations*

of China) departs drastically, which might mean that the information blackout over China made a rigorously parallel volume impossible, but which could also mean that North had had reservations about the utility of Wilkinson's outline.

The study of comparative foreign relations is a valuable but wholly academic or didactic study. Unlike national domestic policies which governments have the sovereign capability to implement, national foreign policies are often more expressions of hope later to be gratified or nullified by the actions of other sovereign states. And so study of foreign policy is by nature incomplete; it is a study of questions, not answers. It is background or preparatory study, leading to study later of the interaction between policies of two or more governments; and it should be undertaken early in a student's academic career. This is especially true of the approach to comparative foreign relations taken by Wilkinson.

Wilkinson emphasizes what might be best called the "geography" (in a broad sense) of comparative foreign relations. Most of his outline deals with the environment out of which the foreign policy of a particular nation springs and which strongly determines the strength and content of that policy. It deals with the human and natural things that are found *in* the nation, as a mountain range would be found *in* a nation. These things include the nations economic capability, its arms, its willfulness, its political culture, its political institutions, and its political processes. The international "out of doors" where the policy of one nation comes into contact with the policies of others is not overlooked by Wilkinson. He allocates to problems of interaction about one-seventh of the time of a student following his approach. But such passing notice can do no more than whet the appetite of the student who wants to know how the world works, and there is no reason why it should do more than that. The student who wants to be a master of international relations must master many demanding fields besides the "geography" of foreign policy. He must be abreast of the interaction of all the important states over all time periods relevant to the present. He must master exceptional tools, like foreign languages and theoretical explanations of the interaction of states. Approaching the study of international relations by way of comparative foreign policy is like approaching the study of sex by way of the comparative study of the male and female. Vital background, yes, but it is the study of the interaction between male and female that crowns the study of sex. Possibly North was influenced by this fact, because the departure North made from Wilkinson's outline allowed more attention to be paid to China's interaction with other nations and less at-

tention to the conditioners of Chinese foreign policy. But there is a didactic necessity to partition the field of international relations in order to make it fit university calendars and organization charts, and I think Wilkinson *has* handled his part of the field well. For a methodological piece his book is surprisingly free of jargon, with the exception of one symbol he created needlessly and used frequently: V (meaning volition, and used in such opaque phrases as "Bursts of V"). Also the bibliography would be exceptionally valuable for students.

In laying down a formula for ideal country studies, Wilkinson makes frequent mention of the desirability of group research. He does not mention such values of group research as the motivation of students or overcoming the foreign language limitations of the individual researcher, but he makes a lot of the diversity in viewpoints that are brought to bear on a project by a group that includes persons with prejudices ranging from left-wing to right-wing. Possibly he has at some time experienced success in arriving at conclusions about foreign policy in such a deliberately antagonistic group, but the reader of his book gets the impression that arriving at conclusions about foreign policy are not so important for Wilkinson as being able to chart all the *possible* conclusions. Thus his polygot group could avoid conflict by returning as many minority reports as it had members.

Wilkinson's enthusiasm for groups is seated, I think, in an attitude that might be cited as one fault of his approach: an indiscriminate attitude toward "possibilities" of interpretation that almost guarantees contradiction and irresolution in studies structured according to his outline. He considers alternatives that are not even plausible, such as the following trial hypothesis (p. 62):

On the whole, the fact that some states are strong and others weak has no striking and systematic impact on the objectives, the content, the quality, or the outcomes of their foreign policy.

Of course, it is conceivable by the mind of man that this may be true; but is it worth the ink of the printer? Should we not also consider the hypothesis that Lesotho seeks to conquer China? Admittedly, a student has to be jarred from his tendency to overlook alternatives, and his prejudices and snap judgments have to be dampened. But how can a student be trained gradually to professional discrimination if *indiscrimination* has been promoted by his mentors?—W. HARTLEY CLARK, *Carleton College*.

The Politics of Regional Integration: The Central American Case. BY JAMES D. COCHRANE. (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1969. Pp. 223. \$4.00.)

In this volume the author describes the evolution of the Central American Common Market, presents some reasons for its modest success, and offers some arguments why it is necessary to be cautious in using universal economic integration models.

He examines the economic setting, the necessity for integration, the evolution of economic integration in the Market, the groups involved in the Market, the external and internal factors promoting integration, and presents a description of the Market's operation and an evaluation of its record to date. He is cautiously optimistic about its future and offers a number of reasons why it has a favorable record. He feels its success is due to a keen appreciation by its promoters, to the economic and political limitations within each of the countries; by strong encouragement and influence of experts who believe in integrated economies; by a feeling of integration or Union long prevalent in Central America; and by substantial cooperation by the United States and others.

Mr. Cochrane presents much economic data to illustrate the various economic problems of the Central American States and additional data to record the growth under the Market. The book does not go into a detailed political analysis of each country, but does present information to indicate why integration is a slow process. He is acutely aware of the relationship of Central America with the United States and well documents the official position of American Presidents since Eisenhower.

The author makes no bold predictions about the future of the Central American Common Market, but is content to say that integrated economies have a positive effect on economic growth and can be successful if properly developed. He presents no new theory but rather makes good use of existing information. He urges that each geographical region be examined as an individual entity with peculiar problems and peculiar solutions.

The book is based on what appears to be an exhaustive examination of material already published, but that does not restrict its value. It offers to the professor and student an easily understood, single volume treatment of the problem of regional economic integration. It is written in a highly readable form and should be useful for courses in economics, international trade, comparative government, and particularly appropriate for studies of international organization and Latin America.—WAYNE E. JOHNSON, *Lincoln University of Missouri*.

The Organization of African Unity and its Charter. BY ZDENEK ČERVENKA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 253. \$7.00.)

Economic and political organizations above the national level have appeared with increasing frequency during this century, and accordingly have become of major analytical concern to several social science disciplines and sub-disciplines. Until recently, this interest has been primarily although not solely sustained by two classes of association; the international United Nations type, which embodies a universalistic approach to the inclusion of member states but enjoys very limited authoritative scope, and the supranational European Economic Community variety, which is highly selective in its choice of members but at least potentially displays a wide range of independent governmental authority.

Regardless of their manifest structural and functional differences, both organizational types share one important characteristic: their policy-making apparatuses are to varying degrees dominated by the national governments of industrialized countries in the northern hemisphere. Yet, as the so-called "Third World" of economically deprived states now emerges from colonial and quasi-colonial control, new groupings of these states coalesce to pursue common interests and internally to resolve conflicts—in a world which overwhelmingly equates international political prowess with domestic industrial capability. This book has to do with one collectivity, the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Zdenek Červenka intends the book to be both a legal explanation of the OAU Charter and a political analysis of its formulation and implementation. He fulfills the first goal admirably, but largely fails to achieve the latter purpose. In his first chapter, Dr. Červenka discusses the events immediately preceding the 1963 Addis Ababa Summit Conference of African Heads of State and Government, which established the Organization. This chapter is unjustifiably short, and does not shed much historical light upon the complex political problems, and resulting inter-colony and inter-state alignments, which profoundly affected the creation and subsequent operations of the OAU.

The second chapter describes the Summit Conference itself, including the drafting of the OAU Charter and several resolutions pertaining to it (prominently, the Resolution on Decolonisation and the Resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination). But again, only the most cursory treatment is given to the probable motives, strategies, and political interactions of the Conference's most decisive actors; men like Tubman of Liberia, Nkrumah of Ghana, Selassie of Ethiopia, and Nyerere of Tanzania.

Chapters Three and Four provide excellent legal evaluations of the main provisions of the Charter and the Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation, and

Arbitration. Červenka also frequently, albeit briefly, alludes to the informal political imperatives and rivalries of the participant elites, which continue to condition their exceedingly limited aims and principles, rights and obligations, official activities, and legitimate areas of conflict-resolution within the OAU. But the intricacies of intra- and extra-Organization politics are never pursued as systematically and deeply as the OAU's legal details, and the reader is afforded few insights into the consistent incompatibility of national political requirements with the demands as well as advantages of extensive international cooperation.

The major external relations of the OAU are discussed in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, consisting of the connection between the Organization and the United Nations, the vagaries of the South West Africa Case in the International Court of Justice, and the bitter-sweet coexistence of the OAU and several other African regional groupings. As the author correctly points out, OAU members maintain that the primary activities of the UN in Africa should be to combat colonialism and racism and to serve as a source of economic assistance. Červenka then enters into an unfortunately sterile legal speculation over whether the OAU is a regional organization within the terms of the UN Charter, only to conclude that the question is not really legal at all: "... it has become obvious that OAU Members do not want to commit themselves formally or legally to such a relationship with the United Nations, and they continue to avoid any official interpretation to that effect." (p. 113). The more basic question of for what political reasons member states unanimously shun OAU integration within the UN Organization is left moot.

Although the account of the sixteen year-long South West Africa Case is concise and enlightening, Červenka cannot demonstrate that the OAU has had even a marginal impact upon its outcome. The same may be said concerning Chapters Eight and Nine, in which the Rhodesian and early Nigerian-Biafran crises are described and where the role of the OAU becomes notable through the complete inability of the Organization to help resolve these tragic disputes. No thoroughgoing explanation of this seemingly panoramic incompetence is offered in any of these chapters.

The greatest present significance of the OAU indirectly appears throughout the volume but is best elaborated in Chapter Seven, on the Organization and other regional associations, and Chapter Ten, the Conclusion. As President Julius Nyerere announced in 1967: "Our only way to unified sovereignty is through sovereign States which exist and which our people accept." (p. 166). That is, notwithstanding the past efforts of Pan-Africanists

like Kwame Nkrumah quickly to transform independent African states into a supranational political entity, the vast majority of African national leaders prefer the slower but surer path of incremental regional and continental unification, first in the socio-economic sector and probably much later in the politico-governmental sphere. A comprehensive awareness of this fact, and the diverse reasons for it, must come before any fair and empirically demonstrable evaluation of the structures, processes, successes, and failures of the OAU. In this book, the Organization's legal status is expertly put forth and its politically determined limitations are adequately, if unsystematically, identified. On the other hand, a more fundamental understanding of the political vicissitudes which accompany the unshaken attempts of African elites to bring transnational unity to their continent still remains to be accomplished.—RODGER YEAGER, *West Virginia University*.

Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair. By ISHWER C. OJHA. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. Pp. 234. \$5.95.)

Mr. Ojha's book is done a disservice by its preface in which the claim is set forth that the book will free the study of Chinese foreign policy from the static uni-dimensional framework of analysis in which it allegedly has been languishing. While it is not difficult to share Mr. Ojha's concern for the state of the art, this book is not the answer. Measured against its objectives it falls unfortunately short.

The book's claim to originality lies in the initial sections which deal with the historic roots of current Chinese foreign conduct. Unfortunately, this is the weakest section of the book. In it the author argues that contemporary Chinese foreign policy bears the strong impress of what he calls the "nationalism of cultural despair." More specifically he asserts that the psychodynamics of Chinese diplomacy is rooted in traumatic search by the Chinese for a new system of values to replace those made irrelevant by the impact of the west. Mr. Ojha argues that to understand Chinese diplomacy one must understand the cultural agony which resulted both from China's humiliation by the west and the alienation of its leaders from the old value system.

Placing his analysis in a comparative framework, the author traces the similarities between the processes at work in China and those at work in the Ottoman Empire and other modernizing polities. What flows from this analysis is the conclusion that Chinese foreign policy is rooted not in the heritage of empire but in the relatively recent past. Thus the hallmarks of that policy, a preoccu-

pation with status and sovereignty, can best be explained by an examination of the period after 1840, focusing on the strains of modernization. This material while persuasive is certainly far from novel, and is often marred by irritating oversimplifications as well as stylistic aberrations.

The book improves markedly in the subsequent chapters where the author applies his framework to the study of post-1949 foreign policy. In a chapter on the Chinese leaders' attitude towards international law and organization, he describes it as one of ambivalence. As challengers of the status quo, with aspirations towards achieving genuine equality in the international arena, they are led to challenge those aspects of international law and organization which reinforce the dominant position of the superpowers. However, where their international status is not in question, and the treaties or agreements to which they are subject have been freely negotiated on the basis of mutual consent, they are extraordinarily responsible in observing their contractual commitments.

In subsequent chapters on Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-American relations, and on the Chinese handling of border disputes, Professor Ojha further documents this theme. What the Chinese seek he argues is not a new tribute system but full "participatory equality" in the world order. He challenges the thesis that the Chinese are uniformly bellicose, citing the peaceful settlement of the border dispute with Burma as an example of the way in which the Chinese are prepared to solve disputes reasonably once their claims are treated with respect and their sovereignty recognized.

Professor Ojha views Chinese foreign policy as fundamentally rational. Dubbing it "the politics of weakness" he argues that the Chinese have sought to strike a balance between their desire to pursue a vigorous foreign policy and their clear recognition of their limited capabilities. This realization has dictated a flexible, pragmatic and cautious diplomacy. If obsessive elements persist, they relate more to the symbolism of status than anything else. One aspect of the "politics of weakness" is the substitution of support for indigenous "people's wars" for a direct policy of confrontation. The injunction by Chinese leaders to other revolutionary movements to practice "self reliance" is part of practicing a vigorous foreign policy "on the cheap."

In describing Chinese foreign policy as a flexible and cautious pursuit of their "place in the sun," Professor Ojha has placed himself with the vast majority of students of Chinese diplomacy. His reconstruction of Chinese motives is persuasive and often perceptive. On the whole however, his book breaks little new ground, and his new framework does not really come to grips with the issue of how

to measure the relative weight of ideology, national interest, historical tradition, or internal politics, or military capabilities as determinants of the concrete foreign policy decisions of the People's Republic over the past twenty years.—VICTOR C. FALKENHEIM, *Franklin and Marshall College*.

Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and The New State. BY W. SCOTT THOMPSON (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 462. \$13.75.)

W. Scott Thompson's *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966* is the first and only major publication on this topic to have appeared since Ghana's independence on March 6, 1957. However, it fails to make an outstanding contribution to an understanding of the problem of formulating and executing foreign policy in Ghana. Thompson's main concern is to examine Ghana's "interaction with its neighbors and its continental aspirations, as well as its attempts to obtain influence with the great powers or to aid one or more of them." The author demonstrates no great argumentative skills, offers no special approach in his critical framework but utilizes a great deal of ideological double talk and double think.

Thompson's volume is divided into three parts. In the first, "Opportunities, 1957-1960," he surveys the general problems confronting Ghana as it plunged into international politics, from the eve of independence to 1960. Thompson also examines the factors influencing Ghana's foreign policy during these formative years. He argues that Nkrumah was a megalomaniac, wanting to rule over a larger territorial unit than Ghana, and that he hence sought to incorporate neighboring states. Thompson also asserts that Ghana took a pro-western stance during its early post-independence phase and that such a stance was calculated to gain financial aid in the form of investments for the country. Thompson points out that such an approach was possible because: (1) The "interests" of the Ghanaian masses were "inchoate"; (2) the nationalist elite was oriented toward western business; (3) Nkrumah had to work with British civil servants; (4) the few (12 at the time of independence) Ghanaian foreign service officers were British trained and indoctrinated and they had considerable influence during the earlier stages; (5) the influence of expatriate advisors on Nkrumah. Thompson also points out that Nkrumah moved cautiously during the early stages, even gaining prizes from *Time Magazine*. An effort was even made to exchange ambassadors with South Africa. Both the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. were late in opening embassies in Accra, with Israel, for instance, preceding the U.A.R. Thompson asserts that Nkrumah's priority was the area of diplomacy (about which he knew

nothing and was hence at times an embarrassment to the "professionals") rather than Pan Africanism. Nkrumah's public remarks, according to Thompson, were calculated to please the west because his main purpose was the industrialization of Ghana and he was convinced he an earlier stage that the money for this would have to come from the west. With the emergence of more independent African states in 1960, Ghana's influence in Africa and the rest of the world began to wane. Ghana's African policy lacked focus, especially after the death of George Padmore, Nkrumah's West Indian advisor. According to Thompson, Nkrumah's efforts did not result in unity anywhere on the African continent because his actions seemed to negate his professed ideals and policies.

In the second part of his book, Thompson discusses what he terms "Diplomatic Cockpit." He attempts to demonstrate that even though Nkrumah had a great opportunity to influence the international political system during the period of the Congo crisis, due to his inability to rightly assess developments, he exaggerated his importance and that led to the failure of Ghana's foreign policy re the Congo. The author demonstrates that Nkrumah fostered divisive tendencies in Africa (which he neither anticipated nor desired) because of his distorted perception of events. These splits dissipated much of the energy and efforts towards unity, and took a lot to heal. This same period saw a steady erosion of western influence and a simultaneous consolidation of communist influence in Accra, with Ghana slowly drifting eastward. At home, the militants in Nkrumah's Convention People's Party were gaining the upper hand in positions of influence and were involving Ghana in what Thompson labels as "unrealistic" African policies.

In the third and final section, Thompson considers "Union Government and Scientific Socialism, August 1962-February 1966." He argues that the Kulungugu assassination attempt on Nkrumah sent him "askew" and dislocated Ghana's foreign policy. It strengthened the stranglehold of the radical elements in Nkrumah's party. While Nkrumah was insistent on Union Government, his "sabotage" activities towards other African states (yet to be documented by the author) resulted in his being excluded from the mainstream of cooperative developments in Africa. In fact, Thompson argues that Sekou Touré was playing the role that aptly belonged to Nkrumah. Assassination attempts, he further argues, led to the tightening of the security apparatus, resulted in closer links with the U.S.S.R., and further strengthened Ghana's ideology of scientific socialism.

Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966 is basically critical in its approach and very negative in its

conclusions. Thompson's technique is the by now typical formalization of emotional accusations against Nkrumah. Arguments accusing Nkrumah of being authoritarian and omnipresent in Ghana's institutions were not examined to see whether they are valid and rest upon acceptable foundations. Instead Thompson easily embraces them and argues that Ghana's foreign policy reflected Nkrumah's character and his perception of how the international system worked along with his reactions to external events, which were almost invariably wrong. He further asserts that Nkrumah had dictatorial powers, both explicit and constitutionally, and could set the policy virtually without regard to domestic pressures. Thompson offers no "correct" perceptions to counter Nkrumah's "wrong" perceptions, however. When one pieces the indictments against Nkrumah together, they appear to be very strong and may have been very good cause for his overthrow: (1) Even though Nkrumah's passion and devotion to a cause are considered to be sincere by Thompson, he argues that Nkrumah's Ghana followed the wrong course. (2) Nkrumah, as a statesman, was a liar (p. 385). (3) Nkrumah was short-sighted in his approach to diplomacy (yet Thompson offers no long-term approaches that Nkrumah could have followed). (4) Nkrumah was a saboteur (p. 308). (5) Nkrumah felt hostility towards the west- (instances of hostile actions and statements are hardly documented, other than the publication of his *Neo-Colonialism* at a time when Ghanaian diplomats were negotiating for aid). (6) Thompson asserts that Nkrumah was erratic and his erratic behavior (presumably schizophrenic) resulted in an erratic foreign policy. Indeed, there are hardly any official sources cited to support the above indictments. Ghanaians have been highly emotional towards Nkrumah since the coup which toppled his government and one wonders whether an objective study could be made, based solely on interviews (as the many footnotes in this book seem to indicate).

In my opinion, Thompson fails to validate his "modest" hypothesis that "foreign policy-making and implementation are intricate systems composed of many subsystems which are unlikely to serve the interests of the state when they are uncoordinated," in relation to Ghana, for we fail to see the significance of subsystems when we are made to believe that the system itself is one man. The confusion about *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1967-1966* is that the answers to the following significant questions remain unanswered: (1) How was Ghana's foreign policy under Nkrumah formulated—and how differently is it being formulated now? (2) Who formulated the policy? (3)

What were the influences on the policy makers? (4) Were decisions rationally made or were they determined irrationally? (5) How different was the Ghanaian approach from that of other African countries and what accounts for the differences, if any? Unfortunately these questions cannot be answered in the near future nor could Thompson's "modest hypothesis" be verified or disputed because of the air of suspicion about "academic research" generated by this book in certain circles. Civil servants liberally relaxed Ghana's "fifty year rule" on access to certain classified public documents only to have them abused, and to be disappointed; the rumoured subsequent disappearance of some of these has been another grievance. As a result, the research doors are constantly being closed to genuine research. It is unfortunate that ideological sentiments camouflaged as scientific research can be made to pervade what appears at first sight to be a rather impressive book. —KOFI ANKOMAH, *Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration*.

Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making. By HARVEY S. PERLOFF. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. 237, \$3.50.)

The most notable characteristic of this book is that the author was a member of the Committee of Nine.

Those who are familiar with the literature on the Alliance for Progress will find the first half of the book repetitive; it is at best a checklist of general problem areas faced by the Alliance.

The second half of the book, bolstered by case studies on Colombia and Chile in an Appendix, presents guidelines for the future of the Alliance. Here again there is little to harvest. The prescription calls for a long term assistance program funneled through international agencies, increased planning and administrative efficiency, and more money. Dean Perloff fails to consider the effects of social revolution, nationalism, the inevitable different perceptions of national interests by donors and recipients, and cold war politics, on Latin American political stability, a condition without which no rational program can succeed. The guidelines become impractical when subjected to the vicissitudes of who gets what, when and how.

This book is too general to be of utility to the specialist. It cannot compare with the quality reflected in Simon Hanson's *Five Years of the Alliance for Progress: An Appraisal*, or Herbert May's *Problems and Prospects of the Alliance for Progress: A Critical Examination*. It is a well written, easy to understand book for the layman.—LEONARD CARDENAS, JR., *Louisiana State University*.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 7-11, 1971, at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

December, 1970

- Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology"
- Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., University of North Carolina, "A Causal Approach to Non-random Measurement Errors"
- James S. Coleman, The Johns Hopkins University, "Political Money"
- Giuseppe Di Palma and Herbert McClosky, University of California, Berkeley, "Personality and Conformity: The Learning of Political Attitudes"
- Harlan Hahn, University of California, Riverside, "Correlates of Public Sentiments on War: The Vietnam Referendum"
- Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii, "Creating Political Reality"
- Robert Melson, Michigan State University, and Howard Wolpe, Western Michigan University, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective"
- Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support"
- Eric Nordlinger, Brandeis University, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic Change in the Non-western States"
- Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908"
- Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics"
- Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan, and Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation"
- Jerzy J. Wiatr, University of Warsaw, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland"

March, 1971

- James W. Clarke and E. Lester Levine, Florida State University, "Marijuana Use, Social Deviance and Political Alienation: A Study of High School Youth"
- M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, and Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, "The Division of Political Labor between Mothers and Fathers"
- Chong Lim Kim, University of Iowa, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy in Japanese Prefectures"
- Gerald H. Kramer, Yale University, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964"

- Frank Levy, University of California, Berkeley, and Edwin M. Truman, Yale University, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Another View"
- Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago, "Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy"
- Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Harvard University, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government"
- Theodore R. Marmor, University of Minnesota, "Income Maintenance Alternatives: Concepts, Criteria, and Program Comparisons"
- Robert Melson, Michigan State University, "Ideology and Inconsistency: The Politics of the 'Cross-Pressured' Nigerian Worker"
- Adam Przeworski and Glauco A. D. Soares, Washington University, St. Louis, "Theories in Search of a Curve: A Contextual Interpretation of Left Vote"
- Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "The Democratic Guarantee: An Index and Some of Its Analytic Arguments"
- Duff Spafford, University of Saskatchewan, "A Note on the 'Equilibrium' Division of the Vote"
- Michael Taylor, University of Essex, "Party Systems and Governmental Instability"
- Donald S. Zagoria, Hunter College, City University of New York, "'Rice' and 'Feudal' Communism in India"

June, 1971

- Blair Campbell, University of California, Los Angeles, "Prescription and Description in Political Thought: The Case for Hobbes"
- James A. Caporaso and Alan Pelowski, Northwestern University, "The European Economic Community as Time-Series Quasi-Experiments"
- Daniel W. Fleitas, Florida State University, "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal Information Elections"
- John E. Jackson, Harvard University, "Senate Roll Call Voting: Statistical Models"
- John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam"
- David E. RePass, University of Minnesota, "Issue Salience and Party Choice"
- Paul M. Sniderman, Stanford University, and Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley, "Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes: Psychological Sources of Political Beliefs"
- Sidney G. Tarrow, Yale University, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Voter Involvement: The Case of France"
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Glendon Schubert is University Professor of Political Science at York University and has written extensively on the judicial branch.

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
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


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
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VOL. LXIV

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NO. 4

CONCEPT MISFORMATION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS*

GIOVANNI SARTORI

University of Florence

"To have mastered 'theory' and 'method' is to have become a *conscious thinker*, a man at work and aware of the assumptions and implications of whatever he is about. To be mastered by 'method' or 'theory' is simply to be kept from working."¹ The sentence applies nicely to the present plight of political science. The profession as a whole oscillates between two unsound extremes. At the one end a large majority of political scientists qualify as pure and simple unconscious thinkers. At the other end a sophisticated minority qualify as overconscious thinkers, in the sense that their standards of method and theory are drawn from the physical, "paradigmatic" sciences.

The wide gap between the unconscious and the overconscious thinker is concealed by the growing sophistication of statistical and research techniques. Most of the literature introduced by the title "Methods" (in the social, behavioral or political sciences) actually deals with survey techniques and social statistics, and has little if

anything to share with the crucial concern of "methodology," which is a concern with the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry. In a very crucial sense there is no methodology without *logos*, without thinking about thinking. And if a firm distinction is drawn—it should be—between methodology and technique, the latter is no substitute for the former. One may be a wonderful researcher and manipulator of data, and yet remain an unconscious thinker. The view presented in this article is, then, that the profession as a whole is grievously impaired by methodological unawareness. The more we advance technically, the more we leave a vast, uncharted territory behind our backs. And my underlying complaint is that political scientists eminently lack (with exceptions) a training in logic—indeed in elementary logic.

I stress "elementary" because I do not wish to encourage in the least the overconscious thinker, the man who refuses to discuss heat unless he is given a thermometer. My sympathy goes, instead, to the "conscious thinker," the man who realizes the limitations of not having a thermometer and still manages to say a great deal simply by saying hot and cold, warmer and cooler. Indeed I call upon the conscious thinker to steer a middle course between crude logical mishandling on the one hand, and logical perfectionism (and paralysis) on the other hand. Whether we realize it or not, we are still swimming in a sea of naivete. And the study of comparative politics is particularly vulnerable to, and illustrative of, this unfelicitous state of affairs.

I. THE TRAVELLING PROBLEM

Traditional, or the more traditional, type of political science inherited a vast array of concepts which had been previously defined and refined—for better and for worse—by generations

* An earlier draft, "Theory and Method in Comparative Politics," was submitted as a working paper to the IPSA Torino Round Table of September, 1969. I wish to thank, in this connection, the Agnelli Foundation which provided the grant for the Torino panel. I am particularly indebted to David Apter, Harry Eckstein, Carl J. Friedrich, Joseph LaPalombara, Felix Oppenheim and Fred W. Riggs for their critical comments. I am also very much obliged to the Concilium on International and Area Studies at Yale University, of which I was a fellow in 1966-67. This article is part of the work done under the auspices of the Concilium.

¹ C. Wright Mills, "On Intellectual Craftsmanship," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959) p. 27 (My emphasis).

of philosophers and political theorists. To some extent, therefore, the traditional political scientist could afford to be an "unconscious thinker"—the thinking had already been done for him. This is even more the case with the country-by-country legalistic institutional approach, which does not particularly require hard thinking.² However, the new political science engages in reconceptualization. And this is even more the case, necessarily, with the new comparative expansion of the discipline.³ There are many reasons for this *renovatio ab imis*.

One is the very "expansion on politics." To some extent politics results *objectively* bigger on account of the fact that the world is becoming more and more politicized (more participation, more mobilization, and in any case more state intervention in formerly non-governmental spheres). In no small measure, however, politics is *subjectively* bigger in that we have shifted the focus of attention both toward the periphery of politics (vis-à-vis the governmental process), and toward its input side. By now—as Macridis puts it—we study everything that is "potentially political."⁴ While this latter aspect of the expansion of politics is disturbing—it ultimately leads to the disappearance of politics—it is not a peculiar concern for comparative politics, in the sense that other segments of political science are equally and even more deeply affected.⁵

² This is by no means a criticism of a comparative item by item analysis, and even less of the "institutional-functional" approach. On the latter see the judicious remarks of Ralph Braibanti, "Comparative Political Analytics Reconsidered," *The Journal of Politics*, 30 (February 1968), 44-49.

³ For the various phases of the comparative approach see Eckstein's perceptive "Introduction," in H. Eckstein and D. E. Apter (eds.), *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963).

⁴ "Comparative Politics and the Study of Government: The Search for Focus," *Comparative Politics*, (October 1968), p. 81.

⁵ On the "fallacy of inputism" see again the remarks of Roy C. Macridis, *loc. cit.*, pp. 84-87. In his words, "The state of the discipline can be summed up in one phrase: the gradual disappearance of the political." (p. 86). A cogent statement of the issue is Glenn D. Paige, "The Rediscovery of Politics," in J. D. Montgomery and W. I. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 49 ff. My essay "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology," in S. M. Lipset (ed.), *Politics and the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 65-100, is also largely concerned with the fallacy of inputism viewed as a sociological reduction of politics.

Aside from the expansion of politics, a more specific source of conceptual and methodological challenge for comparative politics is what Braibanti calls the "lengthening spectrum of political systems."⁶ We are now engaged in world-wide, cross-area comparisons. And while there is an end to geographical size, there is apparently no end to the proliferation of political units. There were about 80 States in 1946; it is no wild guess that we may shortly arrive at 150. Still more important, the lengthening spectrum of political systems includes a variety of primitive, diffuse polities at very different stages of differentiation and consolidation.

Now, the wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to travel. It is equally clear that the pre-1950 vocabulary of politics was not devised for world-wide, cross-area travelling. On the other hand, and in spite of bold attempts at drastic terminological innovation,⁷ it is hard to see how Western scholars could radically depart from the political experience of the West, i.e., from the vocabulary of politics which has been developed over millennia on the basis of such experience. Therefore, the first question is: how far, and how, can we travel with the help of the available vocabulary of politics?

By and large, so far we have followed (more or less unwittingly) the line of least resistance: broaden the meaning—and thereby the range of application—of the conceptualizations at hand. That is to say, the larger the world, the more we have resorted to *conceptual stretching*, or conceptual straining, i.e., to vague, amorphous conceptualizations. To be sure, there is more to it. One may add, for instance, that conceptual stretching also represents a deliberate attempt to make our conceptualizations value free. Another concurrent explication is that conceptual straining is largely a "boomerang effect" of the developing areas, i.e., a feedback on the Western categories of the diffuse polities of the Third

⁶ "Comparative Political Analytics Reconsidered," *loc. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

⁷ The works of Fred W. Riggs are perhaps the best instance of such bold attempts. For a recent presentation see "The Comparison of Whole Political Systems," in R. T. Holt and J. E. Turner (eds.), *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York: Free Press, 1970), esp. pp. 95-115. While Riggs' innovative strategy has undeniable practical drawbacks, the criticism of Martin Landau ("A General Commentary," in Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), pp. 325-334.) appears somewhat unfair.

World.⁸ These considerations notwithstanding, conceptual stretching does represent, in comparative politics, the line of least resistance. And the net result of conceptual straining is that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision. It appears that we can cover more—in travelling terms—only by saying less, and by saying less in a far less precise manner.

A major drawback of the comparative expansion of the discipline is, then, that it has been conducive to indefiniteness, to undelimited and largely undefined conceptualizations. We do need, ultimately, “universal” categories—concepts which are applicable to any time and place. But nothing is gained if our universals turn out to be “no difference” categories leading to pseudo-equivalences. And even though we need universals, they must be *empirical* universals, that is, categories which somehow are amenable, in spite of their all-embracing very abstract nature, to empirical testing. Instead we seem to verge on the edge of *philosophical* universals, understood—as Croce defines them—as concepts which are by definition *supra-empirical*.⁹

That the comparative expansion of the discipline would encounter the aforementioned stumbling block was only to be expected. It was easy to infer, that is, that conceptual stretching would produce indefiniteness and elusiveness, and that the more we climb toward high-flown universals, the more tenuous the link with the empirical evidence. It is pertinent to wonder, therefore, why the problem has seldom been squarely confronted.

Taking a step back, let us begin by asking whether it is really necessary to embark in hazardous world-wide comparisons. This question hinges, in turn, on the prior question, Why compare? The unconscious thinker does not ask himself why he is comparing; and this neglect goes to explain why so much comparative work provides extensions of knowledge, but hardly a strategy for acquiring and validating new knowledge. It is not intuitively evident that to compare is to control, and that the novelty, distinctiveness and importance of comparative politics consists of a systematic testing, against as many cases as possible, of sets of hypotheses, generalizations and laws of the “if . . . then”

type.¹⁰ But if comparative politics is conceived as a method of control, then its generalizations have to be checked against “all cases,” and therefore the enterprise must be—in principle—a global enterprise. So the reason for world-wide comparisons is not simply that we live in a wider world; it is also a methodological reason.

If two or more items are identical, we do not have a problem of comparability. On the other hand, if two or more items have nothing, or not enough in common, we rightly say that stones and rabbits cannot be compared. By and large, then, we obtain comparability when two or more items appear “similar enough,” that is, neither identical nor utterly different. But this assessment offers little positive guidance. The problem is often outflanked by saying that we make things comparable. In this perspective to compare is “to assimilate,” i.e., to discover deeper or fundamental similarities below the surface of secondary diversities. But this argument equally affords little mileage and conveys, moreover, the misleading suggestion that the trick resides in making the unlike look alike. Surely, then, we have here a major problem which cannot be disposed of with the argument that political theorists have performed decently with comparing since the time of Aristotle, and therefore that we should not get bogged by the question “What is comparable?” any more than our predecessors. This argument will not do on account of three differences.

In the first place if our predecessors were culture bound this implied that they travelled only as far as their personal knowledge allowed them to travel. In the second place, our predecessors hardly disposed of quantitative data and were not quantitatively oriented. Under both of these limitations they enjoyed the distinct advantage of having a substantive understanding of the things they were comparing. This is hardly possible on a world wide scale, and surely becomes impossible with the computer revolution. A few years ago Karl Deutsch predicted that by 1975 the informational requirements of political science would be satisfied by some “fifty million card-equivalents [of IBM standard cards] . . . and a total annual growth rate of perhaps 10

⁸ On the boomerang effect of the developing areas more in the final section.

⁹ More precisely in B. Croce, *Logica come Scienza del Concetto Puro*, (Bari: Laterza, 1942), pp. 13–17, universals are defined *ultrarappresentativi*, as being above and beyond any conceivable empirical representability.

¹⁰ For the comparative method as a “method of control” see especially Arend Lijphart, *Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method*, (mimeographed) paper presented at the Torino IPF, Round Table, September, 1969. According to Lijphart the comparative method is a “method of discovering empirical relationships among variables” (p. 2); and I fully concur, except that this definition can be entered only at a later stage of the argument.

much as five million."¹¹ I find the estimate frightening, for computer technology and facilities are bound to flood us with masses of data for which no human mind can have any substantive grasp. But even if one shares the enthusiasm of Deutsch, it cannot be denied that we have here a gigantic, unprecedented problem.

In the third place, our predecessors were far from being as unguided as we are. They did not leave the decision about what was homogenous—i.e., comparable—and what was heterogenous—i.e., non-comparable—to each man's genial insights. As indicated by the terminology, their comparisons applied to things belonging to "the same genus." That is to say, the background of comparability was established by the *per genus et differentiam* mode of analysis, i.e., by a taxonomical treatment. In this context, comparable means something which belongs to the same genus, species, or sub-species—in short to the same class. Hence the class provides the "similarity element" of comparability, while the "differences" enter as the species of a genus, or the sub-species of a species—and so forth, depending on how fine the analysis needs to be. However, and here is the rub, the taxonomical requisites of comparability are currently neglected, if not disowned.

We are now better equipped for a discussion of our initial query, namely, why the travelling problem of comparative politics has been met with the poor remedy of "conceptual stretching" instead of being squarely confronted. While there are many reasons for our neglect to attack the problem frontally, a major reason is that we have been swayed by the suggestion that our difficulties can be overcome by switching from "what is" questions to "how much" questions. The argument runs, roughly, as follows. As long as concepts point to differences of *kind*, i.e., as long as we pursue the either-or mode of analysis, we are in trouble; but if concepts are understood as a matter of more-or-less, i.e., as pointing to differences in *degree*, then our difficulties can be solved by measurement, and the real problem is precisely how to measure. Meanwhile—waiting for the measures—class concepts and taxonomies should be looked upon with suspicion (if not rejected), since they represent "an old fashioned logic of properties and attributes not well adapted to study quantities and relations."¹²

¹¹ "Recent Trends in Research Methods," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.), *A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives and Methods* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966), p. 156.

¹² Carl F. Hempel, quoted in Don Martindale, "Sociological Theory and the Ideal Type," in

According to my previous analysis, a taxonomic unfolding represents a requisite condition for comparability, and indeed a background which becomes all the more important the less we can rely on a substantive familiarity with what is being compared. According to the foregoing argument, instead, quantification has no ills of its own; rather, it provides a remedy for the ills and inadequacies of the *per genus et differentiam* mode of analysis. My own view is that when we dismiss the so-called "old fashioned logic" we are plain wrong, and indeed the victims of poor logic—a view that I must now attempt to warrant.

II. QUANTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION

What is very confusing in this matter is the abuse of a quantitative idiom which is nothing but an idiom. All too often, that is, we speak of degrees and of measurement "not only without any actual measurements having been performed, but without any being projected, and even without any apparent awareness of what must be done before such measurements can be carried out."¹³ For instance, in most standard textbooks one finds that nominal scales are spoken of as "scales of measurement."¹⁴ But a nominal scale is nothing else than a qualitative classification, and I fail to understand what it is that a nominal scale does, or can, measure. To be sure classes can be given numbers; but this is simply a coding device for identifying items and has nothing to do with quantification. Likewise the incessant use of "it is a matter of degree" phraseology and of the "continuum" image leave us with qualitative-impressionistic statements which do not advance us by a hair's breadth toward quantification. In a similar vein we speak more and more of "variables" which are not variables in any proper sense, for they are not attributes permitting gradations and implying

Gross, *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, p. 87. Martindale aptly comments that "Hempel's judgments are made from the standpoint of the natural sciences." But the vein is not dissimilar when the statistically trained scholar argues that "whereas it is admittedly technically possible to think always in terms of attributes and dichotomies, one wonders how practical that is": Hubert M. Blacklock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964, p. 32).

¹³ Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 213.

¹⁴ Eg., L. Festinger and D. Katz (eds.), *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Dryden Press, 1953); and Selltitz, Jahoda et al., *Research Methods in Social Relations* (rev. ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1959).

measurability. No harm necessarily follows if it pleases us to use the word variable as a synonym for the word concept; but we are only deluding ourselves if we really believe that by *saying* variable we *have* a variable.

All in all, coquetting (if not cheating) with a quantitative idiom grossly exaggerates the extent to which political science is currently amenable to quantification, and, still worse, obfuscates the very notion of quantification. The dividing line between the jargon and the substance of quantification can be drawn very simply: quantification begins with numbers, and when numbers are used in relation to their arithmetical properties. To understand, however, the multifaceted complexities of the notion beyond this dividing line is a far less simple matter. Nevertheless one may usefully distinguish—in spite of the close interconnections—among three broad areas of meaning and application, that is, between quantification as i) measurement, ii) statistical manipulation and, iii) formal mathematical treatment.

In political science we generally refer to the first meaning. That is to say, far more often than not the quantification of political science consists of (a) attaching numerical values to items (pure and simple measurement), (b) using numbers to indicate the rank order of items (ordinal scales) and (c) measuring differences or distances among items (interval scales).¹⁵

Beyond the stage of measurement we do own, in addition, powerful statistical techniques not only for protecting ourselves against sampling and measurement errors, but also for establishing significant relationships among variables. However, statistical processing enters the scene only when sufficient numbers have been pinned on sufficient items, and becomes central to the discipline only when we dispose of variables which measure things that are worth measuring. Both conditions—and especially the latter—are

¹⁵ There is some question as to whether it can really be held that ordinal scales are scales of measurement: most of our rank ordering occurs without having recourse to numerical values, and whenever we do assign numbers to our ordered categories, these numbers are arbitrary. However, there are good reasons for drawing the threshold of quantification between nominal and ordinal scales rather than between ordinal and interval scales. (See Edward R. Tufte, "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science," *World Politics*, 21 (July 1969), esp. p. 645.) On the other hand, even if the gap between ordinal scales and interval measurement is not as wide in practice as it is in theory, nonetheless from a mathematical point of view the interesting scales are the interval and even more, of course, the cardinal scales.

hard to meet.¹⁶ Indeed, a cross-examination of our statistical findings in terms of their theoretical significance—and/or of a "more relevant" political science—shows an impressive disproportion between bravura and relevance. Unfortunately, what makes a statistical treatment theoretically significant has nothing to do with statistics.

As for the ultimate stage of quantification—formal mathematical treatment—it is a fact that, so far, political science and mathematics have engaged only "in a sporadic conversation."¹⁷ It is equally a fact that we seldom, if ever, obtain isomorphic correspondences between empirical relations among things and formal relations among numbers.¹⁸ We may well disagree about future prospects,¹⁹ or as to whether it

¹⁶ Otherwise the comparative method would largely consist of the statistical method, for the latter surely is a stronger technique of control than the former. The difference and the connections are cogently discussed by Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *op. cit.*

¹⁷ Oliver Benson, "The Mathematical Approach to Political Science," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.), *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 132. The chapter usefully reviews the literature. For an introductory treatment see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965). An illuminating discussion on how quantification enters the various social sciences is in Daniel Lerner (ed.), *Quantity and Quality* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), *passim*.

¹⁸ A classic example is the (partial) mathematical translation of the theoretical system of *The Human Group* of George C. Homans by Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1967), Chap. 7. No similar achievement exists in the political science field. To cite three significant instances, political science issues are eminently lacking in Kenneth J. Arrow, "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences," in D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), Chap. 8; in the contributions collected in P. F. Lazarsfeld (ed.), *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954); in J. G. Kemeny and J. L. Snell, *Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences* (Boston: Ginn, 1962).

¹⁹ Perhaps the mathematical leap of the discipline is just around the corner waiting for necessary quantitative developments. If one is to judge, however, from the "mathematics of man" issue of the *International Social Science Bulletin* introduced by Claude Levi-Strauss (IV, 1954), this literature is very deceiving. More interesting is John C. Kemeny, "Mathematics without Numbers," in Lerner, *Quantity and Quality*, pp. 35-51; and the modal logic developed by the Bourbaki group.

makes sense to construct formalized systems of quantitatively well defined relationships (mathematical models) so long as we wander in a mist of qualitatively ill-defined concepts. If we are to learn, however, from the mathematical development of economics, the evidence is that it "always lagged behind its qualitative and conceptual improvement."²⁰ And my point is, precisely, that this is not a casual sequence. It is for a very good reason that the progress of quantification should lag—in whatever discipline—behind its qualitative and conceptual progress.

In this messy controversy about quantification and its bearing on standard logical rules we simply tend to forget that *concept formation stands prior to quantification*. The process of thinking inevitably begins with a qualitative (natural) language, no matter at which shore we shall subsequently land. Correlatively, there is no ultimate way of bypassing the fact that human understanding—the way in which our mind works—requires cut-off points which basically correspond (in spite of all subsequent refinements) to the slices into which a natural or qualitative language happens to be divided.

There is a fantastic lack of perspective in the argument that these cut-off points can be obtained via statistical processing, i.e., by letting the data themselves tell us where to draw them. For this argument applies only *within* the frame of conceptual mappings which have to tell us first of what reality is composed. Let it be stressed, therefore, that long before having data which can speak for themselves the fundamental articulation of language and of thinking is obtained logically—by cumulative conceptual refinement and chains of coordinated definitions—not by measurement. Measurement of what? We cannot measure unless we know first what it is that we are measuring. Nor can the degrees of something tell us what a thing is. As Lazarsfeld and Barton neatly phrase it, "before we can investigate the presence or absence of some attribute . . . or before we can rank objects or measure them in

terms of some variable, *we must form the concept of that variable.*"²¹

The major premise is, then, that quantification enters the scene after, and only after, having formed the concept. The minor premise is that the "stuff" of quantification—the things underpinned by the numbers—cannot be provided by quantification itself. Hence the rules of concept formation are independent of, and cannot be derived from, the rules which govern the treatment of quantities and quantitative relations. Let us elaborate on this conclusion.

In the first place, if we never really have "how much" findings—in the sense that the prior question always is how much *in what*, in what conceptual container—it follows from this that how much quantitative findings are an internal element of "what is" qualitative questions: the claim that the latter should give way to the former cannot be sustained. It equally follows, in the second place, that "categoric concepts" of the either-or type cannot give way to "gradation concepts" of the more-than-less-than type.

What is usually lost sight of is that the either-or type of logic is the very logic of classification building. Classes are required to be mutually exclusive, i.e., class concepts represent characteristics which the object under consideration must either have or lack. Two items being compared must belong first to the same class, and either have or not have an attribute; and only if they have it, the two items can be matched in terms of which has it *more* or *less*. Hence the logic of gradation belongs to the logic of classification. More precisely put, the switch from classification to gradation basically consists of replacing the signs "same-different" with the signs "same-greater-lesser," i.e., consists of introducing a quantitative differentiation within a qualitative sameness (of attributes). Clearly, then, the sign "same" established by the logic of classification is the requisite condition of introducing the signs "plus-minus."

The retort tends to be that this is true only as long as we persist in thinking in terms of attributes and dichotomies. But this rejoinder misses the point that—aside from classifying—we dispose of no other unfolding technique. Indeed, the taxonomical exercise "unpacks" concepts, and plays a non-replaceable role in the process of thinking in that it decomposes mental compounds into orderly and manageable sets of component units. Let it be added that at no stage of the methodological argument does the taxonomical unpacking lose weight and impor-

Éléments de Mathématique, appearing periodically (Paris: Hermann). For a general treatment see J. G. Kemeny, J. L. Snell, G. L. Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1957).

²⁰ Joseph J. Spengler, "Quantification in Economics: Its History," in Lerner, *Quantity and Quality*, p. 176. Spengler equally points out that "the introduction of quantitative methods in economics did not result in striking discoveries" (*ibid.*). While formal economic theory is by now highly isomorphic with algebra, mathematical economics has added little to the predictive power of the discipline and one often has the impression that we are employing guns to kill mosquitos.

²¹ "Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: Classifications, Typologies and Indices," in D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences*, *op. cit.*, p. 155 (my emphasis).

tance. As a matter of fact, the more we enter the stage of quantification, the more we need unidimensional scales and continua; and dichotomous categorizations serve precisely the purpose of establishing the ends, and thereby the unidimensionality, of each continuum.

Having disposed of the fuzziness brought about by the abuse of a quantitative idiom, attention should immediately be called to the fact-finding side of the coin. For my emphasis on concept formation should not be misunderstood to imply that my concern is more theoretical than empirical. This is not so, because the concepts of any social science are not only the elements of a theoretical system; they are equally, and just as much, data containers. Indeed data is information which is distributed in, and processed by, "conceptual containers." And since the non-experimental sciences basically depend on fact-finding, i.e., on reports about external (not laboratory) observables, the empirical question becomes what turns a concept into a valuable, indeed a valid, fact finding container.

The reply need not be far-fetched: the lower the discriminating power of a conceptual container, the more the facts are misgathered, i.e., the greater the misinformation. Conversely, the higher the discriminating power of a category, the better the information. Admittedly, in and by itself this reply is not very illuminating, for it only conveys the suggestion that for fact-finding purposes it is more profitable to exaggerate in over-differentiation than in over-assimilation. The point is, however, that what establishes, or helps establish, the discriminating power of a category is the taxonomical infolding. Since the logical requirement of a classification is that its classes should be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, it follows from this that the taxonomical exercise supplies an orderly series of well sharpened categories, and thereby the basis for collecting adequately precise information. And this is indeed how we know whether, and to what extent, a concept has a fact-gathering validity.

Once again, then, it appears that we have started to run before having learned how to walk. Numbers must be attached—for our purposes—to "things," to facts. How are these things, or facts, identified and collected? Our ultimate ambition may well be to pass from a science "of species" to a science of "functional co-relations."²² The question is whether we are not repudiating a science of species in exchange for nothing. And it seems to me that premature haste combined with the abuse of a quantitative

idiom is largely responsible not only for the fact that much of our theorizing is muddled, but also for the fact that much of our research is trivial and wasteful.

Graduate students are being sent all over the world—as LaPalombara vividly puts it—on "indiscriminate fishing expeditions for data."²³ These fishing expeditions are "indiscriminate" in that they lack taxonomical backing; which is the same as saying that they are fishing expeditions without adequate nets. The researcher sets out with a "checklist" which is, at best, an imperfect net of his own. This may be an expedient way of handling his private research problems, but remains a very inconvenient strategy from the angle of the additivity and the comparability of his findings. As a result, the joint enterprise of comparative politics is menaced by a growing potpourri of disparate, non-cumulative and—in the aggregate—misleading morass of information.

All in all, and regardless of whether we rely on quantitative data or on more qualitative information, in any case the problem is the same, namely, to construct fact-finding categories that own sufficient discriminating power.²⁴ If our data containers are blurred, we never know to what extent and on what grounds the "unlike" is made "alike." If so, quantitative analysis may well provide more misinformation than qualitative analysis, especially on account of the aggravating circumstance that quantitative misinformation can be used without any substantive knowledge of the phenomena under consideration.

To recapitulate and conclude, I have argued that the logic of either-or cannot be replaced by the logic of more-and-less. Actually the two logics are complementary, and each has a legitimate field of application. Correlatively, polar oppositions and dichotomous confrontations cannot be dismissed: they are a necessary step in the process of concept formation. Equally, impatience with classification is totally unjustified. Rather, we often confuse a mere enumerative

²² "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics," *Comparative Politics*, (October 1968), p. 66.

²³ It hardly needs to be emphasized that certain data—and for that matter most of the data provided by external agencies—are gathered by conceptual containers which hopelessly lack discrimination. The question with our standard variables on literacy, urbanization, occupation, industrialization, and the like, is whether they really measure common underlying phenomena. It is pretty obvious that, across the world, they do not; and this is quite aside from the reliability of the data gathering agencies.

²⁴ Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. XVI-XVII.

tion (or checklist) with a classification, and many so called classifications fail to meet the minimal requirements for what they claim to be.

The overconscious thinker takes the view that if the study of politics has to be a "science," then it has to be Newton (or from Newton all the way up to Hempel). But the experimental method is hardly within the reach of political science (beyond the format of small group experimentation) and the very extent to which we are systematically turning to the comparative method of verification points to the extent to which no stronger method—including the statistical method—is available. If so, our distinctive and major problems begin where the lesson of the more exact sciences leaves off. This is tantamount to saying that a wholesale acceptance of the logic and methodology of physics may well be self-defeating, and is surely of little use for our distinctive needs. In particular, and whatever their limits, classifications remain the requisite, if preliminary, condition for any scientific discourse. As Hempel himself concedes, classificatory concepts do lend themselves to the description of observational findings and to the formulation of initial, if crude, empirical generalizations.²⁶ Moreover, a classificatory activity remains the basic instrument for introducing analytical clarity in whatever we are discussing, and leads us to discuss one thing at a time and different things at different times. Finally, and especially, we need taxonomical networks for solving our fact-finding and fact-storing problems. No comparative science of politics is plausible—on a global scale—unless we can draw on extensive *information* which is sufficiently *precise* to be meaningfully *compared*. The requisite condition for this is an adequate, relatively stable and, thereby, *additive filing system*. Such a filing system no longer is a wild dream, thanks to computer technology and facilities—except for the paradoxical fact that the more we enter the computer age, the less our fact-finding and fact-storing methods abide by any logically standardized criterion. Therefore, my concern with taxonomies is also a concern with 1) the data side of the question, and 2) our failure to provide a filing system for computer exploitation. We *have* entered the computer age—but with feet of clay.

III. THE LADDER OF ABSTRACTION

If quantification cannot solve our problems, in that we cannot measure before conceptualizing, and if, on the other hand, "conceptual stretching" is dangerously conducive to the Hegelian

²⁶ *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 54.

night in which all the cows look black (and eventually the milkman is taken for a cow), then the issue must be joined from its very beginning, that is, on the grounds of concept formation.

A few preliminary cautions should be entered. Things conceived or meaningfully perceived, i.e., concepts, are the central elements of propositions, and—depending on how they are named—provide in and by themselves guidelines of interpretation and observation. It should be understood, therefore, that I shall implicitly refer to the conceptual element problems which in a more extended treatment actually and properly belong to the rubric "propositions." By saying concept formation I implicitly point to a proposition-forming and problem-solving activity. It should also be understood, in the second place, that my focus will be on those concepts which are crucial to the discipline, that is, the concepts which Bendix describes as "generalizations in disguise."²⁶ In the third place, I propose to concentrate on the vertical members of a conceptual structure, that is, on 1) *observational terms*, and 2) the vertical disposition of such terms along a *ladder of abstraction*.

While the notion of abstraction ladder is related to the problem of the levels of analysis, the two things do not coincide. A highly abstract level of analysis may not result from "ladder climbing." Indeed a number of universal conceptualizations are not abstracted from observables: they are "theoretical terms" defined by their systemic meaning.²⁷ For instance the meaning of isomorphism, homeostasis, feedback, entropy, etc., is basically defined by the part that each concept plays in the whole theory. In other instances, however, we deal with "observational terms," that is, we arrive at highly ab-

²⁶ Reinhard Bendix, "Concepts and Generalizations in Comparative Sociological Studies," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), p. 533.

²⁷ See Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, pp. 56-57, 63-65. According to Hempel theoretical terms "usually purport to not directly observable entities and their characteristics. . . . They function . . . in scientific theories intended to explain generalizations": "The Theoretician's Dilemma," in Feigl, Scriven and Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), vol. II, p. 42. While it is admittedly difficult to draw a neat division between theoretical and observational terms, it is widely recognized that the former cannot be reduced to, nor derived from, the latter. For a recent assessment of the controversy, see A. Meotti, "L'Eliminazione dei Termini Teorici," in *Rivista di Filosofia*, 2 (1969), pp. 119-134.

stract levels of conceptualization via ladder climbing, via abstractive inferences from observables. For instance, terms such as group, communication, conflict, and decision can either be used in a very abstract or in a very concrete meaning, either in some very distant relation to observables or with reference to direct observations. In this case we have, then, "empirical concepts" which can be located at, and moved along, very different points of a ladder of abstraction. If so, we have the problem of assessing the level of abstraction at which observational or (in this sense) empirical concepts are located, and the rules of transformation thus resulting. And this seems to be the pertinent focus for the issue under consideration, for our fundamental problem is how to make extensional gains (by climbing the abstraction ladder) without having to suffer unnecessary losses in precision and empirical testability.

The problem can be neatly underpinned with reference to the distinction, and relation, between the *extension* (denotation) and *intension* (connotation) of a term. A standard definition is as follows: "The extension of a word is the class of *things* to which the word applies; the intension of a word is the collection of *properties* which determine the things to which the word applies."²⁸ Likewise, the denotation of a word is the totality of objects indicated by that word; and the connotation is the totality of characteristics anything must possess to be in the denotation of that word.²⁹

Now, there are apparently two ways of climbing a ladder of abstraction. One is to broaden the extension of a concept by diminishing its attributes or properties, i.e., by reducing its connotation. In this case a more "general," or more inclusive, concept can be obtained without any loss of precision. The larger the class, the lesser its differentiae; but those differentiae that remain, remain precise. Moreover, following this procedure we obtain conceptualizations which, no matter how all-embracing, still bear a traceable relation to a collection of specifics, and—out of being amenable to identifiable sets of specifics—lend themselves to empirical testing.

On the other hand, this is hardly the procedure implied by "conceptual stretching," which adds up to being an attempt to augment the ex-

tension without diminishing the intension: *the denotation is extended by obfuscating the connotation*. As a result we do not obtain a more general concept, but its counterfeit, a mere generality (where the pejorative "mere" is meant to restore the distinction between correct and incorrect ways of subsuming a term under a broader genus.) While a general concept can be said to represent a collection of specifics, a mere generality cannot be underpinned, out of its indefiniteness, by specifics. And while a general concept is conducive to scientific "generalizations," mere generalities are conducive only to vagueness and conceptual obscurity.

The rules for climbing and descending along a ladder of abstraction are thus very simple rules—in principle. We make a concept more abstract and more general by lessening its properties or attributes. Conversely, a concept is specified by the addition (or unfolding) of qualifications, i.e., by augmenting its attributes or properties. If so, let us pass on to consider a ladder of abstraction as such. It is self-evident that along the abstraction ladder one obtains very different degrees of inclusiveness and, conversely, specificity. These differences can be usefully underpinned—for the purposes of comparative politics—by distinguishing three levels of abstraction, labeled, in shorthand, HL (high level), ML (medium level), and LL (low level).

High level categorizations obtain universal conceptualizations: whatever connotation is sacrificed to the requirement of global denotation—either in space, time, or even both.³⁰ HL concepts can also be visualized as the ultimate genus which cancels all its species. Descending a step, medium level categorizations fall short of universality and thus can be said to obtain general classes: at this level not all differentiae are sacrificed to extensional requirements. Nonetheless, ML concepts are intended to stress similarities at the expense of uniqueness, for at this level of abstraction we are typically dealing with generalizations. Finally, low level categories obtain specific, indeed configurative conceptualizations: here denotation is sacrificed to accuracy of connotation. One may equally say that with LL categories the differentiae of individual settings are stressed above their similarities: so much so that at this level definitions are often contextual.

A couple of examples may be usefully entered in a perceptive essay which runs parallel to an

²⁸ I quote from Wesley C. Salmon, *Logic* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 90-91. The distinction is more or less the same in any textbook of logic.

²⁹ "Connotation" is also applied, more broadly, to the associations, or associated conceptions brought to mind by the use of a word. As indicated by the text, I intend here the narrower meaning.

³⁰ The space and time dimensions of concepts are often associated with the geography versus history debate. I would rather see it as the "when goes with when?" question, that is, as a calendar time versus historical time dilemma. But this line of development cannot be pursued here.

line of thinking Neil J. Smelser makes the point that, for purposes of comparability, "staff is more satisfactory than administration . . . , and administration is more satisfactory than civil service."³¹ This is so, according to Smelser, because the concept of civil service "is literally useless in connection with societies without a formal state or governmental apparatus." In this respect "the concept of administration is somewhat superior . . . but even this term is quite culture-bound." Hence the more helpful term is "Weber's concept of staff . . . since it can encompass without embarrassment various political arrangements . . ."³² In my own terms the argument would be rephrased as follows. In the field of so-called comparative public administration, "staff" is the high level universal category. "Administration" is still a good travelling category, but falls short of universal applicability in that it retains some of the attributes associated with the more specific notion of "bureaucracy." Descending the ladder of abstraction further we then find "civil service," which is qualified by its associations with the modern State. Finally, and to pursue the argument all the way down to the low level of abstraction, a comparative study of, say, French and English state employees will discover their unique and distinguishing traits and would thus provide contextual definitions.

The example suggested by Smelser is fortunate in that we are offered a choice of terms, so that (whatever the choice) a different level of abstraction can be identified by a different denomination. The next example is illustrative, instead, of the far less fortunate situation in which we may have to perform across the whole ladder of abstraction with one and same term. In illustrating his caution that many concepts are "generalizations in disguise," Bendix comes across such a simple concept as "village." Yet he notes that the term village may be misleading when applied to Indian society, where "the minimum degree of cohesion commonly associated with this term is absent."³³ Even in such a simple case, then, a scholar is required to place the various associations of "village" along an abstraction ladder in accord with the travelling extension afforded by each connotation.

Clearly, there is no hard and fast dividing line between levels of abstraction. Borders can only be drawn very loosely; and the number of slices

into which the ladder is divided largely depends on how fine one's analysis needs to be. Three slices are sufficient, however, for the purposes of logical analysis. And my major concern is, in this connection, with what goes on at the upper end of the ladder, at the crucial juncture at which we cross the border between medium level general concepts and high level universals. The issue may be formulated as follows: how far up can an observational term be pushed without self-denying results?

In principle the extension of a concept should not be broadened beyond the point at which at least one relatively precise connotation (property or attribute) is retained. In practice, however, the requirement of positive identification may be too exacting. But even if no minimal positive identification can be afforded, I do not see how we can renounce the requirement of negative identification. The crucial distinction would thus be between 1) concepts defined by negation or *ex adverso*, i.e., by saying what they are *not*, and 2) concepts *without negation*, i.e., no-opposite concepts, conceptions without specified termination or boundaries. The logical principle involved in this distinction is *omnis determinatio est negatio*, that is, any determination involves a negation. According to this principle the former concepts are, no matter how broad, *determinate*; whereas the latter are indeterminate, literally *without termination*.

If this principle is applied to the climbing process along a ladder of abstraction, and precisely to the point at which ML categories are turned into HL universals, in the first instance we obtain *empirical universals*, whereas in the second instance we obtain universals which lack empirical value—*pseudo-universals* for an empirical science. The reason for this is that a concept qualified by a negation may, or may not, be found to apply to the real world; whereas a non-bounded concept always applies by definition: having no specified termination, there is no way of ascertaining whether it applies to the real world or not. An empirical universal is such because it still points to *something*; whereas a non-empirical universal indiscriminately points to *everything* (as any researcher on the field soon discovers).

The group concept lends itself nicely as an illustration of the foregoing (other examples will be discussed in greater detail later), and is very much to the point in that it represents the first large scale attempt to meet the travelling problem of comparative politics. In the group theory of politics (Bentley, David Truman, and Earl Lathan being the obvious references) it is clear enough that "group" becomes an all-embracing category: not only an analytical construct (as the

³¹ "Notes on the Methodology of Comparative Analysis of Economic Activity," *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology*, 1967, International Sociological Association, vol. II, p. 103.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Bendix, "Concepts and Generalizations. . . ," p. 536.

queer and unclear terminology of the discipline (would have it), but definitely a universal construct. However, we are never really told what group is *not*. Not only "group" applies *everywhere*, as any universal should; it equally applies to *everything*, that is, never and nowhere shall we encounter non-groups.³⁴ If so, how is it that the group theory of politics has been followed—in the fifties—by a great deal of empirical research? The reply is that the research was not guided by the universal construct but by intuitive concrete conceptualizations. Hence the "indefinite group" of the theory, and the "concrete groups" of the research, fall wide apart. The unfortunate consequences are not only that the research lacks theoretical backing (for want of medium level categories, and especially of a taxonomic framework), but that the vagueness of the theory has no fit for the specificity of the findings. We are thus left with a body of literature that gives the frustrating feeling of dismantling theoretically whatever it discovers empirically.

There is, then, a break-off point in the search for universal inclusiveness beyond which we have, theoretically, a "nullification of the problem" and, empirically, what may be called an "empirical vaporization." This is the point at which a concept is not even determined *ex adverso*. By saying that no-opposite universals are of no empirical use I do not imply that they are utterly useless. But I do wish to say that whenever notions such as groups or—as in my subsequent examples—pluralism, integration, participation, and mobilization, obtain no termination, i.e., remain indeterminate, they provide only tags, chapter headings, i.e., the main entries of a filing system. From an empirical point of view pseudo-universals are only funnels of approach and can only perform, so to speak, an allusive function.

Turning to the middle slice—the fat slice of the medium level categories—it will suffice to note that at this level we are required to perform the whole set of operations that some authors call "definition by analysis," that is, the process of defining a term by finding the genus to which the object designated by the word belongs, and then specifying the attributes which

distinguish such object from all the other species of the same genus. When Apter complains that our "analytical categories are too general when they are theoretical, and too descriptive where they are not,"³⁵ I understand this complaint to apply to our disorderly leaps from observational findings all the way up to universal categories—and vice versa—by-passing as it were the stage of definition by analysis. Apter is quite right in pleading for "better intermediate analytical categories." But these intermediate categories cannot be constructed, I fear, as long as our contempt for the taxonomical exercise leaves us with an atrophied medium level of abstraction.

The low level of abstraction may appear uninteresting to the comparative scholar. He would be wrong, however, on two counts. First, when the comparative scholar is engaged in field work, the more his fact-finding categories are brought down to this level, the better his research. Second, it is the evidence obtained nation-by-nation, or region-by-region (or whatever the unit of analysis may be) that helps us decide which classification works, or which new criterion of classification should be developed.

While classifying must abide by logical rules logic has nothing to do with the usefulness of a classificatory system. Botanists, mineralogists, and zoologists have not created their taxonomical trees as a matter of mere logical unfolding: that is, they have not imposed their "classes" upon their animals, any more than their animal (flowers or minerals) have imposed themselves upon their classifiers. Let it be added that the information requirements of such an unsettled science as a science of politics can hardly be satisfied by single-purpose classifications (not to mention single-purpose checklists). As I have stressed, we desperately need standard fact-finding and fact-storing containers (concepts). But this standardization is only possible and fruitful on the basis of "multi-purpose" and, at the limit, all-purpose classifications. Now, whether a classification may serve multiple purposes, and which classification fits this requirement best, this is something we discover inductively, that is, starting from the bottom of the ladder of abstraction.

The overall discussion is recapitulated in Table 1 with respect to its bearing on the problems of comparative politics. A few additional comments are in order. In the first place, reference to three levels of abstraction brings out the inadequacy of merely distinguishing between

³⁴ This criticism is perhaps unfair to David Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951). However, in spite of its penetrating anatomy the pace of the enquiry is set by the sentence that "an excessive preoccupation with definition will only prove a handicap" (p. 23). For a development of this line of criticism see G. Sartori, "Gruppi di Pressione o Gruppi di Interesse?" *Il Mulino*, 1959, pp. 7-42.

³⁵ David E. Apter, "Political Studies and the Search for a Framework," (pp. 15-16 mns.) to be published in C. Allen, W. Johnson (eds.), *African Perspectives*, Cambridge University Press.

TABLE 1. LADDER OF ABSTRACTION

Levels of Abstraction	Major Comparative Scope and Purpose	Logical and Empirical Properties of Concepts
HL: <i>High Level Categories</i> Universal conceptualizations	Cross-area comparisons among heterogeneous contexts (global theory)	Maximal extension Minimal intension Definition by negation
ML: <i>Medium Level Categories</i> General conceptualizations and taxonomies	Intra-area comparisons among relatively homogeneous contexts (middle range theory)	Balance of denotation with connotation Definition by analysis, i.e. per genus et differentiam
LL: <i>Low Level Categories</i> Configurative conceptualizations	Country by country analysis (narrow-gauge theory)	Maximal intension Minimal extension Contextual definition

"broad" and "narrow" meanings of a term.³⁶ For this does not clarify, whenever this is necessary, whether we distinguish, 1) between HL universal and ML general conceptualizations, or 2) between ML genres and species or, 3) between ML and LL categories, or even 4) between HL universal and LL configurative conceptualizations.

In the second place, and more important, reference to the ladder of abstraction forcibly highlights the drastic loss of logical articulation, indeed the gigantic leap, implied by the argument that *all* differences are "a matter of degree." This cannot be conceded, to begin with, at the level of universal categories. But all differences cannot be considered a matter of more-or-less at the medium level either. At the top we inevitably begin with opposite pairs, with polar opposites, and this is tantamount to saying that the top ML categories definitely and only establish differences in *kind*. From here downwards definitions are obtained via the logic of classification, and this implies that a logic of gradation cannot be applied as long as we establish differences between species. Differences in degree obtain only after having established that two or more objects have the same attributes or properties, i.e., belong to the same species. Indeed, it is only *within* the same class that we are entitled—and indeed required—to ask which object has more or less of an attribute or property.

In principle, then, it is a fallacy to apply the logic of gradation whenever ladder climbing (or descending) is involved. If we are reminded that along the ladder we augment the extension by diminishing the denotation (and vice versa), what is at stake here is the presence or absence of a given property; and this is not a matter of

degree, but a matter of establishing the level of abstraction. Hence it is only after having settled at a given level of abstraction that considerations of more-and-less correctly apply. And the rule of thumb seems to be that the higher the level of abstraction, the less a degree language applies (as anything but a metaphor); whereas the lower level of abstraction, the more a degree optics correctly and necessarily applies, and the more we profit from graduation concepts.

In the third place, and equally important, reference to the ladder of abstraction casts many doubts on the optimistic view—largely shared by the methodological literature—that "The more universal a proposition, i.e., the greater the number of events a proposition accounts for, the more potential falsifiers can be found, and the more informative is the proposition."³⁷ The sentence suggests a simultaneous and somewhat natural progression of universality, falsifiers and informative content. It seems to me, instead, that reference to the correct technique of ladder climbing (and descending) confronts us at all points with choosing between range of explanation (thereby including the explanation of the relationships among the items under investigation), and accuracy of description (or informative accuracy). By saying that the "informative content" of a proposition grows by climbing the abstraction ladder, we should not be misled into understanding that we are supplying more descriptive information. Hence it is dubious whether we are really supplying more potential falsifiers (let alone the danger of "overly universal" propositions of no informative value for which falsifiers cannot be found).

Before concluding it should not pass unno-

³⁶ The same caution applies to the distinctions between micro and macro, or between molecular and molar. These distinctions are insufficient for the purpose of underpinning the level of analysis.

³⁷ I quote Erik Allardt, "The Merger of American and European Traditions of Sociological Research: Contextual Analysis," *Social Science Information*, 1 (1968), p. 165. But the sentence is illustrative of a current mood.

ticed that in this section I have never used the word "variable," nor mentioned operational definitions, nor invoked indicators. Equally, my reference to gradation concepts and to considerations of more-or-less has been, so far, entirely pre-quantitative. What is noteworthy, then, is the length that has been travelled before entering the problems which seem to monopolize our methodological awareness. There is nothing wrong, to be sure, in taking up an argument at whichever point we feel that we have something to say—except that the tail of the methodological argument should not be mistaken for its beginning. Since I have taken up the issue at an early stage, I cannot possibly carry it through to its end. It behooves me, nonetheless, to indicate how I would plug what I have said into what shall have to remain unsaid.³⁸

For one thing, it should be understood that by considering concepts—the genus—I have not excluded the consideration of variables, which are a species. That is, a variable is still a concept; but a concept is not necessarily a variable. If all concepts could be turned into variables, the difference could be considered provisional. Unfortunately, as a scholar well versed in quantitative analysis puts it, "all the most interesting variables are nominal."³⁹ Which is the same as saying that all the most interesting concepts are not variables in the proper, strict sense of implying "the possibility of measurement in the most exact sense of the word."⁴⁰

A closely linked and similar argument applies to the operationist requirement. Just as concepts are not necessarily variables, definitions are not necessarily operational. The definitional requirement for a concept is that its *meaning* is declared, while operational definitions are required to state the conditions, indeed the operations, by means of which a concept can be *verified* and, ultimately, measured. Accordingly we may usefully distinguish between definition of meaning and operational definition. And while it is obvious that an operational definition still is a declaration of meaning, the reverse is not true.

³⁸In this latter connection an excellent reader still is P. F. Lazarsfeld and M. Rosenberg (eds.), *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955). See also its largely revised and updated revision, R. Boudon and P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Méthodes de la Sociologie*, 2 Vols. (Paris and La Haye: Mouton, 1965–1966).

³⁹Richard Rose, "Social Measure and Public Policy in Britain—The Empiricizing Process," *mns*, p. 8.

⁴⁰Lazarsfeld and Barton in Lerner and Lasswell, *The Policy Sciences*, p. 170. This notably excludes, for the authors, the application of "variable" to items that can be ranked but not measured.

The contention often is that definition of meaning represents a pre-scientific age of definition, which should be superseded in scientific discourse by operational definitions. However, this contention can hardly meet the problems of concept formation, and indeed appears to ignore them. As the ladder of abstraction scheme helps to underline, among the many possible ways and procedures of defining the *ex adverso* definitions and taxonomic unfoldings (or definition by analysis) some correspond to different levels of analysis and play, at each level, a non-replaceable role. Moreover operational definitions generally entail a drastic curtailment of meaning for they can only maintain those meanings that comply with the operationist requirement. Now, we are surely required to reduce ambiguity by cutting down the range of meanings of concepts. But the operational criterion of reducing ambiguity entails drastic losses in conceptual richness and explanatory power. Take, for instance, the suggestion that "social class" should be dismissed and replaced by a set of operational statements relating to income, occupation, educational level, etc. If the suggestion were adopted wholesale, the loss of conceptual substance would be not only considerable, but unjustified. The same applies, to cite another instance, to "power." To be concerned with the measurement of power does not imply that the meaning of the concept should be reduced to what can be measured about power—the latter view would make human behavior in whatever collective sphere almost inexplicable.

It should be understood, therefore, that operational definitions implement, but do not replace, definitions of meaning. Indeed there must be a conceptualization before we engage in operationalization. As Hempel recommends, operational definitions should not be "emphasized at the neglect of the requirement of systematic import."⁴¹ This is also to say that definitions of meaning of theoretical import, hardly operational definitions, account for the dynamics of intellectual discovery and stimulation. Finally, it should be understood that empirical testing occurs before, and also without, operational definitions. Testing is any method of checking correspondence with reality by the use of pertinent observations; hence the decisive difference brought

⁴¹*Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*, p. 60. At p. 47 Hempel writes: "It is precisely the discovery of concepts with theoretical import which advances scientific understanding; and such discovery requires scientific inventiveness and cannot be replaced by the—certainly indispensable, but also definitely insufficient—operationist or empiricist requirement of empirical import alone."

about by operationalization is verification, or falsification, by measurement.⁴²

Speaking of testing, indicators are indeed precious "testing helpers." As a matter of fact it is difficult to see how theoretical terms could be empiricized and tested otherwise, that is, without having recourse to indicators. Indicators are also expedient shortcuts for the empirical checking of observational terms. Yet the question remains: Indicators of what? If we have fuzzy concepts, the fuzziness will remain as it is. That is to say that indicators cannot, in and by themselves, sharpen our concepts and relieve us from composing and decomposing them along a ladder of abstraction.

IV. COMPARATIVE FALLACIES: AN ILLUSTRATION

We may now confront in more detail how the ladder of abstraction scheme brings out the snares and the faults of our current way of handling the travelling problem of comparative politics. For we may now settle at a less rarified level of discussion and proceed on the basis of examples. It is pretty obvious that my line of analysis largely cuts across the various theories and schools that propose themselves for adoption in comparative politics, for my basic preoccupation is with the ongoing work of the "normal science," i.e., with the common conceptual problems of the discipline. Nonetheless it will be useful to enter here a somewhat self-contained illustration which bears not only on discrete concepts, but equally on a theoretical framework. I have thus selected for my first detailed discussion the categories of "structure" and "function," and this precisely on account of their crucial role in establishing the structural-functional approach in the political science setting.⁴³

In introducing his pioneering comparative volume, Almond boldly asserts: "What we have

done is to separate political function from political structure."⁴⁴ This separation is indeed crucial. But ten years have gone by and the assignment remains largely unfulfilled. Indeed the structural-functional school of thought is still grappling—with clear symptoms of frustration—with the preliminary difficulty of defining "function"—both taken by itself and in its relation to "structure."⁴⁵

Whether function can be simply conceived as an "activity" performed by structures; or whether it is more proper to construe function as an "effect";⁴⁶ or whether function should be conceived only as a "relation" among structures⁴⁷—this controversy turns out to be largely immaterial in the light of our substantive performance. That is to say, if our attention turns to the functional vocabulary in actual use, a perusal of the literature quickly reveals two

⁴⁴Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 59.

⁴⁵It should be understood that by now the structural-functional label applies to a widely scattered group operating on premises which are largely at variance.

⁴⁶This focus was suggested by R. K. Merton, whose concern was to separate function—defined as an "observable objective consequence"—from "subjective disposition," i.e., aims, motives and purposes (*Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe: The Free Press, rev. ed., 1957, p. 24 and, *passim*, pp. 19–84.) In attempting to meet the difficulties raised by the Mertonian focus, Robert T. Holt construes functions as "sub-types" of effects, and precisely as the "system-relevant effects of structures"; understanding system-relevance as the "system-requiredness" which is determined, in turn, by the "functional requisites" of a given system. ("A Proposed Structural-Functional Framework," in Charlesworth, *Contemporary Political Analysis*, pp. 88–90). My own position is that Merton overstated his case thereby creating for his followers unnecessary and unsettled complications.

⁴⁷This is the mathematical meaning of function. E.G. according to Fred W. Riggs in systems theory function refers to "a relation between structures." ("Some Problems with Systems Theory—The Importance of Structure," mimeographed p. 8. A redrafted version is scheduled for publication in Michael Haas and Henry Kariel (eds.), *Approaches to the Study of Political Science*, (Chandler Publishing Co.) There are problems, however, also with this definition. In particular, while the mathematical meaning of function is suited for whole systems analysis, it hardly suits the needs of segmented systems analysis.

⁴²This is not to say that operationalization allows *eo ipso* for quantitative measurements, but to suggest that either operational definitions are ultimately conducive to measurement, or may not be worthwhile.

⁴³I specify political science setting to avoid the unnecessary regression to Malinowski and Radcliff-Brown. This is also to explain why I set aside the contributions of Talcott Parsons and of Marion J. Levy. Flanigan and Fogelman distinguish between three major streams, labeled 1) eclectic functionalism, 2) empirical functionalism (Merton), and 3) structural-functional analysis. ("Functional Analysis," in Charlesworth, *Contemporary Political Analysis*, pp. 72–79). My discussion exclusively applies to part of the latter.

things: a tantalizing anarchy (on this more later), and, second, that the functional terminology employed most of the time by most practitioners definitely carries a purposive or teleological connotation. Skillful verbal camouflage may well push the teleological implication in the background. Yet it is hard to find a functional argumentation which really escapes, in the final analysis, *Zweckrationalität*, what Max Weber called rationality of ends.⁴⁸ We may well quarrel about the definition;⁴⁹ yet the substance of the matter remains that the definitional controversy has little bearing on our subsequent proceedings. If so, it suits my purposes to settle for the way in which most people use "function" in practice (regardless of how they theorize about it), and thereby to settle for the common sense, unsophisticated meaning.

When we say, somewhat naively, that structures "have functions," we are interested in the reason for being of structures: we are implying, that is, that structures exist *for* some end, purpose, destination or assignment.⁵⁰ This is tantamount to saying that "function" points to a means-end relationship (which becomes, from a systemic viewpoint, also a part-whole relationship), i.e., that function is the activity performed by a structure—the means—vis-à-vis its

⁴⁸ Rationality of ends should not be confused with *Wertrationalität*, value rationality, among other reasons because in the former perspective all conceivable ends can be hypothesized as being equally valid. Hence in the *Zweckrationalität* perspective there is little point in unmasking functions as "eu-functions" or, conversely, as "caco-functions." Whether the good goals of one man are the bad goals of the next man becomes relevant only if we enter a normative, *Wertrationalität* discussion.

⁴⁹ For the many additional intricacies of the subject that I must neglect, a recent, interesting reader largely focussed on the "debate over functionalism" is N. J. Demerath and R. A. Peterson (eds.), *System, Change and Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1967). For a critical statement of the inherent limitations of functionalism see W. C. Runciman, *Social and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 109-123. Hempel equally takes a critical view of "the logic of functional analysis" (in Gross, *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, pp. 271-307), but his standpoint is often far removed from our problems.

⁵⁰ This is not to fall prey to the subjectivistic fallacy on which Merton builds his case (*supra*, note 46). Purpose may be a "motivation" of the actor, but may equally be—as it is in teleological analysis—an "imputation" of the observer.

ascribed or actually served purpose.⁵¹ Conversely, dis-function, non-functionality, and the like, indicate—from different angles—that the assigned purpose is not served by a given structure. And this current usage of function goes a long way to explain, in turn, our difficulties with structure.

The major problem with "structure" is, in fact, that political bodies and institutions largely bear, if not a functional denomination, a functional definition. Either under the sheer force of names—which is in itself a tremendous force—or for the sake of brevity, political structures are seldom adequately defined on their own terms—*qua* structures. That is to say, on the one hand, that we dispose of a functional (purposive) vocabulary, whereas we badly lack a structural (descriptive) vocabulary; and that, on the other hand, even when we deliberately ask "what is," we are invariably prompted to reply in terms of "what for." What is an election? A means (a structure) *for* electing office holders. What is a legislature? An arrangement *for* producing legislation. What is a government? A set-up *for* governing. The structure is almost invariably perceived and qualified by its salient function.⁵² This makes a great deal of sense in practical politics, but represents a serious handicap for the understanding of politics.

The plain fact is, then, that the structural-functional analyst is a lame scholar. He claims to walk on two feet, but actually stands on one foot—and a bad foot at that. He cannot really visualize the interplay between "structure" and "function" because the two terms are seldom, if ever, neatly disjoined: the structure remains throughout a twin brother of its imputed func-

⁵¹ "Unintended functions"—the fact that structures may serve ends and obtain results which were neither foreseen nor desired by the structure builders—can be entered, for the economy of my argument, into the list of the purposes actually served. Likewise "latent functions" are immaterial to my point.

⁵² Riggs makes the same point, namely, that "current terminology quite confusingly links structural and functional meanings" from the opposite angle that expressions such as "legislature and public administrator . . . are normally defined structurally, the first as an elected assembly, the second as a bureaucratic office"; but then goes on to say that "the words . . . also imply functions" (p. 23 of the paper cit. *supra*, note 47). It should be understood, therefore, that my "structural definition" calls for a thorough structural description. If the argument were left at defining a legislature as an elected assembly, then it can be made either way, as Riggs does.

tional purposes. And here we enter a somewhat vicious whirl which leads the approach to conclusions which, if true, would be self-denying.

Whatever else the structural-functional scholar may have failed to discover, he feels pretty sure about three points: first, no structure is unifunctional, i.e., performs only one function; second, the same structure can be multifunctional, i.e., can perform across different countries widely different functions; third, and therefore, the same function has structural alternatives, i.e., can be performed by very different structures. Now, to some extent these points are undeniable—but only to the extent sensed at any time by any perceptive comparative scholar. My quarrel is with the emphasis, which is unwarranted and positively misleading.

Is it really the *same* structure that functions differently? Or is the functional performance different because the structure is not the same? The thesis generally lacks adequate evidence on the structural side. For instance, "elections" are multifunctional (they may well serve the purpose of legitimizing a despot), but "free elections" are not.⁵³ That is to say, as soon as the electoral process obtains a structural underpinning—the minute and multiple structural conditions that make for free voting—electoral multifunctionality rapidly comes to an end. If the voter is offered alternatives, if the candidates are free to compete, if fraudulent counting is impossible, then free elections do serve—everywhere—the purpose of allowing an electorate to select and dismiss office holders. In view of this primary, fundamental purpose the *same* electoral structure (same in providing all the necessary safeties) either approaches unifunctionality, or leaves us with non-functionality, e.g., with the finding that illiterate voters are unable to use electoral mechanisms which presuppose literacy.

While the most serious problem and default is that the structures are inadequately pinpointed and described, let me hasten to add that we are not performing much better from the functional end of the argument. For our functional categories also generally lack adequate underpinning. Surprisingly enough—if one considers the far greater ease with which the functional side of the problem can be attacked—our functions tend to be as unhelpful as our structures.

For instance, if one asks, "Why a party system?" the least challengeable and most inclusive reply might be that parties perform a communi-

cation function. And if the problem is left at that, it easily follows that the authorities and the citizens "communicate," in some sense, in any polity, i.e., even when no party system exists. Hence party systems have structural alternatives—*quod erat demonstrandum*. But the problem cannot be left at that, i.e., with an unbounded, no-difference notion of communication which nullifies the problem. And the underpinning of communication brings out, first, that there is an essential difference between up-going and descending communication, and, second, that it is equally important to distinguish between "communication-information" and "communication-pressure." If so, to define a party system as an instrument for "communicating" demands and conveying "information" to the authorities, is to miss the point. A party system is, in reality, a mechanism for *sustaining* demands—and *pressing* demands—all the way through to policy implementation. What is at stake, then, is the passage from a two-way (reversible) communication-information to a prevalence of up-going communication-pressure. And for this latter purpose we have not devised, so far, any structural alternative. A party system turns out to be, therefore, a non-replaceable, *unique structure* as soon as we spell out its distinctive, crucial reason for being.

A more careful scrutiny goes to show, then, that the multi-functional, multi-structural argument has been pushed far too far, indeed to the point of becoming erroneous. Aside from the error, the irony of the situation is that, as it stands, the thesis appears self-defeating. If the same structure performs utterly different functions in different countries, and if we can always find structural alternatives for whatever function, what is the use of structural-functional analysis?

Pulling the threads together, I need not spend much time in arguing that the stalemate and the mishandlings of the structural-functional approach have a lot to do with the ladder of abstraction.

On the functional side of the coin we are encumbered by a wealth of haphazard functional categories which are merely enumerated (hardly classified according to some criterion, and even less according to the logical requirements of a taxonomical tree-type unfolding), and definitely provide no clues as to the level and type of analysis (e.g., total versus partial systems analysis) to which they apply.⁵⁴ As a result the global

⁵³ I cite the title of W. J. M. MacKenzie's book *Free Elections*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958) to imply that a real structural underpinning may well presuppose a hundred-page description.

⁵⁴ A sheer list of the functional denominations, roles or attributions scattered throughout the literature on political parties suffices to illustrate the point, and would be as follows: participation,

functional argument developed by a number of structural-functionalists remains suspended in mid-air—for lack of a coordinated medium level axonomic support—and is left to play with over-stretched, if not contentless, functional universals.

On the structural side of the coin we are confronted, instead, with little more than nothing. Structures qualified on their own right hardly exist—at least in the Almond line of thinking.⁵⁵ This is all the more regrettable in view of the fact that while functions are meant to be (at least in global comparative politics) broad explanatory categories which do not require a low level specification, structures bear, instead, a closer relation to observables, and definitely need under-pinning all the way down the ladder. With structures understood as organizational structures we are required, in fact, to descend the ladder all the way down to low level configurative-descriptive accounts.

Starting from the top, one can identify—with the help of minor terminological devices—at least four different levels of analysis: 1) structural principles (e.g., pluralism), 2) structural conditions (e.g., the class or the economic structure), 3) organizational patterns (with relation to membership systems), 4) specific organizational structures (e.g. constitutions). By saying “structural principles” I mean that as an HL category the notion of structure can only point to the principles according to which the component part of politics, or of societies, are related to each other. With reference, instead, to the low level of abstraction it should be clear that con-

electioneering, mobilization, extraction, regulation, control, integration, cohesive function, moderating function, consensus maintenance, simplification of alternatives, reconciliation, adaptation, aggregation, mediation, conflict resolution, brokerage, recruitment, policy making, expression, communication, linkage, channelment, conversion, legitimizing function, democratization, labelling function.

⁵⁵ I make specific reference to Almond because I believe that his very conception of structure is largely responsible for this outcome. For instance, “By structure we mean the observable activities which make up the political system. To refer to these activities as having a structure simply implies that there is a certain regularity to them.” (Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1966, p. 21). In the subsequent paragraph one reads: “We refer to particular sets of roles which are related to one another as *structures*.” Under such porous and excessively sociological criteria, “structure” becomes evanescent.

stitutions and statutes are not the “real structure. Nonetheless behavior under written rules is easier to pin down than behavior under diffuse roles, and excessive anti-formalism leads us to neglect organizational theory and the extent to which legally enforced regulations do mold behavior.

In summing up, not only has the structural-functional scholar ignored the ladder of abstraction, but he has inadvertently destroyed, during his reckless climbing, his own ladder.⁵⁶ So much so that the approach encounters exactly the same perplexity as, say, general systems theory, namely, “Why has no scholar succeeded in presenting a structural-functional formulation which meets the requirements of empirical analysis.”⁵⁷ Now, it is hardly surprising that the general systems theorist should encounter great difficulties in deriving testable propositions about politics, since he is required to proceed deductively on the basis of theoretical primitives.⁵⁸ But this is not the case with the structural-functional approach, which is not necessarily committed to whole systems analysis and enjoys the distinctive empirical advantage of leaning extensively—especially with segmented systems analysis—on observational terms.⁵⁹ So, why should the struc-

⁵⁶ This complaint is ad hoc, but could be expanded at length. On the general lack of logical and methodological status of the approach two strong critical statements are: R. E. Dowse, “A Functionalist’s Logic,” *World Politics*, (July 1966), 607-622; and A. L. Kalleberg, “The Logic of Comparison,” *World Politics*, 18 (October 1966), 69-82. While the two authors are overconscious thinkers, I would certainly agree with Dowse’s concluding sentence, namely, that “to ignore trivial logical points is to risk being not even trivially true” (p. 622).

⁵⁷ Flanigan and Fogelman in Charlesworth, *Contemporary Political Analysis* pp. 82-83.

⁵⁸ On general systems theory one may usefully consult Oran R. Young, *Systems of Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), Chap. 2. See also Giuliano Urbani, “General Systems Theory: Un Nuovo Strumento per l’Analisi dei Sistemi Politici?,” *Il Politico*, 4 (1968), 795-819.

⁵⁹ While there is some controversy on the respective merits and shortcomings of the two strategies the structural-functional approach is not inherently tied to either one. For the partial versus whole systems controversy the two stances are well represented by J. LaPalombara, who favors the segmented approach. (cf. esp. “Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics: An Anti-Scholastic View,” in R. T. Holt and J. E. Turner (eds.), *The Methodology of Comparative Re-*

tural-functional scholar remain tied to "a level of analysis which [does] not permit empirical testing?"⁶⁰ According to my diagnosis there is no intrinsic reason for this. Quite to the contrary, we may expect very rewarding returns, and the empirical promise (and distinctiveness) of the approach may well near fulfillment, if we only learn how to maneuver along a ladder of abstraction.

Let us now pass on to a more loose discussion—the second part of this illustration—for which I have selected a somewhat different family of categories: pluralism, integration, participation and mobilization.⁶¹ While one may think of many other examples that would suit my purposes just as well, the four categories in question are representative in that they are used for significant theoretical developments not only under a variety of different frameworks, but also by the non-affiliated scholar, thereby including—in the case of participation and mobilization—the scholar who happens to be interested only in statistical manipulations.

Given the fact that pluralism, integration, participation and mobilization are culture-bound concepts which may reflect—as far as we know at the outset—a distinctive Western experience, the methodological caveat here is that the reference area should make for the starting point of the investigation. So to speak, we are required to elaborate our culture-bound concepts in a "we-they" clockwise direction. It is proper, therefore, to start with the question: How do we understand pluralism, integration, participation and mobilization in their domestic, original context?

At home "pluralism" does not apply to societal and/or political structure, nor to interplay between a plurality of actors. Pluralism came to be used, in the Western literature, to convey the idea that a pluralistic society is a society whose structural configuration is shaped by pluralistic beliefs, namely, that all kinds of autonomous sub-units should develop at all levels, that interests are recognized in their legitimate diversity, and

that dissent, not unanimity, represents the basis of civility. Pluralism is indeed—as already noted—a highly abstract structural *principle*. Yet the term points to a *particular* societal structure—not merely to a developed stage of differentiation and specialization—and does retain a wealth of characterizing connotations whenever we discuss in the Western democracies, our internal policies and problems.

"Integration" can be conceived as an end-state, as a process, or as a function performed by integrating agencies (parties, interest groups, etc.). In any case, in the Western politics integration is not applied to *whatever* kind of "putting together," to *whatever* state of amalgamation. For instance, when American scholars discuss their own domestic problems, they have definite ideas of what is, and what is not, integration. They would deny that integration has anything to do with "enforcing uniformity." They are likely to assume, instead, that integration both presupposes and generates a pluralistic society (as qualified above). And, surely, an integrative agency is required to obtain a maximum of coalescence and solidarity with a minimum of coercion.⁶²

Similar points can be made with regard to participation and mobilization. Regardless of whether "participation" is used normatively (as pointing to a basic tenet of the democratic ideal) or descriptively (as reflecting a democratic experience), in either case in our domestic discussions participation is not any such kind of "taking part." Thus the advocates of a participatory democracy are hardly satisfied by any kind of involvement in politics. To them participation means *self-motion*; it does not mean being manipulated or coerced into motion. And surely the original definite meaning of the term conveys the idea of a free citizen who acts and intervenes—if he so wishes—according to *his* best judgement. So conceived, participation is the very opposite, or the very reverse, of mobilization. Mobilization does not convey the idea of individual self-motion, but the idea of a malleable, passive collectivity which is being *put into motion* at the whim of persuasive—and more than persuasive—authorities. We say that indi-

search, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-149); and, for the contrary view, Fred W. Riggs (cf. especially his forthcoming essay in Haas and Kariel, *Approaches to the Study of Political Science*.)

⁶⁰ Flanigan and Fogelman, *op. cit.*

⁶¹ The relevant "family difference" is that structure and function are not culture-bound concepts, while the four other categories are. This is also to note that the travelling problem of comparative politics cannot be reduced to the construction of "non-culture bound" conceptualizations. How to use those conceptualizations which cannot help being culture bound is equally a problem.

⁶² Since we are discussing here macro-problems and macro-theory I need not follow the concepts under investigation all the way down the ladder of abstraction. I should not let pass unnoticed, however, that "integration" also belongs to the vocabulary of sociology and psychology, thereby lending itself to very fine lower level distinctions. See e.g., W. S. Landecker, "Types of Integration and their Measurements," in *The Language of Social Research*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-27.

viduals "participate," but we cannot say about the same individuals that they "mobilize"—they *are mobilized*.

It is quite clear, then, that pluralism, integration, participation and mobilization all have specific connotations which can be pinned down, and are in fact retained—no matter how implicitly—in our Western enquiries and controversies. However, in the context of global comparative politics the specificity of these notions gets lost: there is no end to pluralism; integration is applied indifferently to pluralistic and non-pluralistic settings; and participation and mobilization are turned into largely overlapping notions. There is no end to pluralism, for we are never told what is non-pluralism. Since pluralism exists somewhere, the assumption appears to be that "to a different degree" pluralism will be found to exist everywhere. However, a different degree of *what*? This is indeed the irony of using a degree language—intended when used appropriately to convey precision—for conveying elusiveness. Likewise the meaning of integration changes, and eventually evaporates, en route. Finally, and similarly, the distinction between participation and mobilization only holds at home. With most comparative oriented scholars mobilization comes to mean whatever process of social activation; and participation is currently applied by the discipline at large both to democratic and mobilizational techniques of political activation.

At this stage of the argument I need not labor at explaining why and how we obtain these drastic losses of specificity. They result, as we know, from conceptual stretching, which results, in turn, from incorrect ladder climbing: the clumsy attempt to arrive at "travelling universals" at the expense of precision, instead of at the expense of connotation (i.e., by reducing the number of qualifying attributes). What remains to be highlighted are the consequences of this state of affairs.

Take, for instance, the formidable errors in interpretation and prediction which are suggested by the universal, unspecified application of "pluralism" and "integration." If we say that African societies are not pluralistic but "tribalistic," the argument is likely to be that a situation of tribalistic fragmentation hardly provides the structural basis not only for integrative processes to occur, but also for bringing integrative agencies to the fore. Indeed my argument would be that the functional needs, or feedbacks, of a fragmented society are at odds with the functional feedbacks, or needs, of a pluralistic society. In Europe, for instance, medieval fragmentation generated monarchical absolutism. However, if pluralism is vaporized into an empty generality, then we are authorized to

call African societies pluralistic, and the unfortunate implication may well be that we expect Africans to solve their problems as if they had to deal with Western-type societies.⁶³

"Mobilization" is also a worthwhile example in that it confronts us with a problem that has only been mentioned, so far, in passing. While pluralism, integration and participation are derived from our experience with democracy—i.e., from the context of the democratic polities—we also dispose of a limited set of terms which originate from a totalitarian context. This is the case of the term mobilization, which derives from military terminology—especially the German total mobilization of World War I—and enters the vocabulary of politics via the militia type of party (as Duverger calls it), and specifically via the experience of fascism and of nazism.⁶⁴ Nonetheless the term is currently applied also to the democratic polities—and this means that we have drawn a "reversed extrapolation" (i.e., a counter-clockwise extrapolation). And since we often complain that our terminology is democracy-centered, my first complaint is that we fail to take advantage of the fact that we do have terms which escape the democratic bias. However, the inconvenience resulting from reversed extrapolations are seen best on a broader scale, and with particular reference to what I call the "boomerang effect" of the developing areas.⁶⁵

Western scholars travelling across Africa or South-East Asia discover that our categories hardly apply, which is hardly surprising. From this they conclude—and this is the boomerang effect—that the Western categories also should not be applied to the West. But this is a strange inference. Granted that global comparative poli-

⁶³ The point could be extended at great length. E.g., I would assume that only in a truly pluralistic society (i.e., qualified by the characteristic conveyed by the Western use of term) may differentiation result in, and join forces with, integration. But much of the literature on political development seems to miss this essential condition.

⁶⁴ Shils and Deutsch relate the notion also to Mannheim's "fundamental democratization" (see esp. K. W. Deutsch "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55, September 1961, p. 494). But while Mannheim may well have provided the bridge across which "mobilization" entered the vocabulary of democracy, the fact remains that the term was commonly used in the early thirties, in Italy and in Germany, as reflecting a distinctly totalitarian experience.

⁶⁵ The boomerang effect is also responsible, in part, for the disappearance of politics (*supra*, note 5).

tics requires minimal common denominators, it does not follow that we should escape Western parochialism by masquerading in non-Western clothes. For one thing, it may well be that a number of ancient civilizations appear diffuse and amorphous to the Western observer precisely because he lacks the categories for coping with devious, overly sedimented, "non-rational" structural patterns. On the other hand, and assuming that underdeveloped political societies may be far less structured than others, this is no reason for feeding back shapelessness where structural differentiation does exist. Hence, reversed extrapolations are a fallacy, and the problem of establishing a minimal common denominator does not authorize us to feed primitivism and formlessness into non-primitive settings.

If I may generalize from the foregoing, it appears that much of the ongoing work of the discipline is plagued by "meaningless togetherness," and thereby by dangerous equivocations and distortions. In particular, and especially important, under these conditions we are dangerously exposed to "begging the question," i.e., to assuming what we should be proving: the *petitio principii* fallacy. For instance, if "mobilization" is applied to a democratic polity the suggestion is that democracies mobilize more or less as totalitarian regimes do. Conversely, if "participation" is applied to a totalitarian system the suggestion is that democratic participation also occurs, to some extent at least, in nondemocratic settings. Now this may well be the case. But the case cannot be proven by *transferring the same denomination* from one context to another. For this amounts to pure and simple terminological camouflage: things are declared alike by making them *verbally* identical.

All in all, then, it can hardly be held that our "losses of specificity" are compensated by gains in inclusiveness. I would rather say that our gains in travelling capacity, or in universal inclusiveness, are verbal (and deceptive) while our "gains in obfuscation" are very substantial.

I cannot discuss this further. As LaPalombara vividly puts it, "so many of our generalizations about the political process move with apparent randomness from the micro to the macroanalytic levels"—the result being "messiness caused by confusion as to the level of analysis."⁶⁶ Following this line of complaint I have argued that confusion as to the level of analysis brings about these unfortunate results: 1) at the higher levels, macroscopic errors of interpretation, explanation and prediction; 2) at the lower levels, a great deal of wasteful data misgathering; 3) at all

levels, confusion of meaning and destruction of the sharpness of our concepts. We do lack words. But conceptual stretching and poor logic have largely impoverished the analytical articulation and the discriminating power of the words that we do have. And my feeling is that only too often major differences are being cancelled on the thin basis of secondary, trivial similarities. It would hardly make sense to say that men and fishes are alike in that both classes share a "swimming capability." Yet much of what we are saying in global comparative politics may not make much more sense.

Let me stress, to conclude, that according to my scheme of analysis all of this is unnecessary. Awareness of the ladder of abstraction shows that the need for highly abstract, all-embracing categories does not require us to inflate, indeed to evaporate, the observational, empirically-linkable, categories that we do have. Moreover, if we know how to climb and descend along a ladder of abstraction—and thereby know where we stand in relation to the "property space" of the analysis that we are pursuing—not only conceptual stretching is ruled out, but also faulty analogies and the begging-the-question fallacy can be disposed of.

V. SUMMARY

Especially during the last decade comparative politics as a substantive field has been rapidly expanding. The scale, if not the scope, of this expansion raises thorny and unprecedented problems of method. But we seem to embark more and more in comparative endeavors without *comparative method*, i.e., with inadequate methodological awareness and less than adequate logical skills. That is to say, we seem to be particularly naive vis-à-vis the logical requirements of a world-wide comparative treatment of political science issues.

My focus is conceptual—about concepts—under the assumption that concepts are not only elements of a theoretical system, but equally tools for fact-gathering, data containers. The empirical problem is that we badly need information which is sufficiently precise to be meaningfully comparable. Hence we need a filing system provided by discriminating, i.e., taxonomic, conceptual containers. If these are not provided, data misgathering is inevitable; and statistical, computerized sophistication is no remedy for misinformation. The theoretical problem can be stated, in turn, as follows: we grievously lack a disciplined use of terms and procedures of comparison. This discipline can be provided, I suggest, by awareness of the ladder of abstraction, of the logical properties that are implied, and of

⁶⁶ *Comparative Politics* (October 1968), p. 72.

the rules of composition and decomposition thus resulting. If no such discipline is obtained, conceptual mishandling and, ultimately, conceptual misformation is inevitable (and joins forces with data misgathering).

Thus far the discipline has largely followed the line of least resistance, namely, "conceptual stretching." In order to obtain a world-wide applicability the extension of our concepts has been broadened by obfuscating their connotation. As a result the very purpose of comparing—control—is defeated, and we are left to swim in a sea of empirical and theoretical messiness. Intolerably blunted conceptual tools are conducive, on the one hand, to wasteful if not misleading research, and, on the other hand, to a meaningless togetherness based on pseudo-equivalences.

The remedy resides—I submit—in our combined ability 1) to develop the discipline along a medium level of abstraction with better intermediate categories, and 2) to maneuver, both upwards and downwards, along a ladder of abstraction in such a way as to bring together assimilation and differentiation, a relatively high explanatory power and a relatively precise descriptive content, macro-theory and empirical

testing. To be sure, no level of analysis can be exactly translated and converted into the next level. In this sense, something is always lost (and gained) along the ladder. But a disciplined use of terms and procedures of comparison generates, at each level, sets of propositions which either reinforce or contradict the propositions of the neighboring levels.

The suggestion has recently been put forward that "political scientists turn to mathematics for [the] rules of logic" required "to introduce the necessary deductive power into a paradigm."⁶⁷ I have taken the more sober, and indeed counter-perfectionistic view that we should not encourage the "overconscious thinker" paralyzed by overly ambitious standards. But surely we cannot expect an unconscious thinker lacking elementary logical training and discipline to meet the intricate new problems arising from global comparisons.

⁶⁷ Holt and Richardson, "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in Holt and Turner, *The Methodology of Comparative Research*, cit., p. 70. The chapter is perhaps perfectionistic, but surely a very intelligent and stimulating "stock taking" overview.

PERSONALITY AND CONFORMITY: THE LEARNING OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES*

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Why do some men embrace society's values while others reject them? Is conformity a general trait, more uniformly manifested by some people than by others? What social or psychological forces lie behind the tendency to conform or deviate?

Although these questions obviously have significance for the conduct of political life, they have received far less attention from political scientists than from scholars in other disciplines such as psychology and sociology. In view of current challenges to the legitimacy of existing political institutions, the mounting debate over the acceptable limits of protest, and the growing disdain for democratic decision-processes shown by some segments of the population, the need for political scientists to understand the nature and sources of conformity and deviation has become, if anything, more urgent. We hope, in the present paper, to explore the psychological—and to some extent the social and political—meaning of conformity and deviation as reflected in citizen responses to political beliefs. To that end we shall review briefly the present state of psychological theory and research on conformity behavior; suggest, in light of our own research findings, some ways in which current psychological explanations might be modified and extended to account for conformity and deviation within the mass public; and furnish data that might help to explain why individuals who have different personality characteristics and who occupy different roles in the society are likely to accept or reject political norms.

Until recently, most writers who dealt with conformity and deviation were concerned to evaluate them morally rather than to investigate them scientifically. Discursive treatments of the subject tend even today either to reify these concepts or to treat them as moral universals,

appraising them as good or bad according to the particular bias of the author. Rarely is it recognized in such discussions that conformity and deviation are terms of relationship that take their meaning from the contexts in which they occur and from the combination of forces that happens in the particular instance to give rise to them. In practice, of course, everyone is to some degree both conformer and deviant, adhering to certain community and group standards but not to others.

Not all acts of conformity spring from the same motivations. Some arise from a tendency to yield to intimidation and some from hunger for approval and group solidarity; others, however, result from the ubiquitous human need to reduce moral and perceptual ambiguity, and still others from a rational assessment of the social realities and a recognition that accommodation to society's standards can help to bring about mutually desired goals. Thus, conformity to social norms may only occasionally signify deference, servility, obsequious surrender, or weakness of character—just as deviation or resistance to norms may only occasionally represent a superior conscience, personal independence, or courage to defy Establishment pressures. In short, conformity and deviation are descriptive terms that merely denote one's response to norms; they can be morally appraised only with reference to their particular motivation and consequences. We shall also see that conformity—defined as the acceptance of majority beliefs—is not necessarily the same as gullibility, yea-saying, suggestibility, or even, for that matter, persuasibility.

Whether desirable or undesirable, conformity to community and group standards is, in any event, "natural." Few social science findings have been more firmly and repeatedly confirmed than those revealing man's vulnerability to group pressure and his responsiveness to group norms.¹ Through association with family, peers,

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¹For reviews of the research see especially William J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," in E. F. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert (eds.), *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 1130-1187; William J. McGuire, "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), Vol. 3, Chap. 21; Vernon L. Allen,

and other reference groups, and through the routine mechanisms of socialization (e.g., imitation, modelling, indoctrination, reinforcement), one learns which standards society prizes and one conforms to them, for the most part, without reflection.

How effectively these values are transmitted will partly depend on one's proximity to the cultural mainstream and partly on one's individual personality characteristics. A mounting body of experimental and other evidence has shown that not everyone is equally susceptible to group pressure or persuasion.² It is with these differences—particularly the relation of personality differences to the adoption of social norms—that we are mainly concerned in this paper. By examining the data collected in two field surveys, we hope to show how personality variables affect the acceptance or rejection of community beliefs. In addressing this question, we also hope to gain further insight into the nature of conformity and deviation in natural settings.

I. THEORY AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The most prolific and systematic research on susceptibility to influence has been carried on by the psychologists, chiefly through small group experiments. Three major experimental traditions have evolved—those of conformity, persuasibility, and suggestibility.³ In the typical

conformity (or convergence) experiment, psychological pressure is exerted upon a subject to induce him to yield to a group standard. No effort is made, however, to win him over by persuasive arguments; instead, he is confronted by group opinions or perceptions discrepant with his own. The measure of his conformity is the distance he moves toward the position held by the group.⁴ Although variations occur in the type of stimulus or group structure employed, almost all conformity experiments aim to assess the subject's susceptibility to group influence. In the typical *persuasibility* (or attitude change) experiment, the subject is exposed to arguments and communications deliberately designed to persuade him to shift his beliefs in the direction of the message.⁵ Here too the experiments vary in detail: in some the source of the communication is revealed, in others concealed; in some the source is congenial, in others inimical. The message employed may be threatening or reassuring; it may be delivered in written form, or via recording, film, or face-to-face communication. Some persuasibility studies are conducted in the laboratory, and some in actual field situations. Studies of *suggestibility* (which are least relevant for our purposes) have mainly been concerned with motor and sensory responses to influence inductions, focusing upon such phenomena as body sway, odor suggestibility, sensory hallucinations, and hypnotizability.⁶

Research involving these concepts has yielded an abundant, complex, but not altogether consistent set of findings. In general, however, the studies show that personality and cognitive characteristics affect conformity and deviation in important ways. For example, in conformity

"Situational Factors in Conformity," in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1965), pp. 133-176; I. A. Berg and B. M. Bass (eds.), *Conformity and Deviation*, (New York: Harper, 1962); Arthur R. Cohen, *Attitude Change and Social Influence*, (New York: Basic Books, 1964); Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis (eds.), *Personality and Persuasibility*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959). See also E. P. Hollander and R. H. Willis, "Some Current Issues in the Psychology of Conformity and Non-Conformity," *Psychological Bulletin*, 68 (1967), 62-76.

² See, for example, Solomon E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," in Harold Guetzkow (ed.), *Groups, Leadership and Men*, (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951), pp. 177-190; McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility," *loc. cit.*; Hovland and Janis, *Personality and Persuasibility*; Richard S. Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," *American Psychologist*, 10 (1955), 191-198; Frank Barron, "Some Personality Correlates of Independence of Judgment," *Journal of Personality*, 21 (March, 1953), 287-297.

³ Cf. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility," *op. cit.*, pp. 1131-1136.

⁴ Leading examples of this experimental tradition are Solomon E. Asch, "Studies in Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One against a Unanimous Majority," *Psychological Monographs*, 70 (No. 9, 1956); Muzafer Sherif, "Group Influence upon the Formation of Norms and Attitudes," in Eleanor E. Maccoby *et al.* (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, 3rd ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958), pp. 219-232; Crutchfield, *op. cit.*

⁵ The major research in this field has been conducted by the "Yale School" under the direction of Carl I. Hovland. Three illustrative publications are Carl I. Hovland *et al.*, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); Carl I. Hovland *et al.*, *The Order of Presentation in Persuasion*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); Hovland and Janis, *Personality and Persuasibility*.

⁶ E. R. Hilgard, *Hypnotic Susceptibility*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1965); McGuire, *loc. cit.*

experiments of the type pioneered by Asch and Crutchfield,⁷ the subjects most likely to yield to group influence are those who are least well integrated psychologically and hence most poorly equipped to interact effectively with others. Subjects possessing superior intellect and creativity submit to misleading majority judgments less often than others do. The ability to withstand pressure is also related to ego-strength and self-awareness: Those who resist erroneous majority judgments usually have greater self-esteem than those who yield to them.⁸ Presumably they are, among other things, less apprehensive about social disapproval.

Other personality characteristics often correlated with yielding in the conformity experiments include rigidity, dogmatism, conventionality, and authoritarianism.⁹ Individuals characterized by these traits prove especially

vulnerable in stressful or unpredictable situations. Their need for certitude may incline them to be negativistic and unmovable when *they* are in command, but submissive and receptive to influence when *others* wield the power and when compliance rather than resistance is the more likely to produce order and predictability. Compared with the Independents, the Yielders are also found to be less trusting and outgoing toward others. Although they crave social approval, they are less tolerant of those who disagree with them.¹⁰ They are less poised than the Independents and have more poorly developed social skills. They generally score lower on dominance, responsibility, and achievement orientation. In short, while the Yielders may seem on the surface to be cooperative and even submissive, clinical measures reveal them to be comparatively hostile and socially maladapted.

Some of these traits also turn up as correlates of *persuasibility* in the research on attitude change and communication conducted by Hovland and his associates. Here the picture is even more complicated, the correlations lower, and the results more inconclusive. As in the conformity experiments, subjects with low self-esteem are more susceptible to persuasion and more likely to alter their opinions in the direction of the influence.¹¹ But even this relationship is confounded, for when the message is highly complicated or threatening, these subjects are more

⁷ See also R. D. Tuddenham, "Correlates of Yielding to a Distorted Group Norm," *Journal of Personality*, 27 (1959), pp. 272-284; Francis Di Vesta and D. Cox, "Some Dispositional Correlates of Conformity Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 52 (1960), pp. 259-268; Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," *op. cit.*; Crutchfield, "Detrimental Effects of Conformity Pressures on Creative Thinking," *Psychologische Beiträge*, 6 (1962), 463-471; Crutchfield, "Independent Thought in a Conformist's World," 1962, mimeographed; Crutchfield, "Personal and Situational Factors in Conformity to Group Pressure," 1957, mimeographed; Frank Barron, "The Psychology of Imagination," *Scientific American* (September, 1958).

⁸ Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," *loc. cit.*; Barron, "The Psychology of Imagination," *loc. cit.*; Tuddenham, "Correlates of Yielding," *loc. cit.*; M. L. Hoffman, "Some Psychodynamic Factors in Compulsive Conformity," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 48 (1953), 383-393; H. C. Kelman, "Effects of Success and Failure on Suggestibility in the Autokinetic Situation," 45 (1950), 267-285; Di Vesta and Cox, *op. cit.*; Leo Levy, "A Study of Some Personality Attributes of Independents and Conformers," *Diss. Abst.*, 19 (1959), p. 1823.

⁹ Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," Tuddenham, "Correlates of Yielding," Hoffman, "Some Psychodynamic Factors," Halla Beloff, "Two Forms of Social Conformity: Acquiescence and Conventionality," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 56 (1958), 99-104; W. Wells *et al.*, "Conformity Pressure and Authoritarian Personality," *Journal of Psychology*, 42 (1956), 133-136; David Marlow, "Some Personality and Behavioral Correlates of Conformity," *Diss. Abst.*, 20 (1959), 2388-2399.

¹⁰ Di Vesta and Cox, *op. cit.*; Marlow, *op. cit.*; Kelman, *op. cit.*; Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," Leo Levy, *op. cit.*; K. R. Hardy, "Determinants of Conformity and Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 54 (1957), 289-294; H. B. Linton, "Dependence on External Influence: Correlates in Perception, Attitudes and Judgment," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51 (1955), 502-507; D. W. Bray, "The Prediction of Behavior from Two Attitude Scales," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 45 (1950), 64-84; J. S. Mouton *et al.*, "The Relationship Between Frequency of Yielding and the Disclosure of Personal Identity," *Journal of Personality*, 24 (1956), 339-347; Tuddenham, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Irving L. Janis, "Personality Correlates of Susceptibility to Persuasion," *Journal of Personality*, 22 (1954), 504-518; Irving L. Janis, "Anxiety Indices Related to Susceptibility to Persuasion," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51 (1955), 663-667; Irving L. Janis and Donald Rife, "Persuasibility and Emotional Disorder," in Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis (eds.), *Personality and Persuasibility*, Chap. 6; Arthur R. Cohen, "Some Implications of Self-Esteem for Social Influence," *ibid.*, Chap. 5.

likely to resist persuasion and to retain the views they initially held.¹² Conclusions about the relationship between persuasibility and such personality attributes as aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and social isolation are still more equivocal. Correlations are found in some experiments but not in others, depending upon the types of participants, procedures, and measures used in the study.¹³ Although Hovland and others

believe that persuasibility is a general trait (i.e., a predisposition "reflecting an individual's susceptibility to influence from many different sources, on a wide variety of topics, and irrespective of the media employed"),¹⁴ its relation to other motivational predispositions appears, from present evidence, to be tenuous and complex.

One need not look far to find the reasons for these uncertainties: the act of yielding to, or resisting, influence is never simple and can rarely be understood by reference to any single explanatory variable. In order to conform, an individual must be located where he can receive the message, and he must have enough interest and cognitive skill to comprehend it. His judgment will be swayed by his estimate of the source's trustworthiness, prestige, and authority, and (where content is relevant) by his feelings about the substance of the communication. He will also be affected by the context, e.g., whether the task is easy or difficult; whether clues are furnished that indicate how he is expected to respond; whether he is called upon to undergo a genuine, enduring shift in viewpoint or merely to comply publicly; whether the group to which he must respond is unanimous or divided in its judgments; and whether he has reason to feel psychologically "threatened" if he fails to comply.

Nor is the relation between conformity and a given personality trait invariably monotonic.¹⁵ Interaction effects are common: a strong personality need may affect one's susceptibility to influence far differently than would a milder version of the same need. For example, anxiety in moderate degree often serves to motivate learning (and hence may increase persuasibility), whereas severe anxiety can be so crippling as to impede learning. A person low in self-esteem may readily open his mind to reassuring messages but close it to threatening ones, whereas a person high in self-esteem may be accessible to both. Sometimes an individual's personality traits work at cross purposes in shaping his response to influence: one trait (say low self-esteem) may lead him to yield, but another (say personality disorganization) may make it difficult for him to

¹² A. F. Gollob and James E. Dittes, "Effects of Manipulated Self-Esteem on Persuasibility Depending on Threat and Complexity of Communication," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 2 (1965), 195-201; Richard Nisbett and Andrew Gordon, "Self-Esteem and Susceptibility to Social Influence," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5 (1967), 268-276; Owen Silverman, Leroy H. Ford, Jr., and John B. Morganti, "Inter-related Effects of Social Desirability, Sex, Self-Esteem, and Complexity of Argument on Persuasibility," *Journal of Personality*, 34 (1966), 555-568; Leventhal and Perloe, "A Relationship between Self-Esteem and Persuasibility," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 64 (1962), 385-388; James M. Dabbs, Jr., "Self-Esteem, Communicator Characteristics and Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 69 (1964), 173-181; Homer H. Johnson, James M. Torcivia, and Mary Ann Poprick, "Effects of Source Credibility on a Relationship between Authoritarianism and Attitude Change," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 9 (1968), 179-183.

¹³ For a discussion of some of the inconclusive and contradictory results see McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility," *loc. cit.*; Hovland and Janis, *Personality and Persuasibility*, Chap. 11. See also Mortimer H. Appley and George Moeller, "Conformity Behavior and Personality Variables in College Women," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 66 (1963), 284-290; Richard D. Tuddenham, "Studies in Conformity and Yielding: II. The Influences Upon a Judgment of a Grossly Distorted Norm," Technical Report No. 2, 1957, University of California, Berkeley, N. R. 170-259; Halla Beloff, *op. cit.*; N. S. Endler, "Conformity Analyzed and Related to Personality," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 53 (1961), 271-283; Ivan D. Steiner, "Personality and the Resolution of Interpersonal Disagreements," in B. Maher (ed.), *Progress in Experimental Personality Research*, Vol. 3, (New York: Academic Press, 1966), pp. 195-239; Homer H. Johnson *et al.*, *op. cit.*; Homer H. Johnson and Ivan D. Steiner, "Some Effects of Discrepancy Levels on Relationships between Authoritarianism and Conformity," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 73 (1967), pp. 199-205; Ivan D. Steiner and Joseph S. Vannoy, "Personality Correlates of Two Types of

Conformity Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 4 (1964), 307-315; Ralph Barocas and Leon Gorlow, "Self-Report, Personality Measurement, and Conformity Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 71 (1967), 227-234.

¹⁴ Hovland and Janis, *Personality and Persuasibility*, p. 225.

¹⁵ William J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility," see especially pp. 1143-1148.

detect accurately what is being communicated and which influence to yield to.

Another complication is that susceptibility to influence often depends upon learning history and reinforcement as well as upon personality characteristics.¹⁶ The rewards and punishments available in any given situation can strongly determine whether the behavior elicited will be deviant or conformist. Many who belong to and are reinforced by "deviant" sub-cultures will diverge from society's norms regardless of their personality needs; others will, for similar reasons, conform.

A further complication is that a given influence attempt may have different consequences in different settings—for example, in a laboratory as compared with a natural setting. These settings affect both the credibility of the rewards and punishments one encounters and the earnestness with which one confronts the research task. They also determine the number and types of communications one receives. In most laboratory experiments, the participants are treated not as individuals but as experimental *subjects*—which means either that they are all treated interchangeably or that their treatment is determined solely by their preassigned role in the experiment; the differences in their individual *personality* configurations are usually ignored. Outside the laboratory, however, people are treated differentially according to their status and their particular cognitive and personality characteristics. Some people will thus be exposed to more frequent, more varied, and more intense communications than others. Obviously, these differences in treatment and exposure will determine how often one encounters the beliefs circulating in the society, and how effectively one learns whether to embrace or reject a given standard.

The intimacy and relatively uncomplicated structure of most conformity experiments also set them apart from natural settings in ways that may be critical for the learning of norms. In the laboratory the task is usually simple, the stimulus is difficult to ignore, the direction of the group pressure is unmistakable, and the extent to which one's views are shared by the other participants is readily ascertained. In the larger society, by contrast, such matters are more difficult to decipher. Many who deviate from conventional standards are not aware that they are doing so. Confronted by a bewildering array of opinions, values, attitudes, assertions, etc., they

are often unable to recognize which standards the society approves and which ones it disapproves. Their interactions with others, about public questions are often so random and casual that they have little sense of being "pressured" from *any* direction. While laboratory experiments on influence characteristically compel them to face alternatives and to make choices, a large, complex society permits them to ignore or remain neutral on many questions. The society also furnishes an extraordinary variety of groups in which individuals with deviant or unpopular outlooks can find a home, enabling them to believe that theirs is the "true" or accepted standard. Thus, the inducements to conform to or deviate from group norms can be dramatically different in the two contexts.¹⁷

A final complication grows out of the differences in the several types of susceptibility to influence. Experimental findings indicate that the intercorrelations among suggestibility, conformity (in the Asch sense), and persuasibility are weak. While the three concepts superficially resemble one another and are sometimes used interchangeably by investigators, they may spring from very different personality dynamics and they often describe very different forms of behavior. For example, a subject with sufficient intellectual discernment to yield to a reasoned argument in a persuasibility experiment is likely to be sufficiently perspicacious to resist the erroneous majority judgments in a standard conformity experiment.¹⁸ Many people adhere

"We are not, of course, claiming that the laboratory context is unreal, synthetic, or in any other way inappropriate to the study of conformity and persuasibility. We are saying, rather, that the findings turned up in a laboratory context, however valid for *that* context, may not take the same form or hold with the same force in some situations encountered in the larger society. As we shall see, the same principles can apply in both contexts, but manifest themselves quite differently.

¹⁶ H. C. Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2 (1958), 51-60; Robert P. Abelson and Gerald L. Lesser, "The Measurement of Persuasibility in Children," in Hovland and Janis, *Personality and Persuasibility*, Chap. 7; Bert T. King, "Relationships between Susceptibility to Opinion Change and Child-rearing Practices," *op. cit.*, Chap. 10; B. W. Harper and Richard D. Tuddenham, "The Sociometric Composition of the Group as a Determinant of Yielding to a Distorted Norm," *Journal of Psychology*, 58 (1964), 307-311; R. R. Sears, "Dependency Motivation," in M. R. Jones (ed.),

¹⁸ See for example, Norman S. Endler and Elizabeth Hoy, "Conformity as Related to Reinforcement and Social Pressure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 7 (1967), 197-202.

strongly to group norms without being unusually susceptible to persuasion. The two, in fact, commonly work in opposite directions, e.g., the stronger one's initial loyalty to a group's norms, the more one resists efforts to persuade him to deviate from those norms.¹⁹

The foregoing qualifications are not meant to deny that some people are more susceptible to persuasive influence than others. They do, however, lead us to question whether all manifestations of yielding to influence should be placed under a single rubric and considered simply as different expressions of the same general predilection. Indeed, conformity may be a behavior category so broad as to be almost equivalent with the concept of learning itself, rather than an identifiable, specific propensity or personality trait that some people possess in significantly greater measure than others.

II. HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES

In the present study we are concerned not with conformity in small groups or laboratory settings but with the influences governing the acceptance or rejection of the dominant political and social values of the society. For this purpose we have defined conformity and deviation operationally as the degree to which individual Americans subscribe to the beliefs held by more than 70 per cent of the American people (as measured by survey data). Although this definition differs in certain respects from the definition employed in laboratory studies of conformity (for example, it lacks an explicit reference to possible conflict between a subject's initial beliefs and the forces pressing on him to shift his views), it does contain the two key ingredients in the definition of conformity: 1) subjective concurrence with norms, and 2) objective social pressure—however covert and unsystematic—to adopt the dominant, or majority, view. We consider it plausible to assume that even highly complex, pluralistic societies make a considerable effort to persuade their members to accept prevailing norms. Pressure to conform is implicit in the mere circulation and repetition of majority beliefs, and it is often made explicit in the

innumerable group interactions in which those beliefs are directly expressed and reinforced. For convenience we shall refer to persons who embrace (or reject) a disproportionate number of society's beliefs as "conformers" (or "deviants").²⁰

In a free and highly diversified society, even moderately informed individuals will encounter and grapple with a bewildering array of beliefs on numerous public questions—all pretending to some measure of legitimacy. Not everyone, however, has equal opportunity or equal capacity to learn which of these beliefs the society approves. The *opportunity* to acquire a society's norms depends on how closely one is stationed to the communications mainstream, and whether one associates with people who reinforce those norms. The *capacity* to absorb and understand what is being communicated depends on education, sensitivity to public affairs, cognitive skills, personality structure, and so on.

Personality structure can affect the learning process—and hence conformity and deviation—in various ways. It can promote or impede social learning *directly*, by enhancing or impairing one's cognitive performance; or *indirectly*, by regulating the nature and extent of one's interactions with others. Given the extraordinary profusion and complexity of beliefs available in modern society, numerous opportunities arise for individuals to select (or avoid) opinions that serve psychological needs. Personality disorders, for example, can determine what an individual hears and what he blocks out; they can distort judgment and cause him to misread signals and messages. Personality traits that affect social adaptation can shape one's interactions with others

²⁰ We are, of course, aware that many who deviate from society's values will conform to the values of their respective subcultures. Correspondence to national norms, thus, is only one of several ways by which one might assess conformity to political beliefs in the society. For some purposes it may not even be the most interesting way. Except for a crude categoric grouping by level of education (see below), we could not, in the present context, analyze the responses of each individual with respect to the several substrata that might be relevant to his political beliefs. We have, nevertheless, investigated conformity and deviation within certain political subcultures, e.g., conformity to party beliefs among the active members of the Democratic and Republican parties, and will report findings in a later publication. There is a depressing paucity of research on conformity and deviation within various political subcultures, a gap which we hope future investigators will soon fill.

Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 25-64; McGuire, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 1141-1142.

¹⁹ Lucille Nahemow and Ruth Bennett, "Conformity, Persuasibility and Counternormative Persuasion," *Sociometry*, 30 (1967), 14-25; H. H. Kelly and E. H. Volkart, "The Resistance to Change of Group Anchored Attitudes," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (1952), 453-465.

so as to impede or promote the learning of norms. Highly defensive, hostile, or paranoid individuals will have more difficulty discerning what others expect them to believe, and will often be unaware that their beliefs diverge from the standard; they will therefore lack incentive for bringing their views into line. Certain personality needs may also lead to a behavior pattern that Crutchfield has called "counterformity"—a tendency to dissent compulsively from the group out of negativistic, hostile, and recalcitrant motives. The counterformist not only resists but is "repelled by the group norms; he seeks to *widen* disagreement between himself and the group . . . to repudiate the group's beliefs or actions even when he perceives that the group is right."²¹

In summary, the tendency to conform to, or deviate from, a society's prevailing attitudes is a function of a complex set of influences, the most significant of which are the following:

1. Social and geographic location, which affect one's opportunity to encounter the beliefs that circulate in the society, and to have them reinforced.
2. Cognitive abilities, which govern one's *capacity* to comprehend those beliefs.
3. Personality characteristics, which influence the clarity, accuracy, and posture with which one perceives and assimilates communications on public questions.
4. Social-psychological factors, which affect social adaptability, including the ability to interact effectively with others, to be aware of the demands of the social environment, etc.

Specifically, then, deviation from majority attitudes should increase with (a) impaired ability or opportunity to encounter and comprehend communications on public questions; (b) personal isolation or estrangement from social institutions and opinion networks; (c) cognitive deficiencies; (d) personality malintegration; and (e) social maladaptation.

Obviously, these hypotheses are fairly broad and could be qualified in several ways. Some people, for example, echo conventional beliefs not because they are informed but because they are intellectually impoverished and respond mindlessly to the opinions they encounter. Others may be receptive to communications on public affairs but, owing to a skeptical turn of mind, question much of what they hear. The college educated, having greater opportunity and capacity to learn the norms than do the less educated, are more likely to respond to the ac-

tual content of the beliefs they encounter and, when they deviate at all, are less likely to do so because of personality impediments to effective cognitive performance. Although the hypotheses stress cognitive, personality, and social adaptability factors, other influences (source, content, reference groups, etc.) also affect conformity and deviation. Then, too, conformity does not always stem from the same psychological motives: some individuals may yield out of dependency, others out of personal strength that enables them to accommodate to majority views without threat to their sense of autonomy. These and other cautions suggested earlier are sobering, but their importance for the arguments in this paper can be assessed by the reader after reviewing the findings.

Procedures. The items used to measure conformity were selected from the attitude scales employed in two lengthy questionnaires developed by McClosky for surveys of the general populations of Minnesota and the United States.²² Both questionnaires contained extensive item pools—539 items in one case and 390 in the other. Some were personality items and others were attitude statements. All were of the agree-disagree type. One questionnaire was administered during the middle 1950's to a cross-section sample of 1082 Minnesota adults, and the other several years later to a national cross-section sample of 1484 adults.

In constructing the conformity measure, we initially selected from each pool every item that had been either endorsed or rejected by at least 70 per cent of respondents from all educational backgrounds—college, high school, and grade school. Our reason for introducing an education hurdle was to insure that the measure would not be education-bound, but would consist of items widely favored (or opposed) by adults in *all* social strata. Approximately 100 items from each item pool met this initial test. These items were then examined and sorted by a panel of 30 judges (drawn from Berkeley staff members and graduate students from the Political Science Department and the Survey Research Center) to select those that clearly reflected political, economic, or social attitudes. The items that survived this sifting were then further screened to reduce subject-matter duplications, to achieve maximum diversity of content, and to eradicate, if possible, any traces of

²² Many of the items came from a battery of personality and attitude scales jointly developed by Paul E. Meehl, Kenneth E. Clark, and Herbert McClosky for earlier surveys of political belief, affiliation, and participation.

²¹ David Krech, Richard S. Crutchfield, and E. L. Ballachey, *Individual in Society*, New York (1962), p. 507.

systematic ideological bias.²³ We also tried to correct for possible acquiescent response set by selecting as nearly as practicable an equal number of items on which the majority had agreed and disagreed.

Two indices for measuring attitude conformity were yielded by these procedures, one from the national survey and the other from the Minnesota survey. The national index consisted of 27 items—16 Agree and 11 Disagree items; the Minnesota index contained 33 items—17 Agree and 16 disagree items. Twenty-one of the 27 items used in the national index also turned up in the Minnesota index. Scalability, of course, was not a criterion in selecting the items for either index.

Sample items from the conformity indices, and the direction of majority preference, follow:

Our freedom depends on the private enterprise system. (Agree)

By belonging to the UN we are running the danger of losing our constitutional right to control our own affairs. (Disagree)

It's the common people who have really made this country great. (Agree)

The idea that everyone has a right to his own opinion is being carried too far these days. (Disagree)

I think it is more important to vote for the man than for the party. (Agree)

There is nothing wrong with a man trying to make as much money as he honestly can. (Agree)

Politicians can't afford to be frank with the voters. (Disagree)

When a community pays a teacher's salary it has

²³ To this end we decreed that no more than two items could be drawn from the same attitude scale; as it worked out, the items in each of the indices came from at least 20 different scales. It also turned out that the norms selected for use in the final measure were widely accepted by adults not only at different educational levels but also in different age groups and in different size communities. In the non-college sample, conformity to the national norms was higher among younger people than among older, and higher among residents of larger communities than smaller—results that are consonant with the findings reported below. Among those who have attended college, however, the correlations between age, size of community, and conformity with national norms are mixed and inconclusive—which is to say that the response to these values is more homogeneous among the college-educated.

the right to tell him exactly what and how to teach. (Disagree)

There is less opportunity in this country than there used to be. (Disagree)

We need a strong central government to handle modern economic problems efficiently. (Agree)

We almost have to restrict the amount of goods we let into this country because labor is so cheap in most other nations. (Agree)

To bring about great changes for the benefit of mankind often requires cruelty and even ruthlessness. (Disagree)

The farmland of this country should be redivided so that no one can own land except the people who actually do the farming. (Disagree)

Poor people should look out for themselves. (Disagree)

No matter what crime a person is accused of, he should never be convicted unless he has been given the right to face and question his accusers. (Agree)

Each respondent was given a conformity score reflecting the sum of his answers to these and the other items in the index. Whenever he answered an item as the majority did (i.e., whenever he was among the 70 per cent or more who agreed, or disagreed, with the item) he was assigned a score of one; whenever he rejected the majority's view, he was assigned a score of zero. The scores on the Minnesota conformity index ranged from 15 to 33, with a mean of 27.7; the scores on the national index ranged from 11 to 27, with a mean of 21.8. To facilitate the analysis, each index was broken into five levels—extreme conformers, moderate conformers, middle, moderate deviants, and extreme deviants—with the cutting points chosen to keep the number of extreme conformers and deviants fairly small and "pure" but large enough to make statistical comparison possible. In the present paper we have simplified the analysis by excluding the respondents who fell into the middle of the distribution; since they neither conformed nor deviated, little was to be gained by including them. (We have, however, run correlations among the variables in which we included the middle group. These correlations merely express, in different form, the same results reported in this paper.) The frequency distributions for the two indices are shown in Table 1.

In the tables that follow we have compared people who largely conform to majority opinion with those who largely deviate from it. The independent variables are the social adjustment, personality, and cognitive characteristics of the

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ON INDICES OF CONFORMITY-DEVIATION

Level of Conformity	Minnesota Survey General Population Sample (N=1082)			National Survey General Population Sample (N=1484)		
	Range of Scores	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents	Range of Scores	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Extreme Deviants	15-21	50	4.7%	11-17	98	6.6%
Moderate Deviants	22-25	179	16.6	18-19	147	9.9
Middle	26-29	511	47.6	20-24	920	62.0
Moderate Conformers	30-31	269	24.1	25-26	279	18.8
Extreme Conformers	32-33	73	7.0	27	40	2.7
		1082	100 %		1484	100 %

respondents, as measured by a number of scales. Most of these scales (Tables 2-6) may be considered "psychological" scales, although not all reflect personality in the same degree. Some of the scales, especially those in Tables 2 and 3, are heavily "social" in content; others, including most (though not all) of the scales in Tables 4 and 5, reflect "personality" characteristics in greater measure. Some of the scales, in short, might be designated as "social-psychological," others as "clinical-psychological." Containing on the average nine items each, the scales were independently developed for inclusion in a battery of psychological tests employed in previous research on political behavior.²⁴

In Tables 2-5, mean scores are presented on selected psychological variables for each of the four levels of conformity and deviation. Given our hypotheses and the implicit explanatory model, it might have been more appropriate to turn the tables around and to show conformity in its actual role as the dependent variable. However, since we wanted to compare conformers and deviants as such, we chose to retain these categories intact and to present the comparisons as shown in the tables.

In assessing the findings, the reader should keep in mind that the Minnesota and national

surveys, although utilizing many of the same measures, were conducted five years apart on samples drawn from two different universes. They were also separately analyzed. Thus the results derive from two entirely independent studies—one, in effect, replicating the other.

III. FINDINGS

Social Adaptation. The most consistent finding in both surveys is that those who conform to the majority outlook are distinctly better adjusted than those who reject that outlook. With only minor exceptions, the data in Table 2 show that social adjustment variables bear a strong and largely monotonic relationship to conformity-deviation. People who are generally satisfied with their lives, who identify with the society and believe they understand it, who do not feel personally isolated, who do not especially fear the future, and who have a strong sense of social responsibility—tend to accept majority beliefs more often than do those who have adapted less successfully. These findings hold for both the Minnesota and national samples.

While the data in Table 2 are fairly straightforward, their interpretation is more open to conjecture. Social maladaptation is in some measure a function of personality traits that independently influence one's ability to recognize and understand the norms. Hence the connections just observed might in part be a product of common underlying personality factors. There is reason to believe, however, that they are also the direct result of one's capacity for social adaptation as such; as the internal evidence of the present research bears out repeatedly, almost any impediment to social interaction or communication reduces the probability that one will encounter and acquire the values held by most other members of the community.

Although this connection may seem obvious after the fact, it is neither logically nor psychologically inevitable. In the absence of data, one

²⁴ The nature and validation of these scales has been set forth in earlier papers. See, for example, Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW 53 (June 1964); Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, 60 (June 1960); Herbert McClosky and John H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," *American Sociological Review* (February 1965); Harrison Gough, Herbert McClosky, and Paul E. Meehl, "A Personality Scale for Social Responsibility," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 47 (January 1952).

TABLE 2. MEAN SCORES ON MEASURES OF SOCIAL ADAPTATION FOR FOUR LEVELS OF CONFORMITY-DEVIATION FOR MINNESOTA AND NATIONAL GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLES

Level of Conformity	Minnesota Survey			National Survey		
	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1082) Non-Coll	College	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1484) Non-Coll*	College**
<i>Alienation</i>						
Ext. Deviants	4.68 (50)	4.74 (47)	— (2)	4.27 (98)	4.31 (89)	3.35 (8)
Mod. Deviants	3.10 (179)	3.30 (148)	2.16 (31)	3.78 (147)	3.91 (117)	3.35 (29)
Mod. Conformers	1.95 (269)	1.94 (175)	1.97 (91)	2.35 (279)	2.42 (187)	2.12 (90)
Ext. Conformers	1.75 (73)	1.82 (39)	1.58 (33)	1.73 (40)	1.85 (27)	2.12 (13)
<i>Anomy</i>						
Ext. Deviants	6.72	6.83	—	5.83	6.04	3.43
Mod. Deviants	4.97	5.37	3.06	5.57	6.08	3.43
Mod. Conformers	2.73	3.06	2.00	3.61	3.88	3.14
Ext. Conformers	2.19	2.87	1.39	3.60	3.56	3.14
<i>Bewilderment</i>						
Ext. Deviants	5.06	5.13	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	3.96	4.11	3.23			
Mod. Conformers	3.07	3.18	2.81			
Ext. Conformers	2.93	3.13	2.70			
<i>Community Identification</i>						
Ext. Deviants	3.52	3.51	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	4.10	4.11	4.06			
Mod. Conformers	4.48	4.58	4.27			
Ext. Conformers	4.63	4.72	4.52			
<i>Folksiness</i>						
Ext. Deviants	3.30	3.26	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	3.54	3.61	3.19			
Mod. Conformers	3.77	3.77	3.75			
Ext. Conformers	4.19	4.38	3.94			
<i>Life Satisfaction</i>						
Ext. Deviants	3.54	3.36	—	3.51	3.51	4.30
Mod. Deviants	4.18	3.96	5.23	3.79	3.62	4.30
Mod. Conformers	4.94	4.77	5.25	4.73	4.59	4.97
Ext. Conformers	5.14	5.15	5.18	4.28	4.00	4.97
<i>Pessimism</i>						
Ext. Deviants	3.32	3.36	—	3.36	3.40	2.78
Mod. Deviants	2.79	2.75	3.00	3.28	3.42	2.78
Mod. Conformers	1.92	1.92	1.93	2.27	2.27	2.33
Ext. Conformers	1.68	1.79	1.52	2.48	2.33	2.33
<i>Social Responsibility</i>						
Ext. Deviants	4.02	3.94	—	4.45	4.29	6.32
Mod. Deviants	5.23	4.97	6.48	5.11	4.80	6.32
Mod. Conformers	6.86	6.83	6.96	6.82	6.59	7.26
Ext. Conformers	7.01	6.85	7.30	6.65	6.52	7.26
<i>Status Frustration</i>						
Ext. Deviants	4.32	4.34	—	4.38	4.47	3.00
Mod. Deviants	3.09	3.28	2.19	3.76	3.95	3.00
Mod. Conformers	2.59	2.69	2.40	2.83	2.82	2.74
Ext. Conformers	2.37	2.67	2.00	2.63	2.85	2.74

* Totals for the general population are in a few instances slightly larger than the combined college and non-college totals, because education was not adequately ascertained for a few respondents.

** Owing to the small size of the N's for the Extreme Deviants and Extreme Conformers in the national college sample, we have, in this and subsequent tables, combined the Extreme and Moderate Deviants, and the Extreme and Moderate Conformers, and entered the mean scores only for the combined samples.

might easily predict that the poorly adjusted would be *more*, rather than less, likely to embrace majority outlooks because they fear further separation from the society and therefore seek out opinions that are conventionally anchored. If such influences are at work, they are outweighed by the relative inability of the socially maladjusted to connect with the majority culture and to comprehend its attitudes.

The results on social adaptation hold for both the well-educated and less-educated respondents, but the differences between the conformers and deviants are generally larger and more consistent among those who have not attended college. Among the college educated, such attributes as cognitive capacity, political awareness, and opportunity for communication are more uniformly adequate to the tasks of social learning; hence, deviations from conventional beliefs, while still reflecting maladjustment to some extent, also reflect greater attention to the content of the beliefs to be embraced or rejected.

Cognitive Capacities. We have suggested that agreement with a society's prevailing beliefs may in part be a function of cognitive skills. The assumption here is that intellectual styles and abilities affect both the motivation and capacity to receive and comprehend persuasive communications. If, to borrow McGuire's phrase, cultural norms are, in effect, "obscure, subtle, persuasive messages" which seep in over time,²⁵ they will in some measure be learned by everyone—but not by everyone *equally*. The intellectually adept will pay closer attention to public affairs and will usually have a better sense of what is valued and likely to be rewarded. They will read the signals more accurately and have a more acute grasp of the intention or meaning of a given public communication.²⁶ They will detect and respond to persuasive influences that are scarcely perceptible to less alert minds.

Whether these expectations mainly result from raw intelligence, or from cognitive style and disposition, is not clearly known. The experimental findings on the relation of intelligence to conformity and persuasion are inconclusive. Crutchfield and other investigators find meaningful correlations in the conformity experiments, but Hovland and his associates, in their persuasion experiments, do not.²⁷ McGuire, in

analyzing the available research, observes that a positive relation between intelligence and persuasibility is more likely to emerge when reception is complex and comprehension difficult.²⁸ The weakness of the connection in some situations may be due to the play of conflicting motivations that cancel each other out: superior intelligence may alert an individual to the message, but may also make him more wary of being manipulated and more resistant to arguments that do not satisfy his intellectual standards.

Data relating to the effects of cognitive disposition on our measure of conformity are presented in Table 3. Although no direct tests of intelligence were included in the surveys, several scales were available which measure some aspect of intellectual performance. Their relationship to conformity is generally positive, although stronger in the non-college than in the college samples.

As Table 3 indicates, the conformers are generally more oriented toward intellectual activities than are the deviants, and they attain higher scores on an achievement test of political and social awareness. They also score lower on Acquiescence (this index was mainly designed to test response set, but because it was constructed as a battery of 19 pairs of incompatible items, it also measures the ability to think consistently and discriminatingly).²⁹ The conformers also have significantly lower scores on the Mysticism scale, which taps the propensity to embrace non-rational, nonscientific, and nonlogical explanations of ordinary phenomena—a propensity that appears from the internal evidence of the study to be most characteristic of people who are intellectually uncritical.

mary and Implications for Future Research," in Hovland and Janis, *op. cit.*, p. 237; Gardner Murphy, *et al.*, *Experimental Social Psychology*, (New York and London: Harper, 1937), p. 930; Carl I. Hovland *et al.*, *Communication and Persuasion*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 181–184.

²⁵ William J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility," *op. cit.*, pp. 1141–1142.

²⁶ In the Minnesota study, the Agree and Disagree items in the Conformity index are closely balanced out. These results, therefore, cannot be interpreted as an artifact of response set. Furthermore, in the national study, this result is achieved despite the bias in the Conformity index in the opposite direction, i.e. it contains 16 Agree and 11 Disagree items. Hence, other things being equal, the Conformers might be expected to score *higher* than the Deviants on Acquiescence, but, in keeping with our prediction, they score lower.

²⁵ McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility," *op. cit.*

²⁶ Irving L. Janis and Carl I. Hovland, "Postscript: Theoretical Categories for Analyzing Individual Differences," in Hovland and Janis, *op. cit.*, pp. 258–259.

²⁷ Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis, "Sum-

TABLE 3. MEAN SCORES ON MEASURES OF COGNITIVE DISPOSITION FOR FOUR LEVELS OF CONFORMITY-DEVIATION FOR MINNESOTA AND NATIONAL GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLES

Level of Conformity	Minnesota Survey			National Survey		
	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1082) Non-Coll	College	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1484) Non-Coll	College
<i>Acquiescence</i>						
Ext. Deviants	7.52 (50)	7.68 (47)	— (2)	6.39 (98)	6.57 (89)	4.10 (8)
Mod. Deviants	5.31 (179)	5.74 (148)	3.23 (31)	6.00 (147)	6.46 (117)	4.29 (29)
Mod. Conformers	4.11 (269)	4.46 (175)	3.32 (91)	3.89 (279)	4.14 (187)	3.49 (90)
Ext. Conformers	3.53 (73)	3.97 (39)	2.85 (33)	3.98 (40)	3.81 (27)	3.13 (13)
<i>Political Awareness</i>						
Ext. Deviants	2.78	2.55	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	3.53	2.99	6.10			
Mod. Conformers	5.14	4.49	6.45			
Ext. Conformers	5.44	4.69	6.36			
<i>Intellectuality</i>						
Ext. Deviants	3.06	2.89	—	3.97	3.81	5.97
Mod. Deviants	3.88	3.51	5.61	4.20	3.76	
Mod. Conformers	5.20	4.83	5.98	5.36	5.00	6.00
Ext. Conformers	5.59	4.85	6.52	5.05	4.86	
<i>Mysticism</i>						
Ext. Deviants	5.46	5.60	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	4.89	5.20	3.42			
Mod. Conformers	3.37	3.68	2.73			
Ext. Conformers	3.26	3.72	2.70			

The general thrust of these findings is consistent with other data in our surveys which indicate that the deviants, both college and non-college, have failed to absorb the values of the "American Creed"—tolerance, faith in freedom and democracy, political and social equality, procedural rights, etc.—as effectively and thoroughly as have the conformers of comparable education.³⁰ They are also more prejudiced, more politically cynical, and more responsive to extreme Right-Wing and Left-Wing values—values which the majority, and especially the majority among the educated, strongly reject. That learning capacity should affect these judgments is entirely plausible. Many deviants seem unable to conform even when they want to. In the non-college group, for example, the deviants value conventionality (as measured by our conventionality scale) more than the conformers do. They also profess stronger love of country and greater respect for traditional values. (These findings, however, are less consistent among the college-educated group.) Apparently, the intellectual and psychological failings that initially led some individuals to misread or reject pre-

vailing norms also keep them from discovering how divergent their beliefs actually are. Their inability to utilize the social validation process effectively apparently prevents them from seeing—and hence remedying—their failures to conform.

Note, finally, that the negative correlation between Acquiescence and Conformity adds credence to the claim that conformity (as herein defined) is by no means the same as yea-saying, suggestibility, or gullibility. It suggests, in fact, that the relation is inverse. An individual who affirms belief after belief regardless of content—indeed, regardless of whether one belief contradicts another—is less likely than someone of greater discrimination to recognize which of the innumerable beliefs he encounters have been approved, or rejected, by the society. Being suggestible does not necessarily make him conformist; on the contrary, it makes him vulnerable to many aberrant opinions that a more perspicacious mind would shun.

³⁰ Since some of the items used in the Conformity index were taken from the scales measuring attitudes toward these values, the relation between conformity-deviation and these attitudes scales partly reflects overlapping item content. However, the differences between conformers and deviants on these and other attitude measures cited in the paragraph are larger than could be accounted for by item overlap alone.

Self-Esteem. Few personality clusters have received as much attention from students of conformity behavior as self-esteem—the evaluation an individual places upon himself. People *low* in self-esteem are guilt-ridden, cautious, morbidly afraid of failure, chronically anxious, and psychologically vulnerable. People *high* in self-esteem, by contrast, feel a sense of command over themselves and their immediate environment; they are well-integrated, candid, and willing to take risks.

The major assumption about self-esteem and

susceptibility to influence is that those who lack self-esteem are highly vulnerable to group pressures. Presumably they will capitulate to pressure either because they fear ridicule if they should prove to be "wrong," or because they yearn for group approval and a sense of interpersonal solidarity. Lacking self-confidence, they are in any event inclined to doubt the worth of their own judgments. For these and other reasons, individuals low in self-esteem have tended under experimental conditions to be uncommonly responsive to group influence. However, the relationship between self-esteem and yielding is not always monotonic, for the anxiety that often attends low self-esteem can function either to inhibit or potentiate persuasibility, depending upon the magnitude of the anxiety aroused by the stimulus.³¹

We predicted that anxiety, and low ego-strength in general, would serve to impede the learning of community norms. The very traits that might lead people with low self-esteem to yield in a laboratory would, in the maelstrom of the complex larger society, insulate them against influence. Lacking self-assurance, such people tend to withdraw from social interactions and avoid "involvement" in group activities.³² McGuire suggests that they are frequently preoccupied with themselves and too distracted to attend closely to outside communications.³³

In Table 4 we present data on scales that tap various facets of self-esteem. Need Inviolacy, for example, measures vulnerability to psychological exposure and the fear of being unmasked; the other scales reflect one's sense of personal secu-

rity and command (Dominance and Self-Confidence), propensity to heightened feelings of shame and regret (Guilt), and a proclivity toward excessive worry, restlessness, inability to concentrate, and pervasive feelings of uncertainty (Manifest Anxiety and Personality Disorganization).

Among the non-college populations in both the national and Minnesota studies, the deviants consistently show up as having less self-esteem than do the conformers. Among the college educated, however, the prediction is supported in only four of the nine instances in which the connection is tested (Dominance, Guilt, Anxiety, and Need Inviolacy—all in the Minnesota sample). No differences turn up in three instances and reversals appear in the other two. We can only guess at the exact meaning of these instances of disconfirmation, but the evidence from our own and other research suggests that the better educated have sufficient ability and opportunity to learn the community norms despite personality needs that are in other ways disabling. Then, too, they are likely, as we have observed, to weigh the content of beliefs more carefully—which in the case of a content-diversified index would tend to flatten differences further.

Rigidity and Aggression. The relation of personality rigidity and aggression to conformity and persuasibility has also been explored experimentally, but with equivocal results. In general, experiments on conformity have usually hypothesized positive correlations with rigidity, hostility, and authoritarianism; while experiments on communication and persuasion have sometimes predicted positive and sometimes negative correlations. One can reason either way that hostile and rigid subjects should be more authoritarian and hence ready to submit to conformity pressures; or, alternatively, that they should prove especially recalcitrant in resisting efforts to persuade them to shift their point of view.

Unfortunately the research findings from the experimental literature are not sufficiently consistent to resolve these issues. Crutchfield³⁴ and others have found positive correlations between conformity and such personality dispositions as hostility and authoritarianism. Linton and Graham³⁵ have found persuasibility to be related to the aggressive and submissive aspects of authoritarianism but not to authoritarianism as a

³¹ See, for example, William J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," *op. cit.*, pp. 1142-1143. For a recent review of the relation between anxiety and learning generally, see Janet Taylor Spence and Kenneth W. Spence, "The Motivational Components of Manifest Anxiety: Drive and Drive Stimuli," in Charles D. Spielberger (ed.), *Anxiety and Behavior*, (New York: Academic Press, 1966), pp. 21-26; and Charles D. Spielberger, "The Effects of Anxiety on Complex Learning and Academic Achievement," in Spielberger, *op. cit.*; S. Sarason, K. Davidson, F. Lighthall, R. Waite, and B. Ruebush, *Anxiety in Elementary School Children*, (New York: Wiley, 1960).

³² See, for example, Morris Rosenberg, *Society and the Adolescent Self-Image*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Stanley Coopersmith, "Studies in Self-Esteem," *Scientific American* (February 1968), 96-106, and *The Antecedents of Self-Esteem*, (London: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1967).

³³ McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Influence," *loc. cit.*

³⁴ Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," *loc. cit.*

³⁵ Harriet Linton and Elaine Graham, "Personality Correlates of Persuasibility," in Hovland and Janis, *Personality and Persuasibility*, pp. 69-101.

TABLE 4. MEAN SCORES ON PERSONALITY MEASURES OF SELF-ESTEEM FOR FOUR LEVELS OF CONFORMITY DEVIATION FOR MINNESOTA AND NATIONAL GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLES

Level of Conformity	Minnesota Survey			National Survey		
	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1082) Non-Coll	College	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1484) Non-Coll	College
<i>Dominance</i>						
Ext. Deviants	2.26 (50)	2.15 (47)	— (2)	3.27 (98)	3.21 (89)	512 (8)
Mod. Deviants	3.35 (179)	3.08 (148)	4.65 (31)	3.58 (147)	3.11 (117)	(29)
Mod. Conformers	4.43 (269)	3.77 (175)	5.76 (91)	4.06 (279)	3.71 (187)	4.69 (90)
Ext. Conformers	4.85 (73)	4.13 (39)	5.70 (33)	4.23 (40)	4.26 (27)	(13)
<i>Guilt</i>						
Ext. Deviants	5.12	5.23	—	4.92	5.00	3.62
Mod. Deviants	4.70	4.82	4.10	4.76	5.06	
Mod. Conformers	3.87	4.10	3.40	3.97	3.97	4.05
Ext. Conformers	3.75	4.03	3.33	4.05	3.89	
<i>Manifest Anxiety</i>						
Ext. Deviants	4.50	4.47	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	3.96	4.05	3.48			
Mod. Conformers	3.20	3.28	3.01			
Ext. Conformers	3.10	3.18	2.94			
<i>Need Inviolacy</i> (Ego Vulnerability and Defense)						
Ext. Deviants	4.04	4.13	—	3.45	3.55	2.38
Mod. Deviants	3.20	3.36	2.39	3.54	3.81	
Mod. Conformers	2.54	2.67	2.23	2.57	2.63	2.35
Ext. Conformers	2.11	2.10	2.12	2.10	2.33	
<i>Personality Disorganization</i>						
Ext. Deviants	4.04	4.11	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	3.02	3.18	2.26			
Mod. Conformers	2.30	2.45	2.00			
Ext. Conformers	2.29	2.31	2.24			
<i>Self-Confidence</i>						
Ext. Deviants	2.94	2.89	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	3.26	3.04	4.32			
Mod. Conformers	3.99	3.63	4.69			
Ext. Conformers	3.62	3.13	4.21			

whole. Other investigators³⁶ contend that authoritarians yield in conformity experiments principally when the message is so simple and easily understood that individual differences in capacity for attention and comprehension are negligible. Still others³⁷ find that persuasibility among aggressive individuals may depend on whether the communication is benign or punitive. Janis and Hovland believe that "personal rigidity" may chronically lead subjects to refuse to accept persuasive messages.³⁸ In short, the existing research bears out the complexities that surround the interplay of these variables and

underscores our earlier observation that the connection between conformity and personality structure is rarely a simple linear relation that can be predicted apart from the context in which they coexist.

In light of our own earlier research, we expected to find rigidity and hostility correlating negatively with the adoption of majority values—largely because these personality traits tend to retard social learning and hinder the social interactions through which beliefs are disseminated.³⁹ If the members of a society acquire its norms through gradual assimilation—through the repeated exchange of ideas, the clarification of subtle distinctions, and the modification of opinions resulting from the interplay of divergent views—one can plausibly assume that people gripped by hostile and inflexible needs will engage less often in these activities and will be less likely to learn what the society really be-

³⁶ See, for example, Homer H. Johnson *et al.*, "Effects of Source Credibility," *op. cit.*

³⁷ Walter Wise and B. J. Fine, "The Effect of Induced Aggressiveness on Opinion Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 52 (1956), 109-114.

³⁸ Janis and Hovland, "Postscript," *op. cit.*, p. 257.

³⁹ Herbert McClosky, *Political Inquiry*, (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 74 and 87.

lieves. Unusually hostile or inflexible people, moreover, tend to be insensitive to the qualifications, contingencies, and nuances that are inherent in many social norms—an incapacity that can easily lead to misunderstandings or misapplications of those norms.

The data in Table 5 generally confirm these expectations. In all but two instances (the scores on Authoritarianism and Rigidity for the national college-educated sample) the deviants are more hostile and inflexible than the conformers. They are more paranoid (a projected expression of hostility), more intolerant of people whose traits or opinions they disapprove of, more distressed by ambiguity, more punitive, and more jaundiced in their estimates of other people. Contrary to the claims in the popular literature,

those who conform in matters of political belief (as distinguished from those who merely glorify conformity) are less motivated than the deviants by a desire to force everyone to obey prescribed standards.

IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The findings from the two surveys reported in this paper confirm the hypothesis that conformity-deviation—defined operationally as agreement or disagreement with prevailing American beliefs on diverse social and political subjects—is significantly related to personality factors. Those who preponderantly conform to majority attitudes are by substantial margins better adapted socially and psychologically than those who preponderantly reject them. They are more

TABLE 5. MEAN SCORES ON PERSONALITY MEASURES OF AGGRESSION AND RIGIDITY FOR FOUR LEVELS OF CONFORMITY-DEVIATION FOR MINNESOTA AND NATIONAL GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLES

Level of Conformity	Minnesota Survey			National Survey		
	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1082) Non-Coll	College	Gen. Pop.	(N = 1484) Non-Coll	College
<i>F Authoritarianism</i>						
Ext. Deviants	5.12 (50)	5.23 (47)	— (2)	6.41 (98)	6.67 (89)	3.62 (8)
Mod. Deviants	4.70 (179)	4.82 (148)	4.10 (31)	6.33 (167)	6.72 (117)	3.62 (29)
Mod. Conformers	3.87 (269)	4.10 (175)	3.40 (91)	5.23 (279)	5.52 (187)	4.05 (90)
Ext. Conformers	3.75 (73)	4.03 (39)	3.33 (33)	5.23 (40)	5.19 (27)	4.05 (13)
<i>Faith in People</i>						
Ext. Deviants	2.04	1.98	—	Scale Not Included		
Mod. Deviants	2.71	2.83	2.13			
Mod. Conformers	3.86	4.01	3.56			
Ext. Conformers	4.37	4.15	4.64			
<i>Hostility</i>						
Ext. Deviants	6.40	6.55	—	4.14	4.33	3.05
Mod. Deviants	4.74	4.99	3.58	3.93	4.09	
Mod. Conformers	2.89	3.05	2.53	3.08	3.14	2.66
Ext. Conformers	2.53	2.90	2.00	3.10	3.19	
<i>Intolerance of Ambiguity</i>						
Ext. Deviants	6.00	6.26	—	5.76	5.96	4.11
Mod. Deviants	5.64	5.85	4.61	5.64	5.96	
Mod. Conformers	4.40	4.73	3.69	4.31	4.55	3.85
Ext. Conformers	3.82	3.90	3.73	4.23	4.26	
<i>Paranoid Tendencies</i>						
Ext. Deviants	6.40	6.55	—	5.37	5.54	3.89
Mod. Deviants	4.74	4.99	3.58	5.31	5.60	
Mod. Conformers	2.89	3.05	2.53	3.04	3.25	2.66
Ext. Conformers	2.53	2.90	2.00	2.88	2.81	
<i>Rigidity</i>						
Ext. Deviants	3.74	3.83	—	3.62	3.75	2.35
Mod. Deviants	3.21	3.36	2.48	3.28	3.47	
Mod. Conformers	3.05	3.12	2.89	2.99	3.01	2.94
Ext. Conformers	2.56	2.95	2.06	2.72	2.67	
<i>Tolerance</i>						
Ext. Deviants	4.60	4.51	—	4.77	4.60	6.24
Mod. Deviants	5.30	5.22	5.68	5.39	5.21	
Mod. Conformers	6.41	6.33	6.57	6.61	6.50	6.85
Ext. Conformers	6.66	6.46	6.91	7.10	7.15	

intellectually oriented, more politically aware, and more proficient in their cognitive skills. They exhibit greater self-esteem and less anxiety than the deviants, and are less motivated by aggression and inflexibility.

The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the conformers are both more able and more likely to encounter and comprehend the norms—contingencies which the experimental research shows to be of central importance in affecting communication and persuasion. They are more accessible to interaction, less withdrawn or socially isolated, and more strongly motivated to receive and respond to information on public questions. Although we have not tested the communication process directly, we think it plausible to infer from the evidence that the deviants, more often than the conformers, have missed or misread communications on public norms—an inference consistent with the findings from our previous research on the correlates of anomy, isolationism, extreme Right-Wing and Left-Wing radicalism, and other outlooks which diverge from prevailing American attitudes.⁴⁰

Despite the pronounced tendency of the findings, some puzzling questions remain. One question, for example, concerns the meaning of the deviant responses: Are they genuine expressions of deviant belief or should they be regarded instead as “non-attitudes”—i.e., labile or casual responses by people so little interested in the substance of the items that they score as deviant largely by answering erratically or randomly?⁴¹ Might there even be reason to believe that many of the deviants would show up as conformers if tested on another occasion?

There is little doubt that some people respond to questionnaire items—as they do to the public opinions they encounter in their daily activities—without much thought. Indeed, it is an argument of this paper that many people hold non-conforming attitudes not because they are led by superior sensitivity to weigh alternatives and to reject conventional views, but mainly because they have been so imperfectly socialized that they are either indifferent to many social issues or unable to recognize what the society believes. This is not to say, however, that their responses to attitude items are entirely random or casual, for one could not then explain the distinct pattern of correlations yielded by the re-

search reported here—a pattern predictable from theory, consistent with our earlier research on other deviant attitudes, and reproduced here in two independent studies conducted several years apart on samples from two different universes.⁴²

Even if we assumed that some respondents had attained deviant scores on the Conformity index by answering randomly or thoughtlessly, they could not, by replying in this fashion, have achieved the highly patterned, and often extreme, scores on the numerous personality and attitude scales with which the conformity index is correlated. Since the items from the various measures were scrambled and presented to the respondents in a single, unstructured item pool, it would be highly implausible to suppose that they responded randomly or heedlessly to the items that were later selected for the Conformity index while replying carefully and “accurately” to the numerous other items with which the Conformity items were intermingled. The assumption that indifferent respondents might be accounting for the results becomes still less tenable when one considers that such respondents would turn up not only among the deviants but also among the conformers, if only because they can be expected, *ceteris paribus*, to encounter majority views more often than they encounter minority views—when they encounter them at all. Note, finally, that no measure employed here has consisted merely of a single item or question; all have been multiple item batteries or scales, averaging close to nine items each for the independent variables and between 27 and 33 items for the dependent Conformity indices. This feature, of course, greatly reduces the possibility that scores at either extreme could be achieved randomly or without reference to actual attitude content.⁴³

Let us assume for the sake of the argument, however, that some of the deviants are in fact expressing non-attitudes or responding randomly. Are the results markedly different for those respondents who are more thoughtful, more discriminating, more informed, and more concerned with public questions?

⁴⁰ Similar correlation patterns have also emerged from our study of deviation and conformity among Democratic and Republican party leaders toward the dominant beliefs of their respective parties. For a preliminary report of these findings, see “The Influence of Personality on Political and Social Attitudes,” *Mental Health Program Reports*—3, National Institute of Mental Health, Chevy Chase, Maryland, January, 1968, pp. 105–106.

⁴¹ Converse, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁰ McClosky, *ibid.*, Chaps. 2 and 3.

⁴¹ Cf. Philip E. Converse, “Attitudes vs. Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue,” paper read at Seventh International Congress of Psychology, Washington, D.C., 1963, (mimeo).

TABLE 6. CONFORMERS AND DEVIANTS COMPARED, CONTROLLED FOR MIDDLE ACQUIESCENCE
AND HIGH AWARENESS—MINNESOTA SURVEY ONLY
(Percentages Down)

Scales	Total Minnesota Sample		Middle Acquiescence Sample		High Awareness Sample	
	Deviants N=229	Conformers N=342	Deviants N=58	Conformers N=128	Deviants N=54	Conformers N=160
Alienation						
% High	40.2	16.4*	34.5	18.0*	25.9	14.4*
% Low	21.4	47.7	19.0	48.4	25.9	52.5
Anomy						
% High	56.8	10.8*	53.4	8.6*	25.9	3.7*
% Low	19.7	53.2	13.8	54.7	46.3	63.1
Bewilderment						
% High	48.0	21.6*	36.2	18.7**	14.8	16.4
% Low	19.2	41.5	15.5	39.1	42.6	46.2
Community Identification						
% High	14.8	24.0***	15.5	28.9	14.8	20.6
% Low	35.8	20.8	36.2	22.7	37.0	21.9
Folksiness						
% High	21.4	32.2**	24.1	36.7	14.8	34.4**
% Low	49.3	35.4	39.7	32.0	59.3	35.0
Life Satisfaction						
% High	24.0	42.1*	22.4	46.9**	40.7	47.5
% Low	40.2	24.9	39.7	24.2	24.1	20.0
Pessimism						
% High	60.7	26.9*	58.6	30.5**	53.7	26.2*
% Low	17.0	42.1	22.4	36.7	22.2	41.2
Social Responsibility						
% High	10.5	36.3*	17.2	33.6*	20.4	40.6**
% Low	59.3	18.4	56.9	20.3	31.5	15.6
Status Frustration						
% High	44.1	27.8*	32.8	29.7	35.2	19.4
% Low	18.3	29.2	24.1	28.9	29.6	36.9
Acquiescence						
% High	51.1	21.9*	—	—	22.2	10.6**
% Low	23.6	40.6	—	—	59.3	47.5
Political Awareness						
% High	15.3	34.2*	8.6	35.9	—	—
% Low	61.1	26.6	60.3	21.1	—	—
Intellectuality						
% High	15.7	48.5*	15.5	46.9*	35.2	58.7*
% Low	52.8	17.8	50.0	14.8	27.8	10.0
Mysticism						
% High	59.8	24.6*	46.6	21.9**	31.5	16.9**
% Low	11.4	32.5	15.5	34.4	25.9	46.9

Table 6 (Cont.)

Scales	Total Minnesota Sample		Middle Acquiescence Sample		High Awareness Sample	
	Deviants N = 229	Conformers N = 342	Deviants N = 58	Conformers N = 128	Deviants N = 54	Conformers N = 160
Dominance						
% High	21.0	51.2*	19.0	53.9*	42.6	63.7*
% Low	42.8	20.8	41.4	14.1	11.1	13.1
Guilt						
% High	39.7	20.8*	32.8	16.4**	25.9	14.4
% Low	24.9	47.7	25.9	51.6	40.7	53.1
Anxiety						
% High	33.2	14.9	25.9	14.8	24.1	11.2
% Low	20.5	31.3	24.1	35.2	27.8	32.5
Need Inviolacy						
% High	49.3	24.3*	36.2	20.3**	31.5	19.4
% Low	27.5	54.4	39.7	63.3	48.1	61.2
Personality Disorganization						
% High	43.2	24.3*	36.2	23.4	29.6	18.7
% Low	21.8	36.5	34.5	39.1	31.5	35.6
Self-confidence						
% High	22.7	37.1*	20.7	38.3***	29.6	50.0***
% Low	35.4	22.5	41.4	22.7	25.9	14.4
F. Authoritarianism						
% High	44.5	14.3*	39.7	10.9*	9.3	5.6
% Low	17.9	38.0	8.6	36.7	46.3	46.9
Faith in People						
% High	10.5	40.1*	10.3	35.9*	18.5	40.6*
% Low	52.0	20.5	48.3	22.7	53.7	23.1
Hostility						
% High	60.7	33.0*	56.9	37.5***	33.3	27.5
% Low	19.7	42.7	22.4	42.2	42.6	50.0
Intolerance for Ambiguity						
% High	60.7	27.8*	58.6	23.4*	37.0	18.1**
% Low	16.2	36.5	10.3	35.9	46.3	45.6
Paranoia						
% High	59.8	19.6*	53.4	17.2*	31.5	13.7**
% Low	13.1	46.8	12.1	40.6	29.6	51.9
Rigidity						
% High	49.8	35.7**	36.2	39.1	25.9	26.2
% Low	26.6	33.9	29.3	32.8	46.3	41.9
Tolerance						
% High	22.7	51.5*	27.6	57.8*	31.5	56.9*
% Low	60.3	20.2	55.2	19.5	51.9	17.5

% Middle has been omitted to conserve space.

* Chi Square for table significant at or below .001 level.

** Chi Square for table significant at or below .01 level.

*** Chi Square for table significant at or below .05 level.

We have already seen (Tables 2-5) that while the differences between well-educated conformers and deviants are usually smaller than they are for the less-educated, the pattern of differences is generally similar for both samples. In Table 6 we have put the issue to two other, more severe, tests. There we present data on two narrowly restricted subsets of respondents—those who, on an achievement test, display high levels of political awareness and understanding; and those who score close to the median on the Acquiescence index,⁴⁴ and who therefore appear to have answered the items with greater care and discrimination. Neither group is likely to have responded randomly or thoughtlessly.

Both Awareness and Acquiescence are measures of cognitive capacity and, as we have seen, are correlated with conformity—one positively, the other negatively. Neither, however, is an exhaustive measure of this capacity, for not only are they imperfect as measures, but other factors, such as personality structure, can and often do have an independent, direct effect on the clarity and understanding with which norms are learned. Thus, respondents with similar scores on Awareness (or Acquiescence) may still differ somewhat in their ability to read communications correctly and discern their implications. Controlling for these measures, we therefore assumed, should reduce the magnitude of the differences between conformers and deviants but not eradicate them entirely. This assumption proved, on the whole, correct.

The results confirm that the psychological differences between conformers and deviants reported for the total sample (and shown in Table 6 in percentage form) hold in most instances even for the more thoughtful and politically informed respondents—although they are, as predicted, smaller for the more narrowly defined subsamples. The differences that emerge are in the predicted direction, and are consistent with the general findings in all but a few instances. Moreover, in 20 of the 25 comparisons with middle Acquiescence controlled, and in 16 of the 25 comparisons with high Awareness controlled, the differences remain large enough to be significant, by chi square test, at or well below the .05 level of significance—despite the severity of the controls and the reduction in sample size. Simi-

⁴⁴ We have chosen the Minnesota, rather than the national survey for this test, partly because it contains all the scales considered in the earlier tables; partly because it includes the Awareness scale, which was omitted from the national survey; and partly because the numbers of Agree and Disagree items in its Conformity index were more closely balanced.

lar tables, controlling for Acquiescence, were also computed for the *national* sample, with results at least as strong as those reported here, and in some cases (e.g., rigidity and status frustration) markedly stronger.

Divergence from majority norms among the more sophisticated respondents, of course, can scarcely be explained by reference to distance from communication networks, lack of information, or insufficient opportunity to encounter the norms. For some, it doubtless represents a considered, philosophically anchored rejection of the established society and its values. For others, however, it appears to be strongly associated with cognitive and personality impairments that hinder effective communication and the accurate learning of norms, or that lead, in some cases, to a "counterformist" rejection of prevailing standards.

Since the data from the two surveys reported in this paper were gathered in the middle and late '50's, one may ask whether they would hold with equal force today. Defiance of traditional norms and accepted standards appears to be more common in the '60's than in the decades that preceded it. In certain quarters today, nay-saying is "in," and may itself have become the norm. Today's deviants then, may conceivably differ in crucial ways from those described in this paper.⁴⁵ The question, of course, cannot be settled without a new study of comparable design on comparable samples. There are, nevertheless, reasons to expect that the results of such a study would be similar to those reported here. For one thing, historical studies of values indicate that a society's basic beliefs are extraordinarily tenacious and change extremely slowly. For another, even if the norms *had* changed dramatically in the space of a decade, the social-psychological processes by which people become aware of and acquire norms can scarcely have changed much. No matter what beliefs prevail in

⁴⁵ For a recent study of one such deviant subculture, see David Whittaker and William A. Watts, "Personality Characteristics of a Nonconformist Youth Subculture: A Study of the Berkeley Non-Student," *Journal of Social Issues*, 25 (1969), 65-89. The members of this special, rather exotic, but by no means homogeneous community resemble our deviants in certain respects (e.g. they are, compared with enrolled students, more "socio-emotionally maladjusted," alienated, anomic, personally less integrated, express lower self-esteem and greater anxiety, etc.); but they differ in important other respects (e.g. they are more autonomous, freer in their impulse expression, and have a more experimental, intellectual, and complex orientation toward social experience.)

a society, some people will be better placed, better adapted, better trained, and better disposed than others to discern and appreciate them.

A final question concerns the apparent conflict between the findings reported in this paper and those turned up by Crutchfield in his personality assessment of subjects who conform in an Asch-type laboratory experiment. A comparison of the personality profiles of conformers and deviants in the two studies reveals that the *deviants* in our study closely resemble the *conformers* in the Crutchfield experiment. Despite the seeming inconsistency, we believe that the findings of the present study are not only congruent with Crutchfield's but in a curious way confirm them. Both Crutchfield's conformers and our deviants suffer cognitive and personality deficiencies that lead to distorted perceptions, heightened anxiety, narrowness and inflexibility of focus, defective capacity for observing situations accurately, insensitivity to signals that indicate how one is expected to respond, and defective antennae that prevent them from sensing what is happening and how they are supposed to react. That such people conform in the one study and deviate in the other largely reflects the differences in the two situations and research tasks.⁴⁶ In the conformity experiment, the stimu-

lus and the research task are simple, the source is identifiable, the pressure is tangible, the direction of the influence is unmistakable, and the means of satisfying the demands and relieving one's internal conflicts are or appear to be immediately available—namely, by conforming to the majority judgment. In the society at large, however, one encounters innumerable, varied, and often conflicting messages, many of them issuing from unknown sources and most of them difficult to comprehend; the pressure to conform is frequently diffuse, intangible, and indirect; the way to resolve conflicting pressures is often unclear or unavailable; the reinforcements for choosing the "correct" alternative are uncertain and sporadic—in short, one is beleaguered by the sheer number and variety of influences that compete for recognition. Under these conditions, those least able to master the environment are most likely to become the "deviants." In the Asch-Crutchfield experiments they are most likely to become the "conformers."

All this points up the risks in assuming that all forms of conformity (or deviation) are phenotypically or genotypically equivalent. Much depends on the source, the context, the reference group, the content, and the like. Even the several forms of susceptibility to influence are only weakly, and sometimes negatively, correlated. In speaking of conformity and deviation, one needs to take into account much more than the simple question of whether an individual yields to or resists influence. When one observes this behavior, he has merely begun the inquiry.

⁴⁶Support for this interpretation may be inferred from a newly published study by Laurence J. Gould, "Conformity and Marginality: Two Faces of Alienation," *Journal of Social Issues*, 25 (1969), 39-63. Gould finds that the highly alienated (who closely resemble our deviants, e.g., more acquiescent, more suspicious, more expressed pathology, less self-esteem, and, of course, more alienated) also conform more in an Asch-type experiment. They also exhibit less curiosity about the reasons for their own judgments and those of the majority, "are less

sensitive to the feelings of others [and] are less likely to be 'tuned in' to the more subtle and informal norms in any given social situation." See also Melvin Seeman, "An Experimental Study of Alienation and Social Learning," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49 (1963), 270-284.

POLITICAL MONEY

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I. MONEY AND POWER¹

Money, Primitive and Modern

The basic institutions of modern democracy were established at a very early stage in the transformation that societies have undergone since feudalism. In their establishment, forms that had developed even before feudalism, in Greece and Rome, were copied. Thus the institutions are very old ones indeed.

When the age of these political institutions is compared to that of economic institutions, the contrast is sharp and striking. As society has become more and more rationalized, economic transactions have mirrored this ever-increasing rationality, with increasing technical sophistication, and increasing abstraction. The best indicator of this is in the role of money. From barter economies to modern economies in which bank-deposit money and credit account for most transactions, the development of economic mechanisms for effecting exchange has been very great. Yet the development of political institutions, and of mechanisms for effective political authority, has been far less great.

In this paper, I want to explore the similarities and differences between political power and the embodiment of economic power or value, that is, money. A careful examination of the differences will suggest which of the differences are intrinsic to the differing natures of economic and political transactions, and which are accidental. This will then allow raising questions about what kinds of innovations in political institutions might be feasible, and might allow these institutions to develop more compatibility with the technical and economic changes that occur with such rapidity in modern society. The development of modern money and monetary institutions acted to greatly facilitate manufacture, and thus to satisfy wants through the economic

system. It is conceivable that analogous developments in political institutions could provide similar benefits.

A review of relevant points in the development of modern money.

One of the first steps away from the primitive economic system of barter is the use of commodity money: some valued commodity which could serve as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account. The use of gold, silver, and other precious-metal coins which were passed by weight was only a sophisticated version of this, for the value of such coins was always regulated by their commodity value for non-monetary uses.

However, a major innovation in economic institutions occurred when notes, or promises to pay, themselves came to be transferred from hand to hand, and used no longer as a private debt, but as a transferable obligation. The importance of this new development was extremely great, because it was a qualitative change in economic institutions. It meant that an obligation that existed on the part of A toward B could be used by B in a relation with C as a valuable commodity, in paying off an obligation he had toward C.²

² This is not to say that chronologically this development occurred late in the history of economic institutions, nor that in every society it followed the development of commodity money. In barter systems, the absence of a monetary unit has often led to a system of widespread obligations or debts, these obligations serving in place of a system of money, to allow nonsimultaneous exchanges to take place. There seem to be no good examples in primitive monetary systems of such obligations being systematically transferred and used as legal tender. (See, for example, Paul Einzig, *Primitive Money*, 2nd edition, London, 1966, pp. 365-366.) However, Hawtrey describes the possibility of such a system, where in a barter economy, a medium of exchange is made unnecessary by a balancing off of debts and credits by the parties in the market. (See R. G. Hawtrey, *Currency and Credit*, 3rd edition, London, 1928.) While this is not so extensive a system of transfer of the obligation from a creditor to a third party as the institution of legal tender, it does represent a transfer of the obligation to a third party, if only for balancing accounts.

¹ My attention was drawn to the comparison of money and power by a paper of Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Spring 1963), 37-62. See also my detailed critique of this paper, and Parsons' reply, James S. Coleman, "Comment on 'On the Concept of Influence'", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Spring 1963), 63-82, and Parsons, *ibid.*, pp. 87-92. I am greatly indebted to Parsons for this initial stimulation.

It is likely that in a small, closely-knit community, a direct transfer of obligations could operate to the extent of cancelling out obligations in short cycles. That is, if A owed B, and B owed C, and C owed A, and all three obligations were of the same amount, then clearly there would be little hesitation on the part of these three to transfer obligations and settle accounts. However, in an extended chain, if A owes B, B owes C, C owes D, D owes E, E owes F, then suppose B attempted to use A's obligation to pay off his own, and so on down the line; the transaction might be cut short at D, who perhaps does not know or does not trust A, and would thus not accept A's note in place of that of his direct debtor. Thus it is easy to see that such a system would be impeded whenever the circle of exchange went beyond a group who enjoyed equal degrees of one another's confidence. In short, such chains of obligation, with the note of the head of the chain serving as currency, do not constitute a viable form of money.³

³ There is one important historical example in which such chains of obligation did constitute a form of money. This was in the early industrial activity of Lancashire in England. (For an account of the use of bills of exchange in Lancashire, see T. S. Ashton, "The Bill of Exchange and Private Banks in Lancashire, 1790-1830," *Economic History Review*, Vol. 15, Nos. 1, 2, 1945, reprinted in *Papers in English Monetary History*, edited by T. S. Ashton and R. S. Sayers, Oxford University Press, London, 1953.) While in most areas of England in the late 18th century, the notes of merchant bankers or goldsmiths became accepted currency, in the Lancashire industrial area, these bank notes were less freely accepted (and then only with a discount) than bills of exchange. Bills of exchange were debts incurred by one manufacturer upon another. The system that developed was one in which the creditor himself would endorse the bill and use it to pay one of his creditors. The use of bills to settle debts had been (and still is) widespread in large commercial transactions, but generally only in order to raise cash in a time of need, and generally at a discount. In Lancashire they were used widely by manufacturers for small transactions, apparently for nearly all transactions other than payment of workers (which was done in coin), and with little or no discount, though they were dated for payment some months in the future. Neither the Bank of England notes nor the notes of country banks or merchants were accepted as freely as the bills of exchange. A bill of exchange would pass through many hands, being endorsed and guaranteed by each holder in turn. The confidence of manufacturers and merchants in industrially dense Lan-

It is for this reason that the notes, or promises to pay, came to be notes of a single party. For the party which issues notes as promises to pay, that is, a bank, must enjoy a degree of confidence or trust greater than that of almost any other person in the community. For if a bank note is not at least as acceptable to a creditor as is the debtor's note itself, then the creditor would reject it, and the bank notes would fail to circulate, but would stop, and accumulate in the hands of the more trustworthy men, whose own credit notes or promises to pay would circulate. The failure to circulate would itself quickly lead to a repercussion along the line, and a back-wave of refusal to accept the notes, leading directly back to the bank's issue.

The development of such a system of obligations as a replacement for commodity money is exemplified in 18th Century England, during the Industrial Revolution. Outside London, a merchant, such as a grain dealer, would begin to specialize by issuing notes or promises to pay, coming to take on the role of banker for the community. These notes, though issued as an obligation of the issuing party, the merchant, were intended to be used as currency, and came to be accepted as such. The distance from London, and greater confidence in local merchants, made these notes or obligations more acceptable locally than those of the Bank of England, located in London, and the merchant's reputation made them more acceptable than the note of a creditor himself. Only later, toward the middle of the 19th Century, with the geographic widening of trade, the need for a commonly accepted currency, and the failures of some country note-issuers, did the obligations of the Bank of England, in the form of its notes, come to be more widely accepted throughout England than the country merchant-bank notes.

It is clear that the use of these debts or obligations greatly facilitated manufacture, because of the inflexibility of supply of hard currency, that is, coin, and the increasing volume of economic transactions that required payment in money. Thus the development of monetary institutions based on trust was an important aid to the increased satisfaction of wants.

In advanced economies today, of course, nearly all money consists of obligations or debts which are exchanged, excluding only some coin which has a commodity value near its face value. Currency is a direct obligation of the government whose treasury issues it; a bank deposit (which constitutes the other major form of

cashire was apparently greater in one another collectively than in any one merchant who undertook to specialize as a banker by issuing notes of his own

money) is an obligation of the bank to pay in currency which itself is an obligation of the government. (In the United States, the lack of confidence in banks after 1932 led to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which in effect transfers the bank's obligation to that of the Federal Government.) In nearly all transactions between two parties other than a bank or a government, however, the obligation or promise that changes hands is an obligation of a *third* party, that is the government (in the case of treasury notes) or a bank (in the case of a check drawn on a bank). The obligations of individual citizens, such as the credit accounts of a merchant's customers or the credit accounts of credit card companies or finance companies are obligations less readily accepted as money, ordinarily only as illiquid assets, which can be transferred only at a discount. Detailed knowledge of the use and transferability of such debts would be necessary in order to determine how close to money they become. In any case, it is clear that the general drift of industrial societies has been toward acceptance of an ever-widening range of obligations as money, presumably with the growth of confidence in the indebted institutions. It is probably true that today the debt of an ordinary citizen is not discounted more when accepted by a bank than was the note of an employer in 1880 in Lancashire when accepted by merchants.⁴

II. POLITICAL POWER

The history of economic institutions shows a great deal of change, facilitating economic activity that would have earlier been impossible. No similar development and change has occurred in the political system; yet the need for such facilitation is undoubtedly equally great. To take a simple example of the impact of technological changes on political processes, in nearly all systems of representative democracy, a legislator represents a geographically-defined population unit. But increasing geographic mobility (daily mobility) to and from work, seasonal mobility in the use of leisure, life-cycle mobility in age-specific communities, and residential mobility with changing jobs) creates a fundamentally different infra-structure to society, one which is not based on a geographic unit. Thus geographically-based representation is, or will soon be, an anachronism compared to other systems for effecting the same constituent-representative exchange, systems that have not yet been invented.

Much of political activity consists of transactions that are not radically different in kind

from economic transactions. There are, to be sure, many differences, in that politics more often involves coercion and threats of coercion, while economic activity is confined to voluntary exchanges. Yet much political activity is similar to this, and there is much similarity between political power and economic power embodied in money.

An example of an exchange process in politics which has some similarity to economic exchange occurs in the very concept of elected representatives who make policy. The transaction between the representative and his constituents is directly one of exchange: he works to obtain for them policies that will be most satisfactory to them, with the aim of inducing them to reelect him. He has control (with his fellow-legislators) of the creation of policies that are important to his constituents, and he in effect gives up to his constituents that control (by using it to further their interests), in return for which he anticipates their continuing to give to him control over his seat in the legislature, which they can revoke at election time.

The representative system of democracy is based in this and other ways on primitive exchange processes. However, it suffers from numerous defects; one that illustrates its primitive character is that it depends too greatly on the political adroitness of men like Lyndon Johnson or Sam Rayburn, who are in effect like skillful professional traders in a barter economy. And there is a great deal of "looseness" in the system, allowing for political middlemen, like party machines, which can absorb for their own use or divert to interested third parties the value inherent in a vote. In economic systems, the competition of the market, greatly facilitated by a flexible system of money, reduces the possibility of such diversion of value.

How can this looseness, which allows political value to be diverted, be reduced? That is the question I want to examine in this paper, and to begin to answer it by specifying some of the differences between political power and economic money—with the ultimate aim of suggesting new institutions to facilitate political processes.

III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MONEY AND OF POLITICAL POWER

The similarities between money and political power have been pointed out by a number of authors. This similarity lies in the major defining characteristic of each: it can be used, within its own realm, to get for its possessor what he wants. The more political power or money he has, the more he can get what he wants in the political or economic realm. Each, in its realm, is

⁴See G. Unwin, *Samuel Oldknow and the Arkwrights* (Manchester, 1924), Chap. 12.

the resource which gives control of events or goods.

The differences between money and political power are, however, great. Some of the principal comparisons are made below.

a. *The range of events or goods that it can control.*

One of the attributes of money is that it can command control over a wide range of goods and services. A quantity of dollars can, within the geographic limits for which dollars are legal tender, purchase any good or service that has a monetary value. Even beyond those limits, it can be used to purchase money which is local legal tender. The geographic range of acceptability of modern money is ordinarily defined by political boundaries and legally defined currency within them. However, in earlier days of non-commodity money, when notes were issued by merchants or goldsmiths, the area of acceptability was defined more by economic trading areas and circles of social acquaintanceship.

It is true, that some goods and services, particularly the latter, cannot be bought. However, in a modern industrial society, the number of these things becomes quite small. In fact, one could well describe the transformation of western society from feudal society to capitalist society as a shift of goods and services from a fixed "privilege" associated with a particular estate or position in society to a good or service that could be bought with a universal currency, money.

Universal power within a given geographic area has not always been characteristic of money. There are many examples in primitive societies of several types of money existing simultaneously, not interchangeable, but used for different transactions. For example, in Yap, Einzig lists nine kinds of money, which were only partly interchangeable: large, (immovable) stone discs, large pearl shells, strings of small shells, dyestuffs, coconuts, tobacco, baskets of taro, woven mats (an intertribal currency), and modern money.⁵ In modern society, however, even where multiple currencies exist, there is relatively easy convertibility from one form of money to another. Thus indirectly if not directly, all forms of money have power to command the goods and services that any one of them does.

This universality of control is precisely not characteristic of political power. A given type of political power, for example the vote of a citizen, is limited to control over a specific resource such as a seat in the legislature filled by election. It is

valueless if its power is not exercised in that specific election. Similarly, the power of the executive in the United States government is limited to control of specific events. He cannot declare war, nor levy taxes, nor pass laws, nor sentence criminals, nor control any of a number of activities that are outside his circumscribed powers. In other words, political powers are narrowly circumscribed, restricted to control over a single event or a narrow class of events.

The reasons for the difference between money and political power appear to lie principally in the divisibility of the things being controlled. If one has a small amount of money, he can buy a small amount of any type of goods. But one cannot define a "small amount" of political power in this way, because the consequences of such power are not divisible into quantities of various sizes, as are economic goods. "Policies," by their very nature, are relatively universal in application. In economics, they would be described as public goods, for which the consequences for one person are inseparable from those for another person.

This inability to divide political power in the same way as economic power has led to a number of different ways of dividing power to create pluralism of control. When early Rome abandoned kings, two devices were introduced to bring about limitations on political power.⁶ One was a time limitation, for magistrates were appointed by the Senate for one year only, and not reappointed. The other was a limitation through overlapping realms of power, for *two* magistrates were appointed, each having the same absolute powers, and each having veto power over an action of the other.

In modern political systems, the principal ways of dividing power into "small amounts" appear to be two: (a) a small portion of control over a set of events, as occurs in a collective decision where each member of the collectivity has, through a vote, only a fraction of the control over each decision; and (b) total control over a very limited set of events, as a judge has full control of initial decision over those cases that come under his jurisdiction, but no control over other events in society, except by virtue of his roles other than that of judge. It appears that in democratic societies, form (a) of partitioning of political power occurs for the citizenry, since each has a tiny fraction of control over election of all officials who have direct control of political actions. In contrast, form (b) of

⁶ See F. E. Adcock, *Roman Political Ideas and Practice* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1964).

⁵ Einzig, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

partitioning political power occurs for the officials themselves (though for legislators it is a combination of (a) and (b)). Each official has total (or a relatively large fraction of) control over a very restricted set of actions.

Another way of describing this difference between political power and money is that political power implies a specific object of power, while money is a generalized resource without a specific object. If one conceived of political power materialized as pieces of paper in a form similar to money, each one of these pieces of paper would have printed on it the object of that power, or the class of events which was its object. A voting slip, for example, would have printed on it the election for which it was valid. Or a piece of paper valid for containing a judge's decision in a case would necessarily be imprinted with a number or title of the specific case.

b. *The negotiability of money and political power.*

A second characteristic of money is that it is not associated with a particular owner. It is fully negotiable, and can be used by the second, third, or fourth holder in exactly the same way as it could be used by its first owner.

Political power does not have full negotiability. If a legislator wants (as often he does) to give up his vote on a particular issue to gain something of greater value to him, the vote still resides with him, though he may engage in an exchange of promises. There is no physical transfer, as in the case of money, but only a promise to cast the vote according to the wishes of the person to whom it was promised. There is, it is true, the case of proxy votes, in which one man gives his proxy to another; and in certain systems, such as stockholders' meetings, proxies may become an important element of power. But even here, the proxy is ordinarily given to a particular person, who himself may not transfer it to another person, so that the chain of transfer is only one or possibly two steps. Also, it is true that only in some collective decisions are proxies allowed. In others, the vote can be cast only by its original owner.

The absence of physical transfer, and the continual attachment of political power to its original owner does not occur in every circumstance; for example; the *delegation of authority* is a transfer of control of certain actions from a superior to a subordinate, and it may occur several times, so that although the ultimate guarantor of the power is the person in final authority (just as the bank is the ultimate guarantor of the value of a banknote), the direct authority over these actions resides with a person far re-

moved from this final authority. Such delegation of authority is always downwards in an organizational hierarchy, and thus not symmetric as is the transfer of money. It is more directly analogous to the transfer of possession of economic goods, which always goes in the direction away from the originator.

There are also less formal transfers of political power which may be in either an organizationally vertical or horizontal direction. For example, the phrase, "passing the buck," refers to a transfer of authority for carrying out an action that has some unpleasant consequences for the one who finally carries it out. It ordinarily refers to transfer of control over a particular action rather than transfer of control over a general class of actions, as in delegation of authority.

These examples, to which many others could be added, indicate that the nontransferability of political power does not as rigidly or intrinsically distinguish it from money as does the broad range of goods over which money has control distinguish it from the narrower range of control of political power. Nevertheless, there are many circumstances, such as the case of a legislative vote cited earlier, in which political power must be exercised by its original owner, and cannot be transferred. Even in those cases where transfer does occur, as in delegation of authority, the person to whom the power is transferred is often seen as the *agent* of the final authority. Thus there is a distinct, if not absolute, difference, between political power and money in transferability, and in its ability to become fully separate from its original owner.

Combining both of the two differences discussed above, it is clear that money exercises its value or power relatively independently of both the subject and the object of the action—that is, independently of the owner of the money and independently of the goods or services over which it brings control. Political power is ordinarily specific to a particular role or status, and is ordinarily limited in scope to a particular object of the power.⁷ Thus political power has two specific referents, its subject and its object, while money has neither. Again, if we visualize political power as concretized on pieces of paper, the piece of paper would not only contain on it the specific class of events that constitute its object, but also the name of the position or role in whom that power resides.

⁷ Political power in modern society is not, however, associated with a particular person. This separation of power from the particular person and blood lines is a major achievement in the rationalization of society, and is one of the crucial characteristics of bureaucratic authority.

c. The accumulation of power and money.

One of the principal properties of money is its ability to serve as a store of value—as a “link between the present and the future,” as Keynes says. That is, money preserves the value of one half of an economic exchange until one is ready to carry out the other half. As a consequence of this property of money, it can be accumulated—neglecting for the present the interest-earning character of money—thus making possible large accumulations of wealth under the control of one man.

Political power is different from money in this regard. It does not appear to serve in quite the same way as a link between the present and the future. It appears instead to be a means of distributing, and fixing the distribution of, control over certain actions with public consequences. As such, power cannot be accumulated or preserved for the future. Because the object of power ordinarily is a specific event or class of events, power is time-specific: if it is not used to exercise control over its particular event or action, then it has lost its value. If a legislator fails to vote on an issue, he is not preserving this power, but throwing it away. If a president fails to exercise his power to initiate legislation, he does not accumulate that power. Indeed, just the opposite may occur, if there is not a sharply defined definition of powers: those who do exercise control over the action in lieu of the proper authority may come to assume *de facto* authority over it which they relinquish only after a struggle.

Just as power is not accumulated, it is not reduced in quantity when it is exercised or used. When a head of an agency or department in a government makes a decision exercising his authority, he does not have any less authority or power after the decision than before. Just as political power cannot, in many cases, be saved, it also cannot be spent. Since political power is ordinarily tied to a specific class of events over a specified period of time, its use does not make the user any poorer.

There is, however, a kind of power which may be accumulated. This occurs frequently in legislatures, where a legislator can preserve the power of his vote on an issue even if he is not otherwise interested in it, by exacting a promise of future aid from someone who is interested in this issue, in return for exercise of his vote in a way that benefits this person. The most adept legislators build up extensive credits or debits in order to concentrate their power on those issues that are most important to them. It is likely that because of the basic time-specificity of power, political credit must be used up fairly

quickly, or else it loses its value. It is quite different in this regard from monetary credit, which apart from price changes does not depreciate, but rather gains in value over time, through the accumulation of interest. Thus while money can be described as having a value per unit time, equal to the interest rate at which it is loaned, political credit loses in value over time, and thus political power may be described as having a depreciation per unit time, equal to the rate at which power exercised in the present loses value when exchanged for power to be exercised in the future. Clearly, if money were time-specific in its value, it also could only be loaned at a discount or with a depreciation, simply because its value would be lost if not used at the appropriate time.

There is a direct relation between the ability of political power to be accumulated, and its being used up or spent when exercised. Formal power as laid down in tables of organization or constitutions cannot be accumulated, and neither can it be spent. But power that arises from political exchanges that are payable in the future can be accumulated. Similarly, personal power, in contrast to power associated with a role, can be accumulated and spent.⁸ Personal power may arise from simultaneous occupancy of several roles, from having special information or ability to perform in a role, or from an extensive line of credit or reputation that has been built over a period of time.

There is, however, a special kind of accumulation of power associated with roles, through a change in the structure of the political system. When it is said that “power begets power,” this usually means that power, the power of a role, can sometimes be used to change the structure of the system itself so as to give that role more power. Such change in the structure of power represents an accumulation of what might be better described as the resources for exercising power. The term power appears to be used in two ways: first as such resources, and second as the actual exercise of control over events.

We may ask why this difference between political power and money, why political power cannot usually be accumulated, while money can be accumulated. It appears that perhaps in this respect the formal power associated with a role

⁸ When an occupant of a position threatens to resign if he fails to get his way on a given issue, he could do so only a few times at most. This is use of personal power, rather than power associated with the role. Only if a man has filled an office in such a way that his personal occupancy of the position is of value to others does this threat have any power.

is more analogous to the actual productive resources, the productive capital, of an economic system. Such productive resources, which constitute the structure of the economic system, do not often change hands in economic exchange; it is their products that do so. When they do change hands, this is a change in the structure of the system, comparable to a change in the constitution of a political system, or in the table of organization of a bureaucracy. The specific acts through which power is exercised cannot, it appears, be accumulated because they are time-specific, as indicated in the preceding section. The only accumulation comparable to that of money appears to be in political credit, reputation, and informal power, which is often, if not always, associated with a person rather than a role. Thus if systems of power were concretized through the use of pieces of paper or other physical symbols, it appears that we might think of three separate elements:

- (1) the resources for exercising power, which could be concretized as a device for generating a steady supply of pieces of paper, each of which represented the exercise of control over a specific event or action. These productive resources may be conceived as an office or a set of rights as specified in a constitution or table of organization. These resources are analogous to the productive resources, the physical capital, in an economic system.
- (2) the pieces of paper themselves, each identified as to the class of actions or events over which it represented control, the position or role to which the power belongs, and the period for which this paper is valid. These are analogous to the products of an economic system.
- (3) a second set of notes, or promises to pay, which are issued against the pieces of paper described in (2). These notes are negotiated by the two parties at the time of agreement, and it is likely that the paper described in (2) will either be discounted in issuing these notes, or that there will be a depreciation rate for these notes, or both. These notes are analogous to specie money in an economic system, and would be designed, like money, to facilitate non-simultaneous transactions, to constitute a "link between the present and the future."

It appears that if the system were concretized in this fashion, only the notes (3) can be accumulated in a way that is at all comparable to money; the mechanism (1) is comparable to productive economic capital; and the slips of paper (2), which are comparable to economic products, must either be used or exchanged

within their period of validity, or must be discarded.

d. *Scope of legitimacy of power and acceptability of money.*

In every monetary system, the question arises as to what determines the acceptability of money in exchange for goods or services of intrinsic value. Commodity money, which was some widely-traded good, like grain, or, in the South Sea Islands, woven mats, or precious metals exchanged by weight, needed no guarantee of its value, for its value was intrinsic in the demand for the good. The only questions that could arise are ones of liquidity, convenience, and stability of command: how quickly and easily could the money be exchanged for desired goods, how easily was it stored, how stable was its value (i.e., the consumption demand for it in relation to supply). Most of these questions were resolved in the very choice or evaluation that resulted in a particular commodity being chosen: it ordinarily had high liquidity, good convenience of storage and exchange, and a stable relation between supply and consumption demand.

With money that has no intrinsic value, the acceptability of money depends upon the reputation and known resources of the issuer or guarantor. Where there is no single legal tender that money will be most acceptable which has the most respected and trusted member of the community or institution as its guarantor, and all other money will be discounted against it. Where there is legal tender, as in modern nations, its acceptability also is determined by the confidence of the community in its guarantor, the government. The declaration of one currency as legal tender forces its acceptance, but does not require sales to be made at a given price. If a currency is over-issued, the reduced value of the money can be expressed by higher prices. In a classic case, this occurred in the city of Venice. In order to pay its debts, the city issued, through its bank, about double the amount of money that ordinarily circulated in the city, which was money of the value of about 800,000 ounces of silver. Although the double quantity of money was accepted as payment for the city's debts, prices rose, and after use in a few transactions, the money gravitated back to the city for refund in silver, which Venetian merchants would accept at a premium. In order to stop this, the city had to borrow back about half the notes and remove them from circulation, to maintain the value of the other half—and it found itself in exactly the situation from which it had started. In Germany, at the time of depreciation of the mark after the first world war, the depreciation was so rapid at one point that a

worker paid one day would not hold his wage until the next morning, but would send all children out to buy food, before the value had been depressed further. In these cases and others like them, the lack of confidence in the legally-determined money was expressed in an unwillingness to hold money, and in increasing prices.

Thus the definition of money as legal tender does not insure its value; this value is insured only by confidence in the productive resources of the community relative to the amount of money circulating, and thus willingness to hold or accept money (to be exchanged for future products) rather than present products.

The acceptance of money is paralleled by a general class of attitudes called the "legitimacy" of political power. Legitimacy means the acceptance of this power, and willingness to act in accordance with its demands. At times of social upheavals the legitimacy of a given system of power may be brought into serious question by the populace, and unless the power can be backed by direct force, it is overthrown. The legitimacy of power, however, may be confined to a much smaller domain than is the domain of a monetary system. That is, the legitimacy of the power of a police force or a city council or a state legislature or a mayor or a judge does not extend beyond a particular jurisdiction defined by geographic boundaries. The legitimacy of the power of a factory owner does not extend beyond the limits of the organization, and is even limited to certain actions within the organization.

Limitations on the domain of political power are also evident when we turn from formal power to political credit, reputation, and other types of informal power. Though these types of power-credit have more of the attributes of money in that they can be saved, spent, accumulated, and invested, they are like formal power in being restricted to a narrow domain. Since they depend upon the formal power that they derive from, they lose most of their value outside that domain of power. A school principal, with enormous power within his school, has political credit and reputation in the community surrounding it, but is an ordinary man outside his community, with no reputation at all.

One might draw a rough parallel between the early locally restricted monetary systems in use in 18th Century England and the locally-restricted power systems of political units such as towns, cities, counties, and states within a nation. With increasing geographic mobility and increasing relevance of distant events, the power of these local units has become less and less used, replaced by use of power at the national level. A simple example of the general direction

of movement is the renovation of cities in the United States. The arguments for and against, and the decision about how much to renovate and how to do so, are made at the national level. The subsequent local decision is little more than a ratification of this action for that locality.

However, despite the drift of attention, decision-making, and general employment of power to the level of nations, there has been no reorganization of the system as has occurred for monetary systems. The result is that this system of collective action functions more poorly than if the appropriate political invention, comparable to the adoption of Bank of England notes, were made.

e. The unit of measure.

One final difference between modern money and political power is important. Money has a specific unit of measure, which is comparable from one transaction to another. Political power has no unit of measure, yet political debts are made and paid. Consequently, there must be some accounting scheme for reckoning these debts. The situation has some similarity to primitive barter systems, in which no strict accounting was kept, but a debt of one good was discharged by payment of another quite different in labor-value. There is no reason to believe that our political systems are not at a stage of development similar to that of primitive economic systems which used no strict accounting scheme. It appears more difficult, however, to conceive how a unit of account might evolve in political systems.

The need for a unit of account in economic systems arises only because of the need to allow debts to be settled in general terms, that is, by any of a variety of goods. Without money specified in terms of an abstract value, debt when incurred would have to be specified in any of a number of alternative goods—for if it were specified in only one, then the creditor could always hold the debtor to his original terms, no matter how much their relative value had changed, nor how difficult it was for the debtor to obtain them.

Summary

Five comparisons between money in an economic system and power in an authority system have been made above: (a) the range of goods or events that it can control; (b) the negotiability of money and political power; (c) the accumulability of money and power; (d) the geographic scope of acceptability of money and legitimacy of power; and (e) the quantitative unit of measure associated with money and its

absence for power. These comparisons all lead to a common question: how do the specific characteristics of the wants governed by political power constrain the form that such power can take? Clearly a system of power that was parallel in all respects to a monetary system could not be devised, because of the different nature of private goods and public policies. Yet it is equally absurd to believe, as the lack of political innovations seems to imply, that political power must be as different from economic power in its organizations as is the case in existing political systems.

The second part of this paper will attempt to build on the comparisons made above, by examining a number of possible alternatives to current political organizations to see what their most obvious defects might be. One might even go so far as to make a comparison with 18th Century liberalism in economics: in earlier political forms, the production and distribution of private goods was carried out under direct political control, and economic liberalism argued for their removal from such control. This was accomplished with enormous increase in human welfare. Perhaps it is now possible for the production of public goods to be removed from political control.

In examining the possibilities, the distinctions made under (c) above, between the *productive resources* (rights inherent in a role), the *products* (exercise of acts of power by the occupant of a role), and the notes or promises to pay (political credit) are important. It is the last of these, the political credit, which is most analogous to specie money in an economic system, and it is the last of these which is absent in any tangible form, existing only in loose and poorly-accounted agreements. The fundamental difference between the productive resources and products of the economic system, for which money exists as a lubricant, and the productive re-

sources and public goods. Policies, i.e., public goods, can not be experienced, or as the economist would say, "consumed," individually, independently and divisibly, but are carried out (or in economic terms "supplied") for a public altogether and thus experienced in concert inseparably.⁹ In other words, political power is control over certain actions or events that do not have the divisibility of economic goods but have indivisible consequences for all in the political jurisdiction. Economic power is similar control over resources that have the characteristics of private goods and services, that is, they can be supplied and experienced independently. The direct analogue for money does not exist in political power, for money is a device that facilitates economic exchange by providing both a measure of value and a counter for storing the value given in exchange until needed for use. But in so doing money itself gains the economic power of the goods whose value it counts and stores. Yet the ultimate economic value, or resources, or power in the system lies not in the money, but in the economic goods or resources themselves. The importance of money for modern economic systems raises the possibility that the absence of such a medium in political processes may greatly inhibit the proper functioning of political institutions, and may, in fact, inhibit political innovations that would aid modern life.

III. NEW POLITICAL FORMS

With the foregoing analysis in mind, it is possible to conceive of a variety of new political forms which would have more of the flexibility that money lends to the economic system. In using that analysis, it is most useful to return first to the distinctions made in section (c) above, between three aspects of an economic system and a political system: (1) the productive resources, (2) the products, and (3) the notes or promises to pay. The comparison is:

	<i>Economic or Market System</i>	<i>Political or Authority System</i>
1) Productive resources	1) Physical, intellectual, and organizational capital necessary for production of private goods	1) Rights of control over specific classes of events, as specified by a constitution or table or organization
2) Products	2) Private goods and services offered in a market	2) Actions carried out in accord with rights under (1), having consequences for a given set of persons
3) Money	3) Specie money (promises of a third party) offered in return for control over goods and services under (2)	3) Informal promises offered in return for control over actions under (2)

sources and products of a political (or authority) system, for which there is no analogue to money, is the difference between private goods

⁹ This does not exactly correspond to Samuelson's definition of a public good, which involves both the jointness of supply and the non-additivity of con-

With this explicit comparison, it is clear that a major reason that nothing formally comparable to money under (3) exists for the political system is the nondivisibility of acts exercising political power under (2). Any action has a consequence for a given set of persons, so that to exchange control over it to any one of this set may be against the interests of others. To exchange control over it to someone outside this set may be against the interests of all. Thus in any new political forms, careful attention must be paid to the scope of legitimacy of any political money that is introduced, and its convertibility beyond that scope.

Three examples of different forms of power are described below. The first and second involve modifications of a system of representative democracy. The transfer of power from individuals (e.g., citizens) in whom ultimate sovereignty resides, to a body which makes decisions as representatives of these sovereigns is now carried out via elections of representatives by the sovereign individuals, and collective decisions made by these representatives. The first and second examples (a) and (b) below, are designed as modifications of that system. The third, (c) below, is a form of power that contains some of the properties of a vote and some of the properties of money: area-specific currencies with limited convertibility.

a. Corporate bodies as representatives with fluctuating power

In political democracies, there is no explicit recognition of the supra-individual actors that have arisen in modern society: corporate bodies in the form of churches, labor unions, business firms, professional associations, and other organized bodies.

These corporate bodies are different from the citizen-sovereigns in one important respect: they have no constitutional political power, but must obtain it from the citizens (as does a trade union in its use of the electoral power of its members to gain the support of legislators), or purchase it with other forms of power, such as money (as does a business firm that helps finance a candidate's political campaign). Consequently, in modern legislatures, these corporate bodies have a very great deal of power that affects the direction the legislature will act.

A different form of political democracy would be one, something like syndicalism, that explicitly recognizes the corporate bodies that have

emerged in modern society, and allows them directly to receive from the citizens political support reflecting the citizens' investments in them, and to use that power through votes in collective decisions of that society. In such a form, a citizen would directly cast votes for activities or corporate bodies in which he had the most psychic investment of self.¹⁰ It is these corporate bodies in which the citizens selves have been invested, and it is through the effect of collective actions on the activities of these corporate bodies that the citizen himself feels the effect of political action.

A system of representation in which each citizen casts several ballots for those corporate bodies in which he has investments of self would allow the delegation of political power to directly reflect the self-investments he had made. As these investments change, his votes would go to other corporate bodies. And in all cases, his votes would not be cast for or against a body, but merely for that body. In the representative assembly, the members of the assembly would be the corporate bodies themselves (i.e., their agents), each casting votes in proportion to those the body had received in the election.

The nation and local geographically-based units such as cities and states are also corporate bodies in which individuals make investments of self, so that these bodies as well as others in society would constitute a basis of representation. Because individuals ordinarily make a great investment of self in the nation, the power of its representative would likely be especially great. The representative of the nation as a unit would

¹⁰ It is Arthur E. Bentley's *Process of Government* (1908) that was most pioneering in this direction, and remains the most theoretically elegant, although it was formulated very loosely. Bentley had a conception of society as composed of *activities*, and of interest groups forming to implement these activities, with the outcomes of governmental actions a resultant of the pressures of these interest groups that were founded on activities. Bentley was never specific about what he included as activities, but it was clear that he intended them to include, but not be limited to, economic activities. In one example he uses, church-going activity is opposed to saloon-keeping activity (with other activities participating as well) over the issue of saloon operation on Sunday. Bentley, however, did not take the next step and examine the possibility that these activities could be the recipient of citizens' votes, and thus represent them in a legislative body. He pays little attention altogether to the form of government, making the implicit assumption that the pressure of the activities through their interest groups would be independent of the governmental form.

sumption. However, the aim here is not to say that all political power concerns control of the supply of public goods, but rather to give a rough description of the kind of actions which political power controls.

attend, in effect, to the interests of the nation as a whole, and insofar as individuals feel that the fortunes of the nation as a nation are important to them, his power would be great. It is obvious, of course, that these psychological investments by individuals fluctuate over time; and as they do, the delegation of political authority in the nation as a whole and in other corporate bodies would fluctuate accordingly.

In a system of representation like this one, every organized activity in society, and thus every corporate body, would compete in a system of pure and open competition for votes of the citizen-sovereigns. The form of the representative assembly might vary from time to time, as the number of different corporate bodies with agents as members varied. Each body would have a number of votes in the representative assembly proportional to the number it had received in the general election.

It is obvious that in modern democracies these corporate bodies wield great indirect power in legislation. It is they that form the lobbies, pressure legislators, write legislation, finance campaigns, organize support for candidates. Thus in the current system they are merely at one remove from formal power in collective action. Yet this remove may make an important difference. Their power to affect the outcome of existing legislative bodies depends on a variety of resources, some of which are not a legitimate part of political currency. Their aims in legislation are often equally hidden, sometimes consisting of private gains at the expense of the general good. Altogether, their actions are hidden from view, and as a "shadow government," as they have been called, they use unknown resources in transactions with legislators, often for private goals. In a body in which their participation was direct and explicit, their resources are those they receive from the citizens through votes, and their activities are less hidden. This does not mean, of course, that other resources such as money do not enter the political arena, for money and psychological investments of people are differently distributed among corporate bodies, thus creating an inherent tension between two forms of power. It does mean, however, that the members of the legislative body would be direct representatives of individual interests, rather than actors interposed between interests and the collective decision, as are geographically-based legislators in existing political systems.

b. Changes in the income of power to representatives

In a representative democracy, the constitu-

tion or the rules of procedure of the body of representatives provides an automatic income of power to each representative. It does so by giving him a vote when there is introduction of proposed legislative action. Innovation, however, is possible through modifying this stream of income.

In a collective body that makes only infrequent and irregular decisions, such as a committee that meets only infrequently, this automatic distribution of power coincident with the introduction of a proposed collective action may be the most viable one; but in a body which has frequent collective actions, informal actions reallocate this power through vote-trading and the use of political credit, which concentrate power on a particular action in the hands of those legislators with greatest interest in it. As a consequence, it is clear that some alternative means of providing a power income, which utilizes the same interests that govern the informal transactions, is possible. Such a means of distributing incomes of legislative power should have first the characteristic that power is distributed equally to those in the same structural positions, as it is now, but secondly, the characteristic that power is less fully tied to the specific action than at present, so that legislators could have some option in the allocation of their power income among different issues. Several possibilities meeting these requirements are outlined below.

1) Fixed set of decisions, fungible votes:

If the numbers of bills voted upon in a legislative session were fixed, a legislator could be given a set of votes at the beginning of the session, for him to use on whatever bills he liked. Thus the vote would have associated with it a label indicating only the session for which its use was valid, but not the particular bill within the session. In such a system, the legislator could allocate this income of power in whatever ways he desired, with no necessity of vote trading. Such an arrangement would not violate the interests of his constituents, but merely give him greater flexibility to realize their interests.

The operating characteristics of such an arrangement are difficult to foresee fully. Some points are clear, however. Both on the basis of some observations of a legislative game played in this way, and on the basis of its comparability to an *n*-person Colonel Blotto game,¹¹ the

¹¹ A Colonel Blotto game is a game in which two opposing players, each with a set of forces, must deploy these forces among several sites. The player with the greatest size of force at a given site wins on that site, and the overall payoff to each player

gislative session can be expected to be more early one of pure conflict. It appears in this respect similar to the situation, in two-person bargaining, in which the move from the initial position to the contract curve has been determined and thus all the mutual gains extracted), but the particular point on the contract curve is at issue. By making the exchange of votes for political credit that goes on in the legislature unnecessary, since the mutual benefits that are realized in those exchanges are realized at the outset by the more flexible use of votes, much of the non-conflict portion of the activities is removed. It appears that the legislature would become more individualistic, less cohesive, since much of the reason for trust and credit have been removed. However, it is not at all clear whether the end result in legislation would reflect the citizens' interests with more distortion than is the case with issue-specific votes, or with less.

2) Bank accounts of fungible votes:

In most collective bodies, the number of actions to be decided is indeterminate. In such bodies, the flexibility of the preceding system may be realized by a different procedure. A certain small number of votes is issued to each member at the beginning of the session. He uses these as a bank account of votes, which he can spend on a given issue or save. Then when the first action is voted, and there are s_1 votes cast for the s_2 cast against, the action passes if $s_1/(s_1 + s_2)$ is greater than the fraction determined by the decision rule (e.g., one-half plus one n a majority rule). Then the number of votes cast, $s_1 + s_2$, is redistributed by adding to the bank account of each member $(s_1 + s_2)/n$ votes. A member can thus save votes, if the current issue is not of interest to his constituents, or spend heavily if it is.

Again, the operating characteristics of such a system are not known. Much, but not all, of the reason for vote trading is removed. A member will be able to more easily concentrate votes on actions of greater interest, so that the realization of members' interests (or constituents' interests) through the collective action would appear to be less distorted than with the issue-specific vote and imperfect vote markets. It would seem to have some applicability in a system of direct democracy without representatives, where the membership is so large and dis-

persed as to make vote trading costly. If each member were allowed to keep an account of votes (with some perishability over time), which he could use on those issues that interested him most, the outcome of the vote in a direct democracy would certainly more fully reflect the differing intensities of feeling than in direct voting with a single vote per issue.

3) Regular vote incomes from constituents:

A third means of providing power incomes to representatives is one in which constituents' votes go directly into a representative's account. Each constituent receives a vote at a fixed interval, say a month. He may cast his vote for or against his representative, during its period of validity. The net number of positive votes received constitutes the representative's bank account to use during this period, on whatever actions he chooses. He recasts the constituents' votes, distributing them as he likes over legislative actions that arise in this period. His votes in the representative assembly in the next period again are the votes cast for him in that period, minus those cast against him. Thus when his constituents are especially interested in the actions likely to arise in the assembly, and when he is casting votes in their interest, they will be very likely to cast a vote in that period. If the first of these conditions do not hold, they will less likely cast a vote. If the second does not hold, they will cast votes against him. In either case, he will have fewer votes to use in his voting.

The operating characteristics of this system are also unknown. It is clear, however, that citizens in a divided district would produce legislators with very little power. However, the effect of a constituent's vote will be much less dependent on the district in which he resides than in current representative systems with elections decided by a majority. The value of the representatives in this case is as vote-concentrators. As is evident, the power of combined votes cast as a unit is in general greater than the power of these same votes cast individually, since when cast as a bloc they can more often determine the outcome.

c. Mixed money-power systems, and the use of vouchers

For some goods, which are not divisible finely enough to be distributed according to money held by individuals, mixed systems of power-allocation arise. Ownership of an automobile in a poor country may reside in a collectivity that has been created to provide enough money to purchase the automobile. Ownership of a house is often joint, between husband and wife, and

is determined by the sum of his gains at each victorious site. This is obviously a game of pure conflict. See R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957).

often purchased with the money incomes of both. Ownership of a country club may reside in a collectivity of members, with rights of usage determined by vote of the members. Cooperatives often form to purchase recreational facilities, such as beach clubs, and the rights of usage are subject to collective decision. The most widespread mixed system exists in publicly-owned or partner-owned business firms, in which actions of the firm are decided by vote, but partial ownership is purchased by money.

These examples of cases in which goods or activities that are purchasable by money nevertheless come to include also votes as a form of power suggest the basis for dividing power through votes rather than money. When the consequences of an activity are indivisible among the members, and yet each has a claim to some control over the activity, this claim must be exercised by a fraction of control over the indivisible activity, rather than total control over the divisible activity.

There is, in addition, another type of mixed system, involving vouchers in which the activity or good is divisible, but the resources to gain control of it are of restricted convertibility.

Vouchers, stamps, coupons, consumption subsidies, or other devices that entitle the holder to obtain control over a particular activity or good contain one of the attributes of a vote, and one of the attributes of money. (I consider here only those vouchers that are sufficient in themselves to obtain the good or activity, not those, as in periods of rationing, that must be used jointly with money to have any value.) They are, like votes, specific to a restricted activity or good, and have value only for obtaining control over that good. They are, like money, usable to obtain total control over a fraction of the good or activity, not like votes usable to obtain a fraction of control over the total good or activity.

The question arises, then, in what circumstances is this intermediate form of power, which contains a mixture of the properties of votes and money, applicable? Some suggestions may be obtained from those cases in which vouchers are used, or in which their use has been proposed.

Food stamps are distributed in the United States to persons whose monetary power is at a particularly low level. The specific reason for the use of stamps rather than money is the fact that the decision about where the money is to be spent has been made by collective action (through government purchases of food in the price support program). The vouchers serve to distribute a portion of the power that originally inhered in that money, the control of the goods

thus purchased, but not a second portion, the choice of whether to purchase these goods from others. The collective decision about the disposition of public money may be made, as in the case, for reasons other than that of restricting the autonomy of the person who ultimately controls the goods (i.e., in this case, for maintaining food price supports); or it may be made specifically to restrict that autonomy.

In a number of European countries consumption subsidies, which constitute a partial voucher for specific goods or activities, are widely used for housing and food for persons with low money incomes. In the United States, public housing or subsidized middle-income housing in large cities is also a partial voucher. In this case, the collective decision which determines these policies is a decision to redistribute a portion of the power that inheres in money to persons with certain characteristics, as in the food stamp plan. However, the decision is explicitly made in these cases in order to withhold that portion of the power of money that inheres in the choice of what class of goods or activities to purchase. The decision is made collectively to augment the economic power of those who have low money incomes, but to restrict this increment of power to those activities or goods determined by vote of the collectivity. The decision is ordinarily made because of a belief that the power given by money will be used for other activities than those in which the collectivity has decided an increment is most valuable.

In other areas, vouchers have been distributed for all members of the citizenry, rather than only for those with low money incomes. Vouchers for the purchase of school services were introduced by some Southern states of the United States, to circumvent the racial integration of public schools. School vouchers have been proposed in England and in the United States for the whole population.

In the area of health, an equivalent to voucher systems has been introduced for all citizens in a number of countries, through a national health service. In these cases, the aim is to redistribute economic power through taxation, but to insure that the funds so redistributed are used for the activity of education or health by redistributing the money in the restricted form of a voucher. Consequently, there is a fractionation of the power of money. The money, publicly held by the government, contains the power to obtain control over various kinds of goods or services. The government uses a portion of that power by collective decision which allocates certain amounts to education, health, etc., and then distributes the remaining

ortion of the power, that is the rights to use or consumption of the goods or services, among its members. The historical situation in the case of health services is the opposite of that in the case of school services: the introduction of health vouchers in the various national health services as a restriction of the power of individuals, who previously had had the total power of the money whose use is now collectively determined. (There is, of course, also a redistribution of power among individuals). In the case of school services, individuals under the public school system have only the power of consumption of a specific service provided by the government; the use of vouchers is an expansion of that power, to use for any educational service that the individual chooses.

If the total cycle of the production and consumption of the monetary power consumed through vouchers is considered, it consists first of the production of the power through individuals' labor; then the collective removal of this power through taxation to shift ownership of the money from individuals to the collectivity; and finally, a redistribution of a portion of this power through the distribution of activity-specific vouchers.

To make clearer the specific characteristics that differentiate vouchers from both votes and money, it is useful to conceive a voucher system in which the redistributive aspect is removed. Consider a collectivity, a nation with a currency system, that makes a collective decision of the following sort: it determines a number of activity areas, including those activities that are not individually consumed, such as public administration and national defense. It then determines what fraction of individual income payments are to be made in currencies that are usable in various areas of consumption: health, food, housing, recreation, and others, with perhaps a fraction in a currency usable in any area. It does not allow consuming individuals to exchange one currency for another at the government bank, but does allow producing institutions, which receive one type of currency but must pay employees a currency mix, to do so, at fixed rates.

In such a system, the vouchers or area-specific currencies are exactly like money except that their range of power is limited to a specific area. The income earner has lost one degree of power, the power to allocate his income among areas according to his tastes. Within these areas, his income has the full power of money.

This analysis of the specific characteristics of money, votes, and vouchers as forms of power

gives some indication of the conditions under which each is most applicable in a social system. Money and votes are clearly applicable when the activity or good is divisible and indivisible respectively. There are some activities in any social system, however, which fit perfectly into neither of these categories. They are consumed by individuals, not by the collectivity as a whole, but the collectivity as a whole has an interest in gaining some power over their consumption. This may be because the collectivity decides they should be supplied equally to all independently of money income, as in health or education, or because the collectivity decides that individual expenditures of income will not allocate expenditures in that area that are commensurate with "real" needs of individuals. (This may be because of market distortions through advertising or other promotion, or merely because individuals do not trust themselves to make rational choices between market areas, when expenditure in some areas brings immediate gratification, while expenditure in others brings delayed gratification.) In these activities, a form of power which is partly at the disposal of the collectivity and partly at the disposal of individuals is clearly appropriate. This is exactly the nature of a voucher or area-specific currency.

It appears likely that in the future development of modern societies, when social production is more divorced from individual productivity, when income payments to individuals for productive activities develop more difficulties as a source of power distribution in society, and as interdependence of activities increases, that a larger portion of the power that arises from productivity will be disposed through such a joint means, involving both decisions by the collectivity as a whole and decisions by individuals as ultimate consumers. The most appropriate emergent form of power as a result of this would appear to be the voucher or area-specific currency.

This discussion of a few alternative forms of political power indicates some of the variations that might exist. What is necessary, in considering the rational design of political institutions, is to consider the essential properties of political power, or control of public policies, as distinct from economic power, or control over private goods—and then to examine the possible concrete forms that political power might take without losing these essential properties. The present essay is intended as a step in this direction.

CREATING POLITICAL REALITY*

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"Suit yourself."

—American colloquialism

Currently fashionable modes of political analysis deserve acclaim today for at least two reasons: they provide opportunities for participating in a pleasurable if strenuous activity (regardless of the value of the end results) and they effectively come to terms with the surface facts of political reality. Our posterity, too, may find it easy to esteem the contemporary products of the profession of political science should it ever look back and see how an affection for craftsmanship is combined with the ability to please. Moreover, the reward system of the profession should appear as having been nicely designed to promote the present display of talent, ingenuity, variety, and success. There is evidence, in any case, that the prevailing inclination to work hard and to develop ever more powerful analytical tools is welcomed and reinforced within the discipline. All would seem to be well.

Yet doubts continue to be expressed today even by those who govern the profession and engage in what Thomas Kuhn has called normal science. Partially, there is a petulant resentment among older practitioners, scholars who are made fretful and irritable by the entrepreneurial opportunism of the *nouveau riche*, by the feeling that mindless industriousness rather than scholarly contemplation is now rewarded by tenure as well as by space in journals, time on panels, positions on editorial boards, and cash for projects. It does not pain me, however, to disregard the indictment that comes from this source—not because I suspect its patrician origins but because I believe it is blind to the underlying impulse of empiricism, because it ignores the subversive, liberating thrust of empirical science. I am also prepared to disregard the assorted indictments which come from *within* the dominant paradigm of the profession: intramural critiques, letters to the editor blown up into articles, manuals by

technicians more critical of one another's techniques than of their shared assumptions. It is a third kind of indictment—sometimes little more than an angry, incoherent expression of uneasiness—which I would like to take more seriously.

What has become annoying to political scientists of diverse methodological persuasions is the profession's inability to frame and illuminate the major events of recent times, events which, because they have run counter to expectations, are perceived as critical. And what makes this doubly annoying is that only unaccredited prophets, poets, seers, preachers, and metaphysicians would seem to have foreseen anything like the contemporary crisis in authority. Who within the profession has made our incapacity to govern ourselves—to control the most brutal and the most generous of our impulses at home and abroad—rationally manageable, subject to disciplined statement? One need not turn to the major catastrophes of the age to become uneasy about the way our professional activities are disconnected from our concerns, seemingly trivial matters close at hand having proved sufficient to provoke questions. Previously unseen (or irrelevant) parts of reality have suddenly had the nerve to make themselves visible. Pushing their way into camera range, unrecognized and unrepresented men have fought to be perceived as significant, becoming relevant if not to professional social scientists, then at least to administrators and legislators worried about the possibility of revolution. Submerged groups (students, blacks, women, construction workers, stockholders, homosexuals, clergymen, cops, and even Army recruits, though not yet patients, prisoners, teachers, coal miners, or bureaucrats) have crashed into the mass media and thereby into the arena of politics.

Their emergence (inevitably characterized as an emergency by those within the consensus) has of course been made comprehensible enough on one level: causal analysis has revealed, for example, that the longer and hotter the summer, as one article has solemnly concluded, the more likely the outbreaks of the lower orders.¹ But

* This essay is drawn from a discussion paper prepared for a meeting of several members of the Caucus for a New Political Science at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, May 1-2, 1969. It was also subjected to helpful criticism by members of the Columbia University Seminar on Political and Social Thought, February 1970.

¹ David C. Schwartz, "On the Ecology of Political Violence: 'The Long Hot Summer' as a Hypothesis," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 11 (July-August 1968), 24-28. In his critique of the Kerner Commission report on civil disorders, Robert M. Fogelson has noted that the Commission, like social

hile causal analysis allows political scientists to cope with new data even in the city of New Haven, while it allows them to explain the appearance of previously eclipsed men or to demonstrate how to engineer their disappearance, the available scientific explanations nonetheless fail to satisfy. Somehow the prevailing modes of explanation do not enable political scientists to comprehend phenomena as fully as the forms used by some novelists, journalists, poets, or film directors. Political scientists—certainly those who have recently turned out in considerable numbers for the special convention panels set up by the auspices for a New Political Science—vaguely sense that their approach does not permit them to see their subject matter as comprehensively as they might. They do perceive people in motion, but primarily as reflexes and outputs, as effects of causes. Convinced that men must be suspected as agents capable of engaging in goal-oriented action, they nonetheless can see little which exhibits purpose, meaning, dignity, and integrity. As political scientists, they are dictated to perceive manipulated and manipulated data; as men with larger concerns and a greater range of compassion, they aspire to perceive something more, namely the public significance of others who happen to be outside the prevailing balance of manifest interests. Professionally, they are impelled—whether by memories of scope-and-methods courses or by the inuendos of their colleagues—to confuse science with an edifice of positivist theory and to identify explanations with unambiguous generalizations about neatly assorted variables. As non-professionals, however, they are sensitive to the need to challenge what are alleged to be the real attributes of functional systems.²

scientists who served it, viewed riots as mere reactions to ills manageable within the prevailing system of liberalism, that is, manageable without redistributing political power: see "Review Symposium," this REVIEW, 63 (December 1969), 1269-1275.

²The notion that reality has real attributes is rarely expressed as explicitly as in the following: "Some features of the world *stand out*, almost begging for names. Concepts clouds, thunder, table, dog, wealth, hunger, color, shape, and the like, name differentiated slices of reality that impinge willy-nilly on all of us." May Brodbeck in *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 3 (*italics in original*). Similarly, nations, university departments, a market economy, or prevailing role differentiation are recurrently treated as if they were indubitably, imperturbably real.

To what extent is it possible to provide professional tools and rewards for such political scientists, for those whose generous moral sensibilities are betrayed by the astringency of their science?

I. A MODEL OF POLITICAL MAN

It is not likely, I believe, that we can expand the focus of political science unless we permit our vision and action to be directed by a model of human nature which allows us not only to account for man's private, economic interests but also to recognize his currently less apparent political possibilities. Unless we learn to acknowledge that more may be present than we have yet experienced, the best political scientists—those most torn between the demands of the discipline and their own moral perceptions, those who bear the greatest strains—will drop out of the profession, becoming increasingly unprofessional and undisciplined. They are apt to follow sentiment, ultimately identifying with their subject matter, arrested and absorbed by its sheer presence, surrendering their critical capacities, becoming so thoroughly engaged by aggregated data that they will finally disdain efforts to bestow structure and form on their experience. If they do not go all the way, they will remain as cynics and opportunists who market the products of normal science in order to be at least free enough for occasional undisciplined, unprofessional forays into the ghettos of our cities and our minds.

To enable them to move coherently—that is, to make it possible for political science to integrate norms and facts, theory and practice, morality and science, ends and means—we will have to ask ourselves whether in our battle against metaphysics, superstition, prejudice, and ideology, we might not have won too large a victory. Frankly accepting the idealist overtones of model building, we will have to reconsider the pathetic directive that scientific models are merely to be checked against the common denominator of present experience and inquire how, instead, we might derive a model of political man from barely recorded, ill-articulated, marginal intimations of human possibilities.

Whatever the difficulties today in accepting the discursive styles generally employed for constructing such a model, it certainly has been recurrently envisaged and formulated. I have had previous occasion to identify its outlines by noting what is shared by Rousseau's self-governed individual, Marx's unalienated man, Nietzsche's self-activated hero, Dewey's educated person, Sartre's man of good faith, Fromm's autonomous individual, and Lifton's protean man. We

can give further resonance to these available images of human nature by considering the non-authoritarian personality of social psychology, the Hermes-like figures appearing in the various myths of the trickster, the picaresque nonhero of modern fiction, or Gordon Allport's portrait of man as a creature in continuous process of becoming. If the result of such an exploration should seem to resemble an unsorted collection of color slides, there is nothing to keep us from carefully sorting them, inquiring how they came to be, and speaking firmly about them with a measure of precision. This would in any case help make vivid a plausible ideal of the healthy personality and might encourage us to inquire into ways for reducing illness.

There is of course a reluctance to permit metaphors borrowed from medicine to orient political life. Won't citizens, unlike physicians, properly disagree on the ends of action? The application of the concept of health to political situations is questioned, in other words, because it would falsely imply agreement on some final ideal, on some static condition.³ But there is no need to entertain such a simplistic notion of "health." A healthy system may well be the *end* of medical practice; yet there are good empirical grounds for treating biopsychological systems—including the body politic—precisely as physicians or psychiatrists do, namely as open-ended ones, as systems which are healthy as long as they remain in process.⁴ And what is characteristic of human beings in process, of men engaged in political action, is their continuous resolve to display themselves, to express their determination to remain purposefully in motion, to defy necessity and assert as much of themselves as they dare.⁵

³ Some of Harold D. Lasswell's overenthusiastic formulations in particular have provoked criticism: see Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 197-209.

⁴ See especially Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 139-140; Steven Polgar, "Health," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), Vol. VI, pp. 330-336; and Marie Jahoda, "Mental Health," in *Encyclopedia of Mental Health* (New York: Watts, 1963), Vol. III, pp. 1067-1079.

⁵ As Jeffrey Smith has pointed out to me, it is no less characteristic of developing human beings to strive for a sense of mastery; desiring to master a progressively richer role repertoire, they impose order on play, orgasmic releases, and wayward impulses: cf. Robert W. White, *Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory* (New York: International Universities Press, 1963).

That political scientists are actually not innocent of this self-exhibiting, self-promoting aspect of political action is shown by Murray Edelman's current work on poverty as well as by voting studies which allow that voters might conceivably be actors who can be understood in social settings which reveal the expressive character of their behavior.⁶ Moreover, there may be an increasing readiness to concede that studies of attitudes and of participation do in practice incorporate unobservable intentions—something more than overt behavior.⁷

The ground for such a perspective, given its classic definition by Aristotle, has been characterized as "political space" by Hannah Arendt. In terms echoing George Herbert Mead no less than Aristotle, she has tellingly identified it as the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly. . . . To be deprived of it means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance. To men the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; "for what appears to all, this we call Being," and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality.⁸

Man's natural "need," in this view, is the opportunity to *be*, to gain recognition by making witnessed and comprehended appearances and thereby becoming significant to others.

That precisely this—nothing less and *nothing more*—is man's universal need is still hard to acknowledge. It does find implicit support in statements such as the epilogue of Amitai Etzioni's *Active Society*, a thoroughly lucid discussion of human inauthenticity, a term given meaning by his review of authentic basic needs.⁹

⁶ See Murray Edelman, "Public Policy and Political Violence," discussion paper, Institute in Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, 1968; and Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," this REVIEW, 63 (March 1969), 5-25.

⁷ One serious effort to show how the dominant paradigmatic directives are being revised is Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies," this REVIEW, 63 (March 1969), 26-39.

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 198-199; the quotation is said to come from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1172b36 ff.

⁹ Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes* (New York: Free

Yet whatever the appeal of such essays, they still respond to the essentialist question of what human needs "really" are. Needs continue to be specified as if some ontological heaven had to be decked out with an assortment of reifications.

To accept the spirit of Etzioni's discussion but avoid its residual Platonism, it should be useful to recall the tradition of empiricism and see it exemplified by Herbert Marcuse's work. His approach is at once far less idiosyncratic than his critics claim and far less complicated than his prose allows.¹⁰ Derived from Hegel, it gives rise to that "unhappy consciousness" generated by the tension between the reality we know all too well and the reality which remains unconfirmed and unrealized—those unacknowledged intimations of life which the prevailing organization of society continues to repress, those unspeakable dimensions of ourselves from which we are kept alienated. Our needs, Marcuse argues with a good deal more fuss than necessary, will make themselves known to us when surplus repression—repression in excess of what men need—is eliminated.

To be sure, we feel that this argument begs the question: just how much repression *do* men need? But the kind of conclusive answer we tend to look for cannot be had within the empirical tradition. We want abstract, unconditional answers whereas Marcuse will rightly provide us only with hypothetical, conditional ones: *if* you reduce repression, his hypothesis states conditionally, *then* the ability of men to harmonize their conflicting drives is likely to be enhanced. Put differently: if reality were changed, men would be more apt to bring diverse experiences into relationships.

But, we might persist in asking, how valid is this proposition? For those empiricists not aligned with the established present, there is only one way to find out. We must proceed by acting as if it were valid: we must be prepared to invest in it, to try. The procedure is of course the familiar pragmatic one. Taking risks, we must attempt to *violate* whatever is alleged to be reality, whatever equilibrium positivists cer-

tify to be real. We will then either lose our wager or else compel reality to yield, learning (by doing) that, to the extent that we succeeded in pushing back the coercive forces of the wilderness, we will have gained in manageable experience, in political space. If we win, we will have learned that we did not *need* the prevailing degree of postponed gratification. We will know that there was, in Marcuse's phrase, surplus repression. We had felt we needed to live more amply—and we found out (if we survived) that, yes, we *could*. Clearly, to accept this experimentalism for discovering one's needs is to see how diversionary it is to draw up an abstract inventory of human needs, how such academic exercises function ideologically to keep us in line.

What we need—not what we want—we will only discover in practice, only by treating present systems of domination and necessity as if they used greater violence and more discipline than necessary. Because the surplus benefits elites, only non-elites, outcasts, or unattached outsiders are likely to be motivated to engage in testing, that is, probing in ways not yet legitimated, acting violently.

It cannot quite go without saying that a commitment to testing, to political life as an on-going, self-consciously conducted experiment, poses troublesome practical questions which no abstract theory can presume to answer. Experiments may be so intoxicating or exhausting that they make us frantic or listless, diminishing us in the very process of conducting them. Of course, we can advise (and compel) men to make only such choices which are likely to make their *continuous* action possible; we can direct them *not* to violate others whom they may yet need as irritants for promoting personal growth. The difficulty, we know, is that every course of action forecloses some future options. In short, it is not helpful merely to instruct men to avoid self-destruction and seek self-enhancement. Forced to make specific choices while unable to see far ahead and yet responsible for the *totality* of ourselves (including a future self which includes our present enemies), we are confronted by the most practical problems of priorities and tactics. To reduce the risks of self-destruction while promoting self-enhancement in practice, we surely need all the positive knowledge we can accumulate—whether by drawing on the conditional conclusions of cost-benefit analysis or comparative research. We must seek to know with a measure of certainty what will keep us from violating both our potential self—our present enemies—and those institutions required to realize it.

This pragmatic approach—implicit in Etzioni, radicalized by Marcuse who follows Dewey as

Press, 1968), Chap. 21. See also Christian Bay, "Needs, Wants, and Political Legitimacy," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1 (September 1968), 241-260; and Peter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Their Implications for Political Theory," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association meeting, September 2-6, 1969.

¹⁰ For a consistently and hence usefully wrong-headed summary of Marcuse's work, see Maurice Cranston, "Herbert Marcuse," *Encounter*, 32 (March 1969), 38-50.

much as Marx—also sustains Ernest Becker's case for making need satisfaction the test of existing regimes.¹¹ Though in many ways exasperatingly eccentric, Becker's work seems to me a useful attempt to define alienation in naturalistic terms, moving us beyond institutions and roles that prescribe *needless* destructions of the self. Further, there is Michael Shapiro's current effort to construct a model of man which would be responsive, as he has written,

to changing needs, values, and interpersonal orientations. Reacting against the way in which conceptions of man have been oriented toward justifying various institutional arrangements, this model of man-the-theorist will be oriented toward exploring man's potential for creating political orders to accommodate changing individual attributes. Such a model, unlike many current formulations, facilitates thinking about directions for changing institutions rather than individual therapy. Empirically, the model focusses on two basic aspects of individual decision-making, information gathering and information structuring. In this way individuals can be assessed in terms of the nature of their decisional postulates. Self-control (the ability to choose) is viewed as dependent upon the extent to which an individual entertains his decisional postulates in an experimental fashion. In this way man can be viewed not only in terms of the closures and reifications he imposes upon his conceptions but also in terms of his potential for learning and development toward forms of social and political organization that are yet unrealized.¹²

Scholarly essays such as these make it possible to see a drive to provide an empirical basis for a conception of man as an open-ended, multi-faceted being, as an actor resisting every certified truth, naturally given to posturing, simulating, performing, playing, equivocating, innovating, testing, improvising—in sum, acting.¹³

Were we to welcome such a view of political man and permit it to work on us at least as an analytical construct, our attention would be drawn toward those presently unknown elements

of experience which the newly formulated model would integrate but not assimilate, which it would esteem for being what they are. No doubt, we might hesitate to confront those elements in their fullness, not wishing to see and discuss them publicly. After all, they are still private and taboo, only to be felt and fondled (as Norman O. Brown has insinuated). At best they may be related, like Portnoy's elaborate complaint, to one's analyst in private sessions as privileged communications. Yet if we should find the economic and psychological resources to expand our political consciousness by learning to speak up, we would expose repressed dimensions, gradually becoming aware of those eclipsed parts of life which still fail to live up to our model, which remain in repose, waiting to be exhibited, stimulated, and activated.

Our model, in other words, would serve to alert us to the gap between what we might be and what we are, between political possibilities and the present reality. When this gap makes us sufficiently uneasy, we will unavoidably feel impelled to close it. Our model would therefore do more than create awareness and direct attention: it would induce us to act, to test environments in order to make them yield. To use it would enable us to implement the Kantian view that society is not something "out there" to be studied, but rather, as Etzioni has written, "a human grouping we collectively organize and are free to restructure, within certain limits we seek to understand and untighten."¹⁴

When we compel reality to accommodate our model of political man—when we are successful both in pretending to *be* such men in sheltered laboratory settings and in extending our laboratories—at least some of the practices and institutions which are commonly alleged to be real will emerge as changeable. As our environments then turn out to be less intractable than we thought (or have been instructed to think) our action will defy and jeopardize the prevailing order of commitments: a functional division of labor, the distinction between private and public sectors, the system of fixed social and biological roles within hierarchical organizations, government by a plurality of elites, the market economy, the identification of security with military power, the separation of means from ends, and finally the organized repression—whether in the family, private associations, or public institutions—of action and pleasure, of politics and play.

Basically, such an approach follows Melvin

¹¹ Ernest Becker, *The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man* (New York: George Braziller, 1968).

¹² Personal communication.

¹³ Outside of the traditions of Marxism and pragmatism, it is true, the problem of deriving norms from experience remains. Still, there are at least some discussions which have advanced the arguments about the naturalistic fallacy to a new level; see especially Abraham Edel, *Ethical Judgment: The Use of Science in Ethics* (New York: Free Press, 1955).

¹⁴ Preface to November-December 1968 issue of *The American Behavioral Scientist*.

lumin by challenging existing captor-captive, superior-subordinate relationships. It questions the structures of power established in schools, prisons, hospitals, political parties, industrial plants, academic departments, professional associations, and nation-states.¹⁵ Postulating political realities dialectically opposed to manifest ones, it negates empirically confirmed experience.¹⁶ The imposing social structures which have been discovered by a non-experimental, non-pragmatic, positivistic social science are thus treated as targets for a political science determined to test their value—their value always in the relation to the structure of human needs. Political science thereby comes to terms with whatever men in power insist is given—given by providence or merely by the process of history, the wisdom of the founding fathers, the necessities of industrialism, the iron law of oligarchy, the immutable nature of man, or the discoveries of a half-hearted empiricism more intent on finding answers “out there” than on honoring its own critical, negativistic, reality-defying spirit.

II. TESTING “REALITY”

If some form of political science is to restructure our sense of reality—to give new meanings to life by engaging in what Dewey called social reconstruction—what are the relevant procedures? How is “reality” best tested to make it satisfy basic human needs?

Before urging the obvious—namely, the extension of programs for experimentation, simulation, prototyping, and participation—I should note that non-participation has assumed at least two forms, and that we have been warned, I think to excess and for the wrong reasons,¹⁷ only about the one which involves the construction of empirically empty frameworks, mathematical systems, and formalistic analytical models. Anti-

¹⁵ See Melvin Tumin, “Captives, Consensus and Conflict: Implications for New Roles in Social Change,” in Herman D. Stein (ed.), *Social Theory and Social Invention* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1968), pp. 93–113.

¹⁶ See Warren G. Bennis and Philip E. Slater, *The Temporary Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); Orion F. White, “The Dialectical Organization: An Alternative to Bureaucracy,” *Public Administration Review*, 29 (January–February 1969), 32–42; Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966).

¹⁷ It is not always acknowledged that social scientists engaged in mathematical enterprises are also participants. Seeking not to *explain* but to express meanings inherent in alternative structure of behavior, they play their roles in plain view of other members of their scientific community.

behavioralists might well acknowledge that there are worse activities than efforts to provide abstract designs whose exhaustive meaning is their public existence, that the kind of abstractions welcomed in the arts—John Cage’s resounding silences or white painted on white—need not be rejected in the social sciences. The more insidious form of non-participation is that of irony. Having previously written on the uses of irony (and having left matters less than clear), I would merely like to remark—not argue—that the ironic mode should be regarded as appropriate only when nature is as intractable as Sisyphus found it or else when it is infinitely pliable, only when nothing whatever can be done about our fate or, alternatively, that all is so well that we can actually disarm, play freely, and reverse roles at will.

Attracted by the ironic posture, we tend to overlook that it demands an inhuman suspension of judgment—the refusal to discriminate, the determination to accept nothing as finally serious. Unintimidated by their humane sentiments, the practitioners of irony have of course given us some stunning accounts: Tocqueville’s account of equality, Weber’s of bureaucracy, Schumpeter’s of capitalism, Riesman’s of the lonely crowd, Veblen’s of the higher learning, Galbraith’s of the techno-structure, Lasswell’s of the garrison state, Huntington’s of the military virtues. And from the perspective of our survey research centers, individuals have suddenly emerged as if they were characters of modern fiction. In Harold Kaplan’s words—which refer to Dreiser, Dos Passos, and Farrell, and not to Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes—

... we are impressed by the fumbling irrelevance in the subjective consciousness of their characters. They are portrayed in terms of rather simplistic laws of psychological and social behavior, while their own consciousness is groping, penetrated by only brief glimpses of light. The field of vision is at the extreme of externality, so preoccupied by the super-personal design of social and biological process that the agents within it seem mindless.¹⁸

Torn out of context—removed from their authors’ impassioned moral concerns—these accounts of institutions and individuals exhibit a capacity for icy detachment, for objectivity and disinterestedness. The posture is serenely non-partisan. There is no interaction with the phenomena, no experimental intervention—only rigorous clinical passivity, observations made in cold blood. Because their authors are manifestly uninvolved, their work enables us to see more of

¹⁸ Harold Kaplan, *The Passive Voice* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966), p. 9.

life than we normally permit to fall within our range of vision. The ironist magnifies and thus makes visible what we are otherwise reluctant to recognize—our fixations, compulsions, addictions, and limitations, our behavior. He removes us from ourselves—at least our familiar active selves—and shows with barely concealed pleasure how little we amount to and how well we behave. At the same time, he unwittingly shows himself to be someone who condescends to examine his data. His very prose reveals his self-restraint: controlling his sympathy and his rage, he displays his superior power—the power of aloof observation. To understand him, to sympathize with him, we need merely recall Truman Capote standing by in cold blood (as we still do) when the State of Kansas proceeded to execute the objects of his study.

Yet an exclusive commitment to such a posture—ever tempting for social scientists who aspire to gain status by separating emotion from fact—is not justifiable, as I have said, unless intervention is futile and absolutely nothing can be done to satisfy our diverse human needs. During such desperate times, we may rightly prevent despair and assign ourselves some activity, exercising what freedom remains, diverting ourselves and escaping necessity. We may then observe and leave a record. When nature (or the state) is implacable and the end is near, that may be the only way to leave one's mark.

To be sure, *no* case, as we fear late at night, is other than terminal. But to go on, to save what we can, we may nevertheless pretend to the contrary and mock reality. Careful probing of reality may suggest that we still do have options, that some of our needs—most basically our need to live, to amplify our existence, to communicate—may still be satisfied. When this becomes evident, we have no warrant for irony. We are then called on (not by some abstraction but by our needs) to integrate the role of observer and actor, of scientist and citizen, to join ethics to policy, norms to facts, and theory to practice.

It should be apparent at this point that action to bridge the gap between man as a value-creating being and man as a value-neutral analyst of the predicaments of others will necessarily be symbolic (as all action is) and, more specifically, that for social scientists it is likely to be literary, that is, ideographic and discursive, capable of elaborating new contexts to reveal the limits of the old. The accounts of the political scientist—his markings, his symbols—will be derived from what he believes to exist beyond accredited reality—beliefs he comes to express and hold by virtue of his experience, his sympathetic involvement.

But if his literary act can scarcely be said to "explain," if his claims are not verifiable because they do not refer to experiences others are ready to observe, on what grounds can we possibly accept his testimony?

I would urge an effort to recover the oldest of tests, the one Aristotle applied to drama: our performances are successful insofar as they enable us to comprehend the polarities of our existence, leading us to take fuller cognizance of them, inducing us to identify visions and interests which, when unidentified and merely experienced, terrify and paralyze.

We will *know* that an author's work is successful only in practice, only as he demonstrates his ability to establish more parts of ourselves and our environment than we had dared to admit into our presence. The critical and wholly empirical question is to what extent his symbols have moved us to confront and accept progressively more complex realities. To the charge that he might simply lie, there is but one response, namely that he assuredly does, that at least so far the truth has not been told. What is at issue is not the fact that he makes things up—depriving "reality" of its success—but, as Nietzsche noted, the quality of his fabrications. To what extent do they make a greater variety of experience manageable? Do they embody a maximum range of bearable interests?

Still exploiting Nietzsche, I would have us assent to ventures which serve to multiply meanings and create new possibilities, which appropriate new space and new time. The newly created realities must demonstrate that the established ones do not have an exclusive claim to the political arena. The new ones must supplement or negate the prevailing ones. They will have to compete with the great hit plays (plays experienced as real enough, however, by anyone involuntarily involved in them) put on by corporate boards, university administrations, welfare bureaucracies, National Guard units, peace research centers, or other institutions for crisis management. Successful hit writing teams, as Donald Freed has noted in defending his own play, "Inquest," have staged performances such as

"The Gulf of Tonkin" and "The Black Panther Will Get You if You Don't Watch Out." And there's the play called "Why Don't They Take a Bath?" "The Body Count" is a wonderful comedy of the absurd. . . . There is also that wild satire by Sidney Hook and other liberal humanists who have told us to use the democratic process. . . . There is the story of "The Outside Agitator," the great continuing adventure series which began with the Palmer raids. Occasionally you have a new star, like the

wife of Attorney General Mitchell. . . .¹⁹

At issue for a political science determined to offer counterrealities is not the morality of whatever skits and plays happen to be staged but the likelihood of their expanding the political life of those affected by them. A reality-creating venture is of value to the extent that, *without destroying self-awareness*, it leads men toward increasingly complex realms of being, freeing them to be progressively more playful and political, more active and alive. But the final test, one social scientists might tentatively wish to apply first to doctoral dissertations, must be its impact on the author himself: does the very process of ordering experience give his life greater measure of meaning? Does it enable him to gain access to additional dimensions of himself?

Although I have been referring to literary acts, there is no reason for political scientists to confine their activities to them. Physical spaces are no less stages for action. Ever since Machiavelli pointed the way, we have in principle been prepared to treat societies, too, as artificial creations, quite deliberately designing them so that they might maximize opportunities for developing our capacities, so that man-made institutions might support as much variety and conflict as we can bear without being overwhelmed.

If the political scientist's familiar environment fails to move him—if it strikes him as inert, dull, fatuous, or torpid—he might therefore seek to become the author of more complex social enterprises, rearranging society, doing violence to it by probes, tests, irritating questionnaires, and disconcerting research designs until it provides him with more stimulating material. Accordingly, he will be violating and restructuring social settings, creating synthetic spaces for experimental purposes, encouraging new things to happen in what had been stable, well-manged enclaves—whether these are welfare bureaucracies, university departments, or professional associations. His purpose is not, however, to bring about some supposedly desirable state of affairs from which men will eventually benefit. It is to increase public knowledge of public possibilities in the very process of public action. Engaged in what Robert Rubinstein and Harold D. Lasswell have called prototyping,²⁰ he will seek to make a

conspicuous record of his interactions, leaving as coherent an account as he can of the meanings of each of his successful probes.

The experimental probing I am urging might well begin modestly at the very places political scientists find themselves at work—their classrooms, departments, institutes, or colleges. Were each of these arenas to be treated lightly—as if they did not quite amount to what is proclaimed by cause descriptions or catalogue prose, as if they held unfulfilled promises for participation—they would be saved from easy success. And were action to be accompanied by efforts to publicize the experimental process, we would be offered practical demonstrations of theoretical possibilities.

In this view of the activities of political science, the practitioner attempts to *express* what he is doing, interweaving theory and practice. Aware of his own operations, seeing them as others might so as to communicate his new experience, he uses words to circumscribe what in life remains slippery and inconclusive. He thus makes experience accessible to himself and to others. In a word, he politicizes it.

This procedure is but analogous to the experiments of those contemporary artists whose work, as the present director of the Guggenheim Museum has noted without misgivings, "is impossible for collectors to collect, for museums to show, for dealers to handle, for critics to appraise. . . ." ²¹ *The new constructs aim at including the spectator, at bringing in the outsider.* They are at once more embracing and more fragile than the constructs of political scientists.

Should political scientists proceed to transform hierarchical, goal-oriented administrative systems into equalitarian, process-oriented political ones, they would be engaged in the kind of artistic enterprises which impel us to become aware of ourselves insofar as we have been en-

The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

²¹ Their characteristic work, as Thomas M. Messer has pointed out, cannot be accommodated by galleries; moreover, it is perishable, if not self-destructive, "It is aimed against—or rather, it implicitly denies—the channels between artist and viewer, as well as the entire intermediary machinery consisting of dealers, critics and museums. What results is not simply opposition to the order of the day, but rather the creation of a dimension that renders such an order irrelevant and anachronistic." Thomas M. Messer, "Impossible Art—Why It Is," *Art in America*, 57 (May-June, 1969), 30-31; see also the telling illustrations assembled by David L. Shirey, *ibid.*, pp. 32-47.

¹⁹ Quoted in *The New York Times*, May 3, 1970, p. D-9. I have argued for appropriating more of reality in "Expanding the Political Present," this REVIEW, 63 (September 1969), 768-776, and in "Making Scenes," *Massachusetts Review*, 11 (Spring 1970), 223-255.

²⁰ See Robert Rubenstein and Harold D. Lasswell,

abled to fill spaces, invent alternatives, impose perspectives, and establish connections. Should political scientists subject themselves to the discipline required to complicate and break up stable social environments, they would create vulnerable structures which remain embarrassingly open and which, like pregnant pauses, demand participation. They would then embrace empiricism fully and invite distrust of even their own conclusions—indeed all completed work. Their very tone would then be that of the novelist as narrator who has given up the omniscient voice. They would decline to speak as authorities—in effect following *Finnegans Wake* which, as Charles Newman has noted, is “the first great book without a single sentence we can trust.”²²

Those who have invested in the prevailing social order are understandably anxious about the ambiguous and therefore untrustworthy features of every new structure. Screening project proposals or research applications, they are reluctant to support scholarly activities which promise no more than a wider sharing of the satisfaction of participating in social experimentation. For them, this promise is hardly enough. They expect unambiguous payoffs in the form of conclusions reached. Yet when pledged to an interactionist, anti-positivist paradigm of political science, we must necessarily view such a demand for specifications as misguided. Unable to claim advance knowledge of our findings, we can at best merely pretend, seeking support for our enterprises by operating on the principle, as David Bakan has said, of being “one ahead”:

To be “one ahead” means to apply for a grant for a piece of research that one has already conducted, and to use the money thus obtained to conduct further research. When one thus works “one ahead” it is possible to write rather splendid applications. Cynical as this approach may appear, it is actually sounder from a scientific point of view than conducting research based on so-called good design. For the fact of the matter is that good research into the unknown cannot be well designed. . . .²³

To be sure, since we do have empirical knowledge of conditions for “good research into the unknown”—requisites of innovative activities—we can request support for promising approaches. But just as Marx declined to discuss the classless society, we should not go further

and identify the functions of future social arrangements. We should have been warned by that obsessive preoccupation with detail and affection for logistics characteristic of utopian thinkers from Henri de Saint-Simon to G. D. H. Cole, realizing that our problem is to live up to the epistemological demands of a transactional paradigm by making both knowledge claims and future experiences conditional on action. There is no alternative but to resist all requests from foundation officers to blueprint and illustrate and specify what it would mean finally to create new political realities, what it would mean to expand the political present and bestow political qualities on non-political time and space. We simply cannot *know* what it would mean until the moment our resources are exhausted, until our research grant has been spent—when, presumably, our application for the next grant is already being processed.

Given this persuasion, the political scientist's concern cannot be with learning something from what he and his colleagues have done but with accentuating and intensifying the very process of acting. The rewards for him and others come not at the end of the game—in the form of answers, results, conclusions, findings, predictions, explanations, or hypotheses confirmed—but in action itself, in the curiously gratifying knowledge that one's ability to maintain one's balance under stress is being continuously tested—and that one has not, at least not yet, succumbed.

To gain in sympathy for such balancing acts, perhaps it is sufficient to remind ourselves that openness is in fact a long-standing convention of empirical science—in fact characteristic of all institutions which reject finalities by compelling men to review their conclusions, interrogate one another, and add to their burdens. Perhaps it is necessary (if not sufficient) to welcome what Sheldon Wolin has recently rejected: the near-religious skepticism of behavioralists which has “abolished all privileged beginnings,” their “animus against tradition,” their faith in a “self which has been purged of inherited notions.”²⁴

The professional demands made by such a radicalized empiricism—one which constitutes what Herbert Simon has called the sciences of the artificial—are obvious enough. Committed to the openness entailed by valuing man as self-governed agent and repelled by procedures and organizations which frustrate us *needlessly*, we are forced to identify practices which fail to serve our natural needs—specifically our need to take turns in playing diverse, mutually incom-

²² “Beyond Omniscience: Notes toward a Future for the Novel,” *TriQuarterly*, 10 (Fall 1967), 37–52; I am grateful to Paul F. Kress for alerting me to the relevance of this article.

²³ David Bakan, *On Method* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1967), p. xiv.

²⁴ Sheldon S. Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” this *Review*, 63 (December 1969), 1068.

patible roles. And as we become sensitive to whatever forces arrest our development, we may learn to appreciate educational institutions which move men, in Marx's phrase, "to do one thing today and another tomorrow" without ever compelling anyone, if all goes well, ever finally to embody merely one of his various functions.

III. EXPANDING POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

I have been asserting, in sum, that a model of political man as value-creating being would serve to direct attention to current nondecisions (or at least to incomplete ones) and that it would induce us to transform present organizational structures and attitudes. Moreover, I have maintained that in order to create new meanings and to construct new realities, we should avoid detached ironic postures and instead seek to interact with our environment, whether (1) by offering descriptive accounts which stimulate both reader and writer, which activate phenomena and dramatize more of life than had been immediately present, or (2) by experimenting in practice, thereby demonstrating the satisfaction of achieving not some end-result but of being engaged in expressive activities. The final test of both of these frankly provocative, intrusive strategies lies in their power to bend what is alleged to be unbending, to expand political experience.

Becoming aware of the desirability of engaging in either vicarious or actual experiments may be all that is feasible today. As we proceed to employ obtrusive measures, we may recurrently find ourselves thwarted (even if consoled by textbooks which teach the uses of unobtrusive research techniques). Unable to be effective even while stationed near the levers of power, we may learn that action is futile and agree with Raymond Williams "that if we move at all we put at risk every value we know, since all the actual movements, all the actually liberating forces, are caught up in a world of reciprocal lying and violence, with no point of entry for any sustained action. . . ."²⁵ But even though recurrent defeats may teach us that this is true, it still remains possible to define our political situation and make its pathos explicit. If these are not happy times, they may nevertheless be partially redeemed by our being generous with words and calling them what, in the end, we found them to be.

To accept this strategy requires welcoming scientific modes which do more than dignify the

vulgar successes manifest at the center of our public life. It requires extending ourselves, surrendering some of our hard-won methodological principles, and seeking to incorporate the flotsam and refuse now at the periphery of consciousness. The proper procedure—my reiterating the point in a new context may now help make it more plausible—is necessarily experimental and discursive, for we reach unknown, unnamed territory only by discoursing, advancing ideas as scouts, sending our words out to appropriate new worlds, using our language to relate inchoate experience to what is established, well-formulated, and familiar. Were we to value this use of the imagination as a distinctive discipline, we would move lightly and playfully through new territory, receptive to its promise, proceeding (as in life) in ever-widening circles. We would at the same time remain prepared to retrace our steps so as to avoid more trouble than we can tolerate. Retreating when necessary, gaining confidence by being as verbose and repetitious as I have been, willing to publish variations of our essays again and again, we would ultimately demonstrate that the new territory can be managed, that it has been secured, and that we can risk moving ahead.²⁶

There is no point in documenting the obvious and showing how effectively the conventional diction and present organization of political science discriminate against such reality-creating, expressive action.²⁷ A pragmatic activism finds

²⁵ What my metaphor intimates may be understood as aesthetic education: see Reginald Snell, "Introduction" to Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954); Herbert Read, *Education through Art* (London: Faber, 1943); John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934); and Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), Chap. 2.

²⁶ Pointless activities—such as providing examples of the obvious—may of course be gratifying. Consider John C. Harsanyi, "Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories," *World Politics*, 21 (July 1969), 524-526, as an example of a plea for perceiving symbolic, expressive action as mere "preoccupation." Harsanyi would have us treat symbolic action alternatively as excessively costly, as "result of neurotic or psychotic conditions," as "a way of making a social commitment" to achieve results, or as desperate acts by "extremist" groups which "have given up all hope of achieving their goals by reality-oriented instrumental activities, and so feel they have nothing to lose by turning to magic, ritual, ideology, and other forms of symbolic behavior."

²⁷ Raymond Williams, "Parting of the Ways," *Commentary*, 47 (February 1969), 73-75.

few legitimate outlets within the normal curriculum. Defying paradigmatic expectations, such activism is perceived as undisciplined and irresponsible. It is seen to reduce political science (like physics at its best) to the level of the humanities. Even worse, it leaves us exposed to the gravest of all charges—that we are unrealistic. Our problem, I think, is somehow to accept the charge and not plead guilty. This will entail not only affirming that it is all right to outwit reality but also demonstrating that the escape from necessity gives pleasure. It will require treating one's own work—indeed the whole of political life—quite seriously as a form of play.

Were we to reconceptualize politics itself as play, we would be led to recognize the prevailing

modes of analyzing and diagnosing political behavior as ideological, serving those who reserve the pleasures of play for themselves. We would be led to suspend our heavy rhetoric and attempt a lighter tone, risking ambiguities and puns, arrogantly speaking of political reality as if it did not exist, placing quotation marks around our most precious possessions—"the individual," "private property," "deterrent credibility," "the free world," "the democratic process," "political science," and—why not?"—"reality." We could thus indicate that these marvels are "so called," that we have made them all up and that—given wit and passion, courage and luck—we might yet remake them to suit ourselves.

A CAUSAL APPROACH TO NONRANDOM MEASUREMENT ERRORS

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The purpose of this paper is to examine several specific kinds of nonrandom measurement errors and to note their implications for causal model construction. In doing so, my secondary purpose is to sensitize the reader to the crucial importance of making one's assumptions fully explicit and to the advantages of a causal models approach to measurement errors. It is well known that the presence of even random measurement errors can produce serious distortions in our estimates, particularly whenever one is attempting to assess the relative contributions of intercorrelated independent variables.¹ Nevertheless, common practice is to utilize what Duncan refers to as the naive approach to the presence of measurement errors: that of acknowledging the existence of measurement errors, and even discussing possible sources of such errors, while completely ignoring them in the analysis stage of the research process.² That is, measured values are inserted directly into causal models as though they adequately reflect the true values. It can easily be shown that such a practice, while leading to important simplifications, can readily lead one astray. In particular, it may blind the analyst to searching for alternative plausible explanations that allow for measurement error.

There have been a number of very recent papers in the sociological literature, some of which will be briefly summarized since they may not be familiar to the reader.³ For the

most part, these papers have dealt rather systematically with ways to handle *random* measurement errors, whereas nonrandom errors have been dealt with only incidentally and much less carefully. One approach to nonrandom errors that will not be discussed in the present context is exemplified by papers by Duncan and by Siegel and Hodge.⁴ In brief, the strategy is to construct causal models of very specific substantive problems and to insert various reasonable estimates of measurement errors based on outside evidence or plausible assumption. The implications of the various alternatives can then be traced through the causal system to see what practical differences can be derived from the alternative assumptions. My own approach will be to attempt to outline a strategy that can be applied more generally and that might be combined with the Duncan and Siegel and Hodge strategies in concrete applications. Specifically, the approach that will be discussed in the remainder of this paper requires that one make explicit assumptions about the sources of nonrandom errors and that one have available multiple indicators of each variable that has been imperfectly measured.

Even random measurement errors lead to numerous complications because of the fact that they introduce additional unknowns into the causal system. Often this leads to unidentified systems that cannot possibly be solved unless the ratio of measured to unmeasured variables is increased through the use

¹ For example see J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), Chap. 6; Robert Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (March 1968), 592-616; and H. M. Blalock, "Some Implications of Random Measurement Error for Causal Inferences," *American Journal of Sociology*, 71 (July 1965), 37-47.

² See O. Dudley Duncan, "Contingencies in Constructing Causal Models," in Edgar Borgatta (ed.), *Sociological Methodology 1969* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), Chap. 3.

³ See especially Herbert L. Costner, "Theory, Deduction and Rules of Correspondence," *American Journal of Sociology*, 75 (September 1969), 245-263; and David R. Heise, "Separating Reliability and Stability in Test-Retest Correlation," *American Sociological Review*, 34 (Febru-

ary 1969), 93-101. See also George W. Bohrnstedt, "Observations on the Measurement of Change," in *Sociological Methodology 1969*, *op. cit.*, Chap. 4; David E. Wiley and James A. Wiley, "The Estimation of Measurement Error in Panel Data," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (February 1970), 112-117; and H. M. Blalock, "Multiple Indicators and the Causal Approach to Measurement Error," *American Journal of Sociology*, 75 (September 1969), 264-272.

⁴ See Duncan, *op. cit.*, and Paul M. Siegel and Robert W. Hodge, "A Causal Approach to the Study of Measurement Error," in H. M. Blalock and Ann B. Blalock (eds.) *Methodology in Social Research* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), Chap. 2.

of multiple measures. As we shall presently see, the existence of nonrandom errors of measurement can create a hopeless situation, even with multiple measures, unless the sources of nonrandom errors can be located and measured, or unless these sources are completely uncorrelated with other variables in the theoretical system. As we consider some of these complexities, it is hoped that the discussion will sensitize the reader to the necessity of investing substantial time and thought in the data collection stages in order to minimize the effects of disturbing influences. We shall see that there is relatively little that one can do in the analysis stage unless the sources of nonrandom error can be recognized and incorporated into the model.

Before discussing nonrandom errors it will be necessary to review briefly certain approaches to the elimination of purely random errors. We shall then consider two important kinds of nonrandom errors: (1) those that are functions of the variable being measured, and (2) those that are produced by one or more variables that may or may not be related to the other variables in the causal system.

I. RANDOM MEASUREMENT ERROR

If measurement error is purely random, such as one might expect to occur as a result of careless responses, coding, or punching, we may write down a very simple model linking the measured and unmeasured variable by the equation $X' = X + u$, where X is the true value, X' the measured value, and u the error component. If u is truly random, then its mean should be zero (except for sampling error), its variance σ_u^2 should be unrelated to X (homoscedasticity), and its population covariance with X should be zero. If it is a resultant of a large number of minor causes that are weakly intercorrelated, then the distribution of the error term should also be approximately normal, though we shall not find it necessary to assume the normality property in the discussion that follows. The essential feature of this simple model is the assumption that X and u are uncorrelated. This property makes it possible to express the variance of X' as the sum of the variance of X and the measurement error variance:

$$\sigma_{X'}^2 = \sigma_X^2 + \sigma_u^2 \quad (1)$$

Thus the variance of the measured value will be greater than the true variance of X by the amount σ_u^2 which of course can never be negative.

This relationship between the variances of

X and X' implies that the ordinary least-squares estimate $b_{YX'}$ of β_{YX} in the equation $Y = \alpha + \beta_{YX}X + \epsilon$ will be biased downward according to the approximate formula

$$E(b_{YX'}) = \frac{\beta_{YX}}{1 + \sigma_u^2/\sigma_X^2} = \frac{\sigma_X^2}{\sigma_{X'}^2} \beta_{YX} \quad (2)$$

where $E(b_{YX'})$ refers to the expected value of $\beta_{YX'}$.⁵ There are a number of practical implications of eq. (2). Since the degree of attenuation in the slope estimate is proportional to the ratio $\sigma_X^2/\sigma_{X'}^2$, it follows that even though σ_u^2 remains constant, attenuation will be a function of the absolute amount of variation in X . Whenever σ_X^2 is reduced relative to σ_u^2 , we can expect the slope estimate to be further attenuated. Thus if one were to introduce control variables in such a way as to reduce σ_X^2 he would be led to infer, in the presence of random measurement error, that the slope of the relationship between X and Y was being reduced. Likewise, two investigators working with different populations would be likely to obtain different slope estimates, even with the same measurement accuracy.⁶ Random measurement error in X will likewise produce an attenuation in the correlation between X and Y . Random measurement error in the dependent variable Y will attenuate the correlation coefficient but not the slope estimate.

A number of ways of taking out or correcting for this attenuation effect have been suggested. Wald and Bartlett, among others, have suggested a grouping procedure that involves grouping individuals according to their X' scores, placing all those with high X' scores (say, in the top quartile) into group 1, and those with low X' scores (say, in the bottom quartile) into group 2.⁷ Denoting the group means for X and Y by (\bar{X}_1, \bar{Y}_1) and (\bar{X}_2, \bar{Y}_2) we can then form the very simple estimator

$$b = \frac{\bar{Y}_2 - \bar{Y}_1}{\bar{X}_2 - \bar{X}_1} \quad (3)$$

⁵ Johnston, *op. cit.*, 149-150.

⁶ See Blalock, "Some Implications of Random Measurement Error," *op. cit.*

⁷ See Abraham Wald, "The Fitting of Straight Lines if Both Variables are Subject to Error," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 2 (1940), 284-300; and M. S. Bartlett, "Fitting a Straight Line when Both Variables are Subject to Error," *Biometrics*, 5 (June 1949), 207-212. For an excellent discussion of these and related approaches, as well as an extensive bibliography, see Albert Madansky, "The Fitting of Straight Lines when Both Variables are Subject to Error," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 54 (March 1959), 173-205.

It turns out, however, that a crucial assumption underlying the procedure is that the method of grouping cases must be independent of the measurement error in X . Since the true X scores will be unknown, and therefore grouping must be carried out by using X' instead of X , this assumption will be violated in practice. Using Monte Carlo procedures, Carter and Blalock have shown that the Wald-Bartlett estimates appear to have biases that are approximately equal to those of ordinary least squares.⁸ Therefore it would seem as though these grouping procedures are of little practical value in instances where random measurement errors are nonnegligible.

A second approach to correcting for random measurement errors in X , the so-called method of instrumental variables, requires one to locate direct or indirect causes of X that are not causes of Y (except through X).⁹ More formally, we must find one or more instrumental variables Z , that are reasonably highly related to X , that do not appear in the equation for Y (which may contain several other independent variables), and that are uncorrelated with the disturbance term ϵ in the equation for Y . In the case of the bivariate relationship $Y = \alpha + \beta_{YX}X + \epsilon$ and a single instrumental variable Z , it can be shown that under the assumptions of the model the estimator

$$b^*_{YX'} = \frac{\Sigma(Y - \bar{Y})(Z - \bar{Z})}{\Sigma(X' - \bar{X}')(Z - \bar{Z})} \quad (4)$$

will be a consistent estimator of β_{YX} (i.e., one having negligible biases in large samples). In effect, by taking a ratio of *covariances* of Y and X' with Z we get around the difficulty produced by the fact that $\sigma_{X'}^2 > \sigma_X^2$.

The instrumental-variables approach can readily be generalized to the multivariate case. However, it is relatively more sensitive than ordinary least squares to certain kinds of specification errors. In particular, if Z is a cause of Y through some path other than through X , then Z should explicitly appear in the equation for Y . If one erroneously assumes a model in which Z is omitted from the equation and used as the instrumental variable,

⁸ L. F. Carter and H. M. Blalock, "Underestimation of Error Variance when Employing Wald-Bartlett Slope Estimation Techniques: A Monte Carlo Simulation," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* (in press).

⁹ For discussions of instrumental variables see Johnston, *op. cit.*, 165-166; Carl Christ, *Econometric Models and Methods* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), 404-410; and Carter and Blalock, *op. cit.*

then the instrumental-variable estimator $b^*_{YX'}$ will have greater bias than the ordinary least-squares estimator.¹⁰ Therefore the instrumental-variables approach requires an a priori theory of the underlying causal structure and should ordinarily be used in conjunction with other procedures to be described below.

Drawing on the work of others who have stressed the importance of multiple measures and corrections for attenuation, Costner and Heise have developed path analytic procedures that enable one to handle random measurement errors whenever there are multiple measures of each variable.¹¹ Heise deals with instances where there are single measures at three or more points in time, whereas Costner's procedure requires two or more measures of each variable at a single point in time. Both procedures can readily be generalized and, if combined, can also be used to infer the existence of certain simple kinds of nonrandom errors.¹² In the present paper, I shall confine my attention to the Costner approach which will be extended in later sections. We shall assume that data have been collected at a single point in time, though in many instances it will be helpful to have data at two or more points in time. Costner's approach can be generalized to k -equation recursive systems, though I shall confine my attention to simple two- and three-variable models.

The basic approach can be exemplified in the simple model of Figure 1, which contains two unmeasured variables X and Y , and two indicators of each variable. The absence of other arrows leading to X_1 and Y_1 indicates that there are no sources of measurement error other than purely random error. (Throughout this paper, I shall for the sake of simplicity omit all arrows from diagrams unless such arrows are needed to indicate sources of correlation between pairs of variables.) The path coefficients (here, all correlation coefficients) connecting all variables are represented by the p_i , with the direction of influence being given by the appropriate arrowhead.

A path coefficient is a standardized regression coefficient and can be interpreted as being the ratio of two standard deviations. In the denominator is the actual standard deviation in the dependent variable, whereas in the numerator we have that portion of the standard

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See Costner, *op. cit.* and Heise, *op. cit.*

¹² See H. M. Blalock, "Estimating Measurement Error using Multiple Indicators and Several Points in Time," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (February 1970), 101-111.




FIG. 1

deviation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to the particular independent variable under consideration, with the remaining causes controlled.¹³ Such standardized measures have certain disadvantages that make it difficult to interpret them across populations or from one time period to the next, but this question need not concern us here.¹⁴ As Wright has noted, however, standardized measures have advantages in instances where one is dealing with unmeasured variables.¹⁵

The attractive feature of path analysis in the present context is that it provides a handy device for writing down expressions involving the unknown p 's in terms of the empirically obtained intercorrelations among indicators. It is assumed that the reader is reasonably familiar with the rules for writing down such expressions by inspection of a path diagram. In the case of recursive systems involving one-way causation, and where there are no curved double-headed arrows connecting exogenous variables, the rule for tracing paths is as follows: we may write the total correlation between any two variables as a sum of simple and compound paths obtained by tracing (a) forward from one variable to the other, (b) backward, or (c) backward and then forward. We cannot, however, trace forward and then back

since this would involve moving through a common effect of two variables. In complex models it is preferable to work algebraically, rather than tracing paths, because of the likelihood of either neglecting certain compound paths or including them more than once.

In the case of Figure 1 there are four measured variables X_1 , X_2 , Y_1 , and Y_2 and therefore there are six intercorrelations among these indicators. In connection with X_1 and X_2 we note that there is only one compound path connecting these indicators, namely p_1p_2 . Similarly, there is a single path p_4p_5 connecting X_1 to Y_1 . Proceeding through all possible pairs of indicators we obtain the following:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{X_1X_2} &= p_1p_2 & r_{X_1Y_2} &= p_1p_3p_5 \\ r_{Y_1Y_2} &= p_4p_5 & r_{X_2Y_1} &= p_2p_3p_4 \\ r_{X_1Y_1} &= p_1p_3p_4 & r_{X_2Y_2} &= p_2p_3p_5 \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Notice that we have six equations but only five unknown p 's. Therefore we have one redundant equation that must be approximately satisfied by the data if the model is in fact appropriate. That is, if measurement errors are truly random the model implies that the product $r_{X_1Y_1}r_{X_2Y_2}$ should approximately equal the product $r_{X_1Y_2}r_{X_2Y_1}$ since (within sampling error) both are equal to the expression $p_1p_2p_3^2p_4p_5$. However, since it turns out that certain particular kinds of nonrandom errors can also be shown to give this same prediction, this test criterion should be considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition the data must satisfy if the random measurement error model is to be retained.

If the model is retained, one can then solve for each of the path coefficients by simple algebra. For example

$$p_3^2 = \frac{p_1p_2p_3^2p_4p_5}{p_1p_2p_4p_5} = \frac{r_{X_1Y_1}r_{X_2Y_2}}{r_{X_1X_2}r_{Y_1Y_2}} = \frac{r_{X_1Y_2}r_{X_2Y_1}}{r_{X_1X_2}r_{Y_1Y_2}} \quad (6)$$

and

$$p_1^2 = \frac{p_1^2p_2p_3p_4}{p_2p_3p_4} = \frac{r_{X_1X_2}r_{X_1Y_1}}{r_{X_2Y_1}} \quad (7)$$

If there were more than two indicators of each variable, then under the assumption that all errors are random, only two new path coefficients would be added to the system, whereas the six measured indicators would give rise to fifteen intercorrelations. This would produce an excess of eight equations that the data would have to satisfy if the model were to be retained. Also, with additional indicators it becomes possible to test for and estimate certain simple kinds of nonrandom errors.

In the event that the indicators of each variable are "equivalent" (having the same

¹³ For discussions of path analysis in the social science literature see Raymond Boudon, "A New Look at Correlation Analysis" in Blalock and Blalock, *op. cit.*, Chap. 6; O. Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (July 1966), 1-16; and Kenneth C. Land, "Principles of Path Analysis," in *Sociological Methodology 1969*, *op. cit.*, Chap. 1.

¹⁴ See especially John W. Tukey, "Causation, Regression and Path Analysis" in Oscar Kempthorne *et al.* (eds.), *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1954), 35-66; and H. M. Blalock, "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (March 1967), 130-136.

¹⁵ See Sewall Wright, "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts?" *Biometrics*, 16 (June 1960), 189-202.

means, standard deviations, and correlations with the underlying variable), it becomes possible to reduce the number of unknown p 's and to increase the number of redundant equations. For example, if so-called "parallel forms" of a measuring instrument had been used in obtaining X_1 and X_2 , then one might reasonably assume that $p_1 = p_2$. Or if Y had been measured by the same instrument at two points in time, and if one were willing to assume no real change in Y or contamination effects of the first measure, then one might set $p_4 = p_6$. Corrections for attenuation discussed in the testing literature are based on this particular kind of simplifying assumption.¹⁶ Heise provides a method for separating out real change from measurement reliability based on this kind of simplification. The combination of multiple indicators with panel data also makes it possible to solve for certain kinds of nonrandom measurement error components.¹⁷

II. MEASUREMENT ERROR A FUNCTION OF X

As soon as one allows for the possibility of nonrandom measurement errors he must begin to face a number of difficult problems, both conceptually and methodologically. How can such nonrandom errors be represented in mathematical equations in a realistic way? Obviously, one must have certain ideas as to the sources of such nonrandom errors and the kinds of distortions being produced; otherwise the situation is too vague to handle. But in many instances it is even difficult to specify exactly what one means by the "true" value of X .

Let us consider two examples. On the one hand, we can readily imagine a "true" percentage of persons who voted for President Nixon, or even the true percentage who "intended" to vote for him. If a survey consistently underestimated this true percentage in every state, or if it underestimated it for males but overestimated it for females, then we would say that measurement error was nonrandom. On the other hand, consider a variable such as the "true" amount of political alienation in the United States. Lacking a theoretical definition of alienation that clearly specifies the research operations, it is even difficult for us to think in terms of measurement biases or nonrandom errors. Yet we would want to design an instrument that does not systematically exaggerate

the alienation of blacks while underestimating that of whites. The notion of nonrandom measurement errors makes some sense in this instance, but it is difficult to pin down because of inadequate theoretical conceptualization. Unfortunately, many of our most important concepts in the behavioral sciences are more like that of alienation than that of a voting percentage.

In the case of alienation, if we could imagine a "true" value X , we might be pleased if we could obtain a measure X' that is an exact linear function of X , say $X' = a + bX$, with no error term. The coefficient b would measure an error of scale, whereas a would give the intercept error. If there were some meaningful zero point (no alienation), then we would prefer that the intercept error be zero, so that we could use the properties of a ratio scale. But in tests of causal models, or in estimating path coefficients, we would encounter no special difficulties if $a \neq 0$. We would have measured X perfectly except for an exact linear transformation. Of course if we wished to report a measure of central tendency, such as the proportion intending to vote for Nixon, such errors of scale and zero point could be disastrous practically, and we would want to be assured that $X' = X$.

In the present context, let us simplify our analysis by ignoring the problem of errors of scale and intercept by taking $X' = X + e$. However, we shall permit the error term e to be some function of the true X and a random component u , and we shall find that we thereby reintroduce a scale and intercept factor as a result of this error component. This seems to be a relatively straightforward way of conceptualizing the measurement error problem without introducing undue simplicity. Although the error component may be a nonlinear function of X , as we shall illustrate below, we shall confine our actual analysis to the linear situation where we may write

$$X' = X + e \quad \text{and} \quad e = c + dX + u \quad (8)$$

where u is a random variable with expected value zero, with variance σ_u^2 independent of X , and with $\text{cov}(X, u) = 0$.¹⁸ We may then write

$$X' = c + (1 + d)X + u \quad (9)$$

¹⁸ There is another possibility that we shall not discuss further, namely that the error variance σ_e^2 is a function of X . Sometimes it is reasonable to take $\sigma_e^2 = a + bX$, where $b > 0$, in which case it may be advisable to transform X to $\log X$. However, this may produce nonlinear relationships with other variables in the causal system.

¹⁶ For further discussions of this point see Bohrnstedt, *op. cit.*; Heise, *op. cit.*; and Siegel and Hodge, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ See Blalock, "Estimating Measurement Error," *op. cit.*

Since X and u are uncorrelated we have

$$\sigma_{X'}^2 = (1 + d)^2 \sigma_X^2 + \sigma_u^2 \quad (10)$$

Notice that if d is negative it is entirely possible for $\sigma_{X'}^2$ to be less than σ_X^2 .¹⁹ This means that if ordinary least squares is used to estimate β_{RX} , we will generally obtain a biased estimate, but we cannot count on this bias being in the downward direction. Also, it turns out that the method of instrumental variables cannot be used to obtain a consistent estimator. The factor $(1 + d)$ will appear in this estimate, and since d will be unknown there appears to be no purely statistical device for eliminating its influence in the derived estimate. In effect, then, the d coefficient will be confounded in slope estimates relating X to other variables.

Before examining the implications of this kind of complication for path analysis, let us consider some substantive examples for which we might anticipate that the measurement error component is a function of X . We shall later discuss instances where the error is a correlate of X due to the operation of extraneous variables, but we are now considering instances where the level of X itself has a direct or indirect effect on the measurement error component. As we begin to conceptualize our measurement errors in causal terms, I believe we shall begin to see the picture more clearly than is at present possible. Nevertheless, there are several kinds of instances for which this particular model is reasonably plausible.

Some Examples. One obvious possibility is that the true value of X may be consistently underestimated or overestimated by a constant proportion of the actual value. For example, persons may report their ages to be .9 of their true ages or their incomes to be 1.25 times their true incomes. Somewhat more realistically, such fractional representations might be appropriate for certain subpopulations (e.g., people over 21, or white collar workers). Whereas differential proportions applied to various subpopulations would imply *nonlinear* relationships between the measurement error component and X , the situation might reasonably be approximated by a series of linear models applied to diverse subpopulations.

Perhaps a more common phenomenon is that of regression effects due to measurement error. Of course if one is dealing empirically with fallible measures and purely random mea-

surement errors, he will encounter a regression effect of a somewhat different nature. For example, if at time one we measure individuals with random error, then certain persons with intermediate true values will appear extreme because of the random errors. But with the next measure, they will be likely to regress toward the mean, leaving us with the impression that there is a homogenizing influence at work. However, there will be other individuals who appeared intermediate at the first measurement whose second scores will have diverged from the mean, again due entirely to random measurement error. A true homogenizing influence can be distinguished from random measurement error effects, in this instance, by a comparison of the variances of the measured values at both points in time. If the regression effect is an artifact of random measurement errors, these variances should be approximately equal, whereas if there has been a homogenizing effect, the variance at time one will be greater than that at time two.²⁰

We are concerned with a different kind of regression effect, however, namely that due to nonrandom errors that are negatively related to the true X scores. Suppose there is a norm operative to the effect that it is desirable to appear "moderate" or "normal." If respondents are given a series of questions designed to tap political conservatism, one might then expect that ultra-conservatives will try to appear only moderately conservative, whereas radicals may wish to appear liberals, and liberals as moderates. If increasing values of X represent increasing conservatism, then the measured scores of conservatives would be less than the true scores, and measured scores of liberals would be greater than the true values. In other words, the slope d linking e to X would be negative.

Of course the norm might not operate equally in all subpopulations, and might even favor polarization, in which case liberals might wish to appear radical and conservatives as ultra-conservatives. In this case the slope linking e to X would be positive and $(1 + d)$ would be greater than unity. Again, if different norms operated in different subgroups a more complex model would be required, and measurement error would be taken as a joint (nonadditive) function of X and other variables. As a first approximation, however, linear models with different error slopes could be used. Our prin-

¹⁹ An empirical example where this occurs in connection with floor and ceiling effects has been discussed by Siegel and Hodge, *op. cit.*

²⁰ For further discussion of regression effects see Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

cial difficulty in these and other instances is a lack of theory concerning specific sources of nonrandom errors.

Another source of errors producing regression effects may arise in the process of aggregating micro-level data, although once more the mechanisms involved seem poorly understood. Suppose, for example, that one has a social psychological theory that on the individual level the number of Negroes to whom a white individual is exposed will affect his political attitudes concerning the role of the federal government in school desegregation issues. But the measurement of exposure to Negroes would necessarily be very indirect and perhaps indexed by the percentage of Negroes in the local area. But how big an area? Living within a mile radius? Within the same county? The same state? The larger the unit selected the less adequate the measure of exposure, and also the less the variation in percentage Negro. That is, whereas counties may range in minority percentage from zero up to almost one hundred, if states are used as the aggregate units the largest percentage may be in the neighborhood of 45 per cent. Likewise, at least in the South, there are no states with under five per cent Negro. In effect, the range of variation in X , per cent Negro, will be reduced whenever larger aggregates are used, and the measure of "exposure" will be biased toward the mean. As larger and less homogeneous aggregates are used, one would thus expect the slope $(1+d)$ to approach zero unless other mechanisms were simultaneously at work. Obviously, sources of nonrandom error such as those produced by aggregation have not been adequately studied by political scientists and sociologists.

As an example of measurement errors that are more complex functions of X , let us consider possible distortions produced by so-called floor and ceiling effects and by measurement instruments that are relatively insensitive to variations in extreme scores. Obviously, if there is a true floor or ceiling effect, then measurement errors can appear only in a single direction or else they would be recognized as nonsensical and thereby modified. If "per cent urban" were measured as negative or greater than 100, an error would immediately be noted. In fact, it would be impossible to obtain such scores by conventional means of measuring per cent urban. But if the true per cent urban (by whatever definition) in a county were very close to zero, measurement errors would usually be in the positive direction. Similarly, these errors would be in the negative direction at the upper limit. Assuming




FIG. 2

approximately random errors in intermediate positions, we might expect that the function relating e to X might be approximately as in Figure 2. Such a function might be approximated by a cubic equation, or by three straight lines, the middle one of which has a horizontal slope. Where the floor and ceiling effects merge into each other imperceptibly, this measurement error situation might be approximated by a single straight line with a slightly negative value for the error slope d .

A very common practice whenever measurement is clearly recognized as being crude is to resort to a relatively small number of ordered categories. In the extreme case the analyst may use dichotomies in order to simplify his analysis. It may not be recognized that such very simple procedures produce both random and nonrandom measurement errors that become increasingly serious as the number of categories is reduced. Of course it will ordinarily be difficult if not impossible to estimate the extent of such measurement errors, but this fact does not miraculously make the errors disappear. It merely makes it impossible to assess their distorting effects. In order to understand these effects it will undoubtedly be necessary to conduct a series of Monte Carlo studies on data with known properties, using various methods of categorization in diverse causal situations. Here it will be possible to provide only a single illustration.

Suppose that the true underlying distribution of X is approximately normal, with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. We then know the proportion of cases expected to fall within any particular interval. Now suppose that a social scientist, ignorant of the true distribution, obtains an approximate measure using a scale that enables him to divide the population into six ordered categories, as indicated in Figure 3. Ordinarily there will also be random errors of measurement that can be




FIG. 3

sult in misclassification superimposed upon effects produced by the fact that individuals in the tails of the distribution will all be lumped together in the extreme categories.

Ignoring the random errors of classification, let us examine the nature of the measurement errors that would be produced if the analyst simply assigned scores of 1-6 to his categories and then proceeded to analyze his data as though no measurement errors existed and as though he had a legitimate interval scale.²¹ The X' scores therefore range from 1-6. Let us say that the true X scores range from -20 to 120. We thus have a change of scale in addition to any measurement errors, but this can be handled by dividing each X by 10, the width of the analyst's intervals, and then subtracting 1.5. Thus a true score of 50 is converted to an X' score of 3.5 which is equivalent to the average score of the two middle categories. We can then obtain the "measurement error" components at selected levels of X from the equation $e = X' - X$ as follows:

For example, an individual with a true score of -20 would be placed into the first category and would receive an X' score of 1, whereas his adjusted X score would be $-20/10 - 1.5 = -3.5$. Therefore the "measurement error" component e for this individual would be $X' - X = 4.5$. As we proceed down the columns we note that e decreases as the true X increases until we reach the boundary of the second class interval at $X = 30$. For any individual having a score slightly less than 30 (symbolized by 30- in the table), the X' score will remain 1. In-

additional distortions in the intermediate values produced by the numerical values assigned to the categories. That is, the true distance between category limits is always ten. If the analyst used unequal intervals that were scored 1-6, there would be the added complication of nonlinearity in this intermediate range. Obviously, methodological studies of the practical effects of these kinds of distortions are very much needed. For an

True X	$(X/10 - 1.5)$	X'	e	True X	$(X/10 - 1.5)$	X'	e
-20	-3.5	1	4.5	50+	3.5	4	.5
-10	-2.5	1	3.5	60-	4.5	4	-.5
0	-1.5	1	2.5	60+	4.5	5	.5
10	-.5	1	1.5	70-	5.5	5	-.5
20	.5	1	.5	70+	5.5	6	.5
30-	1.5	1	-.5	80	6.5	6	-.5
30+	1.5	2	.5	90	7.5	6	-1.5
40-	2.5	2	-.5	100	8.5	6	-2.5
40+	2.5	3	.5	110	9.5	6	-3.5
50-	3.5	3	-.5	120	10.5	6	-4.5

²¹ It might seem absurd for an analyst to treat this kind of data as an interval scale, but we must remember that ordinal data also involve equally difficult problems of interpretation. Notice that in this particular illustration we are assuming no

example of one such study see Sanford Labovitz, "Some Observations on Measurement and Statistics," *Social Forces*, 46 (December 1967), 151-160. See also, Thomas P. Wilson, "Critique of Ordinal Variables," *Social Forces* (forthcoming).




FIG. 4

dividuals whose scores are slightly over 30, however, will be placed in the second category (assuming the absence of random errors), so that for these individuals the error component $e = 2 - (30/10 - 1.5) = +.5$. This jump in X' values near the category limits produces a saw-tooth effect, as indicated in Figure 4. This effect continues until we reach the upper boundary of category 5, at which point the values of e decrease linearly as X increases. When we plot the measurement error e against X , as in Figure 4, we note that, except for the saw-tooth effect, the relationship is very similar to that indicated in Figure 3 for floor and ceiling effects.

In practical terms, this kind of distortion can be reduced by using a large number of categories and by making sure that the extreme categories contain relatively few cases. If this has been done, and if one is willing to consider distortions producing the saw-tooth effect as approximately random, then one may safely ignore the extreme effects and use a random measurement error model. But if only a small number of categories have been used, or if there are numerous cases in the extreme categories, the measurement error should be taken as a negative function of X . Hopefully, a linear approximation may be reasonably adequate.

Path Analyses with Linear Models. Let us assume that a linear approximation is appropriate and that we wish to assess the implications of measurement errors that are functions of X . We have already seen that if $X' = c + (1+d)X + u$ we must anticipate a change in scale that will affect our estimates of regression coefficients. But what about path coefficients or correlations? Will our causal inferences be affected, apart from the matter of scale? Common sense would suggest that the same tools appropriate to random measurement error may be used, but common sense is a notoriously poor guide in complex situations such as this. If we represent the nonrandom

component as a function of X , we may construct a causal diagram in which X' is taken as a function of two variables, X and e , with e in turn being a function of X , as indicated in Figure 5. Furthermore, we may construct relatively complex models allowing for multiple indicators and several imperfectly measured variables.

Let us consider the model of Figure 6 involving two indicators of X , both of which have been measured with errors proportional to X , and a dependent variable Y likewise measured with nonrandom errors by indicators Y_1 and Y_2 . We may ask whether it is possible to estimate the path coefficient p_7 connecting the true values of X and Y in the presence of so many unknowns. Clearly, there are more unknowns than equations, but it does not therefore follow that some of these unknowns cannot be estimated.

Since there are four measured variables there will be six intercorrelations, the path equations for which are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{X_1 X_2} &= p_1 p_4 + p_1 p_5 p_6 + p_2 p_3 p_4 + p_2 p_3 p_5 p_6 \\ &= (p_1 + p_2 p_3)(p_4 + p_5 p_6) = p_1^* p_2^* \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} r_{Y_1 Y_2} &= p_8 p_{11} + p_8 p_{12} p_{13} + p_9 p_{10} p_{11} + p_9 p_{10} p_{12} p_{13} \\ &= (p_8 + p_9 p_{10})(p_{11} + p_{12} p_{13}) = p_8^* p_4^* \end{aligned}$$

$$r_{X_1 Y_1} = p_7(p_1 + p_2 p_3)(p_8 + p_9 p_{10}) = p_7 p_1^* p_3^*$$

$$r_{X_1 Y_2} = p_7(p_1 + p_2 p_3)(p_{11} + p_{12} p_{13}) = p_7 p_1^* p_4^*$$

$$r_{X_2 Y_1} = p_7(p_4 + p_5 p_6)(p_8 + p_9 p_{10}) = p_7 p_2^* p_3^*$$

$$r_{X_2 Y_2} = p_7(p_4 + p_5 p_6)(p_{11} + p_{12} p_{13}) = p_7 p_2^* p_4^*$$

where we have been able to utilize the compound paths




FIG. 5




FIG. 6

$$\begin{aligned} p_1^* &= p_1 + p_2 p_3 & p_3^* &= p_8 + p_9 p_{10} \\ p_2^* &= p_4 + p_5 p_6 & p_4^* &= p_{11} + p_{12} p_{13} \end{aligned}$$

Notice that each of these compound paths p_i^* involves three unknowns that always appear together in identical expressions. In effect, there are two excess unknowns in each of these compound expressions, thus accounting for eight of the unknowns in the system. Although none of these four compound paths can be decomposed without additional data or assumptions, it is possible to estimate p_7 and each of the four p_i^* from the six equations. Of particular interest is the estimate of p_7 obtained as follows:

$$p_7^2 = \frac{p_1^* p_2^* p_7^2 p_3^* p_4^*}{p_1^* p_2^* p_3^* p_4^*} = \frac{r_{X_1 Y_1} r_{X_2 Y_2}}{r_{X_1 X_2} r_{Y_1 Y_2}} = \frac{r_{X_1 Y_2} r_{X_2 Y_1}}{r_{X_1 X_2} r_{Y_1 Y_2}}$$

This estimate is of course identical with the estimate obtained earlier in connection with Figure 1 (with different subscripts). Furthermore, we note that we obtain the same redundant equation for testing purposes, namely the prediction that $r_{X_1 Y_1} r_{X_2 Y_2} = r_{X_1 Y_2} r_{X_2 Y_1}$. In other words, Costner's technique works exactly as in the case of purely random measurement errors. However this means that Costner's procedure and test criterion cannot be used to ascertain whether measurement errors are purely random or whether there is an additional error component that is proportional to X . It can be shown that we could have also estimated p_7 if we had had a perfect measure of Y instead of two indicators. Had there been only a single measure of Y involving measurement error, however, we could not have estimated p_7 without additional assumptions.

It should again be cautioned that path coefficients and correlations will not be invariant across populations or time periods, even in instances where the same fundamental laws are operative (i.e., where the same unstandardized coefficients hold). Therefore in instances where one wishes to compare coefficients in the presence of variances that differ from one population to the next, the above procedure will not be appropriate. Also, in order to be assured of reasonable sampling errors in the case of these rather complex expressions, one must be

dealing with large samples and correlations of at least moderate size.

III. MEASUREMENT ERRORS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS FACTORS

Perhaps a more common type of nonrandom measurement error, and certainly one that is more difficult to handle, stems from the influence of extraneous factors that may also be correlated with X and other variables in the causal system. We can think of numerous examples. When we deal with official data, such as that compiled by national censuses or government bodies, we are likely to find common biases affecting more than a single variable. For example a government may wish to appear more "advanced" economically and politically than it actually is. Size of population, gross national product, and degree of urbanization may all be inflated, whereas indices of crime and internal disruption may be biased in the opposite direction. Census underenumeration of Negroes may have varying effects on a number of different economic and political indicators.

In survey interviews or any other situation where attitudes, knowledge, or ability are being measured it is well recognized that motivational factors are likely to produce nonrandom errors. Respondents with low motivation or interest may tend to check items randomly. On ability or knowledge tests this is likely to lower their performance scores; on attitudinal items it may give them intermediate scores on many different scales. If the questions are tapping several underlying dimensions, without this being clearly recognized, there may be additional confounding effects. For example if many of the items permit responses that are conventional or popular, while others are more controversial, then persons who are conformists or "other directed" may respond differently from those who are nonconformists. This may hold true regardless of the subject being asked, so that there is a common component across several supposedly distinct scales.

Unfortunately, unless these extraneous factors are recognized and controlled in the data




FIG. 7

collection stage they are likely to remain as unknowns. If they occur to an investigator as an afterthought, the chances are that they, themselves, will have been only indirectly measured. Furthermore, if there are numerous such extraneous factors operative it will be difficult to bring them all into the model in such a way that their relationships with the other variables are made explicit. Most commonly we consider such variables when we collect our data, and then we pretend that they no longer exist when we reach the analysis stage. Such a practice is no doubt necessary in order to preserve our scientific sanity. Nevertheless, it will not lead us to the correct conclusions unless the distorting effects are relatively minor.

Let us illustrate in terms of a relatively simple model involving X , which is again measured by two indicators; Y which is dependent on X and assumed perfectly measured (though similar results would be obtained if we had two indicators of Y with random errors or errors proportional to Y); W which is taken as a cause of both X and Y , and an extraneous factor Z taken as a cause of X_1 and X_2 and as possibly correlated with W , X , and Y . In the model of Figure 7, Z is assumed to cause W , X , and Y . Obviously there are many other possibilities, even confining our attention to the links between W , X , Y , and Z . All of the other possibilities I have examined, however, have led to the same basic conclusions. We may therefore use this particular model as illustrative of both the procedure that can be followed and the difficulties one can expect to encounter.

Treating X as unmeasured but the remaining variables as measured, we have five measured variables and therefore ten equations, one for each of the correlations that can be obtained from the data. There are also ten unknown path coefficients that can be found by solving these ten equations, which will be rather complex nonlinear equations that can-

not be easily solved algebraically. Presumably, one could make use of iterative computer programs to obtain numerical solutions if all the data were available.

However, as previously indicated, Z will generally be either unknown or poorly measured. It is therefore important to examine the implications of the model assuming that Z is unknown and that one has available only the six intercorrelations among W , X_1 , X_2 , and Y . There are of course now four more unknowns than equations, so that additional simplifications will be necessary. Keep in mind that our objective is to estimate the causal links p_8 , p_9 , and p_{10} involving only W , X and Y . Therefore it is conceivable that some of these path coefficients can be estimated even though there are too many unknowns in the total system.

In introducing simplifications it is undesirable to place many restrictions on the relationships among W , X , and Y , other than linearity and one-way causation, since these are the variables of fundamental interest. Of course it is possible to assume away the links between Z and X_1 and X_2 , but these are the very sources of nonrandom measurement error of concern to us. We might wish to consider a model in which Z affected X_1 but not X_2 , which might be subject only to random measurement error. Unless there are two or more X_i unrelated to Z , however, this kind of simplification will not really help. Let us therefore consider the kinds of simplifications introduced if Z is unrelated to W , X , or Y .

It turns out that the greatest simplifications will occur if we set $p_6 = 0$, thereby taking out the link between Z and the independent variable W . In this case the six equations can be written down by inspection as follows:

$$r_{X_1 X_2} = p_1 p_2 + p_3 p_4 + p_5 (p_1 p_4 + p_2 p_3)$$

$$r_{X_1 W} = p_1 p_8$$

$$r_{X_2 W} = p_2 p_8$$

$$r_{X_1 Y} = p_1 (p_9 + p_5 p_7 + p_8 p_{10}) + p_3 (p_7 + p_5 p_9)$$

$$r_{X_2Y} = p_2(p_9 + p_5p_7 + p_8p_{10}) + p_4(p_7 + p_5p_9) \\ r_{WY} = p_8p_9 + p_{10}$$

The last of these equations contains only p_8 , p_9 , and p_{10} which are of major interest, and the second and third equations contain only p_1 , p_2 , and p_8 . But the remaining equations contain too many compound paths to be of any help. If equivalent forms had been used in the measurement of X , so that it would be reasonable to assume that $p_1 = p_2$ and $p_8 = p_4$, the system would contain two redundant equations for testing purposes (equations 3 and 5), but there would still be too many unknowns for solution.

If we take out the link p_7 between Z and Y , while retaining p_5 , we remove two terms each from the expressions for $r_{X,Y}$ and r_{X_2Y} but leave the remaining equations unchanged. Similarly, if we remove p_5 but not p_7 we achieve somewhat greater simplifications, but it still remains impossible to solve for p_8 , p_9 , and p_{10} . Let us therefore consider the case where we take out all of the links (p_5 , p_6 , and p_7) of Z with the variables of interest. Even with this very restrictive model the equations reduce to:

$$r_{X_1X_2} = p_1p_2 + p_3p_4 \quad r_{X,Y} = p_1(p_9 + p_8p_{10}) \\ r_{X_1W} = p_1p_8 \quad r_{X_2Y} = p_2(p_9 + p_8p_{10}) \\ r_{X_2W} = p_2p_8 \quad r_{WY} = p_{10} + p_8p_9$$

We now have six equations and seven unknowns. But the equations are not all independent since the ratio p_1/p_2 may be obtained by dividing the second equation by the third or by dividing the fourth by the fifth. This gives us a redundant equation for testing purposes, but even in this very restricted model we still cannot solve for the path coefficients.

Finally, if we introduce the further restriction that $p_{10} = 0$, so that W does not affect Y except through X , the equations reduce to the set:

$$r_{X_1X_2} = p_1p_2 + p_3p \quad r_{X,Y} = p_1p_9 \\ r_{X_1W} = p_1p_8 \quad r_{X_2Y} = p_2p_9 \\ r_{X_2W} = p_2p_8 \quad r_{WY} = p_8p_9$$

Although this set contains a redundant equation as before, and although the compound path p_3p_4 cannot be decomposed, it becomes possible to solve for the remaining paths. For example

$$p_8^2 = (p_8/p_9)(p_8p_9) = \frac{r_{X_1W}}{r_{X_1Y}} (r_{WY}) = \frac{r_{X_2W}}{r_{X_2Y}} (r_{WY})$$

and

$$p_9^2 = (p_9/p_8)(p_8p_9) = \frac{r_{X_1Y}}{r_{X_1W}} (r_{WY}) = \frac{r_{X_2Y}}{r_{X_2W}} (r_{WY})$$

Thus in order to estimate the path coefficients of interest we have had to impose a large number of restrictions on the model. In effect, we have had to assume that the source Z of nonrandom measurement error is uncorrelated with any of the remaining variables in the system. Not only this, but we have had to utilize a very simple model connecting W , X , and Y . If we were primarily interested in p_9 connecting X to its effect Y , we would be obliged, in this instance, to locate a cause W of X that does not affect Y by any other path. Recall that the method of instrumental variables required a similar kind of assumption. Although we have here examined only a single model, it may well turn out that the removal of nonrandom measurement errors of the type under consideration may require us to locate additional variables such as W that can be assumed to have very simple relationships with the variables of primary interest.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although random errors and errors proportional to X present no formidable problems provided multiple indicators are available, we have seen that nonrandom errors produced by extraneous factors can be difficult to handle unless the causal situation is extremely simple or unless these extraneous factors can be measured and explicitly introduced. The last example illustrates an extremely important point. If we wish to allow for nonrandom errors in several variables, the models we develop will generally be complex and will contain a large proportion of unknowns relative to the number of estimating equations. Although one might wish to construct complex models for use in relating the variables of interest, along with complex models allowing for measurement error, simplicity will have to be introduced in order to solve for the unknowns.

As a general principle, it will be necessary to utilize very simple causal models connecting the variables of real interest if one allows for complex models involving measurement errors. Conversely, if one wishes to test and estimate parameters in complex causal models, he will need to keep his assumptions regarding measurement error extremely simple. It would be nice to have it both ways, but this does not seem possible. The implication, of course, is that if we are to test complex models we must purify our measures so as to enable us to keep measurement error assumptions as simple as possible.

Obviously we need to give much more emphasis to measurement error problems than we

ave done thus far. This will require a higher degree of coordination to standardize measures so that results of different studies can be meaningfully compared and knowledge about measurement errors accumulated. Many of our global concepts, such as political alienation, normative consensus, democracy, and the like, are highly abstract and far removed from the operational level. Therefore, each may require indicators that are several steps removed. Whether or not such concepts can be used in models that are even indirectly testable remains to be seen.

Certainly we need to take a careful look at the various mechanisms that produce nonrandom measurement errors. We have considered only a few simple cases. But there may

also be errors produced by nonadditive relationships with confounding variables, or nonlinear relationships between indicators and the underlying variables. Whenever a model implies reciprocal causation, so that least squares is no longer appropriate, it may be much more difficult to handle even random errors of measurement. Finally, as noted above, we have not yet seriously studied possible complications introduced in the aggregation process.

Although it may prove discouraging to note the existence of such complications for our analyses, progress can only be achieved by identifying problems one by one, formulating them as clearly as possible, and then studying the conditions under which each can or cannot be resolved.

MODERNIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE¹

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It has been said that technological and economic development lead ultimately to the decline of communal conflict, and that the emergence of new kinds of socio-economic roles and identities undercuts the organizational bases upon which communal (that is, "racial," "ethnic," "religious," or "tribal") politics rests. In the past decade, several scholars working in culturally plural societies have challenged this conventional view. They have suggested that communalism may in fact be a persistent feature of social change, and that the dichotomous tradition-modernity models which have often guided our empirical investigations have obscured this theoretical alternative and thereby produced false expectations concerning the direction of change.²

¹ Research was supported by the Departments of Political Science at Michigan State University and Western Michigan University, and by the African Studies Center at Michigan State University. We both greatly benefitted by association with faculty and students in a workshop on the Nigerian experience sponsored by the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activity. We also wish to acknowledge, with gratitude, the helpful comments of the following colleagues who read this paper in manuscript form: Karl W. Deutsch, S. N. Eisenstadt, Justin Green, Daniel Lerner, James O'Connell, Simon Ottenberg, Lucian W. Pye, Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Richard L. Sklar, Saadia Touval and Aristide Zolberg. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association in New York, September 1969.

² In particular, see the following works: Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967) pp. 15-33; James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960); S. N. Eisenstadt, "Reflections on a Theory of Modernization," in Arnold Rivkin (ed.), *Nations by Design* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1968), pp. 35-61; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157; Martin Kilson, *Political Change in a West African State: A Survey of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Harvard University

This paper attempts to synthesize the various elements of this emerging theoretical perspective through the formulation of several propositions which link modernization to communalism. While our discussion will draw primarily upon the Nigerian experience for illustrative material, the propositions are intended to be applicable across societies.

"Communalism," in this paper, refers to the political assertiveness of groups which have three distinguishing characteristics: first, the membership is comprised of persons who share in a common culture and identity and, to use Karl Deutsch's term, a "complementarity of communication;"³ second, they encompass the full range of demographic (age and sex) divisions within the wider society and provide "for a network of groups and institutions extending throughout the individual's entire life cycle;" and, third, like the wider society in which they exist, they tend to be differentiated by wealth status, and power. Communal demands and con-

Press, 1966); Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Richard L. Sklar, "The Contribution of Tribalism to Nationalism in Western Nigeria," *Journal of Human Relations*, 8 (Spring-Summer 1960), 407-415; Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); C. S. Whitaker "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *World Politics*, 19 (January 1967), 190-217; W. Howard Wiggins, "Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon," this REVIEW, 55 (June 1961), 313-320; Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

³ According to Deutsch, complementarity of communication in a group "consists in the ability to communicate more effectively and over a wider range of subjects with members of one large group than with outsiders." See his pathbreaking *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953), p. 71.

⁴ Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 39.

lict are politically distinctive in that they may effect a desire for separation and may threaten to alter the political boundaries of the wider society.⁵ The Nigerian experience, we will contend, runs counter to the view that communal "particularism" or "communalism" is an historical nachchronism, ultimately destined to be submerged by the "universalistic" tidal wave of modernity. An analysis of the Nigerian case suggests, rather, that modernization, far from destroying communalism, in time both reinforces communal conflict and creates the conditions for the formation of entirely new communal groups.

In these respects, the Nigerian case is by no means unique. The Nagas have not become Indians indistinguishable from other Indians, any more than Ibos and Yorubas and Tivs have become interchangeable Nigerians. Overseas Chinese and Javanese have not become Indonesians. Nor have French Canadians and Black Americans "melted" into their respective wider societies. In each of these cases, the contemporary pattern of communal formation and conflict may be seen as an immediate by-product of the modernization process.

The Nigerian case is a particularly appropriate illustration of the relationship between communal conflict and modernization in that, on most social and economic indices, Nigeria showed signs of relatively rapid growth in comparison to other developing nations subject to comparable ecological and historical conditions.⁶

⁵ It should be noted that communal groups are not alone in sharing culture, identity and complementarity. An age-grade among the Masai, for example, does in fact share in these characteristics. So does the upper class in Britain. But age grades and social classes are not to be thought of as communal groups, because they do not encompass the full range of demographic divisions within a society and they are not socio-economically heterogeneous. It is these latter characteristics which give to communal groups their distinctive political significance in that they are, to use Clifford Geertz' term, "candidates for nationhood." See Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 111. The term, "Communalism," is not to be confused with the concept of "communal participation" developed by Richard L. Sklar, in his *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 474-480.

⁶ Carl K. Eichler, for example, has written, "Nigeria's rate of economic growth of approximately 5 percent per annum since 1960 is impressive and second only to that of the Ivory Coast among West African nations. Nigeria became the world's tenth largest exporter of petroleum in 1966 and its petro-

Accompanying these developments were a high rate of social mobilization and a significant expansion of the traditional frameworks of empathy and social identification. It was precisely Nigeria's success in these economic and social spheres which produced the constantly optimistic appraisals of the course of Nigerian development. But economic and social success were not matched in the political sphere and, in retrospect, it is clear that Nigeria's very economic and social progress sowed the seeds of the nation's political crisis. That crisis, it will be argued, is traceable neither to poverty nor, as some popular accounts would have it, to the simple fact of cultural diversity and the reassertion of traditional tribal antagonisms. On the one hand, the group frustrations which underlie communal antagonisms are as much a reflection of change and the blocking of new aspirations as they are of impoverishment. On the other hand, inter-group conflict is seldom a product of simple cultural diversity and, in the Nigerian case, there is little that is "traditional" about the contemporary pattern of political divisions. On the contrary, Nigeria's political crisis is traceable directly to the widening of social horizons and to the process of modernization at work within the national boundaries.

Social Mobilization and Communal Conflict

The propositions discussed in this paper attempt to unravel the complicated web of factors which link communalism with modernization. The fourteen propositions listed below focus upon four themes: (1) competitive communalism; (2) institutional communalism; (3) communal transformation; and (4) communal compart-

leum reserves are estimated to match those of Libya." See his "The Dynamics of Long-Term Agricultural Development in Nigeria," *Journal of Farm Economics*, 49 (December 1967), 1158-1170. According to an estimate of Carl Liedholm, Eastern Nigeria in the early sixties possessed the fastest growing industrial sector in the world. See Carl Liedholm, "Preliminary Estimates of an Index of Industrial Production for Eastern Nigeria, from 1961-66," (Enugu: Economic Development Institute, March 1967). For a more extensive discussion of Nigerian economic development, see Gerald K. Helleiner, *Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria* (Homewood: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1966). For lucid discussions of the political consequences of Nigeria's rapid rates of educational expansion and urbanization, see James S. Coleman, *op. cit.* and David Abernethy, *The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

mentalization. Following their listing, we turn to a more detailed analysis of each of these themes.

I. *Competitive Communalism*

1. In a culturally plural society, the competition engendered by social mobilization will tend to be defined in communal terms.
2. Differential rates of mobilization among communal groups exacerbate communal conflict by multiplying coincident social cleavages.
3. In the short term, the reduction of communal imbalances in wealth, status or power may serve to intensify communal antagonisms.

II. *Institutional Communalism*

4. Social or geographical segregation of communal groups may lessen communal conflict if it reflects a mutually agreed upon reduction or elimination of competitive communal interaction; however, if mobilized and competitive communal groups desire, or are forced, to interact within the same system of social stratification, segregation may intensify communal conflict.
5. The formation of communal associations, in response to inter-communal contact and competition, furthers communal conflict.
6. The subordination of political institutions to the interests of particular communal groups tends to reinforce and politicize communal conflict.
7. The greater the number of equally powerful communal groups, the greater the likelihood that political institutions will be able to retain their coherence and impartiality vis-a-vis communal competitors.
8. Political institutions which encourage the participation of the masses in the recruitment of leaders tend to further politicize and intensify communal conflict.

III. *Communal Transformation*

9. In an environment of social mobilization and communal competition, communal groups will tend to fuse or to expand their traditional boundaries to include groups and individuals with whom they can identify and who might prove useful allies during inter-group conflict.
10. Mobilization and competition lead to the increasing internal differentiation of communal categories along socio-economic and ideological lines.
11. Accompanying communal fusion and expansion is the deparochialization of traditional group ties and perspectives.
12. Communal transformation entails the

multiplication rather than the substitution of social identities.

IV. *Communal Compartmentalization*

13. Since politically salient identities are situationally specific, communal and non-communal political orientations may well coexist within the same person.
14. Since communal and non-communal political orientation may coexist within individuals, each activated in different social contexts, modernization need not eliminate communal differentiation and conflict.

I. COMPETITIVE COMMUNALISM

Proposition 1. In a culturally plural society, the competition engendered by social mobilization will tend to be defined in communal terms.

A convenient starting point of this analysis of modernization and communal conflict is the concept of "social mobilization," defined by Karl Deutsch as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."⁷ Social mobilization, in our view, generates the new kinds of social competition and new kinds of scarcity which underlie contemporary communal antagonisms.

The linked processes of change subsumed within the concept of social mobilization—such as urbanization, the introduction of mass education, the diffusion of the mass media, the development of increasingly efficient and productive commercial networks—alter the human landscape in two significant respects. First, "social mobilization" means the reorientation of a large number of citizens to a new system of rewards and paths to rewards in all spheres of society. People's aspirations and expectations change as they are mobilized into the modernizing economy and polity. They come to want, and to demand, more—more goods, more recognition, more power. Significantly, too, the orientation of the mobilized to a common set of rewards and paths to rewards means, in effect, that many people come to desire precisely the same things. Men enter into conflict not because they are different but because they are essentially the same. It is by making men "more alike," in the sense of possessing the same wants, that modernization tends to promote conflict.

⁷ Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW 55 (September 1961), 493-514; reprinted in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.) pp. 205-226.

Second, "social mobilization" means not only the emergence of a new set of motivating values and career paths, but also that the demand for scarce resources cannot keep up with their supply. Nowhere is the reality of "modern scarcity" experienced more intensely than in the cities, wherein the rate of population growth almost invariably exceeds the rate of economic development and the availability of new jobs. It is here that the various elements of the mobilized population are thrown into direct, and very personal, competition with one another—for positions within governmental agencies and commercial concerns, for the control of local markets, for admission to crowded schools, for induction into the army, and for control of political parties. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the competitors perceive themselves as involved in a "zero-sum game," in which one man's failure is attributable to another man's success. While this perception may or may not be accurate in any given instance, the perception itself leads to the increasing competitiveness of the modern sector.

It is against this backdrop of social mobilization and a highly competitive modern sector that communal conflict in culturally plural societies must be understood.⁸ On the one hand, it is the competitor within the modern sphere who feels the insecurities of change most strongly and who seeks the communal shelter of "tribalism."⁹ The tradition-bound rural villager, though he may indeed be caught up into the competitive struggle of his urban-based kinsman, by contrast experiences contemporary tribalism only vicariously and at second-hand. On the other hand, men become tribalists not only out of insecurity but also out of the many opportunities created by social mobilization in a communal milieu. In culturally plural societies, citizens tend to perceive their competitive world through a communal prism and to be responsive to communal appeals. Communalism therefore becomes a matter of opportunism. It matters not that, in any given competition, communal criteria are inappropriate to the determination

of the outcome and may not in fact have been operative. What is important is that the personal fortunes of individuals are generally believed to depend on their communal origins and connections. This being the case, individuals plan and organize accordingly. Thus, the aspirant Nigerian politician seeks to mobilize his "tribal union" behind his candidacy; at the same time, his towns-people—those resident in their home community as well as those resident in the alien city—view his candidacy as an expression of their group aspirations and his election as an indicator of group recognition and power. (Conversely, the members of other communal groups view his candidacy as a threat to their own group aspirations and vested interests.) Similarly, the job applicant or prospective schoolboy turns to his kinsmen for assistance, while his benefactors view the job or financial assistance they extend as a communal investment to be reciprocated by the beneficiary. In short, the common expectation of the primacy of communal criteria produces the self-fulfilling prophecy of communally-oriented competitive strategies in virtually all walks of life.

Proposition 2. Differential rates of mobilization among communal groups exacerbate communal conflict by multiplying coincident social cleavages.

The various communal groups which comprise a culturally plural nation-state are seldom mobilized at the same rate, with the consequence that the members of the more slowly mobilized communities are placed at a disadvantage in the competition for the national rewards of wealth, status and power. This section explores, first, the factors underlying differential mobilization and, second, the implications of differential mobilization for the character of communal conflict.

There are at least three analytically distinguishable factors which work to create inter-group differentials in the developmental process—the nature of Western contact, environmental opportunities and cultural predispositions. While it is difficult to assign weights denoting the relative significance of each, it is apparent that all are involved in determining the timing and pace of social mobilization. First, variations in the timing, intensity and character of Western contact yield group variations in the rate of urbanization, the spread of literacy, the diffusion of the mass media, the acculturation of Western norms and techniques. In Nigeria, for example, accidents of history and geographical location have been especially important in producing very different kinds of contact experiences and resultant rates of social change as between North and South. Thus, the exclusion of missionaries and

⁸ Following Anderson, von der Mehden and Young, "cultural pluralism" refers to "the existence within a state of solidarity patterns, based upon shared religion, language, ethnic identity, race, caste, or region, which command a loyalty rivaling, at least in some situations, that which the state itself is able to generate," *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁹ For an insightful discussion of the psychological dimension of social change, see Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

hence Western schools from the Islamic north was a crucial factor accounting for the subsequent domination by Southerners of both administrative and technical occupations. Similarly, coastal and riverain communities, which were relatively more accessible to the colonizing agents, tended to have contact with the West at an earlier date than communities situated in rural hinterlands, and tended often to be subject to a relatively more intensive and qualitatively quite different acculturative experience.

Second, variations in the kinds of environmental opportunities available to different communities have also contributed to variations in the rates of social mobilization. Such variables as the availability of mineral resources, the fertility of the soils, the export value of indigenous agricultural commodities, the proximity of a transportation crossroads—all condition the pace of social change and the economic potentialities of a given community. Just as Western Nigerian economic growth in the post-war period was at least partially attributable to the profitability of the indigenous cash crop of cocoa, so Northern Nigeria's relative poverty and lower developmental rates were partially attributable to the harsh economic reality that groundnuts were a less valuable agricultural commodity.¹⁰ More recently, the discovery of significant petroleum deposits in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria has meant that the developmental potential of this sector has become very large indeed. Yet another example of environmental influences on social mobilization is that of land shortage in densely populated Iboland contributing to the high out-migration of Ibos to Nigeria's urban centers. As a result of this out-migration, Ibos came to constitute the principal stranger-populations of Northern and Western cities, with many individual Ibos performing highly visible commercial, administrative and technical functions.

Finally, variations in the cultural predispositions of different groups produce variations in their response to Western contact and to existing environmental opportunities. As the work of McClelland, Hagen, LeVine, Young, and Ottenberg suggests, some cultural groups appear to be more predisposed than others to compete successfully for the rewards of modernization.¹¹

¹⁰ Concerning the groundnut industry, see J. S. Hoggendorn, "The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria," in Carl Eicher and Carl Liedholm (eds.), *Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy*, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970), pp. 30-52.

Thus, in the Nigerian case, it has been suggested that relatively rapid rates of mobilization and development in Eastern Nigeria are traceable, in part, to the receptivity to change on the part of the Ibos and to the relatively high incidence of "need achievers" to be found within this cultural group.¹²

The consequence of communal groups being mobilized at different rates is that some peoples gain a head-start in the competition for the scarce rewards of modernity. New socio-economic categories therefore tend to coincide with, rather than intersect, communal boundaries, with the consequence that the modern status system comes to be organized along communal lines. There is, consequently, little to ameliorate the intensity of communal confrontations. The fewer the cross-cutting socio-economic linkages, the more naked such confrontations and the greater the likelihood of secessionist and other movements of communal nationalism.

Thus, in the Nigerian case, a Northern Hausa—because of differential mobilization—came to be not only culturally dissimilar from an Eastern Ibo; he came also to be distinguished by his Islamic religion (as contrasted with the Christianity of the Ibo), his relative poverty, and his relative educational backwardness. In short, the lines of cleavage as between Hausa and Ibo all coincided. As a result, conflict of any sort—whether over jobs or markets or political office—threatened an all-out communal struggle.

¹¹ See David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961); Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1962); Crawford Young, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 256-265; Robert A. Le Vine, *Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965); Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Receptivity to change," in William R. Bascom and Melville J. Herskovits (eds.), *Continuity and Change in African Cultures* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 130-143.

¹² The precise role and significance of such cultural predispositions in the development process is as yet uncertain. For a criticism of the McClelland thesis, see S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Need for Achievement," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 11 (January 1963), 420-431. For a critical analysis of the Ibo "receptivity to change" hypothesis, see Richard Henderson, "'Generalized Cultures' and 'Evolutionary Adaptability': The Comparison of Urban Efik and Ibo in Nigeria," *Ethnology*, 5 (October 1966), 365-391.

Differential mobilization in Nigeria widened the socio-political cleavages not only between the country's major nationality groups but also between majority and minority communal groups within each administrative region and even between sub-groups of a single nationality. Thus, differential rates of educational expansion and economic growth in Eastern Nigeria heightened the previously latent cleavage between the landlocked Owerri Ibo interior, on the one hand, and the more advantaged marginal Ibo (Onitsha, Oguta, Aro) riverain groups and non-Ibo (Ijaw, Ibibio, Efik) coastal communities, on the other.¹³ In similar fashion, the commercially prosperous Lagos and Ijebu Yoruba came to be set off from the less advantaged Yoruba interior. Likewise, within Northern Nigeria, the non-Hausa speaking Middle Belt developed economically and educationally more rapidly than the upper North; and, within the upper North, those Emirates which played a significant role in the colonial administrative and commercial systems—such as Kano and Katsina—assumed preeminent positions in the modern stratification system.¹⁴ In short, differential mobilization had the effect of creating sets of coinciding cleavages within as well as between the three dominant cultural core-areas.¹⁵

Proposition 3. In the short term, the reduction of communal imbalances in wealth, status or power may serve to intensify communal antagonisms.

While it seems clear that, given an environment of social mobilization, communal imbalances in wealth, status and power exacerbate communal tensions, it does not follow that progress toward the elimination of such imbalances will be accompanied by communal accommodation. It is true that inter-group equalization is a necessary condition for the emergence of cross-cutting socio-economic linkages. That does not mean, however, that the members of different communal groups will in fact perceive the commonality of their socio-economic interests or

that, if they do perceive this commonality, that they will act upon it. In the short term, at least, there are two factors which may link progress toward inter-group equalization with the intensification rather than the amelioration of communal antagonisms.

First, upward communal mobility normally leads to the alteration of reference-groups on the part of the communal participants and, hence, to the alteration of their perceptions of their relative status vis-a-vis their communal competitors.¹⁶ This is what appears to have been involved in the determination of the late-starting Ibos to "catch-up" with—indeed, surpass—Western Nigeria's Yorubas, a group with which the Ibos did not even interact in the pre-colonial period. In a very real sense, it is their equality rather than their inequality which is at the heart of contemporary Ibo/Yoruba communal conflict. In short, communal mobility, rather than producing a sense of competitive gain and satisfaction, may lead to a deepening sense of relative deprivation and communal insecurity. The actual intensity of these feelings of communal deprivation and insecurity will depend very largely upon the responsiveness of the wider society to the new communal assertiveness. The blocking of new communal aspirations to wealth, status and power will tend to intensify group frustrations and radicalize political response.

Second, communal mobility may intensify communal dissatisfaction by producing increased impatience with the remaining imbalances. The closer the members of a formerly deprived group approach equality on one of the dimensions of wealth, status and power, the more intolerable becomes inequality on the other two dimensions. It is to this phenomenon that the "revolution of rising aspirations and frustrations" refers. This notion seems to fit more closely the American race experience, for example, than the simple observation that black dep-

¹³ See Howard Wolpe, "Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7 (October 1969), 469-493.

¹⁴ For an excellent analysis of communal conflict and violence within Nigeria's upper north, see John Paden, "Communal Competition, Conflict, and Violence in Kano," to appear in a forthcoming volume edited by Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, *Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971).

¹⁵ For a parallel analysis of Ivory Coast inter-group relationships, see Aristide R. Zolberg, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ Daniel Lerner, for example, has suggested that "A person with high achievement may still be dissatisfied if his aspirations far exceed his accomplishments. Relative deprivation . . . is the effective measure of satisfaction among individuals and groups." See his "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 333. For a parallel treatment of the problem of relative deprivation, see Ulf Himmelstrand's application of rank-equilibration theory to Yoruba-Ibo competition in "Tribalism and Nationalism in Nigeria," in Melson and Wolpe, *op. cit.*

privation leads to black militancy. It is seldom the very poorest who are the most militant.¹⁷

II. INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNALISM

To this point in our discussion, we have considered the relationship between social mobilization and communal conflict without reference to the institutional context in which these processes unfold. But this context is itself directly related to the nature and intensity of communal conflict. Institutions which divide groups from each other *at the same time as they encourage political competition and participation* can only exacerbate communal conflict. Of course, these separatist institutions (such as residential segregation and communal associations) are themselves a reflection of existing patterns of communal conflict. This reciprocity between institution and conflict comprises the subject matter of the next set of propositions.

Proposition 4. Social or geographical segregation of communal groups may lessen communal conflict if it reflects a mutually agreed upon reduction or elimination of competitive communal interaction; however, if mobilized and competitive communal groups desire, or are forced, to interact within the same system of social stratification, segregation may intensify communal conflict.

Some scholars have been tempted to conclude that social mobilization and, in particular, urbanization, entailing as they normally do complex functional inter-relationships between culturally diverse populations, would significantly contribute to the destruction of communal barriers and the creation of integrated and socially cohesive national communities. This view closely parallels the popular "melting pot" hypothesis of American folklore and sociology which asserts that inter-group contact in the United States has led to the "fusion" of these groups so as to produce a distinctive American national stock.

Such a view—whether applied to the developing African continent or to the economically prosperous United States—lacks secure empirical foundation. In the United States, for example, inter-group interaction, while producing a fairly high degree of *cultural* assimilation, has produced far less *structural* assimilation than is conventionally assumed. While most white Americans have been assimilated within the secondary institutions of the society, their primary group relationships remain highly segregated by nationality or religion, and ethnicity remains a

persistent fact of political life. Insofar as racial relations are concerned, structural assimilation has been almost non-existent—Blacks merely abandoning the segregation of the rural South for the segregation of the urban North—and in some cases even the trend toward cultural assimilation seems to have been reversed. In short most Americans, despite their adherence to a common set of national norms, live out their private lives in fairly tight and often segregated communal compartments.¹⁸

Much the same may be said of the citizens of other culturally plural nation-states. In Nigeria, for example, while isolated instances of cultural and/or structural assimilation may be cited, most urban communities evolved segregated residential patterns, especially with regard to the "strangers" vis-a-vis the indigenous host population. The isolation of Ibos in the *Sabon Garis* of Northern Nigeria is only the most dramatic example of this pattern of urban segregation. Segregated Hausa quarters were similarly to be found in the major towns of Eastern and Western Nigeria, and urban life was invariably compartmentalized according to communal categories.¹⁹

The relationship between communal segregation and communal conflict is more complicated than conventionally assumed. Segregation per se does not create or intensify communal conflict. On the contrary, to the extent that communal segregation reflects a mutually agreed upon reduction or elimination of competitive communal interaction, segregation means the reduction or elimination of sources of potential communal

¹⁸ The terminology is Milton Gordon's. See *op. cit.*, pp. 60-83. "Cultural assimilation" implies that a group has changed its cultural patterns to those of the host society. "Structural assimilation" refers to the group's membership actually entering into the cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society, on the primary group level.

¹⁹ For an incisive analysis of Yoruba/Hausa segregation and the communalization of commercial activity in the city of Ibadan, see Abner Cohen, "The Social Organization of Credit in a West African Cattle Market," *Africa*, 35 (1965), 8-19. For related discussions of inter-communal trade, see E. Wayne Nafziger, "Inter-Regional Economic Relations in the Nigerian Footwear Industry," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6 (1968), 531-542, and John Harris and Mary Rowe, "Entrepreneurial Attitudes and National Integration," Melson and Wolpe, *op. cit.* See also the forthcoming studies by Barbara Callaway on Aba urban politics and by George Jenkins and K. W. S. Post on the political history of the important Ibadan political leader, the late Adelabu.

¹⁷ For an extensive discussion of how "deprivation" enters into civil strife, see Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," this *Review*, 62 (December 1968), 1104-1124.

conflict. Indeed, history yields several examples of segregated communities living in peace. Whether in the *ante bellum* southern United States, in the religiously pluralistic Ottoman Empire, or in Nigeria's feudal North, segregation maintained inter-group peace while preserving mutually accepted notions of group privilege and status. Similarly, there are examples in which the separation of groups in conflict has led—as a result of a decline in competitive interaction—to a decline in the level of communal conflict. This would appear to be one result, for example, of the fragmentation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and of the partition of India into Moslem and Hindu states.

If, however, mobilized and competitive communal groups desire, or are forced, to interact within the same system of social stratification—as in the contemporary United States—segregation may intensify communal conflict. First, under these circumstances the effect of communal segregation is to preserve communal inequalities in wealth, status and power. In the abstract, segregation need not mean inequality; it can be, rather, a means of allowing communities a modicum of autonomy in their cultural and social life. In the modern world, however, segregation has meant more than just cultural and social autonomy; it has meant also unequal access to education, to the economy, and to political power. It is by maintaining and promoting such inequalities that segregation has promoted communal conflict.

Second, in a competitive political system (see Proposition 9), the social and physical separation of communal groups encourages the development of communally-based political institutions and strategies. Thus, it is the geographical concentration—and separation—of Black Americans in urban areas which makes the drive for urban “Black power” politically viable. It may be that, in the long run, “Black power,” which is in part a product of segregation, will be able to achieve a breakthrough in the relative wealth, status, and power of Blacks. But it should be noted that segregation also permits the political and economic isolation of the Black minority by the dominant white community, an isolation which might well have the effect of preserving communal inequalities.

Third, the geographical separation of communal groups means that territorial or residential interests come to coincide with communal interests. Consequently, the range of political issues which activate communal identities and hence communal conflict is widened. Thus, the siting of an industry or the allocation of social amenities (e.g., paved roads, medical centers, schools) may

become the occasion for communal confrontation. This, in effect, is but a corollary of the proposition that coincident social cleavages operate to exacerbate communal conflict (Proposition 2).

Fourth, as Gordon Allport has observed, “Segregation markedly enhances the visibility of a group; it makes it seem larger and more menacing than it is.”²⁰ So it was in the case of the Ibo strangers resident in Northern Nigeria. The conspicuousness Ibos possessed by virtue of their economic, technical and administrative pre-eminence was enlarged by their physical separation from the indigenous community. This segregation was partly self-imposed and partly the result of Northern exclusionary policies. Laws were passed, for example, specifically forbidding non-indigenes from acquiring local land. In some instances restrictions were placed upon Ibo commercial activity. The important point, however, is that whatever the causes of Ibo segregation might have been, their physical separation from the host community furthered the out-group stereotype of the Ibos as “clannish” and “concerned only with their own.” In short, communal segregation was an essential ingredient of urban tensions and violence in Northern Nigeria.

Proposition 5. The formation of communal associations in response to inter-communal contact and competition tends to further communal conflict.

Throughout the developing world, scholars have noted the rise of what have come to be known as “communal associations” or “para-communities” in Asia, “improvement associations” or “tribal unions” in Africa. Such unions, associations, and para-communities are a blend of both the cosmopolitan and the parochial. In much the same manner as the immigrant political machines of America's urban communities, the communal organizations of Asia and Africa provide certain badly needed social services. They tend to be future oriented, and concerned with achievement and social welfare not only in the cities, where most of their members live, but also in the rural hinterland, which remains an important reference point for many urban dwellers. By helping to promote loyalty to communal groups, communal associations reduce the discontinuities inherent in migration and rapid social change.²¹

²⁰ Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958), p. 256.

²¹ See for example, Kenneth Little, *West African Urbanization: A Study of Voluntary Associations in Social Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

The important point, however, is that as community associations service their respective constituents, increasingly large numbers of urban residents develop a vested interest in their communal identities and organizational affiliations. Moreover, it has become clear that some communal groups have more of what it takes to organize than do others, with the result that whole occupational categories come to be monopolized by particular associations and their members. For these reasons, communal associations tend to stoke the engine of differential social mobilization and its attendant communal conflict.

The examples of communal organization in Nigeria are legion. The Ibos and Ibibios of Eastern Nigeria assumed the initial organizational initiative during the 1920's and 1930's, and their success inspired similar initiatives among Nigeria's other communal groups. Although in their inception these organizations served mainly social and economic functions, they soon became politicized, acting as communal pressure groups both with regard to the party and to the government. Thus, local improvement associations would attempt to influence the selection of party nominees to stand election in local electoral constituencies or would make demands upon government officials with respect to the allocation of amenities to their home communities. Similarly, at higher levels of communal structure, such organizations as the Ibo State Union and the Yoruba-speaking Sons of the Descendants of Odu-duwa furthered the development of nationality-wide communal consciousness, and advanced the interests of their respective nationalities within party and governmental circles.²² Significantly, however, as communally-oriented single-party systems became established within each region, and national politics became a matter of competition between the three communally-based regional parties, the nationality-wide organizations found their political functions usurped. The parties, in effect, became the defenders of majority communal interests. However, at the sub-nationality level of town and clan, "improvement

unions" continued to play a significant role in intra-party political conflict.²³

Proposition 6. The subordination of political institutions to the interests of particular communal groups tends to reinforce and politicize communal conflict.

The degree of intensity of communal conflict will be determined very largely by what Huntington has termed the "autonomy" of the society's political institutions. To quote Huntington

Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the development of political organizations and procedures that are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups. A political organization that is the instrument of a social group—family, clan, class—lacks autonomy and institutionalization.²⁴

If political institutions do not possess institutional integrity and appear to be in the control of particular communal interests, those communal groups lacking power and position will tend to question the legitimacy of the institutional order and will be encouraged politically to "go it alone." It should be noted that it is not the nature of primary institutions and primary group interaction which are at issue; people may in fact live their private lives within their communal compartments without jeopardizing the political viability or stability of the wider society. What is at issue is the character of those secondary institutions of the society through which the members of communally discrete subsocieties may relate to one another in a systematic and orderly fashion.

This analysis may be illustrated by reference to both the American and the Nigerian cases. Thus, in the United States, communal separatism at the primary group level—that is, with respect to marriage, friendship cliques, etc.—has characterized intra-white as well as Black/white relationships. However, in the case of white Americans, the secondary institutions of the national society were sufficiently flexible and autonomous as to be relevant and legitimate for virtually all communal elements. Only in the case of non-whites—most notably, of course, of Black Americans—were the secondary institu-

sity Press, 1963); Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," in Pierre L. Van Den Berghe (ed.), *Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965) pp. 472-482. For careful analyses of this phenomenon in India see Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *op. cit.*, and Myron Weiner, *op. cit.*

²² Oduduwa is a culture hero and mythical progenitor of the Yoruba people. See Sklar, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

²³ Interesting discussions of the relationship between improvement unions and political parties are to be found in Audrey Smock, "The Political Role of Ibo Ethnic Unions" and Alvin Magid, "The Idoma State Union: Minority Politics in Northern Nigeria," in Melson and Wolpe, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 20.

ons unresponsive and exclusionary. In effect, from the perspective of the wider society inclusive of both Blacks and whites, the political institutions of the society have never possessed autonomy but, rather, have been historically subordinated to the interests of the majority racial group. It is not surprising therefore that the most determined separatist sentiment in the United States has been voiced by the members of that group which has been least participant—in the sense of sharing in responsible decision-making power—in the secondary institutions of the society.²⁵

Similarly, in Nigeria both national and regional political institutions came to be identified with the interests of particular communal groups, thereby impairing their legitimacy in the eyes of minority communal interests at both the national and the regional levels.²⁶ More concretely, with the creation of Nigeria's Federal constitutional system and, in particular, with the creation of regional sources of wealth and power, it became clear that political parties which controlled the machinery of government could control the political and economic fate of the region.²⁷ Since Nigeria's administrative boundaries were so drawn as to give clear numerical superiority to a single nationality within each region, political parties on appealing to majority communal interests quickly came to dominate the regions. Much the same dynamics were operative at the national level, wherein the major communal groups competed for marginal advantages and sought to form opportune communal coalitions. It became evident, however, that no coalition was stable and that no group could feel secure in the Federal system.

In the course of this communal competition for control of regional and national governmental institutions, communal minorities rapidly became disenchanted with the prevailing institutional structures. Significantly, in the light of

the Biafran secession, even communal groups which were dominant at the regional level (i.e., the Ibos, Yorubas and Hausas) were in a minority position with respect to the national institutions and hence shared the same sense of communal insecurity as was characteristic of the regional minority groups. The important point is that at both the federal and the regional levels, governmental institutions became identified with the interests of particular communal groups, thereby losing their legitimacy and institutional effectiveness for crucial elements of the wider society.

Proposition 7. The greater the number of equally powerful communal groups, the greater the likelihood that political institutions will be able to retain their coherence and impartiality vis-a-vis communal competitors.

As in the case of non-political institutions, so in the political realm there is a significant reciprocity between institutions and conflict. While the political institutions of any society directly affect the nature and intensity of communal conflict, so will institutional development itself be influenced by the pattern of communal formation and conflict characteristic of that society. In particular, it would appear that the greater the number of equally powerful communal groups, the greater the likelihood that institutional coherence and impartiality will be retained.

On the one hand, the dispersion of power among a number of communal competitors makes less likely the identification of political institutions with a particular communal group or a coalition of such groups. On the other hand, the dispersion of power among a number of communal competitors helps not only to maintain a stable communal balance, but also to encourage the development of a system of shifting communal coalitions which, in turn, lessens the intensity of communal conflict. In a society in which no communal group is sufficiently large or powerful to stand alone, it becomes necessary to form communal alliances. The greater the number of the communal competitors, the less the likelihood that the same communal groups will join together on all issues. As issues change, so do communal alliances. The resulting pattern of shifting and intersecting communal alliances will tend to mitigate the intensity of communal conflict on any particular issue.

Thus, in the Nigerian case, though there have always been enough communal groups potentially to create an ongoing pluralistic political system, the constitutional compromises of the early 1950's had the effect of excluding communal minorities from the national political system

²⁵ See Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Vintage, 1967).

²⁶ This discussion of the Nigerian experience draws heavily upon the following studies: James S. Coleman, *op. cit.*; Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties, op. cit.*, K. W. J. Post, *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), and John P. Mackintosh (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

²⁷ See Richard L. Sklar, "The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo," in Gwendolen M. Carter, (ed.), *Politics in Africa: 7 Cases* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.), pp. 119-166.

and of creating a three-person zero-sum game among the three major nationalities. As a result, there were enough states to ensure conflict along communal dimensions, and too few states to ensure competitive stability. This was the tragic structural flaw of the Nigerian federal system. Although leaders such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo well understood this point, their advice to create a greater number of states went unheeded. By the time enough states were created to ensure the minorities a modicum of self-determination and to prevent any single communal group from wielding inordinate power, civil war had engulfed Nigeria.

Proposition 8. Political institutions which encourage the participation of the masses in the recruitment of leaders tend to further politicize and intensify communal conflict.

The greater the dependence of political leaders upon the support of their communities of origin, the greater the likelihood that the political process will itself become "communalized." In a culturally plural society, the participation of the masses in the political process encourages aspirant politicians to make appeals to the most easily mobilized communal loyalties, and to define themselves primarily as the representatives of communal interests. In the process, the political order comes to be organized along communal lines.

The stimulating effect of mass participation on communal conflict can readily be seen in the Nigerian case. With the introduction of the franchise at the federal and regional levels of the governmental system, there emerged political parties such as the Yoruba-based Action Group and the Hausa-centered Northern Peoples' Congress which made very explicit communal appeals to the pride and self-interest of the Yoruba and Hausa peoples, respectively. This appeal found an immediate response and led to the rapid rise of communally based regional parties. In turn, the development of communal parties among the majority-nationality groups stimulated the emergence of communal parties among the minority groups in each region. Parties such as the Northern Elements Progressive Union, the Bornu Youth Movement, the United Middle Belt Congress, and the Nigeria Delta Congress translated communal minority dissidence within each region into political terms. Still a further illustration of this politicization of communal conflict was the attempt made by the major communal parties to increase their strength at the federal level by appealing to the dissident minorities in each of the other regions. Thus, the Yoruba-dominated Action Group, based in

Western Nigeria, became in time an important minority party in the Eastern Region and in the Middle-Belt of the Northern Region.

It should be noted that at the same time that mass participation in the recruitment of political elites acts to stimulate communal appeals and hence communal conflict, so does the resulting conflict itself further the communalization of the elites. In effect, a vicious circle ensures the perpetuation of communal conflict in a participant political system: aspirant politicians make communal appeals and communal demands which exacerbate communal tensions; these tensions in turn, encourage the recruitment of leaders who will make communal appeals and demands. Examples of this cyclical process are plentiful in the political experience of nationalist movements. Thus, the B. R. Ambedkars and Rajagopalacharis challenge the leadership of the Nehrus, the Suhartos that of the Sukarnos, and the Carmichaels and Browns that of the Rustins and Wilkins.

Such a challenge was notably successful in Nigeria, wherein democratization and mass involvement in the political process led to the gradual displacement of moderate and universalistic political elites by more militant and more communally parochial leaders. At its inception, the leadership of Nigeria's first nationalist party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), though drawing primarily on Ibo and Yoruba sources, encompassed all of the country's major communal groupings and espoused a pan-Nigerian nationalist ideology. But this "nationalist" period was short-lived. With the introduction of the franchise and the gradual transfer of power to Nigerian hands, communal slogans and communally-oriented political elites acquired increasing appeal. With Regionalization, in the early 1950's, the communalization of the political system was complete. The original nationalist leadership began to sound a more parochial line, and the radical pan-Nigerian nationalists were displaced by champions of communal groups. Thus, by 1963 most of the NCNC's Yoruba contingent had broken away to found a new Yoruba-based political party and, by 1964, the NCNC had to all intents and purposes become the party of the Ibos.

In sum, then, democratic regimes which encourage mass participation and competitive political parties appear to be especially subject to the communalization of political competition. Indeed, judging from the experience of post-colonial regimes, it would seem that it is communal conflict and not class conflict which is most likely to undermine fledgling democracies.

III. COMMUNAL TRANSFORMATION

Frequently it is said that communal categories and identities are the givens of social life. One can change one's occupation, but one cannot change one's communal group as readily. Recently, however, scholars have pointed out that under conditions of social mobilization and inter-group conflict, communal boundaries are indeed transformable. In point of fact, much contemporary communal conflict—whether in Nigeria, India, or the United States—is being waged not by traditional entities, but by communities which were formed in the crucible of mobilization and competition.²⁸ Thus, it is probably more accurate to suggest that conflict produces "tribalism" than to argue, as the conventional wisdom would have it, that "tribalism" is the cause of conflict.

In the discussion of competitive and institutional communalism we made the tacit assumption that the culture, identity, and boundaries of communal groups are formed independently of environmental forces. This clearly is an oversimplification which we now wish to drop. This section considers the various ways in which communal identities and boundaries are transformed in response to changing social and political exigencies.

Proposition 9. In an environment of social mobilization and communal competition, communal groups will tend to fuse or to expand their traditional boundaries to include groups and individuals with whom they can identify and who might prove useful allies during inter-group conflict.²⁹

A number of observers have noted the emergence within urban areas of communal identities and groupings which are considerably wider in their embrace than the communities of the traditional order. This comment on the case of African urbanization is illustrative:

A reductive process takes place in the town: the intricate mosaic of the countryside becomes simplified to a manageable number of ethnic categories. A sense of membership in a group significantly ex-

panded in scale from the clan and lineage system of the very localized rural 'tribal' community develops.³⁰

Similarly, addressing themselves to the Indian case, the Rudolphs use the term, "fusion," to describe the process whereby Indian *Jatis* (popularly known as "castes") of unequal status join to form political and economic alliances against their competitors. It is the exigencies of modern competition which provide the impetus to alliance formation: "The higher castes need numerical strength to sustain their power and status: the lower ones need access to resources and opportunities that support of the higher ones can yield."³¹ As the Rudolphs note, such alliances raise the ritual status of the lower castes and thus transform their traditional identities.

Exemplifying the process of communal expansion in Nigeria is the emergence in this century of new, affectually laden, identities of "nationality," identities which reflect a modern consciousness of cultural and linguistic unities of which traditional man was largely unaware. The evolution of "Ibo" national identity illustrates the newness of contemporary identities of nationality especially well, for in the predominantly Ibo-speaking East pre-colonial societal fragmentation was particularly pronounced. As Simon Ottenberg has observed,

No political superstructure, such as a federation, a confederacy, or a state existed. The Ibo units remained a relatively balanced grouping of independent political structures which never developed into a large formal organization, though some units absorbed or conquered others, some died out, some fragmented, and some changed their characteristics through immigration and emigration.³²

But the general pattern of pre-colonial fragmentation and post-colonial expansion or fusion was characteristic not only of the Ibo but also of many other loosely-knit linguistic groups which today possess a new social and political cohesiveness and self-consciousness. It was only when

²⁸ See Crawford Young's discussion of the Congolese "Bangala," an example of "artificial ethnicity" produced by inter-group competition, in his *Politics in the Congo*, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-246. It should be noted that contemporary "Ibo-ness" and "Yorubanness," like contemporary American "Black-ness," are also new forms of communalism engendered by mobilization and competition.

²⁹ For a parallel analysis of the relationship between conflict and group formation, see Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956).

³⁰ Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

³¹ Lloyd and Susanne Hoebner Rudolph, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

³² Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Oracles and Intergroup Relations," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 14 (Autumn 1958), 296. For an incisive discussion of the political implications of communal transformation among the Ibo, see Paul Anber, "Modernization and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5 (1967), 163-179.

these groups were brought together within a new administrative framework and forced to interact—and to compete—that nationality-wide organizations and ideologies emerged. Of course, the recency of these developments notwithstanding, few will be surprised if “revisionist” Ibo (or, for that matter, Ijaw or Yoruba or Hausa) historians of the future find many more “historical” ties that explain contemporary communal cohesiveness.

The process of communal expansion in Nigeria is manifest not only in the emergence of identities of nationality but also in the emergence of new, politically salient administrative identities. Again, this process is most clearly seen in the traditionally most fragmented area, Eastern Nigeria. There, the new administrative units of Native Court Area, Division, and Province incorporated traditionally autonomous communities within a common structural framework and, in the process, generated new political interests and identities which were related to, but transcended, the village and village-group boundaries of the traditional system. Thus, in the 1960's, Ibo-speaking urban dwellers typically identified themselves to new acquaintances by reference not to their traditional community of origin, but to the administrative division and province in which that community was located. It was these “geo-ethnic” identities around which intra-Ibo political conflict normally revolved, for it was only at these wide, non-traditional levels of social grouping that Ibos were sufficiently numerous to make a political impact upon the regional political system.³³

While this pattern of administrative fusion was especially pronounced in Eastern Nigeria, it was also evident in Western and Northern Nigeria. In the latter cases, the traditional units were considerably larger and more populous, so that

the new administrative boundaries tended to correspond more closely to the existing communal boundaries. Even here, however, the creation of the new administrative structures had an effect analogous to “fusion,” in that competition for governmental patronage—both in colonial and in independent Nigeria—placed a premium upon communal cohesiveness. In Western Nigeria, for example, Oyos were in competition with Ekitis and Ijebus for the scarce rewards of the administrative system, and the competitive process furthered the development of Oyo unity. Inasmuch as Oyo, Ekiti and Ijebu constituted traditional entities as well as modern administrative units, intra-Yoruba competition had an especially volatile character. By contrast, the politically relevant administrative units of Iboland were essentially artificial creations commanding relatively little affect on the part of their members. Consequently, intra-Ibo political competition acquired a distinctively pragmatic and pacific character, political success being a function of coalition development among traditionally autonomous communities.

The process of fusion also operated at the level of the *regional* governments. As will be detailed below, the tri-partite administrative system developed by the British and by Nigerian leaders led to a considerable concentration of power in regional institutions. Therefore, those who lived within a given region had a direct stake in identifying themselves with those who controlled the regional apparatus of government. In particular, minority ethnic groups stood to be penalized—for example, through the denial of government patronage to their members or the non-allocation of government amenities—if they opposed the government of the day. Thus it was that some influential members of the Tiv community sought to ally themselves with the Northern Peoples' Congress, despite Tiv antipathies toward the Muslim Hausa.³⁴ Moreover, this tendency toward intra-regional fusion was furthered by the regional competition for control of the federal government and for federal revenues which was built into the national political system.

Proposition 10. Mobilization and competition lead also to the increasing internal differentiation of communal categories along socio-economic and ideological lines.

Under social mobilization, individuals move into new kinds of occupational and other social

³³ The concept of “geo-ethnicity” has much the same meaning as Immanuel Wallerstein's concept of “ethnicity,” in Wallerstein, *op. cit.* The former term is preferred here for two reasons. First, it offers a sharper conceptual tool than that of “ethnicity” to describe the new kinds of urban groupings which are based upon non-traditional or neo-traditional communities of origin. Second, the use of the “geo-ethnicity” concept to describe urban groupings based upon new, artificial entities enables us to reserve the concept of “ethnicity” for urban groupings based more strictly on kinship, cultural and linguistic ties. See Wolpe, *op. cit.*, and Wolpe, “Port Harcourt: A Community of Strangers—The Politics of Urban Development in Eastern Nigeria” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965).

³⁴ See Martin J. Dent, “A Minority Party—the UMBC,” in John F. Mackintosh (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 461–507.

les, and become differentiated by socio-economic and ideological criteria. New kinds of social identities and conflicts emerge—based upon such reference points as occupation, class, and political party. These new identities may or may not cross-cut the lines of communal cleavage. When they do, they may produce political divisions which—in given situations—override communal loyalties.

The Nigerian experience offers two major illustrations of politically significant intra-communal differentiation based on social class and ideology. The first illustration refers back to the immediate aftermath of World War II and the emergence, on the one hand, of a national trade union movement and, on the other, of the radical Zikist Movement. The second refers to the emergence of what Ricard L. Sklar has called, the "political class."³⁵

In 1945 and again in 1964, successful general strikes demonstrated conclusively that the Nigerian labor movement had come of age and was capable of united and effective action. In both instances, communal divisions were cast aside and a united labor front was able to win significant concessions from both governmental and private employers. Somewhat less successful was the short-lived radical Zikist Movement, organized in the late 1940's by militant trade unionists and intellectuals, most of whom were Ibo, to rejuvenate the NCNC and to force the pace of the independence movement.

With the administrative regionalization of the country in the 1950's, a nationalist party like the NCNC, which until then had been unitarist in its constitutional outlook, had to take part in elections on the regional level. This meant that within the NCNC the fortunes of politicians and groups which were communally well connected via the tribal unions stood to rise, while the fortunes of labor activists and radical intellectuals were destined to fall. Believing constitutional advances to be a subterfuge for the protection of communal interests, and convinced that independence would come only by way of revolution, the more radical wing of the unitarists responded to the dilemmas of regionalism with a call to direct action. Revolution would put an end to constitutional subterfuge, weaken the hand of the communal faction in the NCNC, and accelerate the pace of independence.

³⁵ On the Zikist Movement, see Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-82. For a discussion of the emergence of Nigeria's political class, see Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3 (1965), 201-213.

However, the revolutionary aspirations of the labor activists and Zikists were thwarted. Moreover, unable to rely upon the personal support of Azikiwe, the Zikists were cut off from the main body of the NCNC. Many subsequently turned away from the party to Marxism, some out of conviction and some out of friendship for those who were convinced. Not until the strike of 1964 did the Zikists' isolation from Nigerian politics come to an end. From what they considered to be the NCNC's earlier betrayal and from their own obvious decline in power during the regionalist phase, the activists had learned to distrust the communal parties and their leaders and to be unalterably opposed to regionalism. Regionalism, in their view, was the structural cause underlying their political demise of the 1950's and early '60's.

The second manifestation of intra-communal diversification was the emergence of a privileged Nigerian political class whose security was tied to the maintenance of regional bases of power. As Sklar has noted, the accelerating political crises which led up to the military coup of January 1966—indeed, the coup itself—can all be viewed as phases of a continuing confrontation between this political establishment and a collection of anti-regionalist dissident groups, the latter including increasingly disaffected communal minorities and the long-alienated radical trade unionists and intellectuals.³⁶

Developments such as these—the appearance of ideologically toned political manifestos and organizations, and the formation of a privileged political class—have been cited by some students of non-Western societies as evidence of the deterioration of communal identities and institutions. Indeed, implicit in many of the dichotomous models which have been employed in studies of non-Western development is the notion that communally "particularistic" and socio-economically "universalistic" roles and identities lie at the opposite end of a single social continuum, the emergence of the latter heralding the disappearance of the former. As Propositions 11-14 below suggest, this view of social development possesses neither theoretical nor empirical foundation.

Proposition 11. Accompanying communal fusion and expansion is the deparochialization of traditional group ties and perspectives.

As traditional communal entities are fused to form new and more organizationally effective

³⁶ See Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," *Government and Opposition*, 2 (July-October 1967), 524-539.

groupings, the content and significance of traditional identities are substantially changed. Changes of particular importance are the generally reduced affect associated with the traditional order and the widening of social and political horizons. The Rudolphs' description of these developments in India is applicable also to Nigeria:

... As the block and district headquarters, the extravillage enterprise and the market town, the local school, cinema, and radio set, have become increasingly relevant for village lives, they have created alternative environments for profit, prestige, and self-esteem. By enlarging the reach of empathy, broadening horizons, and multiplying reference groups, they have helped to deparochialize the intimate and closed world of the village. New opportunities, sentiments, and ideas have reduced and dispersed the concentration of affect, power, and economic dependence at the local level.³⁷

In short, social mobilization leads to the widening of social horizons and the loosening of traditional bonds. Urbanization, for example, removes individuals from the constraints of traditional authority and leads them to participate in numerous social roles which not only have no traditional sanction but also which often involve interaction across the communal boundaries of the traditional order. As a result, new interests and loyalties and authorities come to have a claim upon the individual's time and attention. This does not mean that traditional identities and institutions disintegrate; to the contrary, they may well persist and retain both social and political significance. It does mean, however, that such identities and institutions, if they persist, will acquire new functions and new meaning.

From the standpoint of conventional theory, it would seem paradoxical that deparochialization has been associated with intensified rather than diminished communal conflict. Too frequently, political development has been seen in terms of a struggle between "nationalism" and "traditionalism," the fall of the latter thereby signalling the rise of the former. In point of fact, the developmental process yields many new and competitive communal groupings, of which the nation-state is but one variant, and one, moreover, which is relatively remote. Yet, to note the tenuousness of nation-state loyalties is not to denigrate the significant integrative processes at work at the regional and sub-regional levels of many polities. Indeed, it might well be argued in the Nigerian case that the very success of lower-

level communal integration has made more difficult the task of national integration.

Proposition 12. Communal transformation entails the multiplication rather than the substitution of social identities.

The emergence of new patterns of communal identity through expansion, fusion and deparochialization does not necessarily mean the destruction of old communal loyalties. It means more commonly, the superimposition upon the traditional reference points of wider concentric circles of communalism. The old identities, in effect, coexist with the new, with the consequence that citizens come to hold multiple communal identities (for example, to their family village, region, nationality, church, nation-state). By the same token, the internal differentiation of communal categories by socio-economic and ideological criteria signals the proliferation of additional social reference points rather than the substitution of the new for the old. An individual may be an Ibo and also a factory worker. His acquisition of a new socio-economic identity need not mean the elimination of his prior communal point of reference. This point is crucial, for it explains, in part, the paradoxical persistence of communal sentiments and communal conflict within modernizing and modernized societies. The precise relationship between communal and non-communal identities is the subject of the next set of propositions.

IV. COMMUNAL COMPARTMENTALIZATION

Proposition 13. Since politically salient identities are situationally specific, communal and non-communal political orientations may well coexist within the same person.

The individual's perception of the social situation determines which of his multiple identities will be most politically salient at any given moment. The relative political salience of an individual's multiple social identities is not fixed. It is, rather, in a constant state of flux. As Anderson, von der Mehden and Young state, "Every actor in the political community, no matter how unimportant, has a multiplicity of potential foci of social solidarity. The appropriate role is prescribed by the nature of the situation—or more precisely, by the actor's perception of the situation."³⁸ This formulation highlights the element of contingency which underpins the always-shifting lines of political cleavage. In some situations, men join together in defense of their common religious commitment. In others, they organize to protect their economic interests or, at election time, to promote the interests and pres-

³⁷ Lloyd and Susanne Hoebler Rudolph, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

³⁸ Anderson, von der Mehden and Young, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

ge of their communities of origin. The crucial point is that political response is inexplicable without reference to the actor's social context and to his perceptions of that context.

This theoretical position relies heavily on the work of scholars associated with the Rhodes-Livingston Institute, in particular, Max Gluckman, A. L. Epstein and J. Clyde Mitchell.³⁹ Thus Gluckman has pointed out that "though developments in urban and in rural areas affect one another . . . the specific associations of each may exist independently . . . the Africans' lives are partly dichotomized, and they live in separate compartments like other men."⁴⁰ Though in this context Gluckman emphasizes the urban-rural dichotomy, in principle it can be argued without doing violence to his major point that men "compartmentalize" their identities *within* urban and rural areas as well as between them.

Since the various identities of any given individual are each "triggered" by different social situations, seemingly incompatible or conflicting identities may well co-exist within the same person. Social roles may, in effect, be "compartmentalized," thereby permitting the individual to respond flexibly to changing social and political circumstances. Thus, it is possible for the same person to join a trade union to advance his occupational interests, a communal association to promote his social or electoral objectives, and a religious interest group to lobby for educational reforms. In short, it is possible for an individual to be both a communal and a non-communal political actor.

Returning to the Nigerian case, we are now in a position to explain both the success of the 1945 and 1964 general strikes and the failure of the trade union leaders, in 1964, to convert their labor following into votes for labor candidates at election time.⁴¹ When it came to questions of the

pocketbook—to questions of salary and conditions of service—Nigerian workers held much in common irrespective of their diverse communal attachments. During the strike actions in both 1945 and 1964 it was the socio-economic identities of these men which were in the foreground; in the confrontation with employers, their communal points of reference held little salience and labor unity was possible. But when it came to the election of parliamentary candidates in 1964, their communal identities were "triggered" once again and the trade unionists voted their communal loyalties. As a result, the same trade union leaders who had enjoyed the support of a communally heterogeneous rank-and-file during the 1964 general strike were deserted when they subsequently transformed themselves from leaders of a socio-economic protest into parliamentary candidates in opposition to the communally-based regional parties. The moment the strike was concluded, the lines of political cleavage within the nation were redrawn, socio-economic identities once again being subordinated to the communal identities of region and nationality.

Proposition 14. Since communal and non-communal political orientations may co-exist within individuals, each activated in different social contexts, modernization need not eliminate communal differentiation and conflict.

A clear implication of the argument advanced above is that there is no necessary incompatibility between functioning as a modern economic man, on the one hand, and performing as a communal political actor, on the other. We have suggested, in brief, that one can participate effectively in a communally heterogeneous industrial occupation and trade union five days a week, and still vote his communal loyalties at election time. If this is so, it would appear to follow that communal differentiation and conflict may well persist in the midst of economic modernization. Not only may communal particularism be compatible with a modern industrial order, the foregoing suggests that it may well be an essential component of that order. For, by the multiplication and compartmentalization of both communal and non-communal identities, individuals are able to respond more flexibly to changing social and political circumstances. In effect, the retention of communal points of reference enables industrial man to receive the best of two worlds—the collectivism inherent in the

³⁹ See Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," in Van Den Berghe, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-360. This article first appeared in *Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines*, 1 (January 1960), 55-70. Also, A. L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958); and Clyde Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956). For a recent application of the situational mode of analysis developed by the Rhodes-Livingstone group to the Nigerian scene, see Leonard Plotnicov, *Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967).

⁴⁰ See Gluckman, *op. cit.*, p. 359. For a critical discussion of Gluckman's views, see Michael Banton, *Race Relations* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 239-240.

⁴¹ See Robert Melson, "Politics and the Nigerian

General Strike of 1964," in Robert Rotberg and Ali Mazrui (eds.), *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Wolpe, "Port Harcourt: A Community of Strangers," *op. cit.*, pp. 423-454.

functionally diffuse ties of language and culture, and the individuation requisite to effective performance in the modern commercial and industrial milieu. We are suggesting, in short, that the essence of modernity may lie not in the transition from particularistic to universalistic forms, but rather in their compartmentalization.⁴²

How well individuals and groups do in fact compartmentalize their many identities is of course an empirical question. It can be expected that the extent to which co-existing social identities will be compartmentalized will vary with how individuals and groups perceive and interpret particular situations. There arise situations, for example, in which individuals may experience "role conflict" or "cross-pressures" which reflect a difficulty in choosing among conflicting loyalties or in determining which set of loyalties is most appropriate to a particular situation.⁴³

An illustration of this problem can be gleaned from the experience of Nigerian workers after the June General Strike of 1964 and before the December Federal elections. Two kinds of politicians began to compete for the labor vote. On the one hand, there were politically-oriented labor leaders who wanted to take the opportunity of the strike and of the elections to form a labor party. They made their appeals to the class interests of Nigerian workers. On the other hand, there were the politicians of the major political parties who made their appeals to their communal loyalties. Thus between June and December 1964, workers were cross-pressured between their class and their ethnic loyalties. As it turned out the cross-pressure was weak and a majority of workers supported their communal parties.

How the workers responded to the cross-pressure was clearly related both to the objective situation of growing communal conflict during the election and to their perception of the incompatibility between choosing a labor party and choosing a communal party. With regard to the first point it should be noted that the Federal election of 1964, coming as it did on the heels of the many political crises of Federation,

⁴² As the Rudolphs note, "Compartmentalization not only physically separates . . . home and family from place and colleagues, but also prevents the different norms of behavior and belief appropriate to modernity and tradition from colliding and causing conflict in the lives of those who live by both." *Op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

⁴³ "Cross-pressures are combinations of characteristics which in a given context would tend to lead the individual to vote on both sides of a contest." See Bernard Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 283.

raised the salience of communal security as a survival. We should not be surprised therefore that at first, in June, almost nine out of ten workers responding to a survey indicated support for a labor party, but that as the election progressed a growing number of workers indicated support for regional parties and diminishing support for labor parties. With regard to the second point we should not be surprised that almost a fifth indicated their allegiance to *both* parties throughout the election period. Such inconsistency need not have been based on flaw in logical reasoning, but on the confusing situation which existed during the election. It is significant, for example, that the more educated the trade unionist and the longer his involvement in the trade union—that is, the more information the worker had at his disposal—the less likely was he to be inconsistent and to support both parties.⁴⁴

In order to understand the political behavior of actors who are cross-pressured between their communal and non-communal identities it becomes necessary to specify to what extent roles are compartmentalized and to what extent cross-pressures are actually felt. This empirical variance among individuals and between situations does not detract, however, from the basic point that there need not be an inherent incompatibility among co-existing communal and non-communal identities.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In concluding this analysis of the relationship between modernization and communal conflict, three themes require emphasis. The first concerns the political distinctiveness and significance of communal conflict, as contrasted with other types of inter-group conflict. Clifford Geertz has noted that communal groups differ from groups formed on the basis of economic interest or "class-consciousness" in that the latter are seldom ". . . considered as possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood."⁴⁵ Since communal groups may in

⁴⁴ See Robert Melson, "Ideology and Inconsistency: The Politics of the 'Cross-pressured' Nigerian Worker," *American Political Science Review* (March 1971), reprinted in Melson and Wolpe, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 111. See also Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communalization*, *op. cit.*, p. 78: "In an age of nationalism, a nationality is a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behavior of its members. It is a people striving to equip itself with power, with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcement of its commands sufficiently

fact be considered as "candidates for nationhood," communal conflict—unlike, for example, class conflict—may bring into question the very boundaries of the nation-state.⁴⁶ This is not to suggest that class conflict may not possess the same intensity as communal conflict: the Russian and French revolutions testify to the potential intensity of class conflict. Nor is it to suggest that communal conflict may not be significantly motivated by socio-economic issues: on the contrary, to the extent that communal conflict touches on problems of redistribution of wealth, status, and power it tends to resemble class conflict. The important point, however, is that conflict between social classes which are not also communal groups does not threaten the integrity of national political boundaries, whereas

probable. . . ." For Deutsch, what differentiates a people from a nationality is precisely the attempt by a communal group to gain power in order to discipline itself and to have its demands met by others. In that sense, Nigerian political parties, to the extent that they became representatives of a particular communal group served the function of transforming a people into a nationality. Thus, by 1965, Nigerian politics had come to resemble the politics of the multi-national nation-states of Europe before the First World War. See also Anderson, von der Mehden and Young, *op. cit.*, p. 17: "By 'nationalism' we mean the assertion of the will to constitute an autonomous political community by a self-conscious group whether or not the group coincides with a recognized state."

⁴⁶ It is interesting that many scholars have tended to discount the significance of communal conflict. Ralf Dahrendorf, for example, while distinguishing between communal and class conflict, dismisses consideration of the former in favor of an analysis of the latter. In formulating a theory of class conflict, he asserts, ". . . we are by no means considering a general theory of social conflict, although I would undertake to defend the assertion that we are dealing here with one of the most important, if not the most important type of social conflict. However important as problems of social conflict St. Bartholomew's Night, Crystal Night, and Little Rock may be [these are all examples of communal conflict], the French Revolution, the British General Strike of 1926, and the events in East Berlin on June 17, 1953, seem to me more germane for structural analysis . . . the sociological theory of conflict would do well to confine itself for the time being to an explanation of the frictions between the rulers and the ruled in given organizations." See Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), *Social Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 101.

the very nature of communal conflict involves the potentiality of secession and boundary revision. Of course, to the extent that modernization uproots communal groups from particular geographical areas and distributes their members according to the exigencies of the market place, the probability of actual secession is greatly reduced. Thus, secession did not prove a viable strategy for pre-war European Jews, despite the fact that intense communal conflict produced minority demands for geographical and political separation. Indeed, it was from such roots that the Zionist movement sprang.⁴⁷ For similar reasons, the chances for secession by Black Americans in the contemporary United States are slim indeed, though the Black Muslim and Republic of New Africa movements are eloquent testimony to the intensity of separatist sentiment within some segments of the Black American community.⁴⁸ It should be noted that the foreclosure of the secessionist option is one of the factors underlying the sense of powerlessness of communal minorities in modern societies.

The second critical theme which bears elaboration is the persistence of communalism in transitional and modern as well as traditional societies. This is so because communal formation and conflict are not merely the reflection of cultural "givens" and "primordial sentiments."⁴⁹ Social change leads to the formation of entirely new communal groupings which crystallize around new foci of culture and identity. Communalism, in short, is an inherent aspect of social change in all culturally heterogeneous societies. This suggests that the disappearance of those groups which comprise a culturally heterogeneous society at any particular point in time herald neither the disappearance of all communal formations nor the amelioration of communal conflict. Thus, in the United States, the transformation of first-generation Italian, Irish, and Polish immigrant identities and institutions has signalled not the disappearance of communal politics, but the emergence of a more inclusive communalism based upon ethnic solidarity on the one hand, and religious denominationalism on the

⁴⁷ On the Zionist movement, see Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

⁴⁸ On the Black Muslim movement, see E. U. Essien-Udom, *Black Nationalism: A Search for Identity in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁴⁹ Geertz' term, "primordial sentiments," may be an unfortunate label, if it suggests that the bonds which define the cohesiveness of a communal group are in some sense pre-historical, given, or unchangeable. *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

other hand.⁵⁰ Similarly, in Nigeria, the weakening of traditional authority and cohesiveness has been accompanied not by the disappearance of communal identities but by their transformation and expansion.

Finally, the potentially disintegrative implications of intense communal conflict, together with the likelihood of its persistence, suggest that policy makers must begin to come to terms with communalism. If we are correct in our analysis of the relationship between modernization and communalism, communal categories might well

⁵⁰ Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," this REVIEW, 61 (September 1967), 717-726.

become more rather than less politically salient. Intense communal conflict poses an especially trying dilemma for fragile democratic regimes. To the extent that such regimes encourage social mobilization and participation, they may be undermining the very basis of their legitimacy and stability. Political arrangements must be found which accord to all communal groups a meaningful role in national life and which are able to keep communal conflict within manageable bounds. The stability of culturally plural societies is threatened not by communalism, per se but by the failure of national institutions explicitly to recognize and accommodate existing communal divisions and interests.

SOLDIERS IN MUFTI: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY RULE UPON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE NON-WESTERN STATES¹

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When military officers are either sitting in the governmental saddle or have one foot securely in the stirrup, is it likely that such military controlled governments will pursue policies of socio-economic change and reform? What are the officer-politicians' motivations in reacting to the possibilities of such modernizing changes? Under what conditions are their motivations likely to vary? This essay attempts to answer these questions with regard to the contemporary non-western states. And in making the attempt, I believe that the analysis falls squarely within the purview of certain recent changes that are taking place in the study of comparative politics. These changes may be most broadly depicted as a movement away from that aspect of behavioralism that has focused exclusively upon "inputs," and away from that dimension of "scientism" that has focused upon abstract concepts at the expense of empirical analysis. The change can also be described (in an overly facile manner) as a movement toward the politics in political science and the government in comparative politics.

As is evidenced in LaPalombara's call for "parsimony" in the selection of problems, we should choose problems for analysis that are blatantly political and of obvious contemporary relevance. In approximately half of the contemporary non-western states military officers either occupy the topmost seats of government themselves or they have a marked influence upon the civilian incumbents. And when this fact is placed alongside the potential of most contemporary governments to influence the pace and direction of social and economic change, this essay's central concern fulfills LaPalombara's criterion. The shift in emphasis is also found in Pennock's concern with those normatively defined outcomes which he calls "political goods,"

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and Almond's recent emphasis upon governmental capabilities. Insofar as governments act or fail to act in satisfying popular aspirations for greater economic opportunities, security and well-being, we are in the realm of Pennock's "political goods" of individual security and dignity, and what Almond refers to as the government's "responsive" and "distributive" capabilities. Huntington's singular concern for political and governmental institutions, and Macridis' desire for a comparative politics that is relevant to, and focused around, the "black box" of governmental institutions, represent another aspect of the "winds of change" that are beginning to reshape the study of comparative politics. Since this essay is not directly concerned with the factors that contribute to military intervention, focusing instead upon the officers after they have translated their military power into governmental power, we are clearly well within the confines of the governmental "black box." And although I do not intend to introduce the concept of institutionalization in this essay, the appearance of soldiers in mufti is an important manifestation of Huntington's notion of low political institutionalization or "political decay."²

I. THE STATE OF THE LITERATURE

A number of respected political scientists have already offered a substantial answer to our central question. According to this perhaps prevailing interpretation, the likely consequences of military rule are economic growth, the modernization of economic and social structures, and a more equitable distribution of scarce economic

² Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (October 1968), 52-78; J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," 18 *World Politics* (April 1966), 415-434; Gabriel A. Almond, "A Development Approach to Political Systems," 7 *World Politics* (January 1965), 183-214; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968); Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Government," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (October 1968) 79-90.

values and opportunities. As sponsors of these types of change, soldiers in mufti are depicted as progressive forces, whose politicization is to be commended if not recommended, rather than being condemned as an usurpation of civilian authority. A number of factors are said to have shaped the officers' progressive motivations in carrying out the *coup* and in governing the country in the post-*coup* period.

Lucian Pye has suggested that the continuing modernization of the military's organization and weaponry has instilled in the officers the belief that their society ought also to be modernized. "Above all else the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies."³ Similarly, with respect to the Middle East and North Africa, Manfred Halpern has written: "the more the army was modernized, the more its composition, organization, spirit, capabilities, and purpose constituted a radical criticism of the existing political system."⁴ With reference to Latin America, John J. Johnson has pointed to a related consequence of military modernization: the officers' technical-managerial orientation is said to have made it easier for them to accept the shift in political power from the land-holding elite to the new "urban alliances."⁵

The officers' social backgrounds are also thought to be relevant. Edward A. Shils has noted that in non-western societies officers tend to be recruited from lower middle class families of traders, craftsmen and small farmers, and that these men are painfully aware of the distance separating them from the wealthy and powerful. When these officers do achieve political influence they are not sympathetic to big businessmen and conservative politicians, and

thus by implication, they are favorably disposed toward the redistribution of wealth.⁶ With respect to Latin America, Johnson has claimed that the increasing recruitment of officers with lower middle class and working class backgrounds means that "the armed forces may be expected to be more inclined than formerly to gravitate toward positions identified with popular aspirations and to work with the representatives of the popular elements." Furthermore, a officer recruitment penetrates to lower social strata, "the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie in Latin America will be surrendering control of the armed forces, which are maintained by their taxes, to groups more radical than themselves."

In referring to the officer corps of Southeast Asia, Guy Pauker states that they "are not the product of social classes with feudal traditions." Rather, their participation in the struggles for national independence and modernization, has produced an officer corps that is unlikely to become "the natural allies of feudal or other vested interests. Their natural propensities are progressive."⁸ Then there is Halpern's contention that in the Middle East and North Africa, the officers showed "an acute awareness of the chronic ills of their countries," having joined the military in order to escape from the economic frustrations of civilian life compounded by the established elites' failure to encourage economic growth.⁹

This last comment of Halpern's is only one part of his powerfully stated argument in which officer-politicians act as effective agents of socio-economic change because of their close connection with "the new middle class." The defining feature of this new middle class is its salaried position, in contrast with the propertied and land-owning middle class. It is made up of teachers, administrators, scientists, lawyers, engineers, while collar workers and military officers. This class is said to be committed to the refashioning of society; it is only through social re-

³ Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, 1962), p. 78; also see pp. 80-82.

⁴ Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, 1963), p. 258. Similarly, see Morroe Berger, *The Arab World Today* (New York, 1962), pp. 389-390, and P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, 1961), esp. pp. 211, 233.

⁵ John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, 1964), p. 237.

⁶ Edward A. Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in Johnson (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 17. But cf. p. 31 for the soldiers' distrust of anti-traditional modernizers.

⁷ Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 152, 250. Also see Lyle N. McAlister, "The Military," in John J. Johnson (ed.), *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (Stanford, 1964), pp. 145-160.

⁸ Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, 11 (April 1959), pp. 339-340.

⁹ Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military . . .*, p. 295.

orms that careers will be opened and secured or people like themselves who constitute a meritocracy rather than an established class. The new middle class is sufficiently self-conscious and powerful to "undertake the remolding of society," in large part because it has enlisted the military in this effort. "The army has become the instrument of the new middle class." And in adhering to this alliance the army has been transformed "from an instrument of repression in its own interests or that of kings into the vanguard of nationalism and social reform."¹⁰

Since this essay is an attempt to establish the plausibility of an alternative interpretation of the consequences of military rule I should like to make two points quite clear at the outset. First, I am not going to take up the question of whether the particular reasons these writers offered for their conclusion that the military in politics are agents of economic change are valid or invalid. In passing, I would say that they have presented remarkably little evidence for their arguments, while failing to analyze—as opposed to simply stating—the supposed connections between the officers' technical orientations and social backgrounds and their hypothesized modernizing activities and motivations.¹¹ Even

¹⁰ Manfred Halpern, *Social Change . . .*, pp. 52–54, 253, 258 and *passim*. See the criticisms levelled at Halpern's thesis in Amos Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A Comparative Analysis," 10 *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (October 1967). The ensuing debate between Perlmutter and Halpern is found in *ibid.*, 11 (January 1969) and 12 (January 1970).

¹¹ Although he is only referring to Latin America, Schmitter's comments are even more applicable to those continents in which military intervention is not quite the hallmark it has become in Latin America. Studies of military intervention in Latin America have "surprisingly . . . focused exclusively on (its) causes . . . and have neglected almost entirely (its) consequences. They leave us with the generals (or colonels as the case may be) battering down the gates to the presidential palace . . . and tell us very little about what these triumphant groups do with their newly acquired power." The officer-politicians become the "objects rather than the subjects of analysis." The literature abounds with speculations and scattered observations regarding the consequences of military intervention, but they "are rarely accompanied by evidence." Relying upon cross-national and longitudinal aggregate data, Schmitter systematically analyzes the impact of Latin America's officer-politicians upon governmental outputs and economic outcomes, although he does not attempt to explain the officers'

if they are correct in thinking that the officers' technical orientations and anti-conservative social backgrounds do predispose them to carry out programs of economic and social change, other factors have been ignored which have a sufficiently powerful effect upon the officers' motivations to overshadow their possible modernizing predispositions.¹² And where the military do sponsor certain types of economic change they do so for reasons which are quite different from those that have been suggested. Secondly, a number of political scientists, among them Shils, Pye, and Halpern, believe that a country's military establishment is likely to have important modernizing impacts over and above those already alluded to. Hans Daalder presents the following list of such consequences: military considerations have dictated the building of roads, communications networks and heavy industries, which have "benefited social and economic life generally;" the skills learned within the military may be applied to civilian pursuits after the officers and men leave the service; and the rational basis of military organization has a spillover effect upon organizational patterns throughout the society.¹³ My reaction to this list of happy outcomes is simply this: the military may or may not be making these contributions, but whether they do or do not is almost completely unrelated to their acquisition of political power. The validity of Daalder's generalizations is at

political behavior. For the most part his findings dovetail with the aggregate analysis reported below. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950–1967," mimeographed, 1970, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, pp. 1, 7.

¹² Morris Janowitz also suggests that the officers' technical education and their opposition to religiously defined traditions *inclines* them to act as modernizers. However, he does not argue that these predispositions are sufficiently pervasive and powerful to overcome other factors, which would allow him to say that soldiers in mufti generally *act* as modernizers. See *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 28, 44, 67.

¹³ Hans Daalder, *The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 18–20. For similar claims, including socialization into national as opposed to parochial attitudes, see Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82; M. J. V. Bell, "The Military in the New States of Africa," in Jacques Van Doorn (ed.), *Armed Forces and Society* (The Hague, 1968), pp. 263–264; Lyle N. McAlister, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–144; Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

best marginally affected by the presence or absence of military officers in decision-making circles. Which is to say that these generalizations are beyond this essay's confines.

Returning to the questions with which I began this paper, my answers to them can now be set out. At the level of descriptive generalization, when military officers occupy the highest seats of government, or when they have a good measure of control over the civilian incumbents, the officer-politicians are commonly unconcerned with the realization of economic change and reform, and where there are civilian organizations and strata pressing for such changes the officers purposefully oppose them. This statement must, however, be immediately modified by adding that within a particular social and political context (when there is hardly a middle class to speak of, and when workers and peasants have not been politically mobilized), soldiers in mufti sometimes allow or even encourage economic modernization. At the level of explanation, I would point to two motivations that go a long way toward accounting for the officer-politicians' conservative tendencies in protecting or failing to alter the economic and social *status quo*. These are the officers' determined pursuance of their corporate interests in combination with their deeply inculcated military values that assign overriding importance to the preservation of a particular type of political stability, and the officers' attachments to their middle class interests and identities. This interpretation does not include the claim that regimes featuring a politicized military are necessarily less successful in bringing about modernizing changes than are regimes of a purely civilian variety. I am only suggesting that, except under certain conditions, soldiers in mufti are not agents of modernization as has been commonly asserted, concomitantly offering some explanations for this descriptive generalization. And even if it turns out that civilian politicians fare no better as modernizing agents than officer-politicians, the motivations and values underlying the activities of the latter are commonly quite different from those of the former.

II. THE OFFICERS' CORPORATE INTERESTS AND MILITARY VALUES

Dankwart Rustow offered an incontrovertible generalization when he wrote: "In the mid-twentieth century, any serious claimant to power, regardless of his antecedents, associations, or intentions, will justify his claim by professing profound concern for national independence, for popular aspirations, for social justice

and for economic development."¹⁴ In the words of another writer, "At the hour of the political triumph, all army officers in the postwar Middle East have claimed to be card-bearing reformers."¹⁵ However, when the military are a more or less autonomous state within a state without a constituency to which they are responsible or an executive to which they are subordinate, they are unlikely to be motivated by the goals of popular responsiveness, social and economic reforms, or economic development. The officers' corporate interests and military values go a long way in accounting for their disinclination to match their original *pronunciamientos* with governmental decisions.

In discussing the various factors which dispose the armed forces to intervene, S. E. Finer attributes a good deal of importance to the officers' corporate self-interest. "The military is jealous of its corporate status and privileges," which, in its most aggressive form, "can lead to the military demand to be the ultimate judge on all matters affecting the armed forces. . . . these certainly include foreign policy, and invariably include domestic economic policy and may well include all the factors making for morale, i.e., education and the mass media of communication. . . ."¹⁶ While I certainly agree with this point, I would like to expand upon it by suggesting how this corporate self-interest is more encompassing than implied by Finer's statement and his supporting examples, concomitantly showing how it hinders economic and social change.

When we add the enormous political power frequently enjoyed by the military to their corporate interests, it comes as no surprise to find that the armed forces have sometimes been characterized as the country's most powerful "trade union." And as is true of most unions, the military act to maintain or increase their wealth and prerogatives even when these values conflict with the aspirations and interests of larger segments within the society. In countries suffering from economic scarcity, and in the absence of internal or external threats, funds devoted to military expenditures hinder the rate of economic growth, and limit the size of progressive social service, health and welfare programs.

¹⁴ Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. 16-17.

¹⁵ J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York, 1969), p. 117.

¹⁶ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York, 1962), p. 47 and *passim*.

What is more to the point here is the existence of a relationship between size of these economically and socially unproductive military expenditures and the military's political strength. In Latin America, with a sizeable proportion of governmental expenditures already being devoted to the armed forces, these expenditures were increased whenever a military government came to power.¹⁷ In those Latin American countries with a politically non-involved military the mean level of defense expenditures as a proportion of central government expenditures is 9.3 per cent; in countries with an officer corps that has intermittently entered the political arena the percentage is 14.1; while the figure reaches 18.5 per cent in countries dominated by the military circa 1960. This last group of Latin American countries also evidenced a 14.0 percent average annual increase in defense spending circa 1960 to 1965, this figure dropping to 3.3 per cent where the military were intermittent political actors and 2.8 percent where they were politically non-involved.¹⁸ In their exceptionally reliable compilation of aggregate data for 74 non-western, non-communist countries to which the United States has extended some foreign aid, Adelman and Morris classify these countries according to the "political strength of the military."¹⁹ Relying upon the World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators for the proportion of these countries' GNPs spent on defense (circa 1960),²⁰ we find that in those countries in which the military had occupied governmental office during at least part of the 1957-62 period (N=18), the average percentage of GNP spent on defense is 3.6. This proportion is slightly lower (3.4 per cent) among those countries in which the military did not serve as government-

tal incumbents, but did exert a good deal of influence upon the civilians (N=20). Among those countries in which the military's activities remained circumscribed within their instrumental role (N=36), the percentage drops to 1.9. Thus the proportion of GNP devoted to defense is almost twice as large in countries overtly ruled by the military as it is in countries with a non-politicized officer corps, indicating that soldiers in mufti actively pursue their corporate interests and that they do so in a way that detracts from economic and social change.

There is good reason for the officers to view the lower classes as a real or potential threat to their corporate interests, and as such, they are not about to sanction economic programs that will benefit the disadvantaged strata. I would point to three possible factors that lead the military to perceive a politically active peasantry and urban working class as a threat to the military establishment: as an additional contender for political power within a zero-sum political arena, mass political mobilization will decrease the political strength of the military, and thus the ability to pursue its corporate interests; the lower classes are likely to attack the military establishment itself when the officers have previously opposed them in their bid for an effective political role and a larger slice of the economic pie; and the lower classes will try to reduce superfluous military expenditures in order to channel precious economic resources into the modernization process. Insofar as the officers are aware of the close connection between economic modernization and political mobilization, they have an additional reason for preserving the economic status quo. These possibilities take on some illustrative flesh by briefly noting two Latin American examples.

The Guatemalan Army leadership sponsored a strongly reform oriented *coup* in 1944, only to act against the very benefactors of that *coup* in 1954 and 1963. Lieuwen accounts for this reversal when he writes that

the present Army leadership has turned its back on the revolution it made in 1944. It got its fingers badly burned by involvement in the upsetting process of fundamental social change and reform. The revolutionary program, the civilian leadership, the workers and peasants, not to mention the Communists, all turned out to be threats to the very existence of the armed forces. Having eliminated these threats in 1954, (the officers) took every precaution to guard against their resurrection only a decade later. For not only do they now oppose social reform in principle, but they feel they must now protect themselves against the revenge that

¹⁷ Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York, 1961), pp. 147-148.

¹⁸ Schmitter, *op. cit.*, p. 25. In terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP (1960), the ordering is somewhat reversed, with the "intermittent" regimes averaging 2.7 per cent, and only 2.1 per cent of GNP being spent in military-dominated regimes. (The figure is 1.2 per cent where the military are completely out of politics.) Schmitter accounts for this pattern by noting that the civilian elites attempted to buy off the military as they moved in and out of politics. (p. 51)

¹⁹ Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development* (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 74-76. See below, p. 1138 for an explication of this three-fold division.

²⁰ Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political Social Indicators* (New Haven, 1964), pp. 79-80.

would surely be forthcoming if Arévalo and the labor-left should return to power. Thus, institutional self-preservation was a prime motive for the March, 1963, *coup*.²¹

The officers of the Dominican Republic were similarly inspired in the September, 1963 *coup* that removed Juan Bosch from office. The officers reacted against Bosch's expensive development and welfare proposals which were bound to get the lion's share of the governmental budget—an interpretation supported by the fact that it was the Air Force, with its costly equipment and whose request for \$6 million of new aircraft had just been rejected by Bosch, that sparked the *coup*. In addition, the military leaders became alarmed at Bosch's encouragement of the urban and rural workers' organizational efforts, insofar as their new found power would ultimately represent a counterpoise to the military.²² Although these two examples refer to the motivations underlying military intervention in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, we may safely assume that if these interpretations of the *coups* are valid, the subsequent military governments would hardly be disposed to act as agents of socio-economic change.

There are, of course, instances in which a military government or a civilian government largely under the military's influence does bring about economic change and reform. But even in this minority of cases the officers' corporate interests decrease the extensiveness of such efforts. The officer-politicians may permit the government to carry out developmental and reform programs, but only if the military's corporate interests are first satisfied, the costs of the latter thereby detracting from the extensiveness of the former. For example, the Venezuelan armed forces allowed President Betancourt to serve out his entire constitutional term of office (the first time this had occurred in the country's military-dominated history) despite the implementation of agrarian reforms and a progressive tax law which redistributed both liquid and landed wealth. However, Betancourt was only able to move in these directions after he endorsed a more than liberal defense budget, even permitting the purchase of jet aircraft for the military's mythical defensive role, and a generous allotment of fringe benefits and promotions. In addition, the officers were presumably reassured that the cost of the development programs would not reduce these perquisites in the future

²¹ Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America* (New York, 1964), pp. 42-43.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

because of the enormous oil revenues accruing to the government.²³ There is one type of economic change that officer-politicians have sometimes endorsed, *because* it enhances their corporate interests. The military often place a high value upon industrialization, both for its symbolic indication of military might and its presumed guarantee of national self-sufficiency in the event of an improbable war. Yet industrialization is not not always an especially successful strategy of economic development,²⁴ and given the identification of industrialization with the military's corporate interests, the officer-politicians' determined pursuit of the latter is likely to produce an over-emphasis upon industrialization. The industrializing impetus would then exacerbate the country's economic problems, as in some Latin American countries where the military rulers' "drive for economic independence often led to overhasty industrialization programs."²⁵ At a minimum, industrializing efforts detract from the oftentimes more desired and desirable objectives of increased agricultural productivity, land reform, educational expansion and the provision of social and medical services which are unrelated to the military's corporate interests. The military's corporate interests may positively incline them toward economic modernization, but rarely toward economic and social reform, for the latter almost never coincide with even the broadest of corporate interests.

I would underline the tenacity with which the officers pursue their corporate interests by pointing out that these are inextricably bound up with their self-image as the selfless and dedicated guardians of the nation's interests. The military's corporate interests are largely defined, legitimized and rationalized by their close iden-

²³ *Ibid.*, 86-91; Philip B. Taylor, Jr., *The Venezuelan Golpe de Estado of 1958: The Fall of Marcos Perez Jimenez* (Washington, D.C., 1968), pp. 48-52, 67-71.

²⁴ For the persuasive argument that "The postwar dogma, so widespread among the less developed countries, that modern economic growth is dependent wholly on industrialization has done much harm," see Theodore Schultz, *Economic Growth and Agriculture* (New York, 1968), p. 21 and *passim*, where it is also suggested that the agricultural sector of most non-Western countries might contribute most to economic growth.

²⁵ Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-47. Also see Jae Souk Sohn, "Political Dominance and Political Failure: The Role of the Military in the Republic of Korea," in Henry Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes* (New York, 1968), pp. 114-116.

tification with the nation's interests. The officers are thereby able to justify their actions to others and to themselves by identifying with the nation rather than with any of its constituent parts; opposition to their actions are viewed as expressions of partial and selfish interests. This close identification between their own and the nation's interests is so deeply inculcated that the officer-politicians readily come to believe in the necessity and legitimacy of their actions, no matter how self-interested and abusive they may appear to an outside observer. Moreover, this equation of the two interests cannot be questioned. To do so might very well entail the enfeeblement of the military establishment; for its *esprit de corps* is founded upon service, duty, and responsibility to the nation. Any challenges on this score cannot arise, or if they do, they must be rationalized away or defeated. In short, those corporate interests which block socio-economic change and popular responsiveness are strengthened and legitimized by their inextricable association with the nation's interests.

A second aspect of the military establishment that hinders economic change are those near-universal military values—the normative attachments to order, dignity and hierarchy—with which most officers are strongly imbued, out of which emerges an overwhelming concern for political stability, and thus a keen sensitivity to any divergence from the status quo that contains the potential for unwieldy change. Given the brittleness of most non-western governments, we would expect these military values to have an especially pronounced impact upon the officer-politicians' activities; where governmental institutions are weak the officers have good reason for thinking that practically any type of socio-economic change could reduce the level of stability. However, it is one thing to place an extremely high value upon stability in the context of a fissiparous politics, it is quite another when stability is merely intended to replace a cacophonous politics. Consequently, even in those small number of instances in which a politicized military is interested in change and reform, when it becomes apparent that a small cost might have to be paid in terms of some political instability, their military values leave them little time for hesitation. Even in the estimate of John J. Johnson, who is certainly not as critical of the Latin American military as is Edwin Lieuwen, officer-politicians in Latin America might be willing to sanction land reform, but only if the cost to them is not too high and so long as it can proceed in an orderly manner.²⁶

²⁶ Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

Not only does this normative and cognitive map of the political world dictate a conservative reaction to the possibilities of change, the officer-politicians are wedded to a particular form of political stability—what may be described as the creation of an apolitical calm—that further reduces any possible modernizing predispositions. The goal is political stability, “but it is the stability of a vacuum, a state undisturbed by the erratic movements of partisan bodies.”²⁷ Politics as regulated conflict, competition and compromise is transformed into the apolitical politics of consensus, acquiescence and government by fiat. For example, the attempt to create an apolitical stability in Burma during Ne-Win's military dictatorship is manifested in the establishment of a national “political” movement with the give-away name of the National Solidarity Association. According to Zolberg, military rulers in tropical Africa

conceive of national unity as “oneness,” defined negatively by the absence of social conflict stemming from regionalism, primordial loyalties such as ethnicity or religious affiliations. In all countries, ‘ethnic particularism’ has been condemned and its manifestations through voluntary associations prohibited. The goal seems to be the achievement of homogeneity by political fiat, as if the rulers genuinely believed that the absence of conflict somehow produces national integration.²⁸

The tendency of newly established military governments in tropical Africa to arrest and deport even those politicians who had opposed the previous civilian regime and favored military intervention, and their abrogation of bargaining efforts on the part of occupational groups, may also be interpreted as manifestations of their particular conception of political stability.²⁹ This vision of political stability hinders social and economic change insofar as such changes are a product of governmental responsiveness to articulated and forcefully promoted demands: re-

²⁷ M. D. Feld, “Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military,” in Doorn (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁸ Aristide R. Zolberg, “Military Intervention in the New States of Tropical Africa,” in Bienen (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 87. Zolberg goes on to say that the military rulers “think much like their predecessors in the one-party states.” However, the impression that I derive from his essay, combined with some knowledge of African single-party states, is that the military do place greater emphasis upon governmental suppression of actual and potential conflict groups.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.

pressing these demands largely rules out their fulfillment.

Although I am attributing a good deal of importance to these two broad aspects of the military, they do vary in their explanatory power. Soldiers in mufti do not pursue their corporate interests in as determined a fashion where the military establishment is a small one. Where the armed forces number less than 2,000 men we would not expect the "weight" of such a small establishment to have as pronounced an impact upon the emergence of a broadly defined and intensely pursued corporate interest as in the case of a larger military establishment. Nor would we expect military values to be as pervasively and deeply inculcated where the armed forces have only been recently created, without a long tradition to give shape and support to these values and without an extensive period within which these values may be instilled and internalized. Where either one or both of these conditions prevail a politicized military will still detract from the possibility of socio-economic change, but their negative impact will be significantly softened. In geographical terms, these two mitigating conditions most frequently obtain in the tropical African countries. Almost half of these 33 countries supported a military establishment of less than 2,000 men as of 1966, and only 6 had a sizeable force numbering more than 10,000 men.³⁰ And it is in Africa that we find more than two dozen countries that have only recently gained their independence, and thus their military establishments are practically brand new.

III. MILITARY RULE AND MODERNIZATION: CROSS-NATIONAL DATA

In the previous section some reasons were set out for thinking that the officer-politicians' corporate interests and military values dictate a conservative orientation toward economic and social change. By relying upon the cross-national data generated by Adelman and Morris it is possible to test the descriptive generalization that the politicized military do not act as agents of modernization, although the data cannot elucidate the possible validity of the hypothesized motivational explanation based upon the officers' corporate interests and military values. To repeat, Adelman and Morris' data refer to those 74 non-Western, non-communist countries,

³⁰ David Wood, *The Armed Forces of African States*, Adelphi Paper no. 27 (London, 1966); André Martel, "Les Armées africaines," in Leo Hamon (ed.), *Le Role Extra-Militaire de L'Armée dans le Tiers Monde* (Paris, 1966).

which have received some kind of foreign assistance from the United States. These countries were placed into three basic categories (with some differentiation within each of them) according to the "political strength of the military."

The first group of countries are those "in which the military was in direct political control during some part of the period 1957-62"; the second group is made up of "countries in which the military was an important political influence but was not in direct political control during most of (this) period;" the third group contains those "countries in which the military had little or no political influence during (this) period."³¹ I shall correlate this military dimension of governmental structure with a handful of economic factors that are commonly viewed as indicators of economic and social change. Seven indicators were chosen on the basis of their potential amenability to governmental control or influence. Five of the indicators refer to changes that have taken place as opposed to absolute levels, while the two non-change indicators measure intended and possible future changes.

Over and above their intrinsic weaknesses, all types of aggregate data are bound to have limitations when used for a specific purpose. In this instance I would mention the three most important ones. Half of the economic indicators refer to the period 1950-62, whereas the military variable only covers the period 1957-62. The absence of a complete overlap between the independent and dependent variables is certainly important, its significance only being somewhat mitigated by the fact that many of the countries with a politicized military in the 1957-62 period would fall into a similar category between 1950 and 1957. Secondly, I do not suggest that changes among the economic variables are primarily due to governmental activities; obviously many other factors, from n-achievement attributes to patterns of international trade, have an important bearing upon them. Here I shall assume that these 'extraneous' factors are randomly distributed. Until it is shown that n-achievement, for example, is associated with *both* the rate of GNP growth and military intervention, I am on relatively steady ground in assuming that these 'third' factors do not invalidate the interpretations accorded the correlation coefficients. Thirdly, these indicators imply little about reformist changes. However, according to my previous discussion, if soldiers in mufti do not contribute to economic and social modern-

³¹ Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-76, where the classification of the 74 countries can be found.

ization they certainly would not promote social and economic reforms. What follows then is a brief description of the seven modernization indicators.³²

The rate of growth of per capita GNP in constant prices between 1950/51 and 1963/64.

Change in the degree of industrialization between 1950 and 1963: This index is based on the average annual change in industrial output in constant prices, the change in the proportion of gross domestic product originating in industry, and the change in the proportion of the total male labor force employed in industry.

Degree of improvement in agricultural productivity since 1950: This measure is based upon the adoption of such improvements as the more extensive use of mechanical power, chemical fertilizers, more modern irrigation systems, better crop rotation, and more scientific breeding.

Rate of improvement in human resources (specifically education) from about 1957 to 1961: This indicator is based upon changes in enrollment at the second level of education as a percentage of the age group fifteen to nineteen, and enrollment at the third level of education as a percentage of the appropriate age group.

Gross investment rate: This measure represents the level of capital formation, with respect to the average ratio of gross investment to gross national product for the period 1957-62.

Change in the effectiveness of tax systems between 1950 and 1963: "The change in the ratio of government domestic revenue to GNP was chosen as one broad measure of the change in over-all success in raising revenue. A second measure of over-all improvement was the average annual rate of increase in real government domestic revenue . . . The third statistical element . . . was the change in the ratio of direct tax to total government revenue, a common indicator of changes in the structure of tax systems."

The seventh variable—"leadership commitment to economic development"—stands at a different level of analysis than the others. Since economic change may not have occurred in the 1957-62 period because the government's efforts have not yet yielded the kinds of outputs that are expected in the future, and since leadership commitment may not be translated into economic outputs for any one of a number of reasons (e.g., the bureaucracy is incapable of implementing governmental decisions), this measure

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 84-129 and *passim*; also see pp. 14-15 for the assignment of numerical scores.

TABLE 1. THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE (N = 74)

Rate GNP	Change Industrialization	Change Agricultural Productivity	Expansion Education
.13	.29	.07	.08
Change Tax Level		Investment Level	
.04		-.11	
Leaders' Commitment to Economic Development			-.22

serves as a crucial indicator of the governmental incumbents' concern for, and efforts toward, the realization of economic change. In creating their indicator of leadership commitment to economic development for the period 1957-62, Adelman and Morris utilized three types of qualitative judgments: "whether the heads of government and semi-official national agencies (such as ministries of finance, planning agencies, and privately owned central banks) involved in direct or indirect central guidance of the economy typically make concerted efforts to promote economic growth; whether or not this planning includes purposive attempts to alter institutional arrangements that clearly block the achievement of development goals; and whether or not there is a national plan and a planning group functioning within the government which is charged with full time execution of the plan."³³

A first test of the hypothesis that officer-politicians act as conservatives insofar as they do not contribute to, or block attempts at economic modernization, is found in Table 1, where the political strength of the military is correlated with the economic indicators. It turns out that the mean correlation is .04 and two of the correlations are negative. The only indication to the contrary is the .29 correlation with the pace of industrialization. Yet even this single piece of evidence is accounted for by the reasoning underlying the hypothesis itself. For, as was previously noted, the one type of economic change that the military might undertake because of its corporate interests is industrial growth. The data in Table 1 therefore suggest the following three statements, although they cannot be accepted until various counter-arguments and interpretations are first evaluated.³⁴ (1) If the military do act as

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-81. While economic planning might be thought to discriminate against military regimes, Janowitz (*op. cit.*, pp. 64-65) and others have emphasized the officers' statist predispositions.

³⁴ Further confirmation of the absence of any positive relationship between the military's political strength and economic change is evidenced in the following three operations. (1) As an additional

powerful agents of economic change in the non-Western countries then we should have found strong positive correlations here. Thier absence seriously calls into question the arguments and conclusions of Shils, Halpern, Pye and Pauker. (2) The zero order correlations in Table 1 suggest that the officer-politicians do not make any efforts or contributions to economic change, although it is necessary to control for possible "third" factors before this generalization can be asserted with any degree of confidence. (3) On the safe assumption that political organizations, groups or strata are actively demanding and attempting to bring about economic change in many military regimes, the officer-politicians oppose them. This generalization does not emerge solely from the data presented in Table 1. Its further demonstration will have to wait until part IV of this essay where it will be seen that in those countries characterized by a significant level of demands, organization and participation directed toward the realization of economic change, there is no positive relationship between the military's political strength and economic change. This finding therefore implies that the soldiers in mufti oppose such groups and strata in their quest for economic change.

The first basic objection that could be raised concerning the interpretation of the data con-

cerns the presumed direction of the causal arrow. It might be thought that the arrow should lead from the economic variables to the political-military one, rather than vice versa. Certainly most attempts to relate economic and political phenomena have pursued this approach. However, I do not think that this is a valid criticism of the present interpretation. While it is more than possible for economic change or its absence to influence the degree and frequency of military intervention, the zero order correlations in Table 1 indicate that these particular economic variables do not help account for the political strength of the military, at least during overlapping time periods. It could be that low or exceptionally high levels of economic change in the period prior to 1957 (i.e., at time t minus 5) contributed to the military's acquisition or maintenance of political power in the 1957-62 period. But whether this time-lagged relationship exists or not is quite irrelevant to the primary objective of the present essay which centers about the consequences of military rule *after* the officers have entered the political arena.

Secondly, it might appear warranted to argue that the zero order correlations fail to disprove the hypothesis that the military act as agents of modernization when they enjoy substantial political influence or control. For any modernizing efforts and programs would probably not have much impact upon economic change until some years after their implementation. This point is well taken, especially since we are not differentiating between those countries in which the military did or did not exercise political influence prior to 1957, nor do we possess comparable economic indicators for the 1962-67 period (i.e., at time t plus 5). If economic change were to occur at time t plus 5 the government would have to have made efforts in that direction and invested in the economy during the period 1957-62 (i.e., at time t_1). Yet during this period the correlations between the military's political strength and the governmental leaders' commitment to economic development is $-.22$, while the correlation with the gross investment rate is $-.11$. Given these data it is quite unlikely that countries with a politicized military in the 1957-62 period will have experienced economic change between 1962 and 1967. Furthermore, in constructing the political strength of the military index, Adelman and Morris explicitly incorporated the time factor into their classification scheme. Their scale is ordered from high to low not only according to the political strength of the military—whether they were dominant, influential or neutral—but also according to the length of time that the officer-politicians were in

test for the reliability of the mean correlation of .04, I correlated a single indicator of economic modernization (which was constructed by calculating the mean score for each country on the seven economic indicators) with the military variable. The result was a correlation of .08, which hardly differs from the .04 mean correlation in Table 1. (2) To test for the possible effects of curvilinear patterns and extreme scores, each of the seven indicators was separately cross-tabulated with the military variable. There were no significant deviations from statistical independence, except for a weak positive relationship between the military variable and change in industrialization ($\gamma = +.38$) and leadership commitment to economic development ($\gamma = -.28$)—which is what we would expect given the .29 and $-.22$ correlations in Table 1. (3) On the possibility that Adelman and Morris' distinction between the first and second groups of countries classified according to the military's political influence (those in which the military enjoyed a "marked" and "moderate" political role) is far smaller in actuality than the assumed equal difference between the second and third groups of countries ("moderate" and "negligible" political influence), I collapsed the first two categories and performed the above tests without any differences in the resulting measures of association.

direct control of the government or exerting influence over the civilian incumbents. Within each of the two categories of the military's political involvement, those countries in which the officers were politically influential for five years were scored higher than those in which they were influential for three years, and the latter received higher scores than countries in which the military only exercised their influence for one year.³⁵ According to the counter-argument that the military's modernizing efforts will not immediately have their intended impact, we would expect to find that within each of the two groups of countries experiencing military rule, those countries in which the military exercised their political influence for a longer time period would be characterized by greater economic change than countries in which the military were politically involved for only a short period of time. Yet an examination of the scatter plots for the two groups of military dominated countries does not reveal any linear increase in rates of economic change when the length of involvement is considered.

Thirdly, it is necessary to test for possible spuriousness in the correlations before the data can be accepted. Do the zero order correlations in Table 1 survive or change when third factors are introduced? In particular, what happens when bureaucratic proficiency, political stability and level of economic development are taken into account? The data in Table 1 might be due to an association between military rule and a paucity of economic and administrative skills among the civil servants responsible for advising the officer-politicians on economic matters and administering the government's economic programs. In the absence of a well organized and competent bureaucracy any government would have great difficulty in bringing about economic change.³⁶ Adelman and Morris constructed an index of administrative efficiency for the 1957-62 period based upon three qualitative criteria: "The degree of permanence and training of administrators (an indirect measure of whether recruitment is based upon qualifications for the job); the extent to which corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence seriously hamper governmental functioning; and the extent to which instability of policy at higher levels of adminis-

tration promotes inefficiency."³⁷ With the exception of the last criterion, this index provides a reasonably valid measure of the bureaucracy's competence to deal with economic change if expected to do so by the governmental incumbents. The 74 countries were then stratified into three groups according to their level of administrative efficiency. If the zero order correlations were spurious, positive correlations between the military in politics and the economic indicators should have appeared among those countries that enjoyed a high level of bureaucratic competence. However, this turned out not to be the case, thereby pointing to the officers' motivations as the explanation for the absence of any significant correlations in Table 1.

Another possible counter-argument would attribute the low correlations in Table 1 to the circumstances under which the military usually come to exert their political strength. The military are often propelled into the political arena, and often remain there, when their countries are in the throes of violence and governmental instability. Since there is a sizeable negative association between political stability³⁸ and the political strength of the military ($r = -.44$), and between political stability and an index of economic modernization based on the seven indicators ($r = -.35$), it may be that the officers' do have modernizing goals but they cannot be implemented due to the prevailing instability. While this reasoning seems eminently sensible the data do not bear it out. When the 74 countries are stratified into four groups according to the level of political stability, and the political strength of the military is then correlated with the economic variables, we should find strong positive correlations among the more stable countries. Yet this turns out not to be the case at all; there is no apparent difference between the military's success in promoting economic change within more or less stable political contexts.

Lastly, a counter-argument might be found in the statement that *any* government would find it extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible, to bring about significant economic change in the very poorest countries that lack even a minimal

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-81.

³⁸ Adelman and Morris' political stability index is based upon (1) the extensiveness of internal security, or in reverse fashion, the level of violence; (2) the extent of continuity in the form of government (which partly overlaps with the political strength of the military), and (3) the extent of overt consensus regarding the prevailing form of government. (*Op. cit.*, pp. 81-83.)

³⁵ Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

³⁶ A separate analysis of the Adelman and Morris data indicates that the nature of the bureaucracy has an important bearing upon economic change where governments are attempting to modernize their economies.

economic infrastructure. We should therefore expect the correlations between the military's political strength and our economic indicators to be higher in the relatively wealthy non-western countries than in the exceptionally poor ones, the low correlations among the latter being no fault of the military's. However, when the sample is stratified into four groups according to their GNP levels, the correlations are no higher in the high GNP countries than in the low ones. In fact, in the wealthiest countries the correlations tend to be slightly negative, while in the very poorest countries there are significant positive correlations between the politicized military and economic modernization. This last finding serves as a clue to the explanatory hypothesis developed in the next section.

IV. THE MIDDLE CLASS ORIENTATIONS OF OFFICER-POLITICIANS

The day has passed when officers were almost exclusively recruited from the aristocracy and the traditional land-owning class. Today military officers are commonly drawn from the middle class, the marginal middle class, small landholders, and not infrequently from rural and (in Latin America) urban laborers.³⁹ Where the officers do not originate in the solid middle class they are at one with their fellow officers in having achieved a solid middle class occupational and status rank. As members of the middle class by birth and/or achievement, soldiers in mufti act in accordance with their class' interests and identify with its civilian members.⁴⁰ Pre-adult socialization experiences, family connections by birth or marriage, social contacts, status aspirations, property ownership, business connections, political relationships—these factors bind the officers to the middle class' interests and lead them to identify with its values and members. Consequently, a politicized and largely autonomous officer corps would be unwilling to undertake or sanction policies of change that may en-

³⁹ Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-58; also see the references to Shils, Johnson, McAlister, Pauker and Halpern above.

⁴⁰ And this despite C. Wright Mills' assertion that "social origins and early background are less important to the character of the professional military man than to any other high social type," in *The Power Elite* (New York, 1952), p. 192. Although this generalization has a good deal of validity, the present study centers upon those officers that are acting outside of their instrumental or professional role. And Janowitz has noted that the officers' social origins are politically more salient in contemporary non-western countries than in western societies. (*op. cit.*, p. 56)

danger the middle class' economic perquisites and political prerogatives.⁴¹ (Parenthetically, in my estimate class interest and identity is not as compelling a motivation as is the military's corporate interests and values.)⁴²

This hypothesis and the contrary one put forward by Halpern, Pauker, Johnson and others begin with the same premise: the great majority of officers come from middle and lower middle class backgrounds, and there is even some recruitment from lower social strata. I agree with these writers when they argue that this kind of background, and the officers' adult middle class status, turns them into opponents of aristocratic, feudal and land-owning strata. But this statement does not allow us to conclude that officer-politicians are concerned with socio-economic change, and certainly not with "progressive" change. To oppose the upper classes is not necessarily to support the lower classes, especially in the non-western zero-sum political arena and in the context of economic scarcity, although there have been some temporary alliances between middle class officers and the lower classes. Moreover, the proponents of the reverse hypothesis are attributing an inordinate importance to the officers' backgrounds—the disadvantages, marginality, degradation, and poverty many of them experienced before entering the military. These experiences often provide the impetus for individual mobility, but they need not instill a broader concern for the plight of

⁴¹ Until recently, the prevailing view among students of Latin American politics contradicted this assertion. It was thought that the middle class and the military were mutually antagonistic, the military blocking the middle class' quest for economic modernization and democratic government. However, since José Nun pointed to the frequency of "the middle class military coup," the opposite viewpoint has gained a respectable measure of support: José Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (New York, 1967); Charles Wagley, *The Latin American Tradition* (New York, 1968), pp. 203-212.

⁴² The greater salience of corporate interests compared to class interests is sharply illustrated in the case of the 1963 Ecuadorian *coup*. The rationale for the take-over was a thorough-going anti-communism. But the officers' anti-communism was not primarily the product of their middle class interests: it was based upon the protection of their corporate interests. For the officers believed that if the communists came to power they would replace the army with a militia. See Martin C. Needler, *Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador 1963* (Washington, 1964).

TABLE 2. THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE ACCORDING TO SIZE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

	Rate GNP	Change industrialization	Change agricultural productivity	Expansion education
Medium sized middle class (N = 12)	-.17	.05	-.12	.12
Small middle class (N = 33)	-.06	.17	.04	-.18
Miniscule middle class (N = 29)	.34	.44	.17	.34
	Change tax level		Investment level	
Middle sized middle class		.01		.19
Small middle class		-.07		-.48
Miniscule middle class		.09		.07
	Leaders' commitment to economic development			
Medium sized middle class				.17
Small middle class				-.02
Miniscule middle class				-.04

less fortunate strata. In fact, where individual aspirations have been realized there is generally a reduced concern for collective mobility. Undoubtedly the iniquitous and inequitous experiences of some officers were sufficiently poignant and their memories vivid enough to maintain a concern for *los de abajo* throughout their careers. But despite the importance of socializing experiences we cannot assume that they are generally more salient than adult class and status positions. In fact, where there is an incongruity between the past and present there is good reason to assume that the latter is more salient in shaping behavior—at least until proved differently. Although the Marxian hypothesis is obviously not universally valid, Marx was more often right than wrong, and therefore it makes sense to begin with it as a working hypothesis.

Having put forward a generalization regarding the influence of the officers' middle class interests and identities as these shape their governmental decisions, I must now add an important modification, although one that follows logically from the hypothesis. We would expect soldiers in mufti to act differently according to variations in the social structure and the distribution of political power; where modernizing changes and mass political participation are not perceived as threats to the middle class' material and political privileges we would not necessarily expect the military to oppose them, and other factors may even lead the officers to allow such changes. Soldiers in mufti will protect the status quo only where the middle class' interests are seen to be threatened. When the non-western countries are stratified according to their class structure and the distribution of political power we would therefore expect the politicized military to oppose economic change at one end of the continua, perhaps allowing change to occur at the other end, although the hypothesis does

not allow us to predict the critical points on the continua where the military's class-defined interests and identities may undergo a marked change.⁴³

In Table 2 the sample is divided into three groups according to the size of the indigenous middle class, i.e., the proportion of the active male population in "commerce, banking, insurance, or in technical, professional, managerial, administrative or clerical employments." The three groups refer to those countries in which at least 20% of the active male population was engaged in such occupations, in which between 10 and 19% held such jobs, and in which less than 10% did so.⁴⁴ When the military's political influence is correlated with our economic indicators in these different class contexts we find that they fail to sponsor economic change when there is a medium sized or even a small middle class. Without exception the correlations are either weakly positive or negative. Apparently once a middle class constituting over 10% of the active male population emerges, officers in mufti act to conserve its perquisites by opting for the status quo. Only in the context of a miniscule middle class do the officer-politicians allow for some economic change. Among these countries the military's political strength is positively correlated with growth in GNP (.34), with industrialization (.44), and with expansion of education (.34).

The data in Table 2 thus tend to bear out the hypothesis that the officers act in accordance with their class interests, either failing to act as modernizing agents or opposing economic and social change where the middle class is relatively

⁴³ With respect to Latin America, a contrary generalization is found in Johnson, *The Military and Society* . . . , *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

⁴⁴ Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-33.

wealthy and established—where change is presumably seen to involve the redistribution of economic privileges. But how do the military's class interests account for their mild sponsorship of economic change in countries with a miniscule middle class? As leading members of a class that is not nearly as well off as its foreign equivalents, and therefore anxious to secure greater wealth and prestige for the class as a whole and thus for themselves, the officer-politicians are willing to permit economic change to occur because it is part of the modernization process whose culmination is seen in terms of a sizeable and economically established middle class. In addition, the officers' class interests are not especially threatened by the lower classes; for where only a miniscule middle class exists it is improbable that a significant number of peasants and workers have been brought into strategic economic and political positions through urbanization, commercialization and industrialization. On the contrary, any threat to the officers' class interests would be found among those defenders of the traditional order, thereby turning soldiers in mufti into reformers and agents of change.

The class hypothesis derives additional support from a comparison of the economic variables which do and do not correlate with military involvement where there is a miniscule middle class. Although alternative interpretations are indeed possible, the ones I place upon the data are at least plausible. In predominantly agricultural economies (which is what we are dealing with in the presence of a miniscule middle class) GNP may be increased through industrial growth, increased agricultural productivity, or both. If the officer-politicians were acting in accordance with their middle class interests and identities we would expect them to emphasize industrial growth⁴⁵ at the expense of agricultural production, for the former has a far greater impact upon the nature and size of the urban middle class than does the latter. And it turns out that there is a positive correlation with industrial growth (.44), and a practically negligible correlation with increased agricultural productivity (.17). There is an intimate association between middle class occupations and post-elementary education, which may account for the .34 correlation between military involvement and educational expansion. On the other hand, there is a zero-order correlation (.09) with changes in the tax level, and such changes would hurt the existing middle class. Not only does

this indicator measure the amount of tax monies collected, it also gets at the change from regressive indirect taxes which benefit the middle class to nonregressive direct taxes. Then there is the contrast between the -.04 correlation with the governmental leaders' commitment to economic development and the .34 correlation with rate of GNP growth. This would suggest that economic change is due to the officer-politicians' permissive orientation toward change rather than any sustained efforts on their part to bring it about. And this makes good sense according to the class interpretation: economic change is in accord with the interests and prestige seeking identities of the middle class officers, but since they themselves have already achieved many of the perquisites of middle class life there is not sufficient motivation for them to undertake strenuous programs of economic modernization.

This middle class' perception of their "stake in society" is shaped by the distribution of political power as well as the class structure. Where that stake is thought to be endangered by the acquisition of power by peasants, workers and disadvantaged ethnic groups demanding governmental responsiveness to their economic aspirations, the officers act as conservatives; where this threat from below has not yet gathered strength the officers allow for economic change. There is a great overlap between this hypothesis and the central dimension of Huntington's outstanding analysis of the officers' political behavior—"The extent to which a politicized officer corps plays a conservative or a reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation"—and thus the data presented here tend to bear out his generalization. In oligarchical societies the soldier is a radical; in societies dominated by the middle class the officers act as arbitrators among middle class groups; and when mass political participation is in sight the soldier protects the existing order.⁴⁶ There is only one revision that ought to be made of Huntington's interpretation. Analysis of the Adelman and Morris data indicates that it is only at the very lowest levels of political participation and only in the context of a miniscule middle class that the officers sponsor modernizing policies, whereas Huntington is somewhat more generous in estimating the parameters within which this occurs. For example, contrary to his acceptance of Halpern's thesis with respect to the Middle Eastern countries because of their low level of political participation,⁴⁷ the data to be presented

⁴⁵ Admittedly I have already imputed the officers' concern with industrial growth to their corporate interests, thereby possibly over-determining this variable.

⁴⁶ Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222 and *passim*. As it applies to Latin America, the same argument is found in Nun, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 103.

⁴⁷ Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

TABLE 3. THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE ACCORDING TO THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEMANDS

	Rate GNP	Change industrialization	Change agricultural productivity	Expansion education
Urban and rural demand countries (N=21)	-.20	.24	-.11	-.20
Urban demand countries (N=21)	.22	.16	-.02	.05
No demand countries (N=32)	.39	.59	.45	.53
	Change Tax Level		Investment Level	
Urban and rural demand countries		.13		-.09
Urban demand countries		-.27		-.45
No demand countries		.34		.19
	Leaders' commitment to economic development			
Urban and rural demand countries				-.09
Urban demand countries				-.30
No demand countries				-.22

below indicate that the officers are not agents of modernization in that area of the world.

A crude test of this hypothesis is possible by relying upon Adelman and Morris' "modernization of outlook index" insofar as it provides a rough and ready measure of the extensiveness of economic demands and the degree to which these demands are backed up by political participation and organizational strength. The index was constructed in the following manner: First, we divided countries into two broad classes: those in which the outlook of educated urban groups was 'significantly' modernized and those in which it was not. Countries were judged to have significant modernization of outlook only if the adoption of Western or modern styles of living had gone considerably farther than external forms and dress, and had entailed the evolution of at least some important modern forms of social and political participation such as voluntary associations. The second element in the index was a judgment of whether programs of political, social, and economic modernization (health programs, economic institution-building) have or have not gained significant support among the urban population and among some of the rural population.⁴⁸ In Table 3 the sample is stratified into three groups. The first includes those countries "in which the outlook of the urban educated population was significantly modernized, judging by the standards of less-developed countries, and in which programs of political, social and economic modernization had gained significant support among both the urban and rural

populations." The second group has the same characteristics as the first except that the rural population is not demanding modernizing policies. The third group contains "countries in which the outlook of the educated urban sector was partially but not significantly modernized and in which programs of modernization, if they existed, had gained relatively little support among either the urban or rural population."⁴⁹

In the first two groups of countries economic aspirations are widely articulated and supported by a measure of political participation. The correlations between the military's political strength and the economic variables can therefore be interpreted as indications of the officer-politicians' inclinations toward economic change in countries characterized by a significant level of economic demands. The correlations point to the absence of any positive inclination, and thus a lack of popular responsiveness as well. More than half of the correlations are negative and the mean correlations among these "demand" countries is -.05. The politically influential military apparently act as conservatives, opposing those organizations, groups and strata that are working for economic change, presumably because fairly widespread economic demands constitute a threat to the prevailing distribution of power that is politically and financially beneficial to the middle class. These data may also be interpreted in terms of the officers' corporate interests and military values; a politicized working class and peasantry are seen as threats to the military establishment itself and as harbingers of a disorderly politics, obviating any responsiveness to their demands.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 50. Although there is a high correlation between this index and the size of the middle class ($r = .72$), the two variables are analytically and empirically distinct and thus they should be analyzed separately.

⁵⁰ On a more speculative level, it may be that the threat from below engenders a sense of political

TABLE 4. POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN FOUR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

	Latin America (N=21)	Middle East and North Africa (N=15)	Asia (N=15)	Tropical Africa (N=23)
Mean size of the middle class	71	62	51	37
Mean level of economic demands	66	47	37	27
Rate GNP	.01	-.28	.03	.45
Change industrialization	.16	.03	-.02	.42
Change agricultural productivity	-.06	-.03	-.39	.60
Expansion education	-.43	-.12	-.31	.34
Change tax level	-.14	-.11	-.07	.07
Investment level	-.38	-.32	-.26	.06
Leaders' commitment to economic development	-.43	-.16	-.17	.08
Mean correlation	-.18	-.14	-.17	.29

In contrast, all but one of the correlations are positive among the "no demand" countries, where the lower classes are politically quiescent and acquiescent. The degree to which the officer corps is politicized correlates with the economic indicators at the following levels: rate of GNP increase .39, change in the level of industrialization .59, change in agricultural productivity .45, and expansion of educational enrollments .53. In this group of countries the disadvantaged strata represent a preciously small threat to the middle class or the military establishment. This duality would account for the stronger correlations among the "no demand" countries than among countries with a miniscule middle

insecurity among soldiers in mufti, which would further decrease their readiness to fulfill the lower classes' economic demands. Social psychologists are well aware of the aggressiveness, hostility and distrust that grows out of feelings of insecurity. And these reactions could only provide the officer politicians with an added impetus to ignore or repress popular demands. This hypothesis would be particularly applicable where the demands are of a novel type or especially wide-ranging in their impact, such as demands for land reform. Whereas politically secure politicians may or may not be capable of departing from past practices and accepting innovative changes, insecure politicians are likely to reject or repress them due to an anxiety-dictated rigidity. Robert E. Scott emphasizes the insecurities found among Latin American elites due to continuing economic and political change. See his "Political Elites and Political Modernization: The Crisis of Transition," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America* (New York, 1967), pp. 117-127 and *passim*.

class. The officers can therefore allow economic change to take place without feeling threatened by, or hostile toward the lower classes, and they may even sponsor those changes which foster the emergence of a sizeable and prosperous middle class. There is also the possibility—although that is all it is—that the officer-politicians occasionally satisfy some of the lower classes economic desires (as opposed to demands) in order to win their support for modernization programs that challenge the interests and positions of traditional forces, whether these be tribal chiefs, aristocrats, monarchs or large land holders.

Given the apparent plausibility of the class-oriented hypothesis and its corollary, it would be useful to stratify the sample geographically. We might then gain a better general understanding of the politics of particular geographical areas by gauging the variations in the politicized military's activities as modernizing agents; a geographical stratification would identify those areas in which the miniscule middle class and a practically non-existent demand level provide the officers with permissive or even positive orientations toward economic change. In addition, given the fact that statements regarding the purported modernizing consequences of military rule have usually been generalized from a particular area of the world, and the not uncommon belief that it is only in Latin America that soldiers in mufti act as defenders of the existing order, a geographical stratification of the sample would help clarify the issue.

A glance at Table 4 indicates that it is not only in Latin America, but in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa as well, that officer-politicians either fail to contribute to economic change or oppose modernizing demands and efforts where these exist. The mean correla-

tions in these three geographical regions are slightly on the negative side, ranging from $-.14$ to $-.18$. There are sharp variations with respect to three economic variables, but in each case it is a different region that evidences the strongest negative correlation. In Latin America leadership commitment to economic development correlates at the $-.43$ level with the military's political strength, decreasing to $-.16$ and $-.17$ in the two other regions. In the Middle East and North Africa there is a $-.28$ correlation with the rate GNP growth, with $.01$ and $.03$ correlations in the other two regions. In Asia change in agricultural productivity is associated with the military at the $-.39$ level, while in the other regions the correlations are $-.06$ and $-.03$. Even though there are significant variations in the mean levels of economic demands and the size of the middle class among these three regions, there is little corresponding variation in the officer-politicians' motivations. Demands are presumably already too extensive and the middle class sufficiently established to obviate the politicized military giving their positive support, encouragement or approval to modernization policies.

The tropical African countries register the lowest mean level of demands and the smallest middle classes (approximately half of the Latin American averages), which presumably helps account for the positive correlations between the military's political strength and the rate of GNP increase (.45), industrial growth (.42), increased agricultural productivity (.60), and educational expansion (.34).⁵¹ But even here the military allow for economic change rather than actively and purposefully facilitating it, for the correlation with leadership commitment to economic development is .08. There is another factor which is relevant to the interpretation of these positive correlations. I previously pointed out that the officers' corporate interests are pursued less determinedly and their military values are less deeply instilled where the armed forces are especially small and the military establishment is quite new. Of the four geographical areas these conditions clearly obtain most frequently

⁵¹ There is some reason for thinking that the correlation coefficients for the African countries are somewhat artificial. The military were politically influential in only 6 of the 23 African regimes during the 1957-62 period, and in only one other did officers occupy the seats of government. And an examination of the scatter plots shows that the positive correlations are largely the product of 14 "low-low" cases, civilian regimes doing poorly economically, rather than officer-politicians doing well.

in Africa, which means that the African officers' corporate interests and military values only moderately detract from their modernizing inclinations.

Even a cursory examination of the non-western countries during the last 30 or 40 years would immediately highlight the growth of the middle class and the expansion of political participation in most of them; and since the class-oriented hypothesis is based upon these two factors it should be applicable longitudinally as well as cross-nationally. We would expect the consequences of military rule to vary according to alterations in a country's social and political contours over time. Among non-western countries such changes began earliest among many of the Latin American states. In the 1920's and 1930's a small professional, entrepreneurial and commercial middle class emerged, followed shortly by the growth of an urban working class. The appearance of the middle class placed a new strata between the large landholders and an illiterate rural labor force, while the growth and urban concentration of the working class enhanced the lower classes' political power. In the 1930's it was not uncommon for the middle class and the urban laborers to join together in attacking the political bastions of the traditional land-holding class. After World War II the more common outcome was class conflict between these former allies. And it was, of course, during the 1950's and 1960's that the urban working class, and the agricultural workers to a much lesser degree, became sufficiently mobilized to become serious contenders for governmental power. Thus according to the hypothesis we would expect Latin America's officer-politicians to have become increasingly conservative since the inter-war period.

Martin C. Needler's study of Latin American politics contains a classification of the successful *coups* that occurred over the last thirty years. Unfortunately Needler does not provide us with the criteria he used in classifying these *coups* as "reformist." Not knowing precisely what Needler is measuring we are unable to judge the extent to which his data may be used as evidence for our proposition. However, on the reasonable assumption that "reformist" refers at least in large part to the goals of economic change and/or the mitigation of poverty and glaring inequalities of opportunity, then his data do support the hypothesis. For the number of "reformist" *coups* as a proportion of successful *coups* decrease steadily since 1935: between 1935 and 1944, 50% of the successful *coups* are classified as "reformist," dropping to 23% in the 1945-50 period, and falling further to 17% between 1951-

and 1964.⁵² This decreasing pattern is probably related to the increasing size of the Latin American middle classes since 1935. When that class was quite small and the entrenched land-owning class dominated both economy and polity, the officers acted out their middle class interests and identities by challenging the upper class' economic privileges while facilitating the expansion of the middle class through economic change. As the middle class grew in size, wealth and power, the challenge to its perquisites came from the less advantaged strata, thereby sharply reducing the officers' modernizing activities and turning them into protectors of the status quo. And this despite the widely believed reformist lesson found in Castro's revolution. Needler's classification also shows that the proportion of *coups* that occurred just before or right after national elections increased from 12%, to 32%, to 56% during the three decades from 1935 to 1965.⁵³ When viewed alongside the decline in the proportion of "reformist" *coups*, these figures imply that as the lower classes became politically mobilized, the military increasingly stepped in to prevent or abrogate the results of those elections which registered a political threat to the middle class' political predominance and economic interests.

Lastly, I should make an attempt to deal with those deviant cases in which the officer-politicians did subscribe to the tenets of modernization and reform in the context of a sizeable middle class and a partially mobilized lower class. Every non-tautological generalization that is specific enough to be testable will encounter at least a large handful of deviant cases. But if the proposition itself can help interpret some of these deviant cases its plausibility is concomitantly heightened. I would begin by noting that in practically all those instances in which the military intervened with serious intentions regarding modernization and reform, it was the younger captains and colonels that led the *coups*. For example, the Egyptian, Iraqi and Turkish juntas formed in 1952, 1958 and 1960 respectively, consisted of officers with the rank of colonel or below; it was they who planned the coups and then co-opted older generals to serve as respected figureheads. And in each instance the general turned out to be more conservative

than his juniors.⁵⁴ Throughout the Middle East the senior officers have been politically more conservative and more strongly attached to the social status quo than the junior officers.⁵⁵ "Almost invariably, Latin America's popular revolutions of this century were led by young officers. They became the sponsors of fundamental change and reform, the underminers of traditional institutions, the proponents of public-welfare measures."⁵⁶

How can the hypothesis that soldiers in mufti act in accordance with their middle class interests and identities help account for this pattern? As captains, majors and colonels they are members of the middle class, but not only is their income incommensurate with their rank when compared to the incomes of the senior officers, promotions come slowly at this level, and only a proportion of the middle level officers are slated to enjoy the generals' class and status perquisites. The generals have reached the topmost rungs of the middle class pyramid; they are contented compared to the captains and colonels, many of whom are attempting to further fulfill their middle class aspirations. In countries whose political institutions invite military intervention this becomes a broad avenue open to these aspiring middle level officers. But to carry out a *coup* which will propel them into the highest rungs of the middle class pyramid requires a rationale or legitimizing banner that the generals are unwilling to grasp. By stating their cause in terms of modernization and reform the middle level officers can oppose and then replace their conservative superiors. Once having installed themselves in power some of these young officers will act in accordance with their original goals. On the other hand, this reasoning also suggests why so many of the young officers who apparently begin their political adventures as ardent reformers become conservatives only a few short months after their *coups*. They were not convinced reformers to begin with; they simply used the call for economic and social change for the realization of their own class and status interests.

⁵⁴ Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," in Sydney Nettleton Fisher (ed.), *The Military in the Middle East* (Columbus, 1963), p. 15.

⁵⁵ James A. Bill, "The Military and Modernization in the Middle East," *Comparative Politics*, 2 (October 1969), 56-57.

⁵⁶ Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁵² Martin C. Needler, *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change* (New York, 1968), p. 65.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

THE REPRESENTATION OF CITIZENS BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES: CONSEQUENCES FOR REGIME SUPPORT*

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Representation is a matter of linkage. In this paper it is argued that a useful handle can be gained on the problem of identifying and measuring representational relationships empirically by viewing representation as a type of support linkage between members of political systems and the authorities.¹

To conceive representation as a type of support linkage is to direct attention primarily to the represented rather than the representative. Representational relationships have functional significance for political systems particularly because they are linkages which involve members' satisfaction-dissatisfaction with the behavior of the political authorities—linkages which reflect the degree to which members feel that the performance of the authorities "stands for" or "re-presents" their own interests; and this performance satisfaction-dissatisfaction presumably makes a contribution to more general support for the political system. In contrast to legitimacy sentiments, which are independent of immediate outputs from political authorities, members' perceptions of representational linkages between themselves and the authorities depend on their affective responses to outputs, encompassing not only instrumental performance satisfactions, but (and most commonly among the membership in general) symbolic performance satisfactions as well.²

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¹ This approach to the empirical study of representation has been suggested by John Wahlke in his "Public Policy and Representative Government: The Role of the Represented," a paper prepared for the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Brussels, Belgium, September, 1967, and published as Report #9 from the Laboratory for Political Research, University of Iowa, 1967.

² Symbolic or expressive satisfactions are discussed at length in Murray Edelman, *The Sym-*

This paper reports an exploratory investigation of a construct for measuring sense of representation. The sample consists of a group of students enrolled at the University of Iowa—including, in order to ensure adequate variation on the support scales, a number of students arrested for participating in a protest demonstration against the presence of Marine recruiters on the University of Iowa campus.³

The research is concerned with three questions: (1) Is the proposed sense-of-representation construct a valid measure of this phenomenon? (2) To what extent are an individual's sense of representation by Congressman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and President (Johnson) interrelated and associated with the ideological, structural, and personal dimensions of legitimacy? (3) What is the impact of sense of representation on the disposition to extend or withdraw behavioral support?

I. REPRESENTATION AND SUPPORT

In one of the more suggestive analyses of representation to date, Wahlke documents the ways in which traditional demand-response conceptions of representation are deficient, and argues that representation may be more fruitfully studied by focusing on manifestations of support for political objects from citizens.⁴ According to demand-response conceptions, representation is seen to inhere in the relationship between members' policy demands and the policy-making activities of political authorities. In the case of representational linkages between citizens and legislators, empirical studies largely have taken it for granted that "the ultimate test of 'representativeness,' whether by Burkean 'trustee' or 'delegate' legislators . . . or whatever legislative role [is examined], is still . . .

bolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

³ This sample is also discussed in an earlier report by the author, "Correlates and Consequences of Beliefs in the Legitimacy of Regime Structures," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (August, 1970).

⁴ Wahlke, "Public Policy and Representative Government . . ."

the match between legislative policy output and public or constituency policy wishes."⁵ However, much public opinion research, which shows that most citizens do not entertain clearly defined policy preferences, challenges the notion that congruence between citizen policy preferences and legislative policy decisions is the crucial representational linkage.⁶

To look for representation in support linkages between citizens and political authorities is not to ignore congruence between policy demands and policy outputs. Among attentive citizens, policy satisfactions may be important components of representational relationships.⁷ However, conceiving representation in terms of support does draw attention away from exclusive focus on demand-response congruence, and thereby suggests consideration of linkages other than the demand-response variety, linkages that may involve primarily expressive rather than instrumental satisfactions, and may thus be far more salient for the membership in general. Even more importantly, as Wahlke has pointed out, "it is the role of the represented, even more than that of the representative . . . which is highlighted by focusing on the problem of support."⁸ Regardless of whether the representational relationship involves instrumental or expressive satisfactions, focusing on support underlines the importance of citizens' reactions to the behavior of political authorities—of representational relationships actually being *perceived* by citizens. For, although demand-response congruence can be estimated without ever taking into account whether such congruence or lack of congruence is actually perceived by the represented, or the degree of its salience for him,⁹ conceiving

representation as a type of support necessarily brings *perceptions* of congruence (of course, not only of the demand-response variety) to the center of the stage, where they should be, if interest is in the consequences of representational relationships for the persistence and maintenance of political systems.¹⁰

Finally, considering representation in terms of support also calls attention to the fact that legislative bodies are not the only loci of representational linkages in political systems. Of course, this has not gone unrecognized by scholars; in the American system, the presidency is a representative institution of unquestionable importance, and, as Roger Davidson has emphasized, "the non-elective federal bureaucracy also has significant and long-standing claims as a representative instrument."¹¹ But demand-response conceptions have tended to focus singularly on legislative institutions, where the responsiveness of representatives to the demands of the represented is presumably maximized by the electoral process.

The approach to be followed here is certainly not the only way of conceiving of representation. What is or is not a useful conception depends on one's theoretical objectives. The approach suggested recently by Prewitt and Eulau may be useful if the theoretical objective is that of investigating "the processes available to the public for controlling and holding accountable the political leadership . . ."¹² For

ages Ideologies and Party Systems, Vol. 10 of *Transactions of the Westermarck Society* (Finland, 1964). However, data from the same study suggest that most citizens would hardly be aware of any congruence that might obtain statistically; see Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (1962).

¹⁰ This does not imply that the behavior of the representative is of any diminished importance. The *relationship between* representative and represented is still the phenomenon of interest; and the behavior of the representative is, of course, an integral component of that relationship. Focusing on the represented simply means that the representative-represented relationship is investigated in terms of the represented's perceptions.

¹¹ Roger H. Davidson, "Congress and the Executive: The race for Representation," in Alfred de Grazia (ed.), *Congress: the First Branch of Government* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., Anchor Books Edition, 1967), p. 373.

¹² Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," this *REVIEW*, 63 (1969), p. 441.

⁵ Wahlke, "Public Policy and Representative Government. . .," p. 21.

⁶ This research is summarized in Wahlke, "Public Policy and Representative Government. . ."

⁷ Expressive satisfactions are certainly of some importance also: for example, see Thomas J. Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expenditures," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, (1967).

⁸ Wahlke, "Public Policy and Representative Government. . .," p. 33.

⁹ Warren Miller and Donald Stokes' model of the relationships between constituency policy preferences and legislators' roll-call behavior permits a statistical estimate of such congruence; see Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this *REVIEW*, 57 (1963); and Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (eds.), *Clean-*

their purposes, Prewitt and Eulau apply the notion of the representative's decisional style vis-a-vis constituency policy demands, originally examined with respect to individual legislators by Eulau et al., to *groups* of legislators.¹³ Their concern is with the composite representational response style of city councils to constituency policy demands. Representational response style is treated as a collective property: councils in which the individual members emphasize that their council is responsive to attentive publics, and those in which the individual members emphasize that their council is responsive to ad hoc issue groups, can be said to manifest collective types of the delegate representational style; councils in which the members emphasize that their council entertains "a self-defined image of what community needs are," can be said to collectively manifest the trustee representational style.¹⁴ Prewitt and Eulau adopt a demand-response conception of representation, according to which only those councils that respond to citizen policy demands are considered to be representative bodies: "representation is taken to mean a relationship between governed and governors wherein the governing group responds to ('represents') politically organized viewpoints among citizens, that is, responds to something *other* than its own image of what the community needs."¹⁵ Although such a definition is limited, it suits their objective of investigating the characteristics of communities in which citizen control over legislative bodies, according to the theory of "direct" representation, is likely to emerge.¹⁶

The point is that no analytic formulation of representation describes *the* representational relationship. An essentialist definition of representation is, of course, a chimera.¹⁷ Linkages

¹³ See Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," *this REVIEW*, 53 (1959); and, of course, John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962).

¹⁴ The quote is from Prewitt and Eulau, "Political Matrix . . .," p. 430.

¹⁵ Prewitt and Eulau, "Political Matrix . . .," p. 430.

¹⁶ A comprehensive history of the development of direct representation theory, with particular emphasis on the American setting, is in Alfred de Grazia, *Public and Republic* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

¹⁷ Representation does have an identifiable

between citizens and political authorities are inextricably bound up with ongoing political systems. Demand-response conceptions of representation may be appropriate to theoretical concern with the problem of citizen control over political authorities, and viewing representation as a relationship between collectivities may be a useful way to approach this problem. However, Wahlke's extensively documented discussion suggests that, if theoretical concern is focused on problems of system persistence and maintenance, demand-response conceptions leave much to be desired, and the most useful way of conceptualizing representational linkages would be as a source of support.¹⁸

Favorable attitudes and behaviors constitute support for political objects. Easton distinguishes two classes of attitudinal support: specific support involves favorable attitudes in response to outputs which satisfy members' policy demands; diffuse support involves attitudes of general "good will," independent of immediate outputs.¹⁹

The major objects of the political system toward which support is directed—the domain of support—are identified by Easton as: (1) the political community or that group of persons bound together by the fact that they participate in a common political enterprise; (2) the regime, or the constitutional order, broadly interpreted to include the values, norms, and structures of authority; and (3) the authorities, or those actors occupying roles in the authority structure—the rulers.²⁰

Easton argues that the major source of diffuse support for regime and authorities is the belief

meaning, which is, in Hanna Pitkin's words, "that in representation something not literally present is considered as present in a nonliteral sense." Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 9. However, the substance of this meaning can be defined in various different ways. For an explication of the various ways in which the concept of representation has been applied to different contexts, see Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, *passim*; also see the Introduction to Pitkin (ed.), *Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

¹⁸ Of course, as Wahlke notes, such an approach has been implied in a variety of ways by various analysts. See the discussion in Wahlke, "Public Policy and Representative Government . . ." pp. 29–33.

¹⁹ David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), Ch. 17.

²⁰ Easton, *A Systems Analysis . . .*, chs., 11–13.

in legitimacy: a members' sense of the appropriateness of these objects. "It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere."²¹

The object toward which specific support is directed is, of course, the political authorities. Easton states that specific support involves "a *quid pro quo* for the fulfillment of demands."²² However, in considering specific support as an input from the membership in general, and not just from attentive publics, Easton's tendency to equate specific support with demand satisfaction is too restrictive. Surely his broader definition of the concept is the more useful formulation: "Whenever the input of support can be closely associated with the satisfactions obtained from specific classes of output, I shall designate it as specific support."²³ The most useful conception of specific support is not that its distinctive characteristic is demand satisfaction, but simply that it involves members' evaluations of the *performance* of political authorities. Some of the least attentive members may feel that the government (perceived as a monolithic whole) is handling domestic or foreign problems well, and thus extend a form of specific support, without actually entertaining any concrete policy demands, and without being able to identify any particular authorities or groups of authorities as referents for their evaluations. However, an important source of specific support will be the extent to which members feel represented by the performance of particular authorities or groups of authorities occupying roles in the political structures. These representational linkages may result from *performance satisfactions related to the policy-making behavior* of the authorities, or they may result from *satisfactions related to the output of expressive symbols* by authorities which are reassuring to the members in a political performance context. Thus, members' representational linkages will involve beliefs that the performance of authorities or groups of authorities "stands for" or is consistent with their interests, whether instrumental or expressive.

II. MEASUREMENT OF SENSE OF REPRESENTATION

Questions designed to measure sense of representation by Congressman, Congress, President, and Supreme Court, as well as the dimen-

sions of ideological, structural, and personal legitimacy, and intentions to extend behavioral support to the regime, were included on a questionnaire administered during April 1968 to a sample of students enrolled in introductory political science courses at the University of Iowa. Copies of the questionnaire were also mailed to a group of students who had been arrested six months earlier for participating in a protest demonstration against the presence of United States Marine Corps recruiters on the University of Iowa campus. Of 278 students enrolled in introductory political science courses, 275 returned usable questionnaires; of 86 demonstrators to whom questionnaires were mailed, 21 returns were obtained.

For the purposes of this investigation, students enrolled in introductory political science courses and students arrested for participating in the demonstration have been combined into one sample ($N = 296$). The resulting sample may be regarded as a crude "scope" sample.²⁴

The concern of much social science research, this project included, is not to describe population parameters, but to test general laws, or what Willer terms "conditional universals." Random sampling from finite populations is the appropriate method for collecting data if the purpose is to describe population parameters. For example, data collected by the Gallup and Harris organizations are intended to describe attitudes about political issues, political candidates, means of political change, socioeconomic deprivation, etc., among all Americans at a certain time, or among black Americans at a certain time. But if the purpose of the research project is to test conditional universals, then random samples from finite populations are not necessarily any more useful than nonrandom samples.

The appropriate type of sample for testing conditional universals is the scope sample. As defined by Willer, the scope sample is "a number of natural cases fitting the conditions appropriate to the theory model, which are ranged along the major dimensions of the formal system . . . [for example] If a theory model for the conditions of oligarchy in associations relevant to Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' were constructed, it should be applied to organizations over a large variation in size, from extremely oligarchical to extremely democratic, and to organizations of varying form and struc-

²⁴ The notion of a scope sample is discussed in David Willer, *Scientific Sociology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), Ch. 6. The discussion presented in the following paragraphs relies on his explication.

²¹ Easton, *A Systems Analysis* . . . , p. 278.

²² Easton, *A Systems Analysis* . . . , p. 268.

²³ Easton, *A Systems Analysis* . . . , p. 268.

ture, and with members of varying levels of intellectual sophistication . . ." Validating conditional universals requires that the set of generalizations (or "theory model") be tested under as wide a range of circumstances ("ranged along the major dimensions of the formal system") as possible. In effect, the scope sample is a social science surrogate for the experimental method of the natural sciences. In the natural sciences, cases can be arranged by the experimenter himself so as to maximize the variety of the cross-section; in the social sciences, the variety of the cross-section can be maximized only by means of approximately "arranging" cases by scope sampling.

The notion of scope sampling includes samples randomly selected from populations. In some instances, randomly selected samples may provide cross-sections adequate for testing the set of generalizations of interest. However, as Willer points out, "it is essential to remember that the primary aim is to establish the scope of validity (if any) relative to the assumed range of the phenomena. The distribution of real cases [in a random sample] may have nothing to do with the scope." In other words, for the purpose of testing conditional universals, random sampling is valuable only to the extent that it is a better method than non-random sampling for maximizing the variation or scope of the sample relative to the range of cases across which it is desired to test the generalizations.²⁵

This research project was designed to test the construct validity of a measure of sense of representation,²⁶ and to explore certain hypotheses about relationships between representation and legitimacy, and the impact of such attitudes on intention to extend behavioral support to the regime.²⁷ In order to explore and/or test generalizations about support across the entire range of such phenomena, an ideal scope sample in terms of the American setting would include suitable proportions (for multivariate analysis) of, for example, ghetto

blacks, college students, middle-class whites, farmers, members of "radical right" organizations, as well as, in all such groups, sizeable proportions of both the politically attentive and inattentive and individuals in the 18-35 years of age category and 35 years of age and older. The present sample is limited to college students. However, within this category, inclusion as cases in the sample of both students enrolled in introductory political science courses and students arrested for participating in a demonstration does, to some extent, increase the range of cases of support-nonsupport available for study, thereby contributing to the utility of the sample with regard to validating the representation measure and investigating relationships between support attitudes and behavioral intention.

The questionnaire included items pertinent to two levels of political objects serving as loci of representational relationships between citizens and political authorities. Congressman and President are objects at the level of representation by *individual* authorities. Representation has most often been considered in terms of such linkages between individuals. However, *groups* of political authorities, such as the 90th Congress or the Warren Court, may also serve as important loci of representational linkages between citizens and government. At this level, representational linkages involve members' perceptions of the collective performance of authorities occupying roles in political structures.

The sense-of-representation-by-Congressman construct was developed from a battery of items as follows. Various research findings have indicated that the visibility of individual legislators is rather low among the general membership in political systems. Therefore, the initial question in the battery was intended as a screening device to distinguish those aware of their Congressman from those not aware of him. Respondents were instructed: "If you do not remember the name of your Congressman, go on to the next set of items. If you do remember the name of your Congressman write it in the following space." The next question requested respondents to make a very general summary evaluative judgment about the performance of their Congressman. This question was designed to measure direction of affect: "Do you feel that your Congressman is basically a pretty good Congressman or do you feel that your Congressman is basically not a very good Congressman?" A "Don't Know" option was also included. The cognitive dimension of the respondent's attitude was measured by an open-ended question: "If you answered 'Basic-

²⁵ The quotes are from Willer, *Scientific Sociology*, p. 114 and p. 113, respectively.

²⁶ A preliminary report on these data, written shortly after the fieldwork was completed, appeared under the title "Political Stability and the Habit of Legitimacy," Report #23 from the Laboratory for Political Research, University of Iowa, 1968. The present analysis supersedes that report, which suffered from various conceptual and methodological inadequacies and general lack of refinement.

²⁷ Legitimacy beliefs are the focus of analysis in Muller, "Correlates and Consequences . . ."

ally Pretty Good' or 'Basically Not Very Good' above, I would like to know the most important reasons for the way you feel." Finally, intensity of affect was ascertained: "How strongly do you feel this way?—Extremely Strongly; Quite Strongly; Pretty Strongly; Moderately Strongly; Not Too Strongly; Not At All Strongly." Pretesting of this intensity of affect measure disclosed that three-interval options produced poor differentiation, with respondents clustering at the extreme intervals. The six-interval option which was adopted seemed to differentiate more adequately between levels of intensity; for purposes of analysis, "Extremely Strongly" was treated as + or -3, "Quite Strongly" and "Pretty Strongly" as + or -2, and "Moderately Strongly," "Not Too Strongly," and "Not At All Strongly" as + or -1.²⁸

Sense of representation by Congress, by President, and by Supreme Court was measured on the basis of batteries of items equivalent to the above. The initial screening item included in the Congressman series was dropped from these question-sets.

The direction and intensity of affect items are straightforward measures of these attitudinal dimensions. The measure of the cognitive dimension of attitude is intended to differentiate between intervals along a continuum ranging from representation through arepresentation to nonrepresentation.²⁹

The cognitive dimension of these attitudes refers to the range of outputs from political authorities which are salient for individuals. For example, with regard to the object of Congressman, there are some citizens who, although they hardly may be apparent in mass sample surveys, do approximate the democratic ideal of the rational citizen—informed, involved, and so on. They would possess detailed information about such matters as their Congressman's positions on the issues and his votes on major legislation. If asked why they favored or did not favor him, their responses would indicate

exposure to outputs which could be classified as referential stimuli in the sense that they could be tested concretely against reality, and in the sense that the citizen could relate them to his own policy demands. Another kind of outputs could be classified as condensation stimuli.³⁰ Individuals responding to condensation stimuli might explain that they favored or did not favor their Congressman because "X is a businessman," or because "X is opposed to immorality in government," or perhaps simply because "X is a Democrat." Such condensation stimuli would be sufficiently imprecise to permit them to take on many different meanings for different people. Too vague to be of instrumental relevance, they would, however, be of significant expressive value. Condensation stimuli would be highly generalized, expressive outputs, not readily susceptible to reality testing, difficult to relate to policy preferences. Finally, a further group of individuals might explain their preference as a result of the influence of their spouse or friends or relatives, or because they liked their Congressman's physical appearance, or simply because they had just always liked or disliked him. Such individuals would not appear to be cognizant of either referential or condensation

³⁰ "Referential symbols are economical ways of referring to the objective elements in objects or situations; the elements identified in the same way by different people. Such symbols are useful because they help in logical thinking about the situation and in manipulating it . . . Condensation symbols evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness, some one of these or all of them." Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 6. A legislator's vote on a civil rights bill is a referential symbol. Party affiliation for, most citizens, is one of the most salient condensation symbols in political life. It is an economical way, not of referring to the objective elements in objects or situations, but of organizing a whole congeries of basically abstruse and uninteresting information into a coherent entity which has some meaning for the individual whose major concerns in life are not political. The difference between referential and condensation symbols is on the order of more or less; yet it would appear to be of sufficient clarity to permit relatively uniform differentiation between responses indicating perception of outputs characterized mainly by a high degree of referential content, by a high degree of condensation content, or by a high degree of extraneous content.

²⁸ On intensity of affect toward Congressman, Congress, and the Supreme Court, approximately one-fifth of the respondents scored high or low, three-fifths in the middle (+ or -2); intensity of affect toward President Johnson was distributed two-sixths high, one-sixth low, three-sixths in the middle.

²⁹ The intervals along this continuum have been labelled, for consistency and as a mnemonic device: Represented; +Unrepresented; Arepresented; -Unrepresented; Nonrepresented. These are not particularly felicitous terms; they are intended simply as shorthand references to operationally defined characteristics.

stimuli. In these cases the range of stimuli affecting attitudes would seem to be relatively devoid of instrumental or expressive content and could therefore be classified as extraneous.

The distinctions between referential, condensation, and extraneous stimuli are essentially distinctions between the amount of information packed into stimuli and the uses to which this information can be put. Referential stimuli carry a great deal of information which is instrumentally meaningful; condensation stimuli carry much less information, and what there is would be primarily of expressive meaning; extraneous stimuli, in this context, carry little or no instrumentally or expressively meaningful political information.³¹

³¹ For example, the following categories were employed for coding the range of perceived stimuli with respect to Congressman:

Perception of Instrumental Outputs. (In each category, some policy content is implied or specified.)

I favor (do not favor) his position or voting behavior on political issues.
 He has not carried out his campaign promises.
 He has worked for needed projects in the state or district.
 He has had many legislative acts passed which have benefitted his district.
 His voting behavior has emphasized concern with the problems both of his district and of the nation.
 His voting behavior has emphasized national interests above local interests.
 His voting behavior has represented (not represented) the majority feelings of his district.
 He has voted with his party in Congress.
 His voting behavior is too liberal (conservative).
 He has served the nation as a watchdog over the economy, defense establishment, etc.
 His interests are strongly urban (rural) and he has little understanding of rural (urban) problems.

Perception of Expressive Outputs. (In each category, policy content is unspecified.)

He is a member of the same party as I am; he is a member of the other party.
 He is a liberal (conservative)—socialist (fascist).
 He communicates (does not communicate) often with the people in his district.
 He has done a personal favor for me.
 Unlike his predecessor, he has been able to get the cooperation of many of the people in his district.
 He performs his job well: e.g., he has intro-

Thus the question-sets intended to tap the students' affective responses to the performance of political authorities measure the direction and intensity of affect vis-a-vis the performance of the political authorities object (strongly positive; moderately; slightly; neutral; slightly; moderately; strongly negative), and the range of performance outputs associated with the political authorities object (instrumental; expressive; extraneous). These dimensions of attitude were combined to form the sense of representation constructs according to the following rationale.

Sense of representation is assumed to be a continuous variable. At the high positive end of the continuum are attitudes characterized by strongly or moderately positive affect and perception of instrumental or expressive outputs. Such attitudes are considered to be indicative of the presence of positive representational linkages between citizens and political authorities. The citizen entertains either policy demands or emotional desires for symbolic reassurance that political threats are under control; he perceives outputs from the authorities which are relevant to his instrumental

duced important legislation; he speaks out well on important problems.

He does not perform his job well: e.g., he is too concerned with petty problems.

He is intelligent and capable: e.g., he went to Harvard; he is a lawyer.

His background suits him for our district: e.g., he is a member of the farm bureau.

He is concerned with great national problems.

He does not follow the party line, but stands up for his own opinion even if it is unpopular.

He is a pawn of those who contributed to his party fund—not independent enough of special interests.

He is carrying out (not carrying out) my beliefs.

He has been an active member of his party in national politics.

He supports (opposes) the present administration.

Perception of Extraneous Outputs.

He has a pleasant (unpleasant) personality—he is a friendly (unfriendly) man.

I like (dislike) him because of the influence of family and friends.

He keeps getting reelected so he must be doing a good job—he does not do anything.

I have not heard many favorable (unfavorable) remarks about him.

He is an admired (not an admired) man.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTIONS OF SENSE OF REPRESENTATION

Representation Congressman			Representation Congress			Representation President			Representation Supreme Court		
Group	N	Percent	Group	N	Percent	Group	N	Percent	Group	N	Percent
(R)	88	30	(R)	45	15	(R)	83	28	(R)	93	32
(+UR)	26	09	(+UR)	56	19	(+UR)	64	22	(+UR)	68	23
(AR)	147	50	(AR)	98	33	(AR)	35	12	(AR)	105	36
(-UR)	05	02	(-UR)	20	07	(-UR)	07	02	(-UR)	05	02
(NR)	27	09	(NR)	74	25	(NR)	104	36	(NR)	22	08
Totals	293	100%	Totals	293	99%*	Totals	293	100%	Totals	293	101%*

* Rounding error.

or expressive political interests; and he is strongly to moderately concerned about the performance of the authorities.

At the low positive end of the continuum are attitudes characterized by strongly or moderately positive affect and perception of extraneous outputs; as well as attitudes characterized by slight positive affect and perception of instrumental, expressive, or extraneous outputs. Such attitudes are considered to be indicative of habitual or apathetic support for political authorities: support which is either not of the intensity or not of the rudimentary cognitive sophistication to suggest the presence of politically meaningful representational linkages between citizen and authorities. Low affect intensity, regardless of the type of outputs perceived, is taken to mean that the presence or absence of representational linkages with the authorities is not an important concern of the citizen; perception of extraneous outputs, regardless of the level of affect intensity, is taken to mean that the citizen is unaware of how the authorities might "stand" for him or "represent" his interests (if he has any).

At the midpoint of the continuum are attitudes characterized by, in most instances, the fact that particular political authorities or groups of authorities are simply not visible to the citizen.³² Attitudes located at the low and

high negative intervals are exactly the obverse of attitudes at the low and high positive intervals. To call attention to the distinguishing characteristics of these intervals in a more meaningful way than simply calling them high positive, low positive, etc., they have been labelled as follows: Represented, +Unrepresented, Arepresented, -Unrepresented, Non-represented.

Table 1 presents the distributions among these students on the four sense-of-representation scales.³³ The incidence of positive representational linkages with Congressman and Supreme Court is substantially greater than the incidence of negative representational linkages. Negative representational linkages with Congress and President outweigh positive representational linkages, although these students manifest far more positive than negative habitual/apathetic support (the +UR and -UR levels) toward these objects.

Considering representation in legislative bodies, these students show a greater tendency to be unaware of, or not to have an opinion about, their Congressman than is the case with respect to Congress. Most of their neutrality toward their Congressman is due to his lack of visibility, paralleling this phenomenon among the general population.³⁴ However,

Johnson (judging from comments written in the margins), some respondents who selected the "Don't Know" option did so because their evaluation was neutral, not because they were unaware of the performance of the object.

³³ Three cases could not be coded because respondents reported "favorable" evaluations with the qualification "in terms of the interests of the ruling class," or in terms of the interests of Capitalism [Imperialism].

³⁴ See Stokes and Miller, "Party Government . . .," p. 540; the data reported at p. 340 of

³² Unfortunately, screening questions comparable to the Congressman item (e.g., "Have you been following the activities of Congress lately?") were not included in the other question-sets. Thus, the assumption must be made that respondents who selected the "Don't Know" option when requested to make a summary evaluation, did so because they were unaware of the performance of that object. In general, examination of the protocols indicates that this assumption is tenable; however, particularly in the case of President

among those who do have an opinion, three-fifths feel that his performance represents their interests, and only one-fifth feel that his performance does not represent their interests. By contrast, only about one-fifth of those who have an opinion about the 90th Congress feel that its performance represents their interests, and about two-fifths feel that its performance does not represent their interests. These distributions can be interpreted as underscoring the importance of individual legislator-constituent linkages. To be sure, the majority of these positive representational linkages with Congressman involve perceptions of expressive (77%) rather than instrumental (23%) outputs—these students' images of their Congressman, like those of the general public, are remarkably free of policy content.³⁵ However, although a Congressman may not be visible to many of his constituents, these data are consistent with the Stokes and Miller finding that "in the main, recognition carries a positive valence; to be perceived at all is to be perceived favorably;"³⁶ and they suggest that the probability may be high that, if representation is conceived as involving more than just demand-response congruence, a Congressman will be the source of positive representational linkages.

III. CONSTRUCT VALIDITY OF SENSE OF REPRESENTATION

The first priority of this investigation is to test the validity of the representation construct. Construct validation involves deriving from the theory which has generated the construct other constructs which may be expected to be related to the construct of interest, and then formulating and testing the relevant hypotheses.³⁷ Theoretically, the sense-of-representation construct incorporates distinctions between knowledge about the performance of political authorities and distinctions between intensity of affective response to political authorities. Thus, if the intervals of the sense-of-representation construct actually do entail such distinctions, sense of representation

Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States*; Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), p. 493.

³⁵ See Stokes and Miller, "Party Government . . ."

³⁶ Stokes and Miller, "Party Government . . ."

³⁷ See L. Cronbach, *Essentials of Psychological Testing* (New York: Harper & Row, 2nd ed., 1960).

should be nonlinearly related to measures of political knowledge and measures of level of interest in politics, and the form of the relationship should best be described by a quadratic function rule; that is, the relationship should tend to fit the shape of a parabola. The Represented and Nonrepresented should be higher on political knowledge and interest in politics than the +Unrepresented, -Unrepresented, and Arepresented; in turn, the +Unrepresented and -Unrepresented should be higher on political knowledge and interest in politics than the Arepresented.

To test this hypothesis, first the eta coefficient—or correlation ratio—is computed. This coefficient measures the strength of association assuming any form of relationship.³⁸ Next, the amount of variation that can be explained by linear regression is computed. The difference between the amount of variation explained assuming any form of relationship, and the amount of variation explained assuming a linear relationship, reflects the tendency toward nonlinearity in the data; analysis of variance is employed to test for the presence of nonlinearity.³⁹ Assuming that nonlinearity is found to be present in each relationship, the method of planned comparisons among means, using orthogonal polynomial weights, can be used to test whether the relationship best fits the hypothesized function rule.⁴⁰

³⁸ See J. P. Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 4th edition, 1965), pp. 308-317.

³⁹ The formula is: $(\eta^2 - r^2)(N - k) / (1 - \eta^2)(k - 2)$

⁴⁰ A good introductory discussion of this procedure appears in George A. Ferguson, *Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 2nd edition, 1966), Ch. 21. For a more comprehensive treatment see William L. Hays, *Statistics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), esp. pp. 539-562. The computing formula used here is that suggested by Hays.

The use of orthogonal polynomial weights, and of course the use of linear regression, is based on the assumption of equal intervals. One good reason for assuming interval measurement, even if such is only approximately the case, is that considerably more information can be gained from the data. Also, even if the data is "truly" ordinal, order-based measures of association leave much to be desired. Gamma always overestimates the degree of association, and is a measure of one-way association rather than co-relation. Tau-B and Tau-C have no simple interpretation; also, like r , they range between + or -1 only if the

A composite scale, which is a linear combination of political knowledge and level of interest in politics, was constructed according to the following procedure. Three measures of political knowledge and one measure of interest in politics were subjected to a principal components analysis.⁴¹ With the minimum eigenvalue set at 1.0, the four variables loaded at

bivariate distribution is perfectly congruent. Interval statistics have been used in this analysis because it was felt that they would best describe the data.

A word is also in order with respect to the use of tests of statistical significance in this analysis. Strictly speaking, they do not apply to this sample. *But*, they do serve as a useful—if arbitrary—guide to the acceptance of *some* relationship, however slight; or to the rejection of a relationship, as being too slight to matter, in terms of what might be expected from further replication.

⁴¹ A 4-point General Political Knowledge scale was constructed from the sum of correct responses to the following three items:

- (1) Do you happen to remember the names of any of the Chairmen of the Congressional Committees?
- (2) Which political party elected the most members to the House of Representatives in 1966?
- (3) If you remember how many justices there are on the Supreme Court, write the number in the following space.

In order to measure the respondent's awareness of Congressional policy-making activities, a list of eleven policy items was posed and respondents were asked to report whether Congress passed or did not pass each item during its 1967 session (e.g., "a bill authorizing the appropriations requested by the President for Rent Supplements," etc.); a similar procedure was followed in order to measure the respondent's awareness of Presidential policy-making, in this case, respondents being asked to report whether President Johnson did or did not propose each item (e.g., "a resolution favoring the principle of greater economic assistance to Latin American," etc.). The items were developed from sections reporting the policy activities of the Presidency and the Congress in the Spring, 1968 *Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government*. There was no overlap between the Congressional and Presidential policy items. The resulting Congressional Policy Knowledge and Presidential Policy Knowledge scales were 4-point scales based on quartiles of correct responses. The measure of interest in politics is a 4-point scale based on respondents' reports of how often they read about public

greater than .500 on one principal factor, and this factor accounted for more than 40 percent of the item variance. Factor scores were then computed according to the complete estimation method.⁴² The resulting scale was labelled Attention to Politics.


The relationship between Attention to Politics and the construct intended to measure sense of representation by Congressman is shown in Figure 1. The overall association between Representation Congressman and Attention to Politics is .324 and the explained variation is 10.5 percent. Linear regression accounts for none of this variation. The mean Attention to Politics scores at each Representation Congressman interval suggest that, as hypothesized, the relationship between Attention to Politics and Representation Congressman best fits a quadratic function rule. Those who feel that their Congressman's performance does represent their interests ($\bar{X}=28.48$) or does not represent their interests ($\bar{X}=22.96$), manifest the highest average Attention to Politics scores; a Congressman's habitual/apathetic supporters ($\bar{X}=34.62$) and opponents ($\bar{X}=35.80$) manifest the next lowest average Attention to Politics scores; least of all attentive to politics is the individual whose Congressman is not a salient political object ($\bar{X}=41.08$). Comparison of these means by the method of orthogonal polynomials shows that the moderate nonlinear correlation between these two variables is due, for the most part, to a quadratic trend.

A linear trend is described, of course, by a straight line—or a "curve" with no bends. A quadratic trend is described by a curve with one bend; a cubic trend by a curve with two bends, a quartic trend by a curve with three bends; etc. Since Representation Congressman is a five-point scale, a quintic trend would fit the means exactly—and provide no information at all about the relationship, simply because *any* set of means for a five-point scale can be fitted exactly by a quintic function rule. The best description of any relationship between two variables is provided by the lowest order function rule—or trend—which best fits the distribution of means or points. The analysis of variance table for the relationship between Attention to Politics and Representation Congressman shows that the F test for the quadratic trend is statistically significant.

affairs in magazines: "Nearly Every Day" through "Very Rarely."

⁴² See Harry H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition, 1967), pp. 350-360.

Fig. 1. Attention to Politics and Sense of Representation by Congressman



Source of Variation	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F	
Quadratic	1	5109	13.24	$p < .001$
Other	3	2664		
Within	288	386		
Total	292			
		$\eta_{xy} = .324$	$\eta_{xy}^2 = .105$	
			$r^2 = .005$	

cant at the .001 level. The mean square for other trends of 2664 is considerably less than the mean square for the quadratic trend, which is 5109. Therefore, it is apparent that the relationship best fits a quadratic function rule; no higher order function rules will provide a better description.⁴³


Figure 2 shows the relationship between Attention to Politics and sense of representation by Congress. The mean Attention to Politics scores at each Representation Congress

⁴³ Since unequal numbers of cases are located at each interval on these sense of representation scales, only one trend component can be tested by the procedure of orthogonal polynomials. However, this is no constraint here, because the purpose is to test only one trend component (of a higher order than the linear); the possible power of any cubic and quartic trends can be assessed from inspection of the other trends mean square—but there is no need to separately test such trends. Trend analysis with unequal n's is discussed at pp. 351-352 of Ferguson, *Statistical Analysis* . . .

interval again suggest that the hypothesized quadratic function rule best describes the relationship between the two variables. The eta coefficient of .297 indicates a moderate overall correlation. The F test for nonlinearity is statistically significant at the .001 level. The analysis of variance table shows that the F test for the quadratic trend is also statistically significant at the .001 level. Again, the mean square for other trends of 1608 is considerably less than the quadratic mean square, which is 6094. It is apparent that no function rules of higher order than the quadratic will provide a better description of the relationship.

The quadratic trend, as measured by the correlation ratio, is less strong for the Attention to Politics-Representation Congress relationship than it is for the Attention to Politics-Representation Congressman relationship. Those who feel that the performance of the 90th Congress does represent their interests ($\bar{X} = 30.53$) or does not represent their interests ($\bar{X} = 26.64$), manifest the highest average Attention to Politics scores; and those for whom the 90th Congress is not a salient political

FIG. 2. Attention to Politics and Sense of Representation by Congress



Source of Variation	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F	
Quadratic	1	6084	15.44	$p < .001$
Other	3	1608		
Within	288	394		
Total	292	$\eta_{xy} = .297$	$\eta_{xy}^2 = .088$ $r^2 = .020$	$F = 7.15$ $p < .001$


object ($\bar{X}=40.70$) are the least attentive to politics. However, the mean Attention to Politics score for habitual/apathetic supporters of the 90th Congress ($\bar{X}=40.27$) is practically the same as the mean score for those located at the Arepresented interval, and the mean for habitual/apathetic opponents of the 90th Congress ($\bar{X}=32.75$) is not very much lower than the mean for those located at the Represented interval. Thus, while the relationship between Attention to Politics and Representation Congress does fit the shape of a parabolic curve, as hypothesized, it is also evident that the intended distinctions between the Represented Congress intervals are somewhat less clear than in the case of the sense of representation by Congressman construct.

Figure 3 shows the relationship between Attention to Politics and Representation President. Of the four measures of sense of representation, the intended distinctions between intervals are least clear with respect to the object of President. The eta coefficient of .151 indicates a slight overall correlation. Linear regression obviously accounts for none of

the explained variation. The analysis of variance table shows that the F test for the quadratic trend is statistically significant, but only at the .05 level. The mean square for other trends is even smaller than the mean square within groups—the error variance—thus indicating that other trends are completely irrelevant.

Since the quadratic trend for the Attention to Politics-Representation President relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level, the Representation President measure has been used in the investigation of relationships between representation, legitimacy, and behavioral support, which follows this section. Really, however, with an eta as low as .151, the only justification for using the Representation President measure is that this is an "exploratory" study. It is clear where the problem lies. The mean Attention to Politics score for the Arepresented ($\bar{X}=37.69$) is *higher* than the mean scores for President Johnson's habitual/apathetic supporters ($\bar{X}=39.11$) and opponents ($\bar{X}=43.29$), whereas, if the distinctions between these intervals were as intended, the opposite would be the

Fig. 3. Attention to Politics and Sense of Representation by President



Sense of Representation by President .					
	$\bar{X} = 32.15$	39.11	37.69	43.29	33.18
Source of Variation	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F		
Quadratic	1	2177	5.16	p < .05	
Other	3	219			
Within	288	422			
Total	292	$\eta_{xy} = .151$	$\eta_{xy}^2 = .033$		
			$r^2 = .000$		

case. As expected, those who feel that President Johnson's performance does represent their interest ($\bar{X} = 32.15$) or does not represent their interests ($\bar{X} = 33.18$), manifest the highest average Attention to Politics scores. But it seems likely that for many individuals located at the Arepresented interval, President Johnson is a salient political object—but at the same time an object of neutral evaluation.

Turning to Figure 4, the relationship between Representation Supreme Court and Attention to Politics is strongest of all. The eta coefficient of .398 indicates the presence of a relatively strong relationship. The F test for nonlinearity is statistically significant at the .001 level. The other trends mean square of 4706 is less than the quadratic trend mean square of 5534. Thus, as hypothesized, the relationship between Attention to Politics and Representation Supreme Court best fits the shape of a parabolic curve.

The data presented in Figures 1-4 confirm the construct validity of Representation Congressman, Representation Congress, and Representation Supreme Court. The construct

validity of Representation President is questionable.


IV. REPRESENTATION, LEGITIMACY, AND BEHAVIORAL SUPPORT

In order to maintain itself in a relatively stable state the political system must be able to cope with those disturbances which produce stress. Support, Easton argues, "becomes the major summary variable linking a system to its environment."⁴⁴ One of the major conditions of political stability-instability, then, is the ability of the political system to generate and maintain minimal levels of affective and behavioral support on the part of its members for the central political objects: authorities, regime, and community.

Support most immediately relevant to the stability-instability of political systems is that which Easton terms overt support—supportive behavior. Withdrawals of behavioral support directly stress political systems by inhibiting the conversion of demands into outputs by the

⁴⁴ Easton, *A Systems Analysis* . . . , p. 156.

Fig. 4. Attention to Politics and Sense of Representation by Supreme Court



authorities, threatening the persistence of regimes, and eventually producing complete collapse of the system. Associated with the withdrawal of behavioral support are the turmoil and revolutionary dimensions of civil strife.⁴⁵ Thus the survival of authorities, regime, and the political community itself depends on the effective development and maintenance of behavioral support. An important question, then is to ascertain the sources of behavioral support. Sense of representation and legitimacy are obviously two antecedents worth investigating.

The four sense-of-representation variables have been discussed. Following Easton's conceptualization of the dimensions of legitimacy, measures of ideological, structural, and personal legitimacy have been constructed.⁴⁶ Regime values are the objects of ideological

legitimacy. Legitimizing ideologies are sets of values which validate the power of the authorities and regime. In Dahl's discussion of the prevailing American ideology, a set of five such values is identified: (1) popular government; (2) the constitutional system; (3) observance of legal processes of change; (4) the virtues of private property; (5) equal opportunity for all to succeed.⁴⁷ The Agree Legitimizing Ideology variable is a summated scale constructed from items measuring each of these values.⁴⁸ Congress and the Supreme Court are the objects of structural legitimacy included in this investigation. Legitimacy Congress and Legitimacy Supreme Court are variables intended to measure the degree

⁴⁷ See Robert A. Dahl, "The American Oppositions: Affirmation and Denial," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

⁴⁸ The construction of these variables is discussed at length, and the exact wording of the questions reported in Muller, "Correlates and Consequences . . ."

⁴⁵ A useful discussion of these dimensions is in Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, 20 (1968), 272-277.

⁴⁶ These dimensions are discussed in Chs. 18 and 19 of Easton, *A Systems Analysis . . .*

TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS (R) BETWEEN SENSE OF REPRESENTATION, LEGITIMACY, AND BEHAVIORAL SUPPORT

	Sense of Representation			Legitimacy			Support	
	Represent- ation Congress	Represent- ation President	Represent- ation Supreme Court	Legitimacy Congress	Legitimacy Supreme Court	Agree Legit- imating Ideology	Trust Govern- ment	Avoid Protest Action
Representation Congressman	.047	.127	-.032	.179	.105	.204	.174	.218
Representation Congress		.188	-.010	.357	.118	.241	.295	.166
Representation President			.006	.207	.125	.214	.385	.289
Representation Supreme Court				.058	.403	-.008	.053	-.097

to which these institutions are felt to be morally appropriate. The political authorities, of course, are the objects of personal legitimacy. Personal legitimacy sentiments may be directed toward particular individuals; the phenomenon of charismatic leadership is an example. General feelings of trust-distrust in the political authorities considered collectively are an equally if not more important source of personal legitimacy sentiments in political systems. The measure of personal legitimacy, Trust Government, is based on the SRC political trust items. Finally, Avoid Protest Action, the measure of behavioral support, has been constructed from items measuring behavioral intentions to avoid joining non-violent protest demonstrations, avoid joining violent protest demonstrations, and avoid violating laws.

Table 2 shows the intercorrelations between the sense of representation measures, and the correlations between sense of representation and legitimacy and behavioral support. There is some tendency for students to associate their sense of representation by their Congressman with their sense of representation by President Johnson, and to associate their sense of representation by the 90th Congress with their sense of representation by President Johnson; but these correlations are of relatively slight magnitude. Representation Congressman and Representation Congress are quite unrelated: the performance of individual Congressmen and the collective performance of the 90th Congress provide independent sources of representational linkages with this legislative institution. Also, the performance of the Warren Court is not connected in any way to the performance of the other three objects.

The clear tendency is for individuals to perceive the performance of any one political authority or group of authorities as distinct

from the performance of other authorities. The sense of representation relationships tend not to overlap.

Through processes of political socialization, legitimacy sentiments are learned at an early age. At least in the American political system, the high-school age child has developed quite firmly entrenched ideological, structural, and personal legitimacy sentiments.⁴⁹ But, as the child matures, these legitimacy beliefs do not exist in a vacuum. The performance of particular political authorities and groups of authorities may be expected, to some extent, to buttress or contribute to the erosion of legitimacy beliefs.

Of all the authority level objects included in this research design, the performance of the individual Congressman is least consequential in the overall determination of outputs. Certainly, some Congressmen wield substantial political power by virtue of committee chairmanships, etc. But, of course, it is the performance of the President, Congress as a whole, and the Supreme Court as a whole which is most consequential in the determination of outputs. Since legitimacy is a very general or diffuse type of affect, initially learned quite independently of specific performance, it would be expected that members would tend to associate only the performance of the most consequential authority level objects with their legitimacy beliefs. Table 2 shows that, among those students, this is in fact the case.

The correlations between Representation Congressman and legitimacy are slight: only the relationship with Agree Legitimizing

⁴⁹ See, for example, David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (1962); David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," 361 *The Annals*, (1965).

Ideology reaches the .200 level. On the other hand, the correlations between Representation Congress and legitimacy are the largest of all. As would be expected, the collective performance of the 90th Congress is most strongly associated with the degree of legitimacy accorded to this institution. Sense of representation by Congress also makes a moderate contribution to the buttressing or erosion of diffuse trust in the political authorities, and to agreement-disagreement with the legitimating ideology. Other research suggests that Americans may regard Congress as the focal point of their government.⁵⁰ Prior investigation of these data has indicated that, in terms of psychological constraint between legitimacy beliefs, and in terms of impact on behavioral support, Congress is apparently a more important regime structure than the Supreme Court.⁵¹ The correlations between Representation Congress and legitimacy underscore the centrality of this institution with respect to levels of diffuse affective support for authorities and regime.

The sense of representation which most strongly buttresses or erodes diffuse trust in the authorities is that with the President: the correlation between Representation President and Trust Government is .385. Otherwise, the correlations between Representation President and legitimacy are rather small.

These students associate the collective performance of the Warren Court with the legitimacy which they accord to the Supreme Court as a regime structure. However, absolutely no connection is made between the collective performance of the Warren Court and the other objects of legitimacy sentiments. Also, there is hardly any relation to speak of between the legitimacy accorded to the Court and the other objects of representational linkages. Although support for the Supreme Court is high, the Court is apparently perceived as a rather remote institution, with little consequence for affect directed toward other political objects.

The gross effects of sense of representation on behavioral support are generally moderate to slight; sense of representation by the Supreme Court has no effect on behavioral support. In contrast to the case of legitimacy sentiments, it is Representation President, not Representation Congress, which is associated

most closely with behavioral intention to avoid or engage in various types of disruptive protest action. Of the three sense of representation relationships which do affect Avoid Protest Action, Representation Congress shows the least gross impact. The moderate impact of Representation President is not surprising; because the President is such a powerful political object in the American system, his performance likely would have some effect on behavioral support—especially so in the case of an extremely active and visible President like Lyndon Johnson. Yet, given the relevance for affect toward other political objects shown by support for Congress, it might also be expected that the magnitude of the Representation Congress-Avoid Protest Action correlation would approach, if not surpass, the size of the Representation President-Avoid Protest Action Correlation. But, among these students, it is their sense of representation by individual authorities that has the most effect on their intentions to avoid or engage in disruptive protest action. Perhaps, however, the effect of Representation President on Avoid Protest Action might fluctuate to some extent, depending on the personality of the particular occupant of this office.

Of course, none of the separate correlations between sense of representation and behavioral support for the regime are particularly sizeable. Excluding the Supreme Court in both instances, the average correlation between sense of representation and Avoid Protest Action is .224, whereas the average correlation between legitimacy and Avoid Protest Action is .373. Not surprisingly, legitimacy sentiments are a more important source of behavioral support for the regime than sense of representation. However, the relevance of sense of representation is by no means negligible.

A major purpose of this project was to test the construct validity hypothesis. A second hypothesis is: *the effect of legitimacy beliefs on behavioral support will be strong and largely direct, the effect of sense of representation by political authorities will be, for the most part, indirect, via legitimacy, and legitimacy and sense of representation taken together will have relatively substantial impact on intentions to extend or withdraw behavioral support.* In other words, there should be a relatively strong tendency for legitimacy and behavioral support to covary positively, regardless of sense of representation; there should be an even stronger tendency for legitimacy and representation together to covary positively with behavioral support; but there should also be a slight tendency for individuals high on legitimacy to be low on be-

⁵⁰ See Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 146; Easton and Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," pp. 48-49.

⁵¹ See Muller, "Correlates and Consequences . . ."

havioral support if they are also low on sense of representation and, conversely, for individuals low on legitimacy to be high on behavioral support if they are also high on sense of representation.

From Table 3 it can be seen that the multiple correlation between representation, considered separately, and Avoid Protest Action is .370—a moderate total impact, accounting for 13.7 percent of the variance in Avoid Protest Action. It is apparent that the effect of representation on behavioral support is to some extent cumulative. While no single representation linkage correlates with Avoid Protest Action at greater than .289, taking all three into account does produce a measurable increase in the gross effect. However, only about 50 percent of this total impact is attributable to direct effects, as shown by the multiple-partial correlation of .190; the other 50 percent is indirect, depending on the extent to which an individual's sense of representation buttresses or erodes his legitimacy sentiments. Thus the impact of sense of representation on behavioral support is more direct than hypothesized; nevertheless, a considerable portion of the total effect is indirect.

The multiple correlation between legitimacy, considered separately, and Avoid Protest Action is .472—a sizeable total impact, accounting for 22.3 percent of the variance in Avoid Protest Action. And about 75 percent of this total effect is direct, as shown by the multiple-partial correlation of .363. Although it was expected that legitimacy might account for more of the variance than is the case here, the relationship is, nevertheless, fairly strong. Also, as hypothesized, direct effects comprise by

far the major portion of the total impact of an individual's beliefs on his intentions to extend or withdraw behavioral support.

The multiple correlation between representation and legitimacy, taken together, and Avoid Protest Action is .501—accounting for 25.1 percent of the variance in Avoid Protest Action. This can be interpreted as evidence that representation and legitimacy together have a relatively substantial impact on behavioral support—given that some of these measures are rather crude (particularly the dependent variable, which could stand improvement with respect to the number of items used to construct the measure); that the condition of a multivariate normal correlation surface (that is, distributions of congruent shape) is not met; and that the explanation of behavior at the level of individuals is more complex and more subject to random variation, than is the explanation of behavior at the level of *aggregate* units of individuals (that is, explanation of the average behavior of numerous individuals).

Of course, adding the sense of representation variables to the regression equation does not increase predictive power much beyond that obtaining for the impact of legitimacy beliefs alone on Avoid Protest Action. However, with respect to *explaining* rather than predicting behavioral support, sense of representation is clearly a variable cluster of some importance. The performance of political authorities certainly affects behavioral support, but much of this effect depends on the extent to which individuals associate this performance with their legitimacy sentiments; and the collective performance of legislative bodies as well as the performance of powerful individual authorities such as the American President, is associated, if only moderately with legitimacy sentiments.

Now, if sense of representation and legitimacy do affect behavioral support according to the pattern hypothesized, a question of some import for system stability-instability centers on the magnitude of the indirect effect of representation. Sense of representation was not found to be correlated closely with legitimacy beliefs among these students at the time of this study; nor was sense of representation closely associated with behavioral support. Behavioral support was found to depend mainly on legitimacy beliefs which were not bound up strongly with the political authorities' performance of the moment—as ought to be the case in a well-functioning democracy, where the performance of the authorities ideally ought to be a focus of positive and negative affect, but affect which is not

TABLE 3. THE IMPACT OF SENSE OF REPRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY ON BEHAVIORAL SUPPORT

	Behavioral Support Avoid Protest Action	
	multiple R	multiple- partial r
Representation Congressman	.370	.190
Representation Congress		
Representation President		
Legitimacy Congress	.472	.363
Agree Legitimizing Ideology		
Trust Government		
Representation + Legitimacy	.501	

foundation for the stability of the regime (affect which is not closely bound up with legitimacy). However, if sense of representation were to become correlated highly with legitimacy beliefs and with behavioral support (if sense of representation were to show strong indirect effects on behavioral support via legitimacy), satisfaction-dissatisfaction with the performance of the authorities would become the foundation for regime stability-instability. And such a foundation could be insecure indeed.

V. CONCLUSION

Representation linkages between citizens and political authorities have been conceived as a type of specific or performance support. An operational construct for empirically measuring citizens' sense of representation by authority level objects was proposed. The validity of four sense of representation scales (Congressman, Congress, President, Supreme Court) was tested. It was hypothesized that if

the sense of representation measure is a valid construct, the relationship between each sense of representation scale and an Attention to Politics scale should best be described by a quadratic function rule. In each case, the data confirm the hypothesis, although the Representation President-Attention to Politics relationship shows a rather weak fit.

Relationships between representation, legitimacy and behavioral support were investigated. Sense of representation was found to be slightly to moderately associated with legitimacy beliefs and behavioral intention to extend or withdraw support. With respect to buttressing or eroding legitimacy beliefs, sense of representation by Congress was found to have the most important effects. Sense of representation was also found to have slight to moderate gross effects on behavioral support: however, much of this impact was indirect, as hypothesized, depending on the extent to which sense of representation was associated with legitimacy.

DIMENSIONS OF CANDIDATE EVALUATION*

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The story of a presidential election year is in many ways the story of the actions and interactions of those considered as possible candidates for their nation's highest office. If this is true in the abstract, it certainly was true in the election of 1968. The political headlines of 1968 were captured by those who ran for the nominations of their parties, those who pondered over whether or not to run, those who chose to pull out of the race or were struck down during the campaign, those who raised a third party banner, and those who resisted suggestions to run outside the two-party structure. While 1968 may have been unusual in the extent to which many prospective candidates dominated the political scene, every presidential election is, in its own way, highlighted by those considered for the office of President.

The political scientist has shown scholarly interest in the candidates. His interest, however, has been selective in its focus—mainly concentrating on the two actual party nominees and not the larger set of possible presidential candidates. Research in electoral behavior has detailed the popular image of the nominees in terms of the public's reactions to their record and experience, personal qualities, and party affiliation. Furthermore, attitudes toward the nominees have been shown to constitute a major short-term influence on the vote.¹ Yet attitudes

toward other candidates have been surveyed only to ascertain the behavior of those people who favored someone other than the ultimate nominees. The focus in the discipline remains on the nominees—feelings toward them and willingness to accept them.

As research moves from an exclusive concern with explanation of the election outcomes, more scholarly attention should be given to popular attitudes toward the full spectrum of possible candidates. Much remains to be learned about voters' perceptions of the candidates. We still know very little about the psychological dimensions of meaning involved in how an individual perceives, reacts to, and evaluates a set of candidates. We know little about the more general organizing concepts a person uses in developing the specific perceptions and reactions described in contemporary voting and public opinion surveys. In this paper, we shall seek a dimensional interpretation of the individual's perceptions of and preferences for candidates. Extending the set of candidates beyond the bounds of the two nominees allows us to search out broader meanings of candidate evaluation.

While little is known about the factors leading to differing patterns of candidate evaluation, the voting behavior literature suggests a variety of factors as relevant guidelines in any initial inquiries. The most obvious long-term factor is partisan identification. This psychological attachment to party has been treated as a major influence on the vote and research has shown that it can color voters' perceptions of the nominees. The various twists such a factor can take with a larger set of candidates will be a continuing theme of this paper.

Additional factors which may affect candidate evaluation include a person's ideology, the issues

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¹ See, for example, A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and

W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); D. E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," this REVIEW, 60 (March 1966), 19-28.

of the day, and the personality of the candidates. The crucial task is to distinguish which of these factors are important. A related theoretical question is the number of dimensions used as bases for candidate evaluation.

The pioneering work on the modelling of party competition by Anthony Downs was based on a unidimensional ideological continuum.² As Stokes has pointed out, Downs's notion of a unidimensional political space is only an assumption, since party competition could instead easily roam over a multidimensional space.³ The problem of the number of dimensions should be seen as an empirical question. Evidence from surveys indicates that the American public often sees issues in multidimensional terms. Most researchers using dimensional analysis techniques on European multi-party systems have also found the assumption of a single ideological dimension to be inadequate. A prime example is Converse's skillful analysis of the French political scene which found two dimensions being used for the evaluation of that country's many parties.⁴ Exploration of the dimensionality of perceptions of candidates in the United States may be one means of testing the dimensionality of the competition space within which national choices of leadership are made.

I. THE THERMOMETER QUESTION

The specific focus of this study will be on individual reactions to a set of twelve candidates for national office. Data will be taken from the interviews of over one thousand respondents in the 1968 election study of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. A measure was needed to obtain the feelings of the respondents toward the several candidates. We felt that the respondent should be allowed to use those dimensions which come naturally to him, which are his normal guidelines for thinking about candidates. By obtaining such responses without imposing a frame of reference, it becomes possible in the analysis to deduce the dimensions of importance in the thought of individuals. We have employed a measuring device called the "feeling thermometer" which provides one such neutrally worded means of eliciting responses to a wide variety of candidates.

² A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

³ D. E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," this REVIEW, 57 (June 1963), 368-377.

⁴ P. E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in M. K. Jennings and L. H. Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

Basically a "feeling thermometer" is a question asking respondents to indicate on a 0-to-100-degree temperature scale how warm or cold they feel toward a set of objects—in this case, candidates.⁵ If a person feels particularly warm or favorable toward a political figure, he would give that candidate a score somewhere between 50 and 100, depending on how warm his feeling was toward that candidate. If he felt cold or unfavorable toward that candidate, 0 to 50 degrees would be the appropriate scoring range. The actual score of 50 degrees was explained to the respondent to be for candidates about whom he felt neither particularly warm nor cold, a neutral point on the scale. To make the thermometer scale more concrete, a card listing nine temperatures throughout the scale range and their corresponding verbal meanings as to intensity of "hot" or "cold" feelings was handed to the respondent. A separate statement in the question wording attempted to elicit "don't know" responses to individual candidates when appropriate.

The twelve people the respondents were asked to rate on the feeling thermometer covered a wide range of possible presidential hopefuls and ideological streams. The names listed included the actual presidential nominees themselves—Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace—and their vice-presidential running mates. Lyndon Johnson was included, being the incumbent President and considered at one time to be a candidate for reelection. The other five mentioned were the main presidential hopefuls discussed at length in the media who failed to get their parties' nominations—Eugene McCarthy, Ronald Reagan, Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney, and the late Robert Kennedy. This list is somewhat arbitrary, as any list of presidential hopefuls must be. Having the respondents rate twelve candidates is a reasonable task in a survey setting and yet provides enough information for a dimensional analysis of the candidate space. The vice-presidential nominees were included on a basically presidential-oriented list because of the use of the vice-presidential candidates as an issue in the 1968 campaign and the fact that they

⁵ The thermometer question followed the basic format devised by A. R. Clausen for previous Survey Research Center studies, but was revised by the authors to apply to candidates rather than groups and to screen out "don't know" responses. The full wording of the question is given in the appendix. For other analysis involving this question in the 1968 election study, see P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, J. G. Rusk, and A. C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics," this REVIEW, 63 (December 1969), 1083-1105.

are increasingly considered to be an integral part of the presidential race.

The responses to the twelve candidates can initially be conceived of as indicating each individual's feelings toward each given candidate. Additionally, we shall interpret the relative scores given to the candidates as indicating a person's preference order for these twelve candidates. A respondent is assumed to prefer most the candidate to whom he gives the highest score, and so on. While it must be admitted that there may not be a perfect correspondence between an individual's relative scores and his preference order, the use of the thermometer question constitutes one of the simplest means of obtaining preference orders over a large number of alternatives in a survey of the mass public. More conventional ranking of a dozen candidates would constitute a very difficult task for many respondents, whereas scoring the candidates on the thermometer scale was generally painless.

It should be pointed out that the thermometer question was asked *after* the election. This timing is likely to have affected the ratings of the candidates. A "bandwagon effect" in favor of president-elect Nixon must be considered likely. Humphrey was also probably evaluated much more favorably at this point of time than he would have been during the early part of the campaign, due to a combination of the increased party unity on his behalf and sympathy for his defeat. The tragedy of the assassination of Robert Kennedy could be expected to yield a more favorable rating for him than would have been obtained from a measurement during the period in which he was actively campaigning. Finally the vice-presidential candidates were probably near their peak of saliency at the moment of this study. The timing of the question will influence our measure of the relative appeal of the candidates, but we shall be able to minimize its effect on the dimensional analysis.

The first thing to explore about the data obtained from the thermometer question is their basic statistical parameters. By statistical parameters we mean the level of saliency of the candidates and the differences in assessments of them as reflected in their central tendency and dispersion figures. Table 1 summarizes such descriptive features for the candidates included in the 1968 study.

An initial glance at the percentage of "don't know" replies in Table 1 comments to some extent on the saliency of each candidate. The names of the candidates in 1968 were generally recognized by the public. The question was deliberately worded to invite "don't know" replies to the candidates when relevant, but very few

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS

Candidate	Don't Know	50°	Standard Deviation	Mean	First Choice Mentions*	Last Choice Mentions*
Kennedy	1%	13%	26	70.1	43%	8%
Nixon	1	16	23	66.5	36	8
Humphrey	1	14	27	61.7	25	13
Muskie	8	31	22	61.4	16	10
Johnson	1	15	26	58.4	17	14
McCarthy	5	32	23	54.8	11	11
Rockefeller	4	30	22	53.8	9	15
Agnew	7	41	21	50.4	4	13
Reagan	5	34	22	49.1	5	17
Romney	8	46	19	49.0	3	15
LeMay	7	29	26	35.2	3	40
Wallace	2	13	31	31.4	11	62
N's	1315-1326	1210-1311	1210-1311	1210-1311	1304	1304

* These columns add up to more than 100 percent because a respondent could give the same highest or lowest score to several candidates.

were given. The greatest proportion of "don't know" responses was only 8 percent for Romney and Muskie. The only other candidates receiving more than 6 percent "don't know's" were the remaining vice-presidential candidates. In particular, Humphrey, Nixon, Wallace, Johnson, and Kennedy were nearly universally recognized.

Although the surface level of saliency was high, a substantial number of the thermometer scores did not indicate whether the respondent felt particularly warm or cold toward a given candidate. A score of 50 degrees could indicate either ambivalent feelings or no opinion. The proportions of 50's for the presidential nominees the incumbent President, and the late Senator Kennedy were all quite small, but the other candidates showed a sizable concentration of such scores. The large number of 50 scores reflects a substantial lack of affective feeling toward some of the candidates and, in turn, qualifies our earlier discussion of their saliency. Some of the candidates are perceived in the most superficial terms while others have a more central place in the respondents' cognitive structures. There appears to be a major threshold for public evaluation of the candidates which can be passed only through an event of great importance such as the actual nomination. This threshold has implications for the subsequent analysis in that the differences in evaluations of the candidates could be related to their differences in saliency.

In general, the candidates were favorably perceived. The mean values in Table 1 show that most of the twelve political figures were given thermometer scores greater than 50, the break-even or neutral point on the scale.⁶ Only

⁶ Mean values of all the candidates were drawn

George Wallace and his running mate Curtis LeMay scored significantly below 50. In fact over 60 percent of the sample gave George Wallace the lowest score that they gave to any of the candidates, a strong indication that he never succeeded in making a serious appeal to a majority of the electorate. On the popular side of the ledger, the late Robert Kennedy led the field. The two major presidential candidates also ranked high as did Humphrey's running mate. Lyndon Johnson was also seen in fairly positive terms.

The reasons for the generally positive perceptions are not completely clear and cannot be directly ascertained from the thermometer data. One necessary condition for a very favorable rating is the salience of the candidate. The candidates with the most favorable images were particularly well-known. A closely related argument is that the presidential race draws the better men in politics—men with a good image, record, and qualifications and the media publicity and coverage associated with these attributes. A third explanation might be the prestige and dignity associated with seeking the highest office in the land, though some deviant cases exist to question the generality of such a conclusion. Because the thermometer readings were taken after the election, it is difficult to know what explanation might best fit the major party nominees. They may have been nominated because of their public popularity or they may have achieved public popularity because of their nominations and the ensuing campaign and election.

As much as candidates were perceived favorably, individuals still were able to discriminate among those placed before them. Two types of discrimination resulted—variation of scores within candidates across all individuals and variation of an individual's scores across candidates. The standard deviation figures in Table 1 attest to the first type of discrimination. These figures show the considerable fluctuation in "feeling" recorded for each candidate across the set of respondents; such values range from 19 degrees

closer to the break-even point of 50 on the scale because of use by some respondents of the score of 50 degrees to indicate no feeling about the candidates, a meaning which was other than the intended meaning of neutral feelings. The differential in means between Wallace and LeMay would be all but erased if this factor were corrected by removing all 50 responses while the Muskie-Humphrey difference would be dramatically reversed. If the candidates given large numbers of 50's were better known, it is possible that they would have been received in much more favorable or unfavorable terms as the public would have been better able to judge them.

for Romney to 31 degrees for Wallace. A case-by-case inspection reveals the second type of discrimination; the set of twelve candidates was invariably perceived differently by any given individual. The average extent of the range of scores given by a respondent was 73 degrees out of the possible 100. The standard deviation of the values given by the average respondent was 23 degrees, compared to a theoretical maximum of 50 degrees. These two types of discrimination provide the ingredients necessary to justify any analysis of candidate evaluations.

In general, the statistical parameters of the thermometer question point to the recognition and positive evaluation of the candidates along with considerable discrimination among them. A notion of those liked and disliked was gained—a popularity scale was indeed in evidence and it showed the critical position of the presidential nominees. But the basis of these evaluations is yet to be explored. A search beyond the descriptive parameters of the thermometer scores to their underlying dimensions is needed in order to detect the antecedents of candidate evaluation.

II. THE CANDIDATE SPACE

We shall begin a consideration of the dimensional properties of candidate evaluation with an analysis of the three actual presidential nominees by themselves. It is reasonable to expect that their central position in the campaign would accord them critical positions in the overall candidate space which we seek to describe. Then we shall turn our attention to the full set of candidates as a means of noting the relative positions they are assigned in that space.

Table 2 indicates the relative frequencies for the various preference orders for the three nominees.⁷ A basic question is whether a single dimension can account for these preferences. A necessary condition for unidimensionality is that all the preference orders end with only two of the alternatives. If the respondents do employ only a single dimension, then their last place choice must be one of the two extreme alternatives on that dimension.⁸ If, on the other hand,

⁷ The relationship between these preference orders and the vote may be of some interest. Of those voters giving different scores to the three nominees, about 94 percent voted for the candidate they ranked highest while less than one percent voted for the candidate they ranked lowest. About 97 percent of those giving the two major party nominees their highest two rankings voted for their first choice, compared to only 82 percent of those giving Wallace one of their top two scores.

⁸ These notions are based on C. H. Coombs's "unfolding analysis" discussed in his book, *A Theory*

TABLE 2. PREFERENCE ORDERS FOR NOMINEES*

1st Choice	2nd Choice	3rd Choice	Total	Blacks	White Democrats	White Independents	White Republicans
Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	37%	93%	51%	25%	6%
Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace	37	4	19	42	70
Nixon	Wallace	Humphrey	9	0	7	12	13
Wallace	Nixon	Humphrey	9	0	8	15	8
Humphrey	Wallace	Nixon	5	3	10	3	1
Wallace	Humphrey	Nixon	3	0	5	3	2
			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =			997	112	344	265	251

* Only the respondents giving different scores to the three nominees are included.

more than two alternatives receive substantial numbers of last place choices, then multidimensionality of preferences is indicated. Inspection of Table 2 indicates that Nixon received only 8 percent of the last place scores compared to more than twice as many for Humphrey and many times more for Wallace. These results are basically consistent with a single dimension ranging from Humphrey at one end to Wallace at the other end with Nixon in the middle. This pattern would fit quite well with the journalistic left-right interpretation of the 1968 election. Given the known low level of ideological thought among the mass public, we would assume that this dimension is based more on specific issues than on a general liberal-conservative ideology. We shall consider later the nature of the issues leading to this left-right dimension.

The evidence, however, is not unanimously in favor of a unidimensional left-right interpretation. The two bottom rows of Table 2 run counter to the dimensional model which predicts that Nixon would receive no last place choices. Five percent of the respondents gave Humphrey their first choice and reached across the continuum to allot Wallace their second rather than last choice, although this involved bypassing the middle position on the scale. Also a full quarter of the 117 Wallace supporters in the sample

gave Humphrey as their second choice, again violating the left-right dimension. While the overall level of fit is acceptable, we shall consider one further factor which may explain these deviations.

A model of partisan identification and its effects provides the additional explanatory power which is necessary. Party identifiers should give the lowest number of last place scores to the nominee of their party. Thus Democratic identifiers should give fewest last place choices to Humphrey, a prediction opposite to that of the left-right model. The two bottom rows of Table 2 are consistent with this notion of party identification for Democratic respondents but the two middle rows do not fit such an explanation. That fairly equal numbers of Democrats fall into each of these categories suggests that neither model is sufficient in itself.⁹ In particular the 15 percent in each category would be a sizable level of error under any model. Predic-

⁹ An alternate explanation of the behavior of Democratic identifiers is that support for Wallace would not be considered defection from the Democratic party in the South given the peculiarities of Southern politics. This hypothesis yields the same prediction we have specified for the party identification model among Democrats. However, the evidence in favor of the prediction of the party identification model is even stronger among the Democratic North than the Democratic South, which suggests that the effects of party identification are more fundamental than are those of Southern politics. While some respondents may have viewed Wallace as a Democratic candidate because of his background, we choose, partly for ease of exposition, to regard his candidacy as separate from either major party. At a minimum there is no evidence that he was viewed together with the remaining Democratic candidates.

of Data (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 80-121. The assumption is that an individual choosing among alternative stimuli orders them in terms of their distance from his point of maximum preference. As a result, on a continuum from left to right ordered A, B, C, people may give only the preference orders ABC, BAC, BCA, and CBA. Preference orders with the middle scale item, B, in the third choice position would violate this model so the ACB and CAB patterns would be nonexistent under the condition of perfect unidimensionality.

tions from party identification and the left-right theory postulated here are the same in the case of Republican identifiers, so no new information is gleaned from this source. The combined impact of party identification and the left-right model indeed yields a very good fit for Republican identifiers with only 3 percent giving Nixon their last choice. The correspondence of the choice patterns of Independent identifiers to left-right ideas is significant since party identification theory makes no particular predictions for their behavior. Given these results, the left-right dimension is a better ideological discriminator for Republicans and Independents than for Democratic identifiers. The purity of the dimension as an ideological discriminator is lessened for Democratic identifiers because of the conflict for some of them between their party identification and the left-right model. The overall story is basically a reading of two important factors at work—ideology and party, with the former having more weight in the interpretation but with the latter retaining considerable residual explanatory power.

Now that we have considered the preferences for the nominees, we wish to turn to the full spectrum of candidates. The mapping of the full candidate space necessitates a shift in analysis procedure. Analysis of the raw preference orders for the twelve candidates is beyond the reasonable limitations of simple inspection and hand analysis—there being 1306 respondents giving meaningful preference orders (different scores to at least two candidates) with a total of 1301 distinct preference orders being given. The alternative which we shall adopt is to analyze the inter-correlations of candidate ratings.¹⁰ Candidates

¹⁰ The correlations measure the covariation in the ratings of candidate pairs. The average level of popularity of a candidate does not affect such covariation nor does the degree of dispersion in the scores given to a candidate. In particular, the covariation would not be altered by a linear transformation of the scores for a given candidate, such as a "bandwagon effect" which adds five degrees to every respondent's score for Nixon. All temporal effects need not involve simple linear transformations, but the covariation is less affected by such matters than the preference orders would be. Additionally, the use of the covariation measure may affect the distance between a pair of candidates in a spatial representation. A standard unfolding analysis would locate Nixon and Humphrey, for example, very near one another in a geometric space since large numbers of respondents rated both high. However, their correlation is actually a negative value, $-.18$. This indicates that the higher a re-

ceived in a similar fashion should have substantial positive correlations; those seen as quite dissimilar from one another should have sizable negative values. Correlation scores close to zero indicate an absence of shared perceptions of the candidates. The correlations among the three nominees, for example, are as follows: $-.03$ between Nixon and Wallace; $-.18$ between Humphrey and Nixon; and $-.32$ between Humphrey and Wallace. The relative magnitudes of these values indicate the very same locations for the nominees on the dimension as revealed in the preference orders of Table 2; the largest negative value, between Humphrey and Wallace, points to the basic opposition of the two and hence their placement at opposite ends of the continuum. Inspection of the correlation matrix of Table 3 provides a similar indication of the dimensions underlying the full set of data.

One pattern of interest in the matrix is the relationship of Wallace and LeMay to other candidates. Their correlations are low and often negative. In particular, the two are viewed in opposition to the Democratic candidates, and the generality of this statement could extend to most of the other political figures as well. This suggests the possibility of a Wallace-non-Wallace dimension, though such a dimension could also have partisan and/or issue overtones.

Another pattern in the correlation matrix stands out quite vividly. Candidates belonging to the same party generally have high positive correlations which implies that they are perceived in a similar vein. The four highest correlations involve presidential-vice-presidential teams (including Johnson and Humphrey) and the next eight highest also involve pairs of candidates from the same party. All the intra-party correlations are positive.

Conversely, candidates from different parties are usually viewed as dissimilar or unlike each other. The correlations between Republicans and Democrats tend to be negative, though lower in absolute value than the intra-party correlations. These results buttress the earlier notion of party identification as an important variable affecting the processes of political perception. However, an exception to this patterning stands out. McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney, those outside of their parties' "mainstreams," are somewhat correlated with each other—about as much so as with members of their own party. A common bond of popular perceptions may link these

spondent rated one of them, the lower he tended to rate the other; thus, the two belong in opposite parts of the space.

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS OF CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS*

	H	M	K	J	Mc	Rk	Rm	A	N	Rg	L	W
Humphrey (H)	x											
Muskie (M)	.58	x										
Kennedy (K)	.53	.43	x									
Johnson (J)	.70	.46	.47	x								
McCarthy (Mc)	.25	.29	.36	.13	x							
Rockefeller (Rk)	.17	.27	.24	.16	.33	x						
Romney (Rm)	.17	.24	.26	.24	.33	.33	x					
Agnew (A)	-.10	-.03	-.01	-.04	.12	.14	.34	x				
Nixon (N)	-.18	-.09	-.13	-.09	.08	.13	.33	.60	x			
Reagan (Rg)	-.19	-.07	-.10	-.09	.09	.19	.31	.44	.41	x		
Lemay (L)	-.21	-.16	-.09	-.09	-.02	-.04	.10	.30	.11	.28	x	
Wallace (W)	-.32	-.26	-.22	-.23	-.13	-.14	-.06	.13	-.03	.20	.68	x

* All correlations are Pearson r's.

three men together. Kennedy is also associated with them, but he has much higher correlations with the members of his party.

A "left-right" ideological dimension or some specific issue manifestation of it might be underlying these patterns and might be intermixed with the partisan factor. The Democratic candidates tending to be more liberal than the Republicans might explain part of the patterning in the matrix as might the extreme position taken by Wallace. A left-right dimension within each party might also explain the relative correlation values for the separate parties. The bipartisan correlations of McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney (and, to some extent, Kennedy with them) also suggest an ideological or issue interpretation.

The final comment to be made about the structure of the correlation matrix is that four clusters of candidates are evident. The two American Independent Party candidates form one cluster. Three of the five Republicans—Agnew, Nixon, and Reagan—have their highest intercorrelations with one another as do four of the five Democrats—Humphrey, Muskie, Kennedy, and Johnson. There also appears to be a weak bipartisan cluster involving McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney.

In general, the existence of discernible clusters within the correlation matrix indicates an important degree of structuring in this body of data. The relations within and between clusters, however, are difficult to gauge from inspection of the matrix. The fundamental role of party in organizing the correlations is evident from even the most general look at the matrix and there is

further evidence of a left-right dimension. However, the interrelationships between these dimensions cannot be found by simple inspection of the matrix. Closer inspection of the candidate space requires the use of a more sophisticated procedure for dimensional analysis.

We shall employ nonmetric multidimensional scaling¹¹ to obtain the dimensional solution which best explains the correlation patterns of Table 3. A nonmetric technique makes weaker assumptions than does factor analysis; it requires that only the ordering of the correlation values be considered as meaningful data and not the exact values themselves.¹² While making less

¹¹ See J. B. Kruskal, "Multidimensional Scaling by Optimizing Goodness of Fit to a Nonmetric Hypothesis," *Psychometrika*, 29 (March 1964), 1-27; J. B. Kruskal, "Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling: A Numerical Method," *Psychometrika*, 29 (June 1964), 115-130. Also, L. Guttman, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Coordinate Space for a Configuration of Points," *Psychometrika*, 33 (December 1968), 469-506; J. C. Lingoes, "An IBM-7090 Program for Guttman-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis—I," *Behavioral Science*, 10 (April 1965), 183-184; R. N. Shepard, "Metric Structures in Ordinal Data," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 3 (July 1966), 287-315.

¹² There are several reasons why we have more faith in the order of the correlation values than in their exact magnitudes. First, individuals tended to restrict their responses to the nine scores cited on the thermometer card rather than using the full range provided by the thermometer analogy. Ordinal correlation values on such a nine point scale did

stringent assumptions, such nonmetric techniques have been shown to yield fairly unique solutions. Multidimensional scaling interprets the

not equal the correlation values earlier obtained, but the crucial point is that the order of such values was virtually identical for the two types of coefficients (Spearman's $\rho = .99$). Second, some respondents may have given low scores to two candidates for opposite reasons—such as one candidate being too far to the left and the other too far to the right to satisfy the respondent. Giving similar low ratings to a pair of candidates adds to their correlation, even when the respondents involved actually saw the two candidates as quite distant from one another. This has little effect on correlations of candidates near one another in the space, but it may artificially increase the correlations between distant candidates. As a result, the negative correlations and some of the low positive correlations may be higher (in the direction of $+1.0$) than they should be, though the order of the correlations should be substantially unaffected. Third, all respondents did not necessarily translate the same feelings toward the candidates into the same thermometer values. Individuals could have different response set tendencies—some preferring to give candidates high scores and others tending to give them low scores, a result which would give an artificial positive boost to the correlation of any particular pair of candidates. Such slippage between a person's actual feelings and his verbal scoring of the candidates makes our correlations more positive (or less negative) than they should be. (A detailed proof of this regularity is beyond the scope of this paper.) One way to correct for this effect would be to compute correlations based on each individual's deviation scores from his mean; this, however, would destroy the entire meaningfulness of the thermometer scale and its "anchors" of 0, 50, and 100 degrees. The values obtained from such an operation would be different from our correlation values, but again the order of the two sets of correlations would be essentially similar. (In fact, the Spearman ρ coefficient between the original correlations and those obtained by use of such deviation scores is .96, a value which is very high but which does permit some mismatch in the ordering of correlation values for given pairings of candidates.)

An additional consideration motivating the use of a nonmetric technique over factor analysis has to do with the proven tendency of the latter to overestimate the dimensionality of data of the type used here (C. H. Coombs, *A Theory of Data*, Ch. 8). Indeed some exploration with factor analysis on the thermometer data showed that it was supplying one more dimension than was uncovered by our use of a multidimensional scaling algorithm.

correlations as monotonic with distances—the closer to $+1.00$ the correlation between two items (candidates), the closer together should be their corresponding points in a geometric representation. A "goodness-of-fit" measure, called "stress," is calculated to indicate the extent to which the best solution achieved in a given number of dimensions satisfies a monotonic fit with the data. This stress value is at a minimum for the correct solution and increases sharply in value as the number of dimensions being used is cut too far below the correct number. The analysis of the correlation matrix of Table 3 yields a "fair" solution in one dimension with a stress of .108 and a "good" solution in two dimensions with a stress of .050.¹³ We shall look at these two solutions, one at a time, in order to see what explanatory power each offers.

Figure 1 shows the best unidimensional solution which could be obtained.¹⁴ Note first the partisan separation it provides. The Democratic candidates are at one end of the dimension, the American Independent Party candidates are at the other end, and the Republicans in between. Thus the partisan separation does not correspond to the usual party identification scale with Democrats and Republicans at opposite ends but rather parallels the order of the three nominees on a left-right dimension. The dimension of Figure 1 also distinguishes the clusters found in the correlation matrix. Humphrey, Johnson, Kennedy, and Muskie form one tight cluster and Agnew, Nixon, and Reagan form a second. McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney constitute an intermediate cluster between the two major presidential sets, similar to the pattern displayed in the correlation matrix of Table 3. McCarthy is closest to the Democrats, Romney to the Republicans, and Rockefeller midway between them. Ideologically these candidates are as liberal as the Democratic cluster in some respects though less liberal in others. The reasons for the central location of these candidates will be formulated more precisely when we expand the scope of this analysis to include various political attitude measures.

¹³ The terms used are those suggested by Kruskal for the evaluation of various stress values.

¹⁴ The exact details of such a solution should not be overinterpreted. Adjacent points, such as Johnson, Kennedy, and Muskie, might switch positions with one another if alternative assumptions had been made in the analysis. Thus small differences in the solution space should not be given too much credence. However, the gross features of the structure of the space—particularly clusters of points in that space—are generally invariant under the uncertainties governing this analysis.

INTERVIEWER: TAKE SOME TIME TO EXPLAIN HOW THE THERMOMETER WORKS, SHOWING R THE WAY IN WHICH THE DEGREE LABELS CAN HELP HIM LOCATE AN INDIVIDUAL, SUCH AS GEORGE WALLACE.

	Rating		Rating
a. George Wallace	_____	g. Lyndon Johnson	_____
b. Hubert Humphrey	_____	h. George Romney	_____
c. Richard Nixon	_____	i. Robert Kennedy	_____
d. Eugene McCarthy	_____	j. Edmund Muskie	_____
e. Ronald Reagan	_____	k. Spiro Agnew	_____
f. Nelson Rockefeller	_____	l. Curtis LeMay	_____




FIGURE 1. A Unidimensional View of the Candidate Space.

While Figure 1 provides the best fitting unidimensional ordering, we do not regard the candidate space as essentially unidimensional. The unidimensional solution distorts several of the relationships between the candidates. In particular the rule of monotonicity between the correlations and the corresponding interpoint distances demands even greater separation between Nixon and Wallace. It is useful to consider the ordering of the candidates on different possible continua. Nixon would be at the opposite end from the Democrats on a party identification dimension whereas Wallace alone would be at the opposite end from the Democrats on an issue continuum such as civil rights. Further separation between

Nixon and Wallace is needed if both of these orderings are to co-exist.

The solution in two dimensions is shown in Figure 2. The four clusters of candidates are again evident and one can still separate the various parties in the space. The added dimension resolves some of the discrepancies in the one dimensional solution. The axes chosen for Figure 2 are intended to simplify the interpretation of this solution.¹⁵ The horizontal dimension runs

¹⁵ In technical terms, we have employed a varimax rotation around the centroid of the space in order to approximate a simple structure solution. Multidimensional scaling solutions can be rotated




FIGURE 2. The Candidate Space in Two Dimensions.

from the Democrats and Rockefeller to Wallace. This ordering seems to correspond roughly to a left-right pattern or even to a Wallace-non-Wallace dimension. The vertical dimension runs from the Democratic candidates to the American Independent and Republican Party candidates. The ordering here might correspond roughly with party identification and attitudes on social welfare policy or government power more generally. We shall not justify the exact ordering on these axes but will further explore this question in the next section.¹⁶

freely because the choice of axes in the multidimensional space is arbitrary. The arbitrary determination of the axes suggests that the overall structure of the space should be given the most emphasis or, alternatively, the relation of the candidate items to validating attitude items located in the same space should be stressed.

¹⁶ The solution in Figure 2 still portrays the rela-

The solutions we have seen do no great damage to our intuitive views of the candidates, but

tionships between the parties more accurately than it portrays those within the parties. In particular it understates the distance between McCarthy and Johnson. The three dimensional solution resolves these remaining discrepancies, with the third dimension providing separation within each party. This dimension divides Johnson from Kennedy and McCarthy among the Democrats and divides Nixon and Agnew from Rockefeller, Romney, and Reagan. In each case it separates the "middle-of-the-road" candidates in the party from the more liberal and conservative candidates. Those controlling their parties' organizations are divided from those who opposed their parties' establishments. While the three dimensional solution provides an "excellent" fit to the data (stress = .018), this third dimension yields very little explanatory power so we shall not consider it further.

TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDES

	Party	Full Employ- ment	Gov't Power	Urban Unrest	Civil Rights	Chicago	Viet- nam	Foreign Aid
Party identification— Democratic*	x							
Favor government guarantee of full employment	.20	x						
Federal government is not powerful enough	.29	.26	x					
Solve urban unrest by social solutions rather than force	.15	.24	.15	x				
Favor desegregation	.05	.17	.16	.26	x			
Too much force was used in Chicago	.05	.20	.06	.36	.34	x		
Favor withdrawal from Vietnam rather than escalation	.02	.16	.11	.29	.13	.24	x	
Favor foreign aid	.04	.13	.08	.12	.22	.22	.00	x

* Labels for the issue items indicate the direction of their scoring.

looking at the candidates by themselves provides us with precious few handles by which to interpret the dimensions of the space. Therefore we shall consider the relations of attitudes toward the candidates to attitudes on issues and parties as a means of further explaining the candidate dimensions. This will allow us to note the similarities in the ways in which respondents view candidates, issues, and parties and will simplify the interpretation of the dimensions of the candidate space itself.

III. CANDIDATES, ISSUES, AND PARTIES

Political attitudes were important in the 1968 election and, in addition, seemed to stress other issues than those emphasized in earlier decades. The electorate of the 1960's was concerned with problems of the cities, civil rights, Vietnam, protest, and law and order.¹⁷ Civil rights was not a new concern, but it now became associated with urgent new problems of domestic life and foreign affairs. The correlations in Table 4 show that this new issue cluster has a cohesive charac-

ter of its own and is little related to partisan identification or to the classic social welfare and foreign policy areas. Past voting studies have highlighted the issues of social welfare and foreign policy, showing the two to be independent of each other and the former to be related to party identification.¹⁸ Respondents still mentioned them in 1968 but they, by no means, had the salience and priority of the more contemporary focused issues. The other political orientation of concern, party identification, remained stable in 1968 compared to earlier years, but its lack of association with the new issue cluster may have dimmed its relevance in this election.

We shall now relate these attitudes directly to the full candidate space. We have chosen four items for closer analysis as being representative of the traditional party and social welfare areas and the new domestic and foreign concerns—the items being party identification and attitudes on full employment, solutions to urban unrest, and Vietnam, respectively.¹⁹ Multidimensional scal-

¹⁸ Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, *The American Voter*, Ch. 9.

¹⁹ The questions on urban unrest and Vietnam analyzed here and in Tables 6 and 7 below were devised by R. A. Brody, B. I. Page, S. Verba, and J. Laulicht.

¹⁷ Approximately three-quarters of the electorate listed one of these as the major problem facing the government when asked just before the 1968 election. See also Converse, *et al.*, "Continuity and Change in American Politics."




FIGURE 3. Candidates and Attitudes in Two Dimensional Space.

ing of these attitude items in both their original and reflected forms together with the candidate evaluations yields the solution shown in Figure 3.²⁰

²⁰ The associated stress value is .106, indicating some difficulty in satisfying the monotonic constraints. The need to satisfy the additional relationships between the attitude items and the candidate ratings has affected somewhat the structure of the candidate space embedded in Figure 3, though we would regard this candidate space as being essentially similar to that of Figure 2. The attitude items were included in both their original and reflected forms in order to facilitate comparisons of their locations with respect to both liberal and conservative candidates. While the candidate ratings have a natural direction, the scoring of these attitude items is arbitrary. Therefore it makes sense to consider both possible directions for each item. Unlike some other analysis procedures, the multi-

The vertical dimension of Figure 3 is basically partisan. The classic party identification item is associated with this dimension. Also the two partisan clusters have their highest loadings on it. The social welfare issue is quite close to this dimension—a result which fits well with the fact that party identification and social welfare concerns both grew out of the economic problems of the 1930's. Nixon is nearest to Republican identification while Reagan is closest to the conservative pole of social welfare, indicating that so-

dimensional scaling model does not force the two poles of an item to be exactly opposite one another in the space, though we find this to be approximately true. If an item is related to a given axis, its alternative scorings would be at opposite ends of that axis. Both poles of an item unrelated to a dimension would project on approximately the same place on that dimension.

ial welfare is tied to party though they are not completely identical.

The horizontal dimension involves the more immediate problems of 1968. Vietnam attitudes are associated most strongly with this dimension and the urban unrest attitudes are also related to it. The American Independent Party candidates and McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney have their highest loadings here. The conservative ends of the Vietnam and urban unrest items are near Wallace and LeMay. The liberal end of Vietnam is nearest to McCarthy and Kennedy while the liberal end of urban unrest is closest to Kennedy and Humphrey. Respondents thus did differentiate within this set of issues, though overall perceptions of candidates on urban unrest and Vietnam are quite similar. Differentiation in respondents' perceptions was also evident in their contrasts of Wallace and LeMay with the rest of the candidates. While there have been previous indications of a Wallace-non-Wallace dimension, it is now apparent that such a dimension has issue bases and that some liberal candidates are also linked with this issue continuum.

The two dimensional space also comments on the relative positioning of the major party nominees. The basic opposition of Humphrey and Nixon along the vertical dimension points to the importance of party identification in molding evaluations of the candidates. Differences between them on the issue dimension were not considerable, but the bonds of traditional party identification kept them from moving toward a "tweedledee-tweedledum" position in the space. Even the intrusion of an issue dimension in 1968 did not eliminate the differences due to partisanship. In fact the partisan dimension is of somewhat greater importance than the issue dimension even in the full candidate space, though this should not be given too much emphasis since the measure of importance is considerably affected by the somewhat arbitrary selection of candidates included in the thermometer question.

The two dimensions of Figure 3 represent two basic political continua. The vertical axis corresponds to the partisan issues which divided the old left and the old right. The horizontal axis corresponds to the issues which divide the new left and the new right, issues which are not linked closely to the partisan attachments of an earlier generation. It is true that a very broad left-right dimension divides the issues and candidates in the upper-left corner of the diagram from those in the lower-right. Indeed such a continuum would correspond to the ordering of the candidates in Figure 1. However, the complexities of 1968 were too great for a good fit

with a single left-right dimension. Equally important, issues apart from traditional partisan identification were critical in the determination of attitudes toward several of the candidates. The electorate did adapt to changing circumstances in its evaluation of the candidates. Indeed, the mapping of Figure 3 suggests considerable flexibility and sensitivity on the part of the electorate.

Nevertheless the data cannot indicate whether these dimensions are unique to the 1968 election or would have been found in a similar analysis of other recent presidential elections. The "new issues" dimension is most likely to be a recent development while the dimension similar to party identification probably has had a longer existence. Whether there is always a continuum relating to the issues of the day in addition to a long-term party identification dimension cannot be answered by the analysis of a single election. The closeness of the social welfare and party identification items might mean that an "issues of the day" factor would not appear when an election is fought along traditional social welfare lines. The issues of the day might form the basis of candidacies in any election, though we would regard the sharp dichotomization of the dimensions in this election as indicating that more fundamental concerns were at work in 1968.

The dimensional analysis has shown the critical roles of parties and issues in molding popular perceptions of the candidates in 1968. The impact of these factors on the specific candidates must be detailed as must the conditions governing their impact. The two factors could work together or separately, depending on the circumstances of the election year and its cast of leading characters. We shall now concentrate on how these factors operate on each of our twelve candidates and how they interrelate in their effects. We shall later specify the probable conditions under which the different dimensions of candidate evaluation are used, leading to a working knowledge of the formation of candidate evaluations.

The first factor of importance is party. Our suggestion that it is a crucial variable is not exactly novel. Past voting studies have shown that specific perceptions of the nominees are often expressed in terms of party ties. The authors of *The American Voter* have particularly detailed the respondents' likes and dislikes of the nominees in these terms, most notably in the Eisenhower-Stevenson elections of 1952 and 1956. They found that party provided an important basis for the evaluations of these two men—perhaps initially in 1952 because it was one of the few cues available to evaluate such new person-

alities on the national political scene. They also traced the impact of party on reactions to the personal characteristics of the two nominees and found the expected partisan slope, adherents of each party evaluating their party's candidate more favorably than did adherents of the opposite party.²¹

The theme of party influence was carried further in the literature by Converse and Dupeux as they probed the complexities of the Eisenhower case.²² They point out that Eisenhower was long seen apart from the party system and that Democratic leaders, at least at one time, hoped he would run for office as the candidate of their party. Reaction to him in the 1952 campaign was influenced by his eventual choice of the Republican banner. Yet Converse and Dupeux argue that there was no reason to feel that admiration for him had previously followed partisan lines and if Eisenhower had chosen the Democratic party, "we may assume the relationship would have rotated in the opposite direction: strong Republicans would have decided they disliked Eisenhower."²³ Party was thus seen as a strong and inexorable influence on the perceptions of the candidates.

Given such research, one should expect that party would be a major orientation to the candidates in 1968. After all, most of the candidates had long backgrounds in partisan politics and were known as national political figures prior to the 1968 campaign. People like Humphrey, Nixon, and Johnson were considered leaders of their parties and had all held national elective office. Kennedy was well-known as a key participant in his brother's Democratic administration, for being a prominent Democratic senator, and for taking his campaign in 1968 directly to the people. McCarthy, too, was a Democratic office-holder and conducted a quite visible campaign in his party's primaries. On the Republican side, Rockefeller had participated in national campaigns for his party's nomination since 1960 and Romney, also a governor of a large state, was considered by many to be the front-runner for his party's top prize until the start of the 1968 primary season. Reagan did not mount a national campaign but received

considerable publicity as a result of his political success in California. Muskie and Agnew were less well-known nationally but were naturally tied to and identified with their party's presidential ticket, awareness of them increasing as the campaign progressed. Only Wallace and LeMay provided a contrast to this general theme in publicly disavowing the two party system and running a third party campaign. With that exception, the candidates of 1968 had direct partisan connections and were generally familiar in that guise. In a very real sense, the party cue was available longer to these men than to either Eisenhower or Stevenson in 1952. Whether they actually were so perceived, however, is a question to which we now turn our attention.

Table 5 suggests the effects of party identification on the candidate evaluations. Partisan slopes are clearly evident for several of the candidates. Strong Democrats gave the highest mean scores to Humphrey, Muskie, Kennedy, and Johnson while strong Republicans gave them the lowest mean scores. This pattern is exactly reversed for Agnew, Nixon, and Reagan. The difference in means between the strong identifier groups for these candidates is 18-37 percent, indicating an effect of considerable magnitude. These seven partisan candidates represent a mixture of those who have been on the national scene the longest and shortest times. In some instances the candidates have long been identified with the parties while in other cases party is one of the few available cues for candidate evaluation. The patterns shown for the latter type of candidate are similar to those found for Eisenhower and Stevenson. But while all seven of these political personalities had sizable party slopes, there is a marked tendency in Table 5 for candidates having been on the national scene the longer time and candidates associated with higher partisan office to have the larger partisan slopes in the group.

A marked departure from partisan guidelines appears for the remaining candidates. Wallace and LeMay, in particular, were seen in relatively non-partisan terms. Their levels of strength, when weak and strong identifiers of each party are combined, are about the same among Democrats and Republicans, indicating that on balance they were not seen as Democrats regardless of Wallace's past partisan ties. Being third party candidates, it is also not surprising that support for them varied inversely with strength of party identification and that, as a result, their greatest backing came from among those not identifying with either major party. There may even have been a shift of Wallace supporters into the ranks of the Inde-

²¹ Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, *The American Voter*, pp. 128-131.

²² P. E. Converse and G. Dupeux, "De Gaulle and Eisenhower: The Public Image of the Victorious General," translated in A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 292-345.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

TABLE 5. MEAN SCORES OF CANDIDATES
BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	Strong Demo- crats	Weak Demo- crats	Inde- pendents	Weak Repub- licans	Strong Repub- licans	Eta*
Humphrey	81.1	66.0	54.5	50.8	43.6	.46
Muskie	73.8	60.8	58.4	55.5	51.8	.31
Kennedy	81.9	72.7	65.8	61.2	55.5	.32
Johnson	75.7	63.3	51.5	48.0	42.3	.43
McCarthy	55.7	53.8	55.2	56.9	50.6	.08
Rockefeller	54.5	51.7	52.6	58.0	54.0	.09
Romney	49.5	47.4	48.3	49.1	53.8	.10
Agnew	43.8	48.3	50.3	56.0	61.6	.25
Nixon	54.9	61.3	66.8	77.1	84.2	.40
Reagan	41.2	46.9	50.2	53.7	60.2	.25
LeMay	28.4	37.6	38.5	34.6	35.0	.14
Wallace	24.3	35.2	35.5	32.1	23.6	.16
N's	238- 267	298- 331	356- 381	163- 180	125- 132	1192- 1291

* The eta statistic indicates the degree of relationship between the independent variable (party identification) and the candidate's ratings.

pendents, although the small differences observed in Table 5 suggest that only a few members of the electorate probably made such a change. The other candidates—McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney—received approximately equal backing from all classes of identifiers. This means that their appeal was not strongly partisan and consequently did not reap the usual advantages of partisan support. This finding is more unusual than the Wallace-LeMay pattern since the three had definite partisan backgrounds and were identified with the race for their parties' nominations. What remains to be considered is the bases of support which these five candidates employed instead of the usual partisan appeal. Conversely, it will also be important to clarify why the other candidates were seen as "party people" and to determine in what other ways they were viewed.

To explore these questions further, we have examined the relationships between the scores given to the candidates and two of the new issue items. The first item had the respondent indicate on a seven point scale what he considered to be "the best way to deal with the problem of urban unrest and rioting." The scale ranged from solving the underlying problems of poverty and unemployment at one end to using all available force at the other. This "urban unrest" question evoked some of the respondent's basic feelings toward the subjects of law and order, militancy, civil rights, and social welfare. Table 6 shows the mean scores given the candidates by attitudes on urban unrest and enables us to look for "issue slopes" in the same manner that we

looked for partisan slopes in the previous table.²⁴

The data in Table 6 indicate that some of the more partisan candidates were also seen in issue terms. For instance, Humphrey, Kennedy, and Johnson were evaluated more highly by those in favor of solving the problems of our domestic life by social justice instead of law and order. Muskie also followed suit, but not as much so as his Democratic colleagues. Of the partisan Republicans, Reagan was liked most by those advocating the use of all available force, though the difference is not a sizable one. Feelings toward Nixon and Agnew also tended to be more favorable on the "law and order" side, but their strength is nearly constant across the continuum. Such slopes show that the strength of the issue factor varied for the partisan candidates, although each candidate was evaluated higher on one side of the continuum than the other. A comparison of these results with Table 5 reveals that the urban unrest issue is not as important as party in its effects on this set of candidate ratings.²⁵

²⁴ The seven point scales on this and the next issue were collapsed into five point scales by combining the two extreme positions at each end.

²⁵ In order to gauge the relative importance of these effects, it is necessary to consider the slopes, the distribution of cases on the issue and party variables, and the curvilinear tendencies for some of the candidates. The eta coefficient takes all of these matters into account and, hence, forms the basis for our judgments of relative importance. When squared, it relates the proportion of variance in a candidate's ratings explained by a given factor. Eta values for two variables can be com-

TABLE 6. MEAN SCORES OF CANDIDATES BY
ATTITUDES ON URBAN UNREST

	Solve problems of poverty and unemployment			Use all available force		Eta
Humphrey	71.5	67.7	59.1	51.7	50.2	.32
Muskie	66.2	66.8	60.4	55.6	54.2	.22
Kennedy	78.6	72.3	67.5	59.3	61.0	.28
Johnson	64.8	62.3	58.7	49.8	48.9	.24
McCarthy	60.0	58.3	52.3	52.0	50.2	.18
Rockefeller	56.0	56.6	54.7	50.6	49.6	.12
Romney	43.9	52.6	51.6	48.3	43.9	.16
Agnew	48.6	48.5	51.3	52.6	51.4	.07
Nixon	63.2	63.9	68.8	69.9	66.8	.11
Reagan	43.2	47.4	51.3	51.4	54.3	.19
LeMay	26.3	30.5	35.1	37.9	47.7	.29
Wallace	18.2	24.4	28.9	38.5	51.1	.39
N's	358- 389	124- 129	343- 369	115- 126	224- 249	1173- 1261

TABLE 7. MEAN SCORES OF CANDIDATES
BY ATTITUDES ON VIETNAM

	Immediate Withdrawal		Complete Military Victory		Eta
Humphrey	64.4	65.8	64.8	63.1	53.3 .19
Muskie	62.5	63.5	63.0	63.0	57.0 .12
Kennedy	76.3	73.2	70.6	67.2	62.6 .20
Johnson	57.0	60.8	62.6	58.8	53.3 .14
McCarthy	61.5	58.9	55.6	52.5	49.6 .20
Rockefeller	54.0	59.1	55.2	55.8	50.3 .12
Romney	46.7	50.2	51.5	51.3	47.0 .12
Agnew	46.8	49.1	50.8	51.6	52.4 .10
Nixon	61.9	69.1	67.1	68.5	67.0 .11
Reagan	43.0	47.6	49.4	51.8	52.4 .16
LeMay	26.4	28.4	31.8	33.9	45.0 .27
Wallace	21.8	20.5	25.7	30.8	45.1 .31
N's	246- 275	95- 101	346- 369	125- 133	336- 357 1152- 1234

Perhaps the most interesting patterns in the table concern the candidates lacking partisan ties. Issue colorations were evident for most of these individuals. Wallace and LeMay, in particular, were supported by those wanting all available force with a strong slope toward the opposite end. The difference in means for Wallace between the two extreme categories was 33 percent, the largest such difference in the table. McCarthy, by contrast, was seen as a liberal with a definite tendency existing for people to evaluate him, as Humphrey, Kennedy, and Johnson, on the social justice end of the urban continuum. Rockefeller and Romney also did best on the social justice side, though the differences are not large which may be due, in part, to their lower level of saliency among the public. The scores given to these five candidates have a greater relation to this dimension than to party identification. The overall public ranking of these and the other candidates along this dimension fits very well with the interpretations given by political commentators. In some cases we are not dealing with large effects, but there is evidence that this dimension was quite salient to the public and that they could accurately locate the candidates on it.

The other overriding issue in 1968 was certainly the Vietnam war. Following a format similar to the urban unrest question, respondents were asked what action they felt the United States should take in Vietnam. The choices ranged from immediate withdrawal at one end to winning a complete military victory at the other. Table 7 shows the mean scores given the candidates by attitudes on Vietnam. The war

pared to ascertain which factor, issue or party is the more important for the candidate of concern.

generally affected ratings of the partisan candidates less than did either party or urban issues. Still, some differences on Vietnam did appear among the partisans with higher ratings for Kennedy among the "doves" and somewhat higher scores for Reagan and Agnew among the "hawks." Humphrey and, to a lesser extent, Muskie fared better on the dove side, but their ratings fell off at the extreme. Johnson manifested another pattern—those in the middle of the scale liked him most and then his support trailed off as one moves to the more extreme categories. This fits well with Johnson's "middle-of-the-road" handling of the war and indeed the two extremes of this scale were intended as alternatives to his policies. Nixon's level of support varied little with Vietnam policy except among strong doves who tended to rate him lower. His announcement of a "plan to end the war" without indicating the nature of that plan appears to have hurt him only among doves.

Vietnam attitudes tend to have more impact on the ratings of the remaining candidates than party and are almost on a par with those on the urban issue. Leading off this parade of effects are Wallace and LeMay who are once again found at one of the extremities of the continuum. The two definitely show the strongest issue slopes on the "hawkish" side of the Vietnam question, pointing up the way in which they embodied the issue scene of 1968. Evaluations of McCarthy were also affected by attitudes on the war with the Senator receiving his greatest support among those wishing immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. There is every indication here that his candidacy was visible and that he did succeed in tying it to the war issue. Rockefeller's and Romney's patterns are more ambiguous, again possibly due to their lower level of saliency. Romney's best standing was among those favoring "middle-of-the-road" policies toward the war, possibly suggesting that he experienced difficulty in communicating his war position to the public. Rockefeller's virtual silence on the war may explain the irregularities in his pattern of support, though he definitely did garner greater backing among doves. Basically the data fit usual statements of the twelve candidates' policies quite well. The effects of Vietnam attitudes tend to be smaller than those associated with urban problems, but this may well be explained by smaller differences between the candidates and less clarity on their part in the statement of exact positions on the war.

The data presented here show that some of the candidates not seen in partisan terms are instead associated with the issues of the times. In order for a candidate to become strongly identi-

ied with an issue position, it is necessary for him to be salient to the public and for him to take a definite stand on the issue. Wallace and LeMay provide the strongest contrasts in data patternings since they were not partisan candidates and did become strongly identified with the important issues. McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Romney also were differentiated on issue bases, though not as strongly so as Wallace and LeMay because of their lower salience and their less definite positions on some issues. While an elite audience would generally recognize sharper issue positions for these three candidates, their limited salience to the mass public dampened public perceptions of these positions so that only relatively mild reverberations of their issue stands are evident in the data.

Among the partisan candidates, issues were not always relevant, but some contrasts do appear. The Democratic hard core—Kennedy, Johnson, Humphrey, and Muskie—registered moderate issue effects, particularly on solutions to urban problems. Reagan alone among the Republican candidates was seen in fairly distinct issue terms. But generally assessments of the partisan candidates were not necessarily based on current issues whereas the evaluations of the non-party candidates were related to such issues. That issues can be of the same order of importance as party in determining attitudes toward candidates, even candidates for the nominations of the major parties, is significant.

The impact of party and issue factors on perceptions of the candidates has been noted and detailed. The next step is to suggest conditions under which these two factors operate in the molding of candidate orientation. Party seems to be a useful cue for candidate evaluation when the individual is a new candidate without well-known policy stands, as in the case of Eisenhower, Stevenson, Agnew, and Muskie. Party will also loom important as a determinant of ratings when the candidate is a well-known national leader of his party, e.g., Humphrey, Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy. The candidates of the major parties may still be perceived in issue as well as party terms; Kennedy and Reagan provide examples, though we find them viewed significantly more in the latter than in the former vein. Candidacies based mainly on issues are also possible, even in the major parties. A candidate without a decidedly partisan national reputation may distinguish himself on an issue basis, with little regard to conventional party lines. Wallace and LeMay demonstrate this possibility as third party candidates. McCarthy and, to a lesser extent, Rockefeller and Romney also tend to exhibit the patterning of

an issue-based candidate. The conditions making such issue candidacies viable remain to be considered.

IV. AN ERA OF INCREASING IDEOLOGICAL FOCUS

Two ideal types of "ideological focus" have been distinguished by Donald E. Stokes. Some periods of time can be characterized by "strong ideological focus" with political controversy "focused on a single, stable issue domain which presents an ordered-dimension that is perceived in common terms by leaders and followers." By contrast, a period of "weak ideological focus" would be one in which political conflict is "diffused over a number of changing issue concerns which rarely present position-dimensions and which are perceived in different ways by different political actors."²⁶ The nature of candidacies is basically dependent on the degree of ideological focus; viable issue candidacies require the sharp issue conflicts of periods of strong ideological focus. This election must be viewed in the broader perspective of the nature of party conflict in the last generation in order to determine the impetus for issue candidacies in 1968. This will lead us to an ultimate consideration of the future shape of party competition.

The contemporary period has been typified by the conditions of weak ideological focus and this is particularly true of the 1950's. While there were "issues" of a sort in that decade, they tended not to be position issues. One doubts whether the public perceived the Taft-Eisenhower contest in 1952, the Stevenson, Kefauver, Russell, Harriman, and Barkley contests of 1952 and 1956, or the Eisenhower-Stevenson elections in strong issue terms. In particular Eisenhower and Stevenson did not emerge on the national political scene as the embodiments of strong issue positions. In periods of weak ideological focus, one expects that the candidates will be more party-based than issue-based. The candidates, particularly the new candidates without a partisan reputation, will be more positively evaluated by the identifiers of their own party since there are few competitive cues available.

The degree of ideological focus of American politics has been low since the period of the New Deal. "Then, more than now, the intervention of government in the domestic economy and related social problems provided a position-dimension that could organize the competition of par-

²⁶ D. E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," p. 376. "Position-dimensions" involve dimensions of conflict on which political actors—voters and parties—can and do take different policy stands.

ties and the motivation of electors."²⁷ What is remarkable is that the social welfare questions which realigned the parties in the 1930's still constitute the basis of party identification regardless of the many changes in our life since then. The stability of partisan loyalties is such that it does not change until the circumstances of the day force such a change.

The stability of partisanship at the mass level has a parallel among the party leaders. The electorate maintains its loyalties, in part, because the party leaders keep their doctrines relatively fixed. The parties originally became differentiated with respect to certain issues, such as social welfare. The differences on these issues are maintained by the parties in order to keep their underlying group support, though these differences may be muted in order to gain electoral advantage.

It is in periods of strong ideological focus that this stability is most seriously threatened. A set of issues may accumulate with little regard to conventional party lines. The parties tend to avoid involvement with new position issues for fear of losing their base of support, instead maneuvering to establish somewhat similar positions on these issues. This allows minor parties to take advantage of the new issues, at least for the short run. If the new position issues permit the minor parties to make a noticeable dent into the normal vote of the major parties and if furthermore these issues do not show signs of receding, the major parties shift their stands on these issues. The resulting changes in group loyalties betoken a realignment of the parties.²⁸ Those first joining the electorate during a period of strong ideological focus are less tied to traditional party lines and are often most affected by the new issues; thus the addition of young voters to the system can help provide the momentum needed for a realignment. Issue-based candidacies are more likely in a period of strong ideological focus; the actual nomination of an issue-based candidate by a major party can provide the final spur needed for the realignment to take place. Our political system is stable because few issues are of the magnitude necessary to cause a realignment, but they are not totally absent from the political scene.

Civil rights is one issue which could cause a realignment. It formed the basis of a regional third-party movement in 1948, but no lasting

change resulted. The Supreme Court opinions of the 1950's increased the immediacy of the issue. The major parties first became actively involved in the issue in the 1964 election, but the basic problem could still be geographically isolated. By the 1968 election, however, civil rights was a national problem. Furthermore, the civil rights problem fit into a more general syndrome which also included riots in the urban ghetto, campus unrest, protests against the Vietnam war, disorders on the streets of Chicago during the Democratic convention, and the general "law and order" theme. The establishment candidates in the major parties did not take sharply different positions on these issues, basing their appeals instead on conventional issues and party ties. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats moved to a position on the new issues which would satisfy the extremists on either side, though their differences on the core civil rights problem were sufficient for black Americans to have no doubt as to their direction.

The echoes of these developments are evident in our data. We have found that a new set of issues has emerged, quite distinct from both social welfare and party identification. The civil rights issue of the previous decade provides the core of this new issue cluster, but further domestic and foreign problems are now associated with it. The independence of this new set of issues from the traditional concerns was particularly evident in the candidate/attitude space of Figure 3. Since a new position-dimension emerged at the mass level without the nominees of the major parties taking very different stands on it, a minor party emerged at one end of the dimension. Candidates associated with the liberal end of this dimension unsuccessfully contested for their parties' nominations, but chose not to take their fight to the electorate with a fourth party movement, at least not in 1968.

If our statement of the development of a new issue area independent of conventional party lines is correct, we are left speculating as to the shape of the political future. The new issues could recede in urgency by 1972. This could occur with reference to Vietnam, but seems less probable with regard to the other issues. It is always possible that the civil rights problem will become less urgent for a short period of time, but the long-term trend seems to be one of greater urgency. Protest, the complaints of youth, and the law and order theme are likely to become familiar parts of the political landscape. If indeed the issues do maintain their level of urgency, we may see some efforts toward party realignment by the 1972 election. Efforts toward reform of Democratic party procedures are al-

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ A classification of elections in terms of maintaining, deviating, and realigning elections is given in Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, *The American Voter*, pp. 531-538.

ready suggesting the feasibility of such a realignment.

The changes in the political horizon have a particularly important effect on the youth. Many have been directly affected by the new issues and all have witnessed a more vigorous political climate than that of the previous generation. Not having long participated in the political system, they tend to be less firmly identified with a party and less firmly committed to the parties than are their elders. The three party race of 1968 along with the new issue dimension and the issue candidacies may have further delayed the first real commitment to the party system for many young adults. As a result the pool of young voters who may enter the political system for the first time in the 1972 election includes more than the usual number of delayed entries. Additionally that pool will be larger than in most recent years because of the effects of the post-war "baby boom." That many of the new young voters will be veterans of the Vietnam conflict introduces another note of uncertainty. Taken together these elements point to a potential increase in the fluidity in the electoral system in 1972.

Thus the 1964 and 1968 elections could well constitute the prelude for a series of changes of a scope more vast than those to which voting studies have become accustomed. A deviating election such as 1968 may mark the end of a political era, though it would be too early to suggest the outline of a new one. In particular, the seeming stability of party identification may just mask an increasing irrelevance of tradi-

tional party ties during a period of growing ideological focus when some of those ties are becoming unhinged. This election was marked by events having theoretical importance—a new issue dimension developed, issue candidates emerged in the major parties, and a third party made a sizable showing. The voting patterns of significant groups in the electorate, particularly blacks, seem destined for a meaningful change from their patterns in the 1950's. Only time will tell whether a lasting reorientation of American politics occurs along these lines, but a considerable change in the panorama of American politics seems likely even if a full realignment is avoided.

There are two major dimensional antecedents of candidate evaluation. Party provides a basic dimensional antecedent, especially during periods of weak ideological focus when people unknown on the national political scene are nominated by their parties and also when the party leaders fight a rear-guard action against a realignment of the parties along the lines of the issues of the day. However, there is also room for issue dimensions, particularly in periods of strong ideological focus. Minor parties may grow up at the poles of such issue dimensions, though one would expect realignment of the major parties if those issue dimensions remain vigorous for any period of time. Party and issues thus provide two basic mechanisms of candidate evaluation. In 1968 we had both party-based candidates and issue-based candidates, a fact which in itself may be quite suggestive of the future of American politics.

APPENDIX

As you know, there were many people mentioned this past year as possible candidates for President by the political parties. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these people.

I have here a card (INTERVIEWER HANDS OVER CARD #5) on which there is something that looks like a thermometer. We call it a "feeling thermometer" because it measures your feelings toward these people. You probably remember that we used something like this in our earlier interview with you.

Here's how it works. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward a person, then you should place him in the middle of the thermometer, at the

50 degree mark.

If you have a warm feeling toward a person, or feel favorably toward him, you would give him a score somewhere between 50° and 100°, depending on how warm your feeling is toward that person.

On the other hand, if you don't feel very favorably toward a person—that is, if you don't care too much for him—then you would place him somewhere between 0° and 50°.

Of course, if you don't know too much about a person, just tell me and we'll go on to the next name.

Our first person is George Wallace. Where would you put him on the thermometer.

CORRELATES OF PUBLIC SENTIMENTS ABOUT WAR: LOCAL REFERENDA ON THE VIETNAM ISSUE

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Political science, by whatever definition of the discipline one might want to adopt, traditionally has been concerned with public opinion and participation on significant policy questions. Although the literature has become too vast for a complete enumeration of the varied contexts in which this research has been conducted, one issue that might rank high on a list of priorities for study—and yet has received somewhat less emphasis than other topics—is the subject of public attitudes toward war.

Perhaps this relative neglect has been promoted by a lack of opportunities for direct public participation in foreign policy decisions. Unlike most domestic issues, controversies over world problems have been relatively insulated from popular influence. Hence, research on the development of international conflict usually has devoted more attention to the statements and behavior of national leaders or key influentials than to public sentiments regarding war.¹

In recent years, however, the bitter debate generated by the war in Vietnam has stimulated mounting interest in popular attitudes concerning military action.² The controversy has provoked both an unusual display of public disagreement about the war and a desire for basic changes in the policy-making process. Many persons not only have registered strong disapproval of American involvement in the Vietnam war, but they also have expressed an acute sense of frustration about their inability to affect the

conduct of international relations. As a result growing demands have emerged to permit expanded public access to critical decisions and to create increasingly democratic methods of formulating foreign policy.

The probable outcome of enhanced public participation in framing foreign policy decisions however, has been difficult to assess. Since voters seldom have been able to exert a direct influence on foreign affairs, government officials—as well as anti-war leaders—have not been able to determine whether increased opportunities for the expression of public sentiments about international problems would produce demands for more conciliatory or more militaristic policies. As Robinson and Jacobson reported after a thorough summary of existing data on the Vietnam issue, "In spite of increasing inquiry and speculation about the psychological basis of war we have few theories and fewer empirical studies of public support for any war—let alone the war in Vietnam."³

Perhaps one of the most perplexing problems in the analysis of public opinion on war has been a lack of clarity concerning the foreign policy attitudes of persons at different socioeconomic levels. Early research suggested that variables such as party or group influences and affiliations were more important than social class in determining foreign policy attitudes.⁴ In addition, studies of voting behavior indicated that, in contrast to voters whose interest in foreign policy outweighed their interest in domestic problems, there was an increased prevalence of "status voting" among persons who were more concerned about domestic than foreign policy issues.⁵ A careful investigation of survey data col-

¹ See, however, Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

² See, for example, William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (Summer 1966), 187-199; William C. Rogers, Barbara Stuhler, and Donald Koenig, "A Comparison of Informed and General Public Opinion on U. S. Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Summer 1967), 242-252. A comprehensive review of the literature relating to public opinion on issues of war and peace has been prepared by William Eckhardt and Theo. F. Lenz, "Factors of War/Peace Attitudes," *Peace Research Reviews*, 1 (October 1967), 1-114.

³ John P. Robinson and Solomon G. Jacobson, "American Public Opinion About Vietnam," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, 10 (1968), 75.

⁴ George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (Winter 1951-52), 601-623.

⁵ Philip E. Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class in Political Attitudes and Behavior," in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 396-

ected since World War II concluded that, in comparison with other attributes, "the social class variable seems to be less clearly and less strongly related to attitudes on Cold-War issues."⁶

The association between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward the Vietnam war also has not been particularly clear. A major national survey of public opinion on the war in Vietnam, for example, reported that policy preferences on the Vietnam issue were not significantly related to accepted measures of social class such as income, education, and occupation.⁷ Subsequent data analyses, however, have indicated that "differences by social status and age . . . seem more visible, with those of higher status and middle age most in favor of war policies."⁸ In addition, two other national studies found that lower-class persons were more likely than middle- or upper-status respondents to support "moderate" or "conciliatory" policies in both the Vietnam and Korean conflict⁹ as well as to favor a de-escalation of the Vietnam war.¹⁰

Despite the latter evidence, many observers adopted the conventional belief that working-class segments of the population have failed to express strong opposition to the Vietnam war. The report prepared by Jerome Skolnick for the National Commission on the Causes and Pre-

vention of Violence concluded that, for a variety of reasons, "rank-and-file American workingmen have not supported the peace movement."¹¹ The failure of working-class voters to make a conspicuous or major contribution to the anti-war protest movement, however, might not have reflected the actual distribution of public attitudes about the Vietnam issue. In fact, participation in mass demonstrations may have provided a less accurate measure of popular sources of support or opposition concerning the war than survey responses or voting behavior.¹²

Perhaps a major weakness of prior studies of public sentiments about war and peace has resulted from the relatively remote character of those controversies. Perceptions of complicated international issues often have been affected by feelings of patriotism and by the statements of respected national leaders.¹³ In addition, investigations of foreign policy attitudes seldom have been linked to specific acts of political behavior or participation. Since many respondents may have become aware that their opinions will have less impact on international than on domestic issues, perhaps their replies have been shaped by special influences or constraints that have not affected policy preferences on other issues. Increased opportunities for direct popular participation in the development of foreign policy, therefore, could have a major effect on public attitudes toward war.

Perhaps the only means by which rank-and-file citizens can influence military actions directly, however, is through a popular referendum. In fact, this proposal was nearly adopted by Congress in 1937. The so-called "Ludlow Amendment," which would have granted the electorate "sole power by a national referendum to declare war or to engage in warfare overseas," was rejected in the House of Representatives by

397; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), p. 361.

⁶ Milton J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process: American Public Opinion on Cold-War Issues," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 317.

⁷ Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," this REVIEW, 61 (June 1967), 317-333.

⁸ Robinson and Jacobson, "American Public Opinion About Vietnam," 67.

⁹ Richard F. Hamilton, "A Research Note on the Mass Support for 'Tough' Military Initiatives," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (June 1968), 439-445; Richard F. Hamilton, "Le Fondement Populaire des Solutions Militaires 'Dures': Le Cas de la Chine en 1952," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 10 (1969), 37-58.

¹⁰ Martin Patchen, "Social Class and Foreign Policy Attitudes," unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California, September, 1969.

¹¹ Jerome H. Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 58.

¹² The 1968 elections study conducted by the Survey Research Center indicated that white opposition to the Vietnam war was associated with disapproval rather than approval of anti-war demonstrations. See Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," this REVIEW, 63 (December 1969), 1087-1088.

¹³ Eugene J. Rosi, "Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Tests and Fallout, 1954-1963," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Summer 1965), 280-297; S. Putney and R. Middleton, "Student Acceptance or Rejection of War," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (October 1962), 655-666.

21 votes through intense pressure from the Roosevelt administration after national polls had revealed that almost three-fourths of the American people favored the legislation.¹⁴ Although the sponsor of the amendment, Representative Louis Ludlow (D.-Ind.), argued that referendum was "the only way a question of such transcendent importance should be decided," the opportunity for the public to vote directly on issues of war and peace did not become widely available in this country for another thirty years.

At the height of the Vietnam controversy, several American communities held referenda on the war to permit residents to express their sentiments about this issue. As an unusual and specific context for the assessment of public attitudes toward war, the votes offered an important means of identifying segments of the population that might support or oppose military action abroad.

Although numerous studies have examined referenda on such diverse topics as fluoridation,¹⁵ school bonds,¹⁶ metropolitan government,¹⁷ and civil rights controversies,¹⁸ researchers usu-

ally have been compelled to investigate voting behavior on foreign policy issues in candidate elections rather than directly in referenda. One study of referendum voting derived from Hofstadter's distinction between the political ethos of "Yankee" and "immigrant" voters, however, alleged that upper class citizens were more likely to favor "public-regarding" proposals or measures justified by "the public interest" than lower-class residents.¹⁹ Subsequent research has suggested that this phenomenon might be more closely related to socioeconomic than to ethnic characteristics²⁰ and that the concept of "public-regardingness" may have other limitations.²¹ Yet, Hofstadter's original description of the upper- and middle-class ethos as denoting a belief that public policy should be developed "in accordance with general principles and abstract laws apart from and superior to personal needs," while the lower-class ethos "took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs"²² seemed to contain some useful implications for the study of foreign policy attitudes. The referenda concerning the Vietnam war thus provided a rare opportunity to explore this speculation by investigating voting behavior on foreign policy issues.

I. COMMUNITY REFERENDA ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Between 1966 and 1968, at least seven cities in the United States—Dearborn, Michigan; San Francisco, California; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Madison, Wisconsin; Mill Valley, California; Lincoln, Massachusetts; and Beverly Hills, California—held local referenda on the Vietnam war.²³ Election returns and comparable census

White Voters," *Western Political Quarterly*, 21 (September 1968), 483-495; Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting," this REVIEW, 62 (September 1968), 753-769.

¹⁹ James Q. Wilson, and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December 1964), 876-887.

²⁰ Harlan Hahn, "Ethos and Social Class: Referenda in Canadian Cities," *Polity*, 2 (Spring 1970), 295-315.

²¹ Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June 1966), 306-326.

²² Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 9.

²³ For a description of the Cambridge referendum, see Victoria Bonnell and Chester Hartman, "Cambridge Votes on the Vietnam War," *Dissent*, 15 (March-April 1968), 103-106. For an account of

¹⁴ Richard Dean Burns and W. Addams Dixon, "Foreign Policy and the 'Democratic Myth': The Debate on the Ludlow Amendment," *Mid-America*, 47 (October 1965), 288-306.

¹⁵ Thomas F. A. Plaut, "Analysis of Voting Behavior on a Fluoridation Referendum," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 23 (Summer 1959), 213-233; Harlan Hahn, "Voting Behavior on Fluoridation Referendums: A Re-evaluation," *The Journal of the American Dental Association*, 71 (November 1965), 1138-1144.

¹⁶ Richard F. Carter and William G. Savard, *Influence of Voter Turnout on School Bond and Tax Elections*, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Cooperative Research Monograph No. 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961).

¹⁷ James A. Norton, "Referenda Voting in a Metropolitan Area," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (March 1963), 195-212; Richard A. Watson and John H. Romani, "Metropolitan Government for Metropolitan Cleveland: An Analysis of the Voting Record," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5 (November 1961), 365-390.

¹⁸ Norman I. Lusting, "The Relationship Between Demographic Characteristics and Pro-Integration Vote of White Precincts in a Metropolitan Southern County," *Social Forces*, 40 (March 1962), 205-208; James W. Vander Zanden, "Voting on Segregationist Referenda," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Spring 1961), 92-105; Harlan Hahn, "Northern Referenda on Fair Housing: The Response of

tract data were obtained within each of the communities, except Lincoln and Mill Valley, to provide a basis for the examination of referendum voting on the war in Vietnam.²⁴

By focusing on the comparative study of referendum votes, this research will attempt both to investigate recurrent voting patterns and to assess the responses of separate local electorates to the Vietnam issue.²⁵ Although individual behavior cannot, of course, be precisely inferred from ecological correlations,²⁶ the analysis of voting data at least permits the identification of the characteristics of segments of communities that were related to voter preferences concerning American participation in the Vietnam war.²⁷ In this study, survey data also will be used to supplement and verify the correlates of opposi-

tion to the war disclosed by referendum voting behavior.

In addition to the unusual opportunities that the referenda offered for direct public participation in foreign policy decisions, the voting may have been partially shielded from the conventional influence of national loyalties that often shape public attitudes on international issues.²⁸ As a logical extension of democratic procedures, referenda probably have evoked a relatively useful and accurate expression of voter preferences regarding the war in Vietnam.²⁹

Furthermore, the referenda afforded a rare occasion to examine the distribution of sentiments on the Vietnam war within specific local areas that normally cannot be adequately sampled in national surveys. Since the characteristics of cities that held referenda on Vietnam policy differed appreciably, this study also has sought to explore the effects of local traditions and social structure on the correlates of public attitudes regarding a major political controversy.

Although the referendum results recorded slightly greater support for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam than concurrent national surveys,³⁰ the vote against the war in five cities between 1966 and early 1968 differed by no more than four percent. At the mid-term elections of 1966, 41 percent of the votes cast in Dearborn, Michigan endorsed a ballot proposition that was similar to the question used by university-sponsored surveys in asking, "Are you in favor of an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam so that the Vietnamese people can settle their own problems?" In municipal elections one year later, 39 percent of the voters in Cambridge favored "the prompt return home of American soldiers from Vietnam" and approximately 40 percent approved a similar proposal

the first Dearborn referendum, see Harlan Hahn and Albert Sugarman, "A Referendum on Vietnam," *War/Peace Report*, 11 (May 1967), 14-15.

²⁴ Census tract data were not available for Lincoln or Mill Valley. Data for the other cities in this study were prepared by superimposing precinct boundaries on tract maps and reaggregating precinct voting statistics so that election and census districts were comparable. For a further description of this procedure, see Hahn, "Ethos and Social Class," 299. The author currently is conducting an extension study supported by U. S. Public Health Service grant No. DH 00151 of referendum voting behavior in approximately 60 U. S. cities employing social and economic variables obtained from city block statistics rather than from tract data.

²⁵ Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 99-100.

²⁶ W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 351-357; Herbert Menzel, "Comment on Robinson's 'Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,'" *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 674-675.

²⁷ This study will attempt to compare not only voting patterns between cities but also the sentiments of relatively high or low status segments of the electorate both within the same community and in different communities. For a statement about the utility of focusing upon the study of social areas, or census tracts, rather than individuals, see Robert C. Tryon, "Identification of Social Areas by Cluster Analysis," *University of California Publications in Psychology*, 8 (August 1955), 4.

²⁸ Vander Zaden has noted that "since voting does take place secretly and privately—not publicly, where other social concerns, pressures, or considerations might intervene—it may be quite indicative of private sentiments." Vander Zaden, "Voting on Segregationist Referenda," 103.

²⁹ Perhaps referenda also have given citizens an increased opportunity to project their personal sentiments about the war in their votes rather than asking them to respond to the specific alternatives posed by an interviewer, which usually have focused on the international rather than the personal implications of foreign policy proposals.

³⁰ Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest*, p. 44; Robinson and Jacobson, "American Public Opinion about Vietnam," 71-72.

in San Francisco. Similarly, opposition to "the continued United States prosecution" of the Vietnam war in February, 1968 in Lincoln, Massachusetts was recorded at 39 percent. On April 2, in the Wisconsin primary 43 percent of the voters in Madison approved a proposal for "an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam."

One week later, and ten days after President Johnson's dramatic decision to limit the bombing of North Vietnam, the trend of the public opinion seemed to shift slightly as two California communities—Beverly Hills and Mill Valley—passed anti-war resolutions by identical margins of 56 percent. A virtual replication of the Dearborn referendum in November, 1968 also resulted in the approval of a proposal for unilateral withdrawal by 57 percent of the voters in that community. While the votes held after the Wisconsin primary reflected somewhat greater opposition to the war than the elections held before then, the results of separate referenda during both periods seemed to be essentially similar.

II. SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

The referendum voting returns permitted a comparative investigation of public sources of support or opposition concerning American participation in the Vietnam war. The Pearsonian product-moment coefficients of correlation between conventional measures of socioeconomic status such as income, education, and occupation and the percentage of the vote against American participation in the Vietnam war in six referenda are presented in Table 1.³¹

Perhaps most striking relation shown in Table 1 is the strong *inverse* association between opposition to the Vietnam war and increasing socioeconomic status. Disapproval of the war appeared to be related to working-class rather than to high-status characteristics. In most communities, as the proportion of voters possessing relatively low-status attributes grew, the vote against the Vietnam war also tended to mount.

The voting, however, did reveal some of the

unique features of each locality. In Dearborn and San Francisco, for example, the percentage of persons earning an annual income of less than \$7,000 was directly related to the vote against the war, while the proportion earning wages higher than that figure was negatively associated with anti-war voting; but, in the exceedingly affluent environs of Beverly Hills, the correlations did not reveal an inverse association between income and opposition to the war until the salary level of \$15,000 was reached. On the other hand, in Madison, voting for the withdrawal of American troops was directly related only to the percentage of people receiving wages of less than \$5,000 annually; and it was inversely related to the proportions earning larger sums.³² The association between educational attainments and the vote against the Vietnam war in Beverly Hills was inverse only for the variable measuring college attendance; but in Dearborn this relationship was inverse for the percentage of people that completed high school, and in San Francisco it was negatively related to all groups that had gone beyond the eighth grade. Comparable patterns were evident in the associations between occupational characteristics and the vote in Dearborn, San Francisco, and Beverly Hills. *Relative* to the aggregate socioeconomic level of most communities, therefore, the data indicated that attributes signifying lower social status were related to increasing opposition to the war in Vietnam.

Perhaps the clearest exception to this generalization, however, was the referendum vote in Cambridge. In that municipality, opposition to the war was directly related to the proportion of persons earning incomes of \$10,000 or more annually, the college-educated, and professional or managerial employees; but it was inversely associated with the percentage of people exhibiting lower educational, salary, or occupational attainments. In part, this pattern may have been produced by unique features of the Cambridge referendum campaign which, after a bitter struggle with a Progressive Labor Party group that circulated a counter-petition condemning the war for exploiting American workers, was conducted and led by what two participant-observers called "a middle-class, university-oriented" organization that virtually ignored working-class neighborhoods. Despite this neglect, the observers concluded, "Support for the referendum was lower than anticipated in the predominantly upper-income university sections but substantially

³¹ Although the variables or categories of income, education, and occupation are both inter-related and ipsative—that is, the proportion of persons at one level will affect the percentage at another level, they are not mirror images of each other. Consequently, all of the classifications have been reported both to indicate the patterns or the thresholds reflected by the correlations and to provide a more complete picture of the associations between socioeconomic status and the vote on Vietnam policy than would be possible through the use of summary measures.

³² The mean vote against the Vietnam war in Madison ranged from 59 percent in tracts with a median income below \$4,000 to 37 percent in tracts where the median income was \$8,000 or more.

TABLE 1. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
AND THE VOTE AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR
BY CENSUS TRACT IN FIVE CITIES, 1966-1968

	Dearborn (1966) (N = 18)	Dearborn (1968) (N = 18)	Beverly Hills (1968) (N = 5)	San Francisco (1967) (N = 122)	Madison (1968) (N = 27)	Cambridge (1967) (N = 30)
<i>Income:</i>						
Percent of population earning less than \$5,000 annually	+.83***	+.82***	+.70	+.39***	+.57***	-.27
Percent of population earning \$5,000-\$6,999 annually	+.66***	+.78***	+.74	+.19*	-.06	-.59***
Percent of population earning \$10,000-\$14,999 annually	-.81***	-.85***	+.53	-.44***	-.41*	+.37*
Percent of population earning more than \$15,000 annually	-.50*	-.64**	-.67	-.30***	-.19	+.54***
<i>Education:</i>						
Percent of population with 8 years of schooling or less	+.79***	+.81***	+.40	+.24**	+.00	-.71***
Percent of population with 9-11 years of schooling	+.53*	+.68***	+.80	-.03	-.13	-.74***
Percent of population with high school degrees	-.45*	-.34	+.53	-.38***	-.30	-.55***
Percent of population with college education	-.65**	-.78***	-.75	-.18*	-.24	+.81***
<i>Occupation:</i>						
Percent of population employed in professional or managerial jobs	-.66***	-.80***	-.63	-.30***	+.00	+.76***
Percent of population employed in clerical or sales jobs	-.66***	-.68***	+.73	-.22**	-.14	-.14
Percent of population employed as craftsmen or foremen	+.11	+.28	+.43	-.11	-.38*	-.44**
Percent of population employed as operatives or laborers	+.71***	+.81***	+.23	+.16*	-.13	-.70***
Percent of population unemployed	+.51*	+.40*	+.75	+.39***	+.44**	-.44**

* significant at the .05 level

** significant at the .01 level

*** significant at the .001 level

higher than anticipated in the working-class districts."³³ In addition, voting patterns on other political controversies and referendum issues in this city long have been influenced by a traditional "cleavage between the 'Yankee' residents of 'Old Cambridge' and the Irish and Italians who live primarily in 'East Cambridge.'"³⁴ The peculiar circumstances surrounding the referen-

dum campaign in Cambridge as well as local social animosities, therefore, probably contributed to the marked differences between the socioeconomic correlates of the vote there and the patterns uncovered in other cities.

Although the findings from the other major university community of Madison also were somewhat unclear, the data revealed few other contrasts between voter preferences in large cities such as San Francisco and suburban communities such as Dearborn and Beverly Hills or between the periods in which the referenda were held. The social and economic sources of opposi-

³³ Bonnell and Hartman, "Cambridge Votes on the Vietnam War," 105-106.

³⁴ Hahn, "Voting Behavior on Fluoridation Referendums," 1142.

tion to the Vietnam conflict in 1966 or 1967, when criticism of the war was limited, did not seem to differ appreciably from those reflected in the referenda of 1968, by which time hostility to the war had broadened and intensified. In fact, the nearly identical referenda held in Dearborn in 1966 and 1968, respectively, seemed to indicate no major changes in the distribution of attitudes or voting patterns on the Vietnam issue, except that the associations between lower-class attributes and sentiments favoring an end to the Vietnam war seemed to increase, while the corresponding relationships between high-status indicators and support for the war also were enhanced.

The socioeconomic discrepancies between supporters and opponents of the war reflected in referendum voting also were confirmed by survey data. The Gallup Poll found, for example, that high income and well educated respondents were most likely to describe their attitudes toward the Vietnam war as "hawkish," while a large proportion of persons with grade school educations chose the designation "doves."³⁵ Manual workers also expressed stronger support for both the immediate and the gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam than persons in business or professional occupations.³⁶ Moreover, investigations of a 1966 survey of 406 adults in Detroit using the concept of "social position" developed by Galtung³⁷ revealed that both support for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war and the desire to participate in a referendum on Vietnam policy were inversely related to increasing social positions.³⁸

While the findings seemed to contradict much popular speculation about the alleged resistance of working-class voters to the anti-war move-

ment, they did not appear to be inconsistent with some appraisals of the social and economic effects of war. In general, young men from high income families are less likely to be drafted than low status males.³⁹ Other statistics have indicated that a disproportionate number of youths from low socioeconomic origins and minority groups are assigned to Vietnam, and those soldiers may have suffered increased casualties.⁴⁰ In many lower-class homes, the actual or threatened loss of a son perhaps has implied economic hardship as well as personal tragedy; and more working-class than high-status families apparently have been exposed to this risk. The Vietnam war probably has had a particular impact on lower-class voters that affected the preferences on the issue they expressed at the ballot box.

III. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Since family interests, especially in homes that contain draft-age sons, may have had an important effect on public attitudes toward the Vietnam war, variables that reflected the age, ethnic, social, or economic attributes of families were related to referendum voting behavior. The coefficients of correlation between selected household characteristics and the vote in opposition to the Vietnam war are contained in Table 2.

The referenda tended to confirm the findings of earlier surveys that a relatively strong "predictor of attitudes toward Vietnam policy was race."⁴¹ Although the proportions of black residents in Dearborn and Beverly Hills were so small as to make the correlations virtually meaningless,⁴² race was associated with opposition to the war in Madison and Cambridge, where black voters comprised a small segment of the community, and in San Francisco, which contained a sizeable black population.

³⁵ James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "Selective Service and Military Manpower: Induction and Deferment Policies in the 1960's," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 83-121.

³⁶ "Negroes and Military Service—Latest Facts," *U. S. News and World Report* (August 15, 1966); see also Ralph Guzman, "Mexican-American Casualties in Vietnam," unpublished paper, Merrill College, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1969.

³⁷ Verba, *et al.*, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," 325.

³⁸ In Dearborn and Beverly Hills, however, the percentage of foreign-born residents was closely-related to the vote against American participation in the war.

³⁵ *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 40 (October 1968), 25.

³⁶ *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 49 (July 1969), 10-11; "Americans on the War: Divided, Glum, Unwilling to Wait," *Time*, 94 (October 31, 1969), 13-15. In May, 1970, blue collar workers lacking a high school education apparently expressed strong opposition to President Nixon's action in Cambodia. "A Newsweek Poll: Mr. Nixon Holds Up," *Newsweek*, 75 (May 25, 1970), 30.

³⁷ Johan Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1 (1964), 206-231; Johan Galtung, "Social Position, Party Identification and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Norwegian Case Study," in Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, 161-193.

³⁸ Harlan Hahn, "Dove Sentiments Among Blue-Collar Workers," *Dissent*, 17 (May-June, 1970), 202-205.

TABLE 2. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN SELECTED HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
AND THE VOTE AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR BY CENSUS TRACT
IN FIVE CITIES, 1966-1968

	Dearborn (1966) (N = 18)	Dearborn (1968) (N = 18)	Beverly Hills (1968) (N = 5)	San Francisco (1967) (N = 122)	Madison (1968) (N = 27)	Cambridge (1967) (N = 30)
<i>Children in Households:</i>						
Percent of households containing children under 18 years of age	-.60**	-.56**	-.33	+.22**	-.77***	-.63***
Percent of males aged 10-19 years	-.80***	-.82***	-.62	+.05	+.48**	-.23
Percent of males aged 15-24 years	+.23	+.23	-.84*	-.09	-.54**	-.37*
<i>Age of Males:</i>						
Percent of males aged 20-34 years	+.76***	+.83***	+.62	+.37***	+.63***	+.53***
Percent of males aged 35-44 years	-.75***	-.73***	+.01	+.20*	-.68***	-.46**
Percent of males aged 45-59 years	-.26	-.35	-.82*	-.43***	-.23	-.16
Percent of males over 60 years of age	+.81***	+.72***	+.25	-.35***	+.11	+.13
<i>Ethnicity:</i>						
Percent of population nonwhite	+.25	+.11	-.57	+.65***	+.21	+.15
Percent of population foreign born	+.81***	+.79***	+.98**	-.16*	+.34*	-.67***
<i>Home Ownership or Value:</i>						
Percent of owner occupied dwelling units	-.80***	-.67***	-.44	-.30***	-.70***	-.32*
Percent of homes valued at less than \$10,000	+.67***	+.74***	+.14	+.19*	+.58***	-.58***
Percent of homes valued at \$10,000-\$19,999	-.06	+.07	+.58	+.18*	+.05	-.26
Percent of homes valued at \$20,000-\$25,000	-.51*	-.64**	+.96**	-.05	-.27	+.51**
Percent of homes valued at more than \$25,000	-.41	-.54**	-.96**	-.19*	-.14	+.66***
<i>Average Monthly Rent:</i>						
Percent of residents renting for less than \$60	+.68***	+.58**	+.34	+.36***	+.64***	-.37*
Percent of residents renting for \$60-\$99	+.64**	+.70***	+.61	+.01	+.29	-.36*
Percent of residents renting for \$100-\$149	-.80***	-.77***	+.52	-.37***	-.33*	+.64***
Percent of residents renting for more than \$150	-.56**	-.64**	-.51	-.26**	-.44*	+.50**

* significant at the .05 level

** significant at the .01 level

*** significant at the .001 level

In addition, the data on household characteristics seemed to underscore the influence of socioeconomic attributes on referendum voting. In all cities, for example, renters apparently expressed greater opposition to the Vietnam war than homeowners. Furthermore, lower house values and rents were directly associated with the vote against the war in four of the cities; but more expensive homes and rents were inversely related to the protest vote. Generally, differences in the associations with the vote began to appear as house values approached \$10,000 and as average monthly rents neared \$100, except in the high-status community of Beverly Hills, where the signs of the correlations changed markedly at the levels of more than \$25,000 for home values and of \$150 or more for mean monthly rent. Although the relationships between the vote on the Vietnam war and both the value of dwelling units and average monthly rent in Cambridge again were inconsistent with the associations found elsewhere, in the remaining cities opposition to the war was related to such working-class attributes as an annual income below \$5,000, less than 8 years of schooling, unskilled occupations, unemployment, low home ownership, house values below \$10,000, and monthly rents of \$100 or less.

Family characteristics, however, seemed to be more closely related to opposition to the Vietnam war than might have been expected. In fact, the proportion of households containing children under 18 years of age was inversely related to the vote against the war in all cities except San Francisco. Moreover, the percentage of young men between 10 and 19 years old, or approaching draft age, was negatively associated with disapproval of the war in the Dearborn, Beverly Hills, and Cambridge referenda. In Beverly Hills, even the proportion of men in a prime category of draft eligibility, aged 15-24 years, was inversely related to the vote in opposition to the war; and it was significantly correlated with voting behavior only in Madison and Beverly Hills. Variables reflecting the age of children, therefore, did not seem to yield particularly strong or consistent associations with positions on the Vietnam war.

The inverse associations between the vote against the war and the proportion of young men as well as middle-aged parents seemed to be inconsistent with the apparent interests of those segments of the population; yet, many citizens have professed a willingness during wartime to sublimate their personal concerns for the sake of national loyalty. Perhaps opposition to the Vietnam war has been inspired less by the draft status of young males than by the social status of

voters who may hold different perceptions of "the public interest" or national obligation. While the probability of induction into military service has varied by social class, disapproval of American participation in the Vietnam war apparently was more closely related to socioeconomic attributes than to the potential threat of the draft.

IV. CORRELATES OF THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

To illustrate the major associations between ecological characteristics and voting behavior in the Vietnam referenda, 12 variables that were significantly related to the vote were chosen from an initial analysis of 198 attributes. The coefficients of correlation between selected socioeconomic and household characteristics and the vote against American participation in the Vietnam war are presented in Table 3.

The combined effects of the twelve variables as determined by multiple regression analysis seemed to be closely associated with referendum voting on Vietnam policy. The multiple correlation coefficients (R) ranged from .80 in San Francisco to .99 in Dearborn and Beverly Hills, indicating that the variables accounted for a sizeable amount of the variation (R^2) in the votes. Demographic characteristics, therefore, appeared to be strongly related to the vote on the Vietnam war.

The summary measures also revealed that median family income was inversely associated with opposition to the war, even in university centers such as Madison and Cambridge. In fact, some evidence indicated that the association between socioeconomic status and voting on the Vietnam issue in Cambridge and Madison may have reflected the unusual distribution of educational characteristics in those campus communities. When median education was employed as a control variable, the partial correlations between median income and the vote against the war increased to $-.58$ in Cambridge and to $-.87$ in Madison. The relationship between median family income and opposition to the war, therefore, seemed to broaden somewhat the scope of the finding that socioeconomic status was inversely related to the disapproval of American military activities in Vietnam.

Variables denoting the proportions of households that contained draft-age sons did not seem to be uniformly associated with opposition to the war, but the percentages of men aged 36 to 60 years were inversely related to the vote against the Vietnam war in all cities. In fact, the only variables that yielded consistent or unidirectional correlations in all communities were median family income, the percentage of owner

TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC OR HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR BY CENSUS TRACT IN FIVE CITIES, 1966-1968

	Dearborn (1966) (N=18)	Dearborn (1968) (N=18)	Beverly Hills (1968) (N=5)	San Francisco (1967) (N=122)	Madison (1968) (N=27)	Cambridge (1967) (N=30)
Median family income	-.79***	-.85***	-.64	-.41***	-.66***	-.33*
Median education	-.75***	-.78***	-.72	-.14	+.22	+.74***
Percent of population employed in white collar jobs	-.70***	-.81***	-.27	-.30***	-.03	+.72***
Percent of population unemployed	+.51*	+.40*	+.75	+.39***	+.44**	-.44**
Percent of owner occupied dwelling units	-.80***	-.67***	-.44	-.30***	-.70***	-.32*
Median value of dwelling unit	-.60**	-.74***	-.62	-.14	-.39*	+.72***
Median monthly rent	-.84***	-.85***	-.66	-.35***	-.39*	+.60***
Percent of population nonwhite	+.25	+.11	-.57	+.65***	+.21	+.15
Percent of population foreign born	+.81***	+.79***	+.98**	-.16	+.34*	-.67***
Percent of households containing children under 18 years of age	-.60**	-.56**	-.33	+.22**	-.77***	-.63***
Percent of males aged 15-24 years	+.23	+.23	-.84*	+.12	+.76***	+.21
Percent of males aged 35-60 years	-.71***	-.76***	-.67	-.09	-.54**	-.37*
Multiple R	.99	.99	.99	.80	.98	.96
Multiple R ²	.99	.99	.99	.65	.96	.93

* significant at the .05 level

** significant at the .01 level

*** significant at the .001 level

occupied dwelling units, and the proportion of men between 35 and 60 years of age. Each of those characteristics was inversely related to opposition to the war in all six referenda.

This finding raised the disquieting possibility that the association between age and the vote on the Vietnam issue, instead of indicating the concern of fathers for the safety of their sons, actually may have signified generational conflict or the hostility of middle-aged voters toward youthful anti-war protestors. Perhaps many middle-aged parents endorsed existing Vietnam policy in the referenda as a reflection of their faith and confidence in the country or as an expression of their disapproval of student demonstrations to end American involvement in the Vietnam war. Contrasting perceptions of the war and the national interest may have represented generational as well socioeconomic differences. Since popular speculation has emphasized the disagreements between young people and the

older generation over the Vietnam issue, this interpretation seemed to require further examination.

V. AGE AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Since increasing social status and advancing age usually have been highly inter-related, median family income was used as a control variable in the computation of partial coefficients of correlation between several demographic characteristics and the vote against the Vietnam war in four cities.⁴³ The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.

The partial correlations suggested that income

⁴³ Due to limitations on degrees of freedom in some cities, only first-order partial correlations were used in this study. Missing data for some variables also necessitated the elimination of Beverly Hills from this analysis.

TABLE 4. PARTIAL COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION† BETWEEN SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC OR HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR BY CENSUS TRACT IN FOUR CITIES, 1966-1968

	Dearborn (1966) (N = 18)	Dearborn (1968) (N = 18)	San Francisco (1967) (N = 122)	Madison (1968) (N = 27)	Cambrid (1967) (N = 30)
Median education	+ .16	+ .02	— .00	+ .56*	+ .77***
Percent of population employed in white collar jobs	+ .55*	+ .10	— .08	+ .19	+ .76***
Percent of population unemployed	+ .28	+ .47	+ .28**	— .12	— .47**
Percent of owner occupied dwelling units	— .79**	— .54*	+ .21*	+ .00	+ .02
Median value of dwelling units	+ .58*	+ .24	— .14	+ .20	+ .79***
Median monthly rent	— .37	— .34	— .07	+ .56*	+ .74***
Percent of population nonwhite	+ .07	— .40	+ .62***	+ .13	+ .18
Percent of population foreign born	+ .46	+ .62*	— .00	— .42	— .75***
Percent of households containing children under 18 years of age	— .44	— .59*	+ .38***	+ .00	— .52**
Percent of males aged 15-24 years	— .37	— .22	+ .35***	+ .59*	+ .16
Percent of males aged 35-60 years	+ .21	+ .14	— .09	— .34	— .35*

† controlling on median family income

* significant at the .05 level

** significant at the .01 level

*** significant at the .001 level

may have been a primary determinant of the vote in opposition to the Vietnam war. The associations between disapproval of the war and other socioeconomic indicators such as education, occupation, home ownership, house value, and monthly rent, with the effects of median income removed, were either reversed or substantially reduced. In fact, several socioeconomic characteristics displayed a strong direct rather than inverse association with the vote against the war after partialling on median income. This pattern appeared in most of the cities except San Francisco, although it was particularly evident in Cambridge. Race remained strongly related to the protest vote in San Francisco, but there were few other particularly striking or meaningful correlates of the vote independent of the influences of family income. None of the variables yielded correlations that were consistent in direction or sign after the intervening impact of median income had been excluded.

In addition, the associations between the vote and several age variables—including the percent of children under 18, the proportion of young males between 15 and 24, and the percentage of men between 35 and 60—were not strengthened, but they were generally reduced or reversed in the partial correlations controlling on median family income. The inverse association between

disapproval of the war and the proportion of men between 35 and 60 years of age, for example, remained weak in San Francisco; it was diminished somewhat in Cambridge and Madison; and it became mildly positive in the two Dearborn referenda. On the other hand, the partial correlations between opposition to the war and median family income, controlling on the percentage of men between 35 and 60 years of age, were only lowered slightly; and they remained consistent in all communities, yielding the following inverse relationships: Dearborn (1966), —.57; Dearborn (1968), —.55; San Francisco, —.51; Cambridge, —.23; and Madison, —.62. The partial correlations, therefore, suggested that voter preferences in referenda on the Vietnam issue may have been less closely or consistently related to generational differences than to socioeconomic divisions within the community.

VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Voting behavior in local referenda on the Vietnam war seemed to be strongly associated with demographic characteristics. In fact, a multiple regression analysis indicated that twelve basic personal or household attributes acting together accounted for a sizeable amount of variance in the votes. Yet, some interesting differences were discovered in the associations be-

een specific variables and public support or position concerning American involvement in the Vietnam war.

Although voting patterns in municipal referenda on the Vietnam issue may have been affected by the social structure of the entire community as well as by local traditions and rivalries, the data generally indicated that opposition to the war was associated with working-class rather than middle- or upper-income attributes. In most of the referenda, the vote to end U. S. participation in the Vietnam war was directly related to relatively low income, education, occupational status, home ownership, house values, and monthly rent, while relatively high positions on these measures were associated with the endorsement of existing policies in Vietnam. In short, this finding may have reflected the special burdens that wars have imposed on lower-class voters.

In addition, opposition to U. S. military intervention in Vietnam was inversely related to median income in each of the cities. Partial correlations, employing median family income as a control variable, seemed to underscore the importance of socioeconomic influences on the vote in Vietnam referenda. The associations between contest voting and the proportion of middle-aged men as well as other age groups seldom remained consistent or significant when the impact of income was excluded, but partial correlations between income and opposition to the war were uniformly inverse and statistically significant in our referenda with the effects of middle age removed. Opposition to American participation in the Vietnam war, therefore, seemed to be rejected more by social and economic distinctions than by the disagreements that have divided young people and their elders.

Perhaps attitudes about war have been shaped by the simple fact that most members of the public, and especially working-class voters, seldom have been given an opportunity to exert a direct influence on foreign policy decisions. For very small sectors of the population, the chance to express personal convictions about the Vietnam war has been available through picketing and mass protests; but it has been difficult to determine whether or not the demonstrations accurately reflected popular sentiments about the issue. The relatively remote nature of foreign policy questions has seemed to greatly complicate the search for correlates of public opinion regarding war.

The national survey, which reported that social and economic characteristics were not related to attitudes toward the war, for example, also disclosed that the opinions about the Viet-

nam war held by informed and articulate respondents did not differ appreciably from the views expressed by persons who lacked those characteristics.⁴⁴ Subsequent analysis of a survey of Detroit adults, however, revealed that the greatest desire to vote in a referendum on Vietnam policy was centered among persons who displayed a low sense of political efficacy but who were highly interested in world problems; those respondents also expressed the strongest support for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war.⁴⁵

Since feelings of political ineffectiveness have been most prevalent among relatively low-status voters,⁴⁶ perhaps a tendency to defer to the statements of supposedly expert national leaders and the lack of a strong sense of efficacy promoted the common perceptions of working class "hawkishness" during the Vietnam controversy. Increased opportunities for the public to vote directly on issues of war and peace, therefore, conceivably could have revealed a slightly altered distribution of popular sentiments about the Vietnam issue.

The inverse association between increasing socioeconomic status and opposition to the Vietnam war found in most communities seemed to suggest some important qualifications of existing speculation about public attitudes on political issues. The tendency of lower class voters to favor a conciliatory rather than a militaristic solution to the Vietnam conflict, for example, did not seem to be consistent with the notion of "working class authoritarianism."⁴⁷ One researcher even has suggested that the findings of recent studies of attitudes regarding war may indicate the presence of a characteristic "which, at least with respect to this kind of foreign policy concern, we might label as 'upper middle class authoritarianism.'"⁴⁸

The results of this investigation, however, did not seem to contradict speculation about the concept of an upper-class "Yankee-Protestant"⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Verba, *et al.*, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," 326-330.

⁴⁵ Harlan Hahn, "Political Efficacy and Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Social Problems*, 17 (Fall 1969), 271-279.

⁴⁶ See Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1965), pp. 56-58.

⁴⁷ Seymour M. Lipset, "Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (August 1959), 482-502.

⁴⁸ Hamilton, "A Research Note on the Mass Support for 'Tough' Military Initiatives," 442.

⁴⁹ Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, pp. 9-10.

or "public-regarding"⁵⁰ ethos that usually has implied support for public policies or referendum measures that are sanctioned by "the public interest" or by "the welfare of the community." As a collective action that often has been justified as necessary for the protection or preservation of the entire society, the endorsement of national participation in a major war seemed to be consistent with the political ethos of relatively high-status segments of the community. On the other hand, working-class residents probably have tended to adopt political positions on the basis of personal or family considerations. Among lower-class voters, who have been inclined to interpret political controversies in terms of simple or immediate needs and obligations, perhaps attitudes concerning war have been shaped less by the perceived interests of the entire country than by the potential loss of

young lives.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Impressionistic, unstructured interviewing conducted after the first vote on the Vietnam war in Dearborn, Michigan, in fact, suggested a sharp distinction between the "ideological" reactions to the referendum issue that were elicited in relatively affluent sections of the community and the high "personal" responses that emerged in working-class neighborhoods where the proposal to withdraw American troops from Vietnam received a clear majority. While many high-status voters evaluated the controversy as a necessary defense against the global threat of Communist expansion or as an unwarranted intervention in a civil war, most working-class residents responded to the war as a tangible and direct threat to the lives of American men. Since their interpretation of the war was confined to the death and injury that it implied, the perspectives of working-class voters left them with few alternatives except to oppose the war. See Hall and Sugarman, "A Referendum on Vietnam," 14-1

⁵⁰ Wilson and Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," 876-887.

POLITICAL TRUST AND RACIAL IDEOLOGY*

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I. INTRODUCTION

No government yet established has had the loyalty and trust of all its citizens. Regardless of the popularity of its leaders or how careful they are in soliciting opinions and encouraging participation in the process of policy-making, there are always those who see inequalities and injustices in the society and harbor suspicions of the government's motives and intentions. Resentment and distrust are elements of disaffection and the first step toward resistance. Therefore, even the most dictatorial governments have usually striven to increase their credibility and popularity. For democratic governments, however, the problem of combating distrust and encouraging voluntary acceptance of its institutions and decisions is a paramount concern. One of democratic theory's distinctive characteristics is its strong emphasis on voluntary consent, both as a basis of political obligation and as a central attribute of citizenship. The concern expressed by democratic thinkers about the elements of due process and the protection of opportunities for widespread participation is directed toward the creation of citizens who voluntarily accept the society's goals; "the demand for consent is the demand that the government must be more than self-appointed and must, in some significant way, be the chosen instrument through which the body politic and community acts..."¹

Democracy's guiding ideal is the substitution of mutual understanding and agreement for coerciveness and arbitrary authority in all phases of social and political life. The existence of distrustful citizens who are convinced that the government serves the interests of a few rather than the interests of all is a barrier to the realization of the democratic ideal. In Sabine's

words: "full understanding cannot be reached except on the basis of mutual respect and with a mutual acknowledgment of good faith and the acceptance of the principle that the purpose of understanding is to protect all valid interests."² Leaders in a representative democracy cannot be successful until they have gained the trust of the citizens; this is even more important in American society where racial and ethnic minorities are actively searching for a new, more dignified role as political equals.

Besides its important normative implications, the level of trust in government also is an important determinant of political change. The rise and fall in the number of distrustful citizens over time is a sensitive barometer of social conflicts and tensions. When any sizable group becomes distrustful and begins to make demands, the government is prompted to reallocate its resources or change its institutions to accommodate these new pressures. If the political system is flexible and adaptive enough, needed adjustments can be made without any consequent outbreak of violence, but if distrustful groups are denied access to decision-makers, or if institutions are too rigid to change, destructive conflict and a breakdown in the social order are possible. Under the right political conditions, distrustful groups, which exist in all societies, may produce the kind of creative tensions needed to prompt social change, but under other conditions, these same tensions either may lead to violent disruption or indiscriminate and cruel repression. A society's leaders may either strive to meet the demands of the distrustful group, or instead, they may endeavor to isolate and attack the group, making it a scapegoat for the resentment and hostility of the majority. Rising distrust is often a stimulant to social change, but its consequences depend on the response it provokes from leaders and other elements of the society.

The level of trust in government strongly influences the kind of policies and strategies available to political leaders. As Gamson has argued, when the level of trust is high, "the authorities are able to make new commitments on the basis of it and, if successful, increase such support even more. When it is low and declining, authorities may find it difficult to meet existing com-

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¹ Joseph Tussman, *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 23.

² George Sabine, "The Two Democratic Traditions," *The Philosophical Review*, 61 (1952), p. 471.

mitments and to govern effectively."³ Levels of trust and allegiance differ greatly among countries and these differences determine both the number of options open to the government and the relative danger of political fragmentation.⁴ The distribution of trust among different social groups in the society also may have an important effect on the relative success of different governmental policies, and a sensitive awareness of its importance should allow a political leader to adopt more successful strategies of persuasion.

Widespread trust in government is recognized by students of both normative and empirical questions as the foundation for democratic order. This paper presents a comparative analysis of political trust in the black and white communities of Detroit, Michigan—a city which has a history of racial conflict and experienced major civil disturbances in 1943 and 1967. We discuss: (1) the concept of political trust; (2) the levels of trust in both racial communities; (3) the principal social and political sources of trustful and distrustful attitudes; (4) the contrast between the correlates and nature of political distrust in the black and white communities; (5) the behavioral consequences of distrust; and (6) the racial ideologies linked to political trust in both communities.

II. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Given the widely acknowledged importance of political trust in maintaining political stability or promoting change⁵ it is surprising that empirical research on the origins and consequences of trust is so scarce. In addition, the small body of literature which does exist raises more questions than it answers. Studies contradict each other as conceptual and measurement problems abound. Sometimes political trust is clearly related to social status⁶ and sometimes not.⁷ Often it is

correlated with feelings of political efficacy,⁸ but not always.⁹ In most instances it is strongly related to measures of trust in other people,¹⁰ but again, not always.¹¹

At least some of this confusion is due to the fact that the reported research has taken place in different settings. We know that levels of trust vary according to what Litt has called the "political milieu" in which distrust "may be acquired as a *community norm*, a part of the political acculturation process in the city's daily routine."¹² Not only can the political milieu influence the level of trust, but the relationships between variables are not always the same in each setting. For example, in Litt's comparative study of a middle class neighborhood in Boston and a comparable area in adjoining Brookline there is no relationship between feelings of political trust and political efficacy in Boston and yet there is a strong relationship in Brookline. The explanation offered is that in Boston, a city noted for blatant corruption in its political life, "community-wide suspicions of 'base practices' may go hand in hand with a belief that the professional practitioner of politics will still turn an attentive ear to the complaints of his constituents,"¹³ while in Brookline, a community with a history of clean government, those who are distrustful are fully convinced that political leaders will not be responsive to their requests. In Brookline the citizens' distrust can be traced to personality variables, while in Boston the political milieu is the dominant factor.¹⁴

(1961), 477-506 and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this Review (1964), 361-383.

¹ Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," in Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), *Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military* (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 61-73; and Joel D. Aberbach, *Alienation and Race* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1967), especially pp. 102-126 and 206-208.

⁸ Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 68; Agger, *op. cit.*, p. 494; and Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *The Journal of Politics*, 23 (1963), p. 321, Table 5.

⁹ Litt, *op. cit.*, p. 320, Table 2.

¹⁰ See Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (1956), 690-695.

¹¹ Litt, *op. cit.*, p. 320, Table 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 319.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 317. Litt finds that the "degree of

³ William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968), pp. 45-46.

⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 490.

⁵ Gamson's work, *op. cit.*, builds on the concerns of Parsons and Easton. See, especially, Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process" in Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 33-70, and David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

⁶ Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *The Journal of Politics*, 23

A study of distrust at the federal level raised similar issues. Stokes, using data from the Survey Research Center's 1958 national election study, found a correlation between feelings of political efficacy and political trust. He hypothesized that under certain conditions one could find subjective powerlessness linked with a positive attitude toward government, but "in the context of democratic values, feelings of powerlessness toward public authority tend to create feelings of hostility toward the authority."¹⁵ While Stokes reported a relationship between political trust and efficacy similar to that found among Litt's Brookline residents, his national sample resembled Litt's Boston respondents in that social status variables were at best weakly correlated with trust.

The setting of the research apparently is important in determining both the level of distrust and the relationship between it and other variables. If we are to explain successfully the origins and consequences of distrust, therefore, we must systematically introduce into our measures factors associated with the political settings of the population. To do so we must deal with conceptual problems which are intimately tied to problems of measurement. The concept of political distrust is defined by Stokes as a "basic evaluative orientation toward the . . . government."¹⁶ However, items in many of the scales designed to measure political distrust often involve simple clichés about the quality of politics and politicians with little or no indication as to the governments or figures involved. McClosky, who employs such items in his measure, is quite concerned about their validity and therefore about the interpretation of his results. "It is," he says, "impossible in the present context to determine the extent to which scores contained in these tables signify genuine frustration and political disillusionment and the extent to which they represent familiar and largely ritualistic responses."¹⁷ This is not to deny that some element of disaffection may be tapped by questions of this kind, but one can only guess at how much. We cannot tell which politicians the subject is reminded of, or the relative importance of most of the images conjured up by the statements. The goal of scholars in the field is to get below this surface veneer to tap deeper hostility.

personal trust, unrelated to political cynicism in Boston, is directly related to the expression of cynical comments about politicians in the suburban community."

¹⁵ Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁷ McClosky, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

To do this it would seem vitally important that the subject be stimulated to think about some more focused symbol than "politicians"¹⁸ and that the items not be phrased in simple agree-disagree form. This will not completely avoid the problem of imperfect measurement due to ritualistic responses, but it should mitigate it somewhat by making the statement of disaffection more meaningful to the subject.

Stokes' scale is a model of what we seek here. Before the items are presented to the respondent he is told: "Now I'd like to talk about some of the different ideas people have about the government in Washington and see how you feel about them. These opinions don't refer to any single branch of government in general."¹⁹ A series of items (see below for examples) follows which are not in agree-disagree form and which are reversed so that the positive alternative is not presented first in each case. These questions measure whether the respondent believes that the government generally does the right things, and whether it serves the public interest. The format is designed to cut down response-set problems and, in this case, focus the respondents' attention on the collective workings of an identifiable set of political arrangements and institutions.

As Gamson says, "it is possible for individuals simultaneously to feel high confidence in political institutions and alienation towards those who man them."²⁰ In fact, according to Gamson, it is important to find out whether political trust is generalized—that is, in the simplest case, whether people dissatisfied with a given decision or set of decisions first begin to distrust the authorities, then perhaps the institutions and procedures of the regime, and finally become so disenchanted with the political community itself that they wish to separate themselves from the community. Where trust is high a negative decision may be bearable because of a belief in the integrity of the authorities and the legitimacy of

¹⁸ See Aberbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-42 for a detailed discussion of the importance of specifying the focus in measuring disaffection and pp. 46-56 for a critique of the political trust literature using this perspective. A briefer discussion can be found in Joe D. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," this REVIEW, 63 (1969), pp. 86-99. See, also, Kenneth Keniston, *The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965), pp. 453-455.

¹⁹ Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICPR), *1966 Election Study* (Ann Arbor, 1968), p. 129.

²⁰ Gamson, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

the procedures employed. Where trust is low, negative outputs may be unbearable and lead to an intensification of distrust or separatist feelings. If several sets of authorities prove unsatisfactory, citizens are likely to "conclude that the institutions themselves may be the source of bias, and 'throwing the rascals out' will have little effect if indeed it is even possible."²¹ The existence of high levels of trust allows authorities to make commitments which build more trust and weather situations in which citizens are unhappy about governmental outputs. A distrustful citizenry, however, is suspicious of every perceived governmental move, impatient for results and prone to deeper and more extreme levels of distrust. Ultimately, this process may lead to acts which undermine the political system.

III. THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TRUST

There are two general approaches to explaining political trust employed in the existing literature. Gamson, for example, emphasizes political factors. The content of decisions and the reactions they provoke are seen as the basic sources of political trust and distrust. Other scholars stress personality factors which are basically independent of political considerations as explanatory variables. They believe that: "If one cannot trust other people generally, one can certainly not trust those under the temptation of and with the powers which come with public office. Trust in elected officials is seen to be only a more specific instance of trust in mankind."²²

Litt has introduced the idea that both political and personality variables are potentially important as explanatory factors. The relative importance of each class of variables, however, depends on the political environment or "milieu" prevailing in the community being examined. Stokes draws attention to the importance of generalized political expectations born of widely held democratic values as influences on political trust. Individuals may be influenced in their thinking by a local government's reputation for political corruption, and this seems to affect the

relative influence of personality factors in explaining the existing degree of political trust. Trustful attitudes are also determined, however, by general public expectations about the nature of democratic governments, and a government's general record of performance in certain policy areas.

We do not suppose that levels of political trust are immutable. We conceive, instead, of a process in which this basic orientation toward the system²³ slowly changes as individuals are subjected to outside influences. In Gamson's model, for example, the individual's level of distrust is based on his judgement of the content of political outputs important to him and the procedures used to reach decisions. These judgements cumulate through time and are affected by cues from his experiences with government and his group allegiances. For a person with a high level of trust, a bad decision may be seen as an understandable, if unfortunate, mistake which does not call the political system's legitimacy into serious question. For a person with a moderate level of trust, however, the same bad decision is more likely to serve as proof of fundamental faults in the political system and may precipitate a rapid decrease in political trust. For the already distrustful person, the bad decision is merely further proof that the system is evil and may move him to some extreme, perhaps violent, protest.

There are numerous feedback loops in the complex process which generates or maintains trust. For example, satisfactory outputs stimulate trust, but trust itself predisposes a person to view outputs positively. The same process operates when we view trust or distrust as an element leading to radical ideologies or behavior. A distrustful person, for example, should be more disposed to take part in violent activities or to endorse radical interpretations of social ills than a trusting one, but his behavior or endorsement reinforces his distrust or tends to lower his previous level of trust.

We will need extensive time-series data to study this developmental process in detail and to determine precisely the levels of trust and the structural conditions which are sufficient to maintain a stable system or to inhibit the generalization of distrust. We are currently gathering data which we hope will carry us in this direc-

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51. Gamson suggests a series of conditions which discourage the generalization of political distrust. Among them are the disaggregation of large issues into smaller ones, an emphasis on the ad hoc nature of decisions (so that citizens do not see in negative decisions the application of general rules or principles), and a structural situation in which memberships of groups with varying goals and experiences overlap.

²² Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 164.

²³ M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi discuss political trust in these terms on p. 177 of their article on "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 169-184.

tion.²⁴ Many important questions, however, can be answered simply using data collected at one point in time, although this limits us to inferences about feedback loops and to primary reliance on summary measures (overall assessments gauged at one point in time) of people's satisfaction with their status in life and their political achievements.

IV. THE DATA

Our data come from a survey of the residents of Detroit, Michigan, completed in the fall of 1967. A total of 855 respondents were interviewed (394 whites and 461 blacks). In all cases whites were interviewed by whites, and blacks by blacks. The total N came from a community random sample of 539 (344 whites and 195 blacks) and a special random supplement of 316 (50 whites and 266 blacks) drawn from the areas where rioting took place in July 1967.²⁵ When we discuss the attitude patterns in the communities we will use the random sample data. However, since there are few meaningful differences between the distributions and relationships in the random and riot-supplement samples, we have employed the total N in the analysis so that a larger number of cases are available when controls are instituted.

V. LEVELS OF POLITICAL TRUST: A RACIAL COMPARISON

We defined political trust, following Stokes' lead, as a basic evaluative orientation toward government. Our measure of trust is a revised version of his. The following questions were asked at various points in the questionnaire:²⁶

1. How much do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?
2. Would you say that the government in Wash-

ington is pretty much run for the benefit of a few big interests or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

3. How much do you feel that having elections makes the government in Washington pay attention to what the people think: a good deal, some, or not very much?
4. How much do you think we can trust the government in Detroit to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?
5. How much do you feel having elections makes the government in Detroit pay attention to what the people think: a good deal, some, or not very much?

In the minds of Detroit residents there is a generalized sense of trust in the federal and local governments.²⁷ While trust in the Washington government on the individual items is always higher than trust in the Detroit government, the differences are slight. Detroit city government is relatively well run, nonpartisan, and generally not in such ill repute as the governments of cities like Boston or Newark.²⁸ This is apparent in Table 1 where we compare the levels of political trust exhibited by blacks in Newark and Detroit. It is clear that Litt is correct and the particular political setting is an important determinant of the level of trust. Since this is so, in the Detroit case we are fortunate to have an adequate distribution of responses to the attitude items so that we can examine the relationship between political trust and a general personality variable like trust in people which many scholars believe is the foundation of political trust under ordinary circumstances.

When we compare the political trust of blacks and whites (Table 2) we find that the blacks are less trusting. This holds for all of the individual items as well as the index as a whole. This actually represents a change in the usual pattern, as blacks have always had at least the same distri-

²⁴ This paper is based on data gathered in 1967 in Detroit. In 1968 we re-interviewed a random subsample of the original sample (N = 295) and we will interview a larger number of respondents in 1970, many of them for the third time. Our study will also include interviews done in 1967 and 1970 with administrators in the Detroit city government and with business, civic and labor leaders who are members of the New Detroit Committee.

²⁵ Riot areas were defined by a location map of fires considered riot-related by the Detroit Fire Department.

²⁶ The wording of these questions is drawn from Survey Research Center questionnaires. Preliminary statements of the kind cited above were included. See ICPR, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-132.

²⁷ A single political trust index was constructed. The items formed a clear dimension when data from the study were factor-analyzed. The factor analyses (varimax rotation) were performed on the whole data-set and separately for blacks and whites. Questions on Detroit and Washington are equally weighted so that the index runs from 0 to 4.

²⁸ For confirmation of this view see: Edward C. Banfield, *Big City Politics* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 51-65; and David Greenstone, *Report on the Politics of Detroit* (Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1961), Chapter 2.

TABLE 1. TRUST IN DETROIT AND NEWARK
GOVERNMENTS FOR RIOT AREA
BLACK MALES: 15-35*

Item: How much do you think you can trust the government in (Newark/Detroit) to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or none of the time?

	Trust City Government				%
	Just about always	Most of the time	Some of the time	None of the time	
Newark (N=232)	2%	9	50	38	=100%
Detroit (N=71)	10%	21	51	18	=100%

* The figures for Newark are recomputed from the table in the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 178. This survey, conducted for the Commission by Nathan Caplan of The University of Michigan, covered only males 15 to 35 living in the riot zone and we drew comparable respondents from our sample to facilitate comparison.

bution as whites on answers to these political trust questions.²⁹ No survey data exist concerning levels of trust which prevailed at earlier times, but through the years the federal government and local governments in much of the North, for all their shortcomings, have been the black man's friend in an otherwise hostile environment. The federal government, especially, won him his freedom, gave him the best treatment he received in his bleakest days in the South, provided relief in the Depression and in the difficult periods which have followed, and has done the most to secure him his rights and protect him during his struggle for equality.³⁰ In addition, the government in Washington has been the symbol of the American Negro's intense identification with and "faith in the American Dream."³¹ Now, at least in cities like Detroit, this sense of trust is being undermined as many black people are beginning to reject their traditional ties with paternalistic friends and allies, and are striking out at the more subtle forms of discrimination and deprivation found in the North. These expressions of distrust, as

²⁹ See Stokes, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-73 and Aberbach (1967), *op. cit.*, pp. 119-126.

³⁰ For example, see William Brink and Louis Harris, *The Negro Revolution in America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 131 and 232-233 on Negro attitudes towards various political institutions and figures.

³¹ Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 250; and also see Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Row, 1944), pp. 3-5, 880 and 1007 on the Negro as an "exaggerated American."

we shall see in more detail below, are accompanied by a militant racial ideology and an expressed willingness to resort to almost any means necessary to achieve their goals.

VI. EXPLAINING POLITICAL TRUST

A. *As a Function of Trust in People.* As we have mentioned, one commonly held hypothesis about the origins of political trust is that it is "only a more specific instance of trust in mankind"³²—which is a personality factor basically independent of political considerations. Our survey contained a standard version of the Rosenberg Trust-in-People measure³³ which should provide an excellent means of testing the relationship between interpersonal trust and political trust. Given the similarities in the concepts and the measures, in fact, anything short of a strong relationship would raise serious questions about the hypothesis and one would expect "personality" variables other than trust in people to show even weaker direct effects on political trust.

The relationship between the indicators of

TABLE 2. POLITICAL TRUST IN THE DETROIT
BLACK AND WHITE COMMUNITIES

	Political Trust Index			
	Low 0-1	2	High 3-4	
Black Random Sample (N=186) $\bar{x}=1.66^*$	52	13	35	=100%
White Random Sample (N=327) $\bar{x}=2.13^*$	33	24	43	=100%

* The mean in the Black Riot Area Sample (N=341) is 1.67 and 1.66 in the Total Black Sample (N=461).

The mean in the White Riot Area Sample (N=75) is 2.12 and 2.11 in the Total White Sample (N=394).

³² Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

³³ See Rosenberg, *op. cit.* The version we used consists of two of the three questions regularly asked by SRC in their surveys. They are:

1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair?

trust in people and political trust is positive but weak. Rank-order correlation coefficients (Gamma) between the two are .17 for blacks and .16 for whites.³⁴ Clearly, political trust is more than a mere specific instance of trust in mankind. A strong relationship between interpersonal trust and political trust would hold ominous implications for American race relations given the low level of trust in people which most studies have discovered among blacks. In our data, for example, over 50 per cent of the whites but less than 30 per cent of the blacks have high scores on our trust-in-people scale. The pattern of these differences hold with education controlled and was the same in the Michigan Survey Research Center's 1964 national survey where similar questions were asked.³⁵

B. *As a Function of Social Background Factors.* A simple and plausible explanation of variation in political trust is that the socially advantaged are more trusting than the disadvantaged because they possess the status and the skills which bring them societal rewards and honors, while the disadvantaged achieve relatively little, and as a result, have little faith either in their fellow men or their government.³⁶ Our data forces us to reject this simple explanation. There is virtually no relationship between indicators of social advantages, such as education, occupation and income, and political trust.³⁷ If such factors have an effect, it is indirect.

There are other background factors, however, which have a greater influence on political trust. Individuals who were born in the South are somewhat more trustful than those born in the North³⁸ and people who have active affiliations with churches (i.e., are members of churches or church-related groups) are more trusting than those who are inactive.³⁹ These relationships are

not strong, but reflect important acculturation patterns; persons born in the North more readily adopt a "worldly" cynicism about government, and individuals who have broken away from the traditional moorings of the church are also less likely to believe that government represents a benevolent authority. Our measures of this acculturation process are crude and indirect at best. In future studies we intend to create more explicit measures of this form of modernization which will enable us to ascertain more exactly the strength of its impact on political trust.

C. *As a Function of Political Expectations.* Since political trust does not seem to be merely a reflection of basic personality traits, or a simple product of social background, we turn to political factors in search of a more satisfactory explanation. As a person gains experience in the political realm, he slowly builds an assessment of himself as a political actor and develops his ideas about the fairness of the political process and the utility of its outputs. These evaluations are summaries both of his actual experiences and his expectations. They are answers to a series of questions:

- (1) Am I, or can I be, influential?
- (2) Do governmental outputs make a difference in my life—are they beneficial?
- (3) Do I, or will I, receive equal treatment if I have a grievance about governmental decisions?

Each answer is an element in the political equation suggested by Gamson where political trust is a function of an individual's cumulative assessment of the procedures and outputs of the political process.⁴⁰ Also, if Stokes is correct, in a system infused with the democratic ethos, perceived influence is as important as the quality and justice of the outputs themselves in determining political trust.⁴¹

Obviously, political expectations are a com-

ation with a church and political trust is .24 for blacks and .15 for whites.

³⁴ Gamson, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁴¹ Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 67: "When the individual's sense of political efficacy is compared with his positive or negative attitude toward government, it is apparent that a sense of ineffectiveness is coupled with feelings of hostility. This relation is more than a tautology. In other cultures or other historical eras a sense of ineffectiveness might well be associated with a positive feeling. In the context of democratic values, feelings of powerlessness toward public authority tend to create feelings of hostility toward that authority."

³⁴ See Aberbach, *op. cit.* (1969), pp. 92-93 for somewhat similar findings for whites using 1964 SRC national sample data.

³⁵ Aberbach, *op. cit.* (1967), pp. 104-114.

³⁶ The notion of a "theory of social disadvantages" as a general explanation for attitudes of estrangement is developed at length by Marvin E. Olsen, "Political Assimilation, Social Opportunities, and Political Alienation" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1965).

³⁷ For example, the correlation (Gamma) between education and political trust is .08 for blacks and .03 for whites.

³⁸ The correlation (Gamma) between regional birthplace and political trust is .14 for blacks and .13 for whites.

³⁹ The correlation (Gamma) between active affli-

plex function both of factors in an individual's personality and his assessment of a political situation. We cannot hope to sort out these elements in the attitudes we use as predictors, but we assume that political evaluations have strong foundations in the cumulative political experiences of an individual or group. In the process model we are developing, political experiences and expectations have a more immediate effect on political trust than personality factors, and are themselves conditioned by a respondent's level of trust. Because of these feedback relationships, we would expect individuals' political experiences and expectations and their feelings of political trust to be strongly associated. We do not assume that all governmental decisions will affect political trust, but we are struck by Gamson's idea that "disaffection begins to be generalized when an undesirable outcome is seen as a member of a class of decisions with similar results."⁴²

In order to investigate these relationships we have utilized measures of our respondents' sense of political competence, their beliefs about the importance of the actions taken by government, and their expectations concerning the kind of reception they would receive at a government office. (The questions employed and the methods used in constructing indices are listed in the footnotes to Table 3.) A look at Table 3 will show that each of the political indicators is much more strongly related to political trust than was our measure of trust in people. These are substantial relationships, indicating the power of a political explanation. Controlling for education does not change the basic picture in two of the three cases, even though a variable like political competence is strongly related to education. However, the effect of education on the gamma between trust and expectations of equal treatment is worth further discussion.

First of all, a feeling that one would receive worse treatment than other people in attempting to solve a problem at a government office is more strongly related to political trust for whites than for blacks. Naturally, there are more blacks who expect unequal treatment (35 percent versus 12 percent of the whites), but if we correctly gauge the intensity of emotion reflected in answers to this question in our survey, white respondents who believe they would receive a harder time at a government office are even angrier than blacks with similar expectations. Many of the whites are evidently convinced that blacks receive special treatment and are given favors without deserving them. One

typical white respondent said he would be given unequal treatment

"because the white people are discriminated [against]. If you have a home and are working and you have pride, they just don't come to your assistance. One who has no will power or pride, they'll give you assistance."⁴³

For the minority of whites with such extreme views (especially those in the lower education group), the emerging assertiveness of blacks is clearly a factor of the utmost importance in determining their level of political trust.

Expectations of treatment in a government office is of less direct importance for blacks, especially the upper educated group. This is not because all upper status blacks expect equal treatment (25 percent do not), but results from the fact that there is a relatively flat distribution of political trust scores across categories of our expectations-of-equal-treatment measure. One possible explanation, which is supported by data we will now present, is that distrust among upper status blacks does not arise so much from actual or expected discrimination as from empathy for others in the black community who experience these insults in worse form. The stronger relationship for lower education blacks indicates a more direct effect of expected discrimination on trust for this group, but even here the effect is weaker than for whites. Something more than blatant personal mistreatment underlies black political distrust.

D. As a Function of Feelings of Deprivation. There is a large literature concerning the relationship between psychological deprivation and political unrest (denied as violence or propensity to engage in violent behavior)⁴⁴ and a de-

⁴³ This quote is from one of the respondents included in our 1968 panel. The 1967 questionnaire did not probe answers to the close-ended question on equal treatment in a government office. After examining the 1967 interview protocols, we believed that whites who felt they would receive unequal treatment often ascribed this to reverse discrimination and we used the 1968 interviews to confirm this hypothesis.

A poll by the Gallup organization reported in *Newsweek* (October 6, 1969) gives evidence of somewhat similar feelings among "a substantial minority of whites" that "the black man already has the advantage." (p. 45).

⁴⁴ For examples of analyses employing aggregate data see Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns" and James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and De-

⁴² Gamson, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) BETWEEN POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS AND POLITICAL TRUST, BY RACE AND EDUCATION

Political Experiences and Expectations	Blacks			Whites		
	Zero-Order	Low* Education	High* Education	Zero-Order	Low* Education	High* Education
Political Competence**	.40	.37	.45	.32	.30	.44
Impact of Governmental Actions***	.40	.42	.43	.32	.34	.21
Expectations of Equal Treatment****	.26	.32	.13	.42	.51	.33
(N) =	(461)	(322)	(122)	(394)	(254)	(124)

* Respondents in the low education group include all individuals who have completed high school, while those in the high education group have, at minimum, gone beyond high school to either special training or college. These definitions of low and high education are retained throughout the paper. The N's for each group are also the same. We chose education as a status indicator and dichotomized the sample in order to preserve the maximum number of cases for the analysis.

** The following items were used in the political competence index:

1. How much political power do you think people like you have? A great deal, some, not very much, or none?
2. Suppose a law were being considered by the Congress in Washington that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do about it?
 - 2a. If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed: very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?
3. Suppose a law were being considered by the common council that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do about it?
 - 3a. If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed: very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

*** How much difference do you think it makes to people like yourself what the government in Washington does? A good deal, some, or not very much?

**** Suppose that there was some question that you had to take to a government office—for example, a tax question, a welfare allotment, or a housing regulation. Do you think that most likely you would be given a harder time than other people, would be treated about the same as anyone else, or would be treated a little better than most people.

All variables are coded so that positive experiences and expectations receive high scores.

veloping literature, using aggregate data, which speculates about the relationship between deprivation and feelings that the government is not legitimate.⁴⁵ One of the best psychological

clining *Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion*," pp. 632-688 and 690-731 respectively in Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr (eds.), *The History of Violence in America* (New York: Bantam, 1969). An example of the use of psychological data is Don R. Bowen, Elinor Bowen, Sheldon Gawiser and Louis H. Masotti, "Deprivation, Mobility and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," pp. 174-187 in Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen (eds.), *Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1968).

⁴⁵ A particularly interesting analysis of this type which is used to speculate about urban unrest in the United States is found in Ted Gurr, "Urban Disorder: Perspective from the Comparative Study

measures of deprivation now available is the Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale which indicates the discrepancy between an individual's definition of the "best possible life" for him and his past, present, or future situations.⁴⁶ After each

of Civil Strife," pp. 51-69 in Masotti and Bowen, *op. cit.* More details on the measures used in Gurr's study can be found in Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 1104-1125.

⁴⁶ See Hadley C. Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965). Our respondents were given the following set of questions:

Now could you briefly tell me what would be the best possible life for you? In other words, how would you describe the life you would most like to lead, the most perfect life as you see it? (Show R card with a Ladder.)

Now suppose that the top of the ladder repre-

respondent gives a definition of the life "he would most like to lead" in his own words, he is shown a picture of a ladder with ten rungs and asked to imagine that the top rung represents the best possible life which he has just described. He is then asked to rank, in comparison with his ideal, his present life, his life five years ago, and what he expects his life to be like five years in the future. A person's position on these scales is a function of his own definition of the best possible state of affairs. His standards may be determined by class or race models, or expectations created by the mass media, but no simple objective indicator of achievement like income or occupation will be an adequate substitute for this psychological measure.⁴⁷

We use these measures of deprivation as indicators, based on standards meaningful to each individual, of a deep-rooted dissatisfaction or expectation of dissatisfaction which may be blamed on government. They are conceptually and empirically independent of the *political*-expectations indices employed in the previous section since a person may be deeply dissatisfied with the general course of his life, but feel politically powerful, believe he receives equal treatment from government and feel that governmental outputs have a beneficial impact. In other words, the two sets of indicators are related, but do not have the same psychological significance for the individual, and each has an independent effect on political trust.⁴⁸

We employed two sets of self-anchoring scales

sents the best possible life for you, the one you just described, and the bottom represents the worst possible life for you.

"Present Life" A. Where on the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?

"Past Life" B. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago?

"Future Life" C. Where on the ladder do you think you will be five years from now?

"In our study, for example, income is correlated (Gamma) .29 for whites and .23 for blacks with position on the "present life" ladder. Income is thus a meaningful predictor, but these are far short of simple one-to-one relationships.

⁴⁸ This proposition was tested for each racial group by a multiple regression analysis in which the measures of trust in people, the background factors, political experiences and expectations, and the ladders were used as predictors of political trust. The political variables and the relevant ladders each had an independent effect on trust with all of the other variables controlled. Multiple R's were .52 for the blacks and .49 for the whites.

in our surveys: One was the standard "best possible life" question explained in note 46 and a second sought the respondents' definitions of the "best possible race relations" as a base for selecting rungs on a ladder running from 0 to 10.⁴⁹ Both whites and blacks gave a wide variety of definitions of the "best possible life" in response to that question, with almost none of them directly involving race relations. While whites were much more satisfied with their past and present lives, both racial groups are strongly optimistic about the future.⁵⁰ When we turn to race relations we find very substantial differences in the patterns of answers. Blacks talk almost exclusively in terms of total integration, better personal relationships with whites, the

⁴⁹ See footnote 46 above for the wording on the "best possible life" questions. The "best possible race relations" items were in the same form with the following sentences as the initial stimulus:

Here in Detroit, as in many places, different races of people are living together in the same communities. Now I would like for you to think about the very best way that Negroes and white people could live in the same place together. In other words, what would be the very best kind of race relations, the most perfect you could imagine?

This item was adapted from that used by Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 285-294, 513-514.

⁵⁰ Income and job advancement were desired by 28% of the blacks and 16% of the whites, good health or family life by 22% of the blacks and 20% of the whites and personal property (homes, cars, etc.) by 15% of the blacks and 11% of the whites. The major difference was that 13% of the whites (as opposed to 3% of the blacks) said the life they were now living was the best possible and 23% of the whites, compared with 9% of the blacks, mentioned peace and tranquility.

% Scoring High (7-10) on "Best Possible Life" Ladders, by Race

	Past Life	Present Life	Future Life
Blacks	13 %	23 %	64 %
Whites	49 %	47 %	66 %

We will present more complete descriptions and analysis of the answers to the "best possible life" question in Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, *Race and the Urban Community* (Boston: Little Brown, forthcoming).

TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) BETWEEN LADDER POSITIONS ON SELF-ANCHORING SCALES AND POLITICAL TRUST, BY RACE AND EDUCATION

Scales*	Blacks			Whites		
	Zero-Order	Low Education	High Education	Zero-Order	Low Education	High Education
<i>"Best Possible Life" Ladders</i>						
Past Life	.18	.27	-.12	.02	.06	.03
Present Life	.31	.39	.05	.20	.23	.20
Future Life	.30	.38	-.11	.15	.14	.13
<i>"Best Possible Race Relations" Ladders</i>						
Past Race Relations	.16	.22	.04	-.04	-.07	.00
Present Race Relations	.13	.23	-.17	.26	.29	.17
Future Race Relations	.10	.17	-.11	.37	.40	.29

* The ladders were trichotomized as follows: 1-3=0; 4-6=1; 7-10=2. (This is the division used by Cantril, *op. cit.*, p. 257). Therefore, a positive coefficient indicates that the higher a person's score on the various ladders, the higher his trust in government.

disappearance of color consciousness, and respect and dignity for all, while more than 30% of the whites spontaneously endorse segregation or separation of some kind. In addition, many more whites than blacks are pessimistic about the future in this area⁵¹ with the correlation between expressed separationist feelings and whites scores on the future ladder at (Gamma) .40.⁵² The white community, not the black, is divided over the desirability of integration and whites are more depressed than blacks about the prospects for future race relations in Detroit.

This fact is reflected in Table 4 which indicates how much more potent a predictor of political trust the present and especially the future

⁵¹ Our "Best Possible Race Relations" ladders yielded the following results:

% Scoring High (7-10) on "Best Possible Race Relations" Ladders, by Race

	Past Race Relations	Present Race Relations	Future Race Relations
Blacks	10%	22%	61%
Whites	39%	23%	40%

⁵² The correlation (Gamma) is .09 for blacks because there is virtual unanimity in the black community on integration. See Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan," this REVIEW, 64 (1970), p. 883.

race relations ladders⁵³ are for whites than for blacks. The situation is reversed when we look at the "best possible life" ladders. Here the correlations are higher for the black sample. In addition, for whites, controlling for education has only mild effects on the relationship between the ladders and trust (the high education group is somewhat more homogenous on the ladders than the low education group), but it substantially increases the correlations in the low education black group. The signs are actually reversed in four of six cases for the high education black group where those who are dissatisfied are actually more trusting than those who are satisfied.

If we look back at the discussion of the correlation in Table 3 between expectations of equal treatment and political trust we recognize certain similarities to the relationships we are now describing; in both cases a racial question is a better predictor of trust in the white commu-

⁵³ Ted Gurr stresses the importance of "anticipated interference with human goals" in his analysis of discontent. He says that,

analysis of the sources of relative deprivation should take account of both actual and anticipated interference with human goals, as well as of interference with value positions both sought and achieved. Formulations of frustration in terms of the "want: get ratio," which refers only to a discrepancy between sought values and actual attainment, are too simplistic. Man lives mentally in the near future as much as in the present. Actual or anticipated interference with what he has, and with the act of striving itself, are all volatile sources of discontent.

See p. 254 of Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, 20 (1968), 245-278.

nity, and in both cases the upper education black group is quite different from the lower education black group. In summary:

- 1) Blacks are less likely than whites to lose faith in the government when they expect discriminatory treatment in a government office or when they see failures in achieving the pattern of race relations they favor. For high education blacks there are even cases when the relationship between the race relations ladders and political trust is negative.
- 2) Lower status blacks tend to be very bitter about government when they fail to achieve their personal goals in life while higher status blacks do not.
- 3) While higher status black people are somewhat more satisfied and less discriminated against than lower status blacks, this is not enough to account for the differences in relationships found here since there is a fairly uniform level of trust no matter how poorly the higher status person expects to be treated or how deprived he feels. In fact, the deprived high education black person is likely to be a little more trusting than those in the same group who are relatively satisfied.

The data for the white community are relatively easy to interpret: racial issues, especially those involving integration and governmental treatment of blacks become so important that they have superseded considerations of personal achievement, especially for the lower status group. Some of this may be due to the fact that our survey was conducted soon after a major disturbance, but large numbers of whites are clearly upset about the future of race relations and some actually feel discriminated against because of their race.⁵⁴ Government officials are faced with an increasingly angry, bitter and frightened group of white people who feel persecuted and unrepresented.⁵⁵ These feelings are

⁵⁴ We have already seen above that there are some whites who believe that they would receive unequal treatment at a government office because of their race. Even more astounding, however, is the fact that in our 1968 survey of a random subsample of the original (1967) sample 46% of the whites believed that if they were black they would be either making advances toward their goals in life or advancing more rapidly toward their goals. This compares to 57% giving similar answers in the black community. Unfortunately, this question was not on our 1967 questionnaire.

⁵⁵ More than half of the white respondents in our sample could not name any national or local leader who represented their views on race relations and whites actually scored lower than blacks on our

TABLE 5. CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) BETWEEN (A) PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION AND (B) RECOGNITION OF SERIOUS COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL TRUST FOR BLACKS, BY EDUCATION

	Zero-Order	Low Education	High Education
(A) <i>Personal Experiences</i>			
Personal Experiences of Discrimination Index (Police Excepted)*	-.15	-.18	.00
Personal Experiences of Police Mistreatment**	-.43	-.57	-.21
(B) <i>Recognition of Serious Community Problems</i>			
Crowded Conditions	.02	.05	-.22
Poor Education	-.01	.00	-.21
The Way the Police Act	-.21	-.21	-.24

* This is a simple additive index of personal experiences of discrimination in Detroit in obtaining housing, in the schools from a landlord, or in obtaining, holding or advancing on a job.

** This is an index of reports of police mistreatment experienced by the person himself.

A negative coefficient indicates that the more a person has been discriminated against, mistreated, or recognizes a community problem as serious, the lower his trust in government.

undermining their basic trust in government and making them much more sympathetic to political candidates who call for repression of the blacks in the name of law and order.

A more complex process is at work in the black community. In Table 5 we see that the indicators of reported discrimination are differentially related to political trust for the lower and upper education segments of the black sample. Experiences of discrimination in obtaining housing or on the job are associated with distrust for the lower education group, but not the upper education group. Even police mistreatment, the most volatile issue in Detroit's black community, is much more strongly related to political distrust in the lower education segment of the population. (This is not because only lower status blacks experience mistreatment, since about 15 percent of each group report some form of bad experience.) However, when the issue is simply whether a community problem is recognized as important or not, the relationship between recognition and distrust is stronger in the

measure of subjective political competence. See our discussion of these points in Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan," a discussion paper issued by the Institute of Public Policy Studies, The University of Michigan, 1968, pp. 27-34.

upper education group. Their distrust, unlike that of the lower education respondents, may not be rooted so much in concerns about *personal* experiences of expectations, nor even in considerations of larger and more abstract feelings about the conditions of race relations in Detroit, but in *empathy*—a feeling of identification with the black political and social community which includes persons from all social classes. This is part of a group identification gaining momentum in the middle class which identifies the fortunes of the black community, rather than prospects of the individual, as the key in evaluating decisions and institutions.⁵⁶ This could be the reason that our ladder measures of personal achievement are so successful as predictors for the lower education group and yet so unsuccessful for the upper education group. If some upper status blacks are identifying with others in the community who are persecuted, we would expect segments of both the lower and upper status groups to share a racial ideology of protest which is related to feelings of political trust. We will test this proposition in the next section.

VII. POLITICAL TRUST AND RACIAL IDEOLOGY

Our data give clear evidence of a developing racial ideology in Detroit's black community.⁵⁷ The elements of this belief system include a favorable interpretation of black power, the choice of militant black leaders as representatives of one's own point of view on race relations and a revolutionary interpretation of the meaning or significance of the 1967 disturbances. Scholars studying other cities have reached similar conclusions.⁵⁸ This ideology is not a manifestation

⁵⁶ Lupsha has discussed the same basic phenomenon: "Anger can occur without one's being frustrated or deprived. One can learn that certain events, or violations of one's rights and values, should be responded to with hostility. One can be angry and aggressive because one's values or sense of justice (a learned phenomenon) have been affronted, without any blocking of the individual's goal-directed activity, or awareness of any personal "want-get ratio" deprivation, or any personal feelings of "anticipated frustration." One can be angry and aggressive simply because one believes the behaviors of the situation are wrong or illegitimate." See p. 288 of Peter A. Lupsha, "On Theories of Urban Violence," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* (1969), 273-296.

⁵⁷ Aberbach and Walker, *op. cit.* (1970), pp. 379-386.

⁵⁸ See, for example, T. M. Tomlinson, "The Development of a Riot Ideology among Urban Negroes," *American Behavioral Scientist* (1968), 27-31.

of growing sentiments for separation,⁵⁹ but of a militantly expressed ideology of protest which demands quick and effective action to better conditions for *all* black people. Unfortunately, it is opposed by an equally militant ideology held by a large segment of the white community which demands racial separation and the curtailment of programs designed to aid disadvantaged blacks. These are the kinds of emotional issues which destroy trust in government and undermine the normal constraints on intemperate or even violent political behavior.

We will now examine the relationship between elements of these belief systems and political trust. Here, even more than in the previous section on explanations of political trust, we are dealing with a process in which a set of beliefs influences the level of trust which in turn influences or deepens the beliefs; the man who sees the 1967 riot as a justified reaction to social injustice is more likely to develop or sustain distrust of the government, but, in a cumulative spiral, this distrust strengthens his belief in the justification of the riot as a reaction to oppression. Since we are measuring these phenomena at a single point in time we cannot give our process model an adequate empirical test. Before progress can be made in verifying and refining our model, data on the same individuals must be collected on several different occasions.

Bearing in mind the restrictions placed on our efforts by the nature of our data, we turn first to our black respondents (Table 6) and see that each of the elements we have measured in the developing racial ideology is related to political trust. Blacks who label the 1967 disturbances as a revolutionary protest against mistreatment, favorably interpret the black power slogan, or select a militant as the leader best representing their views on relations between the races, are also likely to distrust the government. These

⁵⁹ Less than 2 percent of our black sample endorsed the idea of the separation of the races. This is not surprising in light of the history of the concept integration as a symbol of equality in the black community. We used the word separation in our questions in order to overcome the obvious connotations of segregation, but few of our respondents were attracted by the term and almost none used it spontaneously in their definitions of the "best possible race relations." Even among intellectuals, most of the debate about race relations revolves around various forms of social pluralism as opposed to assimilation. One of the major goals of our panel study is to examine the ways in which people modify their ideals about desirable forms of race relations and community goals through time. See Aberbach and Walker, *op. cit.* (1970), p. 383, especially footnote 49.

TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) BETWEEN MILITANT IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL TRUST FOR BLACKS, BY EDUCATION

	Zero-Order	Low Education	High Education
Favorable Interpretation of "Black Power"*	-.39	-.39	-.37
Favorable Explanation of the July, 1967, Disturbance**	-.22	-.20	-.25
Leader Best Representing the Respondents Views on Relations Between the Races***	-.23	-.19	-.32

* Favorable interpretations of black power (given a high score on this index) consist almost exclusively of notions about a "fair share" for blacks or "racial unity" in the black community as a tactic in bettering conditions. See Aberbach and Walker, *op. cit.*, for an extensive discussion of this.

** This is an index in which a high score indicates a revolutionary label for the disturbance and a belief that those who took part did so not because they were riffraff or criminals, but because they had been mistreated by society.

*** Respondents selected, without any cues from the interviewer, the leader who "best represented" their views on relations between the races. The selections were then scored from militant black leaders (high) through to conservative white leaders. See Aberbach and Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 385, for distributions.

sentiments are not a function of social status and, as we can see, the relationships are as strong or stronger for the upper educated black group as for blacks with lower levels of educational achievement. We should emphasize that these relationships are quite strong when we take into account the fact that the elements in the black ideology are all measured with open-ended survey questions. It is possible, therefore, to speak as we did before of a *black political community*, crossing social class lines, marked by a developing racial ideology focused on militancy and pride and connected with a strong distrust of government. This growing solidarity is a political phenomenon of the utmost importance for a minority community which needs to mobilize the skills of its growing middle class.

Turning now to the white community, we again find that racial variables are of great importance as predictors of trust, only here views on integration versus separation and spending public money to improve conditions in the ghetto are key factors in determining the level of trust. Whites are almost evenly divided on these issues (about 50 per cent of our white sample favor integration and approximately the same percentage endorse spending more money).⁶⁰ Such an

⁶⁰ The correlation (Gamma) between the two is .49 for whites. The exact distributions by race on

TABLE 7. CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) BETWEEN ATTITUDES ON INTEGRATION, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLITICAL TRUST FOR WHITES, BY EDUCATION

	Zero-Order	Low Education	High Education
Integration*	.28	.29	.28
More Money for Improvements**	.35	.31	.39

* This is a summary index of responses to items calling for the endorsement or rejection of a general policy of integration or separation, school integration and the description of the "best possible race relations" coded according to the degree of integration or separation endorsed. We used the word separation in preference to segregation to insure that black respondents could comfortably endorse this alternative; only 2% did so.

** The following close-ended question was asked in the middle of our section on the riot and conditions in the black community: "Do you feel that more money or less money should be spent on trying to improve conditions?"

overwhelming majority of blacks (over 90 per cent) favor both, however, that analysis of the correlates on these questions is not very fruitful.

The racial issue and the means of dealing with it inspire great emotion in the white community and threaten to undermine trust in the government for a substantial segment of the population. As Table 7 demonstrates, separationists and those opposed to spending more money to improve ghetto conditions are decidedly more distrustful of government than integrationists and those willing to spend more money. The relationships hold for those with high levels of educational achievement as well as those with lower levels of education. In addition, attitudes on integration and scores on the race relations ladders have independent effects on the level of trust,⁶¹ so that, for example, integrationists who are dissatisfied with the current or emerging course of race relations are more distrustful of the government than those who are satisfied, and they are also more distrustful than satisfied or optimistic segregationists. It is easy to envi-

spending public money are as follows:

Spend More Money to Improve Conditions

	More	Same	Less	DK, NA	
Blacks	94%	4	1	1	=100%
Whites	50%	28	19	3	=100%

⁶¹ For example, the correlation (Gamma) between political trust and scores on the future race relations ladder is .36 for segregationists and .27 for integrationists. It is .37 for the entire white sample.

TABLE 8. POLITICAL DISTRUST AND POTENTIAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR FOR BLACKS AND WHITES

Blacks				Whites		
Political Trust	Can you imagine a situation in which you would riot?*			If the election for mayor of Detroit were held tomorrow and the candidates were Jerome Cavanaugh and Mary Beck, who would you vote for?		
	<i>Yes or Maybe</i>	<i>No</i>	(N)	<i>Beck</i>	<i>Cavanaugh</i>	(N)
Low 0	54	46	(129)	74	25	(42)
1	35	65	(86)	42	58	(36)
2	35	65	(94)	52	48	(60)
3	21	79	(75)	39	61	(46)
High 4	17	83	(59)	26	74	(69)
	Gamma = .40			Gamma = .35		
(Percentages are across.)						

* The word "riot" was not actually used. Respondents were asked early in the interviews to give their own label to the events of July, 1967, and this term was used throughout by the interviewer.

sion situations in which events or governmental policies and pronouncements embitter both segregationists and integrationists, thereby dealing a double blow to the level of political trust in the white community.

VIII. POLITICAL DISTRUST AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Distrust of the government creates a tension in the polity which can build for some time, but ultimately seeks release. Among other things, people can revolt, engage in limited displays of violence like riots, demonstrate, or support candidates for elective office who give voice to their fears and frustrations. The mode of expression depends on the depth of the discontent, traditions of violence in the society, loyal coercive forces available to the government, and the availability of free electoral processes.⁶² At this point many distrustful blacks have taken to the streets and distrustful whites troop to the polls to vote for so-called "law and order" candidates.

We asked respondents whether they could "imagine any situation" in which they would take part in a disturbance like the one Detroit had in July of 1967 and we also conducted a mock mayoral election in which the choice lay between the incumbent mayor (Jerome Cavanaugh) and a very vocal member of the Detroit Common Council (Mary Beck) who had been courting backlash support. Since very few whites could envisage taking part in a disturbance, of the 1967 variety at least, and few blacks would

ever vote for Miss Beck, we could only employ each indicator for one racial group. This is simply a matter of convenience. We certainly do not wish to imply that blacks would never vote for extremist candidates or that whites would never engage in violence.

As Table 8 indicates, distrustful whites are indeed strongly in favor of Miss Beck and distrustful blacks are better able to imagine situations in which they would riot. Distrust clearly stimulates a willingness to engage in violence or favorably predisposes people toward voting for extremist candidates. Moreover, high levels of trust serve to dampen the behavioral impact of adverse experiences while low levels of trust lead to volatile situations in which each insult increases the probability of extreme behavior. In statistical terms, political distrust and adverse experiences interact.

A classic example of this interaction can be seen in the Detroit black community where political distrust and reported experiences of discrimination interact to inspire willingness to engage in a civil disturbance (See Table 9). When trust is low, experiences of discrimination have a very powerful effect on a person's ability to imagine a situation in which he could take part in a civil disturbance, but high trust seems to serve as a dike which blunts somewhat the political effects of these experiences. Persons who are low in trust seem to interpret each experience of discrimination as further proof that the political system is evil and must be dealt with by any means, while those who are trusting have a less severe reaction to these experiences. High levels of trust are resources which governments can use to gain time in order to correct wrongs in

⁶² Gurr, "Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," *op. cit.* See Aberbach, *op. cit.* (1969) for an extended discussion of political distrust and political behavior.

TABLE 9. EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION AND WILLINGNESS TO TAKE PART IN A CIVIL DISTURBANCE BY LEVEL OF POLITICAL TRUST FOR BLACKS*

Trust	Low (0-1)			High (2-4)		
Reported Experiences of Discrimination	Can you imagine a situation in which you would riot?					
	<i>Yes or Maybe</i>	<i>No</i>	(N)	<i>Yes or Maybe</i>	<i>No</i>	(N)
Few (0-1)	30	70	(122)	22	78	(139)
Medium (2)	60	40	(31)	30	70	(37)
Many (3-4)	71	29	(61)	36	64	(44)
	Gamma = -.65			Gamma = -.26		
	(Percentages are across.)					

* This is a simple additive index of reports of personal experiences of discrimination in Detroit in obtaining housing, in the schools, from a landlord, or in obtaining, holding, or advancing on a job.

the society. When trust is low injustices have a stronger and more immediate impact since the reservoir of good will has been destroyed.

IX. POLITICAL TRUST AND RACIAL IDEOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW

We conceive of political trust as a central element in a dynamic process. Earlier research has shown that the most important variables which influence trust differ somewhat according to the political environment in which the research takes place, and our own analysis demonstrates that determinants of trust differ from group to group. Since our study is based on data collected from only one city we cannot claim universal applicability for our findings, but we believe that data collected in Detroit have characteristics which make them eminently suitable for studies of political trust. Data from our Detroit sample, unlike those gathered in cities like Boston or Newark which have reputations for corruption and inefficiency, are distributed in such a way that legitimate examinations of the relationships between political trust and several of its possible determinants can be conducted successfully.

Our analysis shows that political trust is not merely a reflection of our respondents' basic personality traits, or a simple function of general social background factors. Our most important explanatory variables are those which arise from the workings of the social or political system, such as the citizen's expectations about the treatment he will receive from government officials, general feelings of deprivation and well-being, and beliefs about the status or acceptability of one's group in society. Levels of trust are determined by these factors and, in turn, are influenced by them in a chain of interactions which continues as the political system operates. Repeated setbacks or disappointments are neces-

sary to dissipate trust when it is high, and when trust is low, numerous successes are needed to increase it. Gamson argues that when a group has become extremely disaffected it is especially difficult to regain their trust because they may see any concessions made to them merely as proof that a corrupt system responds only to threats.⁶³ Our analysis lends support to many of Gamson's propositions, but his explanation of changes in levels of political trust cannot be given a conclusive empirical test until data are collected at several points in time from the same respondents. We are now collecting such data from our Detroit sample and will report our results in later work.

The determinants of trust are not the same for every social grouping within our sample. Among lower status blacks, high political distrust is related to expectations of discriminatory treatment in contacts with government officials, low feelings of political competence, experiences of racial discrimination, complaints about arbitrary or unjust behavior by the police, and low evaluations either of one's present situation in life or one's personal future prospects. Those lower status blacks who believe themselves to be suffering from some form of deprivation tend to become distrustful of the political system.

For upper status blacks, on the other hand, adverse experiences and dissatisfaction with their current achievements do not necessarily lead to political distrust. In fact, the small number who are dissatisfied with their present lives are slightly more trusting than those who are satisfied. Political distrust is highest among those middle class blacks who have a strong sense of identification and empathy with the problems of the black community. The accommodating, apolitical "black bourgeoisie" de-

⁶³ Gamson, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-178.

scribed by E. Franklin Frazier⁶⁴ is fast disappearing. The emerging concern with the nature of black identity or the meaning of the black heritage are reflections of the desire of blacks to find places of dignity and respect in the American social system. No matter how satisfied or dissatisfied they may be with the courses of their own private lives, many middle class blacks increasingly feel bound up with the black community and its problems. They are anxious to obtain assurances that the society will recognize the legitimacy and value of their culture and life style. They look to the government's policies and to the society's ceremonial or ritual acts for evidence that their status and importance is being recognized.

Political distrust among whites is rooted in their resentment and dissatisfaction with the course of American race relations and in a sense of political powerlessness. Our interview protocols are filled with bitter, angry outbursts, especially from the lower status whites, who believe they are victims of a cynical government which is willing to grant any black demand in exchange for votes and popularity. Most of the concessions being made, especially the symbolic gestures, seem to come at their expense. They feel leaderless and powerless in this new, confusing environment. In the past, their self respect and social orientation have been founded on myths of racial superiority which are being destroyed in the social revolution now taking place. Behind their anger we detect a sense of profound bewilderment and fear. White anxieties may be expressed in support of political leaders who seem to recognize their dignity and promise a return to "law and order," but they are as much victims as oppressors. Whatever our view of them, however, these restless whites are a potentially powerful political element which must be taken into account when public policies are being developed.

X. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Emerging from our analysis are the outlines of an ominous confrontation between the races. The growing sense of solidarity and racial identification among blacks is being matched by rising, increasingly bitter resentment among elements of the white community. More often than in past decades, the anger and resentment of both sides is being translated from generalized racial hostility into focused political demands for specific programs or policies from agencies of both local and national government. These de-

veloping tensions may precipitate the kinds of social changes being called for by blacks, but they could lead to an altogether different result. If both black and white citizens lose sufficient confidence in the essential trustworthiness of the government, the society may reach its political "tipping-point," constraints on intemperate or even violent protest may completely disappear, and the stage will be set either for large-scale anti-democratic efforts at change by blacks and/or massive attempts at reaction and repression by whites.

The government's success in avoiding a complete break-down in race relations depends, to a significant degree, on its success in building political trust. Declining trust can be a stimulant to social change. The direction or nature of the changes, however, will be determined by the reactions of the government or the rest of society to the demands of distrustful groups. If public officials are able to build or maintain high levels of trust, a broader range of policy options are opened for consideration and governments can more easily risk short term opposition from some groups in the hope of achieving an important long term result. When trust is low, however, groups are unlikely to give the government the benefit of the doubt and may begin to call for immediate fulfillment of their demands. A dangerous process of competitive mobilization may begin. In Gamson's words: "The presentation of demands by one group stimulates their presentation by others. Thus, it is possible for the loss of trust to encourage a 'deflationary' spiral akin to a run on the bank."⁶⁵ The level of trust, in other words, determines the amount of patience or forbearance citizens can be expected to exercise. Since the problems of finding an equitable and peaceful new basis for racial harmony cannot be quickly solved, governments must have time to deal with them successfully. By building trust, governments may buy the time they need.

The level of political trust existing at any time is the result of a complex process involving interactions with many variables. It is a changing reflection of a society's politically relevant conflicts and tensions. When trust is high, officials are in a better position to make commitments or adopt controversial policies aimed at the solution of difficult problems. Since high levels of trust are an important resource which cushions the impact of programs some groups find intensely objectionable, whenever substantial segments of the population begin to grow distrustful, it is important for the government to

⁶⁴ E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957).

⁶⁵ Gamson, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

act before the level of trust drops to the point where the resources to solve societal problems and rebuild trust cannot be mustered. When distrust is growing leaders are faced with the delicate problem of making policies which reach the sources of dissatisfaction at a time when any action is likely to make some group angry—often even some of those among their traditional political constituencies. This is a high political price which leaders seek to avoid, thereby making the problem worse for themselves and often much worse for their successors. It is difficult to devise policies which can solve social problems, and still more difficult to build coalitions which can enact these policies and support their enforcement. The problem is doubly difficult when political trust is low.

In this section on the implications of our analysis for public policy we emphasize racial problems because they are the major concerns of our study and a fundamental problem faced by the nation, but we recognize that the legitimacy of our political system currently is being undermined by controversies over many other social problems. It is not possible to separate cleanly the racial crisis from the problems of poverty, the Vietnam War, the development of huge private and public bureaucracies, and the student rebellions. The government's response to all of them has contributed to political distrust. A thorough treatment of the problems of political disaffection would range far beyond the racial crisis, but our discussion is necessarily confined to these difficult issues by the limits of the data we have collected and the space available to us.

Effective public policies, which have the important side benefits of encouraging a growth in political trust, must be designed to meet the needs of the people they are meant to serve. As our analysis demonstrates, the factors influencing political trust among Detroit's population are not easily categorized. The causes of the suspicions and hatreds which have created the racial tensions we describe are deeply rooted in our history. No single, simple governmental program can be expected to eliminate the dangers we face or usher in a period of mutual compromise and understanding among blacks and whites. No matter what may be done, we are moving through an extremely difficult period of transition in race relations which almost inevitably will be accompanied by hurt feelings and racial conflict. The level of turmoil we experience, however, and the impact it has on the shape of American institutions, will depend in large part on the decisions made and the programs instituted by public officials. Even though the situation contains many intractable elements, if di-

saster is to be averted, the government must intervene whenever possible with effective efforts to build a truly inter-racial society.

Racial harmony cannot be achieved unless the damage done by the innumerable insults and racial slurs exchanged between whites and blacks during the last two centuries can be at least partially repaired. The desires of blacks for symbolic assurances of good faith, however, are becoming increasingly difficult to grant because of mounting white resentment. Any policy which seems to grant benefits to blacks is interpreted by segments of the white community as unfair, preferential treatment. Many of the whites in our sample believe that blacks are getting "something for nothing" simply because they are "trouble makers." During the last two decades many highly significant symbolic gestures have been made which were designed to signify that blacks were being included as full partners in American society. These gestures have fueled the fires of white resentment, helped to stimulate a major realignment in Southern politics, and prompted the rise of political candidates like George Wallace. Black aspirations have also risen during this period, so that gestures which once were appropriate or satisfactory are now denounced as "tokenism." This emotion-laden struggle over symbolic assurances threatens to destroy the government's credit within both racial communities at once, and it constitutes the central dilemma of domestic policy making in contemporary American politics.

We do not believe this dilemma can be avoided through a policy of prudent immobility. Although there is no easy way to reach a new state of racial accommodation, governments must make an effort to encourage that development. There are many ways in which governments may seek to halt the erosion of political trust caused by heightened racial tensions, but there is no policy, including inaction, which may be implemented without costs or dangers. Every governmental action will stimulate an intense reaction from some element within one of the two racial communities. Our analysis indicates, however, that if there is to be any hope of a resurgence of trust in the integrity of American governmental institutions, the promise that all public forms of racial discrimination will be eliminated must be fulfilled. As our findings demonstrate, personal experiences of racial discrimination are an important determinant of political distrust among lower status blacks. The persistence of discrimination against members of the black community is also one of the most important factors encouraging despair among upper status blacks. The constitution requires that

racial discrimination be eliminated, and repeated declarations that it would be stopped have been made during the last two decades by public officials. Reducing efforts to fight discrimination at this time would only encourage disaffection and cynicism in both racial communities. It would lead citizens to view their government, rightly, as an unprincipled entity willing to retract its pledges of justice in response to threats. If our hypotheses about political trust are valid, this would lead even those who successfully made the threats to distrust government more than before.

Many courses of action are open to those wishing to attack the problems growing out of the contemporary racial crisis, but none will have a reasonable chance of success unless it involves a genuine effort at broad social reform. The developing sense of community among blacks in Detroit, to which we have referred so often, is founded on a common outrage about the material and social status of their group. Fundamental social changes have transformed the black community since World War Two and led to the widespread protests which marked the past decade. As a result of this controversy over the status and welfare of black Americans, an impressive new awareness of politics and public leaders has developed within the black community which is stimulating both higher expectations and greater impatience with the slow pace of change. The efforts of government to respond to black demands, no matter how small their scope or limited their success, have led to the creation of groups and the generation of similar demands for change and improvement within the white community. Many formerly quiescent ethnic and racial minorities and a significantly large segment of the white middle class have become critical of economic and social inequalities which were accepted as inevitable or simply ignored in the recent past. By responding to protest in the black community, the government has opened itself to similar demands from many other groups. It has also stimulated even higher expectations about its performance among all its citizens. Under these circumstances, once a process of competitive mobilization has begun, vigorous action to meet demands is necessary if the government hopes to maintain its integrity and the trust of its citizens.

Broad social reform does not come cheaply. Our analysis leads us to conclude that significant changes in the quality of public services and recognizable improvements in the level of well-being among large segments of the population are necessary if the society's problems are to be solved. In short, unless some means are

found to raise large amounts of money for domestic programs, far beyond that now being used for these purposes, the problems arising from the racial crisis are almost certainly going to get worse.

When both the competence and good faith of the government are being called into question, action to deal with widely perceived social problems is urgently needed. The policies called for, however, must be designed to meet several important political criteria. Vitrally needed money alone, even in unprecedentedly large amounts, will not necessarily insure the government's creditability. Democratic governments which wish to build trust must also convince the public that policies are the result of consultation and citizen participation, that the opinions of average people matter, and that individuals will receive a fair hearing from public officials. Plans for establishing neighborhood city halls, instituting a system of ombudsmen to aid citizens in making complaints against public officials, creating citizen review boards, electing advisory committees, and decentralizing large public agencies all come in response to the demand that rigid and insensitive public bureaucracies be eliminated. These proposals differ somewhat, but they all share the aim of improving the responsiveness of government to the complaints and desires of its citizens.

Plans for creating more responsive bureaucracies through various forms of administrative reorganization will have little chance of success unless they are accompanied by significant improvement in the benefits offered by government. The need for increased public expenditures and the need for a heightened sense of governmental responsiveness are closely linked. Programs which are designed merely to give the citizens a new assurance of the government's concern for their well-being without seeing that outputs are actually improved may produce better relations between citizens and officials in the short run, but in the long run they are likely to create even greater cynicism and disaffection.

Our analysis indicates that policies which do not result in increased benefits or better governmental services will be inadequate either to build political trust or to deal with the racial crisis. Our data also suggest that the agencies of government must become more responsive and sensitive to the needs and fears of both blacks and whites, and that individual citizens must be given more opportunity to influence bureaucracies whose actions affect their lives in fundamental ways. There are several policies now being proposed which might meet these criteria. One such option, which has recently received

considerable publicity, is the decentralization of large city school districts into smaller units based essentially on established racial and ethnic communities. Advocates of this reform argue that it combines meaningful social change, through increased funds and improved services, with heightened administrative responsiveness, through a locally elected school board and increased consultation by teachers with members of the community. The plan is also meant to promote a new awareness and pride in cultural identity among blacks which will eventually lead to greater motivation for learning, an improved educational climate, and higher scholastic achievement. Plans for community control over important city services call for recognition of the fact that little progress has been made toward racial integration and that society has long tolerated the existence of many ethnic and racial enclaves within the cities. Decentralization is designed to capitalize on these social trends rather than combat them in order to promote racial pride and, ultimately, better education.

Decentralization of the administration of city services along racial lines may be initially satisfying to certain militant elements in the black community, and to many hostile, segregationist whites. By officially separating these antagonists and concentrating on enrichment of the existing communities decentralization plans are supposed to lay the foundation for a new racial harmony based on an even greater degree of cultural and racial pluralism than now exists. We believe, however, that there are serious dangers in any policy which grants legal recognition to the racial divisions within our society and employs them as official administrative categories.

The problems of resource allocation will likely be exacerbated once districts are clearly separated on racial and ethnic grounds. The temptation to deny a fair share of essential resources to minority groups will receive legitimation as each district of the newly decentralized system is inevitably called upon to provide the major sources of funds for its operations. This will only tend to encourage debilitating conflicts along racial and ethnic lines and likely cut down the funding available to the districts which need it most. The result will be programs which do not live up to heightened expectations and decreased political trust. The prospects will be increased for competitive mobilization of racial and ethnic groups and uncontrollable conflicts in the future.

We do not mean to discourage or belittle the importance of efforts to encourage a heightened sense of awareness and pride among blacks in their cultural identity. We do not believe, however, that the government should play a large

role in this effort. Political leaders should concentrate, instead, on turning the society's attention away from an exclusive concern with racial conflict to a new broader concentration on problems of economic equality, the provision of medical care, housing, education and job training, the control of industrial planning and development, and the problems of environmental pollution. As coalitions of support are built on each side of these new controversies, racial conflicts might be displaced or reduced in importance. Schattschneider has observed that political "conflicts divide people and unite them at the same time, and the process of consolidation is as integral to conflict as the process of division."⁶⁶ Struggles over fundamental social issues, rather than pitting whites and blacks against each other on primarily racial grounds, might unite the two racial communities in pursuit of shared goals.

In other words, the best hope of obtaining an enduring racial peace and building political trust at the same time is through a massive, general attack on the outstanding social problems of the society which affect both whites and blacks. If these efforts at social reform are large and extensive enough, they would less likely be seen as special benefits designed solely for black people. Although there appears to be significant white opposition to spending more money to improve conditions in the ghetto and great ambivalence about the pace of change in the status of blacks there is a sense that something must be done and a large reservoir of support probably exists among working and middle class whites for extensive new expenditures on such things as housing, health and education which are aimed at improving the environment for all.

The value of truly large scale efforts to rebuild the cities, provide employment and job training, improve health care and meet other social problems is that through their magnitude and impressiveness alone, even if no special effort is made to emphasize their utility for black people, they might convince the black community that the government cares for their welfare and intends to provide them with the same benefits being provided for whites. Programs of this kind would provide material benefits greatly desired both by working class blacks and whites and at the same time, might supply the symbolic assurances needed by the middle class blacks without unduly antagonizing the whites. Edelman assures us that policies which distribute

⁶⁶ E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1960), p. 64.

tangible rewards may also have significant symbolic overtones: "Because the requisite conditions are always present in some degree, every instance of policy formulation involves a 'mix' of symbolic effect and rational reflection of interests in resources, though one or the other may be dominant in any particular case."⁶⁷

The public policies we advocate would not achieve racial harmony and widespread political trust in the short run—no policy can achieve that. The reforms we envisage would call for a large scale reallocation of resources which would certainly set off monumental political struggles, leading possibly to governmental stalemate. It may be impossible, given the rhetorical legacy of the past twenty years, to convince discontented whites that programs of general social reform are not merely further cynical efforts to pay off the black community. The time may have passed when broadly based interracial coalitions of support for social reform can be created. It also may be impossible to create responsive, effi-

cient and flexible governmental agencies of the size needed to carry out the large national programs we have in mind.

There are no easy solutions to the current American racial crisis, especially in view of the questions being raised in so many quarters about the legitimacy of established governmental institutions and their ability to successfully meet the many demands being placed upon them. Our data reveal considerable political disaffection among blacks, but there is little desire as yet for separation from the political community as a whole. Blacks overwhelmingly support integration and even those who find violence acceptable still display a willingness to participate vigorously in conventional politics. Events and policies of the next few years may cause political distrust to be generalized to the point where people wish to separate themselves completely from the American political community, but this is not an inevitable development. A workable, interracial society will not evolve without positive, calculated efforts to create it, but if genuine programs of social change are aggressively pursued, citizens may slowly gain new trust in the government, a process which might spiral upward with repeated successes.

⁶⁷ Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 41-42.

THE EFFECT OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT REFORM ON SPLIT TICKET VOTING: 1876-1908*

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In the last two decades of political science, there has been considerable interest in the determinants of electoral behavior. Theories have been developed and tested on the sociological, psychological, and political antecedents of the vote. Virtually neglected in this search for determinants have been the institutional or structural properties of the electoral system itself. With a few notable exceptions,¹ such factors as electoral qualification requirements, registration laws, and ballot and voting systems have not generated much research enthusiasm. These institutional properties, however, provide the framework within which the effects of other independent variables must be judged. This applies to all basic electoral research—whether time specific or longitudinal—but especially to the latter. Too often longitudinal research tries to trace the causes of changing voting patterns without taking into account the institutional framework. A pointed example of this is Walter Dean Burnham's recent description of this country's "changing political universe" around the turn of the century²—a change which he ascribed to a break-

down in party competition and consequent voter alienation, but which undoubtedly could be partially, if not largely, explained by reference to the many institutional changes in voting rules which occurred during this period. The effects of institutional properties must be sorted out if the researcher is to establish reliable baselines against which to measure the effects of other variables.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of one such institutional property of the electoral system—the Australian Ballot reform—on the changing split ticket voting patterns of the American electorate in the 1876-1908 time period. A theory is advanced to predict the ways in which ballot might be expected to affect split ticket voting. The theory encompasses not only the comparative effects of the Australian Ballot and the earlier unofficial "party strip" ballot, but also the differential effects of the varying internal formats the Australian Ballot assumed in the several states. A test of this theory is then made—involving a comparison of mean split ticket scores for the various ballot conditions across states within election years and within states across election years. Results show that the basic theory is confirmed. A test of Walter Dean Burnham's alternate theory of voting behavior for this time period is also made, and it is shown to be largely unsubstantiated insofar as it is dependent on the ticket-splitting phenomenon. Final interpretations are generalized to the role and influence of other institutional properties of the system on the voting decision.

I. THE AMERICAN BALLOT SYSTEM³

The Australian or "official" ballot was instituted in most states in the early 1890's. Massa-

³The history of the American ballot system can be found in various sources such as Spencer D. Albright, *The American Ballot* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942); Eldon C. Evans, *A History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917); Joseph P. Harris, *Election Administration in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1934); Arthur C. Ludington, *American Ballot Laws: 1888-1910* (Albany: New York State Library, 1911); and J. H. Wigmore, *The Australian Ballot System as Embodied in the Legislation of Various Countries* (2nd

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¹The few exceptions include Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 266-289; Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayres, and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," this REVIEW, 61 (June 1967), 359-379; V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956); Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," this REVIEW, 57 (June 1963), 355-367; and Warren E. Miller, "Memorandum to the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation" (unpublished Michigan Survey Research Center paper, 1963).

²See Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, 59 (March 1965), 7-28.

Massachusetts was the first to adopt it statewide in 1888⁴ and, in less than eight years, approximately 10 percent of the states had followed suit. Rarely in the history of the United States has a reform movement spread so quickly and successfully. The example of Australia, which originated the Australian Ballot Law in 1856, and several other nations who adopted this law was sufficient to recommend the new system as a probable cure for the ills of the electoral administration of the time.

Before the introduction of the Australian Ballot, there was a separate ballot for each party called a "party strip" or "unofficial" ballot since it was prepared and distributed by the party instead of the government. Each party, in essence, made up its own ballot, listing only its candidates, and had "party hawkers" peddle it to the voters in what resembled an auctioneering atmosphere in and around the polling station. Each party also made its ballot distinctive by printing it in a different color and on a different sized sheet from those of the other parties. This assured instant recognition of the ballot by the voters, and, in turn, recognition by the party workers of which party's ballot a person picked up and voted. In addition, the fact that the actual act of voting was usually performed in the open further assured that the people had no right to a secret ballot.⁵

The Australian Ballot system changed all this. It was completely different from the earlier system in concept and orientation. The new ballot was state-prepared and state-administered—

hence making it an "official" and uniform ballot which precluded the existence of party-prepared ballots. Secondly, the new ballot was a consolidated or "blanket" ballot, listing the candidates of all parties on it instead of only the candidates of one party. Last, the ballot was secret, an important complement to its being a consolidated ballot. The new system thus offered the voter an impartial, multiple-choice instrument, upon which he was allowed to deliberate and make a decision in the privacy of the polling booth. The intimidating party aura which so permeated the voting situation under the old system had been effectively dispelled.

Most states enacted ballot laws with the basic principles of the Australian Law—officiality, consolidation, and secrecy—intact. This still left them free to determine the internal format of the ballot, a matter on which there was not so much agreement among the states as there had been on the more basic provisions and general orientation of the Australian Law. Some states, following the lead of Massachusetts, looked once again to the original ballot law for cues and basically adopted its nonpartisan practice of aligning candidate names under office blocs. Some modification was made in this format, such as adding party names beside candidate names, but in general the ballot retained its objective, nonpartisan character. Other states followed the lead of Indiana in enacting a party column arrangement of candidate names on the official ballot. This format resembled a consolidation of the old party strips, placed side by side on the same sheet of paper. In essence, these states had overlaid their old party strip system onto the new Australian framework. Today, these two types of official ballot are known as the "Massachusetts office bloc" and "Indiana party column" arrangements.

The popularity of the two types of official ballot varied in this early time period. As Figure 1 shows, the office bloc format was the favorite of states in the beginning, but the party column design predominated after 1890, generally increasing in popularity over the years. The inference can be drawn that the early popularity of the office bloc form was due to its association with the original Australian Ballot Law. But this type of ballot, even when modified by the addition of party names, was too objective and nonpartisan to be in keeping with the style and heritage of American politics. Americans soon changed the format of the ballot to party column, to correspond more with the partisan nature of their political life. They perceived the important contribution of the Australian Law as lying in its basic provisions and not in its specific stipulation of internal format.

ed.; Boston: Boston Book Co., 1889). In general, these references give much better accounts of the Australian Ballot era than the voting systems in use prior to that time. An exception to this is the book by Evans.

⁴Although the first Australian Ballots were adopted in 1888 and 1889, they did not become effective in federal elections until 1890.

⁵The party strip or unofficial ballot came into use in most states during the first half of the nineteenth century. Before that time, the states (or colonies) had other forms of paper balloting, voice voting, or such unorthodox procedures as letting corn or beans designate one's vote. At one time, in the early 1800's, several states allowed the voter to make up his own ballot. The parties, noting this, were motivated to print their own ballots in order to thwart the use of handwritten ballots. This practice of party-prepared ballots was upheld in a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in 1829, setting a precedent which was not challenged until the beginning days of the Australian Ballot reform.




FIGURE 1. Trends in State Adoption of Partisan Ballot Types and Features

States also experimented in this period with adding certain features to the physical format of the ballot, such as straight ticket and party emblem devices. States would try a feature, evaluate its results, and then decide whether or not to keep it on the ballot. Figure 1 reveals certain trends in this experimentation and the resulting decisions made. For instance, the straight ticket addition seems to have been well received, since its popularity gained over the years. In part, such a movement is to be understood in the light of the increasing popularity of the party column form, the straight ticket option adding to the partisan flavor of this kind of ballot. This is not to say that such an option could not be or was not offered on office bloc ballots but rather that the general trend was for its incorporation onto the party column format. Party emblem was less used, but it also increased in popularity during this period, primarily, again, as a complement to the party column ballot.

II. BASIC THEORY

The theory proposed here centers on the effects on voting of two key dimensions of the ballot as an institution—its structural properties and the electoral environment in which it is used. Such information about the ballot is obtainable from state statute books and historical accounts of the time. Certain logical develop-

ments of this information and the use of past research findings about voting behavior help us to understand how ballot law and usage define the parameters and alternatives of the decision-making process at the polls and how the individual reacts under different ballot conditions. Two central hypotheses on ballot effects can be formulated. The first is that the Australian Ballot system had a stimulating effect on split ticket voting relative to its predecessor, the unofficial party strip ballot. The second is that the different internal formats of the official ballot themselves had differential effects on split ticket voting; in particular, we may hypothesize that the incidence of such voting was related to the degree of partisan orientation the particular ballot format displayed.⁶

Under the old party strip system, the voter's

⁶ These central hypotheses are based on a model of individual decision-making to be presented below. Testing such a model with aggregate election data is subject to the normal analytic cautions expressed by W. S. Robinson in his article, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (June 1950), 351-357. For a discussion of the Robinson argument of "ecological fallacy" as it applies to this analysis, see Rusk, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 67-70.

decision was, for all practical purposes, limited to a single choice—that of which party's ballot to cast. If the voter was interested in several candidates of different parties, he would have to weigh their relative importance and make a decision either to go with the one he liked best, or to go with what he considered to be the best overall party slate of candidates. The same type of decision model could apply to parties as well, if the voter preferred this alternative to that of ranking individual candidates. The important point is that the ballot system encouraged the voter to reduce his several choices to one and then take the party ballot corresponding to that decision.

The party strip system did not deny the possibility of a split ticket vote being cast. There were ways to vote a split ticket if the individual had the motivation to find out how and to execute such a decision in an environment emphasizing partisan norms and allowing only an open vote. One method was to "scratch" a name off the ballot and write the name of another party's candidate above it. Another was to take two different party ballots, marking each for certain offices, and then have them attached together before depositing them in the ballot box. Certain variants of these voting schemes existed in other states. But it was rare to find instructions on how to vote "a split ticket" printed on the ballot or for a party hawker to mention such a possibility. The electoral environment discouraged deviant voting in most instances—the complete party control of the ballot encouraging and reinforcing a tendency toward straight ticket voting.

The voting situation was different under the Australian Ballot system. The voter no longer had to reduce his several choices to a single dominant choice; he could instead express his multiple preferences as they stood across the new consolidated ballot. If he needed guidance on how to do so, the ballot had voting instructions printed on it, and voting assistance was also obtainable from nonpartisan state officials. The presence of a secret vote gave further notice that the prevailing norms of the partisan world were capable of being broken at the polling station. In fact, the new system encouraged different norms more compatible with the changing milieu. Split ticket voting was on the rise because the opportunity clearly existed to be used. This did not mean that electorates immediately registered large split ticket tendencies overnight; voters had to adjust to the new ballot instrument and the new norms that the changing milieu created. Old habits had to be modified or broken to adjust to the new situation—habits that had been in existence for a long time.

Changes in voting habits (and the rate at which they took place) depended considerably on the internal format of the Australian Ballot. The two different formats of the official ballot could have effects of their own. For instance, the party column format, since it had consolidated the party strips of the earlier period, continued to suggest a more partisan vote than its counterpart, the office bloc ballot. The similarity in style of the Indiana format to its predecessor was compatible with previous voting habits, thereby making it more difficult to recognize and use the ticket-splitting potential of the new ballot. On the other hand, the Massachusetts ballot was conducive to an independent decision being made for each office. The alternatives it defined favored a multi-choice orientation rather than a single-choice one. The difference in orientation between it and the unofficial ballot probably prompted a faster adjustment to its split ticket capabilities than to those of the Indiana format.

The addition of straight ticket and party emblem features to the ballot could also have effects on voting behavior. Such partisan devices suggested some decrease in split ticket voting from the levels normally associated with ballot format alone, but the extent of this decrease depended on the ballot format on which they were displayed. The devices probably had only a small effect on the party column ballot since this format already provided a strong partisan orientation. But because these devices stood in greater contrast to the office bloc format, they were more salient to the voter and thereby considerably decreased the likelihood of split ticket voting on this ballot. In statistical terms, they must have had something akin to independent effects on the Massachusetts form, but only interactive effects on the Indiana ballot.⁷

III. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

The first step in testing any theory is to oper-

⁷ In contemporary research on survey data, Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller show the voting effects of one of these partisan devices, the straight ticket provision. They find that there is a greater tendency toward party slate voting when a ballot format has a straight ticket device than when it does not. However, it is difficult to tell to what extent such effects are separate from ballot format considered as a variable since the correspondence between straight ticket provisions and party column formats (or multi-choice provisions and office bloc formats) is very close today. See Campbell and Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," *this REVIEW*, 51 (June 1957), 293-312.

ationalize its basic concepts; the second, to evaluate the merit of such operations from a methodological point of view. In this study, only the dependent variable—split ticket voting—needs to be operationalized. The independent variables of ballot types and forms are usable for analysis purposes directly as they are taken from state laws.

The research literature provides few guidelines for operationalizing the dependent variable. A measure authored by Walter Dean Burnham has gained some currency in the field and is related to one theoretical interpretation of the voting patterns of this period.⁸ The decision was made to use the Burnham measure, primarily for two reasons—tests show it to be capable of meeting our major analysis requirements, and use of it will facilitate contrasting our findings with those of Burnham in a later section of this paper. Results of experimentation performed with the Burnham measure in order to understand its behavior and its methodological strengths and weaknesses will be given below.

The Burnham measure is defined as the difference between the highest and lowest percentages of the two party vote cast for the Democratic party among the array of statewide races in any given state and election year.⁹ For example, state A in a certain election year has the following statewide races, with the results expressed as Democratic percentages of the total vote cast for the two major parties: President, 51%; Governor, 49%; Secretary of State, 48%; State Treasurer, 48%; and, Attorney General, 48%. The split ticket value for state A in this election year is 3%.

The central focus of the Burnham measure is on the competitive interaction of the two major parties in an electoral situation. This requires the exclusion of uncontested races and the virtual exclusion of races with third party activity from consideration in the split ticket computations.¹⁰ Third party intrusions of a sizable na-

ture would especially create additional variation in the two party vote which could not be considered a true split ticket effect for Burnham's or our purposes.¹¹

As an aggregate-based measure, the Burnham index suffers from the same liabilities as other such measures. For example, it assumes that the "gross difference value" it obtains is due solely to ticket-splitting, yet one realizes that some portion of this value is attributable to other causes. Election fraud, accidental miscounting of election returns, etc., can register artificial effects in the index. Also, since the measure is an aggregate difference figure, it would not detect mutual crossovers between the two parties which have the effect of cancelling each other out.¹² After recognizing the weaknesses of an aggregate-based measure, the researcher must usually take the position that such problems are either minor or else distributed fairly randomly among the various cases in the data collection.

A fault more specific to the Burnham measure is that it does not provide for analysis of "com-

and some might consider it too high; however, given the many and large third party movements in this period, the figure seems reasonable. To check this procedure, we also looked at those cases of states having third party vote figures greater than six percent for most of their races and yet where the percentage did not vary greatly across the set of contested races. These data, impure as they were, conformed to the same trendlines in the ballot analysis as the figures generated by the screening criterion selected for use with the Burnham measure. This gave increased confidence in the findings, and on two occasions in the ballot analysis below (Tables 5 and 8), we display the "impure" values of states with the "pure" values of other states, carefully distinguishing the two in such instances.

¹¹ For certain research purposes, the third party vote would be a useful statistic to keep in the split ticket picture. Third parties broaden the alternatives open to the voter and in this way contribute to split ticket voting in certain areas. However, when the concern is with fluctuations in the two party vote space, third party figures can only be viewed as creating needless disturbances in the data.

¹² Aggregate election analyses usually assume that voters crossover or split their tickets mainly in one direction—the direction of national trends. But even if this were not the case, the phenomenon of mutual crossovers would not contaminate our ballot analysis unless it occurred, for some reason, far more often in unofficial than in official ballot states, a proposition that seems unlikely.

⁸ Burnham, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁹ The definition of a "statewide race" was expanded in this paper to include an aggregation of the district congressional vote. As a check on this operation, another measure was constructed excluding the congressional vote, and, when compared, both revealed similar behaviors and interpretations in the subsequent ballot analysis.

¹⁰ Burnham did not indicate what screening criteria he used to eliminate third party intrusions in his data. The rule established in this study was that no race would enter the computations if the third party vote contributed six or more percent to the total vote for that race. Admittedly, this figure was somewhat arbitrary

parable race sets" across states within a given election. The number and kinds of races from which it is computed can vary from state to state. The Burnham measure is rather best suited for analyzing ticket-splitting within states across election years as a means of controlling its "race composition factor."¹³ A major part of the analysis in this paper uses the Burnham measure in this context. But an analysis across states is also an important interest. In this situation, use of the Burnham measure needs some intellectual justification since its values could fluctuate from state to state simply because of differences in the races composing it. Whether or not this is a disadvantage depends on how the index behaves as a function of the composition factor and what the relation of this behavior is to the predictions of ballot theory.

Several tests of the Burnham index were conducted, primarily to determine the effect of the race composition factor, but also for the more general purpose of checking to see if the measure was indeed tapping ticket-splitting. With regard to the latter purpose, the measure was found to behave as one might expect, both statistically and theoretically. That is, as one increased the number of races in the index, its value would generally rise as a function of the probability of rare outcomes entering the calculations. As one included the presidential race with two or more state-specific races, its value also tended to increase in keeping with the theory that the presidential race is a more powerful generator of short-term influences in elections. While these two tests suggested the validity of the measure, they also highlighted the possibility that states contesting larger numbers or given kinds of races could have higher split ticket values simply because of their particular race composition situations. Hence, another test was called for—and this revealed that the race composition factor was not spuriously affecting our own predictions as to ballot effects. That is, it indicated that there were not larger numbers of races or given types of races associated with those ballot conditions predicted by ballot theory to have greater incidences of split ticket voting.¹⁴ A last test also confirmed this lack of

spurious correlation and gave further evidence of validity. Three measures devised to have "comparable race sets," and hence to control for the variable factor of race composition, behaved similarly and gave similar results in the ballot analysis as the Burnham measure.¹⁵ The results from all the tests indicated that, assuming some care with the number of races per state, the Burnham index reflected split ticket voting adequately and avoided any noticeable confounding or contaminating effects in its operations.

IV. INTRODUCTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT

The Burnham split ticket values, when computed for the 1876–1908 time span, are quite revealing. Figure 2 displays a trendline of rising values in the years in which the Australian reform took place.¹⁶ However, until ballot has

analysis context, once again revealing an absence of correlation between the race composition factor and the predictions of ballot theory.

¹³ The three measures computed were based on the presidential-gubernatorial, presidential-congressional, and gubernatorial-congressional pairings of races. Ideally, they would have been the best measures to use in an analysis of ballot conditions across states within election years since they standardize race sets; however, there are several reasons why, in practice, they were not so useful. For one thing, they severely limit the number of cases entering the analysis. Even with the pairings mentioned above, one is assured of most states entering only the presidential-congressional computations since some of them do not contest the gubernatorial race in a presidential election year. With the addition of any third race to the index, more states would drop out of the computations for similar reasons. Second, the inclusion of but two races in an index for any given state does not allow much room for variation in the vote to occur. It certainly does not provide one with good estimates of a state's split ticket voting behavior. Third, such an index does not provide an adequate comparison with the results generated by the Burnham measure within states across election years. Comparability of the two modes of analysis is best achieved by using the same measure rather than two differently constructed ones. Also, it is more appropriate to use the Burnham measure consistently in order to compare our results with those produced by Burnham for his interpretation of the voting behavior of this period.

¹⁶ Burnham, of course, also observed a rising split ticket trend in these years. His evidence for this was the split ticket scores of five states. See Burnham, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14, 17–20.

¹³ By "race composition factor" is meant the types of races entering the Burnham index computations in any given state. Inspection of the data shows that this factor is fairly stable across elections though the index can in no way guarantee a complete control over this.

¹⁴ While the primary purpose of this test was to examine the effects of the race composition factor on across-state, within-year analyses, it was also used in the within-state, across-year




FIGURE 2. Means of Split Ticket Voting Index by Election Year for Nation and Region

been examined as an analysis variable, such a trend can only be regarded as indirect evidence of ballot's effect on voting. Perhaps there were other ticket-splitting stimuli that were particularly active in the Australian Ballot years. More direct tests of the central hypothesis need to be undertaken in order to determine the role ballot played in this split ticket voting picture.

One test is a within-year analysis of ballot conditions. Such a test also provides us with an election normalization device. Some control on different kinds and intensities of political stimuli can be put into effect by examining the unofficial and official ballot systems with regard to ticket-splitting in the same year. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1.

A few points need to be made about Table 1 before it can be analyzed effectively. First, the number of cases in the table is necessarily limited due to (1) the ballot reform being accomplished in a short period of time, leaving few data points in the unofficial ballot categories, and (2) part of this general period, 1890-1908, being marked by fervid third party activity, making it necessary to drop some of the states (mainly in the Australian Ballot category) from the analysis. Second, the table contains not one but two unofficial ballot categories. Row (1) refers to the general type of unofficial ballot in use during this period—the "pure party strip" which has been described in previous sections. Row (2)

includes all unofficial ballot states, combining the ballot cases of row (1) with the very few states (never more than five in the United States at any particular time) that used a deviant form of the unofficial ballot. This deviant form was called the "separate party strip system"—its distinguishing characteristic being that a separate party strip ballot was used for each office contested by the party instead of following the modal pattern of placing all offices contested by the party on a single party strip ballot. Row (3) of the table is, of course, the official ballot category.

The main finding in Table 1 follows the predictions of ballot theory. Regardless of whether one compares row (1) or (2) with row (3), the direction of mean values shows that the Australian Ballot states have more ticket-splitting than their unofficial counterparts in every election year in both the North and the nation.¹⁷ The

¹⁷In some election years, the split ticket distributions (as pictured on a standard low-to-high percentage value scale) were skewed to the right. Because of this, medians were computed to compare with the pattern of means. As one might guess, the results were similar in direction although some of the differences were smaller. Variance figures in this and other tables also behaved predictably in accordance with the pattern of mean values. Another way to look at this basic

TABLE 1. SPLIT TICKET VOTING MEANS OF UNOFFICIAL AND AUSTRALIAN BALLOT STATES
BY ELECTION YEAR FOR NATION AND REGION^a

Ballot Condition	Election Year										Overall Means 1890-1908
	1890	1892	1894	1896	1898	1900	1902	1904	1906	1908	
Nation											
Pure Party Strip (1)	1.5 (16)	0.8 (3)	— (0)	1.0 (1)	0.7 (1)	0.4 (2)	0.3 (2)	2.8 (2)	— (0)	3.3 (2)	1.5 (29)
All Party Strip (2)	2.5 (18)	1.0 (5)	0.6 (2)	4.0 (3)	0.7 (2)	1.4 (4)	0.5 (3)	2.6 (4)	0.1 (1)	4.3 (4)	2.2 (46)
Australian Ballot (3)	2.6 (7)	2.2 (13)	2.4 (11)	4.3 (34)	2.7 (26)	2.6 (36)	2.7 (20)	7.4 (21)	3.1 (13)	4.6 (21)	3.6 (202)
North											
Pure Party Strip (1)	1.7 (13)	0.8 (3)	— (0)	1.0 (1)	0.7 (1)	0.4 (2)	0.3 (2)	2.8 (2)	— (0)	3.3 (2)	1.5 (26)
All Party Strip (2)	1.6 (14)	0.8 (4)	0.9 (1)	1.7 (2)	0.7 (2)	1.6 (3)	0.5 (3)	2.7 (3)	0.1 (1)	4.8 (3)	1.7 (36)
Australian Ballot (3)	2.2 (6)	2.3 (11)	2.1 (9)	4.9 (28)	2.6 (24)	2.6 (27)	2.7 (19)	9.1 (15)	3.2 (12)	5.5 (16)	3.8 (167)
South											
Pure Party Strip (1)	0.4 (3)	— (0)	— (0)	— (0)	— (0)	— (0)	— (0)	— (0)	— (0)	— (0)	0.4 (3)
All Party Strip (2)	5.4 (4)	1.9 (1)	0.3 (1)	8.5 (1)	— (0)	0.9 (1)	— (0)	2.2 (1)	— (0)	2.6 (1)	3.8 (10)
Australian Ballot (3)	4.6 (1)	1.7 (2)	3.8 (2)	1.4 (6)	3.4 (2)	2.8 (9)	2.2 (1)	3.2 (6)	1.2 (1)	1.7 (5)	2.5 (35)

^a Category (2) refers to all unofficial ballot states; category (1) refers to those unofficial ballot states which have all major statewide races on a single party strip ballot. Figures in parentheses denote the number of states on which the mean split ticket value was based for any given cell entry.

strength and consistency of this pattern of voting values attest to its own importance. The new official ballot allowed and encouraged split ticket voting. As a contrast, the South manifests a ragged, nonconsistent pattern. Partly this can be ascribed to inadequate cases for analysis purposes because of our data screening process. But also it is thought that the deviant form of unof-

relationship is conveyed in Table 3 below, which presents the split ticket means for the ballot conditions for each state separately over all years, thereby holding constant the variation in the other states while viewing state X.

ficial ballot, which was used by a few southern states, motivated additional split ticket voting beyond that associated with the modal party strip ballot system. Such a tendency, given the few data cases in the table for the South, would accentuate the importance of this ballot in explaining the idiosyncrasies in this region's ticket-splitting picture.

A comparison of rows (1) and (2) by nation and region comments on the unique split ticket properties of the "separate party strip ballot system," the deviant form of unofficial ballot. For instance, in the nation, in all but one year the values of row (2) are greater than those of

row (1). Since row (2) is an average of row (1) values and those of the deviant unofficial ballot states, one can easily infer that the deviant ballot is associated with the larger split ticket tendencies. The reason for this association lies in the fact that the voter had to choose a separate party ballot for each office for which he wished to vote; in so doing, he was faced with several possible decision-making situations, and unlike the voter in the modal party strip system, he did not have to reduce his several choices to a single dominant choice. The separate party strip system thus encouraged some modicum of ticket-splitting, at least generally greater than that evidenced in pure party strip ballot states. Its effects were more pronounced in the South than in the North, but the general tendency existed in both regions.

While the Australian Ballot and, to a lesser extent, the separate party strip system encouraged split ticket voting, a perusal of row (1) in the table reveals that the pure party strip states had very little split ticket voting in almost every election from 1890 through 1908. In fact, the values are similar in size to those registered in the same situation in earlier years before the Australian Ballot appeared in America. One might expect the values to rise in election years showing high split ticket values in the Australian Ballot states, but a comparison of rows (1) and (3) shows this rarely to be the case. For the separate party strip system, there seems to be some tendency in this direction as a result of its unique split ticket properties, but the modal party strip system presents a considerable obstacle to ticket-splitting in most elections, including some high ticket-splitting elections.

Another important aspect of Table 1 is the consistency of the unofficial-official ballot comparisons, given the varied stimuli probably associated with the different election years. The arrangement of the data is the same across all years—high and low stimulus, or turnout, elections, "Republican" and "Democratic" years. A more rigorous analysis of this across-year consistency in the data would be through regression techniques. Such techniques can pinpoint the amount of temporal covariation in voting properties between the Australian and unofficial ballot conditions. The resulting slope lines and coefficients would comment on the relative sensitivity within each ballot condition to whatever short-term forces lead to more or less ticket-splitting over the years. Such regressions were performed on the values in Table 1, considering the Australian Ballot values as the independent variable and the two unofficial ballot categories successively as dependent variables. The findings from both analyses revealed little variation in

the effects of the unofficial ballot relative to the official one, indicating once again that people using the official ballot were more likely to translate whatever short-term forces there were in these years into greater split ticket voting. The official ballot provided the best opportunity for people to express their reactions to the short-term forces in the political environment.

A summary of the effects of the unofficial-official ballot conditions across all years can here serve to highlight the effects we have observed within given election years. As shown in Table 2, the progression of split ticket values is as predicted and reflects the need to consider the two pre-Australian forms as separate categories with separate effects. This logic fits well with the idea that the two are conceptually different and that this difference is shown to have predictable influences on ticket-splitting behavior. The dominant theme of the two is, of course, registered by the pure party strip system with its low frequency of split ticket voting, since it was the type of unofficial ballot used by about 90 percent of the states. The contrast between the two pre-Australian categories and the Australian Ballot reflects the split ticket potential existing with a secret, consolidated ballot. The opportunity is presented by the ballot and stands in contrast to the party emphasis in the earlier voting system.

Another way to look at the effect of ballot is to take each state separately and compare its split ticket voting before it adopted the official ballot with such voting after adoption. The analysis mode then shifts from comparing mean split ticket scores of the unofficial and official ballot conditions across states within election years to within states across election years. Within this mode, comparisons will usually be made for similar types of elections—keeping presidential and off-year elections distinct because of the differing stimuli associated with each.

TABLE 2. SPLIT TICKET VOTING MEANS OF UNOFFICIAL AND AUSTRALIAN BALLOT STATES OVER ALL ELECTION YEARS, 1876-1908^a

Ballot Condition	Split Ticket Means
Pure Party Strip	1.2 (197)
Separate Party Strips	3.1 (20)
Australian Ballot	3.6 (202)

^a The first two row categories refer to different types of the unofficial ballot.

Practically speaking, the actual computations involve summing a state's split ticket values for elections of the same type, within each of the two ballot time periods, and then deriving a mean value for each period. Such an aggregation across elections within ballot periods has the advantage of sharpening the accounting of effects attributable to the ballot while dampening out (through mutual cancelling) the effects of any unique election year stimuli. The end product of such aggregating and averaging operations should be good estimates of each state's ticket-splitting behavior in the two ballot environments.¹⁸

The data for presidential elections are presented in Table 3 and resemble the other data sets with respect to the effects of the official ballot. All but one state—97 percent of the states in all—have a higher split ticket figure for their official ballot period than for their unofficial ballot period. In almost all of the states, the split ticket values of the two periods differ quite remarkably. Some states, such as Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Rhode Island, reveal very little ticket-splitting in the party strip phase, but mushroom in value when the reform movement took hold. What is important in this regard is the increment in split ticket voting from the unofficial ballot condition (as expressed in ratios of ballot categories) and not a given percentage increase taken to be a standard for all states to pass or fail. The relative increase is the item of interest, and, in most cases, such an increase is quite large. A doubling, tripling, or quadrupling of such voting is commonplace among the various states.

Some excellent summary information can also be gleaned from Table 3. The import of its message is similar to earlier statements, but it can give us some indication of the average effect of the two ballot time periods. In the table, twenty-nine states qualify as having both unofficial and official ballot conditions. For these states, ticket-splitting goes from a mean value of 1.1 to 3.4 for the two ballot conditions, an increase of approximately three times. This is the average effect of the official ballot for states having both forms in presidential years. For all states, the figures deviate even more—1.1 to 4.1.

Several states, of course, were deleted from the first set of figures because of one or the other of two reasons—they used the unofficial ballot exclusively in this period, or, the converse,

TABLE 3. SPLIT TICKET VOTING MEANS OF UNOFFICIAL AND OFFICIAL BALLOT PERIODS OF STATES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS, 1876-1908^a

State	Unofficial Ballot Period	Official Ballot Period	Difference of Means	Category Cases
Alabama	1.10	—	—	1, 0
Arkansas	0.65	2.05	1.40	2, 2
California	1.12	2.15	1.03	4, 2
Colorado	2.62	3.88	1.26	4, 5
Connecticut	0.60	—	—	4, 0
Delaware	0.28	1.14	0.86	4, 5
Florida	0.70	2.70	2.00	3, 2
Georgia	—	—	—	0, 0
Idaho	—	2.03	—	0, 3
Illinois	1.18	1.20	0.02	4, 2
Indiana	0.38	1.10	0.72	4, 5
Iowa	0.93	3.40	2.47	3, 3
Kansas	2.77	0.72	-2.05	4, 4
Kentucky	0.45	1.58	1.13	4, 4
Louisiana	1.10	—	—	2, 0
Maine	—	—	—	0, 0
Maryland	0.48	1.54	1.06	4, 5
Massachusetts	1.15	6.58	5.43	2, 6
Michigan	1.00	6.62	5.62	3, 1
Minnesota	2.63	16.58	13.95	3, 4
Mississippi	2.00	—	—	2, 0
Missouri	1.57	2.00	0.43	6, 1
Montana	—	12.90	—	0, 3
Nebraska	2.05	3.65	1.60	4, 4
Nevada	1.80	4.35	2.55	4, 2
New Hampshire	0.72	4.08	3.36	4, 5
New Jersey	1.28	—	—	9, 0
New York	0.88	2.33	1.45	5, 3
North Carolina	0.48	—	—	4, 0
North Dakota	—	8.44	—	0, 5
Ohio	0.65	1.98	1.33	4, 4
Oregon	0.48	3.15	2.67	4, 2
Pennsylvania	0.42	0.70	0.28	1, 1
Rhode Island	0.55	5.46	4.91	4, 5
South Carolina	—	—	—	0, 0
South Dakota	—	1.40	—	0, 2
Tennessee	1.70	2.30	0.60	4, 4
Texas	0.55	3.40	2.85	2, 2
Utah	—	18.65	—	0, 2
Vermont	1.92	4.06	2.14	4, 5
Virginia	0.30	5.73	5.43	3, 3
Washington	—	3.23	—	0, 3
West Virginia	0.73	2.40	1.67	3, 5
Wisconsin	0.57	1.30	0.73	5, 2
Wyoming	—	4.06	—	0, 5
Means of State Means	1.1	4.1	2.3	128, 125

^a The unofficial ballot category covers the period from 1876 through the last presidential election before change from the unofficial ballot for each state. The official ballot category covers the period from the first presidential election in which the Australian Ballot was used through the 1908 election. The designation "category cases" refers to the number of elections entering the split ticket mean computations for the unofficial and official ballot periods of any given state.

¹⁸ The voting estimates are "good" except for the fact that there is a rising split ticket curve in this period that makes sense substantively. Better estimates could be obtained by excluding the transition trends in the data.

they adopted the official ballot, never having any previous ballot system. The incidence of ticket-splitting for the first category of states is very low—0.8 percent. The second category of

TABLE 4. SPLIT TICKET VOTING MEANS OF UNOFFICIAL AND OFFICIAL BALLOT STATES IN SELECTED YEARS OF BALLOT CHANGE^a

Ballot Condition	1890	1892	1894	1896	1898
Pure Party Strip (1)	1.5 (16)	0.8 (3)	— (0)	1.0 (1)	0.7 (1)
All Party Strip (2)	2.5 (18)	1.0 (5)	0.6 (2)	4.0 (3)	0.7 (2)
First Election Year of Official Ballot Use (3)	2.6 (7)	1.9 (9)	2.6 (1)	19.0 (2)	— (0)
Second Election Year of Official Ballot Use (4)	— (0)	3.0 (4)	2.4 (8)	2.0 (2)	2.8 (3)

^a It should be noted that in order to trace the same set of states from the first to the second year of official ballot use, one must compare a given election in category (3) with the succeeding election year in category (4) of the data set. Some states, however, will be missing in one or both years of the data set because of failure to meet its screening requirements.

states, those western states entering the Union in the early 1890's or later, go in the opposite direction—they display the highest split ticket average in the study, 7.2 percent. Obviously, variables other than ballot were contributing to this outcome. The entrance of a territorial entity into national politics in itself must promote some reactions similar in kind to those shown for the ballot. The presence of the ballot makes it easier to implement such reactions. However, even when the large split ticket effects of these official ballot states are controlled for, the basic relationship between ballot and voting behavior still holds, as our example of the twenty-nine states above indicated.

The same story of ballot effects repeats itself in the off-year election figures so that little new information is to be gained from this data source. Approximately 85 percent of the states, in the off-year election context, show a rise in ticket-splitting in their Australian Ballot period. When off-year and presidential types of elections are merged, 91 percent of the states reveal the predicted direction.

Demonstration that ballot has an effect on split ticket voting is only one part of an analysis; for ballot theory to be substantiated, split ticket voting patterns must be shown to have changed in the states shortly after the new ballot was introduced. A reasonable prediction would be that, in accord with adjustment patterns, split ticket voting would show a rise in either the first or second election year in which a state used the new ballot. This proposition is first tested across states within these crucial years of ballot change. Table 4 presents mean split ticket values for three categories of states

—unofficial ballot states (row 1 or 2), official ballot states in their first year of new ballot use, and official ballot states in their second year of use. According to the data, both the first and second years of ballot use seem to be good indicators of the effects of the official ballot. Sizable differences exist between the unofficial and official ballot states, as a comparison of either row (1) or row (2) with rows (3) and (4) indicates. States adopting the new ballot soon changed their voting patterns from those remaining steadfast to the existing system. Voters were seen to be adjusting to the new ballot and its ticket-splitting potential without much difficulty.

A second way to test this proposition of early ballot effects is within states across election years. In Table 5, split ticket values are listed for each state in its last election year using the unofficial ballot and the first two elections using the official ballot. Also listed are "difference values" between the last unofficial ballot election and the second election year in which the official ballot was used. (Use of the second, instead of the first, election year in computing these "differences" rests on the assumption that it is less disturbed by adjusting tendency "noises" of the electorate toward the new ballot.) The type of election, presidential or off-year, used in these unofficial-official ballot comparisons is decided separately for each state, according to which year its change of ballot occurred.

Of first interest in the data is the fact that approximately 80 percent of the states had greater split ticket scores after they adopted the new ballot. The difference values in column (4) show this, and the trend is repeated when one compares columns (1) and (2). Certainly, this finding would be more impressive if higher, yet its consistency with our earlier tables is further evidence of this type of patterning in the data.

The ballot picture is improved if one considers a few additional features of the data. For one thing, the deviations in the difference values are very small for the remaining 20 percent of the states. This is because these states adopted the party column type of official ballot, which in many respects resembled the earlier unofficial ballot situation. Of note here too is the observation that most of the party column states showing the predicted direction also registered but small difference values. (Asterisks denote the party column states in Table 5.) The next section will show that the party column form in the first few years revealed similar split ticket figures to the pre-Australian Ballot states. The habits formed by the party strip situation carried over to the party column form, with its arrangement of party strips and straight ticket

TABLE 5. SPLIT TICKET VALUES OF STATES IN LAST ELECTION BEFORE AND FIRST AND SECOND ELECTION YEARS OF OFFICIAL BALLOT USE, FOR COMPARABLE ELECTION TYPES^a

State	Last Election Year Using Unofficial Ballot (1)	First Election Year Using Official Ballot (2)	Second Election Year Using Official Ballot (3)	Difference Values (Column 3 Minus Column 1) (4)
California	0.7	(2.7)	4.0	3.3
Colorado	1.6	1.0	5.6	4.0
Delaware*	0.1	0.1	2.1	2.0
Illinois*	0.9	(0.5)	1.4	0.5
Indiana*	0.4	0.7	(0.5)	(0.1)
Iowa*	0.6	(0.8)	6.0	5.4
Kentucky*	0.2	—	0.6	0.4
Louisiana*	1.9	—	0.6	-1.3
Massachusetts	1.2	3.6	2.2	1.0
Michigan*	0.6	(2.2)	0.6	0.0
Minnesota	3.8	(6.3)	(6.4)	(2.6)
Nebraska	2.6	(8.1)	3.2	0.6
Nevada	2.7	(7.2)	4.9	2.2
New Hampshire	1.0	1.4	6.8	5.8
New York*	0.5	2.3	1.6	1.1
Ohio*	0.0	0.7	0.2	0.2
Oregon	0.7	—	3.9	3.2
Pennsylvania*	0.5	0.1	0.3	-0.2
Rhode Island	(0.4)	2.8	3.2	(2.8)
Tennessee	1.1	4.6	1.9	0.8
Vermont*	1.6	2.1	4.3	2.7
West Virginia*	0.5	0.4	0.2	-0.3
Wisconsin*	(1.4)	1.4	(1.1)	(-0.3)
Means	1.1	2.4	2.7	1.6

^a Most values in the table met the screening requirements of the Burnham index. Those enclosed in parentheses did not but were included as "impure" cases as defined in footnote 10 above. In order for a state to be included in the table, it had to have split ticket values in both the last election before and the second election of official ballot use—thus excluding those states that had no pre-Australian period, those never adopting the official ballot in the 1876-1908 time period, and those screened out of even the "impure data set" in these heavily "third party" election years. For a given state, the "difference value" compares the split ticket scores of similar types of elections (either presidential or off-year), depending on when the ballot change took place. The designation "—" entered for some states in column (2) indicates that these states' split ticket values were not included because of failure to meet the requirements of either the Burnham index or its "impure version."

* Denotes states having the party column format in their second election year of official ballot use.

provision facilitating the continuation of these habits.

Lending further weight to our ballot interpretation is the fact that with continued use of the party column format over time, the split ticket figures do increase. Admittedly, this tendency is not major, yet it does exist, as we shall see in Figure 3 below. The reasons for the increased split ticket use of the party column form over time are probably twofold—a continuing adjust-

ment to the new ballot and a given election producing a desire to use the split ticket property of the ballot.

Thus, an analysis within states across election years substantiates the earlier results found by examining data across states within election years. The new ballot has effects on voting behavior not only, generally speaking, across time, but also fairly immediately after it is introduced in the several states.

V. TYPES OF AUSTRALIAN BALLOTS

The general conclusion of the last section was that the introduction and establishment of the official ballot facilitated a rise in split ticket voting. A more detailed question has to do with the relative contributions of the party column and office bloc types of this ballot to such ticket-splitting and also the contrast of their effects with those of the earlier unofficial ballot system.

Figure 3 presents the split ticket pictures for party column, office bloc, and unofficial ballot states in the North. The values in the figure are mean scores for each ballot condition within the election years of the 1890-1908 time period. Looking first at just the two types of official ballot states, one notes the wide divergence in their respective split ticket values, suggesting the influence of differing internal ballot formats on voting behavior. Ticket-splitting is significantly higher under the less partisan arrangement of the office bloc form than under the party column type.

It is also interesting to contrast each form of the official ballot with the unofficial ballot. The spread between the office bloc and unofficial ballots is sizable, reflecting a marked difference in the ticket-splitting potentialities of the two. Smaller differences are shown between the party column and unofficial ballots, especially before the turn of the century. The correspondence in orientation and design of the two ballots undoubtedly has much to do with their closer split ticket values. Both ballots have "party" as their main focus and both provide an easy means of voting a straight ticket, if in somewhat different senses.¹⁹ Identification of party, its column or strip arrangement, and the attached emblem or color of ballot are conceptual parallels that

¹⁹ There were two ways to vote a straight ticket in an unofficial ballot state—either deposit a given party strip in the ballot box unmarked or else mark it for all the candidates on it. Some states by law specified one way or the other, but some allowed both ways. In a party column state, one could vote a straight ticket by marking the entire ballot or by making a single mark if such an option was provided.




FIGURE 3. Split Ticket Means for Three Ballot Conditions of States, North Only

could facilitate the task of straight ticket voting for the elector.²⁰

In spite of this stress on the relatively close voting patterns of the party column and unofficial ballots, it is important to note, on the other hand, the very existence of divergence. As predicted, the party column form of the official ballot had somewhat greater ticket-splitting than the unofficial ballot, since its consolidation and secrecy features provided a better opportunity for this type of voting.²¹ Across time this differ-

ence in voting between the two ballots became more marked as electorates adjusted to the split ticket potential of the new ballot. It took time for voting habits to change, and the similarity of the party column and unofficial conditions was an important reason why such habits changed more slowly under the party column than under the office bloc format.

These comparisons of the three trendlines in Figure 3 can also give us a better understanding of the voting patterns earlier observed in Table 1. The large differences between the official and unofficial ballot conditions were, to a large extent, a product of the effects of the office bloc

²⁰ The split ticket differences between the party column and party strip systems become even smaller if one contrasts the latter with only those party column states having emblem and "single mark" features. The effects of these two devices will be explored in later tables.

²¹ Two deviations occur in the data—for the years of 1890 and 1894. The deviation in 1890 is possibly due to the extremely small number of party column cases involved, 1890 being the first election in which this form of the Australian

Ballot was used by any of the states. The deviation in 1894 is due to a separate party strip situation in one state. The differences between the two systems would have been larger and cleaner if one had contrasted pure party strip values with party column values; this tact was not taken in Figure 3 simply because two years had no values for the former condition.

states—at least in the first part of the Australian period. It was not only the fact that a state switched to the official ballot that prompted a rise in ticket-splitting—it was also the condition of imposing a specific internal format on this ballot, namely the office bloc arrangement, that facilitated the larger increments in voting fluidity. After the turn of the century, the split ticket trendline of the party column states deviated more seriously from the unofficial ballot trendline—resulting in a greater contribution of the Indiana ballot to the sizable Australian Ballot ticket-splitting figures and, hence, to their differentiation from the unofficial ballot figures.

A different analysis of the party column, office bloc, and unofficial ballots, involving within-state, across-year comparisons, produced the same results as shown in Figure 3. Office bloc states had higher mean split ticket scores than party column states, and both types of ballot states had greater mean split ticket scores in their official ballot period than in their unofficial ballot period. A study of those states that shifted ballot formats in their Australian years also revealed higher mean split ticket values for the period in which they used the office bloc format.

Within and across state comparisons have shown the impact of ballot format on voting habits. Obviously, this is a crucial variable in the overall ballot picture. But still there are other factors to consider—states could and did embellish these formats with straight ticket provisions and party emblems. Ballot formats did not have to exist in isolation, and the addition of these features could have added effects on electoral behavior.

The same sort of analysis was performed with these ballot features as with the party column—office bloc dichotomy in Figure 3. That is, states were divided into those having and those not having straight ticket or party emblem features on their ballots. The results were similar in trend to the party column—office bloc contrast, and, indeed, the differences in split ticket scores between the straight ticket and non-straight ticket situations were comparable in magnitude to those found between the party column and office bloc formats.

The finding of associations between voting patterns and the two ballot features is a step in the right direction—but only the first step. There is a further question as to how these features relate to one another and to the format of the ballot.

All possible combinations of the two partisan features and ballot format were surveyed to an-

TABLE 6. RELATION OF BALLOT FORM AND STRAIGHT TICKET PROVISION TO SPLIT TICKET VOTING, 1890-1908^a

	Presence of Straight Ticket	Absence of Straight Ticket	Marginals
Party Column	2.7 (106)	3.0 (17)	2.7 (123)
Office Bloc	3.7 (16)	5.3 (63)	5.0 (79)
Marginals	2.8 (122)	4.8 (80)	3.6 (202)

^a Cell entries are split ticket means computed over all election years, 1890-1908, for states having the ballot combinations listed in the table.

swer the question about their interrelationships.²² They showed ballot format to be the dominant explanatory factor. The most revealing pairing of variables was that of ballot format and the presence or absence of a straight ticket provision. As shown in Table 6, both variables had considerable gross effects on voting, but larger differences occurred between types of ballot format when presence or absence of a straight ticket provision was controlled for than vice-versa.

The importance of the straight ticket provision depended on the ballot format on which it was placed. In the case of the party column ballot, the split ticket value seemed little affected by whether or not a straight ticket option was present. The party column format in itself was facilitative of straight ticket voting, and the straight ticket provision added only the ease of marking just one "X" instead of marking an "X" for each candidate. It took little extra effort to mark "X's" down a column, especially given the earlier experience with the party strip system.

²² Originally, such combinations were viewed within election years and the direction of mean split ticket values was basically as predicted. However, one quickly confronted cells with few cases since several ballot configurations appeared with rare frequency in reality. Given these conditions, a better strategy was to aggregate ballot cases across time to better observe their effects and the following analysis is based on this procedure.

The straight ticket variable, however, took on more importance when on the office bloc ballot. Here it cut down the ticket-splitting potential of a ballot offering many independent decision-making possibilities. The voter could escape the problem of deciding on each successive office how he would vote by relying on the straight ticket option. Apparently, many voters preferred this alternative.

The results of the table suggest the presence of some interaction. It is possible that people were viewing the party column ballot with its straight ticket device as a whole, as an entity, with the underlying format defining this basic orientation, whereas this would seem less to be the case with the office bloc-straight ticket ballot. Interaction of device with format could be occurring in the former case, while in the latter, the device would be having more of a separate effect from that of format. Interaction of effects would most likely occur if format and device were conceptually compatible and less likely if they were antithetical in purpose and orientation.²³

The other two pairings of variables provided us with additional information. Their results will be discussed here, but the actual data patterns are presented in a summary table below, Table 7.²⁴ The second pairing of variables, ballot format and party emblem, gave further evidence of the dominating explanatory power of ballot format. However, party emblem did have some influence in the party column case, making "party" even more salient to the voter and thereby decreasing split ticket voting tendencies slightly more than if it had not been present. Comparisons of the office bloc format with and without a party emblem could not be made since so few cases of the former pairing existed then and none do today. The problem of few cases made it difficult to hazard any test of interactive effects, although it seems plausible that people viewed the party column-emblem configuration

²³ This interpretation of interactive effects in the party column-straight ticket case is suggested but not necessarily confirmed by the data at hand. As one can observe, the important off-diagonal cell entries in Table 6 have few cases and may not significantly depart from a value of 4.0, a condition indicating additive (separate) effects instead of interactive effects.

²⁴ A collapsing of some categories in Table 7 is needed to recover the points discussed for these two pairings of variables. However, this is a simple mental exercise and saves us from presenting two further bivariate tables at this time which would only convey the same information as Table 7.

as a single entity because of the compatible orientation.

The last pairing of variables, the two ballot provisions themselves, showed some modest decrease in split ticket voting when both partisan devices were present instead of just one. That is, the combination of a straight ticket and emblem provision reduced ticket-splitting in comparison to the "straight ticket only" type of ballot. The reason for this seems logical. The two devices share a common orientation and possibly interact in their effects, highlighting still further the partisan guideline. It is also of interest to note that the straight ticket-emblem combination, except for two cases, appeared only on the partisan-oriented Indiana format. The question of interactive effects between the two variables could not really be resolved since no state adopted a ballot form with an emblem but without a straight ticket.

The ballot combinations just presented can be summarized in one table. The cell cases decrease with an enlarged table, but the contrasts apparent in it are well worth the sacrifice. Table 7 presents these results.

Most of the discoveries of the pairwise comparisons mentioned above are repeated and highlighted here. The general influence of ballot format pervades the table. Some of the largest differences in the figures are attributable to it,

TABLE 7. RELATION OF PARTICULAR BALLOT CONFIGURATIONS TO SPLIT TICKET VOTING 1890-1908*

	Party Column	Office Bloc	Marginals
Straight Ticket and Emblem	2.3 (57)	3.5 (2)	2.3 (59)
Straight Ticket Without Emblem	3.1 (49)	3.7 (14)	3.2 (63)
Neither Straight Ticket Nor Emblem	3.0 (17)	5.3 (63)	4.8 (80)
Marginals	2.7 (123)	5.0 (79)	3.6 (202)

* Cell entries are split ticket means computed over all election years, 1890-1908, for states having the ballot combinations listed in the table. The ballot combination of emblem but no straight ticket did not exist for any office bloc or party column cases; for this reason, it was not included as a category in the table.

and when the other variables are controlled, ballot format confronts one vividly as the dominant variable. The row marginals tell the story of decreasing split ticket voting with an increase in the number of partisan features in use. To understand this better, between-cell comparisons must be made. Reading the columns from bottom to top, one can see, in general, that adding a partisan provision to a given ballot type has the effect of decreasing the ticket-splitting. For instance, with the office bloc figures, ticket-splitting decreases by 1.6 percent when a straight ticket device is added. The counterpart party column cells show no decrease, this being the one deviant category in the data pattern. However, when going from straight ticket only to both straight ticket and emblem on the party column ballot, a decrease of 0.8 percent in split ticket voting is manifest.²⁵ When viewing the whole table from bottom right to top left, the decrease in split ticket voting progresses in a rather orderly and consistent fashion.

Thus ballot format, in its basic definition of the alternatives open to the voter, is a major key to understanding the incidence of ticket-splitting. The two partisan devices, straight ticket and emblem features, complement the party column format and, as a result, have some further role in heightening the salience of the "party vote" alternative. But clearly they are of secondary concern, interacting with the dominant theme portrayed by the ballot format. Such devices on an alien format, the Massachusetts type, stand in contrast to the voting alternative suggested by its structure. Something more akin to separate effects are registered in this case by the partisan devices.

VI. SUMMARY

The findings of this study of the Australian Ballot can be summarized as follows:

1) The introduction and establishment of the Australian Ballot in the states led to an increase in ticket-splitting in comparison to the previous ballot system. Placing both major parties on the same ballot and guaranteeing a secret vote were the major new provisions of the Australian Ballot that allowed and encouraged the expression of cross-party preferences in the polling booth. Government preparation and regulation of the ballot assured the enforcement of the consolidation and secrecy provisions and made the ballot uniform and impartial throughout a state.

²⁵ Comparison of the counterpart office bloc figures, 3.7 and 3.5, is unwarranted since the latter figure is based on so few cases. Also, the cells with 17 and 14 cases must be interpreted with caution, as footnote 23 earlier suggested.

2) The unofficial ballot system in use previous to that time was distinguished by very little split ticket voting. This lack of ticket-splitting was explained by the existence of non-secret, easily identifiable, separate party ballots and the way in which the party workers peddled them to the voters. The situation forced a single choice on the voter—which party's ballot to take. A deviant form of this ballot system, using a separate party ballot for each office, revealed somewhat higher split ticket patterns. The possibility of voting a split ticket was more apparent in this situation.

3) The extent to which ticket-splitting rose from the unofficial to the Australian Ballot depended on the type of internal format used on the Australian Ballot. The party column format displayed a slightly higher split ticket pattern than the unofficial ballot. The remarkable conceptual and physical similarity of the two explains the closeness of the difference—voters were familiar with a certain kind of ballot and the party column format was compatible with their earlier voting habits. Voters only gradually adjusted to the split ticket potential existing with this form of the Australian Ballot. The office bloc format, on the other hand, was a complete contrast to the unofficial ballot and therefore revealed much higher split ticket patterns than its predecessor. A more immediate adjustment to it was forced on the voter.

4) By implication from the discussion in (3), the party column and office bloc forms themselves had very different split ticket voting patterns. The party column ballot was associated with a low level of ticket-splitting, since it was the more partisan-oriented of the two. The office bloc ballot displayed a much stronger split ticket pattern as a result of its multiple-choice orientation.

5) The inclusion of a partisan feature on a ballot format also had consequences on voting patterns. A straight ticket addition on an office bloc ballot decreased split ticket voting because it worked against the multi-choice orientation of this format. On the party column ballot, use of a straight ticket alone had no effect, but when an emblem was also added, some decrease in split ticket voting occurred. Throughout, however, the dominant variable was the ballot format itself. When the partisan devices were included, they decreased ticket-splitting within a narrow range of the levels imposed by ballot format.

6) The general picture is one of ballot being an important explanatory variable in the 1876-1908 time period. While other theories can be offered to explain split ticket voting trends, the contributing factor of the ballot cannot be de-

nied its role in any such discussion. It allowed an element of flexibility to enter the system and, perhaps, helped to shape new trends in party organization, new boundaries of political competition. The system was more in flux, and ballot had helped to set it in motion.

VII. BURNHAM'S THEORY

To date only one other theory has been advanced to explain the split ticket voting patterns of this period. The theory proposed by Walter Dean Burnham purports to explain the rise in ticket-splitting of this period by a breakdown in party organization and competition and a corresponding alienation of the voter from the political system. Before this breakdown, the electorate was, according to Burnham, quite firmly rooted in the party milieu and "party" served as the main reference group in the system.

Burnham's evidence for his theoretical conclusions is the split ticket records of five states, only four of which will concern us here.²⁶ But one could contend, given the above ballot analysis, that the increase in ticket-splitting observed by Burnham is, in fact, mainly due to the introduction and establishment of the official ballot in this period. The crucial question is how much variation in voting, if any, is there left to "explain" after ballot has explained all that it can. Any additional variation could be considered "fair game" for other variables, such as Burnham's, to interpret.

In order to answer this question, a series of "expected" split ticket values for the four states were computed—"expected" in the sense that they encompassed the mean effects on split ticket voting of all other states using the same Australian Ballot configuration; then, these figures were compared with the "actual" values of the four states.²⁷ The results are presented in

²⁶ Burnham's fifth state, Oklahoma, is not relevant to this analysis since it entered the Union at the end of the time period covered in this study.

²⁷ The model used to compute these "expected" values is a simple additive one based on the formula, $Y = X + Z$. In the formula, X equals the state's pre-Australian split ticket effect, and Z refers to the net effect of other states with the same official ballot configuration as the state in question. The latter effect is computed by taking all such states for the election year (or year span) in question and subtracting their unofficial ballot mean from their official ballot mean. The type of election is held constant throughout the computations. An example for a state's first election year of official ballot use (year "A" in

Table 8 for each state's first election year of official ballot use, its second year of such use, and the remaining time spans for presidential and congressional election years, respectively.

The "difference values" in the table are the items to note. They sum up for the various years of interest the additional split ticket voting a state had left over after the effects of ballot were removed from the picture. Positive values indicate that some split ticket voting was left over; negative values indicate the reverse—that the states in question did not even achieve a split ticket value as high as the mean figure of other states using the same ballot configuration. A state-by-state analysis reveals that three of the four states had little or no additional split ticket voting for factors other than ballot to explain. The mean difference values for Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania across these years are $-.1$, $-.2$, and $.2$, respectively. Only Michigan with a mean of 1.9 provides an exception to the general theme. The mean difference for all states over all years is 0.5 , with Michigan providing most of the positive component in the computation. A value of zero would indicate that other explanatory factors were not needed for these states.

The reasons for such small difference values seem clear in the framework of previous ballot analyses. All four states had party column—straight ticket ballots and all save Pennsylvania had an emblem as well. Such states displayed only moderate split ticket increases in their Australian years relative to earlier ballot days. What increases in ticket-splitting there were to explain could easily be done by resort to the ballot variable alone. Only in Michigan did there seem to be other factors entering the picture.

The types of variables Burnham mentioned in his theory were supposed to be making widespread, not miniscule, changes in voting. While this could be the case in Michigan, it definitely is not so in the other three states. It is possible that a study of other states in this context might show additional ticket-splitting beyond

the table) will illustrate the procedure. The state of Ohio changed to a party column—straight ticket—emblem ballot in a presidential year. Therefore, its " X " value would be the mean split ticket value for presidential years in the unofficial ballot period. The " Z " value would find the same type of mean for all other states with that particular ballot configuration and subtract it from their mean value for the election year in which Ohio's ballot change occurred. Then, one merely adds the " X " and " Z " values together to get the "expected" split ticket value Y for Ohio in this particular election year.

TABLE 8. EXPECTED AND ACTUAL SPLIT TICKET VALUES IN
SELECTED TIME PERIODS FOR FOUR STATES^a

		Michigan				Ohio				New York				Pennsylvania			
		A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
Actual Split Ticket Values	(1)	(2.2)	1.5	6.6	3.5	0.7	(0.2)	2.4	0.9	2.3	0.8	2.4	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.8	6.1
Expected Split Ticket Values	(2)	1.2	1.0	2.1	2.1	1.0	0.1	2.3	1.1	1.2	0.7	3.3	1.1	0.1	1.1	3.0	2.2
Differences of (1) and (2)	(3)	1.0	0.5	4.5	1.4	-0.3	0.1	0.1	-0.2	1.1	0.1	-0.9	-1.0	0.0	-0.9	-2.2	3.9

^a Each state has actual and expected split ticket values for the following years: first election year of official ballot use, second election year of official ballot use, mean of the remaining presidential election years in the 1890-1908 time span, and mean of the remaining congressional election years in the 1890-1908 time span. These four time periods are designated in the table as "A," "B," "C," and "D," respectively. Those split ticket values enclosed in parentheses in row (1) are "impure" values as defined in footnote 10 above. The state of Pennsylvania was included as a data point in the official ballot period only until 1903 for three reasons. First, this state changed its ballot in 1903, providing a stimulus other states did not share—a stimulus that could contaminate the ensuing voter reactions in light of the previous experience with another official ballot format. Second, the time span for the second form (1904-1908) was too short to provide a reliable estimate of its split ticket effects. Third, the ballot change was to an office bloc—straight ticket combination, a virtual rarity among the states, thereby providing too few cases to ascertain its net effects in these other states.

what could be explained by ballot—but the crucial point is that the key examples of states used by Burnham do not confirm his theory. Even if other states showed such a tendency, Burnham would still have to account for other plausible features of this period which could cause ticket-splitting.

The ballot variable also seems to contribute to another of Burnham's findings. In his analysis, Burnham was concerned with not only the increased tendency toward ticket-splitting, but also toward "roll-off"—the tendency of the electorate to vote in greater numbers for high than for low prestige offices on the ballot. In the four states examined, Burnham found an increase in roll-off in the exact time period when the official ballot was adopted in these states. The official ballot contributed to roll-off since it was long and consolidated, requiring substantial effort on the part of the voter to mark all offices. But the unofficial ballot required less effort in voting than the official ballot—in many states, merely depositing the ticket in the ballot box, and, in some others, the marking of offices down a single column with no attendant decision-making involved as to partisan choices.²⁸

²⁸ In an interesting piece of research, Jack Walker has shown that roll-off also varies according to the type of official ballot in use—the office bloc ballot contributing more to a roll-off effect than the party column ballot. Walker also views his findings as a possible modifying factor on Burnham's theory as the following quotation suggests: "The argument made by both Burn-

VIII. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The position of this paper has been that the Australian Ballot had an important effect on split ticket voting behavior. But its broader position has been that the institutional properties of the electoral system, considered either as an entity or as a network of component parts, have played and continue to play a crucial role in influencing and shaping voting behavior—in essentially defining the conditions and boundaries of decision-making at the polls. Stanley Kelley and cohorts, in their excellent article on registration variables, probably stated it best—it is a matter of "putting first things first."

By "institutional properties" are meant those laws, customs, and norms that define and regulate the broader entity known as the electoral system. Such things as registration requirements, electoral qualification laws, voting systems (e.g., plurality, proportional representation systems), ballot and voting machine arrangements, and the like are the framework of the system. Introduction of new properties or changes in existing ones affect the voting setting and, in turn, the behavior and attitudes of peo-

ham and Stiefbold that increasing roll-off is an indication of increasing political alienation at least is weakened by our finding that changes in ballot forms directly affect the amount of roll-off" (p. 462). See Jack L. Walker, "Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Bloc and Party Column Ballots," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (November 1966), 448-463.

ple. Yet, all too often the institutional environment has been taken for granted or as a "given" instead of being probed for its effects on political behavior.

The attempt of this study and a few others has been to demonstrate the importance of these variables. In this study, important and often large effects on voting have been shown to be associated with one such institutional variable when it was first introduced into the environment. Comparing these effects to contemporary election data tells us that ballot had its greatest effects in the period of this study because of its novelty and fairly immediate impact, and then tapered off to a more normal, stable trendline as it became a commonplace in the political culture. Although the necessary research has yet to be done, the author would venture that the most crucial effects of any institutional property are

visible in the early period of its use and then settle back to more normal differentiations in later years.

The explanatory power of institutional variables offers insight for future analyses. The introduction, establishment, or change in such factors can lend useful interpretations to shifts in electoral behavior. Take, for example, the changing vote turnout curve around the turn of the century, which cries for explanation. This sudden shift to lower turnout was another variable used by Burnham to justify his theory of party breakdown and voter alienation. But a more plausible explanation would be the effects of the newly enacted registration systems of the time, placing an additional barrier to the vote. Without much effort the reader can probably think of several other analytic uses to which this highly important set of variables could be put.

POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN POLAND*

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Discussing the character of the Polish party system elsewhere,¹ I have suggested a label of "hegemonic party system" for it, as well as for some other party systems based on similar principles. The hegemonic party systems stand midway between the mono-party systems and the dominant party systems as defined by Maurice Duverger.² In an earlier paper written jointly with Rajni Kothari we have suggested the following typology of party systems:³

1. Alternative party systems, where two or more political parties compete for political power with realistic chances of success;

2. Consensus party systems, where multi-partism does exist but one political party commands in a lasting way the loyalties of a predominant majority of the citizens and permanently runs the government;

3. Hegemonic party systems, where all the existing parties form a lasting coalition within which one of them is accepted as the leading force of the coalition;

4. Mono-party systems;

5. Suspended party systems, where political

*The present paper has been written during the author's stay in the University of Manchester as Simon Visiting Professor, October-November 1969. I should like to express my deepest gratitude to the Simon Fund and to the Department of Government, University of Manchester, for giving me this excellent opportunity to write it.

¹Cf. Jerzy J. Wiatr, "One Party System: The Concept and Issue for Comparative Studies," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1964); and, Jerzy J. Wiatr, "The Hegemonic Party System in Poland," in Jerzy J. Wiatr (ed.), *Studies in the Polish Political System* (Wrocław; Ossolineum, 1967). The latter has been reprinted in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: The Free Press, forthcoming).

²Maurice Duverger, "Sociologie des partis politiques," in Georges Gurvitch (ed.), *Traité de Sociologie*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1960), p. 44.

³Rajni Kothari and Jerzy J. Wiatr, *Party Systems and Political Pluralism: Comparisons between India and Poland*, paper presented at the VIIth World Congress of Sociology, Evian, France, 1966, mimeographed.

parties exist but are prevented from regulating political life by other forces (for instance, the military);

6. Non-party systems, where the government is ideologically hostile toward the political parties as such and does not permit them to function.

Quite obviously, this typology does not exclude mixed types of party systems. On the contrary, the very fact that in political life nothing is absolutely permanent leads to the emergence of transitory types of party systems. However, I am satisfied that the above-mentioned typology better reflects the differences and similarities of the party systems which exist nowadays than the traditional numerical typology of multi-, two-, and one-party systems.⁴

Every party system is a product of history and is also functionally interrelated with the socio-economic and political characteristics of the society in which it operates. The present paper is an attempt to interpret the Polish hegemonic party system from the point of view of its historical roots, its role in the process of interest representation and the interrelation between economic development of the country and the party system.

I. HISTORY: THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

The hegemonic party system in Poland is based on the lasting alliance between the three political parties and non-party political and social organizations. These three are:

- a) The Polish United Workers' Party. Founded in December 1948 through the unification of the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish

⁴Our typology differs in details from that proposed by Giovanni Sartori in his paper on *Typologies of Party Systems—A Critique*, presented at the VIIth World Congress of Political Science, Brussels 1967 (mimeographed). Sartori distinguishes between the following types of party systems: 1) one-party, 2) hegemonic party, 3) dominant party, 4) two-party, 5) moderate pluralism, 6) extreme pluralism, 7) atomized. His (5) and (6) types should certainly be taken care of by sub-dividing our (1) type, while our (3) and (6) are subtypes of his (1). Otherwise, two approaches are very similar.

Socialist Party, the membership of the P.U.W.P. reached 2 million in the last two years. The party controls the most important positions in the government and has a clear majority of about 51% in all parliaments elected in last twenty years. In our terminology it is the hegemonic party of the system.

b) The United Peasant Party, founded in November 1949 through the union of the two political parties of the peasantry which had existed previously. With a total membership of about 450,000 and about 25% of seats in the Diet it is the second strongest party in Poland.

c) The Democratic Party, founded nominally in 1939 and more strongly expanded after 1945; its total membership amounts to about 75,000 and it holds about 8.5% of the seats in the Diet.

The three-party alliance is a permanent coalition based on common participation in the left-wing underground during the Nazi occupation of the country. In January 1942 the various Communist and radical political organizations merged in the new "Polish Workers' Party", which, after having failed to persuade the anti-Communist underground that the time was ripe for the comprehensive policy of national unity in the struggle against Hitler's Germany, launched a political offensive for a front of national unity led by itself. On New Year's night of 1944 the National Council of Homeland was established as a provisional parliament of the nation. It was composed of the representatives of the Polish Workers' Party, left-wing socialists, left-wing activists of the peasant movement (the so-called "People's Will" group) and the radical democrats, as well as by the representatives of the left-wing underground armed forces. In July 1944, when the first part of the Polish territory had been liberated by the Soviet Army, the Council created the Polish Committee of National Liberation, which at the end of the year transformed itself into the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic. After the end of the war and on the basis of the Yalta and Moscow agreements between the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, the new, enlarged government was formed and received diplomatic recognition from the Western powers (the provisional government had been recognized by the Soviet Union previously).

The liberation of the whole country (January 1945), the expansion of leftist political parties and, finally, the legalization of two centrist parties, which joined the coalition after the Yalta and Moscow conferences, resulted in the emergence of six political parties. Four of them (the Polish Workers' Party, Polish Socialist Party, Peasant Party and Democratic Party) were the continuation of political forces which had cre-

ated the National Council of Homeland during the war. They considered themselves permanent allies and in 1946 founded the Bloc of Democratic Parties for contesting jointly the forthcoming parliamentary election (January 1947). The centrists who joined the provisional government in June 1945 organized themselves in two political parties: the Polish Peasant Party and the Labour Party. The first became a strong political force, while the latter (based on former membership of the pre-war Christian Democracy) never managed to achieve any prominence.

To be sure, the six parties did not represent the whole spectrum of politics. The right-wing parties of the emigration as well as some traditional center parties (including the right-wing socialist party) refused to recognize the new political situation of the country and launched an armed attack against the new government through the network of their underground organizations. In 1945-1947 a state of semi-civil war prevailed in most of the country with casualties of tens of thousands on each side. During the electoral campaign the right-wing underground forces supported the Polish Peasant Party against the Bloc of Democratic Parties. As the result of this the election itself became a part of the civil war and led to a direct show of force.

After the Democratic Bloc's victory in the election the two centrist parties tried to play the role of parliamentary opposition during most of 1947. By the end of the year, however, splits in their ranks, defection to the West of some of their leaders and the pacification of the country by the victory of the government forces over the underground resulted in de facto defeat and liquidation of the anti-Communist opposition in all its forms. The two peasant parties merged in 1949, and the Labour Party dissolved itself in 1950, some of its members joining the Democratic Party. Therefore, the end of the "struggle for power" stage of the Polish post-war history was marked by the consolidation of all legally existing political parties within the permanent coalition and by the consolidation of political power in the hands of this coalition. The war and post-war history of the country explains the roots and characteristics of the party system in the sense that:

(1) it allows us to trace back the origins of the cooperation between the Workers' (Communist) party and the two other leftist parties to the years of the struggle against Nazis during the war;

(2) it explains how the logic of revolutionary seizure of power eliminated anti-Communist forces from the political life of the country;

(3) it explains the hegemonic role of the

Workers' party in the system in terms of the role it played during the critical years when the future of the nation was being decided.

The realization of the new political order resulted in the transformation of the war-time and revolutionary-time coalition into a permanent "National Front" alliance which, under the leadership of the P.U.W.P., runs the country at the beginning of the second quarter-century period of its post-war history. Within this alliance the hegemonic role of the P.U.W.P. is manifest in its five main functions:

(a) The party represents and expresses the socialist ideology underlying the entire political system. It determines the fundamental aims and values which constitute the basis for the functioning of the political and socio-political institutions of the country.

(b) Through the activity of its members on the institutions of state and social organizations, the party harmonizes the functioning of these institutions with the basic goals of the system.

(c) The party determines the general directives of policy-making by the state institutions.

(d) The party mobilizes a number of citizens to participate in political decision-making at various levels of government.

(e) The party recruits and educates cadres of political leaders operating within the party as well as in the institutions of the state.⁵

The two other parties of the alliance play a different role within the system. Their main functions can be best described as follows:

(a) They participate in political decision-making at various levels of government and in the practical execution of these decisions.

(b) They constitute additional, although not the only, political representation of the social strata within which they operate (peasants in one case, white collar workers and craftsmen on the other). It has to be kept in mind, however, that the Workers' party operates among these social strata as well; the peasant membership of the P.U.W.P. is about equal to that of the U.P.P.

(c) They constitute forms of political participation not based on clear ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism "They are not," to quote Wladyslaw Gomulka, "Marxist parties, but they are independent parties of socialist democracy and of actualization of the current tasks of the joint policy of their members and sympathizers."⁶

In decision-making and decision-executing, in

⁵ Cf. Wiatr, "The Hegemonic Party System in Poland," *op. cit.*

⁶ Wladyslaw Gomulka, *O naszej partii* (On our Party) (Warszawa, 1968), p. 437.

interest representation and in enlarging the possibilities of political participation, the non-Communist parties play an important role. They are no longer considered "transmission belts" of the Workers' party,⁷ but its valuable and independent allies within the whole structure of the political system.

II. INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Since no modern society is absolutely free from differences of interests, the way in which interests are represented within a system of government constitutes a very important characteristic of any system. But let us first address ourselves to the question, what interests do exist within the Polish society?

We can distinguish between two meanings given to the term "interest" in the current literature. In the first, interest is the policy objective which is favorable to a group of citizens and either less favorable or unfavorable to other groups. In this sense, we say that the increase of prices paid for agricultural products is in the interest of farmers; and—as far as this interest is concerned—we may treat farmers as an interest group. In the second sense, "interest" is a policy objective which is being pursued by a more or less clearly defined sub-group of citizens. The abolition of capital punishment may be a declared policy-objective of an "interest group." However, using this term does not mean that the members of the group *campaign* for something more favorable to them than to the others; obviously it is not the case in our example.

Interest representation includes representation of interests in both these senses of the term. In politics it can, moreover, count less what interest is being represented than how it is represented and to what extent the interest representation is a part of the functioning of the policy. In this respect one has to take into account an important precondition of the socialist state: the declared willingness to exclude from the political process the interest of those social classes whose very existence is incompatible with the long-

⁷ The application of this term to the non-Communist parties in the early nineteen-fifties reflected a tendency to reduce their role within the system. The trend was, however, reversed after October 1956. Cf. Z. Mikolajczyk and E. Patryn, *Struktura i funkcje partii chlopińskiej na przykładzie ZSL* (Structure and functions of a peasant party: the case of UPP) (Warszawa, 1968); and A. Lopatka, *Kierownicza rola partii komunistycznej w stosunku do panstwa socjalistycznego* (Directive role of the communist party in relation to the socialist state), (Poznan, 1963).

term policy objectives of the socialist transformation of the society. This restricts the interest representation to those interests which are considered to be in harmony with the principles of the system.

Within these restrictions we may enumerate the following types of interest groups:

(1) economic interest groups, such as trade unions, peasant associations (in Poland, Peasant Self-Aid Union, farmers' circles), associations of private (small) business;

(2) professional interest groups, such as the writers' union, General Technical Organization, etc.;

(3) interest groups representing various segments of society such as the Socialist Youth Union, Rural Youth Union, Women's League, and the veterans' organization—Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy;

(4) religious organizations, particularly religious socio-political associations of Roman Catholics (Pax, Znak etc.); the Catholic Church, albeit not an association, may itself be considered a powerful interest group of a special status and structure;

(5) national organizations, such as Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, German and Jewish socio-cultural societies;

(6) regional associations, such as an association for the development of Nowy Sacz county, in which prominent people born or educated in this county work in the interests of their mother-region.

The interest representation takes, therefore, two forms. First, within the political parties sectional interests are represented—on the basis, however, of the accepted principle that no party should serve a narrow interest only, but that all parties should seek means of reconciling the various interests with the all-national interest of the country. In this respect, there is a difference between the Polish United Workers' Party and two other parties. The P.U.W.P. is committed to the policy of combining all-national interests (interpreted also as the prospective, historical destiny of the working class) with the current interests of the manual workers, peasants, white collar workers and professionals, all of them being strongly represented among the party membership and in its leading organs. The U.P.P. and the D.P., on the other hand, are committed to combining all-national interests with the special interests of the peasants and craftsmen, respectively. Dyzma Galaj, a prominent theoretician of the U.P.P. and well-known sociologist, defines the peasant character of the U.P.P. by pointing to the following functions of this party: 1) it accepts responsibility for the correct develop-


ment of economic and "socio-cultural relation in the countryside"; 2) in the process of socialist education of the citizens it "takes into account first of all agricultural, mostly peasant population"; 3) it defends peasant interests in direct contacts with agricultural institutions which show certain "bureaucratic characteristics"; and 4) it "looks for those forces among the peasants which can accelerate and deepen the processes of socialist education of the society."⁸ The representation of group interests is therefore, considered to be a two-fold process. It includes influencing the represented segment of the society in the direction favorable to the general policy of the ruling alliance, as well as defending the interests of this segment in direct contacts with the state authorities.

As far as interest groups in their relations to the political parties are concerned, two characteristics of the system are of special relevance:

(1) The political parties, and particularly the P.U.W.P., influence most of the interest groups through the activity of party members within those groups. Except the religious groups (and to some extent also some of the national groups) party members tend to play an important role in the leadership of the interest groups.

(2) The political parties (again particularly the P.U.W.P.) determine the general line of the activities of the state apparatus and, through delegating their members to the government service, see to it that the administration puts into practice the general line as it has been defined by the political parties.

From these two traits of the system a kind of triangular relationship among the government, political parties and interest group emerges:




If we take as an example the trade unions, we can say that within the limits of the general objectives of the economic policy they are concerned with: (a) mobilizing the workers to achieve the goals of that policy, and (b) representing their interests in the consultations leading to the definition of policy objectives and economic strategy, as well as during the actualization of this policy.⁹ The state apparatus is

⁸ D. Galaj, Introduction to Z. Mikolajczyk and E. Patryn, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-18.

⁹ This point has been discussed at length by Krzysztof Ostrowski, "Rola zwiazkow zawodowych

charged with the task of policy execution; therefore between it and the trade-unions differences of views (or emphasis) can and do emerge. On the factory level workers' self-management is an instrument of reconciling differences of this type.

The above model could be extended and made more complicated in the case of some other types of interest groups. If we take the peasantry, we have the relationships of the following type:



However, a general characteristic of interest representation vis-a-vis the state is that the process is in most cases indirect (religious groups being the only exception), the political parties playing the role of moderator among the various interests which have to be represented.

Undoubtedly, this is a model. Its usefulness lies in the fact that we may start with the model and look for the situation where, for one reason or another, the process of interest representation does not work properly. This, however, is beyond the subject of this paper. What I want to emphasize is the crucial role of the party system in interest representation and the fact that although the function of interest representation has a universal importance for modern societies, the political forms of this representation differ considerably.

III. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Post-war Poland is a country whose public policy has been focused on achieving rapid economic development within the life period of one generation. Official ideology and public statements put the emphasis on mobilization of all available resources to make the rapid economic progress possible. During the twenty-five years of her third independence Poland has advanced from the group of backward, predominantly agricultural countries to that of medium industrialized ones. The total industrial output in 1966 was 545.5% and the industrial output per capita 427.3% of that in 1950. In 1966 the inhabitants

of cities and towns represented 50% of the population, the comparable index for 1950 amounting to 39% and that for 1931 to a mere 27.2%.

Economic development being the principal focus of official policy, it is interesting to find to what extent the political mobilization through the political parties constitutes a factor in the economic change. Our major hypothesis, which we have tested in empirical research conducted during recent years, has been that *political mobilization is a precondition of economic development* in the socio-political system of contemporary Poland. The extent to which this hypothesis can be generalized to cover other countries (for instance, other socialist countries or some of the developing countries) depends in part on the availability of empirical material for the countries concerned.

One of the steps to test the hypothesis was the analysis of aggregate data from 50 Polish counties (poviats) conducted in the Political Sociology Department, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences.¹⁰ On the basis of correlation and factor analysis of 25 indices of economic development a synthetic index of economic development has been worked out. Every county has then been given a score on the scale of economic development. Finally, correlation coefficients for economic development and five indices of political mobilization have been computed. The results are shown in the matrix in Table 1.

Two conclusions emerge from the matrix in Table 1.

(1) political mobilization, measured as a ratio of political parties' or political organizations' membership in the population, positively correlates with economic development;

(2) various forms of political mobilization are mutually complementary rather than alternative (since they also correlate positively).

Before we discuss the actual character of the first interrelationship, a few additional findings related to the second one should be mentioned. An independently conducted analysis of aggregate data on economic development and political mobilization in the Polish countryside, summarized in Table 2, shows again that political mo-

¹⁰ Cf. Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Przemysł i instytucje polityczne Polski Ludowej" (Industry and political institutions of People's Poland) in: Jan Szczepanski (ed.), *Przemysł i społeczeństwo w Polsce Ludowej* (Industry and Society in People's Poland) (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1969). For the statistical analysis of the data on mobilization and economic development I should like to express my gratitude to Dr. Krzysztof Ostrowski.

w polskim systemie politycznym" (Role of trade-unions in the Polish political system), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 1968.

TABLE 1. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Political Mobilization Indices	Country Economic Development Scores				
	2	3	4	5	6
1. Members of P.U.W.P. per 10,000 population	.67	.39	.50	.47	.37
2. Members of U.P.P. per 10,000 rural population		.13	.70	.58	.27
3. Members of S.Y.U. per 10,000 population			.18	.33	.60
4. Members of R.Y.U. per 10,000 population				.39	.18
5. Members of U.F.F.D. per 10,000 population					.29

PUWP—Polish United Workers Party; UPP—United Peasant Party; SYU—Socialist Youth Union, RYU—Rural Youth Union; UFFD—Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, veterans' organization.

bilization through the two principal parties and the R.Y.U. correlates positively.¹¹

In still another study conducted in 342 villages, Stefan Dziabala has established positive correlations between the strength of the P.U.W.P. in these villages and the level of economic and cultural development of the villages, as well as between the strength of the P.U.W.P. and that of the UP.P. and the R.Y.U.¹²

One can, therefore, generalize that similar social conditions are favorable to political mobilization within the P.U.W.P. and within the other parties and political organization. Political mobilization can, therefore, be regarded as one dimension, regardless of the party or organization through which it is channeled. This in itself seems to be an important finding, since it emphasizes the "nonantagonistic" character of the political pluralism within the Polish system.

Turning now back to the interrelation between political mobilization and economic development I should like to concern myself with the

¹¹ Krzysztof Ostrowski and Adam Przeworski, "A Preliminary Inquiry into the Nature of Social Change: the Case of the Polish Countryside," in Jerzy J. Wiatr (ed.), *Studies in the Polish Political System*, op. cit., p. 86.

¹² Stefan Dziabala, "Dynamika i struktura rozwojowa wiejskich organizacji partyjnych" (Dynamics and developmental structure of the rural party organizations), *Zycie Partii*, no. 10, 1962, p. 10.

TABLE 2. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Indices of Political Mobilization	Development Scores	
	2	3
1. Members of P.U.W.P. in the countryside as a ratio of labor force employed in agriculture	.90	.82
2. Members of U.P.P. as a ratio of labor force employed in agri- culture		.75
3. Members of R.Y.U. as a ratio of labor force employed in agri- culture		

nature of the interrelation. Is economic development a condition favorable to the growth of political mobilization? To test both hypotheses an analysis of the time dimension is required. This has been provided for by the study of aggregate data relating to the growth of the P.U.W.P. between 1964 and 1968 (the dates of the IVth and Vth Party Congresses respectively).¹³

In this analysis level of economic development (for 1967) has been distinguished from the rate of economic development (1963–1967), allowing us, therefore, to account for the time dimension in the study of interrelation is between economic growth and political mobilization. As the result of this the following pattern emerges:

(1) The level of economic development positively correlates with the ratio of P.U.W.P. members among the adult population.

(2) The rate of economic development positively correlates with the ratio of P.U.W.P. members among the labor force employed in the nationalized economy.

(3) It negatively correlates both with the level of economic development (the backward regions having been developed more rapidly due to the public policy of reallocation of resources) and with the ratio of P.U.W.P. members among the adult population.

¹³ Cf. Krzysztof Ostrowski and Zbigniew Sufin, "Problemy rozwoju partii między IV and V zjazdem" (Problems of the growth of the party between IV and V Congresses), *Nowe Drogi*, no. 1 (236), 1969. The findings are based on correlation, factor and regression analyses. Data have been collected on the level of voivodships (provinces). The analysis has been done in the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences.

To put it in a different way, at the earlier stages of industrial expansion party membership increases rapidly among those employed in the nationalized (mostly industrial) sector of the economy. On the latter stages of economic development, it spreads to the other sectors of the population, particularly to the rural one. Tentatively, since the findings at our disposal have to be enriched by future inquiries, I should modify the original hypothesis in the following way: *political mobilization within the key sector of the economy is a precondition of economic development, while political mobilization of a larger sector of the public tends to be a consequence rather than a condition of economic development.*

IV. CONCLUSION

The empirical studies of political parties in Poland are still in their early stage. The analyses I have referred to in the preceding section do not exhaust all the types of problems under study in this field. For instance, the personality characteristics and motivations of the party members are being studied extensively with an emphasis on the influence of political activeness on

value orientations and professional performance of party members.¹⁴

The character of party systems and of political parties themselves in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe is different from that which prevails in the West. It needs to be studied not as a departure from the "natural" state of things, as seems to be an approach adopted in some area studies, but as a socio-political reality of different character and determined by different types of social conditions. Empirical research on this subject, still in its early stage, does not yet allow us to undertake broader comparative analyses. It might, perhaps, be regarded as a step in this direction.

¹⁴Positive interrelation between political activeness and education and/or professional performance of party members has been emphasized in the studies conducted by Z. Mikolajczyk and E. Patryn, *op. cit.*, as well as by A. Stasiuk, "Czynni i bierni członkowie partii w zakładzie przemysłowym" (Active vs. passive party members in an industrial enterprise), *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, no. 16, 1964. All the studies on this subject are case studies and do not permit statistical analysis on a larger scale.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

As a British observer of the American political scene, it was heartening to learn that professional scholars are so willing to use their scientific expertise to shoulder moral and political responsibilities. Particularly enlightening were the results of the Columbia University survey showing that 66% of the sample said let's get out within eighteen months, while 43% were confident that this would not lead to "large-scale slaughter of the South Vietnamese" (perhaps they were comforted by the thought of small-scale slaughter). Here indeed is moral responsibility of startling proportions. Evidence of comparable political responsibility is found in the revelation that only 35% believed that a viable South Vietnamese government would emerge after withdrawal. One is reminded of the (modified) Shakespearean injunction: Let us lay down our arms against a sea of troubles and by abdicating end them.

BRYAN S. R. GREEN

York University, Canada

TO THE EDITOR:

The urge to write to the editor of the *Review* comes upon me in two-year cycles; thus it is likely to be the last letter I will be writing you, at least in your capacity as an editor.

This is not really a Dear-Sir-You-Cur-type of letter but it comes mighty close to being one. What set me off was the headnote for Professor Caspary's article in the June issue, p. 536, especially the second paragraph. I gather there is a long waiting list for articles to be published in the *Review* and beyond that list there must be quite a number of political scientists who do not consider their work to be sterile exercises and who would value the opportunity to present their work to their colleagues in the premier review of the profession. Given all this, why did you find it necessary to fill the *Review* with 12 pages of a sterile exercise four years old, a work the author himself considers to be infinitely less significant than his present enterprise?

I have not asked Professor Caspary why he chose to permit publication of a "sterile exercise" because I do not think that it is any of my business to ask him such questions. But I feel that as a member of the Association whose dues support the publication of the *Review* I am entitled to ask why my membership dues are used to print a "sterile exercise."

With best wishes for a peaceful existence as an editor emeritus,
Indiana University

ALFRED DIAMANT

(EDITOR'S NOTE: ever in keeping with the spirit of our times, the referees and the editor concluded that the progeny should be judged on its merits, not on the progenitor's low opinion of his own work.)

TO THE EDITOR:

Steven Brown and John Ellithorp's article on emotional experience in political groups is an interesting blend of psychology and political science, but it demonstrates the pitfalls involved. Psychological analyses of political phenomena are customarily viewed with a suspicion that they really constitute a below-the-belt attack on behalf of the authors' political predilections. One combats ideology, not with critique, but with the discovery of non-rational motivational factors.

Specifically, the authors regard liking Senator McCarthy or agreeing with his low-key tactics as indicators of dependence, an infantile longing for a charismatic leader; while disagreeing with McCarthy's tactics or regarding him as a poor loser is evidence of emotional detachment.

It's rather curious: these rational counterdependent types who represent Bion's work group, who reject hostility and are goal-oriented score +5 when it comes to disagreeing with McCarthy, expressing strong views and contributing their two-cents worth (4, 15). Rather than having a high work orientation, they would appear just as likely to be carping malcontents who wanted all things their own way.

By the same token, a refusal to get involved in time-wasting petty arguments is regarded, not as steadfast goal-orientation, but is evidence of withdrawal from threatening or competitive situations (4, 28). And when factor 1 makes an ambivalent score on an ambivalent question, it is regarded as "failing to come to grips with what is implied" (29—What is implied? that defeated McCarthyites should have chosen between Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace? or that they might feel all was finished once McCarthy had lost?).

If we wish to play psychological games, we might note that the nature of our presidential

ampaign system is precisely that of dependence upon a leader, that once a leader is chosen it is customary to acknowledge his right to conduct the type of campaign that befits his own style, and that the obsession with the way in which McCarthy conducted his campaign represents a need to rationalize failure. The good political worker limits his concern with such matters and goes out and rings doorbells.

Since the authors argue for the importance of objectivity in a theory of political action, it is only fair to agree with them and to contend that they strongly disagreed with Sen. McCarthy's actions and felt that the McCarthyites should have rallied behind Hubert Humphrey, and that they are engaged in a hatchet job on all those whose responses differed.

May I suggest that a psychological analysis of political behavior demands categories that carry no opprobrium, rather than an attempt, conscious or unconscious, to divide into devils and angels or healthy and sick.

WILLIAM A. BAKER
Loop College, City Colleges of Chicago

TO THE EDITOR:

We appreciate Professor Baker's comments, but wish to point out that our paper was on a theory of groups and not on the McCarthy movement per se. We admired Eugene McCarthy and, of course, did have feelings about the issues, but the fact that Baker thought we were defending the factor 4 position—whereas factors 2 and 5 represent the views with which the authors, respectively, would identify—leads us to think we succeeded somewhat in keeping our biases to ourselves.

Professor Baker is correct in labeling our efforts a game; for political analysis, like chess, has its rules. For example, in offering an alternative explanation to our own, Baker notes that refusal by factor 1 respondents to engage in petty arguments (observation X) could reflect goal-orientation (Baker's alternative theory) rather than dependency (Bion's theory). The posing of alternative explanations is quite legitimate under the rules of the game. However, if one is to play the game properly he must try to explain all and not simply those observations which seem to fit. For example, the factor scores also indicate factor 1 eschewed group-related activities (observation Y) and felt personally ineffectual (Z). Do Y and Z follow from Baker's theory? We think not. However, Bion's theory accounts for X, Y, and Z and so appears to be a better theory.

We anticipate that much of Professor Baker's disappointment stems from a suspicion (unfounded, we assure him) that we were trying to do in

the McCarthy people. Unlike our critic, perhaps, we do not equate "irrational" with "nonrational," nor either of these with "bad." The democratic personality may automatically and unthinkingly (i.e., nonrationally) defend threatened liberties. Such behavior need not be rational to deserve our support.

We are quite certain that the McCarthy people were among the most articulate in 1968. The rationales they articulated, however, are the subject matter of the political-theory game, whereas analysis of why they articulated what they did is part of the political-psychology game. Both games complement one another and are legitimate under the rules of political inquiry. We sought to study the psychological aspect, and went out of our way to say so, and ought not therefore be scored for not attending to the former. One can do just so much in a single study.

STEVEN R. BROWN
JOHN D. ELLITHORP

Kent State University

TO THE EDITOR:

In undertaking a reconsideration of Fascism, a subject charged with so much negative emotion, I fully expected to encounter a certain measure of hostility and perhaps incivility. Moreover, in an informal discipline such as ours—characterized as it is by but few common standards for evaluation—I fully expected variable assessments of my book, *The Ideology of Fascism*. My expectations have been largely fulfilled. The book met with considerable hostility, some incivility, and widely variable assessment. The conjunction of emotion with variable (if not idiosyncratic) standards, has produced evaluations which vary from "an admirable study of Fascist thought" to be "recommended"—"a fresh, clear, intelligent, intelligible and carefully researched book"—"perhaps the most important and provocative analysis of Italian Fascism since Nolte"—"a book argued at a high level of ability" (*Journal of Politics*, *Il Borghese* [Rome], *Choice*, *The Economist* [London])—to that of a book that "lacks perspective" afflicted with "lapses from ordinary scholarly accuracy" producing "few fruitful results" (*Annals of the American Academy*). Sometimes my scholarship is characterized as "thorough" and "precise"—and sometimes as "tedious" (*Washington Post*). My style is sometimes conceived as "intelligible" and "clear"—and at other times as "bearing a close resemblance to sludge, with a precisely articulated crystalline structure" (*Washington Post*).

Recognizing the likelihood of just such variable assessments, I expected that professional reviewers would be circumspect in their judgment. Where their judgment was all-but-unremittingly

negative, I fully expected arguments to accompany it. In this expectation I have been sadly disappointed by Mr. Dante Germino's review (*APSR*, June, 1970).

I am not particularly concerned about Mr. Germino's judgments regarding my literary style. These judgments tend to reflect largely personal preferences. Whatever substantive discussion such judgments could possibly generate exceed the prescribed limits of this reply. I am more concerned about Mr. Germino's evident indisposition to provide arguments in support of his broad, negative substantive judgments. Instead of arguments he entertains us with special punctuation—exclamation points, underlinings for emphasis—innuendo via the employment of *sic*—as well as the exploitation of metaphor (I “mechanically” discover things, and I “play a game”). Such strategies are appropriate where the propositions in question are self-evidently absurd. That the propositions advanced in my book do not so qualify is evidenced by the fact that the section of my book to which Mr. Germino takes special exception—the treatment of “leftist” modernizing movements as sharing genus and species traits with Mussolini's Fascism—has been found by other reviewers to be not only “welcome,” but “convincingly demonstrative”—that it is “carefully worked out and deserves close attention” (*Journal of Politics and the Economist*). Even the critical reviewer for the *Times Literary Supplement* found my theses “challenging and challengeable—and well argued.” If Mr. Germino finds these theses so “sweeping and questionable as seriously to detract from the value of the book,” it seems legitimate to suggest that he provide *arguments* to support his claim. I'm sure that there exists a sub-culture in which “Wow!” and “Right on!” constitute the counterfeit of arguments, but I hardly think such curious strategies can pass for evidential support for judgments in a professional journal.

For example, I am sure that Mr. Germino knows that others have identified the same similarities subtending Fascism and Leninism (particularly in the form it took under Stalin), as I have. Franz Borkenau, Peter Drucker and Ely Halevy, among others, early argued the case. Trotsky found “deadly similarities” between Stalinism and Fascism—as did Bruno Rizzi (*La lezione dello Stalinismo* [Rome: Opere nuove, 1962]). Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski argued similarities at the genus level. More recently, in an article in *Survey*, Brzezinski suggested that “the highest stage of communism is fascism”—which seems to argue identification at the species level. Ludovico Garruccio (*L'industrializza-*

zione tra nazionalismo e rivoluzione [Bologna: Mulino, 1969]), in turn, has made a case for genus and species similarities between Fascism, Leninism, Maoism and “Third World” one party states. Angelo Del Boca and Mario Giovana provide a journalistic argument in support of a thesis of “fascism” in African one-party states (*Fascism Today* [New York: Pantheon 1969]). Surely, if the theses were so “sweeping and questionable” as Mr. Germino affirms, they could be defeated with summary argument. Mr. Germino could defeat a significant number of analysts at one fell swoop. For some reason known only to himself Mr. Germino has sought defeat not with argument, but with special punctuation.

The interpretation of the Fascist phenomenon, as well as its contemporary “relevance,” are serious topics. I invite Mr. Germino to publicly exchange *arguments* with me. I am sure we can find an appropriate vehicle for such an enterprise.

There is more to Mr. Germino's review than a questionable intellectual strategy. He apparently objects to the view (which I hold) that one of the principal tasks of political science is to generate descriptive, predictive and explanatory propositions. Political science is, of course, equally obliged to evaluate. But if the former without the latter is sterile, the latter without the former is puerile. I'm sure that Mr. Germino does not suggest that the analysis of Fascism (or fascism) be restricted to accounts that “unequivocally reject fascism” and preoccupy themselves with the “deep scars” identified with fascist experiments. We are all familiar with the horrors of Stalin's purges, with Mao's massacres and with Castro's “revolutionary justice”—but I suspect that any political historian who dwelt on those aspects of those regimes would be charged with “cold war hysteria,” and perhaps “anti-communist paranoia,” which fault understanding, objective assessment and adequate classification. There is no dearth of literature devoted to the horrors of fascist regimes. There are few, however, that attempt any reasonably objective account of Fascist ideology, the public *rationale* of Fascism. My clear purpose was to provide that rationale for inspection. That rationale, placed against fascist practice (something I have urged readers to do), affords a more substantial comprehension than any catalogue of enormities.

Mr. Germino evidently has a special methodology which permits us to avoid something he calls “pseudo-objective descriptivism.” His methodological convictions are apparently the ultimate basis for his criticisms. Again, I suggest

that these are important issues that cannot be resolved by his pronouncements. I invite Mr. Germino to a public discussion of them.

Finally, perhaps because of Mr. Germino's special epistemological insights, he seems driven to the judgment that when I argue that Fascism, Leninism and Maoism share genus and special traits I fail to make any distinctions between them. Certainly, whatever special epistemology Mr. Germino embraces, he recognizes that many things share genus traits and are not identical; horses are not zebras although both belong to the same genus. Moreover, creatures can even share species traits and yet not be identical; Lapdogs are not Great Danes. For heuristic and classificatory purposes one may dwell on similarities—but for hunting badgers one does well to dwell on the distinction between Dachshunds and Saint Bernards. One must distinguish between cognitive and pragmatic purposes—between classification and evaluation. Where one doesn't one runs the risk of lapsing into silly judgments. Other reviewers have avoided Mr. Germino's mistake. The reviewer for the *Journal of Politics* simply states that I am "sensitive to the differences" but provide a convincing argument for subtending genus and perhaps species similarities.

In some obscure way, I suppose, Mr. Germino knows some of these things. That his knowledge is not evident in his review is, I conjecture, a consequence of his commitment to a new political style (which I have baptized with my own neologism): neo-visceralism.

A. JAMES GREGOR

University of California, Berkeley

TO THE EDITOR:

The widespread use of statistics in political science (and the other social sciences) undoubtedly is contributing and will continue to contribute to its maturation as a science. This does not mean, however, that their indiscriminate use is wise, for the misapplication of such manipulations can produce results that are highly misleading. The recent article (June 1970) by Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters on "The Politics of Redistribution" may be taken as a case in point. Following the earlier work of Richard Dawson and James Robinson, Thomas Dye, Ira Sharkansky, and others, their study tries to answer the question, "Does politics make a difference in the policy formation process?" While it is obvious that in a broad sense politics is very germane to the process, statistical results that confirm the obvious among the American states have not been as readily produced as one might expect. Fry and Winters, using an ingenious

measure of "redistribution" (in terms of expenditure as opposed to tax burdens) toward the lower income classes as their "policy" issue, argue that they have proof that "political variables" (including extent of political participation, interparty competition, aspects of elite behavior, etc.) are more important the socio-economic variables (median income, industrialization, urbanization, education).

To prove their argument they test eighteen hypotheses (involving six socio-economic variables and twelve political variables), first by running zero-order correlations between the "redistribution ratio" and each of the eighteen variables, and second by running partials in which they control for the 17 other variables. If one looks just at the zero-order relationships, it is apparent that they have achieved some success (not complete, but some), although some of the correlations are of a low magnitude. While their successes are noted, if only in passing, they pass on to the partial relationships. They state: "Shifting our attention to partial coefficients of correlation, a *measure of independent impact of each independent variable* on redistribution, we find somewhat longer lists of contrary correlations (my italics)." Indeed the contrary correlations include negative relationships between the redistribution ratio and (1) median income (originally .18, when partialled it became -.27), and (2) industrialization (originally .29, it became -.02). To at least some of us this seems most surprising. But if one looks for an explanation of such results, Fry and Winters fail to provide one. A reason for this, it may be suggested, is that such findings are spurious, hence attempting to explain them could lead to strained mental contortions.

The reason that such findings are probably spurious (as well as some of the other findings that are a result of partial relationships, although in a less obvious way: the probability that the "independent" variables are more highly correlated to one another than to the "dependent" variable does not bode well) is that the independent variables in the set of socio-economic variables suffer from multicollinearity (highly correlated independent variables), so that when one "controls" for variation caused by, say, industrialization, urbanization and education to see if "median income" has any "independent" effect on "redistribution ratios," one actually controls the *valid* variation of, in this case, "median income." (Several methodologists have written about this (including Robert A. Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (1968), 592-616, and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Inde-

pendent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," *Social Forces*, 42 (1963), 233-237), Robert Gordon's article being particularly useful.) For example, using Dye's results for the 50 states (Fry and Winters use 48; data are from *Politics, Economics, and The Public*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), there is a zero-order correlation between median income and urbanization of .67, indicating that they are nearly equivalent for the purposes at hand. And, as Gordon notes, "When two variables are equivalent, they will both be equally valid to some degree, and controlling for one of them amounts to controlling for valid covariation. This makes as much sense as controlling for a parallel form of the same instrument." For reasons that cannot be gone into here for lack of space, but which Gordon discusses at length, such partialling can produce weird results. Such, it may be suggested, as those Fry and Winters report.

Probably at the heart of the problem of the use of statistics in such a problem (are political or socio-economic variables more important?) is the belief (see italicized part of quote from Fry and Winters above) that partialling provides "a measure of (the) independent impact of each independent variable. . . ." As Gordon notes, this view is "generally accepted," but incorrect insofar as multicollinearity exists. This letter, then, only attempts to point out for the unwary some of the pitfalls that Gordon tries to indicate and explain.

What implications does this analysis have for the other findings reported by Fry and Winters, including "The most interesting and significant finding in this study (concerning) the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables in determining redistributive fiscal policies in the states," namely that "politics plays a dominant role in the allocation of the burdens and benefits of public policies"? One can probably conclude, it may be suggested, that the other relationships are spurious too. In this section of their paper one may note that Fry and Winters' multiple regression methodology has far outdistanced their theory. They provide, that is, no explanation of, have no theory covering, the overall results of using, first, all eighteen, then "only" ten, variables in a multiple regression analysis, as opposed to their original hypotheses. More controlled investigation may have asked, upon finding a correlation between a certain political variable and the redistribution ratio, whether such a relationship was spurious, "reflecting" genuinely the effect of the socio-economic environment (assuming a correlation between the political variables and the socio-economic environment), and controlled *just* for socio-economic environ-

ment to find out if the political variables did have an independent effect. It may be pertinent to note here that their re-analysis using "only" ten variables in a multiple regression equation, where they find also that political variables are much more important than socio-economic variables, could have been expected if the socio-economic variables are more highly intercorrelated, as one suspects is the case, although Fry and Winters do not provide such data. (Gordon's article is very useful in this connection also.)

While Fry and Winters have introduced a useful policy consideration by way of their "redistribution ratio" for future analysts to consider, because of, apparently, multicollinearity among (some of) their independent variables, as well as allowing methodological possibilities to overshoot their theory, their method of analysis and of course their results (past the zero-order correlations) are most questionable. It is perhaps only by making and then becoming aware of such mistakes, however, that understanding increases.

JAMES J. NOELL

Washington University, St. Louis

TO THE EDITOR:

Mr. Noell's major point is well taken, namely, that multicollinearity is a serious problem in multivariate analysis where high inter-correlations among variables can lead to great difficulties in interpretation of, and misleading inferences can be drawn from, the data. He is also correct in his assertion that the presence of multicollinearity among the independent variables used in our analysis renders the partial correlations difficult to interpret and susceptible to misleading inferences. However, the misleading inferences to which Mr. Noell refers are his, not ours. Briefly, what Noell has done is to use a statistic (the partial correlation) to assess the relative explanatory value of political and socio-economic variables, a purpose for which it is neither particularly well-suited nor intended, while ignoring the statistic (the multiple-partial coefficient of correlation) which we had intended for use in such an assessment. The partial coefficients of correlation were reported simply to indicate the "marginal" relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable controlling for all other variables in the set with the specific acknowledgement that the complex interrelationships among the individual independent variables would require further investigation (an endeavor in which we are currently engaged). The multiple-partials, on the other hand, *were* meant to be an indicator of the relative explanatory power of the political and socio-economic variables. In em-

playing the multiple-partials for this purpose, we feel that we have substantially reduced, though admittedly have not eliminated, the problem of multicollinearity and consequent misinterpretations of our findings. In sum our purpose was to present a dependent variable of potential theoretical utility in political analysis. It was not our purpose to explore specific causal linkages in pursuit of a general budgetary theory. We feel

that the major finding of the paper still stands: measures of economic capability and need were less highly related to differences among the states in budgetary redistribution than were a set of political variables.

BRIAN R. FRY

Stanford University

RICHARD WINTERS

Dartmouth College

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice. By DAVID BUTLER AND DONALD STOKES. (New York: St. Martin's press, 1970. Pp. 516.)

Students of voting behaviour, whether or not interested in British politics, will certainly be interested in *Political Change in Britain*, because it is the first book-length analysis of voting behaviour to appear from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan since the publication of *The American Voter* in 1960. As a consequence, it is a model of how to analyse voting in a national context, whether in North America, or the Europe of the Six and the Seven. It is also a mine of information about mass political attitudes in Britain.

Unpredictable aspects of elections have given David Butler and Donald Stokes an unusually rich resource of data: nationwide sample surveys of the British electorate at three different points in time, with *two* general elections occurring in the period. Their first wave of interviews was conducted in 1963, when Conservative support was near bottom; the second wave in autumn, 1964, when the two parties were even; and the third after the 1966 general election, when the Labour Party had reached a pinnacle of success. Hence, the authors have a considerable amount of change to analyse by the standards of a relatively stable European electorate. They also have problems of panel mortality, sampling and weighting; these are clearly discussed in an appendix.

The questionnaire employed follows the Survey Research Center's concern with obtaining as much information as possible about individual respondents' social characteristics and political attitudes. Donald Stokes' analytic skills are reflected in the sophistication with which data is analysed, especially where complex problems of cause and effect are concerned, as in the discussion of the relationship of newspaper reading and trade union membership to voting behaviour. David Butler's long involvement in the detailed study of British election campaigns is reflected in the concern shown with the relevance of findings to British electoral politics in the 1960s. A number of key tables are of interest to practitioners of campaigning at Smith Square, London, as well as to an international circle of academic students of voting.

The 20 chapters and 225,000 words of text begin with a straightforward but by no means simple discussion of the social bases of party preference in Britain, with a chapter devoted to reli-

gious, local and regional influences, as well as several chapters on class influences and a chapter on socialization and generational differences in party allegiance. The second part is primarily concerned with issues and the extent of ideological awareness. Sections three and four describe influences changing the party preferences of individual voters and the aggregate strength of the parties in the electorate. Here, the availability of data from the same panel for two general elections is particularly valuable.

No review can do justice to all the materials and themes contained within this volume. Moreover, the clarity of organization is such that the busy student of comparative politics can dip into particular chapters and abstract much of use, especially if he is already familiar with the context of British politics. To this reviewer, the most interesting and elegant discussions concerned two topics long emphasized in the Nuffield studies of aggregate electoral data: the evenness of national swing, and the homogeneity of the national electorate.

In a series of seminar papers, Donald Stokes had previously emphasized the paradox of swing: that is, the net percentage change in votes between Conservative and Labour parties in a given constituency is nearly identical in all constituencies in Britain (or, at least, in England). This is a paradox since a swing of 3 per cent of the vote is equivalent to a change of one-tenth of its strength, whereas it reflects the switching of only one-twentieth of strength in a constituency where it polls 60 per cent of the vote. The phenomenon is explained as a consequence of ecological and communication factors that work in opposite directions in a party's safe and hopeless seats, with the net effect homogenizing shifts at the level of the constituency. The discussion blends logic, empirical data and theoretical sophistication.

The decomposition of influences upon voting into their regional components is carried out by using statistical techniques that Donald Stokes has already demonstrated in other contexts. The authors' analysis here shows that 6.4 per cent of the greater strength of the Labour Party in the North of England and of the Conservatives in the South is accounted for by differences of party preference within a given class (i.e., by a 'regional' effect) and only 2.8 per cent is due to the difference in the class structure of the two regions. The interaction effect is a negligible 0.1 per cent.

A pervasive theme of the book is the extent to which actuarial changes in the social structure

of the electorate effect the balance of power between the two major parties. This is initially introduced by a careful analysis of generational cohorts, including those undergoing early political socialization when the Liberal Party was a major party, and Labour minor. The analysis extends to consider such matters as the political consequences of differential fertility and mortality rates in the middle and working-class. For example, working-class Conservatives have fewer children than working-class Labour parents. The care and lucidity of the presentation stimulated some British reviewers to hail the book as evidence of an ineluctable trend to Labour. (One satirist even wrote a piece entitled 'The Naked Psephologist'.)

The victory of the Conservatives at the 1970 British general election provides a public rebuke to anyone who ignores the *ceteris paribus* clause in such extrapolations. It also provides the authors with yet another book of major interest, to be based upon the continuation of interviews with a panel of respondents in 1969 and 1970. The desire for replication and intensive analysis of floating voters—where changes are matters of record and not matters of sometimes faulty memory—will presumably lead the authors to devote the bulk of their next study to a further detailed analysis of mass political behaviour and attitudes. It is debatable, however, whether any number of surveys will lead to full comprehension of their titular subject: political change in Britain.

The reasons for this are several and important. The basic question is: What changes when political change occurs? The answer implied by these students of voting behaviour is very different from that presented by Samuel Huntington or Gabriel Almond. The second question is: What time span must be observed to verify that alterations are something more than a transitory quasi-random fluctuation? The answer is likely to be a time span rather longer than the six years (or was it six days?) wonder of Mr. Wilson. The authors' review of the life history of their respondents only underlines the importance of the last big change in British electoral politics: the replacement of the Liberals by Labour. A forthcoming study by Donald Stokes of the relationship of MPs and constituents' attitudes in Britain will provide some insight into the contemporaneous relationship of two significant political strata. But this data cannot analyse possible long-term changes in MP-constituent relationships. Moreover, the peculiarly constrained role of British MPs in the political executive makes it difficult to draw inferences about government from information about MPs.

To say this is not to criticize the book that

David Butler and Donald Stokes have written, but to note that the title they chose could equally well have been used for other kinds of political analysis too. In England, this could extend back to times before the introduction of the democratic franchise, to issues and administrative problems remote from the perception of the ordinary voter, and to a universe as confined and elitist as theirs is broad and democratic.

RICHARD ROSE

University of Strathclyde

Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship. BY MICHAEL WALZER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, Pp. 244. \$7.95.)

It has been the case historically that political theory has flourished during periods of political and social upheaval. The names of such thinkers as Plato, Hobbes, Locke, and Marx, to name only a few, come readily to mind in this connection. In particular, questions dealing with the theory of political obligation tend to assume great importance in such times. There arises a pressing need to explore the conditions under which men are obligated to obey the laws or, conversely, the circumstances under which they may disobey them, or—in extreme circumstances—under which they even incur a positive obligation to disobey. Given the present political situation in the United States, it is therefore not surprising that the past several years have witnessed a substantial revival in political theory dealing with these and related topics. Michael Walzer's new book is a distinguished contribution to that revival.

His subjects are of the most immediate importance, including, among others: the nature and demands of modern citizenship; political alienation, conscientious objection and their relation to the system of conscription; civil disobedience and corporate authority; the responsibility of intellectuals; and the obligation to die—or sometimes to live—for the state. The form of the book is that of a collection of essays, but this is not just another typical example of that much abused genre. Over half of the eleven articles have never before appeared in print and the author makes it quite clear that the decision to publish essays rather than a more systematic treatment of the subject was a carefully considered choice related to the considerable number of "kinds and degrees" (p. xvi) of obligation which he is able to distinguish. Thus the papers must be read as tentative explorations and it would be improper to attribute to Walzer the sort of general theory of obligation he so carefully eschews. However, it is fair to say that there are a number of themes which recur with

some frequency and to which special importance must be attached.

These papers are applications of a theory of consent derived from such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, and even though Walzer is not uncritical of this tradition his work still may be said to represent a revival of social contract theory. In applying this body of ideas there is much emphasis placed upon the need for consent to be given frequently and over an extended period of time, as well as on the real necessity for genuine evidence to be discovered that *meaningful* consent has in fact been granted. Ritualistic formulas are not enough and Walzer displays a healthy skepticism as to the efficacy of many of the mechanisms by which modern democracies attempt to evoke such consent.

A third recurrent theme is the pluralistic basis of political obligation although this pluralism is much more than the "pleasant illusion" (p. 205) so commonly found in contemporary American thought. In Walzer's view, one generally incurs obligations not simply on the basis of the dictates of the individual conscience, not on the Lutheran ground, "Here I stand; I can do no other," but rather through participation in the activities of political or social groups of one kind or another. As Walzer puts it, "... commitments to principle are usually also commitments to other men, from whom or with whom the principles have been learned and by whom they are enforced." (p. 5) Moreover, and very importantly, the process by which obligations are assumed is not automatic; instead it stems only from "willful membership" in a group. (p. 7) We have here a restatement of the central point of social contract theory. Under these conditions the pluralist citizen "receives protection and shares in ruling and being ruled, not in spite of his plural memberships, but because of them." (p. 227) Obligations to the state can arise only when the citizen is afforded a choice between the commitments he has made to the groups of which he is a member and the commitments which the state may ask him to make. Only then can citizenship as a genuine moral choice rather than a mere legal status be said to exist.

If there is a serious objection to Walzer's book it would seem to lie in his failure to confront consent theory with other conceivable bases of obligation. For example, in the essay on "Political Alienation and Military Service" he raises a possible objection to his own view which he derives from Blackstone and which holds that "obligation in fact derives from birth and upbringing, and that the voluntary actions or inactions of adults have no significance in the formation or destruction of moral bonds." (p. 115) Walzer admits that this is a position which has consist-

ency and force but he declines to discuss it on the ground that it is "simply a denial of consent theory." (*Ibid.*) This is true, of course, but it will not satisfy advocates of the view that obligations derive from the fact that the state is in some sense a natural institution rather than an artifact of man's will produced by a consensual process. This is the price Walzer pays for choosing to apply an assumed body of ideas to a series of specific problems rather than attempt a more general theory. However, this should by no means be taken to mean that his essays are not by and large very compelling; it is merely to raise a hope that sometime he will turn his attentions to such issues.

Political theorists will learn much from this book and so should many non-theorists as well. To them it offers not only a series of penetrating analyses of currently important problems, but also an outstanding example of that working out of a tradition of thought which Sheldon Wolin has argued is so vital to the vocation of political theory. Anyone operating under the delusion that the tradition is played out should quickly be disabused of that notion by a reading of these stimulating studies.

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The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. By ADAM PRZEWORSKI AND HENRY TEUNE. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970. Pp. 153. \$8.50.)

It is now apparent that the revolution in comparative politics introduced a decade ago by the appearance of *Politics of the Developing Areas* is completed. The functional categories set forth in that volume stimulated a growth of interest in truly comparative research. But ten years of toil have shown the scholar that the important epistemological, theoretical, and methodological problems have yet to be tackled. The work under review here begins that task.

The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry grows out of the authors' participation in the International Studies of Values in Politics project. It is a short and complex book, often difficult to understand on first reading. Nevertheless, every political scientist who professes to be a comparative analyst should master it; no doctoral candidate can consider himself well trained unless he has perused it thoroughly.

The volume is divided into two main parts. The first, well over half, is concerned with theory building and the second with problems of cross-cultural measurement. There are several interesting assertions about the nature of comparative research. While it is generally recog-

nized that the primary goal of comparative research is the building and testing of theories, the authors postulate that generality and parsimony of theories is more important than accuracy. Even more significant is the rather special meaning given to the term "comparative" which is reserved exclusively to denote studies "in which the influence of larger systems upon the characteristics of units within them is examined. . . . In this sense not all the studies conducted across systems or nations are comparative. . . . If the analysis is conducted exclusively at the level of nations, then . . . it is not comparative." (p. 74)

This is an important departure from the normal usage of the term "comparison" in the social sciences ("comparative psychology" excepted). In the tradition of Bacon, Mill, Weber, Durkheim, Nadel and many others the comparative method was another form of the experimental method. Instead of being able to control and manipulate variables in a laboratory, the social scientist had to seek out natural social settings. He would test or generate hypotheses by comparison across cultures in which his theoretical variables occurred in the most useful combinations for causal inference. Thus Weber, through an "imaginary experiment," compared Western and Indian cultures to derive his famous hypotheses on the relationship between religion and capitalism. And, Nadel compared similar societies in Africa to generate propositions on witchcraft.

Przeworski and Teune point out that the old comparative method, in addition to limiting the researcher to natural settings and introducing problems of diffusion, was based on the unrealistic assumption that characteristics of cultures could be manipulated in quasi-experimental fashion. It was also fairly rigid—the *a priori* assumption about the importance of certain factors had to be followed through to the end of the study.

In place of this they recommend a "most different systems design" in which the question of explaining variation remains open throughout the process of inquiry. Thus it is possible to move from the level of individuals, to groups, to communities, to regions and on to total countries. Whatever level produces the greatest reduction in variance and thus provides better prediction is the one used in the final analysis. For them "Comparative research is inquiry in which more than one level of analysis is possible. . . . a study of local leaders sampled from local communities in a single country is comparative since research can proceed at both the individual and community levels." (p. 37)

Part I is a discussion of the various facets of this research design. It is replete with illuminating examples from comparative research. Throughout the work the unit of analysis most frequently referred to is the "system." The goal is to replace the proper names of systems (e.g. India) with the names of theoretical variables. In theory formulation proper names become the final residual concepts explaining the remaining variance in the dependent phenomenon.

One difficulty is that the reader is never told explicitly how to identify the various levels and units discussed. What is an "individual," a group, a community, or a country? What is the epistemological status of these concepts? How are they related to each other? Although a formal definition of "system" is provided, what are its operational indicators? How is one to know that a certain level in one system is comparable to a level in another? The entire discussion of changing levels of analysis was difficult to understand for this reviewer and yet it is a key element in the argument.

Part II consists of a good survey of the problems of measurement in cross-cultural research, particularly as applicable to the design set out previously. The problem is presented in the form of developing a meta-language which will provide equivalence of measurement across systems. There are some surprising assertions here too—such as that stimulus equivalence is not as important a problem in designing a questionnaire as might be supposed.

The two main parts of the book are not as well integrated as they could be. Nevertheless, the volume is an important addition to the recent literature on comparative political analysis. The problems it raises are not always settled, but it is a good beginning.

W. G. FLEMING

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Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing, and the Power of the Poor. By MICHAEL LIPSKY. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. Pp. 214. \$5.95.)

Some of the central themes of Michael Lipsky's *Protest and City Politics* will be familiar to readers of this *Review* (December 1968) but even those who have seen the preview will find the book provocative and worthy of examination. Professor Lipsky seeks to increase our understanding of both low cost housing problems and the dynamics of protest but the latter is clearly his prime concern. As Lipsky acknowledges, he is concerned with only a segment of that which is often described as protest: i.e., nonviolent political action involving showman-

ship or public display by groups he (rather vaguely) defines as "relatively powerless" that is aimed at obtaining changes by and through the established economic and political systems. One may, of course, wish that he had defined his interests more broadly but the territory he has staked out is clearly in need of exploration.

Professor Lipsky argues that there are limits to the effectiveness of protest activity, especially recurrent protest by a particular interest, and that these limits may best be understood by focusing on the problems faced by protest leaders in managing the various constituencies from which support must be secured. Since the needs of the target agency, or group, third parties, the mass media, or members of the protest group itself are often in conflict, the position of the protest leader and the stability of the movement are inherently tenuous.

As Professor Lipsky sees it, a necessary if not sufficient condition for successful protest is the mobilization of third parties to which the target group refers (or defers) and the mass media is seen as essential in such activation. Certainly, the support of third parties and sympathetic treatment by the mass media can increase the probabilities that protest will succeed. On the other hand, protest by "relatively powerless groups" can be direct and neglect by the media need not be fatal. For example, protests led by James Forman and the Black Economic Development Conference appear to have secured substantial funds from a number of churches without the involvement of third parties. And, Forman's "reparation" demands did not generally receive friendly response from the media. Moreover, if the referent groups of protest targets (i.e., third parties) are elites, as they most often are, it seems likely that direct contact by protest groups will suffice in many cases to explain protest demands. It may be that (1) as those who would utilize protest as a political resource have come to recognize Professor Lipsky's point that successful appeals to third parties and to the media are likely to complicate the task of maintaining the cohesion of the parties to the protest, and (2) as the nature of demands by racial minorities and the poor have changed, the role earlier played by third parties and the media in successful protest has diminished.

One of the difficulties with Professor Lipsky's approach is that groups utilizing protest may also make use of strategies such as legal action, direct lobbying and other conventional forms of interest group activity. No effort is made to sort out the contributions the various strategies make to whatever success the protest group experiences nor does he warn us of the

problems involved in doing this. It seems possible, for example, that protest groups can be effective despite, rather than because of, their protest activity.

Lipsky deals with the difficult problem of assessing protest effectiveness with sophistication and admirable thoroughness. While he does not show what factors actually brought about or discouraged response to protest demands, he makes an important distinction between symbolic responses and policy changes on the one hand, and direct benefits on the other, and rather convincingly demonstrates that rent strikes secured very little of the latter. Among the explanations suggested for why protest groups are more successful in achieving policy innovation than in altering administrative procedures or securing direct personal remedies to grievances are: 1) policy changes are less costly and more interesting to city officials; 2) third parties are more likely to seek seemingly dramatic policy changes than more short-run responses to protestors' grievances; and 3) protest groups are inherently more effective in raising issues and establishing their importance than in participating in the formulation or adoption of solutions to the problems they dramatize. Perhaps identification of the barriers to effective protest also might be facilitated by looking as much at what protest targets are capable of doing as at what they actually do.

While few will agree with every aspect of Professor Lipsky's formulation of the process of protest, most will find food for thought in the numerous generalizations he advances. The value of his book, however, does not rest solely on its more abstract formulations. The reader will find in the descriptive segments of the book numerous insights many of which are deserving in themselves of further analysis. His commentary is quite strong with respect to the response of formal institutions to demands for housing reform. The discussion of the diversionary tactics utilized by city bureaucrats is especially penetrating (though one wishes more could be said about the incentives bureaucrats have for such obfuscation). Lipsky's examination of how the demands of the protestors were formulated or how Jesse Grey (the rent strike leader) came to dominate the protest and how he handled the problems he is said to have faced in dealing with his indigenous constituents seems less adequate.

Professor Lipsky views his analysis as a critique, or at least a modification, of those theories which seem to stress the widespread opportunities for participation in decision-making available in our political system. It seems doubtful that many among us, including the most san-

guine pluralist, will disagree with his conclusion that the poor face unusual difficulties in mobilizing effective political action. However, Professor Lipsky may be mistaken in explaining so many of the difficulties in terms of the fact that the poor lack organizational skills and the "status and refinements which accompany income, education, and social position." Perhaps it is not only, or even most importantly, that the poor are less well organized and less politically sophisticated than the middle and upper class but that they demand more basic change. No matter how articulate and well organized they may be, the advocates of fundamental change will invariably face more substantial constraints than groups that place less substantial demands on the prevailing allocation of resources and privilege.

Finally, one of the refreshing things about Professor Lipsky's book is that it manifests a clear and uncommon sense of what politics is about. Whatever its methodological weaknesses (the limits of the case study are apparent here), whatever modification to its central conceptualizations may be warranted, the book conveys the complexities and ambiguities of political action and this seems reason enough for including it on one's list of things to read.

WILLIS D. HAWLEY

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The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority. By THEODORE J. LOWI. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. Pp. 322. \$6.95.)

Professor Lowi has an argument with America and with American political science. The American liberal state, he argues, is not working. Its ideology is outmoded, its institutions are incompetent, and its policies unjust. Pluralism and interest-group liberalism have failed, and their failure has produced a crisis of authority which now threatens the foundations of order. At the same time, the political science which claims to study that state has become its ideological handmaiden. The crisis is academic as well as practical.

Lowi's earlier critiques of pluralism and interest-group liberalism are by now familiar to students of American politics. The present book represents an empirical broadening of that earlier work, and a polemical sharpening of it, but the intellectual and political framework remains the same. The work stands squarely within the neo-liberal tradition even while criticizing it. *The End* is both a major expression of American liberalism—the most important since Robert Dahl's *Preface to Democratic Theory*—and a vigorous critique of it.

Lowi's primary thesis is that "Interest-group

liberalism seeks to justify power and to end the crisis of public authority by avoiding law and by parceling out to private parties the power to make public policy. A most maladaptive political formula, it will inevitably exacerbate rather than end the crisis. . . ." (p. 58). In developing this thesis, Lowi builds a formidable bill of particulars against the regime of interest-group liberalism. Interest-group liberalism corrupts democracy, renders government impotent, and cannot achieve justice. The liberal state degrades general law into universal privilege. Forms and formalisms disappear, replaced by temporary bargains arranged by the interested parties themselves, and then imposed on the rest of us for our distrustful submission. Awash in relativism, buffeted by a thousand groups and interests, liberal states cannot plan for the future or steer a safe course through the hazards of our time. The pluralist model of the self-correcting system is a sham. It was based on impossible assumptions about free group competition and consensus on the rules of the game, and it excluded large groups from most of the benefits of society. It concealed the real nature of interest groupings under a cloud of sentimental rhetoric, so that "pluralist theory became the complete handmaiden of interest-group liberalism . . . much more than laissez-faire economics was ever a handmaiden to big capitalism." (p. 296).

While none of the specific charges in this case is original, the whole is impressive for its scope and coherence. If Hegel was right about the time of day when Minerva's owl takes flight, Lowi's book suggests that liberalism has reached its late afternoon.

Lowi exhibits and supports these assertions in a series of studies on various institutions and policy areas. This, the substantive, empirical part of the book, rests on solid, forceful, and discriminating scholarship. The contrast between "old" and "new" welfare is shown to be a contrast between a program which knew what problems it was coping with and one which conceals confusion under the slogans of experimentalism and participation. Urban renewal and federal housing, under the liberal dispensation, have become obscene caricatures of social justice, fattening the real estate interests, subsidizing the flight of the whites to the suburbs, and institutionalizing a form of apartheid. Blocs of farmers set agricultural policy. The Departments of Commerce and Labor are thoroughly in the grip of their clientele groups.

In all these cases the same process repeats itself. Under the ideology of pluralism, with its faith that the public good emerges from the clash of private interests, public power is parceled out to special interests. Democratic re-

responsibility, general standards of policy, and uniform procedures of administration decline. In their place appears something fearfully similar to the corporate state, where organized and irresponsible interests capture the power to govern and set both the direction and the details of public policy. As the gap between liberal ideals of justice and the realities of organized selfishness widens, more and more people become alienated. The crisis of authority grows, and it will not be stopped by attempts to buy consensus.

After the diagnosis, Lowi bravely offers a cure. What the people want is not bribes and special privileges, but standards of conduct they can live up to established by an "independent and legitimate government" (p. 297) they can respect. Toward this end, he proposes a "radical platform" of "fundamental institutional change." The main planks are (pp. 297-310): stop large and vague delegations of power by restoring the *Schechter* rule; centralize administration and require early and frequent administrative rule-making; foster "a truly independent and integrated administrative class—a Senior Civil Service;" abolish city corporate autonomy; strengthen the federal battery of fiscal regulatory powers and techniques; set a "limit of from five to ten years on the life of every organic act." By such "radical" means would Lowi establish a new political formula, called "Juridical Democracy."

Herbert Croly wrote *The Promise of American Life* sixty years before Lowi wrote *The End of Liberalism*, but *The End* surely fulfills the spirit of *The Promise*. All of Croly's dominant themes are here—from the attack against the special interests, through the assault on the shibboleths of democratic participation, and on to the passion for centralism, efficiency, and the administrative elite: powerful officials directing a powerful government toward the public interest. Both are convinced that reliance on "the people" really means victimization by organized and aggressively selfish elites. And if the people are not at the foundation of political life, then an elite must be at the apex. All that is missing is Croly's nationalist rhetoric.

In sum, while Lowi offers a useful analysis of some of the flaws in the liberal-corporatist regime, his analysis stays well within the assumptions of such a regime, while his prescriptions intensify its most dangerous tendencies. Let me illustrate these contentions.

The crisis of authority is deeper than the New Deal consolidation of 1936-39. It has its roots in the secularism, relativism, and materialism of our time, and it is nourished by the very logics of efficiency, rationality, and centralism which

Lowi applauds. The crisis has long been manifest in the family, religion, educational institutions, and work. Restoration of the *Schechter* rule will be of little help, for the terrors and predicaments of our time are deeper than Lowi's orientation can acknowledge. The United States is already well into a period of conflict over fundamental questions—a period of great politics, in Tocqueville's expression. Lowi's book, by its silences as well as its assertions, still sees our condition as one of little politics, in which interests are the substance of political life and efficient procedures the concern of political thought.

Lowi's prescriptions—basically the rule of law plus great power in the hands of an expert national elite—are as dangerous as the disease. At one point (pp. 158-160), he argues that the American response to crisis situations in foreign affairs is good because "crisis decisions in foreign policy are made by an elite of formal officeholders" who can "act rationally" because they are insulated against political pressures. As examples of "exemplary behavior in crisis" he offers the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift, response to the Korean invasion, the 1956 Arab-Israeli intervention, the Cuban missile crisis, and our response to Dienbienphu in 1954. He might have added Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos. One who can keep his faith in "an elite of formal officeholders" after such decisions is in no danger of ever losing it.

This book, I think, shares the liberal fear of politics and the inability to see that the politics of a free people both depends upon and promises more than a machinery of offices, procedures, statutes, and programs. The centralism, formalism, and elitism recommended throughout the book will not save us, though they may give our fears a restless peace. Nor will the Supreme Court prayed to in the book's last paragraph, though it may give our hopes a mortgaged home.

Despite my uneasinesses with *The End of Liberalism*, the reading of it was an intellectual pleasure. Professor Lowi has written a serious work on an important subject. It deserves to be widely read and discussed. It should open a vigorous conversation among students of American politics.

JOHN H. SCHAAER

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Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics. By ROBERT AXELROD. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 216. \$8.95.)

Conflict—its bases, manifestations, and resolution—is the stuff of politics. Whether as inter-

personal persuasion, competition, or coercion, conflicts over the authoritative distribution of resources and its underlying values define the essence of politics. Professor Robert Axelrod contributes to the formal analysis of this "stuff" in his recent book *Conflict of Interest*. Though his examination is elementary, his treatment of conflict of interest is careful, considered, and eminently readable. More importantly, it is a fine example of the use of careful, formal reasoning in the treatment of an especially relevant topic.

Professor Axelrod's study is useful for a number of reasons. The most glaringly apparent of these is the obvious void it fills. Political scientists are neither ignorant of the importance of conflict in their inquiries nor hesitant to venture into the field to study its various manifestations. However, with the noticeable exception of those interested in game theory and collective decision-making, it does seem that political scientists have devoted a minimal amount of intellectual energy to definitional problems (the magic word, I think, is "conceptualization"). Axelrod begins this task.

In the first part of the book, Axelrod attends to theoretical questions. A simple theme dominates the discussion, namely that "... the amount of conflict of interest in a situation of strategic interaction can be used to predict certain aspects of the behavior of the actors in that situation" (p. 5). In particular, Axelrod argues that conflictual behavior is related to the amount of conflict of interest in a contingency, and that the former may be explained by the latter. Taking conflict of interest to mean incompatibility of the actors' preferences, he suggests a measure of the concept which is independent of measures of the behavior to be explained.

His initial political paradigm is the two-person bargaining game. For this class of games he proposes five properties (axioms) that a measure of conflict of interest should satisfy. Axelrod then proves that one and only one technical definition is consistent with the five properties. The axioms, similar to those found in game theory and information theory, are:

1. Symmetry with respect to the labeling of players
2. Invariance under utility transformations
3. Continuity with respect to the strategic environment
4. Boundedness
5. Additivity

At this point it is useful to ask how a measure such as Axelrod's (and, in effect, the axioms or properties which imply it) might be evaluated. Axioms are funny things and social scientists of-

ten misunderstand their purpose. Axioms are not statements about reality. They are analytical constructs and their empirical content may be irrelevant. The criteria for judging the efficacy of axioms are the degree to which they account for empirical regularities and their fruitfulness in other theoretical enterprises, not their "realism." As to the fruitfulness of Axelrod's axioms in other enterprises, the first four are relatively uncontroversial, although Schelling has occasionally been critical of the first and third. The fifth axiom, additivity, is somewhat more controversial. In essence it asserts that the conflict of interest in a game is the sum of the conflicts of interest in the subgames composing it. The controversial feature of this axiom involves the elimination of strategic interaction among subgames. Although Axelrod acknowledges the restrictiveness of this axiom and seems to be bothered by it, I find it difficult to make a *priori* judgments. The utility of axioms is best determined by the "quality" of their implications. The applications of the conflict of interest measure provide an opportunity to make this evaluation.

The second part of the book, devoted to applications, illustrates the strengths and the weaknesses of the analysis. The applications presented here involve conflict situations in the congressional conference committee, multilevel bureaucracies, electoral competition, and legislative coalition-building. The models he considers are simple, yet they demonstrate the versatility of his index. They also shed light on the suitability of the axioms as defining characteristics of conflict of interest. This is perhaps best illustrated by his treatment of electoral competition in pluralistic democracies.

Professor Axelrod employs the Hotelling-Downs spatial model of electoral competition in order to generalize his conflict-of-interest concept. In the unidimensional version of this model, voters have single-peaked preference functions defined on a policy dimension. Axelrod assumes, unnecessarily I think, that utility loss for a voter is linear with distance from his most-preferred point. Given this arrangement he shows that the conflict of interest between any two voters is proportional to the square of the distance between their most-preferred points. He then defines "conflict of interest in society on a given policy dimension" as "the average conflict of interest between a pair of people, as each one of the pair takes on all the positions in the policy dimension in proportion to the position's frequency in the society" (p. 150). That is, social conflict is defined as a weighted average of dyadic conflicts. With this definition and the earlier result, he proves that "conflict of interest

a society measures exactly the same thing as does the variance of the distribution [of voter most-preferred points]. Hence the concepts may be used interchangeably" (p. 151).

At this point some peculiarities arise. Consider the case of two polarized electorates possessing identical voter distributions. In one electorate each voter's utility function slopes gently in either direction from his most-preferred point. In the second electorate, on the other hand, each voter possesses a very "spiked" utility function. That is, in the former electorate preferences are much less intensely held than in the latter. Intuitively, it would appear that the conflict of interest (and hence conflictual behavior) in the electorate with intense preferences is higher. Yet Axelrod's index assigns equal conflict of interest to each. In my judgment, then, Axelrod's axioms are not complete for they do not discriminate among contingencies with varying intensity.

A second weakness in the index follows as a result of the second axiom. This axiom requires the index to be invariant under utility transformations so that normalized versions of conflict situations may be considered. However, this restriction, desirable for other reasons, does not enable the researcher to discriminate varying saliency. With Axelrod's index conflict of interest may be high in certain issue areas, but conflictual behavior absent because the issues are trivial. On the other hand, an issue area, e.g. gun control legislation, may generate low conflict of interest owing to a large majority on one side of the issue, yet encourage conflictual behavior because of the saliency and intensity of preference of a small minority, e.g. National Rifle Association.

These omissions point to the need for a more complex analysis of conflict. Saliency and intensity are concepts deserving of elaboration. Nonetheless Axelrod's treatment is commendable for steering us back to fundamentals. Conflict, he reminds us, is a function of *expectations about outcomes*. This point is frequently overlooked in the social scientist's concern with process.

Conflict of Interest, as well as other studies of the same genre, convincingly demonstrate the power of formal analysis. The insights (as well as the omissions) should generate a productive dialogue.

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Regionalism in American Politics. IRA SHARKANSKY. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970. Pp. 194. \$9.50.)

In what will unquestionably become a reference point in the literature on regionalism, state politics and policy analysis, Professor Sharkan-

sky employs an impressive assortment of statistical tools to analyze the economic and regional correlates of no less than 61 political and policy variables. Following the contiguity principle, he uses four demarcations to divide the 48 states (Alaska and Hawaii are excluded) into 17 regions. Later in the book, an eighteenth region is added. Three indicators of state economic characteristics are used—per capita personal income, urbanization and total personal income. Professor Sharkansky exhibits an extraordinary amount of courage in embarking on such an unwieldy task in an effort to examine such an elusive concept.

The purpose of the book is to provide answers to four basic questions. The first two questions are closely related. They are:

- 1) How do state politics and public policies of each region differ?
- 2) How consistent are the patterns within each region—that is, what diversities in politics and public policies exist within each region?

The answers provided for these questions, as the author warns, are indeed confusing. In part, the ambiguities in these chapters can be attributed to the complexity of the data. There are, in addition, some interpretive problems.

In Table 3-2 (p. 67), the author compares the intra-regional uniformity of each of the seventeen regions. Coefficients of variability (which measure the magnitude of variation around each regional mean; are used as the measure of uniformity on each of the 61 dependent variables. In this table he lists the region and the number of coefficients of variability in each which were less than 0.1. The author concludes that

... regions tend to be more uniform in their political traits than is the nation as a whole; in the case of every dependent variable, most of the regions show smaller coefficients of variability than does the aggregate of 48 states.

He adds that

for only ten of the 61 variables do more than one-third of the regions show greater diffusion (relative to their means) than the nation as a whole.

These conclusions appear to be very tenuous because the analysis of regional uniformity suggests that there is only a relatively small proportion of the 61 policy variables which can be considered uniform in each of the regions. The most homogeneous region, the Upper Middle West, provides only 15 out of a possible 61 coefficients of variability of less than 0.1. This means that on the remaining 46 variables there was no uniformity within the region. This number drops to 14 for the next most homogeneous

region, the Great Lakes, and then falls off to 11 for the third—the Mountains. The modal number of homogeneous variables for the regions was only 7. Two regions—the South and the Transmississippi—had only 3 variables which met the requirements of uniformity.

These findings would appear to raise questions about the definitions of uniformity and region. Can clusters of states which are uniform on only 3 of 61 variables be considered regions? If so, what does the concept region mean in a political sense? If not, at what point does a geographic cluster of states become a political region? Moreover, this apparent lack of intra-regional uniformity leads one to wonder whether uniformities at least as convincing could be found in random clusters of non-contiguous states. Even more basic is a question whether a priori definitions of region are appropriate.

There are further ambiguities in the research design. The 17 regional groupings are not mutually exclusive, i.e., the same states are included in different groups. For example, the two most homogeneous regions—the Upper Middle West and the Great Lakes—both include the states of Michigan and Wisconsin. The author notes the similarities between these regions. For example, both regions exhibit high voter turnout, intense party competition, relatively high state and local expenditures and a strong reliance on state and local revenues. Question: Is the uniformity in both regions explained by the inclusion of Michigan and Wisconsin in each?

The two regions are then compared and the author concludes that although the regions are very similar, "the Great Lakes states show somewhat less voter turnout and party competition, a lower level of government spending, less reliance on federal aids and better . . . secondary roads" (p. 68). It would appear that such minor differences cannot be explained as regional peculiarities. Clearly, any differences between these two regions can be attributed to only two of the four states in the Upper Middle West and three of the five states which comprise the Great Lakes region. The lack of regional exclusivity raises questions about many of the inter-regional comparisons made throughout the book.

The third question addressed is:

- 3) To what extent do regional traits in politics and policies merely reflect the regional distribution of economic resources among the states?

Professor Sharkansky employs simple and partial correlation analyses, coefficients of multiple determination and three separate analyses of covariance to answer the question. The results of these analyses are reported in two truly formi-

dable tables in chapter 5. In Table 5-2 the coefficients of multiple determination (R^2) indicate that economic measures account for at least half of the *interstate* variation in only four of the 61 dependent variables. Thus he concludes that "large proportions of interstate variation in political traits are not subject to an economic explanation."

In Table 5-3, the analysis of covariance leads to the conclusion that

. . . non-economic features are significantly related to fifty measures of state politics and public policy while controlling for the influence of economic conditions; economic characteristics show significant relationships with 57 measures while controlling for other regional attributes (p. 112).

The use of tests of significance to determine the strength of independent variables creates some ambiguities in the interpretation of this table despite a lengthy footnote warning, in part, that "It is not feasible to make direct comparisons of the correlation coefficients from the right to the left side of [the table]." For example, one questions the value of tests of significance as an interpretive device when correlation coefficients as low as .10 are significant at the .05 level.

The final question addressed is:

- 4) For those regional differences in politics and policies that cannot be traced to current economic characteristics, what other experiences shared by neighboring states provide an explanation for regional peculiarities?

The author uses regression analysis to arrive at estimated regional scores on each dependent variable, given the average economic characteristics of states within each region. When these estimates depart from *actual* values by at least 15 percent on a dependent variable, the author speculates about the non-economic factors within each region which may account for this deviation. As the author suggests, a more thorough investigation of the myriad of non-economic factors which may account for the unexplained variance in regional politics and policy is beyond the scope of the book. This chapter does provide, however, a number of hypotheses worthy of future research.

In a tangential chapter (to the four basic questions raised), the author examines regional change during the twentieth century and concludes that "there appears to be a development toward both greater regionalism and greater nationalization . . ." This chapter, however, does not compare well with the author's interesting subsequent research on "incrementalism" as a factor in policy change.

In part, the book is a bit disappointing because it does not meet the high standards of

Professor Sharkansky's other work. The difficulties in the book which have been suggested in this review should not detract from its overall value as an interesting and innovative scholarly effort. Such difficulties are to be expected as new advances are made in any area of scientific inquiry.

JAMES W. CLARKE

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The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case. BY DAVID B. ABERNETHY. (Stanford: *Stanford University Press*, 1969. Pp. 357. \$10.00.)

In newly developing societies, popular education is highly valued both as an end and a means. As an end-in-itself, education realizes the dormant spirit of a people. As a means, it is their main road to collective development and active participation in the modern world culture.

As Professor Abernethy demonstrates in this impeccably researched study, conducted in southern Nigeria, few peoples surpass the southern Nigerians in their zeal for education as both a measure of cultural pride and an investment in social development. With great resolve and firm faith, the two regional governments of southern Nigeria, at the time of national independence for the Nigerian federation as a whole, were devoting more than 40% of their annual recurrent expenditures to education. The lion's share of this outlay was spent on schemes for universal primary education, resulting in the rapid rise of enrollment from 30% of the school-age population to 75% in less than a decade. Should that extraordinary achievement be criticized? Abernethy's critique should be read because it is as sympathetic to the goals of the Nigerian educational planners as it is realistic in its assessment of their programs.

Briefly, Abernethy contends that southern Nigeria spends too much money on educational objectives of questionable relevance to the needs of that society. Specifically, he shows that universal primary education has been pursued at the expense of more directly productive investments in agriculture, industry, and transportation. This might be justified if the system of education were rationally designed to complement the economy and promote its growth. The case, however, is to the contrary. Nigerian popular education, with its primary and literary emphasis, is more of a consumption item or welfare benefit than a social investment. It fails to produce either an adequate supply of the skills required for rapid economic development or the capacity of citizens to lead satisfying agrarian lives. For countries at the Nigerian level of development, an excessive expenditure of funds on

education may be unwise from the strictly economic point of view. Abernethy reveals a more serious misallocation of funds within the educational systems of southern Nigeria. That misallocation has helped to generate urban unemployment, widespread personal frustration, and political discontent.

It might be argued that the misallocation of resources in this field was a virtually inevitable consequence of the historic relationship between education and religion. Southern Nigeria's school system was conceived and carried on primarily as a mission enterprise. Over the years, these schools have been financed and supported with intense devotion by parishoners. Today, 80% of all primary school students in this area attend church-affiliated schools.

Abernethy's account of educational expansion, involving an analysis of relations between rival mission movements, is masterful. His evidence substantiates Coleman's thesis to the effect that Nigerian nationalism was largely nurtured by the mission school movement. Naturally, nationalism matured with a sturdy belief in the efficacy of familiar forms of education. To a point, the most familiar form—rote literary learning—was fairly consistent with the needs of a commercial colony. Initially, there was an obvious link between primary education and desirable employment. That link was not obviously broken until after the introduction of universal primary education.

When, in the early 1950's, nationalist politicians took control of the school system, their watchword was expansion of opportunity rather than revision of content. In other words, they were pledged to perfect and enlarge an existing system. Furthermore, the cause of popular education suited their claim to govern in the name of democracy. To suggest that these leaders were destined to misallocate their resources because of circumstances that they could not be expected to see objectively, even less alter purposefully, would not go beyond the evidence in this book. Even the movement for secular education served to strengthen the parochial pillars of the inherited system, since the primary goal of expansion put a premium on the expertise and financial solvency of the religious schools.

It should be noted, that the greatest of African educators, in the tradition of Edward W. Blyden, have always been alert to the shortcomings of colonial-style education. In Africa, as elsewhere, the barrier to progressive change is not a lack of social imagination. Abernethy documents the disposition to change, including a widespread desire for technical education for skilled manual work. The chief obstacle to change would appear to be a pattern of interests

that is broadly social in nature, rather than educational or intellectual.

For example, the school system itself is shown to foster the growth of a privileged ruling class. This finding is somewhat paradoxical. It seems that the democratization of primary education has been accompanied by an increasing inequality of opportunity at the point of entry to secondary schools. Government grants-in-aid to secondary schools have actually subsidized the education of those who can afford to pay the relatively high remaining fees required to defray the cost of a good secondary education under existing conditions. As a rule, admission to a secondary grammar school is the key to affluence, newly acquired or enhanced. This matter is discussed cogently in terms of class formation. But the issue of equality is the only one analyzed from that theoretical perspective.

In order to link the educational dilemma with Nigeria's great national crisis, Abernethy resorts to the familiar notion of "political decay," holding, roughly, that runaway mass expectations have lowered resource levels, sapping the capacity of the political system to realize its goals. His overall approach is a composite of functionalism and the idea of "decay," leading to this pithy statement of the dilemma of popular education: "It is both a necessary condition for political development and quite possibly a sufficient condition for political decay." A more venerable language, emphasizing the forces of social change and their fetters, might be preferred and would be consistent with what is said in conclusion about "the creative potential of crisis." Yet this skillful application of various approaches is in itself a noteworthy contribution to the literature of development politics. Indeed, Abernethy has written a basic book, both for students of the relationship between education and development and for students of Nigerian social history. It auspiciously inaugurates a new series of books—the Stanford Studies in Comparative Politics.

RICHARD L. SKLAR

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Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems. EDITED BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON AND CLEMENT H. MOORE. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. Pp. 533. \$12.50.)

The opening thrust of this significant book is a challenge to what Professor Huntington perceives to be the misguided conventional wisdom of the 1960's, the belief that authoritarian governments are about to pass from this earth. Huntington identifies the state of pessimism for the future of authoritarianism and optimism for

the inevitability of democracy with a propensity for glib generalizing about the pluralistic requirements of modernization and the leveling and rationalizing effects of industrialization. These views in turn have led to theories and hopeful expectations about the liberalization of Communism, the "convergence" of the superpowers, and the rapid "development" of all the newly emergent states, all of which when taken together would bring a standardized model of democracy to all societies.

The issue is overdrawn, particularly given the latitude Huntington takes in his definition of authoritarian governments. "To keep things simple, an authoritarian government is defined as a non-democratic one. A democratic government is one whose principal leaders are chosen at regular intervals through competitive elections in which the bulk of the adult population has the opportunity to participate." With such a definition authoritarianism might have little to do with repressive government and could include everything from bungling, incompetent and ineffectual regimes, to the rule of benign technocrats dedicated to populist values.

In actual fact, however, neither the issue of historical trends nor of the proper definition of authoritarian government are of great importance because the focus of Huntington's introduction and the book as a whole is less on the concept of authoritarianism and more on the character of established one-party systems; that is, the book deals more with its subtitle than its main title.

Personally I found Huntington's initial essay a brilliant and at times dazzling exercise in classifying and distinguishing all conceivable types of one-party systems. Although tightly reasoned and rigorously disciplined, his typologies are not merely the products of semantics and logic but rest instead upon very provocative and penetrating empirical propositions about the relationship between social and class divisions and types of one-party systems. By making the important distinction between "revolutionary" and "exclusionary" one-party systems he demonstrates that internal transformations can come to revolutionary systems without necessarily bringing an end to one-party rule. Huntington outlines the sequential process of "transformation," "consolidation," and "adaptation" that produces the "established one-party system."

Although Huntington is careful not to overstate the advantages of "established one-party" systems for accelerating modernization and development, he recognizes the utility of what he considers to be the key characteristics of such systems for effective development. His list of

characteristics again raises the question of the appropriateness of his label of authoritarian government. In his view such regimes stress pragmatism rather than ideology, have oligarchical and bureaucratic rather than charismatic and autocratic leadership, are prone to give initiative for change to a relatively dispersed technocratic and managerial elite, accept the role of interest groups and of intellectuals who may criticize governmental performance. Given these characteristics as the substance of Huntington's expectations of what one-party rule is likely to end up as, it is apparent that he is considerably more optimistic about benign trends than he wants to admit. But again let us repeat that it is important to ignore semantic issues and recognize Huntington's great analytical powers.

Professor Moore's introductory chapter is also an impressive essay that focuses on the problem of legitimacy and ideology in one-party systems. Nearly every sentence reflects detailed familiarity with a wide variety of times and places, and comparison reaches the point at which the reader must mentally jump in the same sentence from Liberia to Virginia, from Turkey to Mexico, from Spain and Portugal to the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

Moore seeks to bring order to the variety of single-party ideologies by using a four-fold typology which distinguishes *functions* of ideologies as being either instrumental or expressive and *goals* as being either the total transformation or a partial transformation of the society. Personally I find it extremely difficult in practice to judge whether an ideology is more instrumental or expressive. Can one, for example, really say that the Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung provide instrumental guidance for policy, or that even the earlier Chinese Communist doctrines contained the qualities of a blue-print for action? Similarly I am not sure that we are on very solid ground by saying that ideologically Fascism was more expressive and Naziism more instrumental.

I find more useful Moore's argument that the legitimizing force of one-party ideologies stems from different mixes of three basic dimensions contained in all ideologies: the chiliastic or shared myths, the tutelary or agreed goals, and the administrative or procedural traditions.

As a reviewer I am distressed with the difficulty of doing justice to a symposium volume in which the editors present the general introduction and conclusions and a group of very distinguished scholars provide rich and highly competent country case studies as the bulk of the book. Limitation of space means that it is hardly possible to identify, to say nothing of evaluating, the separate chapters, but I do feel

that the minimum requirements of justice demand the recognition that all the authors have made valuable theoretical, and not just descriptive, contributions.

Hugh Douglas Price has done the near impossible by brilliantly compressing existing knowledge about one-party state systems in the United States into a few pages while delineating historical trends. Henry Bienen effectively criticizes early theories about one-party systems in Africa, and arrives at the conclusion that they should be largely understood as analogous to "machine politics" in urban America. Out of his deep knowledge of the workings of Franco's Spain, derived from both personal experience and scholarly study, Juan Linz has produced a rare document on the social dynamics and the intellectual arguments that produced the shift from Falange to Movimiento-Organizacion in Franco's Spain.

Carl J. Fredrich's data-filled summary of the characteristics of Hitler's Germany, and Andrew C. Janos' review of one-party systems in Eastern Europe between the wars provide valuable historical perspectives on the sources of one-party rule. Jeremy Azrael makes a significant addition to the already large body of literature on the internal dynamics of the Russian party and James R. Townsend has done a solid and highly original evaluation of the effects of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party. Clement Moore's substantive contribution on the institutionalization of the Tunisian single-party system is a model blending of theory and historical analysis.

The book also contains three impressive and indeed ingenious comparative chapters: Giorgio Germani on the political socialization of youth in both Italy and Spain, Ergun Özbudun on democratization in Mexico and Turkey, and most unconventional of all, Melvin Croan's imaginative use of Mexico as a model for speculating on the future of East Europe. Although much was once written about the Kuomintang when it was a force on the Mainland of China, Hung-chao Tai has made a distinct contribution by reviewing its current role in modernizing Taiwan.

In an era when in a great variety of situations authorities are beleaguered and governments are increasingly beset with crises of authority, it is useful to be reminded that so much of contemporary history has been dominated by either weak or strong one-party systems. The topic is significant and students of comparative politics will find in this book more challenging empirical propositions than in any book in recent years.

LUCIAN W. PYE

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Political Socialization and Student Activism in Indonesia. BY STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970. Pp. 228. \$7.95.)

The unprecedented intensity of student involvement in politics has generated a growing body of literature concerned with analyzing student political behavior in the United States. But the inherent emotive force and contemporary nature of the phenomenon has made it exceedingly difficult for the political scientist to engage in systematic and long term studies of an increasing significant group within the political process.

It is therefore refreshing to note the publication of a book which aptly demonstrates that a basic intellectual dividend may be derived from comparative studies—perspective. Stephen A. Douglas' *Political Socialization and Student Activism in Indonesia* not only provides the reader with an opportunity to examine the role of an emerging political force within a remarkable country, but perhaps more significantly gives us the opportunity to develop insights into the role of a restive domestic student generation. It is of course difficult to draw distinct parallels between the Indonesian student and his American counterpart, but comparisons can be made. In Indonesia, we see the conversion of the outwardly apolitical student population under the period of "Guided Democracy," being transformed into a political force that helped to oust the old regime as symbolized by the fall of President Sukarno in the wake of "The Untung Coup." In contrast, in the United States, the full cycle from political awareness, to political action, to political power has yet to take place. The rise of the Indonesian "Generation of 66" therefore may ultimately represent a model for student activism that may be actualized in this country. An understanding of the course of youthful involvement in the archipelago ultimately not only offers explanations for the conditions that create activism but may also underscore the problems a student political culture encounters once its initial goals have been realized.

Mr. Douglas' study is the product of an extended investigation. His initial research was conducted in the Republic from 1963-65. In the summer of 1967 he returned to reassess the student political perspective under the Suharto Government.

The author has systematically sampled the attitudes of Indonesian students by engaging in extensive interviewing. In 1964-65 he conducted 116 "usable" interviews "of which 80 were university students and the remainder high school students." "The post-coup interviews obtained

in 1967 included 82 university students and no high school students." (p. 22) While one can contend that the author's statistical sample is too limited, it should be recognized that he did not attempt to survey national student opinion but the opinion of the student population of the capitol on "the assumption that Jakarta students effectively control the policy position of the national student movement . . ." (p. 21). The author therefore infers that the elitist character of Indonesian politics is carried over to the realm of student activism. This assumption is questionable especially when one considers the massive degree of mobilization that took place throughout rural Indonesia in the form of an anti-P.K.I. campaign in the period of reaction that followed the "30th of September Movement." It should also be noted that Mr. Douglas has not clearly indicated how many individuals in the 1965 sample were reinterviewed in 1967. While the inherent difficulties in attempting a follow-up study of a rapidly changing student generation is appreciated, the utilization of different samples impinges upon the author's capacity to effectively analyze changes in attitudes. If we assume that the 1965 and 1967 samples reflected the beliefs of two distinct generations, one can accept the comparison. But, many of the apolitical students of 1965 were individually transformed into members of the politicized movement that emerged after the attempted coup.

Mr. Douglas suggests that the changes in attitudes and action on the part of the Jakarta student population were the product of the divergent political socialization process in the Republic. He demonstrates how the various agencies of socialization acted and interacted to create the students' perception of an Indonesian political universe.

In pursuing the study, the author specifically examines how the family, the educational system and the mass media have served to reflect and reinforce the fragmented Indonesian political culture.

Mr. Douglas contends that the "loose" structure of the family and the impact of social change has reduced the capacity of this primary unit to condition political attitudes. Nevertheless, Douglas suggests that the lack of participation by children in the family decision-making process may have helped to inhibit students from entering politics. He also notes that the contradictory role of the father ("ritualized patterns of defense to authority") (p. 35), may help to explain why the younger generation accepted *Pak* (Father) Sukarno, even while they disagreed with his policies. Finally the author suggests that the families preoccupation with

controlling and internalizing emotion has led to a wide variety of mental disorders. One can maintain that the massive violence that took place after the coup attempt represented the collective release of deeply held frustrations that could no longer be maintained. The author however is careful not to carry his assumptions too far by noting that "psychoanalytic theory . . . is both especially subject to dispute and especially difficult to test empirically (p. 39).

In his investigation on the role of education, the relationship between agent and action can be more tightly drawn since the author is dealing with the highly organized, specialized and limited institutions of the formal educational process. His conclusion that the *Indoktrinasi* (civics) classes tended to alienate students rather than instill loyalty in the Sukarno regime has direct implications on the role and method of conducting introductory courses on politics in our country which should not be ignored. The charges leveled at civics education in Indonesia bear a strong resemblance to the debates surrounding the development of political science curriculum in the United States.

In completing his study of socialization, Mr. Douglas argues convincingly that it was the mass media which was the prime conditioner to the actualization of student involvement in the post-coup period. Mr. Douglas ably demonstrates how the discontinuity between the call for national unity and the intensive partisan competition that characterized the Jakarta press was not ignored by a student population which read the papers not only as a source of information, but as one of the limited forms of entertainment open to individuals of college age. While there are those who would suggest in contrast that it is the alleged uniformity of television that has stimulated domestic violence, the similarity between the Indonesian and American experience is readily apparent. The mass media in any form is increasingly becoming a leading agent for primary political socialization.

In the final analysis, the parallel between the Indonesian and American experience in student activism is most closely drawn in the author's chapter dealing with the creation of a new student political subculture in the Republic. The author contends that the future of Indonesia may ultimately be stated in terms of the capacity of "the Generation of 66" to channel its newfound identity to meet the enduring problems of a nation in permanent crisis. The activists at the University of Indonesia must now face the challenge of developing a shared national purpose or face the alternative of becoming a fragmented group that can again be readily manipulated by and become an adjunct to the adult political

world. At Kent State and Columbia, Drew University or Beloit, an American student population is now facing a similar choice. Will the emergence of a political consciousness degenerate into an empty series of polemics, or will a new awareness create a model of political ideals and action that the political community will have to recognize?

STEPHEN SLOAN

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Sociologists, Economists and Democracy. By BRIAN BARRY. (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1970. Pp. 202.)

Books which concisely summarize bodies of scholarly work and which provide in addition useful criticism of that work are probably less frequent than is desirable in political science. Brian Barry's book, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy*, accomplishes both these tasks in truly masterful fashion for limited features of contemporary political analysis stemming from the work of Anthony Downs on the one hand and that of Talcott Parsons on the other. The book is not a general review of all that might be conveniently classified under these origins but rather is a highly selective treatment of the ways in which three political problems are treated in the two traditions. The problems which provide the central organizing scheme are party competition, political participation, and conditions for the maintenance of democratic political systems. This book is must reading for all graduate students, good advanced undergraduates, and all political scientists who care about systematic argument and its relation to systematic evidence.

Barry's analysis of the two traditions is selective. For example, he disposes of Riker's *Theory of Political Coalitions* in a footnote while treating one of Riker's articles more extensively. In the economic tradition there are, in Barry's judgement, two authors of books worth discussing for their theoretical relevance—Downs and Mancur Olson. For authors in the sociological tradition he is somewhat more generous although the inclusion of a larger number of authors is clearly not meant to suggest a higher appraisal of the merit of their work. The joint work of Almond and Verba in the *Civic Culture* is treated rather summarily as is the writing of Harry Eckstein on Norway and democratic stability. S. M. Lipset receives somewhat more space and Parsons himself is given the most extensive discussion. Selectivity in problems and theorists allows selectivity in the systematic evidence employed to help assess the theories. By far the most important source of additional evidence is that drawn from various studies of vot-

ing which Barry puts against the theories with insight and telling effect.

The principal virtue of economic theories according to Barry is that they in fact provide deductive structures. Indeed, he sees the deductive structure of economic theories as the feature which primarily distinguishes them from the sociological theories he considers. This distinction, however, undoubtedly rests on the particular choice of sociological tradition and thus by nuance, if not by direct assertion and fair implication, Barry suggests that sociological theories are not deductive. He shows that Parsons is on record essentially to that effect but thus he overemphasizes the extent to which the Parsonian view of the possibilities for deductive theory in the social sciences is shared by scholars reasonably classified as being within that tradition.

The virtue of deductive power does not preserve the economic theorists from criticism. His most important criticism here is the most common which Barry presents as: "Obviously, the constant danger of 'economic' theories is that they can come to 'explain' everything merely by redescribing it. They then fail to be any use in predicting that one thing will happen rather than another." (p. 33) Barry uses this line of argument sparingly but he is continually sensitive to the important consideration that reasonable a priori deductions are necessary if an economic theory is to have any "teeth."

The general plan of the book is to treat specific arguments of specific authors on specific problems. The result is a powerful critique. The inevitable associated problem is that some will cry "foul" and others "totally misunderstood" and still others "see?" None of these responses is appropriate for Barry's critique is a genuine effort to advance the cause of theory relevant to evidence, in short, to our knowledge of politics. To misread the book, i.e., to take it as polemic, would be a serious error but nevertheless one which is likely to be frequent for no author and no work that is seriously discussed escapes often sharp criticism. In spite of the general spreading around of criticism the economic theorists make out somewhat better at Barry's hands than do the sociologists. One of Barry's concluding sentences is revealing in this regard: "The books of Downs and Olson, plus a handful of articles, really do exhaust the field of worthwhile attempts to get from general premises to substantive political conclusions." (pp. 182-183) That is strong language. His concluding criticism of the whole enterprise of empirically oriented theory in political science is that it is woefully underdeveloped with a correspondingly limited literature. Barry's suggested remedy, banal as he

notes, is more but better. Given the generally critical tone of the book this is an optimistic conclusion.

One important consequence for readers of Barry's book is that it will probably disabuse them of the notion that economic theories of politics are all deductively rigorous. Furthermore, they will find that much of what is worth knowing about these theories can be presented and discussed in English. It remains true, however, that familiarity with Downs, Olson, and (some) Parsons is a minimum background for reading the book with profit. It is written for those who know the arguments and require only a refresher course rather than for those who seek a "pony" on contemporary empirically oriented political theory.

The book is written with grace and wit. It is evident that Barry reads carefully (by implication he suggests some scholars do not) and it is equally clear that Barry is as capable of close argument as the best of the theorists he critiques. An additional virtue of the work is that it is anchored in history. Although very little space is devoted to historical roots, enough is said to place Barry's analysis, as well as the sociological and economic theorists, in a tradition. This book is short, perhaps too short, but it is meaty and it deserves to be (very carefully) read by political scientists.

JOHN SPRAGUE

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The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment. BY CHARLES E. LINDBLOM. (New York: The Free Press, 1965. Pp. 335. \$7.95.)

The Policy-Making Process. BY CHARLES E. LINDBLOM. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1908. Pp. 118. \$2.25.)

Professor Lindblom has written these books to fulfill different functions. *The Intelligence of Democracy* is a theoretical monograph which builds upon the exposition of decision-making as a strategy of disjointed incrementalism developed by Lindblom and Braybrooke in *A Strategy of Decision*.¹ *The Policy-Making Process* is an introductory text in which Lindblom outlines the institutional behavior patterns and analytic tools which characterize "the play of power" in the policy-making process. *The Policy-Making Process* is not a new stage in Lindblom's evolving argument, but rather a summary of the empirical and normative conclusions he and his collaborators have reached in earlier work. Therefore, we will concentrate upon *The Intelligence*

¹ D. Braybrooke and C. E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York, Free Press, 1963).

of *Democracy* and its contribution to the corpus of Lindblom's work.

Lindblom's broad objective in this book is "to undertake a systematic comparative analysis of centrality and partisan mutual adjustment among various kinds of political officials and leaders as competing methods for rational coordination of governmental decisions . . ." (p. 9). Lindblom defines coordination of a set of decisions as adjustments through which "adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions in the set are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or outweighed" (p. 154). Lindblom defines centrality as a process through which one decision-maker, in a set of decision-makers, has a symmetric, dominating, control relationship with every other member of the set, and who uses this relationship to adapt, or coordinate, the decisions of that set (p. 105). He defines partisan mutual adjustment as the various adaptive or manipulated processes through which interdependent, partisan decision-makers can coordinate with each other "without anyone's coordinating them, without a dominant common purpose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relations to each other" (p. 3). Partisan mutual adjustment produces coordination as a byproduct of ordinary decisions, not as a specialized subset of "coordinating" decisions through a central coordinating mechanism. Thus, for partisan mutual adjustment, the study of coordinating devices becomes coextensive with the study of policy-making itself (p. 9).

Such policy-making through partisan mutual adjustment is characterized by the absence of cooperation among decision makers: by the absence of common objectives, agreed-upon application of values to concrete decisions, or agreed-upon criteria to govern mutual adjustments (pp. 28-9, 106, 132). Instead, partisan mutual adjustment is the set of processes through which *partisan* policy-makers advocate and pursue their specialized interests according to a strategy of disjointed incrementalism, the policy-making strategy Lindblom developed in earlier works.² Values which an advocate for any given interest

neglects are typically "mopped up" by advocates of the neglected values. Lindblom's empirical conclusion is that partisan mutual adjustment pursued through the strategy of disjointed incrementalism characterizes the policy-making behavior of all major political institutions in democratic, polyarchal systems in situations of complex policy choice (Chap. 6 and pp. 151, 160-1).

Lindblom's formulations of the processes of partisan mutual adjustment and the strategy of disjointed incrementalism have, under the collective term incrementalism, become a major benchmark in the policy sciences. Incrementalism constitutes an interrelated set of empirical hypotheses about the role structures and rules of the game through which policy-makers perceive their environment and pursue their policy goals. Most policy scientists would agree that many policy-makers do in fact operate through such processes and according to such strategies, and that Lindblom has made a significant contribution in developing an empirical theory of great explanatory power.

The evaluative, or normative implications of Lindblom's work are more controversial. Lindblom treats incrementalism as one polar conceptualization of the policy-making process, in contrast with various central-coordinating, rational-comprehensive, or synoptic techniques such as planning-programming, budgeting or systems analysis.³ What is at issue between Lindblom and the critics of incrementalism are his treatment of these two conceptualizations as polar and largely irreconcilable, and his conclusion that incrementalism is likely to produce better decisions than does synoptic decision-making.

Lindblom moves towards this evaluative conclusion in two stages. First, he argues that in situations of complex policy choice, synoptic problem-solving is impossible, given the underlying heterogeneity of value preferences (pp. 168, 286). Intellectual capabilities, information, and monetary resources are all insufficient for the task. Values are either conflicting or unknown. Finally, a definite policy solution is unlikely due to the interrelationship of fact and value, the open-endedness of values and policy alternatives in a technologically dynamic society, and the on-

² According to the strategy of disjointed incrementalism, policy-makers compare and evaluate only increments of policies at the margin. They consider a restricted number of policy alternatives and consequences for any given policy alternative. They engage in constant readjustment of ends and means, returning frequently, or serially, to the same problem. Finally, they concentrate on remedial changes in social ills rather than on the pursuit of a well-defined future state (pp. 143-8).

³ The synoptic method, by Lindblom's definition, is a comprehensive method of decision-making which requires: identification and ordering of the objectives and values being sought; a comprehensive survey of alternative means of achieving those values; an exhaustive examination of the consequences of each alternative; and, finally, the choice of an alternative policy that will achieve a maximum, or at least an acceptable amount of the values sought (pp. 137-8).

going nature of policy disputes (pp. 138-149). Thus, Lindblom concludes that since synoptic policy analysis is empirically impossible, it is also normatively irrelevant in situations of complex policy choice. If synoptic, central coordination cannot be used to resolve policy choices, it cannot be as good as the formalized "pulling and hauling" of policy-making through partisan mutual adjustment.

Having made this negative case against synoptic analysis, Lindblom then suggests certain positive attributes of incrementalism which promote "calculated, reasonable, rational, intelligent, wise—the exact term does not matter—policy making" (p. 294).

First, conflicting values in society are protected through partisan mutual adjustments by their advocates, so that no consequence adverse to one value will be ignored. In addition, the large number of advocates provides the policy-making process with energy, intelligence and skill, ensuring a thorough clarification and defense of relevant values. Thus, any value advocated by even a small group will be weighted in the policy-making process. Moreover, the more widely and intensely held the value, the greater the weight it will receive. Such representation of values through partisan mutual adjustment is in contrast to synoptic analysis which cannot exhaustively review all relevant values, thereby necessarily ignoring some (pp. 140, 151).

Second, partisan mutual adjustment promotes agreement on both values and policy since partisan policy-makers are highly motivated to achieve their own values. Hence they are willing to accept moderate, open-ended decisions. Such compromises in turn actually form new, widely shared values, reconciling previously conflicting interests through persuasion, alliance-building, bargaining, compensation and the like (p. 206).

Thus, Lindblom argues that incrementalism, unlike synoptic analysis, successfully maximizes the skills and information available to the policy-making process, reconciles values, and arrives at policy decisions, albeit tentative and on-going ones. In summary,

the synoptic idea of problem solving is fairly straightforward. To solve a problem one must first understand it—one masters it. In contrast, behind the incremental and disjointed tactics . . . is a concept of problem solving as a strategy. In this view, public policy problems are too complex to be well understood, too complex to be mastered. One develops a strategy to cope with problems, not to solve them (p. 148).

It appears to this reviewer that Lindblom is evaluating incrementalism and synoptic analysis according to different standards. Most policy scientists would agree that synoptic analysis

cannot "solve" complex policy choices in any final way, just as, by definition, incrementalism cannot. Any suggestion that synoptic analysis can "solve" such choices is tantamount to a "straw man" argument. Important social choices at a high level of value aggregation must be made through political processes which resemble partisan mutual adjustment and the strategy of disjointed incrementalism.⁴

Synoptic analysis can, however, serve as an adjunct to incrementalism and, in important ways, improve the ability of policy-makers to cope with problems. In comparing partisan mutual adjustment and PPB, for example, Charles Schultze has remarked:

No one conceives of PPB as a system that makes decisions. Rather, it is a means of helping responsible officials make decisions. It is not a mechanical substitute for the good judgement, political wisdom, and the leadership of those officials. The question at issue is *not* how the PPB can supplant the political process but whether and how it can fit into that process.⁵

Lindblom, in concluding that synoptic analysis cannot solve problems but that incrementalism can cope with problems unnecessarily accepts some important disadvantages of incrementalism and fails to recognize important advantages of synoptic analysis in coping with complex policy choice. The critics of incrementalism argue, on the other hand, that in certain cases biases inherent in incrementalism can be compensated for by systematic analysis. We shall conclude this review by citing four such cases.

First, we cannot assume that the advocacy process underlying incrementalism always brings out the information about program inputs and outputs necessary to an informed decision. As Charles Schultze has convincingly argued, contemporary policy-making is often so technically complex that decision-makers cannot directly and/or intuitively evaluate program proposals in terms of political values. Program inputs in such technically complex policy areas must be translated into policy outputs before the values they serve can be evaluated.⁶

Second, incrementalism may be subject to organizational bias. Lindblom states that if incrementalism is to operate in a normatively acceptable fashion, special social conditions must obtain. There must be many partisan decision-makers with a great variety of attitudes and interests, so that no important social value is ne-

⁴ C. L. Schultze, *The Politics and Economics of Public Spending* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 74-5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-4.

lected (p. 151). Lindblom enjoins us not to confuse the processes of partisan mutual adjustment generally with a particular distribution of weights among specific interests in any given process of partisan mutual adjustment (p. 245). Further, Lindblom suggests that the appropriate corrective for a biased distribution of weights in the policy-making process is an alternate distribution of power among the participants.

There are, however, frequently situations in which the structure of interests permits only limited values to be represented and constitutes an ongoing organizational bias against alternate distributions of power. Since specialized bureaucracies consistently initiate policy, and unorganized, apolitical, or poor interests consistently lack well-established access to the policy-making process, such organizational bias frequently prevails and excludes the consideration of certain political values and policy alternatives. In such cases, incrementalism may consistently serve interests closely related to the status quo, and consider only proposals for moderate change moving towards a Pareto optimum rather than radical changes which may require redistribution of values. Furthermore, due to differential access, the corrective Lindblom advocates may well be impossible in the short-run and extremely costly and difficult in the longer run.

Third, Lindblom argues that remedial and serial policy-making can cope with emerging problems.

In short, if decision making is remedial and serial, anticipated adverse consequences of any given policy can often be better dealt with if regarded as few and separate problems than if regarded as aspects of an existing problem. And unanticipated adverse consequences can often be better guarded against by waiting for their emergence than by often futile attempts to anticipate every contingency as required in synoptic problem solving (pp. 50-1).

There are cases, however, in which such serial and remedial decision-making might cumulatively skew the policy output. Synoptic analysis might, on the other hand, produce different policy outputs and thus be an appropriate aid to rational decision-making.

To cite only one example, consider the extremely specialized policy process which determined the escalation of US involvement in Vietnam in 1964-1965. Adam Yarmolinsky has observed the disadvantages connected with the remedial, serial incremental counterforce policy which was pursued in this period compared with the putative advantages of a more synoptic analysis.

It is easy to justify an escalating intervention

by pointing out that you are only matching force with force and greater force with greater force. . . . In each case the use of force to counter force may be justifiable in reciprocal terms, as seen by the person initiating the counterforce, but in human terms it may only result in avoidable tragedy. . . . If the question is asked whether previous events justify the use of force in response, one may be tempted to reply in the affirmative; but if the question is put, rather, as to whether the alternative involving the use of force is the best one available in light of all the facts and circumstances, the answer may be quite different. And if the question of alternatives is raised, not only at the outset of a course of action involving the use of force, but at every stage of potential escalation as well, it may result in a process of involvement that will indeed be more cautious and more controlled than some of our recent involvements in other countries' problems.⁷

The incremental analysis of disaggregated aspects of emerging problems may, in other words, cumulatively create a policy which might be rejected if, at any stage of the policy-making process, that output were systematically compared with alternative policies.

Fourth, in some cases synoptic analysis may produce more and/or better values than incrementalism, in contrast to Lindblom's argument that incrementalism typically produces normatively good, consensual values. In the 1954 RAND study of overseas bases, for example, systematic analysis "discovered" a new value for which there had been no initial support in the advocacy process. The study originated as a logistics exercise to determine an efficient method of basing and fueling the strategic bombing force. It became apparent early in the analysis, however, that the available policy alternatives were extremely sensitive to the order of nuclear strike: that is, all were significantly less effective if the USSR struck first. Therefore, the objective of the analysis was transmuted into that of reducing the vulnerability of SAC to a Soviet first strike. The analysis, in effect, "discovered" the new value of strategic invulnerability.⁸ In policy areas characterized by rapid technological change, such as nuclear weaponry or space, such synoptic analysis may be particularly needed to compensate for the status quo bias of incremental policy alternatives.

In conclusion, the critics of incrementalism are concerned that as social scientists, we do not view a policy as normatively acceptable simply

⁷ R. M. Pfeffer (ed.). *No More Vietnam?* (New York, Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 107-8.

⁸ See E. S. Quade (ed.), *Analysis for Military Decisions* (Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1964), Chap. 3.

because the processes of incrementalism have arrived at it. According to Lindblom, such a consensual policy *ipso facto* constitutes a normatively good policy since it has mustered widespread agreement and is presumably a Pareto Optimum. Alternatively, the critics argue that although consensus may be a necessary condition of good policy, it surely is not a sufficient condition.

Moreover, the critics of incrementalism are concerned with pushing out the limits of effective systematic analysis rather than with em-

phasizing, as does Lindblom, its limitations. In an admittedly complex universe, the systematic analyst as well as the incrementalist recognize that the universe is too complex to completely understand. The systematic analyst, however, wants to give up later rather than sooner.⁹

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⁹ See Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 37. But see C. F. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 27.

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Law, Society, and Industrial Justice. BY PHILIP SELZNICK WITH THE COLLABORATION OF PHILIPPE NONET AND HOWARD M. VOLLMER. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969. Pp. 282. \$7.00.)

This is a contribution, brilliant and substantial, to the literature on private government. Specifically it deals with employee disciplinary and grievance procedures. (Selznick is a sociologist interested in the sociology of law and of law-touched phenomena.)

The book reports some empirical studies of employee attitudes, presents a sociological analysis of personnel government, and surveys much of the relevant social science and legal literature. But its core lies in its theoretical claims.

Analysis begins with the evolution of the legal ideas, and of what the authors call moral ideas, relevant to the subject. "Moral evolution" is a somewhat unfashionable phrase, but it can usefully denote the progressive clarification of human ideals, and the enlargement of institutional competence to serve them. Our concern is with a special ideal—the rule of law—and its extension to the conditions of employment in modern industry." P. 1. The context is "the embodiment of ideals in institutions, the infusion of group life with the aspirations and constraints of a moral order." P. 1. The law of the work-place is a strategic point at which to make inquiry.

Law to the authors is generic, not uniquely associated with the state; its gist is not simply coercion but social control through formal authority and rule-making. Further, law properly conceived contains an ideal element; it is a realm of value, and we rightly "distinguish a developed legal order from a system of subordination to naked power." P. 11. It and legality root in rationality, in the progressive reduction of arbitrariness. Still further, legality, as rationality and reduction of arbitrariness, has affinities with the ideal of political

democracy in treatment of the civic participant, in emphasis on constraints on power, and emphasis on participation.

As to moral evolution, the authors see, from Durkheim, Weber, Piaget and others, a tendency toward the possible development of a morality of cooperation—of linked specialization, so to speak—in evolving societies as distinguished from more primitive or traditional moralities of constraint. This in turn fosters rationality.

The two, legality and the morality of cooperation, are emergent social phenomena neither accidental nor matters of subjective preference, and are strongly congruent with each other, the second playing a large role in the development of the first. But legality, under the impulse of the two moralities and a developing society, is not a static affair of rules. Rather it is an affair of evolving doctrines. And the line between the legal and the political is progressively blurred as its ideals are absorbed into the political order. In the end law merges into polity, as the criteria of legitimacy extend and deepen.

There is of course nothing inevitable about this evolution. There are latent values, as seen by normative theories of law. But there are also the insights of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence; law is also a becoming, driven by needs and conditioned by circumstances.

To bring all this to bear on private government requires a law of associations. "To extend the rule of law is to build it firmly into the life of society, to make the master ideal of legality a true governor of official conduct. If this is to come about, political and legal theory must lend a hand. It can do so by fashioning concepts and doctrines to bridge the gap between new social realities and the received legal tradition." P. 35. This is the next problem.

Here the doctrinal (less so the conceptual) re-

sources of law are rich; the authors' contribution, a large one, is rethinking and reorganizing. It is in two stages, a critical one early in the book and a creative one at the end.

In the first they deal with these resources, with the values and weaknesses of pluralist thought as a means of rationalizing the legal materials, and with the sociological character of the institutions that generate private government. A crucial assertion is that we may want to see the institution "as a potential body politic, as a legal order struggling to be born." P. 52. There is a distance to go. Classic views of the corporation are inadequate as theory and as pictures of reality. There are tensions between the premises of the law of contract and an adequate treatment of association. So also for the law of property, another possibility. A reconstruction of the whole theory of organizational authority, and of the association's entire inner order, in the light of sound public policy is required. This the authors essay in their final chapter, "Private Groups and the Law of Governance."

They pose the problem as that of how to extend, *mutatis mutandis*, to private organizations the ideals and techniques available in public law for doing justice without destroying workability.

They begin by decisively undermining the distinction, sharpened by nineteenth century liberalism's separation of state and society, between private and public law; when they are done, the resources of public law are available for extending legality to private government, a central analytic tool being enlargement of the meanings of citizenship and civic participation under the sign of the theory of emergent polity.

This done, the concept, broadly perceived, of due process as the positive law of legality, as the law of governance in general, comes to bear. "Thus, as a public-law idea giving definite form and substance to legality . . . due process may help us find a way to extend the rule of law to areas hitherto controlled only by concepts of private law." P. 250.

But if there is such a law of governance to what should it be applied? The authors' answer is broad: whenever the nature of the association and its members' relationships to it create, or in justice or practicality require to be created, the private equivalent of citizenship.—WINSTON M. FISK, *Claremont Men's College*.

The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes. BY AMITAI ETZIONI. (New York: The Free Press, 1968. Pp. 671.)

Alvin Gouldner, in his recent book *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (Basic Books, 1970), argues that "the central locus of the tension in functional theory is in its ways of dealing, or not dealing, with social change. Functionalism's drift

toward a convergence with Marxism is an effort to cope with the tensions it feels in this intellectual area, as well as an indication of the mounting crisis it is undergoing." Amitai Etzioni's *The Active Society* is a major work marking the leftward drift of American sociology and like Ralf Dahrendorf's *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, also part of the drift toward Marxism, it has been vigorously attacked by the Marxists and by the declining functional school as well.

The active society is a future state, the detailed definition of which provides the normative and transcendental basis of an approach to social problems which Etzioni labels "societal guidance." As Etzioni indicates in a companion text (*Societal Guidance*, Crowell, 1969), societal guidance is a theoretical framework for societal efforts to treat social problems. As such it is opposed to sociologies which revolve around questions of social origins, genetic patterns, or functional consequences. It may also be contrasted with aggregative approaches to social order, such as those embodied in the economic full competition model or the veto group analysis of national politics. It represents a departure from homeostatic systems analyses and from various voluntaristic conceptions of history, as embodied in rationalistic game theory or implied in Marxism-Leninism. Political scientists will find its critique of pluralistic decision-making analysis of the Dahl and Lindblom varieties equally important challenges to prevailing doctrine.

It is from the explicit opposition of societal guidance to these alternative methodologies that Etzioni derives his subtitle, "A Theory of Societal and Political Processes" and his claim to advance foundations for a new theory of macroscopic action. That the scholastic jargon in which Etzioni indulges at length separates the reader from the American experience, as one critic has charged, should not obscure the importance of the attempt to define a consistent theory of political process intermediate between functionalism and Marxism.

No review can do justice to the intricate argument that Etzioni has constructed at enormously greater length. In general, however, Etzioni argues that in the modern and "post-modern" (an unfortunate term) phase, an active orientation, marked by self-knowledge, commitment, and access to power, is developing and that just as the first social revolution led to corporate organization, so a second social revolution will generate a higher level of social guidance organizations, characterized by high degree of control over social assets and power and by high responsiveness to basic human needs: the active society.

Etzioni discusses how types of action may be differentiated by the degree to which they are subject to control processes, the basic elements of

which are knowledge, commitment, and power (in turn divided into violent-coercive, material-utilitarian, and symbolic-normative types). Power and societal control, while rooted in the stratification system, involve man's capacity for symbolization and transcendence (pulling oneself into a projected future). In this sense Etzioni sees a basic unity between idealism and materialism.

Etzioni then goes on to critique approaches which seek to explain the variance in social phenomena on the basis of subsocietal units like individual roles or the behavior of small groups. This is followed by a lengthy criticism of the aggregative theories, such as balance of power models of international relations and other approaches interpreting the societal state as the sum of individual actors; collectivist or system approaches, which interpret the societal state as a gestalt; voluntaristic approaches, which assume that man can restructure society. Etzioni then sets forth an alternative, the theory of societal guidance, integrating collectivist and voluntaristic elements. The language of social guidance analysis focuses on knowledge, commitment, and power as bases of capability for societal choice and planning. Etzioni emphasizes the connection of this approach to cybernetic emphasis on knowledge, the dynamic nature of the analysis, and its emphasis on functional equivalents.

After setting forth the societal guidance approach, the collectivity is established as the basic unit of macroscopic action, in opposition to the role or the organization. The collectivity, based in the stratification system, derives its cohesion from a leadership net primarily, and from shared norms only secondarily. The state, which has power in its own right, does not merely reflect normative consensus and is more an agent of control than of consensus-formation, has a pyramidal pattern capped by a state-controlling elite (defined by role rather than class). The state as an effective control and guidance network depends on the nature of its relation to societal collectivities.

The functional requisites of a fully active society include knowledge (here Etzioni discusses the capacity of elites to give contextuating orientations), power (discusses the need for intellectual and expert filters to political decisions of state elites), and commitment (rejects the Lindblom incrementalist model in favor of a mixed-scanning model). Moving to discuss the implementation of decisions, Etzioni defines power as a generalized capacity, not inferable from a single case decision, which must be operationalized by inference from social assets.

Power is thus linked to a stratification (not necessarily class) base. The state, wishing to implement decisions, undertakes mobilization (collectivization of energy, aggregating assets at disposal of

the state), but this in itself is insufficient for social support—responsiveness, primarily to organizations representing collectivities in turn rooted in the stratification system, is also essential. To make the transition from a “drifting” society (high in consensus but low in guidance) to an “active” society (high in both), certain structural changes are necessary to enable inter-collectivity consensus: centralization (less states' rights), access to control centers (minority inclusion), regulation of the economy, “inter-woven” planning (a conducive mix of state ownership, cooperative, private firms, etc.).

Thus the trend is for business influence to decline and for control systems to emphasize normative and utilitarian rather than coercive sanctions, since this is less alienating and hence more effective. The lever here is the willingness of the more powerful collectivities to allocate political power to the weaker in the hope that this will drain their drive for redistribution of assets. This mobilization of weaker collectivities is key to the transformation of monopolized societies into more active ones. This movement from an “inauthentic” society (claims responsiveness, but is alienating) to an active society may be measured by the extent to which specific basic human needs are met (for affection, recognition, repeated gratification, stability, etc.). The member of an inauthentic society is forced to choose between retreatism and activism.

Ultimately, *The Active Society* remains at the level of taxonomic sociology, not attempting to anchor social change in a phenomena with a describable natural history which need not be explained itself (as in Marx and Freud). While beginning to reacquaint functionalism with Marxist emphases on alienation, power, and stratification, all Etzioni means by theory is “a process in which concrete data are ‘broken down’ into abstract components and reintegrated on still more abstract levels” (p. 42). To refocus on a more concrete level useful to political analysis, it will be necessary to further specify the manner in which power, collectivities, and hence the state are rooted in stratification systems, and to articulate more clearly the manner in which less powerful collectivities are mobilized to restructure monopolized societies. These theoretic needs represent the forces behind what Gouldner labels the “drift” of functionalism toward convergence with Marxism.—G. DAVID GARSON, *Tufts University*.

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. BY ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 162. \$6.95.)

The problem analyzed in *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* is the deterioration of performance in economic and political organizations. The quality of

performance by firms in the economy can decline, and in an analogous manner, the performance by political parties can create dissatisfaction with its membership. As another contemporary work in political economy the author seeks first to convince the reader that certain problems which exist in the economy exist also in the polity, and then to suggest that the same concepts can explicate both problems.

According to Hirschman, the solution of the problem of quality deterioration is an effective use of either an "exit" option or a "voice" option. Individuals who receive benefits from the products, policies, or services of an organization, whose quality of performance is decreasing, can either reveal their dissatisfaction by leaving the organization and searching for another one or by verbally protesting their views to the leadership. The extent to which individuals use either option depends upon availability and cost of the options, and individuals' "loyalty" to the organization. Loyalty or identification with an organization tends especially to decrease the use of the exit option.

In his concluding remarks, the author claims that there is no specifiable optimal combination of voice and exit that can arrest deterioration in organizational performance (pp. 124-5). Without contradicting that claim, the author seeks to persuade the reader that voice is an essential mechanism for terminating deterioration in the polity. Since political scientists should primarily be interested in the author's discussion of the polity, it is important to focus upon his analysis of voice. There are at least five claims in his argument.

First, the author notes that economists overemphasize the efficacy of the exit option (pp. 15-19). He suggests that while exit is the primary alternative in the economy it is not the only one available in the polity. Second, in order for voice to be effective there must be a combination of actors in the polity. Some actors must always be alert to deterioration while others need to utilize voice only when their essential needs are threatened (pp. 31-32.) If every individual would use the voice option constantly, then there would be an overreaction to the decline in performance and the lapse would not be corrected (p. 31).

Third, he argues that the members of the polity who would be most effective with voice, i.e., those who can articulate dissatisfaction, are those who will first try to use the exit option (pp. 47, 50-1). He offers the illustration of parents' reactions to the decline in the quality of public schools and asserts that those who could most effectively voice opposition to the school administration would be the first to enroll their children in private schools. He states that those individuals "who care *most* about the quality of the product and who, there-

fore, are those who would be the most active, reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason also those who are likely to exit first in case of deterioration" (p. 47). The fourth point in the author's argument is that the most effective use of voice can be made when the exit option is not available due to high costs of exiting or induced loyalty (pp. 92-3). He offers a critique of the Harold Hotelling-Anthony Downs model of political party ideology to demonstrate this point. He argues that the Hotelling-Downs model cannot predict party positions, such as the shift to the right by the GOP in 1964, because it does not consider the effectiveness of voice by individuals with extreme ideological positions. If the voters on either extreme of a liberal-conservative continuum have "no where to go," they will be highly motivated to voice their views and influence party leadership. Unlike moderate party members the extremists will have high levels of participation. In this manner, the GOP in 1964 followed the author's argument and falsified the prediction of the Hotelling-Downs model.

Finally, the author believes that when the exit option is used in the polity it is improperly used. He claims that since the polity deals with public and not private goods as in the economy, the exit should be slightly different for each activity. When an organization provides only private goods the members who exit will not criticize the organization since they are not affected by it as non-members. However, with public goods, both members and non-members can be affected by the policy of the organization. Hence, when individuals exit from political organizations they should publicly criticize any policies that they oppose. On this basis, the author criticizes officials in the Johnson administration who disagreed with the Vietnam policy, but who would only give private reasons for exiting. This "malaise" the author believes was countered by Senator Eugene McCarthy's public dispute over the Vietnam conflict (pp. 103-5).

Of the literature in political economy published since Arrow's *Social Choice and Individual Values*, this work is one of the most broad-gauged arguments and one of the most politicized. However, there are some critical questions that can be raised about it. First, what is the range of political organizations that are subject to a decline in the quality of performance? Does it affect interest groups as well as parties? Does it affect legislatures as well as bureaucracies? Second, what criterion specifies the "decline in the quality of performance"? Can the decline in quality be defined independently of behavior expressing dissatisfaction? This is an important aspect of the work because the author assumes that concern for the quality of the schools, neighborhoods, or public policies can be

identified and measured. Second, he assumes that concern for service is highly correlated with the ability to effectively voice dissatisfaction. Finally, he assumes that activity, reliability, and creativity of voice can be identified in a measurable manner. Third, what is the connection between the quality of services and the benefits of the services? Do actors prefer a certain combination of quality and benefits? Fourth, are there some actors whose role precludes them from even considering exiting or voicing dissatisfaction? Do some actors make a decision, not on the basis of loyalty, to always accept the quality of performance? Finally, under what conditions will individuals choose to exit or to voice dissatisfaction? The author mentions that costs are associated with each alternative, but he fails to specify precisely when these costs are high or low. If the author can answer these questions in future research, then *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* will lead to some of the more interesting work in political economy.—ROGER A. HANSON, *University of Georgia*.

Open Systems: Arenas For Political Action. By HENRY S. KARIEL. (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1969. Pp. 142. \$3.50.)

Open Systems refers to Henry S. Kariel's belief that we are presently faced, in our personal, social, and political worlds, with what he terms "closures," to which the proper response is greater openness. In our personal lives, closures are manifested by rigid conceptions of role definition; in our social and political lives, by rigid institutional boundaries that prevent adequate response to the shifting realities of contemporary life. Furthermore, our very language itself, particularly that of academic social science, joins in and helps encapsulate us in our closures by "bracketing out" all too many aspects of reality, especially those threatening established political and social elites.

Kariel is convincing in his central assertions. The book is provocative and at times even exciting for any frustrated middle-class academic wondering in the words of political theorist Peggy Lee, "Is That All There Is?" It is this very appeal, however, that also signifies the volume's greatest failing. Kariel admits early in the book that he is speaking to a special audience. Recognizing that, "As I take time out to form my sentences, men elsewhere are being used, violated, discarded," he goes on to say, "My words are not directed to them. Nor are they directed to their wholly pre-occupied rulers—specialists in violence who *know* what is just and are very busy doing justice. I can only expect to reach those in the middle who are fortunate enough to share my shelter, who are not fully involved oppressing others or fighting oppression, who can afford to read and listen, to think, and to talk back." (p. 10.) His very defini-

tion of politics, moreover, is linked to his specialized constituency. The "specifically political quality of society," he tells us, is "its playfulness." (p. 6.) Politics at its best, therefore, is not instrumentally linked to the attainment of goals, but is rather the sheer joy of interaction with others for its own sake.

It is an irony befitting Kariel himself, who preaches the virtues of an ironic stance toward life, that he has recently been the victim of a slanderous attack within the American Political Science Association for his membership in the Caucus for a New Political Science, presumably because of the Caucus' alleged linkage with the contemporary radical left; for Kariel's vision of politics is aristocratic to the core, speaking to and having relevance for only the relatively well-off in what he himself recognizes to be a society featuring gross inequalities in access to the various goods of life. Nietzsche really is the patron saint of Kariel's vision of openness; Kariel in no way shares Nietzsche's contempt for the mass (he is too decent a liberal to do that), but the problems of the overwhelming majority of men for whom politics is not play but rather a desperate attempt to achieve the minimal conditions of a humane life, have little emphasis in his argument.

This is not to say, however, that Kariel's argument is thus trivial. He joins someone like Robert J. Lifton in exploring the potential life-style of what Lifton calls "Protean Man." If Kariel has nothing to say about the black or poor white, he has much to say about the dilemma of those large numbers of Americans who have "made it," and then, like J. S. Mill, discovered that the conventional notion of happiness or fulfillment was insufficient. When Kariel says, for example, "that indeed we should ultimately accept as democratic nothing less than a society all of whose members are active participants in an interminable process—and who will not mind such activity," (p. 73, italics in original) he is saying something with very radical implications for a variety of contemporary American institutions. If indeed all the world's a stage, then those of us who are not full-fledged players in it are therefore being deprived of crucial aspects of human existence. Whether the institution in question is the business corporation, the university, or the American Political Science Association, none offers remotely enough "parts" (as distinguished from the all-too-ubiquitous "roles") so that everyone can participate in the drama of political life. (Perhaps then the defenders of the *status quo* were wise to attack Kariel, for in a bureaucratic society based on rigidity, a Nietzschean aristocrat is perhaps as dangerous as a more traditionally left-wing radical.)

Is the book worth reading? My answer is a qualified yes. Kariel does not speak to *all* of our

political problems, or even to what many of us might believe to be the most important ones. On the other hand, he reminds us of the importance of utopian and genuinely speculative thought, because of both the relevance to our own middle-class lives and the wider question of conceiving the good life, even for the presently oppressed, in terms beyond the vision of the welfare state. And, ultimately, the chief virtue of his book might rest in what a more conventional approach would see as a defect. The volume is not so much a systematic argument to which a reader (or reviewer) can respond on a formal level, but rather a series of poses, of possibilities, asking us to test them out as parts of our own lives and realities. In the less than two hours that it takes to read the book we are jarred into new ways of conceiving of ourselves as political scientists, as citizens, and ultimately as human beings.—SANFORD LEVINSON, *The Ohio State University*.

Value Judgment and Social Science. By EUGENE J. MEEHAN. (Homewood. The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1969. Pp. 159. \$2.50, paper.)

Eugene Meehan's, *Value Judgment and Social Science*, is a useful and provocative book, which, as the author says in his introduction, was his major intention when he wrote it. In that sense he has fulfilled his purpose admirably. It is useful because it addresses social scientists generally, and political scientists particularly, concerning the cognitive processes and analytic structures involved in that all too human activity—moral evaluation. To be sure we have libraries of works devoted to how we ought to behave, but precious few to how we ought to think about how we ought to behave. This is one of the latter.

It is provocative because it helps to cut the ground from under at least three different popular or once popular stances with respect to the relation between description and explanation on the one hand and evaluation on the other. The first I can only call (with the author) a kind of mindless empiricism. It holds that social science deals only with Facts immediately and plainly available in reality, and eschews any sort of value judgement on the grounds that they can only be private and subjective responses. This view has been known to be scientifically untenable for at least twenty years, although Meehan, properly I think, repeats the point that scientific explanation deals not with external reality but our preceptions of it. And he goes on to add that no human ever actually acted according to this description, for action involves choice and choice involves evaluation. It is existentially impossible to avoid value judgements and therefore disastrous to attempt it.

The second position which Meehan takes on is advanced by those who, in reaction to the kind of

raw empiricism mentioned above, seek to turn social science into a body of moral aphorisms derived variously from the great works of the past or from relevant social critics of the day. The difficulty here, says Meehan, is that moral choice is not and cannot be made independent of the world in which men live. Evaluation demands adequate description and explanation in order to make real choices. Adequate evaluation in the social sciences therefore demands a sharpening and extension of the methodological tools of empirical social science, not their abandonment. In fact it is Meehan's point that the acceptance of the positivist interpretation of the fact—value dichotomy has done more harm to the evaluative enterprise than anywhere else because it allows those making such judgements to escape the methodological and analytic rigor normally demanded of those who deal with other kinds of concepts.

The third position which Meehan attacks is one not perhaps so prevalent in academic circles but certainly present as a trend in contemporary social criticism. It is the view that moral choice can and must be separated from criteria of rational thought—indeed from any criteria. Such a view is at least implicit in the current (following a long line) cult of immediate sensation—the hippies. But, says Meehan, to act without criteria for choice is neither moral nor rational. The opposite of rationality is not morality but randomness. The author pleads powerfully that ethical concepts, like other concepts, are constructs of the human brain. As such their quality can and should be judged by the same standards; namely, the quality of the reasoning that lies behind them.

One can fault this book at points. The generalizations are sometimes sweeping, due perhaps to the style of writing more than anything else. Some claims are grandiose. Consider, for example, "In very general terms the approach to inquiry accepted here combines empiricism, naturalism, instrumentalism and pragmatism, but without dogmatism." (p. 12) This reader's reaction was that we would be doing well indeed to get all that packed in 155 pages. And finally the author is sometimes careless in his own use of language. In an introductory discussion of the relation between fact and value Meehan says:

Granting that a value judgment is not a statement about "reality," and that it cannot be "proved" by reference to factual data . . . it does not follow that an explanation is such a statement. While descriptions, explanations, and evaluations relate to empirical observations, they cannot in either case be deduced from observations, nor are they "discovered" in the external world. (pp. 5-6)

But one can assert that, say, an explanation has been "proved" in the sense that it comports with all known observations without at the same time asserting that it is either deduced from those ob-

servations or discovered in the external world. The point the author is making here is a very good one. My impression is that he might have made it somewhat more carefully.

*But the above are minor, some might say picaresque, complaints. For those interested in the topics raised here, and few of us are not, Eugene Meehan has written a very good book. He has also written one of the very few books about the structure of normative thought rather than its content and thereby considerably enriched this universe of discourse. For that alone even those who profoundly disagree with him should applaud.—DON R. BOWEN, *Case Western Reserve University*.

The Political Theory of Local Government. BY W. HARDY WICKWAR. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970. Pp. 118. \$5.95.)

"Is Local Government self-government, or is it a creature of the state?" Professor Wickwar's little book is a timely contribution to this long debated question which is still argued in legislative, constituent, and judicial bodies. In tracing the evolution of the concept of local sovereignty from Western Europe's middle ages to the present, he sees local government as "an essential link between the central government and the people, and one of the characteristics therefore of all the states that have made the modern world." Moreover, he points out, local government has evolved with the evolution of government as a whole, having a phase in its evolution corresponding to each phase in the evolution of the modern state. He distinguishes the characteristic way of thinking of each of these successive phases in order to help clarify the role of local government in the contemporary state.

Since local government is, as the author states, essentially a creature of law, its political theory and legal philosophy have been largely identical. The main concern of the study, then, is the evolving legal philosophy of local government, found to some extent in legislative and judicial decisions but more often in the philosophy of jurists, legal histories, and law reformers. Professor Wickwar concentrates on these ideas as they were expressed in the local institutions which developed.

The medieval concept that local liberty is in practice self-achieved was soon overshadowed by the legal doctrine that local bodies were incorporated by the sovereign. Thus the question of the degree of their remaining liberty was raised. The answer was found and gained general acceptance, from the time of Bodin to Montesquieu, in the theory of "intermediary bodies" which recognized local units as having a certain constitutional status moderating the power of the sovereign while enjoying some delegated sovereign power.

When the conception of the state began to

change as a result of the development of utilitarian theory, local government was influenced in several ways. Central reorganization of local government into hierarchical systems of territorial jurisdictions was thought to provide the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This conception of mathematical subdivisions of the state, subject to the constant guidance of competent authority, was applied to the governments of the United Kingdom, India, and France, with emphasis on central responsibility for local government. In America, the application led to the restrictive mid-nineteenth century view known as Dillon's rule, that local government in its many manifestations is created by and subordinate to the state.

The commitment to governmental subdivisions that would cover the entire territory of a state and have upwards responsibility to the authority and competence of the center was soon modified by an ideology of local government that looked backwards to local self-government. The influence of various Western European political philosophers, especially German and English, became evident in the romanticization of the local historical unit with elected officials serving gratuitously. The self-governing, usually rural, group was held to have a common law right to protection from central legislative interference. Just as Americans were learning that they were being transformed from a rural into an urban society, they were shocked at the conspicuous failure of their cities and sought municipal home rule, among other reforms, in order to free cities to become strong enough to hold their own in the general interest against strong private interests.

Today in the technologically developed countries of the North Atlantic, major attention has been given less to the freedom left by the state to the local community than to the services rendered by government, centrally promoted but locally executed. A concept of neighborhood arising in the face of the exploding megalopolis may force the central government to make a redetermination of the territorial subdivisions within which people can best take responsibility for meeting their common needs. At the same time, stress on the efficiency of local government is being replaced by emphasis on the techniques of relationships between central and local government, with a resulting need for coordination at the center.

In the final chapter of this study, the author describes local government as an "article of export," one of the "many ideas and institutions that were to give this world a newer approach to cultural unity than it had ever known before." The variety of forms of the article exported from its homelands has varied ever more widely as each has become a part of a very different political system.

Professor Wickwar's unpretentious study, while

not answering as such the initial question raised, leaves no doubt that at the present point of its evolution, the central-local relationship is marking out a new path, one which seems appropriate and desirable in technologically developed nations and which may enable us to understand more clearly the institutional problems facing the developing world.

Beginning with sixteenth century writers, the author draws on many of the important contributors to the theory of government and of local government in particular. Whether or not he has extracted the significant aspects of their thought concerning local government is a decision which might be questioned by a political theorist. Nonetheless, for the student of local government his survey of the broad sweep of political thought concerning the question of local sovereignty provides a view of the entire forest which might otherwise be lost among the trees.

Professor Wickwar is one of the very few scholars who has given attention to the political theory of local government. The small number of others making similar studies, such as Anwar Syed in his *Political Theory of American Local Government*, have made presentations much more limited in scope and substance. This book is not only a valuable contribution to local government theory but is also apparently unique in its conception.—ALICE L. EBEL, *Illinois State University*.

Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH, MICHAEL CURTIS, BENJAMIN R. BARBER. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969. Pp. 164. \$6.00.)

The concept "totalitarianism," as used by serious students of authoritarian regimes, was developed primarily in response to a sense that Soviet Russia (at least under Stalin) and Nazi Germany were essentially similar political systems and at the same time qualitatively different from traditional dictatorships. By whatever criterion or criteria that scholars in the 1940s and 1950s chose to employ in order to differentiate among political systems, the two dictatorships seemed fundamentally unique—or at least to combine a series of traits manifest in other polities in an unprecedented fashion. Teleologically, the regimes seemed to entertain and seriously aspire to uniquely all-encompassing goals. There was enough substance in the rhetoric of the building of a new Soviet man, for instance, as to suggest that these were novelly purposive political systems. Instrumentally the regimes seemed to have developed a new form of rule in that terror was used systematically as a political instrument for engendering the rapid circulation of elites and the atomization of the masses; terror was, in Merle Fainsod's work, the lynchpin of the totalitarian system. Behaviorally,

also, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia were thought to be set off from other authoritarian regimes. In Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, the traditional distinction between state and society, between politicization and socialization, was erased. No longer was mere compliance tolerable: for the first time affirmation became the norm and affect totally mobilized.

In the 1960s, however, scholars began seriously to question the usefulness of totalitarianism as an analytical construct. In a professional climate in which developmental constructs were gaining the ascendancy, the static, ahistorical quality of most (though by no means all) theorizing about totalitarianism became more readily apparent. The conceptual fuzziness which permeates most efforts to define totalitarianism, similarly, was thought less tolerable as professionals became more preoccupied with the tasks of operationalism. More importantly perhaps, events in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union suggested to virtually every analyst that there were severe limits to traditional totalitarian analysis. At a minimum it was suggested that reconceptualization was in order. Efforts were made as a result to relate patterns of totalitarianism either to levels of economic or political development or to the duration of a regime in power. Many, however, went beyond the advocacy of reconceptualization. For these specialists the issue has become whether there is heuristic utility in classifying most contemporary east European communist states, or, for that matter, the present-day Soviet Union as totalitarian. Finally, some have argued that totalitarianism is of dubious usefulness even in the study of Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany and occasionally assert that the concept was propagated in the United States in order to provide the ideological rationale for the cold war.

The three essays contained in the slim volume under review are in different ways evidence of the unease which scholars now feel about "totalitarianism." The essay by Carl Friedrich, for instance, constitutes something of a departure from his earlier positions. Friedrich is now of the view that the "regimes of Stalin and Hitler, far from providing the typical model of a totalitarian dictatorship were rather extreme aberrations." He has seen fit, moreover, to modify his definition of the totalitarian syndrome in order to reflect "some of the evolving theory and practice of totalitarian dictatorship." Professor Curtis takes a somewhat different tack. He may be included among those who argue that there is such a phenomenon as totalitarianism, that there have been totalitarian regimes in the past, and that this concept is of utility in studying the Peoples' Republic of China. He does not, however, consider the contemporary Soviet Union totalitarian. Soviet reality in the 1960s,

he asserts, has deviated sufficiently from the totalitarian model stipulated by Friedrich fifteen years ago so as to render improper a decision to include the Soviet Union within the totalitarian rubric. Mr. Barber, finally, would excise the word from the vocabulary of serious political analysis. He appears attracted by the notion that totalitarianism is primarily a pejorative rather than an analytical term; his somewhat discursive essay provides ample evidence that definitions of totalitarianism are numerous, contradictory, and polemical.

Regrettably, however, the book is as significant as an illustration of why "totalitarianism" has become increasingly suspect as a term of art than as evidence of professional unease about the term. Friedrich's essay is particularly vulnerable on this score. For instance, notwithstanding all that we know about the existence of ongoing conflict within the Politburo, among key sub-elites, among formal institutions, as well as between the regime and such major mass elements as the non-Russian nationalities, Friedrich's basic image of Soviet politics in the 1960's is that of consensus—an assessment which is bound to lead readers to inquire whether the totalitarian model facilitates the acquisition of data about the nature of Soviet politics.

He continues to maintain that totalitarianism is a unique form of rule. In practice, however, it turns out that the term is largely a pejorative one used to designate a bevy of authoritarian regimes. It is not quite clear whether Friedrich considers contemporary Yugoslavia totalitarian or not; his statements in this regard are self-contradictory. One is, however, left to wonder what the criteria for inclusion and exclusion are which separate Nkruma's Ghana, Sukarno's Indonesia, Gomulka's Poland, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union—all designated totalitarian by Friedrich—from other classes of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, it is difficult to know how a communist regime could cease to be totalitarian in Friedrich's scheme of things unless it became basically pluralist—which leads one to think that in the case of communist politics, "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" are for Friedrich essentially indistinguishable. Indeed one sometimes gains the impression that Friedrich's effort to adjust theory to practice is little more than an effort to make sure that the Soviet Union fits the definition totalitarian, no matter what changes occur. One would have thought the normal procedure would be to take a definition as given and then reach a considered judgment as to whether a particular state at a particular time sufficiently approximated the archetype as to be retained within a particular rubric. (In this respect Curtis' essay is far more in keeping with the canons of scientific inquiry).

Regrettably, too, the Barker and Curtis essays—

while not subject to the reservations expressed about the Friedrich piece—contain little that professionals will find novel, a fact for which Barber and Curtis should not be greatly faulted. Curtis' field is largely Western Europe, while Barber's main interest evidently is in political philosophy. As a result, the volume will be primarily useful for beginning students of comparative politics. Because there are so many controversial aspects to the book, its major attraction for the faculty member will likely be as a corollary text to assign in order to have something to attack in one's lectures.—WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN, *The University of Michigan*.

Ideologi-jidai no Ōkon [The End of Ideology], JERZY J. WIATR, translated into Japanese by HIROSHI BANDO. (Tokyo: Godoshuppana 1968. Pp. 292. Y800.)

This book, written in Polish, was translated into Japanese by Professor Hiroshi Bando who studied at the University of Warsaw for three years. The original title of the book is *Czy Zmierzch ery ideologii?* The book was first published in Warsaw in 1966. When a book written in Polish and translated into Japanese is reviewed in English for an American audience, it is very possible that some misunderstanding may have occurred somewhere along the line.

The book is divided into five chapters: "The End of Ideology and Sociology," "The Concept of Ideology," "The End of Ideology in the West: A Myth or a Reality?" "The Problem of 'De-ideologization' in Poland," and "The Meaning of Ideology in Social Life."

Professor Wiatr critically analyzes the end-of-ideology hypothesis as presented by such Western social scientists as Raymond Aaron, Daniel Bell, and Seymour M. Lipset. His examination of the hypothesis does not stop at the conceptual level; he cites empirical works of Himlstrand, Torgersen, and others to strengthen his position as critic. Aaron is criticized rather severely from the point of view of Wiatr's own Marxian sociology. Having written his doctoral dissertation on the sociology of American racial problems, he demonstrates his knowledge of the works of Western social scientists throughout the book, particularly in Chapters 2 and 3.

Advocates of the end-of-ideology hypothesis contend that the functional importance of ideology depends upon the extent of economic development. In other words, economic development brings about the end of ideology in all countries. Wiatr would assume, rather, that general social conditions and the degree of social stability in particular form an important independent variable affecting the importance of ideology in a given country. The present disturbance in the United

States as symbolized by the rise of many radical organizations, such as the Black Panthers, seems to suggest that Wiatr's approach has had more predictive validity than that of Aaron and others. Ideology is far from dead in the United States today. As I write this review, two buildings of the University of Hawaii are being peacefully occupied by students and faculty members who are opposed to the present University policy of giving academic credits for R.O.T.C. training. My conversations with the protesters lead me to conclude that they are a highly ideologically oriented group, who believe they are doing their part toward the realization of what they consider to be a more desirable society in the United States. I might also add that there are people gathered at the State Capital who are protesting the protesters. There seems to be empirical ground for Wiatr's position in that there is an association between the degree of social unrest or conflict and the importance of ideology. Economic development in the United States in the late 1960's certainly did not bring about a decline of ideology in American political culture. On the contrary, despite the existence of the "silent majority," there is a trend toward a rise in ideology particularly among Black Americans and youth. Our recent concern over ecological issues presents an analytical problem in the sense that it does not constitute any part of ideology as understood in conventional terms. It could be that this is an example of what Yrjö Littunen refers to as the beginning of a new ideology.

The section on Poland (Chapter 4) presented the author with a problem owing to the lack of relevant empirical work. I believe that he could have presented much more forceful evidence to refute the hypothesis, had he been able to base this chapter on his own survey of Polish citizens. In fact, he could have made a more original contribution to the literature if he himself had done some survey work in Poland prior to writing this book.

In the final chapter, he argues from the Marxian viewpoint that an end to ideology is detrimental to the development of a society and serves to preserve the status quo. He goes further to suggest, under the subheading of "Ideology and Science," that ideological inspiration plays a crucial role in the development of science. He ends the book by emphasizing the importance of ideology in the development of a society. Ideology, by affecting our feeling and rational thinking, will lead us down the road toward progress. Thus, he not only rejects the end-of-ideology hypothesis which LaPalombara and others have attempted to formulate, but he emphasizes the functional use of ideology not only in developing a society but also in advancing our scientific knowledge.

Professor LaPalombara (March, 1966, this Re-

view) and Professor Wiatr seem to be in agreement that the end-of-ideology hypothesis is not applicable to Italy. The former confines himself to the Italian situation, whereas the latter finds it inapplicable elsewhere. However, Wiatr admits that there seems to be some truth to the end-of-ideology hypothesis in the United States and some other Western nations. He, in this sense, certainly cannot be accused of being dogmatic.

Although I sympathize very much with the translator in his difficult task of translating this book into Japanese, including as it does quotations which originally appeared in English, French, Russian, and other languages, I must report that I found a few errors. For example, the book refers to the University of Michigan as "Ann Arbor University" (pp. 109 and 110). Since Professor Wiatr spent some time at the University of Michigan, it is difficult to imagine that he made the error. In any case, these errors are not crucial.

The book is not a polemic work of the sort which is found in abundance in Marxian literature. Rather, it presents a scholarly effort to challenge the end-of-ideology hypothesis and to analyze the role of ideology in societies.—YASUMASA KURODA, *University of Hawaii*.

The Politics of History. By HOWARD ZINN. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970. Pp. 390. \$7.50.)

The purpose of Howard Zinn's excellent collection of essays on history and historiography is to draw attention by both analysis and precept to "the consequences *in action* of historical writing. The meaning . . . of a writer will be found not just in what he intends to say, or what he does literally say, but in the effect of his writing on living beings." (p. 279) "The Politics of History," then, is a literal title, referring not to political events in time past but to the current activities as historians (and social scientists) themselves, Zinn's own included. For in a world, as he puts it, "where children are still not safe from starvation or bombs," it is willy-nilly a political act to engage one's sympathies with or withhold them from the actors who have made the present and are making the future, and who are the objects of our study; indeed, the very choice by academics of a subject matter itself is also a political act. Thus Zinn rejects the canon of so-called objectivity in research, for since all social studies whose interpretation bears on our assessment of our own condition are *ipso facto* political, "objectivity" is only a mask with which we hide the real social consequences of what we are doing and saying.

In the beginning and concluding theoretical essays that form the framework of this collection, Zinn criticizes *inter alia*: 1) history-writing as *supposedly* value-free narrative about events whose interpretation is significant for us as citizens today

(and which therefore can't possibly be genuinely "value-free"); 2) history-writing about such events, in the analysis of which the historian shows the *wrong* human sympathies, rather than pretending to have none; 3) the conventional wisdom particularly in the field of American History, which fobs apologetics off as "historical knowledge" to be passed on from generation to generation; 4) pedantic historiographical controversy about the supposedly best way to insure the discovery of those chimeras "science" and "objectivity" in historical studies, a controversy which otherwise intelligent academics engage in as a substitute for committing themselves to the discussion of important substantive issues; and 5) history-writing as value-free narrative about events of mere antiquarian interest. (Zinn, I think, overdoes this last point. The tellers of socially trivial tales are the true members of a very narrow, specialized calling related to Zinn's in name only; no more than shoemakers ought they to be scolded for not being critical intellectuals—no more than Agatha Christie ought to be scolded for not being James Joyce.)

In all these cases the clear point Zinn makes is that historians and social scientists are political men (one of Zinn's essays is entitled "Knowledge as a Form of Power"), functioning as apologists for the American status quo. Some carry out this function tacitly—through professional narrow-mindedness (4 and 5), methodological naivete (1 and 4), or lack of commitment to piercing beneath the veil of appearances (3); others carry it out overtly (2) by opposing the drastic social changes Zinn feels are necessary (and will be felt as necessary, he suggests, by anyone who detaches himself from the interests of the wealthy and powerful of the world). Unfortunately there is some confusion in Zinn's theoretical discussion of these points: the concluding essays are pitched almost entirely at the level of methodology, when in fact the more important criticism is that so many academics lack independence of intellect or a feeling for justice (3 and 2)—and these are not methodological problems at all.

This confusion in an otherwise brilliant discussion is more than compensated for by the uniform excellence of the substantive essays that form the bulk of this book. It is in these essays that Zinn both particularizes his critique of status quo apologetics and—what is more rarely done—offers his own, competing version of history in the service of social change rather than history in the service of the current world and national division of powers.

Roughly speaking, these essays fall into two groups. First those collected under the heading "Nationalism" vigorously attack the credentials of American liberalism in foreign policy. In a well-

known article on the Vietnam War and with especial forcefulness in a chapter of historical summary entitled "Aggressive Liberalism," Zinn undercuts the pieties with which Americans assure themselves that they have been peaceful and reformist in external affairs (including especially the affairs of this continent), rather than warlike and reactionary. Of course this argument is familiar by now; but it is Zinn among others who helped to make it so familiar.

The second group of essays forms a long and often exciting example of what Jesse Lemisch has called "History from the Bottom Up." This kind of history, unlike most of our standard histories, is not based on the perceptions of political and social leaders, intellectuals and other beneficiaries of the American success story; rather, it is built around an attempt to understand the lives and hopes of the American underclass, and of our relatively few but enduring rebels; the "success" of American liberalism on the domestic scene is not presumed (as it is by "consensus" historians) but is precisely the fundamental point in question. In essays on inequality in American history, the 1914 massacre of striking miners at Ludlow, Colorado, Fiorello LaGuardia, the New Deal, the Abolitionists, racism in America, and the suppression of mass civil rights demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, Zinn returns to this point over and over again. There has always been a multitude of the excluded and oppressed in America, and their oppression has often been (and still is) terrible; liberal meliorism has often been of little help to this class and on many occasions, especially when race has been involved, has not even been benign (Zinn demonstrates conclusively that the Kennedy Administration, by its unwillingness to protect peaceful protestors against savage attack, combined with its willingness to prosecute *them* when they defended themselves, allowed and even fostered a "pattern of brutality against the Negro" in the Deep South—and today everywhere). Finally, he reveals American history-writing at its most complacent and methodologically inept in its treatment of the American radical tradition, as he shows that our historians have followed the pattern of psychoanalyzing the *latent motives* of radicals, but unquestioningly accepting the *manifest statements of principle* of the ruling class—and of the historians themselves! Writing about Lewis Feuer's analysis of the Berkeley rebels Zinn notes that "Biopsychological 'causes' of human catastrophe are . . . marvelous reinforcers of the going order because they have no operable corrective . . . Explanations of social events by castration complexes insure impotency" (p. 165).

In sum, Zinn writes from the same standpoint that Christian Bay justifies in his *The Structure of Freedom*: a society—and for an historian like

ment. Before he died, in his mid-forties, in 1895, he had reached revisionist conclusions similar to those of his friend, Bernstein. Since little has been written in English about Stepniak, Hulse's work provides an introduction to this apparently influential nihilist. Hulse uncovers enough to arouse curiosity but not enough to provide a full understanding of Stepniak, opening the door for further work.

Kropotkin and Bernstein also underwent transitions from militance to moderation during their London years. Kropotkin was in London thirty-one years before returning to Russia during the 1917 revolution. Bernstein stayed in London thirteen years, from 1888 until he again became involved in politics in Germany. Hulse shows that Kropotkin's revolutionary anarchism, although resolute throughout his life, ended in frustration in Bolshevik Russia. Nevertheless he did not dilute his anti-capitalist, anti-statist ideas and maintained that a revolutionist had an ethical obligation to restrain hate and irrational violence.

Bernstein was not known as a revisionist until toward the end of his stay in London, but Hulse maintains Bernstein's revisionism did not result from an intellectual debt to the Fabians. Instead, it was more the general English atmosphere, Bernstein's contact with Engels, his work on Ferdinand Lassalle's writings, and his interest in seventeenth-century English revolutionary history that made him sceptical of final dogmas. 'Socialism got a good history from Bernstein's studies of the English revolutions, but it also got a man who had developed a taste for heresy' (143).

The chapters covering Morris and Shaw do not seem as well developed as the others. Morris and Shaw might have been compared to the three exiles without separate treatment. Neither underwent the dramatic transformations of Stepniak and Bernstein or the gradual mellowing of Kropotkin. Hulse sees Morris as "an English equivalent of the *narodniki*" (80) but never rigid in his position, receptive to the ideas of the Marxists as well as of Stepniak, Kropotkin, and Shaw. "Shaw's Socialism," Hulse concludes, "was an amalgamation of his early admiration of Marx's denunciation of capitalism, his preference for the moderate procedures of the Fabians, and his anarchist yearning for the total transformation of society" (228).

In general Hulse presents each of the thinkers separately, but he can be credited with making an effort to integrate the ideas, personalities, and intellectual environment of these unorthodox radicals in Victorian London.—RONALD CHRISTENSON, *Gustavus Adolphus College*.

Montesquieu's System of Natural Government.

By HENRY J. MERRY. (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1970. Pp. 414. \$8.50.)

We cannot but be amazed by the breadth of Montesquieu's scholarship. He seems to present a comprehensive view of politics by comprehending an almost bewildering variety of societies and practices, and by enabling the reader to supply variations left out. If Montesquieu teaches by example, we are faced with the challenge that one must become a truly cosmopolitan scholar to understand either Montesquieu or politics.

Professor Merry seeks to correct the parochialism of American interpretations of Montesquieu's works. Heeding the warning in the introduction to *The Spirit of the Laws* that "a great many truths will not appear till we have seen the chain which connects them with others," he searches for the unity that will enable one to understand the diversity of subjects contained in Montesquieu's great work.

Our parochialism is excessive legalism, the allegedly mortal disease of old-fashioned American political science. This view finds the heart of Montesquieu to be a doctrine of separation of governmental powers as the guarantee of liberty. It vulgarizes Montesquieu and mistakenly lends the authority of a wise man to American institutions whose true origins are mundane. Montesquieu must also be defended against sociologists who see his discussion of climatic influence as but a primitive forerunner of modern sociology. In truth, the ancestor equals or surpasses the progeny. Far from dwelling amid provincial legalism or simplistic climatic determinism, Montesquieu finds his true home in contemporary sociological and psychological sophistication. Merry banishes parochialism by showing that the 18th century baron is at least as sociological as we are.

The coherence of *The Spirit of the Laws* is found to be that of a system: a complex series of interrelationships that have a pattern. The unity is a system because it is composed of relationships between parts, not between parts and the whole. One need not look at the form or end of government. Nor is the pattern of relationships to be found between governmental institutions. Rather, one must view how government stands in relation to natural—that is, sociological and psychological, as opposed to political—factors. While Montesquieu prescribes healthful medicine for France, his deeper intention and accomplishment is to set forth a system of natural government that will give the reasons for every government without judging the ends of any.

The opening chapters of Merry's book summarize Montesquieu's ideas about the nature of man and society. Montesquieu, who was at home among the world's strangest customs, is assumed to share the opinions of man expressed by those two amazed Persian tourists, the tormented Usbek and his companion Rica. The problem discussed can here only be indicated by Montesquieu's remark,

"It is well that there has been in the world some good and some bad; without that, one would be driven to leave this life."

• The bulk of the book examines *The Spirit of the Laws*. Books XIV-XXXI are discussed first in order to proceed from nonpolitical to political. Since Merry contends that Montesquieu believes the latter does and must reflect the former, he treats the subpolitical first in order that politics may be better understood. He argues that Montesquieu seeks to establish the independence of economics, religion, and civil law from politics and political law in order to unleash the activity stimulated by greed and checked by fear of God, and to replace natural by civil law as the standard of political law.

Read in the light of Montesquieu's treatment of nonpolitical things, books II-X, which have traditionally been regarded as a discussion of forms of government, are interpreted to be an examination of the capabilities, roles, and relations of the three main social classes. Their purpose is to show the need for and foundation of a mixed government that reflects social forces and does not require austere virtues.

The final three chapters, which discuss the books on liberty (XI-XIII), seek to show that both civil and political liberties are primarily nurtured and secured by the proper distribution of political authority among the three social classes rather than by legal separation of powers. Professor Merry finds that the famous discussion of the English Constitution is not central to *The Spirit of the Laws*, but deals with only one kind of political liberty and that not the most important. Furthermore, Montesquieu's natural government cannot be understood, and is distorted, by looking at its end of liberty. A spirit of moderation is more to be sought by mixed government than even liberty.

Professor Merry's book is best when it is closest to Montesquieu. He reminds us of the breadth and subtlety of Montesquieu, and gives us the fruits of reflective hours spent in the baron's company in many provocative interpretations. He has an easy time in rescuing Montesquieu from legalistic Americans, though one might wonder whether there was not some truth in the old prejudice. For if the ends of government are given, is there a more important question than how these ends are achieved? It is true that Montesquieu writes about the spirit, but it is the spirit of the laws.

Merry would have Montesquieu read in our times by showing that he speaks like our times. The use of social science terminology confuses the interpretation and makes Merry say less than he knows. For example, to say that moderation is higher than liberty in Montesquieu's value hierarchy is to neglect the fact that neither moderation nor liberty is a value for Montesquieu, but one a

spirit and the other an end of the laws. This confusion prevents Merry from clearly raising and adequately answering the question whose general form might be, "Why does Montesquieu write about the spirit of the laws rather than the end of law?" To say that Montesquieu values the spirit more than the end is no answer.

One is tempted to suggest that Montesquieu should be read in the light of what preceded him rather than in that which followed. The character of the mixed government admired by Montesquieu is never clarified by Merry as it could have been had he compared it to the mixed regime of Aristotle. The opening discussion of the nature of man would have been less a mere collection of opinions had he sharpened the issues by, say, reflecting on the previously quoted remark in the light cast by the *Politics*. Furthermore, the warrant for such comparisons would be Montesquieu's own, as it is he who uses the traditional terminology to change it.

Finally Merry's procedure hides from us the most important lessons of Montesquieu. Montesquieu proceeds from the old classification of governments to the new. In discussing Montesquieu, Merry proceeds from the new sociology and finds the old classification irrelevant. Accepting Merry's interpretation of the character of the new political science, one might wonder whether Montesquieu's order does not indicate that political philosophy leads to sociology, where Merry's order seeks but to reveal Montesquieu as a political sociologist. In portraying Montesquieu as a sociologist, Merry nearly forgets that he was a philosopher. By neglecting the possibility that Montesquieu does not merely present a system, but that he gives the reasons for doing what we now do out of habit, Merry downplays precisely that element of Montesquieu from which our times might learn the most.—GLEN THUROW, *State University of New York at Buffalo*.

Robert's Rules of Order. (New Revised). By HENRY M. ROBERT, SARAH CORBIN ROBERT, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF HENRY M. ROBERT III, JAMES W. CLEARY, AND WILLIAM J. EVANS. Glenview, Illinois. Scott Foresman and Co. Pp. 550. 1970.

If it is natural for Americans, at least middle and upper class ones, to join voluntary organizations; it is almost as natural for those organizations to run, at least in principle, in accord with parliamentary procedure. While hundreds of manuals of parliamentary procedure have been published over the years, of which well over a dozen are currently in print; there remains only one *Robert's Rules of Order*. For almost a century, ever since it replaced *Cushing's Manual of Parliamentary Practice* (1844) as the basic parliamentary reference work, to virtually all Americans *Robert's*

Rules is parliamentary procedure and using any other manual would be sacrilege. Indeed, it has been seriously suggested that only the Bible has had a greater influence on the organizational behavior of Americans. Almost three million copies of *Robert's* various editions have been sold since 1876, which has made it one of the all-time nonfiction best-sellers.

Although General Henry M. Robert has been dead for nearly half-a-century, *Robert's Rules of Order* lives on; and within its pages the ideas of the long-dead general are perpetuated. The present edition, edited by the General's daughter-in-law with the assistance of several others including the General's grandson, is the first complete revision since 1915 and the first new edition in nearly twenty years; but there is nothing in it that would be new to General Robert. It supersedes previous editions, but has been written to be "in complete harmony" with them. Nonetheless, in the words of its inside front cover dustjacket, this edition is "more modern, more complete, more comprehensive, better organized, more clearly presented, more efficient, and FAR EASIER TO USE than any earlier edition," a description with which I am in complete accord.

Robert's Newly Revised is several hundred pages thicker than the 75th Anniversary Edition which it replaces. It incorporates material from General Robert's earlier works, *Parliamentary Practice* and *Parliamentary Law*, so as to provide for the first time answers to various esoteric questions of procedure in one definitive reference work. Earlier editions of *Robert's Rules* had charts which were impossible to use, with stars, asterisks, footnotes, and fine print enough to confuse even an experienced parliamentarian. This new edition has a forty-eight page center section of charts and tables, readily set off by a different color and heavier stock paper, which is an absolute delight to use for the student seeking quick reference as to form, precedence, and applicability of motions. This new edition also has the pleasant distinction of being reasonably well written and exceptionally well organized. Logical arrangement of material has replaced the old paragraph format and the order of presentation has been designed to be in accord with the natural flow of business at meetings. The ambiguous classification of certain motions has been remedied and the basic classification scheme clearly explained. For each motion, a section in outline form clearly and succinctly sets forth the motion's basic operational characteristics and its uses. All in all, the new edition is far superior to any of its predecessors.

Robert's Rules has an importance to the social scientist which goes well beyond its possible immediate relevance to him as a concerned participant in various group decision processes. Parlia-

mentary procedure, especially that distillation of it which has entered into parliamentary law—those common principles of procedure which are held by the courts to be the applicable to every organization as being essential to legal action or for the protection of members in their individual rights—has been important in shaping and refining basic American notions of due process and majority and minority rights as applied to group activity. Indeed, *Robert's Rules* has been cited as authoritative in a number of court cases. More generally, however, *Robert's Rules* may be regarded as an implicit theory of democracy. For many Americans its procedures are synonymous with practical democracy. In fact, the inside jacket cover calls *Robert's* the "book you will want . . . the book you will need, to help get things done in accord with the American spirit (emphasis mine)." Contrasting the procedures in *Robert's* with those practiced by Quakers and with the Quaker inspired "participatory democracy" procedures of the New Left reveals quite different priorities assigned by each to values such as speed of deliberation, unanimity, intensity of preference v. majority rule, mass participation, etc.—raising questions which should be of great interest to any student of democratic theory. *Robert's Rules* is also important to the student of public policy concerned with the impact of rules on outcomes, and is, of course, particularly relevant to the student of legislative behavior. Finally, for the mathematically oriented political scientist, *Robert's Rules* offers for study a remarkable and fascinating system of queueing rules.

In an era where faculty meetings, student-faculty meetings, and mass meetings abound, we do not wish to neglect consideration of *Robert's* as a guide to the parliamentarily perplexed. It is possible for someone to learn parliamentary procedure by reading *Robert's Rules of Order* from cover to cover, but we would certainly not recommend it.* Despite the stated intentions of the editors of this edition to combine in it a definitive reference work and a teaching manual, it is only the former which has been achieved; although this edition is

* To learn the basics of parliamentary procedure we would recommend Alice F. Sturgis, *Learning Parliamentary Procedure*, McGraw-Hill, 1953. Her *Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure* is also excellent.

far superior to its predecessors in its accessibility to the parliamentarily uninitiated. Despite vast improvements in organization and in prose style, *Robert's Newly Revised* is, like its predecessors, marred by an archaic terminology (e.g., previous question, lay on the table), some unnecessarily complex and confusing rules (e.g., reconsider, committee of the whole v. informal consideration), and some rules which could best be dispensed with (e.g., move to reconsider and enter on the min-

utes, object to consideration) which fealty to the dead General Robert and a desire to maintain terminological accord with the U.S. House of Representatives have unfortunately frozen into place. While this new edition is a vast improvement in so many ways, it is also a great disappointment to those who had looked for a genuine revision and modernization of American parliamentary practice. For example, the discussion of procedures which could be adopted in either very small or very large gatherings when ordinary parliamentary procedure becomes unduly cumbersome (either because it is too formal or because it becomes bogged down in the weight of large numbers of participants) is woefully inadequate, despite a considerable improvement in the section on mass meetings; and in general we found some lack of sensitivity to the need to vary procedures in accord with the size and nature of the group. Also, the section on voting procedures reveals no knowledge of recent work on committee election procedures, such as that of Duncan Black, which is highly relevant to a consideration of selection of an appropriate and fair voting procedure. Regardless, however, of its shortcomings, *Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised* is definitely a book with which most political scientists should become acquainted.—BERNARD N. GROFMAN, *State University of New York, Stony Brook*.

The Origins of Socialism. BY GEORGE LICHTHEIM.
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 302.
\$6.95.)

The purpose of Professor Lichtheim's book is not merely what it seems to be. The purpose is to "clarify the origins of socialism, both as a worldview and as the specific response of workers and intellectuals to the twofold upheaval of the French Revolution and the industrial revolution." (p. vii) This is achieved by presenting socialism as originating in French and English thought but receiving its "classical formulation" in Marx "with the help of German philosophy." This theme explains the tripartite division of the book, entitled respectively "Heirs of the French Revolution," "Critics of the Industrial Revolution," and "German Socialism." The author himself, however, renders this explanation questionable. Although "socialism's greatest thinker" did his "real theoretical work as an economist" after 1848, "technical reasons" forced concluding the book with that date. This strange omission suggests that the "technical reasons" in question are of more than passing importance.

Even without this problem, the book's structure is "peculiar and somewhat daunting" since "German Socialism" is not congruent with the other titles. His explanation: the book was originally intended as "the opening section of a general history

of socialism and communism." The author does not say why its structure was not properly adjusted, since that would require changing only a title. This omission raises the question why he broaches the structure at all? And why is either problem relevant to the reviewer? The answers have to do with what the reviewer understands to be a conclusion reached by the author in the course of his "general history."

"sons" forced concluding the book with that date.

Although there are no further statements as to why the original plan was not completed, there is another reference to "technical points" (p. viii). These have "for the most part" (i.e. not completely) been relegated to the Notes. The suspicion that the Notes have some unusual relevance is supported by the author (p. ix): "The discerning reader who takes the trouble to consult the Notes. . . ." However, the Notes' dimensions have "been swelled by the attempt to cite as many sources as possible." This reason explains neither their size nor their importance for the "discerning reader."

What does the author mean by such peculiarities explained by weak reasons? He disclaims "any intention beyond the obvious one of providing the student with a concise analysis of the subject and a critical introduction to the literature" (p. viii). But "the discerning reader," not "the student" is told to consult the Notes. The discerning reader notices the proportion (1:3) between Notes and text. The number 3 recalls the "peculiar and somewhat daunting" external arrangement. Part 3 merits peculiar attention especially since the author said (p. 98) Part 3 is "The Marxian Synthesis" rather than "German Socialism."

"The Marxian Synthesis" asks whether "the threshold of our concluding chapter" coincides with "the summit of our theme?" The answer "depends on what one expects from an analytical account of socialist origins." The answer never becomes explicit. But we can glean an answer which explains the "technical reasons" which puzzle this reviewer.

The original theme must be qualified. Marx was not merely a socialist writer who "combined German philosophy with British economics and French socialism." He was a philosopher essentially concerned with "the genesis and functioning of modern society." By 1848 Marx transcended socialism as such. This synthesis may "continue to be of importance to the historian of philosophy long after socialism has taken its place, with liberalism and conservatism, as one particular reaction to the twofold upheaval of the industrial revolution and the French Revolution." And having done that Marx abandoned philosophy.

I suggest the major technical reason for ending this study with 1848 is the author's conclusion that

nt socialism's "summit" (the subject of his concluding chapter) "Marxism" chose "critical" (partial) understanding, which could be revolutionary, over "comprehensive" understanding which it thought must necessarily be static. Philosophically, as distinguished from economically or politically, that is a decline. The historian of philosophy cannot but be daunted by the moral and intellectual price of this choice and it is not surprising that the "external arrangement" of his book should bear marks of his dismay.

Students will find this book intimidating because it is written with extraordinary care and because the attention devoted to unfamiliar figures and to explicating complex movements is overwhelming. Historians of philosophy should brush up on political economy before reading Part II. Conceptually, the author's link between socialism

and Natural Law reveals a defective understanding of the latter's development. He speaks of "*the* ancient doctrine of Natural Law" (p. 107, italics mine) which begins with the Stoics and has merely a "variant" in Locke and his followers. Seen as one unbroken tradition, he cannot explain how it gave rise both to inequality and private property, and to equality and common ownership (pp. 108-109). This problem can be explained by recognizing two traditions, *jus naturale* and *lex naturalis*. Failure to distinguish them was already a Hobbesian theme. (Leviathan, Chapter xiv). On the whole, this book is recommended to those seeking a comprehensive, critical, and non-doctrinaire view of the topic. Students seeking instruction about particular figures or movements should approach it with considerable background.—GARY D. GLENN, *Northern Illinois University*.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Public Officials and the Press. BY DELMER D. DUNN. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 208. \$2.95.)

This study undertakes the task of adding to our knowledge of the interrelationships of news reporters and government officials through as intensive analysis of the views and activities which make up these relationships in a particular environment—state government. Conceived in the image of Bernard Cohen's *The Press and Foreign Policy* it adapts Cohen's conceptual framework and applies it at the state level, going beyond Cohen (and other studies of national news reporting) by specifically focusing on the differences in press relations found among executive officials, administrators and legislative leaders. An effort also is made to assess the impact of the particular level of government.

Data for the study are drawn primarily from interviews with 50 state officials and 21 political reporters in Wisconsin in the winter of 1966-67. These were supplemented by personal observation and newspaper reading. Three brief Appendices provide details on methodology, conceptual framework and related research.

The author meticulously describes the work of gathering and presenting the news and the conceptions reporters have of their roles. This is followed by a presentation of the public official's side of the picture—his view of the reporter's role and performance, how much he is exposed to the press, what he gets from the press and how he goes about providing information to the press.

The book provides no startling conclusions. The author finds his data tend to confirm the principal judgments reached in previous studies at the national level by Cohen, Dan Nimmo, Douglass Ca-

ter and Donald Matthews. It can be said, also, that his data underwrite impressions this reviewer has acquired in some years of observing state capital political reporting—impressions, I suspect, that are shared by many political scientists.

Even though Professor Dunn finds "press relations are closely akin at both levels of government" (p. 150) he notes some distinctions. There is less need for the press to help communications in state government than in the Washington bureaucracy. State officials do not need the instant reporting of news tickers—life in the states is not crisis-oriented. Nor do they have as great a need for the structured interaction of the press conference. Such differences are more likely related to government size than to government level, the author suggests. The thing he sees which sets apart all state governments—big or small—from the national government in press relations is the lack of public interest in state affairs. This lessens coverage, reporter interest, and officials' opportunities to obtain publicity.

The principal finding of the study is that different offices have different relations with the press, depending upon the officeholder's views of the press, his information needs, and his purposes in dealing with reporters. What constitutes "news" is still crucial, and some officeholders and certain activities are more likely than others to meet these vague criteria.

The Governor has a decided advantage in access to reporters and ability to use them to his advantage. Legislators are found to have more intimate ties with reporters, stemming from greater need for the press as an information source and the "newsworthy" nature of legislative activity. Administrators are least likely to develop close rela-

tions with members of the press, even though they find them valuable communication aids and are less wary of reporters than are elected officials.

- These are but a few of the specific findings of this study. They are carefully enumerated throughout the book and recapitulated in the concluding sections. The author makes no claim to complete delineation of the way the press affects policy-making in state government, but he ends by suggesting its impact will be the result of its attention-focusing ability, information-conveying and reporting on performance. The impact will be maximized, he claims, when policies are new or changing and when policy-makers are inexperienced.

The writing style utilized in this book does not arouse much reader interest. It is a precisely arranged, methodically presented body of data, each chapter neatly subdivided with major points listed initially and then elaborated upon—all in 1, 2, 3 order. The format ultimately made this reader feel the same message was being repeated over and over again—that limited data were being stretched to the utmost. Occasionally this seems to be the case, as when an important-looking italicized finding that “administrators, more than other officials, use the press to gauge timing” (p. 107) turns out to be based on the fact that there were responses in this vein from 4 of 25 administrators and no such responses from the 20 elected officials being covered. There are times when it is unclear whether or not the author has gone beyond his data in making generalizations. In part these difficulties arise because the author dissects his data from every point of possible interest.

Despite these weaknesses, the study does what the author claims. It adds to our limited supply of systematically-gathered knowledge about the relationships of public officials and news reporters. It broadens our understanding of statehouse politics. It provides a carefully-drawn analysis which invites replication in other states. In an age of mass communications and professional public relations, these constitute worthy contributions.—EARL A. NEHRING, *The University of Kansas*.

Metropolitan Decision Processes. By MORRIS DAVIS AND MARVIN G. WEINBAUM. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969. Pp. 150. \$6.00.)

Davis and Weinbaum have undertaken a controversial task and are to be congratulated, first off, for having the imagination to do it. They have assembled thirty-two rather diverse case studies of policy-making in metropolitan areas and attempted to systematize the case data by coding the narratives according to each interaction reported or clearly implied. After making certain adjustments—the authors are impeccable in reporting their procedures in detail—2,842 interaction units are available for analysis.

Seven aspects of interaction are employed as variables: *modes*, distinguishing among meetings, messages and public statements; *actor roles*; *spatial location*, including central city and three levels of remoteness from the city; *permeability*, or the extent to which the interaction was open to observation or participation; *formality* or structuredness of the interaction; continuity, or the extent to which the interactions are *ad hoc* and ephemeral, extended but specific to the case, or regular community patterns; and *flows over time*. The time variable is analyzed primarily by dividing the total period of the case-event into four equal periods and observing interaction rates and associated factors in the quartile periods.

The legitimacy of the Davis-Weinbaum undertaking can be considered from at least two perspectives. One is pragmatic—does it generate theoretically meaningful empirical patterns? Secondly, we must ask whether we can take seriously any results derived from procedures which, by systematizing the unsystematic impressions and interpretations of diverse authors, are so far removed from the empirical reality. To this reviewer the answer to both questions is a qualified affirmative. There are certainly some interesting findings. For example, the authors discover that business interests participate at a rather steady and high rate throughout the life of a civic issue while non-business groups tend to come in mainly toward the end. Or, again, small cities display a more closed and informal pattern of interaction than large cities. There are several dozen propositions derived and conveniently summarized at the end of each chapter. Still, one has a sense of disappointment at the final product. Not many of the tables generate much grist for an interpretive or theorizing mill. Relatively few of the propositions are likely to provoke new directions in research.

Perhaps the difficulty lies in the procedures employed. Do case studies—at least, these case studies—contain rich enough ore to make mining worthwhile? I believe that Davis and Weinbaum have demonstrated techniques by which the ore can be recovered, but I doubt that it is as yet an economical undertaking. If we contrast this effort with James Coleman's synthesis, *Community Conflict* (1957), a significant difference is apparent. Coleman pulls together a number of studies into his impressionistic bag, ponders them, and then generates some hypotheses which may *subsequently* be tested systematically by others. Davis and Weinbaum are trying to reverse this process, developing theory out of a rather special and quite limited kind of research—the narrative case study—which has been done already and done usually for heuristic or pedagogical purposes rather than to contribute to the development of empirical theory. Most cases, taken by themselves, seem to me rather low grade ore. Lest we seem more negative

than is intended, however, it should be stressed that for mining case study materials Messrs. Davis and Weinbaum have provided an impressive model, and they have developed enough usable gold to encourage others to make comparable efforts with other sets of cases.—ROBERT H. SALISBURY, *Washington University*.

Congress and the Public Trust, Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Special Committee on Congressional Ethics. By JAMES C. KIRBY, JR. (New York: Atheneum, 1970. Pp. 351. \$8.95).

This volume, brought out by a committee of the prestigious New York City Bar Association is a timely, if limited, contribution to the recent discussion and debate about Congressional ethics and, even more broadly, Congressional reform. In a sense, it is a companion volume to an earlier report by the Association on conflict of interest and the executive branch. As a result of its studies the Committee proposes: 1) a Model Code of Conduct 2) Model Disclosure Rules 3) some recommendations for changes in existing statutes, such as in the area of campaign financing and finally 4) some informal standards for Congressional conduct, such as total abstention from the practice of law.

In arriving at these recommendations, the Committee pursued an extensive research program including a review of reference materials, discussions with key observers (journalists, attorneys, Congressional staff, administration and social scientists) and extensive interviews with a stratified sample of Congressmen. Its focus was on the following topics: conflicts of interest, Congressional law practices, campaign financing, salaries and allowances, gifts, supplemental funds and honoraria.

The report is noteworthy in several respects. First, its lack of self-righteous finger pointing. Rather it attempts to understand the behavior of Congressmen in the milieu within which they work (particularly its special pressures and demands), and the nature of the functions they perform in the political system. Second, they never underestimate the complexity of the topic, nor the impossibility of entirely wiping out the ambiguities in any set of standards. And they recognize that no code can ever replace an ultimate reliance on the decency and integrity of the members themselves and the sanction of the ballot box. Nor do they regard their proposals as a panacea or final answer in a society with changing values and sensitivities.

The Committee, however, narrowed its focus, perhaps unduly, and as a result did not consider some very timely and crucial topics. For example, they excluded intervention by members of Congress into issues pending before administrative agencies. Such intervention raises some very diffi-

cult and perplexing questions and is deserving of study. They also excluded lobbyists on the grounds that while their methods raise ethical questions, it involves the ethics of constituents and interest groups more than the ethics of members of Congress. This seems a rather debatable compartmentalization of the legislative system.

In its conclusions, the Committee also seems highly optimistic, for they contend that "Congress has entered an historic new phase of ethical self-discipline." (p. 231) What this conclusion is based on is not made clear. However, it seems related at least in part to the establishment in each chamber of an Ethics Committee. But the study suggests earlier that such Committees would not have been embraced by Congress without the impetus of the Baker, Powell and Dodd cases and the pressure of public opinion and that the reluctance to use self-discipline is still in the background (pp. 220-21). Indeed, what groups (whether it be teachers, policemen, lawyers, doctors, etc.) do discipline their fellow members except under outside pressures of considerable magnitude? Perhaps, it would be more realistic to include public members on such Committees or set up an outside Commission to hear complaints, as was done with the salary issue, with each chamber reserving final power.

Because this is largely a set of prescriptions for behavior the dynamics of Congressional life is somewhat lacking. This is particularly evident in their five page survey of the history of the Senate and House Ethics Committees (pp. 216-221) which is notably flat and uninformative. This reviewer found James Boyd's *Above the Law* or Robert Getz's *Congressional Ethics* more interesting in this regard.

Finally, as the authors are well aware, they are dealing with only a small facet of Congressional activity that has bearing on the public's perception of the integrity and responsiveness of Congress. Indeed, it may not even be the most important one. The rules and procedures, the openness of the institution, and its responses to current problems and challenges may be even more pertinent in an appraisal of Congress as a responsible institution.—DALE VINYARD, *Wayne State University*.

The Politics of Corruption: Organized Crime in an American City. By JOHN A. GARDINER. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. Pp. 129. \$5.95.)

John A. Gardiner's book is well worth reading, albeit quickly. This monograph is a case study on the relationship of organized crime to civic corruption in "Wincanton U.S.A." (The names appear to be changed to protect the guilty.)

This work was developed out of research done for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and suffers accordingly. Like many reports padded into

books, this is a "déjà vu" book, i.e. thoughts, ideas, summaries, even whole sentences appear and reappear like bit players in a "cheap-jack" movie. If this was a dissertation evaluation one would recommend that there are a couple of *good articles* here and no more. Thus, though a short work, it merits the "quick reading" designation.

In spite of this I recommend the book. In fact it would make a good supplementary reading in any undergraduate urban problems or policy course having a section on crime. The merit of the book is that the author has stressed and reminded us—in our recently rediscovered emphasis on organized crime and police policy—that civic corruption is the societal payoff of organized crime, and has illuminated its operation. The effects of civic corruption are detailed—some \$2,400 a week was pocketed by Wincanton's key public officials—as is the effect of corruption on the political attitudes of Wincanton's citizens. At the same time, the author successfully balances the dilemma of a democratic society between the demands for a vice-free society and the recognition of a vice tolerant human nature.

In this book Gardiner also casts light on the multifaceted nature of corruption. He shows, for example, how when top officials "sell out" those below them have few alternatives—if they want to stay around—but to keep quiet or join in. He also notes the effects on "beat officers" who, aware of the corruption of their superiors, are tempted to engage in their own petty rackets, such as accepting bribes from speeders. Perhaps most frightening, in a free society, he notes how a "bought government and police" can be used to "legally" remove those who do not accept the leadership of the organization.

Not one to back off from his research, Gardiner offers, in conclusion, some concrete suggestions about how the corruption of law enforcement agencies might be reduced.

First, improve the internal structure of law enforcement agencies. In Wincanton, as in some Connecticut cities, party loyalty, patronage, and payoff work to constrain and defeat merit and dedication in the appointment and operation of the police department.

Second, improve the role and initiatory energies of state and federal agencies. The Wincanton case suggests that these agencies are at times remiss in developing and initiating legal action when that action might intrude on the local police agency even where there is a strong smell of official corruption, and that petty rivalries between agency bureaucracies at times hinder and delay this action.

Third, eliminate the fragmentation of local government and the decentralization of power that facilitates the division and conquest of local authori-

ties (Wincanton possessed a modified Commission system). To this end the author suggests a strong mayor system and notes the virtues of democratic centralism. While not convinced on this point since it would seem that any structural form is corruptible, one must defer to the author's experience.

Fourth, attempt to reduce the conflict between popular values and formal legislation. Here the author notes that the public is inadequately aware of the relationship between the consumption of illicit goods and services and the growth of organized crime and corruption. He suggests that while laws exist, public ignorance, apathy to "crimes without victims," and human interest in vice, may make some middle path most acceptable. Certain forms of vice, notably gambling, should perhaps be legalized, or perhaps the government should negotiate a series of "understandings" or license the purveyors of vice. An interesting sidelight to this point, the author finds that in Wincanton, as elsewhere, one-issue reform movements that come in to "clean things up" fade in the stretch and are a poor return bet.

Organized crime in America is a big business. In fact it is one of America's largest enterprises. In Wincanton, horse and numbers gambling grossed \$1.3 million annually, the dice game had an *employee payroll* of \$350,000, and the illegal still could produce \$4 million worth of alcohol a year. One notes that in comparative terms this is a relatively small operation, but then "Wincanton" is a city of less than 100,000 people. Unfortunately, few Americans realize that the operations of organized crime stretch far beyond our major cities to gross, by the best government guessestimate, some \$7 to \$50 billion a year from gambling alone. Fewer still realize how it can corrupt government and law enforcement to the point where all citizens suffer and civic trust is eroded. By bringing these problems to light Gardiner has performed an important service, and his information and insights should be passed on to students and citizens alike. —PETER A. LUPSHA, *Yale University*.

Aging and Society. Volume 1: An Inventory of Research Findings. EDITED BY MATILDA WHITE RILEY, ANNE FONER AND ASSOCIATES. *Volume 2: Aging and the Professions.* EDITED BY MATILDA WHITE RILEY, JOHN W. RILEY, JR., MARILYN E. JOHNSON AND ASSOCIATES. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Vol. 1, 1968. Pp. 636, \$35.00; Vol. 2, 1969, Pp. 410, \$9.50.)

These two first volumes of a trilogy sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation tell a great deal about aging, even more about "OP" (older persons), much less about aging and society, and virtually nothing about society. This is too bad. For the effort and the conscientious care which have

Zinn the past of a society—is to be judged not by the power and freedom available to its best-off citizens, or even to the average citizen, but by the kind of life available to its *outsiders*. Zinn, like several others now doing the same kind of work in diverse areas of research—Lemisch, Stephen Thernstrom, Michael Parenti, Peter Bachrach, Louis Lipsitz, and Robert Coles for example—has made a major contribution to a more balanced judgment of this society. It may be time for the practitioners of this kind of scholarship to come together and create their own standard texts to spread their unconventional wisdom.—PHILIP GREEN, *Smith College*.

Interest-Groups. By GRAHAM WOOTTON. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. 116. \$1.95 paper, \$4.95 cloth.)

This textbook is introductory, comparative, theoretical and short. Descriptions of group behavior appear only as examples, the purpose being to provide a framework within which students may analyse and compare interest groups, their activities and impact. The guiding formulation is:

PA → T : G

which means that Private Actors (other than political parties) seek to influence governmental Targets to secure certain Goals.

Wootton starts with an incursion into semantics, examining several definitions of "interest group" and purposes served by defining it. He concludes that these have led to a "muddle." He then proposes the device of a "real" (rather than "literary") definition, one which flows from Observers' efforts to explain actions in their context and to relate them to other actions and situations in order to understand and interpret them; e.g., "handsome is as handsome does." Then he suggests that the symbol PA may stand for whatever agency one feels it necessary to study.

Thereupon he introduces Parsonian pattern variables, somewhat adapted, to represent the social context in which group actions take place. There are Economic (adaptive) groups, e.g., factories, farms and mines; Integrative groups, e.g., legal institutions; and Cultural (pattern maintenance) groups, e.g., families, churches and schools. The fourth category, Political, of course, provides the Targets. Other dimensions include latent-manifest, industrial-agrarian, and first, second and third order groups, from operating units up to peak associations. These typologies lead into his "general hypothesis" (p. 38) that "line of importance of interest groups *tends* to follow the contours of manifest functional significance."

He further makes clear the difficulty of classifying some groups by this set of variables, note that Targets, such as legislatures and executives, may

not perceive the latent functional significance of groups in the same way as Observer does, and hypothesizes that ascribed status-groups such as veterans appear to be influential beyond their functional contribution. He discusses the "anchorage" of certain front organizations in more basic interests. Then he sets forth the variables to be analyzed: The Actor group and its Goals and claims, the Targets and their constitutional and electoral base, the Political Parties, the impinging activities of other groups, and the Political Culture in which it all takes place. Adapting Dahl, he evaluates influence in terms of the number of Targets a set of Private Actors can affect, how far it can move them, at what cost to T in terms of altered normative commitments, and the scope of action, i.e., the variety of policies that can be influenced. He classifies the endowments of groups as money, organization, control over jobs, expert knowledge, votes and prestige (note the absence of ideological appeal), and observes that the willingness to devote these endowments to political action as well as the ability to employ them efficiently are critical variables. He examines the responsiveness of Targets, and their occasional willingness to incite group pressures upon themselves and other Targets. Thus he covers many of the concepts of traditional and contemporary interest group studies, incorporating them into an integrated scheme of analysis.

This is an introductory text, and should be evaluated as such. First, its assets. Wootton regularly, explicitly reminds the student that he is Observer, that data do not speak for themselves, that phenomena as perceived by Actors or Targets may be evaluated differently. He distinguishes what is to be established empirically from what is assumed or defined. He relates his scheme to those of other social and political theorists, which is useful to undergraduates, who usually are not adept at transferring what they have learned in one course or discipline over to another. The important variables are listed, explained and appraised. The examples he gives are set in a comparative framework—usually British vs. American—and they serve to keep theory and data in touch with one another.

The style—brisk, straightforward, almost conversational—should be a joy to students. Why can't American scholars write like this? An example, apropos of functional requisites (p. 32): "As for survival, we can judge that for an organism, but what is it—and what is death—for a society or social system? In the functionalist canon the sweet simplicity of death is lacking."

Among its shortcomings must be listed the evasive character of the hypotheses. The central one (see above) is essentially a metaphor in which "lines" tend to follow "contours." I am unable to

see how this or any other metaphorical proposition can be falsified. His subsidiary hypothesis, that business groups are powerful because production is functionally important, has a tinge of circularity about it. But perhaps it is unfair to expect testable hypotheses from functional analysis.

Though quite suitable in style and content as an introductory text for theoretical analysis, it probably will work better with students who have acquired some sophistication. It would be better to start a budding social scientist out along the well-mapped terrain of comparative political parties than to throw him into the labyrinth of group theory where some senior scholars have perished.

My final cavil is not with this book but with interest group studies in general. They derive from and remain too largely preoccupied with business interests and the counterforce of organized labor. They have not come to grips with recent events in the United States. Following the theory presented here, especially the portion dealing with endowments of groups, one could reasonably have predicted that the Economic Opportunity Act would not pass Congress, that the Welfare Rights Organization would be impotent and that college students would exert a negligible impact upon foreign and defense policy.

On balance, this looks like a good textbook.—
WILLIAM BUCHANAN, *Washington and Lee University*.

The Anti-Communist Impulse. By MICHAEL PARENTI. (New York: Random House. 1970. Pp. 333. \$7.95.)

This book by a young political scientist of a radical bent is directed not to specialists but to a general readership. Although it is something more than a tract (perhaps also something less) its evident purpose (a laudable one, as far as it goes, in the opinion of this reviewer) is to influence contemporary politics, to persuade people, to change the minds of readers about current affairs. "My Hope," Mr. Parenti writes, "is that this book will help others entertain new images and new realities of the kind that might bring us to a saner, less tragic political world."

The means Mr. Parenti has used to try to fulfill this worthy hope is a kind of hortatory and thoroughly disapproving analysis of what he sees to be a distinct social-political phenomenon, "anti-communism" (that is, *American* anti-communism; he does not examine international varieties, to deal with which might complicate his argument considerably). This "anti-communism," he says sweepingly, "is the most powerful political force in the world . . . it commands the psychic and material resources of the most potent industrial-military arsenal in the history of mankind. Its forces are deployed on every continent, its influence is felt in every major region, and it is

capable of acts which—when ascribed to the communists—are considered violent and venal. Our fear that communism might someday take over most of the world blinds us to the fact that anti-communism already has. If America has an ideology, or a national purpose, it is anti-communism. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been expended, and hundreds of thousands of lives have been sacrificed on its behalf." If the reader will look closely at the use of the word "it" and "its" in those sentences—"it" commands, "Its" forces are deployed, "it" is capable of violent, venal acts—he will see what Mr. Parenti's central idea and rhetorical strategy is, and perhaps also (depending maybe in some part on his own political opinions) what is wrong with it.

To this reviewer Mr. Parenti in parts of this book seems to be a more sophisticated Fred Schwarz, stood on his head. (Fred Schwarz, the reader may remember, is that "You can trust the Communists—to be Communists" man who in the early sixties went around the country lecturing at "anti-communist" schools, explaining that one must "teach" about the omnipresent, terrible, almost omnipotent thing "communism" in the same way that medical schools teach about cancer). It may have been a deliberate ploy of Mr. Parenti's, to do with "anticommunism" just what, as he says, the Americans he is criticizing have done with "communism." But the result of adopting this device, it seems to this reviewer, is to give to his own book something of the polemical distortion, the over concentration on ideology divorced from events. The blurring together of quite distinct positions, the unhistorical scoring of points by people living in one situation against people living in a quite different one, that characterize the phenomenon he attacks.

This is one of these controversial opinion-reflecting books of which it will be hard to find an objective review. In the present intellectual climate no doubt it will receive some favorable ones. In an attempt to be fair the present reviewer should state (what is already evident) that he is less than sympathetic to the political position from which the book is written; the reader should make whatever adjustments he thinks that fact requires. But surely Mr. Parenti intends not only to reinforce those who already agree with him but also to persuade and educate a reader with somewhat different opinions, and one may therefore usefully state why that did not work in the present case. Obviously the first question is, how does the writer relate this obsessive self-deluding American "anti-Communism" that he describes to objective realities in world politics? The Soviet Union, and Communist China, and communist movements elsewhere, after all, do exist, and do have a real history, however distorted popular American perceptions may be. What is the *corrected* perception of the events and realities of

cold war history? Mr. Parenti's book has an unsatisfactorily tangential relation to that question, which gets short shrift. He focuses instead rather too exclusively on America's national self-righteousness, and moral imperialism, and self-justifying myths, and so on.

The second question is, how does the book relate popular American anti-communism (of which indeed a separated opinion-study could be made) to American policy making and to serious American interpreters of world politics? The answer is, that he binds them all in one bundle of simplified obsessive anti-communism. The cover of the book carries ugly mask-pictures not only of Senators Joseph McCarthy and Karl Mundt, but also of Secretaries Dulles and Forrestal, and also Presidents Eisenhower and Truman. There will be readers who will find it meaningful to regard Joseph McCarthy and Dean Acheson as part of the same thought world, but this reviewer is not one of them.

A point that Mr. Parenti very much wants to make—he argues some of these rather well—is that “liberals” during the cold war period reinforced the nation's vulgar and obsessive anti-communism by regularly acceding to it, reiterating how anti-communist they are too. There is truth in that. But Mr. Parenti does not assess accurately how much of that liberal anti-communism was genuine, based in brutal experience and not merely on public relations considerations. And a reader who remembers the time cannot in his heart bring himself to join Mr. Parenti in condemning—to choose just one striking example—Owen Lattimore, after his ordeal, for listing in his book all the anti-communist things he had written and said. Such a reader cannot believe that this book will help much in bringing “a saner, less tragic political world.”—WILLIAM LEE MILLER, *Indiana University*.

Politics and the Community of Science. By JOSEPH HABERER. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969, Pp. 337, \$3.50.)

In the light of steadily increasing concern over questions relating to the social responsibility of scientists, this book has been published at a most appropriate time. For its main purpose is “to examine modern science in the light of some fundamental political and moral problems with which its rise to a major institution of society has confronted us.” (p. i)

For Professor Haberer, science is not just one of society's major institutions. In his opinion it is quite possible that science is becoming the “leading institution” of society. In large part his judgment is based on the view that “modern man looks not to the Church or the State, nor even to the Corporation or the Military, but to Science and the scientist for answers to his besetting problems.” (p. 3) There is good reason to share the

latter view. Ironically, the effect of the case that Haberer argues throughout his book is to show that it is the nation-state and not science, the emerging “leading institution,” which is the object of the ultimate loyalties of scientists themselves. As the author himself points out, scientists have generally been much more prepared to make serious sacrifices for the sake of their nation-states than for the sake of science or the scientific community. Thus, to say that science is becoming the leading institution of society is not to say that it constitutes a community which claims the ultimate loyalties of its members.

The author begins his examination of modern science by describing what he considers as the two main conceptions or models of science as a community and the role of that community within the political order. These two models are those advanced by, and embodied in, the behavior of Bacon and Descartes.

For the author the significance of Bacon and Descartes is that they

laid the philosophical and institutional bases for the whole enterprise of modern science [and] provided the rationale and the models for the community of science, as well as a pattern and vision for its future development. (p. 20)

While the ideas of Bacon and Descartes differ in certain crucial respects, those relating to the role of the scientist vis-à-vis the State are similar. As the author puts it,

In any serious confrontation with State or Church . . . they [Bacon and Descartes] both advocated a tactic of prudential acquiescence: their theory and their conduct posited retreat or an apparent acquiescence as the appropriate response to danger. (p. 80)

Haberer disclaims the possibility of unequivocally establishing any causal relationship between the ideas of Bacon and Descartes and the behavior of scientists in specific situations involving the State. However, his approach is based on an assumption that those ideas and the institutional development of science which was based on them inevitably have some influence even on the behavior of scientists in recent times.

The method by which the existence of a pattern of prudential acquiescence is established consists of an examination of the relationship of Bacon and Descartes to the political authorities of their day and the responses of two scientific communities, the German and the American, to sets of events which constituted major crises for those communities or their leaders.

The author's judgment on the response of the scientific community to crises in a harsh one. He concludes that

when the interests and values of science confront those of politics, the community of science has ultimately tended to acquiesce with astonishing ease, permitting, with only token opposition, the destruction of colleagues and scientific institutions, and the perpetration of obvious assaults upon the integrity of science itself. (p. 310)

Thus the German scientific community acquiesced in "Nazi attacks on the integrity of science, Jewish colleagues and the traditional autonomy of university life," (p. 155) and American "scientists' public response on behalf of [J. Robert] Oppenheimer can be characterized as weak, nonactive, and tenuous." (p. 293)

For Haberer, the failure of the community of science to defend itself against the State suggests that members of the community may in fact be committed to no "ultimate values," such as the search for truth, and thus have functioned as guns-for-hire in the interest of whatever values the State chooses as desirable. Scientists are urged to face the question of their "social responsibility" and to abandon the outdated assumption that "progress" is an inevitable, and desirable, product of science.

The book succeeds in making explicit and clarifying important questions involving the relationship of science and governments. It also convincingly demonstrates that the scientific community has acquiesced to governments at crucial points in history and has generally been unwilling to face up the question of its "social responsibility." Furthermore, it calls attention, explicitly or implicitly, to a number of areas which might profitably be the subject of future research by political scientists employing a wide variety of methods. One of the more significant of these areas is that involving the socialization of scientists and the implications of that socialization for their attitudes and behavior vis-à-vis government and public affairs.

In terms of the book's objectives, its failures are relatively minor and in large part unavoidable consequences of the breadth of its scope and the nature of its methods. For example, Professor Haberer himself notes that previous literature on the relationships between science and government suffers from an assumption of the universality of conclusions drawn from studies of single countries. In spite of the fact that his work encompasses a time period of more than 300 years and a geographical range of four countries, his evidence derives from a small number of case studies and is subject to some of the same kinds of objections he makes to previous work. Nevertheless, the inclusion of historical and comparative perspectives represents a significant addition to the literature.—JAMES E. UNDERWOOD, *Union College*.

Revolutionists in London: A Study of Five Unorthodox Socialists. By JAMES W. HULSE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 246. \$6.00.)

Professor Hulse examines the impact of tolerant late Victorian London and the company of each other on five radicals: the Russian nihilist-activist, Sergi Stepniak; the Russian anarchist-philosopher,

Peter Kropotkin; the German Marxist, Eduard Bernstein, and the two British men-of-letters, William Morris and George Bernard Shaw. In the receptive London intellectual environment the three radical exiles changed considerably in the direction of democratic liberalism. The two Britishers were, in turn, influenced toward more radical positions by their contact with the expatriates.

Hulse sets out on "an experiment in synthesis" with the five thinkers "to understand each of them better by looking at them together, comparing them as it were with one another rather than describing each of them against a more generalized background" (22). His objective is not to duplicate the works of G. D. H. Cole, with its encyclopedic classification, or of others who have focused on the organizational machinations of radicals. Because he found "people more interesting than petty factional struggles and men of integrity more fascinating than men of power" (vii), Hulse became disappointed with the conventional accounts of Socialism, Communism and Anarchism which focus on institutional and doctrinal disputes and neglect the personalities involved.

Although Hulse puts forth his work as a synthesis, he devotes most of his study to each thinker separately or to their individual influences on each other. In only two places (22-24 and the final paragraph, 228) does he turn his attention to the five together. The men did not think of themselves as a group. They worked alone and contacted each other singly. If they ever came together at one time, it was likely a chance meeting, perhaps at a public debate or in the home of Frederick Engels.

Lines of influence among the five, furthermore, were uneven. The Morris-Shaw relationship was close and well-known; Kropotkin had frequent contact with Morris and was admired by Shaw, and Stepniak seems to have been friendly with each of the others. Bernstein had a warm friendship with Stepniak and his ideas have some parallels with Kropotkin's, but his contacts with Morris and Shaw seem to have been minimal.

Sergei Stepniak-Kravchinskii has been bypassed by most interpreters of revolutionary socialist thought, including Cole. Hulse makes it apparent the Stepniak has been wrongly ignored. Stepniak, a practicing terrorist, had assassinated a Russian adjutant general. He saw this and other terrorist deeds as defensive, collective acts of reformers, the necessary logical results of Tsarist bureaucracy. His appeal to the English intellectual community on behalf of the Russian peasants won him support in Britain and America. At the same time his last dozen years in London mellowed his terrorist zeal. The London atmosphere and the success of German Social Democrats convinced Stepniak that violence was not necessary to advance socialism, even under authoritarian govern-

ment. Before he died, in his mid-forties, in 1895, he had reached revisionist conclusions similar to those of his friend, Bernstein. Since little has been written in English about Stepniak, Hulse's work provides an introduction to this apparently influential nihilist. Hulse uncovers enough to arouse curiosity but not enough to provide a full understanding of Stepniak, opening the door for further work.

Kropotkin and Bernstein also underwent transitions from militance to moderation during their London years. Kropotkin was in London thirty-one years before returning to Russia during the 1917 revolution. Bernstein stayed in London thirteen years, from 1888 until he again became involved in politics in Germany. Hulse shows that Kropotkin's revolutionary anarchism, although resolute throughout his life, ended in frustration in Bolshevik Russia. Nevertheless he did not dilute his anti-capitalist, anti-statist ideas and maintained that a revolutionist had an ethical obligation to restrain hate and irrational violence.

Bernstein was not known as a revisionist until toward the end of his stay in London, but Hulse maintains Bernstein's revisionism did not result from an intellectual debt to the Fabians. Instead, it was more the general English atmosphere, Bernstein's contact with Engels, his work on Ferdinand Lassalle's writings, and his interest in seventeenth-century English revolutionary history that made him sceptical of final dogmas. "Socialism got a good history from Bernstein's studies of the English revolutions, but it also got a man who had developed a taste for heresy" (143).

The chapters covering Morris and Shaw do not seem as well developed as the others. Morris and Shaw might have been compared to the three exiles without separate treatment. Neither underwent the dramatic transformations of Stepniak and Bernstein or the gradual mellowing of Kropotkin. Hulse sees Morris as "an English equivalent of the *narodniki*" (80) but never rigid in his position, receptive to the ideas of the Marxists as well as of Stepniak, Kropotkin, and Shaw. "Shaw's Socialism," Hulse concludes, "was an amalgamation of his early admiration of Marx's denunciation of capitalism, his preference for the moderate procedures of the Fabians, and his anarchist yearning for the total transformation of society" (228).

In general Hulse presents each of the thinkers separately, but he can be credited with making an effort to integrate the ideas, personalities, and intellectual environment of these unorthodox radicals in Victorian London.—RONALD CHRISTENSON, *Gustavus Adolphus College*.

Montesquieu's System of Natural Government.

By HENRY J. MERRY. (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1970. Pp. 414. \$8.50.)

We cannot but be amazed by the breadth of Montesquieu's scholarship. He seems to present a comprehensive view of politics by comprehending an almost bewildering variety of societies and practices, and by enabling the reader to supply variations left out. If Montesquieu teaches by example, we are faced with the challenge that one must become a truly cosmopolitan scholar to understand either Montesquieu or politics.

Professor Merry seeks to correct the parochialism of American interpretations of Montesquieu's works. Heeding the warning in the introduction to *The Spirit of the Laws* that "a great many truths will not appear till we have seen the chain which connects them with others," he searches for the unity that will enable one to understand the diversity of subjects contained in Montesquieu's great work.

Our parochialism is excessive legalism, the allegedly mortal disease of old-fashioned American political science. This view finds the heart of Montesquieu to be a doctrine of separation of governmental powers as the guarantee of liberty. It vulgarizes Montesquieu and mistakenly lends the authority of a wise man to American institutions whose true origins are mundane. Montesquieu must also be defended against sociologists who see his discussion of climatic influence as but a primitive forerunner of modern sociology. In truth, the ancestor equals or surpasses the progeny. Far from dwelling amid provincial legalism or simplistic climatic determinism, Montesquieu finds his true home in contemporary sociological and psychological sophistication. Merry banishes parochialism by showing that the 18th century baron is at least as sociological as we are.

The coherence of *The Spirit of the Laws* is found to be that of a system: a complex series of interrelationships that have a pattern. The unity is a system because it is composed of relationships between parts, not between parts and the whole. One need not look at the form or end of government. Nor is the pattern of relationships to be found between governmental institutions. Rather, one must view how government stands in relation to natural—that is, sociological and psychological, as opposed to political—factors. While Montesquieu prescribes healthful medicine for France, his deeper intention and accomplishment is to set forth a system of natural government that will give the reasons for every government without judging the ends of any.

The opening chapters of Merry's book summarize Montesquieu's ideas about the nature of man and society. Montesquieu, who was at home among the world's strangest customs, is assumed to share the opinions of man expressed by those two amazed Persian tourists, the tormented Usbek and his companion Rica. The problem discussed can here only be indicated by Montesquieu's remark,

"It is well that there has been in the world some good and some bad; without that, one would be driven to leave this life."

•The bulk of the book examines *The Spirit of the Laws*. Books XIV-XXXI are discussed first in order to proceed from nonpolitical to political. Since Merry contends that Montesquieu believes the latter does and must reflect the former, he treats the subpolitical first in order that politics may be better understood. He argues that Montesquieu seeks to establish the independence of economics, religion, and civil law from politics and political law in order to unleash the activity stimulated by greed and checked by fear of God, and to replace natural by civil law as the standard of political law.

Read in the light of Montesquieu's treatment of nonpolitical things, books II-X, which have traditionally been regarded as a discussion of forms of government, are interpreted to be an examination of the capabilities, roles, and relations of the three main social classes. Their purpose is to show the need for and foundation of a mixed government that reflects social forces and does not require austere virtues.

The final three chapters, which discuss the books on liberty (XI-XIII), seek to show that both civil and political liberties are primarily nurtured and secured by the proper distribution of political authority among the three social classes rather than by legal separation of powers. Professor Merry finds that the famous discussion of the English Constitution is not central to *The Spirit of the Laws*, but deals with only one kind of political liberty and that not the most important. Furthermore, Montesquieu's natural government cannot be understood, and is distorted, by looking at its end of liberty. A spirit of moderation is more to be sought by mixed government than even liberty.

Professor Merry's book is best when it is closest to Montesquieu. He reminds us of the breadth and subtlety of Montesquieu, and gives us the fruits of reflective hours spent in the baron's company in many provocative interpretations. He has an easy time in rescuing Montesquieu from legalistic Americans, though one might wonder whether there was not some truth in the old prejudice. For if the ends of government are given, is there a more important question than how these ends are achieved? It is true that Montesquieu writes about the spirit, but it is the spirit of the laws.

Merry would have Montesquieu read in our times by showing that he speaks like our times. The use of social science terminology confuses the interpretation and makes Merry say less than he knows. For example, to say that moderation is higher than liberty in Montesquieu's value hierarchy is to neglect the fact that neither moderation nor liberty is a value for Montesquieu, but one a

spirit and the other an end of the laws. This confusion prevents Merry from clearly raising and adequately answering the question whose general form might be, "Why does Montesquieu write about the spirit of the laws rather than the end of law?" To say that Montesquieu values the spirit more than the end is no answer.

One is tempted to suggest that Montesquieu should be read in the light of what preceded him rather than in that which followed. The character of the mixed government admired by Montesquieu is never clarified by Merry as it could have been had he compared it to the mixed regime of Aristotle. The opening discussion of the nature of man would have been less a mere collection of opinions had he sharpened the issues by, say, reflecting on the previously quoted remark in the light cast by the *Politics*. Furthermore, the warrant for such comparisons would be Montesquieu's own, as it is he who uses the traditional terminology to change it.

Finally Merry's procedure hides from us the most important lessons of Montesquieu. Montesquieu proceeds from the old classification of governments to the new. In discussing Montesquieu, Merry proceeds from the new sociology and finds the old classification irrelevant. Accepting Merry's interpretation of the character of the new political science, one might wonder whether Montesquieu's order does not indicate that political philosophy leads to sociology, where Merry's order seeks but to reveal Montesquieu as a political sociologist. In portraying Montesquieu as a sociologist, Merry nearly forgets that he was a philosopher. By neglecting the possibility that Montesquieu does not merely present a system, but that he gives the reasons for doing what we now do out of habit, Merry downplays precisely that element of Montesquieu from which our times might learn the most.—GLEN THUROW, *State University of New York at Buffalo*.

Robert's Rules of Order. (New Revised). BY HENRY M. ROBERT, SARAH CORBIN ROBERT, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF HENRY M. ROBERT III, JAMES W. CLEARY, AND WILLIAM J. EVANS. Glenview, Illinois. Scott Foresman and Co. Pp. 550. 1970.

If it is natural for Americans, at least middle and upper class ones, to join voluntary organizations; it is almost as natural for those organizations to run, at least in principle, in accord with parliamentary procedure. While hundreds of manuals of parliamentary procedure have been published over the years, of which well over a dozen are currently in print; there remains only one *Robert's Rules of Order*. For almost a century, ever since it replaced *Cushing's Manual of Parliamentary Practice* (1844) as the basic parliamentary reference work, to virtually all Americans *Robert's*

Rules is parliamentary procedure and using any other manual would be sacrilege. Indeed, it has been seriously suggested that only the Bible has had a greater influence on the organizational behavior of Americans. Almost three million copies of *Robert's* various editions have been sold since 1876, which has made it one of the all-time nonfiction best-sellers.

Although General Henry M. Robert has been dead for nearly half-a-century, *Robert's Rules of Order* lives on; and within its pages the ideas of the long-dead general are perpetuated. The present edition, edited by the General's daughter-in-law with the assistance of several others including the General's grandson, is the first complete revision since 1915 and the first new edition in nearly twenty years; but there is nothing in it that would be new to General Robert. It supersedes previous editions, but has been written to be "in complete harmony" with them. Nonetheless, in the words of its inside front cover dustjacket, this edition is "more modern, more complete, more comprehensive, better organized, more clearly presented, more efficient, and FAR EASIER TO USE than any earlier edition," a description with which I am in complete accord.

Robert's Newly Revised is several hundred pages thicker than the 75th Anniversary Edition which it replaces. It incorporates material from General Robert's earlier works, *Parliamentary Practice* and *Parliamentary Law*, so as to provide for the first time answers to various esoteric questions of procedure in one definitive reference work. Earlier editions of *Robert's Rules* had charts which were impossible to use, with stars, asterisks, footnotes, and fine print enough to confuse even an experienced parliamentarian. This new edition has a forty-eight page center section of charts and tables, readily set off by a different color and heavier stock paper, which is an absolute delight to use for the student seeking quick reference as to form, precedence, and applicability of motions. This new edition also has the pleasant distinction of being reasonably well written and exceptionally well organized. Logical arrangement of material has replaced the old paragraph format and the order of presentation has been designed to be in accord with the natural flow of business at meetings. The ambiguous classification of certain motions has been remedied and the basic classification scheme clearly explained. For each motion, a section in outline form clearly and succinctly sets forth the motion's basic operational characteristics and its uses. All in all, the new edition is far superior to any of its predecessors.

Robert's Rules has an importance to the social scientist which goes well beyond its possible immediate relevance to him as a concerned participant in various group decision processes. Parlia-

mentary procedure, especially that distillation of it which has entered into parliamentary law—those common principles of procedure which are held by the courts to be the applicable to every organization as being essential to legal action or for the protection of members in their individual rights—has been important in shaping and refining basic American notions of due process and majority and minority rights as applied to group activity. Indeed, *Robert's Rules* has been cited as authoritative in a number of court cases. More generally, however, *Robert's Rules* may be regarded as an implicit theory of democracy. For many Americans its procedures are synonymous with practical democracy. In fact, the inside jacket cover calls *Robert's* the "book you will want . . . the book you will need, to help get things done in accord with the American spirit (emphasis mine)." Contrasting the procedures in *Robert's* with those practiced by Quakers and with the Quaker inspired "participatory democracy" procedures of the New Left reveals quite different priorities assigned by each to values such as speed of deliberation, unanimity, intensity of preference v. majority rule, mass participation, etc.—raising questions which should be of great interest to any student of democratic theory. *Robert's Rules* is also important to the student of public policy concerned with the impact of rules on outcomes, and is, of course, particularly relevant to the student of legislative behavior. Finally, for the mathematically oriented political scientist, *Robert's Rules* offers for study a remarkable and fascinating system of queueing rules.

In an era where faculty meetings, student-faculty meetings, and mass meetings abound, we do not wish to neglect consideration of *Robert's* as a guide to the parliamentarily perplexed. It is possible for someone to learn parliamentary procedure by reading *Robert's Rules of Order* from cover to cover, but we would certainly not recommend it.* Despite the stated intentions of the editors of this edition to combine in it a definitive reference work and a teaching manual, it is only the former which has been achieved; although this edition is

*To learn the basics of parliamentary procedure we would recommend Alice F. Sturgis, *Learning Parliamentary Procedure*, McGraw-Hill, 1953. Her *Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure* is also excellent.

far superior to its predecessors in its accessibility to the parliamentarily uninitiated. Despite vast improvements in organization and in prose style, *Robert's Newly Revised* is, like its predecessors, marred by an archaic terminology (e.g., previous question, lay on the table), some unnecessarily complex and confusing rules (e.g., reconsider, committee of the whole v. informal consideration), and some rules which could best be dispensed with (e.g., move to reconsider and enter on the min-

utes, object to consideration) which fealty to the dead General Robert and a desire to maintain terminological accord with the U.S. House of Representatives have unfortunately frozen into place. While this new edition is a vast improvement in so many ways, it is also a great disappointment to those who had looked for a genuine revision and modernization of American parliamentary practice. For example, the discussion of procedures which could be adopted in either very small or very large gatherings when ordinary parliamentary procedure becomes unduly cumbersome (either because it is too formal or because it becomes bogged down in the weight of large numbers of participants) is woefully inadequate, despite a considerable improvement in the section on mass meetings; and in general we found some lack of sensitivity to the need to vary procedures in accord with the size and nature of the group. Also, the section on voting procedures reveals no knowledge of recent work on committee election procedures, such as that of Duncan Black, which is highly relevant to a consideration of selection of an appropriate and fair voting procedure. Regardless, however, of its shortcomings, *Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised* is definitely a book with which most political scientists should become acquainted.—BERNARD N. GROFMAN, *State University of New York, Stony Brook*.

The Origins of Socialism. By GEORGE LICHTHEIM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 302. \$6.95.)

The purpose of Professor Lichtheim's book is not merely what it seems to be. The purpose is to "clarify the origins of socialism, both as a worldview and as the specific response of workers and intellectuals to the twofold upheaval of the French Revolution and the industrial revolution." (p. vii) This is achieved by presenting socialism as originating in French and English thought but receiving its "classical formulation" in Marx "with the help of German philosophy." This theme explains the tripartite division of the book, entitled respectively "Heirs of the French Revolution," "Critics of the Industrial Revolution," and "German Socialism." The author himself, however, renders this explanation questionable. Although "socialism's greatest thinker" did his "real theoretical work as an economist" after 1848, "technical reasons" forced concluding the book with that date. This strange omission suggests that the "technical reasons" in question are of more than passing importance.

Even without this problem, the book's structure is "peculiar and somewhat daunting" since "German Socialism" is not congruent with the other titles. His explanation: the book was originally intended as "the opening section of a general history

of socialism and communism." The author does not say why its structure was not properly adjusted, since that would require changing only a title. This omission raises the question why he broaches the structure at all? And why is either problem relevant to the reviewer? The answers have to do with what the reviewer understands to be a conclusion reached by the author in the course of his "general history."

"sons" forced concluding the book with that date.

Although there are no further statements as to why the original plan was not completed, there is another reference to "technical points" (p. viii). These have "for the most part" (i.e. not completely) been relegated to the Notes. The suspicion that the Notes have some unusual relevance is supported by the author (p. ix): "The discerning reader who takes the trouble to consult the Notes. . . ." However, the Notes' dimensions have "been swelled by the attempt to cite as many sources as possible." This reason explains neither their size nor their importance for the "discerning reader."

What does the author mean by such peculiarities explained by weak reasons? He disclaims "any intention beyond the obvious one of providing the student with a concise analysis of the subject and a critical introduction to the literature" (p. viii). But "the discerning reader," not "the student" is told to consult the Notes. The discerning reader notices the proportion (1:3) between Notes and text. The number 3 recalls the "peculiar and somewhat daunting" external arrangement. Part 3 merits peculiar attention especially since the author said (p. 98) Part 3 is "The Marxian Synthesis" rather than "German Socialism."

"The Marxian Synthesis" asks whether "the threshold of our concluding chapter" coincides with "the summit of our theme?" The answer "depends on what one expects from an analytical account of socialist origins." The answer never becomes explicit. But we can glean an answer which explains the "technical reasons" which puzzle this reviewer.

The original theme must be qualified. Marx was not merely a socialist writer who "combined German philosophy with British economics and French socialism." He was a philosopher essentially concerned with "the genesis and functioning of modern society." By 1848 Marx transcended socialism as such. This synthesis may "continue to be of importance to the historian of philosophy long after socialism has taken its place, with liberalism and conservatism, as one particular reaction to the twofold upheaval of the industrial revolution and the French Revolution." And having done that Marx abandoned philosophy.

I suggest the major technical reason for ending this study with 1848 is the author's conclusion that

it socialism's "summit" (the subject of his concluding chapter) "Marxism" chose "critical" (partial) understanding, which could be revolutionary, over "comprehensive" understanding which it thought must necessarily be static. Philosophically, as distinguished from economically or politically, that is a decline. The historian of philosophy cannot but be daunted by the moral and intellectual price of this choice and it is not surprising that the "external arrangement" of his book should bear marks of his dismay.

Students will find this book intimidating because it is written with extraordinary care and because the attention devoted to unfamiliar figures and to explicating complex movements is overwhelming. Historians of philosophy should brush up on political economy before reading Part II. Conceptually, the author's link between socialism

and Natural Law reveals a defective understanding of the latter's development. He speaks of "the ancient doctrine of Natural Law" (p. 107, *italics mine*) which begins with the Stoics and has merely a "variant" in Locke and his followers. Seen as one unbroken tradition, he cannot explain how it gave rise both to inequality and private property, and to equality and common ownership (pp. 108-109). This problem can be explained by recognizing two traditions, *jus naturale* and *lex naturalis*. Failure to distinguish them was already a Hobbesian theme. (Leviathan, Chapter xiv). On the whole, this book is recommended to those seeking a comprehensive, critical, and non-doctrinaire view of the topic. Students seeking instruction about particular figures or movements should approach it with considerable background.—GARY D. GLENN, *Northern Illinois University*.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Public Officials and the Press. By DELMER D. DUNN. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 208. \$2.95.)

This study undertakes the task of adding to our knowledge of the interrelationships of news reporters and government officials through as intensive analysis of the views and activities which make up these relationships in a particular environment—state government. Conceived in the image of Bernard Cohen's *The Press and Foreign Policy* it adapts Cohen's conceptual framework and applies it at the state level, going beyond Cohen (and other studies of national news reporting) by specifically focusing on the differences in press relations found among executive officials, administrators and legislative leaders. An effort also is made to assess the impact of the particular level of government.

Data for the study are drawn primarily from interviews with 50 state officials and 21 political reporters in Wisconsin in the winter of 1966-67. These were supplemented by personal observation and newspaper reading. Three brief Appendices provide details on methodology, conceptual framework and related research.

The author meticulously describes the work of gathering and presenting the news and the conceptions reporters have of their roles. This is followed by a presentation of the public official's side of the picture—his view of the reporter's role and performance, how much he is exposed to the press, what he gets from the press and how he goes about providing information to the press.

The book provides no startling conclusions. The author finds his data tend to confirm the principal judgments reached in previous studies at the national level by Cohen, Dan Nimmo, Douglass Ca-

ter and Donald Matthews. It can be said, also, that his data underwrite impressions this reviewer has acquired in some years of observing state capital political reporting—impressions, I suspect, that are shared by many political scientists.

Even though Professor Dunn finds "press relations are closely akin at both levels of government" (p. 150) he notes some distinctions. There is less need for the press to help communications in state government than in the Washington bureaucracy. State officials do not need the instant reporting of news tickers—life in the states is not crisis-oriented. Nor do they have as great a need for the structured interaction of the press conference. Such differences are more likely related to government size than to government level, the author suggests. The thing he sees which sets apart all state governments—big or small—from the national government in press relations is the lack of public interest in state affairs. This lessens coverage, reporter interest, and officials' opportunities to obtain publicity.

The principal finding of the study is that different offices have different relations with the press, depending upon the officeholder's views of the press, his information needs, and his purposes in dealing with reporters. What constitutes "news" is still crucial, and some officeholders and certain activities are more likely than others to meet these vague criteria.

The Governor has a decided advantage in access to reporters and ability to use them to his advantage. Legislators are found to have more intimate ties with reporters, stemming from greater need for the press as an information source and the "newsworthy" nature of legislative activity. Administrators are least likely to develop close rela-

tions with members of the press, even though they find them valuable communication aids and are less wary of reporters than are elected officials.

- These are but a few of the specific findings of this study. They are carefully enumerated throughout the book and recapitulated in the concluding sections. The author makes no claim to complete delineation of the way the press affects policy-making in state government, but he ends by suggesting its impact will be the result of its attention-focusing ability, information-conveying and reporting on performance. The impact will be maximized, he claims, when policies are new or changing and when policy-makers are inexperienced.

The writing style utilized in this book does not arouse much reader interest. It is a precisely arranged, methodically presented body of data, each chapter neatly subdivided with major points listed initially and then elaborated upon—all in 1, 2, 3 order. The format ultimately made this reader feel the same message was being repeated over and over again—that limited data were being stretched to the utmost. Occasionally this seems to be the case, as when an important-looking italicized finding that “administrators, more than other officials, use the press to gauge timing” (p. 107) turns out to be based on the fact that there were responses in this vein from 4 of 25 administrators and no such responses from the 20 elected officials being covered. There are times when it is unclear whether or not the author has gone beyond his data in making generalizations. In part these difficulties arise because the author dissects his data from every point of possible interest.

Despite these weaknesses, the study does what the author claims. It adds to our limited supply of systematically-gathered knowledge about the relationships of public officials and news reporters. It broadens our understanding of statehouse politics. It provides a carefully-drawn analysis which invites replication in other states. In an age of mass communications and professional public relations, these constitute worthy contributions.—EARL A. NEHRING, *The University of Kansas*.

Metropolitan Decision Processes. By MORRIS DAVIS AND MARVIN G. WEINBAUM. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969. Pp. 150. \$6.00.)

Davis and Weinbaum have undertaken a controversial task and are to be congratulated, first off, for having the imagination to do it. They have assembled thirty-two rather diverse case studies of policy-making in metropolitan areas and attempted to systematize the case data by coding the narratives according to each interaction reported or clearly implied. After making certain adjustments—the authors are impeccable in reporting their procedures in detail—2,842 interaction units are available for analysis.

Seven aspects of interaction are employed as variables: *modes*, distinguishing among meetings, messages and public statements; *actor roles*; *spatial location*, including central city and three levels of remoteness from the city; *permeability*, of the extent to which the interaction was open to observation or participation; *formality* or structuredness of the interaction; continuity, or the extent to which the interactions are *ad hoc* and ephemeral, extended but specific to the case, or regular community patterns; and *flows over time*. The time variable is analyzed primarily by dividing the total period of the case-event into four equal periods and observing interaction rates and associated factors in the quartile periods.

The legitimacy of the Davis-Weinbaum undertaking can be considered from at least two perspectives. One is pragmatic—does it generate theoretically meaningful empirical patterns? Secondly, we must ask whether we can take seriously any results derived from procedures which, by systematizing the unsystematic impressions and interpretations of diverse authors, are so far removed from the empirical reality. To this reviewer the answer to both questions is a qualified affirmative. There are certainly some interesting findings. For example, the authors discover that business interests participate at a rather steady and high rate throughout the life of a civic issue while non-business groups tend to come in mainly toward the end. Or, again, small cities display a more closed and informal pattern of interaction than large cities. There are several dozen propositions derived and conveniently summarized at the end of each chapter. Still, one has a sense of disappointment at the final product. Not many of the tables generate much grist for an interpretive or theorizing mill. Relatively few of the propositions are likely to provoke new directions in research.

Perhaps the difficulty lies in the procedures employed. Do case studies—at least, these case studies—contain rich enough ore to make mining worthwhile? I believe that Davis and Weinbaum have demonstrated techniques by which the ore can be recovered, but I doubt that it is as yet an economical undertaking. If we contrast this effort with James Coleman's synthesis, *Community Conflict* (1957), a significant difference is apparent. Coleman pulls together a number of studies into his impressionistic bag, ponders them, and then generates some hypotheses which may *subsequently* be tested systematically by others. Davis and Weinbaum are trying to reverse this process, developing theory out of a rather special and quite limited kind of research—the narrative case study—which has been done already and done usually for heuristic or pedagogical purposes rather than to contribute to the development of empirical theory. Most cases, taken by themselves, seem to me rather low grade ore. Lest we seem more negative

han is intended, however, it should be stressed that for mining case study materials Messrs. Davis and Weinbaum have provided an impressive model, and they have developed enough usable gold to encourage others to make comparable efforts with other sets of cases.—ROBERT H. SALISURY, *Washington University*.

Congress and the Public Trust, Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Special Committee on Congressional Ethics. By JAMES C. KIRBY, JR. (New York: Atheneum, 1970. Pp. 351. \$8.95).

This volume, brought out by a committee of the prestigious New York City Bar Association is a timely, if limited, contribution to the recent discussion and debate about Congressional ethics and, even more broadly, Congressional reform. In a sense, it is a companion volume to an earlier report by the Association on conflict of interest and the executive branch. As a result of its studies the Committee proposes: 1) a Model Code of Conduct 2) Model Disclosure Rules 3) some recommendations for changes in existing statutes, such as in the area of campaign financing and finally 4) some informal standards for Congressional conduct, such as total abstention from the practice of law.

In arriving at these recommendations, the Committee pursued an extensive research program including a review of reference materials, discussions with key observers (journalists, attorneys, Congressional staff, administration and social scientists) and extensive interviews with a stratified sample of Congressmen. Its focus was on the following topics: conflicts of interest, Congressional law practices, campaign financing, salaries and allowances, gifts, supplemental funds and honoraria.

The report is noteworthy in several respects. First, its lack of self-righteous finger pointing. Rather it attempts to understand the behavior of Congressmen in the milieu within which they work (particularly its special pressures and demands), and the nature of the functions they perform in the political system. Second, they never underestimate the complexity of the topic, nor the impossibility of entirely wiping out the ambiguities in any set of standards. And they recognize that no code can ever replace an ultimate reliance on the decency and integrity of the members themselves and the sanction of the ballot box. Nor do they regard their proposals as a panacea or final answer in a society with changing values and sensitivities.

The Committee, however, narrowed its focus, perhaps unduly, and as a result did not consider some very timely and crucial topics. For example, they excluded intervention by members of Congress into issues pending before administrative agencies. Such intervention raises some very diffi-

cult and perplexing questions and is deserving of study. They also excluded lobbyists on the grounds that while their methods raise ethical questions, it involves the ethics of constituents and interest groups more than the ethics of members of Congress. This seems a rather debatable compartmentalization of the legislative system.

In its conclusions, the Committee also seems highly optimistic, for they contend that "Congress has entered an historic new phase of ethical self-discipline." (p. 231) What this conclusion is based on is not made clear. However, it seems related at least in part to the establishment in each chamber of an Ethics Committee. But the study suggests earlier that such Committees would not have been embraced by Congress without the impetus of the Baker, Powell and Dodd cases and the pressure of public opinion and that the reluctance to use self-discipline is still in the background (pp. 220-21). Indeed, what groups (whether it be teachers, policemen, lawyers, doctors, etc.) do discipline their fellow members except under outside pressures of considerable magnitude? Perhaps, it would be more realistic to include public members on such Committees or set up an outside Commission to hear complaints, as was done with the salary issue, with each chamber reserving final power.

Because this is largely a set of prescriptions for behavior the dynamics of Congressional life is somewhat lacking. This is particularly evident in their five page survey of the history of the Senate and House Ethics Committees (pp. 216-221) which is notably flat and uninformative. This reviewer found James Boyd's *Above the Law* or Robert Getz's *Congressional Ethics* more interesting in this regard.

Finally, as the authors are well aware, they are dealing with only a small facet of Congressional activity that has bearing on the public's perception of the integrity and responsiveness of Congress. Indeed, it may not even be the most important one. The rules and procedures, the openness of the institution, and its responses to current problems and challenges may be even more pertinent in an appraisal of Congress as a responsible institution.—DALE VINYARD, *Wayne State University*.

The Politics of Corruption: Organized Crime in an American City. By JOHN A. GARDINER. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. Pp. 129. \$5.95.)

John A. Gardiner's book is well worth reading, albeit quickly. This monograph is a case study on the relationship of organized crime to civic corruption in "Wincanton U.S.A." (The names appear to be changed to protect the guilty.)

This work was developed out of research done for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and suffers accordingly. Like many reports padded into

books, this is a "deja vu" book, i.e. thoughts, ideas, summaries, even whole sentences appear and reappear like bit players in a "cheap-jack" movie. If this was a dissertation evaluation one would recommend that there are a couple of *good articles* here and no more. Thus, though a short work, it merits the "quick reading" designation.

In spite of this I recommend the book. In fact it would make a good supplementary reading in any undergraduate urban problems or policy course having a section on crime. The merit of the book is that the author has stressed and reminded us—in our recently rediscovered emphasis on organized crime and police policy—that civic corruption is the societal payoff of organized crime, and has illuminated its operation. The effects of civic corruption are detailed—some \$2,400 a week was pocketed by Wincanton's key public officials—as is the effect of corruption on the political attitudes of Wincanton's citizens. At the same time, the author successfully balances the dilemma of a democratic society between the demands for a vice-free society and the recognition of a vice tolerant human nature.

In this book Gardiner also casts light on the multifaceted nature of corruption. He shows, for example, how when top officials "sell out" those below them have few alternatives—if they want to stay around—but to keep quiet or join in. He also notes the effects on "beat officers" who, aware of the corruption of their superiors, are tempted to engage in their own petty rackets, such as accepting bribes from speeders. Perhaps most frightening, in a free society, he notes how a "bought government and police" can be used to "legally" remove those who do not accept the leadership of the organization.

Not one to back off from his research, Gardiner offers, in conclusion, some concrete suggestions about how the corruption of law enforcement agencies might be reduced.

First, improve the internal structure of law enforcement agencies. In Wincanton, as in some Connecticut cities, party loyalty, patronage, and payoff work to constrain and defeat merit and dedication in the appointment and operation of the police department.

Second, improve the role and initiatory energies of state and federal agencies. The Wincanton case suggests that these agencies are at times remiss in developing and initiating legal action when that action might intrude on the local police agency even where there is a strong smell of official corruption, and that petty rivalries between agency bureaucracies at times hinder and delay this action.

Third, eliminate the fragmentation of local government and the decentralization of power that facilitates the division and conquest of local authori-

ties (Wincanton possessed a modified Commission system). To this end the author suggests a strong mayor system and notes the virtues of democratic centralism. While not convinced on this point since it would seem that any structural form is corruptible, one must defer to the author's experience.

Fourth, attempt to reduce the conflict between popular values and formal legislation. Here the author notes that the public is inadequately aware of the relationship between the consumption of illicit goods and services and the growth of organized crime and corruption. He suggests that while laws exist, public ignorance, apathy to "crimes without victims," and human interest in vice, may make some middle path most acceptable. Certain forms of vice, notably gambling, should perhaps be legalized, or perhaps the government should negotiate a series of "understandings" or license the purveyors of vice. An interesting sidelight to this point, the author finds that in Wincanton, as elsewhere, one-issue reform movements that come in to "clean things up" fade in the stretch and are a poor return bet.

Organized crime in America is a big business. In fact it is one of America's largest enterprises. In Wincanton, horse and numbers gambling grossed \$1.3 million annually, the dice game had an *employee payroll* of \$350,000, and the illegal still could produce \$4 million worth of alcohol a year. One notes that in comparative terms this is a relatively small operation, but then "Wincanton" is a city of less than 100,000 people. Unfortunately, few Americans realize that the operations of organized crime stretch far beyond our major cities to gross, by the best government guess estimate, some \$7 to \$50 billion a year from gambling alone. Fewer still realize how it can corrupt government and law enforcement to the point where all citizens suffer and civic trust is eroded. By bringing these problems to light Gardiner has performed an important service, and his information and insights should be passed on to students and citizens alike.

—PETER A. LUPSHA, *Yale University*.

Aging and Society. Volume 1: An Inventory of Research Findings. EDITED BY MATILDA WHITE RILEY, ANNE FONER AND ASSOCIATES. *Volume 2: Aging and the Professions.* EDITED BY MATILDA WHITE RILEY, JOHN W. RILEY, JR., MARILYN E. JOHNSON AND ASSOCIATES. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Vol. 1, 1968. Pp. 636, \$35.00; Vol. 2, 1969, Pp. 410, \$9.50.)

These two first volumes of a trilogy sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation tell a great deal about aging, even more about "OP" (older persons), much less about aging *and* society, and virtually nothing about society. This is too bad. For the effort and the conscientious care which have

gone into the fashioning of these volumes have clearly been very great. A platoon of 68 distinguished "consultants and advisors" has been mobilized to conduct painstaking search missions through the many chapters of facts, figures and interpretations. The failure of the work to come to grips with social processes and problems—let alone political ones—is all the more disappointing. Possibly volume three, which is to examine the "implications (of the research findings) for sociological understanding" will remedy this defect; but the chance seems remote.

It is difficult to find the proper term to describe Volume One, the "Inventory." The words "atlas," "compendium," and "propositional inventory" all come to mind. Innumerable research findings on the economic, social and physical condition of the aged have been culled from virtually every respectable study done in the United States and from a few conducted in other countries, mostly those of Western Europe. Each finding is summarized succinctly in a few precise sentences. The multitude of findings is presented in tightly organized chapters, so that it is possible to examine at a glance all of the research results bearing on some particular question. The most important or most typical findings are illustrated by "exhibits"—charts and graphs which convey information with striking clarity and economy in presentation. The editors, moreover, show much scholarly concern for the quality of the information. They have selected only studies which, in their judgment, have been competently executed; and occasionally they add cautionary notes apprising the reader of possible errors due to research design problems or sampling biases.

All of this is most commendable. Irrespective of its content, the volume is a monument to scholarly thoroughness and responsibility. It should be shown to every graduate student as an object lesson in the art of organizing and weighing information.

Volume Two consists of chapters written by "professionals" drawn chiefly from the faculties of professional schools. The task assigned to the writers was to derive, from the findings arrayed in Volume One, implications for the professions they represent—social work, medicine, public health, architecture, law, economics, religion, education and communications. The result is less than a full success. The professionals, aided by their advisors, essentially deal with current changes in their professions' outlook and with some special problems that older people present to them. Professor of Medicine Louis Lasagna and Professor of Nursing Doris R. Schwartz each devote long sections of their chapters to the ethical and practical problems of care for dying patients. On the other hand, Professor of Economics Juanita M. Kreps presents a

careful analysis of income, expenditures and savings among age groups as a foundation for a rather inconclusive discussion of income re-distribution. Professor of Architecture John Madge speculates about the desirability of various housing arrangements for older persons. Whether or not they quote Volume One, it is rather doubtful that the findings have in any important way affected their views. Indeed, in spite of the editors' insistent prefatory notes on "the relevance of Volume One," it is rather difficult to see by what logical procedure the "professional" could have drawn policy conclusions from the facts contained in the first volume.

Volume Two, even more than Volume One, reflects the state of the arts; and the state of the arts reflects the state of our society. We tend to see social problems as the problems of some particular group—the young, the old, the black, the poor—and not as problems inherent in our social and political structures and in our cultural practices and values. To be sure, the aged do have special problems, but many of these are different from those of other people in magnitude rather than in kind. Old people are sick more often and more severely than are younger people, they are (perhaps) more isolated, they often are severely deprived by insufficient incomes. But the problems that cry for both scholarly analysis and social action are those of health care, social integration and income maintenance for *all* people. The physical lay-out and the social climate of our cities is not merely bad for the aged (or the black, or the poor), it is just plain bad. It is rather doubtful that either systematic scientific analysis of social processes and systems or coherent policy making will be possible so long as we keep focussing so much of our attention upon some particular groups of whose existence we have become painfully aware.

In this context, it is rather significant that Volume One has virtually nothing to report about society. A few paragraphs are devoted to "norms," e.g. legislation concerning the financial responsibility of children for their aged parents. Reading these two volumes, one would never guess that the current welfare system has been accused, by both the left and the right, and by both academics and practitioners, of undermining the self-reliance and personal dignity of recipients. And, *a fortiori*, there is nothing to tell us what social and political processes make the aged (or the young, or the black) a special group in society in the first place—a group which the public, the expert and the policy maker then perceive as a problem group.

The editors and authors would clearly have been able to include much more material on social policy, minimally some compilation of legislative patterns and possibly an examination of their socio-

be allocated; and finally it was his iconoclastic passion for civil liberties combined with abrasive wit, more so than the ongoing work of the Fund that unleashed the wrath of the opposition and threatened the organization's continued survival.

Only when it became evident that the Fund was in danger of losing its tax-exempt status and would thereby forfeit the entire Ford Foundation subsidy, did the board of trustees, drawn largely from the ranks of establishment lawyers and corporation executives, intervene to restrain Hutchins and erase the growing fellow-traveller image. After narrowly avoiding dismissal, Hutchins tempered his own public appearances and modified the organization's direction. Gradually, projects that had angered professional anti-communists, such as studies critical of blacklisting practices, federal loyalty-security programs and Congressional investigations were discontinued or allowed to lapse, and funds were channeled to more acceptable programs in the fields of school integration, race relations and the threat of American Communism. Moreover an extensive public relations campaign was launched to persuade Middle America that the defense of civil liberties was in the spirit of true conservatism. Whatever embarrassment was suffered by the campaign—which elicited favorable response from both J. Edgar Hoover and the American Legion—was more than offset by declining interest in the Fund on the part of Congressional investigating committees and the Internal Revenue Service.

By 1956 the fervent national mood of anti-communism had abated, and the Fund was no longer a center of great controversy. While Hutchins's crusading impulses remained intact, the absence of formidable opponents sharpened his discontent with his administrative chores. With approximately 7 million of the original 15 million Ford money yet to be spent, Hutchins won the trustees' approval to reconstitute the Fund as the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Pasadena, thereby bringing to fruition a lifelong ambition that dated back to his association with Mortimer Adler at the University of Chicago to found a Platonic Academy. But as several staff members who opposed this proposal correctly foresaw, a permanent community of scholars cut loose from their institutional bearings would be more conducive to petulant infighting than new insights into the great issues.

As a grant-giving agency the Fund scored notable achievements, having encouraged and brought to completion such enduring works as Samuel Stouffer's *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, Telford Taylor's *Grant Inquest*, Lazarsfeld and Thielen's *The Academic Mind*, and Adam Yarmolinsky's *Case Studies in Personal Security*,

among others. Yet it is ironic to observe that the area where Hutchins felt the Fund could make its most distinctive contribution, the inculcation of widespread attitudes favorable to civil liberties, proved a qualified failure due to Hutchins's intemperate approach, poor choice of grantees, and resistance from the mass media and the general public.

Political scientists interested in the Fund as a case study of the problems of a nonprofit social science foundation will be disappointed with this book since the author presents no model or holds no firm conception of this type of organization to enable the most relevant data to be presented and judgments offered. Professor Reeves's fascination with the complexities of Hutchins's behavior and his desire to recapitulate by now familiar highlights of the McCarthy era tends to obscure the less obvious internal order. As a result important aspects of the Fund's operations are neglected, passed over lightly and sometimes misconstrued. For example, a comprehensive listing of the grants and recipients approved at board meetings is recorded, and the reader is assured in the conclusion that the projects were painstakingly and fairly selected. But neither the criteria or the screening process that produced the unusual record of successful work is discussed in detail. Professor Reeves affirms the wisdom of the Ford Foundation to restrict membership on the board to establishment figures, alluding to the loss of widespread support if a Roger Baldwin or Norman Thomas were to have served. Yet it is precisely such battle-hardened civil libertarian veterans who might have kept Hutchins under a tighter rein and averted the constant pitfalls that led to near extinction. Although the possible loss of tax-exempt status is a recurrent theme the author does not deal with the issue of whether the Fund's activities may have indeed violated existing laws and regulations. On at least two occasions it is noted without comment, substantial grants were made to Congressional committees sympathetic to the Fund's programs.

While the author fails to draw any parallels between the Fund for the Republic's struggles over civil liberties in the 1950's and the Ford Foundation's involvement in the juvenile delinquency, anti-poverty and community decentralization controversies of the 1960's, such a comparison would seem to be particularly appropriate for those wishing to evaluate the impact of social science foundations on public policy. Even though the current situation appears to be more complex and many liberals with strong commitments toward constitutional freedoms are ambivalent about these contemporary issues, the continuity between these approaches outweighs their differences. In point of

fact the Fund may have served as a staging-ground for these newer social programs since many of its staff during the 1950's—Joseph Lyford, Michael Harrington, John Cogley, Adam Yarmolinsky and Paul Jacobs have been closely identified with the programs emerging in the New Frontier and Great Society. Since the days of free-wheeling foundations are about numbered, and the files of the Fund are conveniently on deposit at the Princeton University Library, a re-examination of the Fund from this perspective might prove to be highly instructive.—ARNOLD J. BORNFRIND, *Queens College, City University of New York*.

The Influence of Federal Grants: Public Assistance in Massachusetts. BY MARTHA DERTHICK. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 285. \$8.50.)

This book is a descriptive case study of the impacts of federal grants for public assistance in Massachusetts from the 1930's through a major reorganization and centralization battle in the late 1960's. As a single-state analysis it reflects the assets as well as the limitations of the case study method.

This is not a standard chronological, blow-by-blow account of events, however. The bulk of the book (Part II, "The Pursuit of Federal Goals" extracts five issues for longitudinal and critical analysis. The five are: (1) adequacy of assistance, (2) equity of administration, (3) efficiency of administration, (4) giving of services, and (5) professionalization of personnel. This descriptive-analytic core is preceded by an introductory segment, "The Federal Government as Grant Giver." It provides an overview of the federal grant "system" and of the public assistance function. Part III, "The Consequences of Federal Action," discusses the exercise of federal influence and prospects for the grant system.

Among the themes and conclusions constituting a capsule summary of the book, I would offer the following:

- (1) federal influence, in addition to setting the agenda for the Massachusetts legislature on welfare issues, produced centralizing and professionalizing results;
- (2) influence exercised by federal administrators, to be effective, must be employed discretely and preferably subliminally;
- (3) a high level of conflict between federal and state welfare administrators may exist simultaneously with a high degree of cooperation and mutual support;
- (4) there is considerable utility in national administrators emitting ambiguous stimuli in an effort to precipitate state action;
- (5) intergovernmental relationships are cut

from the same whole cloth from which diplomatic relations are derived, namely, conflict bargaining, collaboration, coalition formation, negotiation, accommodation, risk, uncertainty, and strategy;

- (6) welfare, as Gilbert Steiner argues, is an issue transcending partisan politics;
- (7) it is difficult and perhaps impossible, as well as undesirable, to specify the conditions under which federal officials can measure with precision the degree to which states conform to federal standards;
- (8) after introductory innovations, intergovernmental relations operate incrementally (perhaps glacially) in the welfare field, with more than three decades required to achieve the structures, processes, and attitudes at the state-local level that closely approximate the objectives of national administrators;
- (9) intergovernmental relations are intimately linked to the more general features and philosophy of the American political system, particularly pluralism.

Criticisms of the book are best expressed by suggesting what the volume does not cover.

First, no careful or explicit theory or conceptual definition of influence is presented despite the statement (p. 5) that "My central purpose is to analyze the grant-in-aid system as an instrument of federal influence." The facts do, indeed, reveal that influence was exercised but the reader is left with considerable doubt about the generic character and the asymmetric aspects of the federal-state-local relationships described. Federal influence finally brought about centralized, state welfare administration in 1967. But can the actions taken and results achieved from this use of influence provide a basis for comparison in other areas of intergovernmental relations? Can the thirty years required to accomplish this result be traced to "weak" federal influence or "strong" localizing influences?

A closely-related second omission arises from the limitations of the case study method. Miss Derthick proposes "the case of public assistance as a standard of comparison and a source of hypotheses for the investigation of other programs" (p. 218). I found many important *issues* raised in the book, but I did not obtain the quasi-scientific precision conveyed by remarks about a standard for comparison (the measurement problem) and the hint at hypotheses (relations between two or more specific variables).

This volume is not a policy critique of federal grants-in-aid or of the public assistance program, although the reader is provided ample evidence to arrive at his own policy conclusions. Miss Derth-

ick's conclusions are analytic, abstract, and twice or thrice removed from translation into policy considerations.

On at least two points the level of abstraction leads the author to state as assumptions two intergovernmental considerations that are better treated as problematic. Both are captured in a single statement (p. 7): "In short, there is a grant system—a system by which the federal government seeks to influence the conduct of state and local governments in such a way as to promote the realization of its own goals." The proliferation of categorical grants into 160 programs and over 500 authorizations calls into question either the assertion that a system exists or else the definition of the term system. The second problematic element in the quotation is the implication of a unitary, common, or underlying aim representing the motive force behind grants. Apart from the reification present in the statement, the matter is not a closed question. It has the potential for laying bare a basic issue troubling our politics today. I refer to the debate over whether there is a conscious collective, and concentrated mobilization of power (bias?) in government or whether diverse, dispersed, and pluralistic patterns of value allocations prevail in the political community.

A concluding way of describing and identifying this volume is to compare it with recent books dealing with welfare and intergovernmental relations. It lacks the sense of policy criticism present in Steiner's *Social Insecurity*, although its depth and detail furnish evidence of the political constraints under which one welfare program has operated and blunts a few of Steiner's barbs. As a single-state case study it lacks the quantitative-comparative, policy-output approach adopted by Dye, Sharkansky, *et al.* But this volume sheds much more light on the impact of politics, processes, and administration on welfare policy than any set of correlation matrices. Compared with Elazar's *American Federalism: A View From the States*, it also focuses on state government as a keystone in the federal arch but deals less with imaginative and impressionistic interpretations of state politics or on individual motivations as a basis for a state's culture. But *The Influence of Federal Grants* does detail the dynamic and systemic character of intersecting forces on state decision making from a political and administrative standpoint. It also pinpoints the effects one state's political culture has on specific policy decisions. In adopting a process approach, the volume is close intellectually to the tack taken by the late Morton Grodzins (e.g., *The American System*). Miss Derthick parts company with Grodzins, however, in not sharing his descriptive and normative views of the American system as preponderantly cooperative and collaborative, one dominated by a be-

nign "mild chaos." Miss Derthick finds and contends that conflict is at least an equal partner in intergovernmental relations and she implies that more than a mild degree of chaos inheres in the system. It would have been interesting and instructive to have had a more direct discussion on whether the current degree of chaos is tolerable.

My overall evaluation of this book is fundamentally favorable. It combines a thoroughness bordering on the exhaustive with a judicious, economical, and clear presentation of facts and events. It weaves politics, policy, and administration in the seamless web found among these modes in the real world. It blends the description of issues with a healthy flavoring of political insights (sometimes buried in footnotes). The book should serve as a valuable supplement for political science courses in public administration, intergovernmental relations, and public policy and also for professional courses in welfare administration. The contents can be easily grasped by advanced undergraduates. —DEIL S. WRIGHT, *University of North Carolina*.

Taxes and Politics: A Study of Illinois Public Finance. By GLENN W. FISHER. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. 332. \$10.00.)

Many recent political science studies of state taxing and spending policies, such as those by Dye and Sharkansky, have been broadly comparative in approach and have involved substantial statistical analysis of the relationships between political and economic variables of various sorts and public policy. In marked contrast to this genre, Professor Fisher provides us with a detailed examination of the experience of a single state, although he does occasionally compare Illinois with the other states on such matters as tax yields and tax burdens.

Following a short introductory chapter in which he sets the context for his study, Professor Fisher proceeds to a description of Illinois state expenditure patterns and revenue sources. His treatment of the state's general sales tax is especially penetrating and meaty. From there he moves to a discussion of local government expenditure and revenue patterns, which he relates to state activity. Especially worthy of comment here is his consideration of the nature and problems of property taxation. The next two chapters comprise the more analytical portion of the book, involving as they do an economic analysis of the burden of Illinois taxation (he concludes that Illinois is a low tax burden state) and a somewhat traditional but nonetheless insightful analysis of the politics of taxation in the state legislative arena. The final chapter attempts an appraisal of the Illinois tax system from several perspectives found in political science and economic literature, e.g., the Downsian model democracy. As this brief summary indicates, Fisher is primarily concerned with the state tax

system. He does not deal systematically with the appropriations process, there really being no need to do so given the excellent earlier study by Thomas Anton, *The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois*.

Professor Fisher approaches his task in the manner of the political economist (albeit not the "new" political economist), utilizing both political and economic modes of analysis and data. Taxation and expenditure decisions are viewed as political decisions made within a framework provided by the state constitutions, case law, and custom, and shaped partly by economic analysis and considerations. No over-arching theory guides the study, a fact which some may lament. However, the author appears quite correct when he states that "there exists no integrated theory of the economics and politics of public finance which would serve as a framework for analyzing Illinois public finance."

Much of the tax data presented, and there is a substantial quantity of it in the text and in a sizeable appendix, is for the 1942-1965 period. Consequently, one gets a good longitudinal view, as well as a contemporary cross-sectional view, of tax patterns and developments in Illinois. Most of the data is presented in easily deciphered charts and tables. Although some statistical (correlational) analysis is employed, this is kept to a minimum. Those of our brethren with statistical antipathies will likely find this agreeable while those with stronger statistical proclivities will be less enthused. Partly for this reason the volume does little to make up for the lack of an "integrated theory" remarked on in the preceding paragraph of this review.

Political scientists will find the chapters concerned with the politics of taxation and appraisal of tax system the most interesting and pertinent to their tastes. However, useful pieces of political information and tantalizing insights and generalizations are scattered throughout the work. Thus we find that the Illinois Supreme Court, through interpretation and application of the detailed provisions of the state constitution, has played a major role in shaping the state revenue system. For instance, the state sales tax for several decades took the guise of a retailer's occupation tax, a legal fiction necessary to circumvent a constitutional barrier created by a court decision. Generally, one can conclude that tax policy formation has been characterized by a fair amount of judicial supremacy in Illinois. As Fisher states (p. 243), "Many debates about Illinois taxes turn into debates about wording the proposal to make it constitutional rather than remaining debates about issues of equity, administrative feasibility, or even yield." He further suggests that this may

help ameliorate tax conflicts by shifting them into verbal and technical channels. The proposition is indeed an interesting one.

Overall, this book is rich in factual content, essentially traditional in approach, competent in execution, and straightforward in style. It will be of particular interest to students of Illinois politics, specialists in state and local politics, and devotees of public finance. Some will probably wonder, upon reading or examining the book, whether in the fashion of the small boy's book on penguins it does not tell us more than we really need to know about taxation in Illinois. On the whole I think not. It is a solid reference work, among other things, and similar studies of taxation in other states would be desirable, both for the basic information they present and as the basis for more theoretically sophisticated analyses.

In conclusion, a reading of Fisher's book will provide one with much information on public finance in Illinois. It will also enhance one's understanding of and "intuitive feel" for Illinois politics, once aptly described by Fenton as the "politics of clout." A book which does these things is a worthy contribution to the literature.—JAMES E. ANDERSON, *University of Houston*.

The Public Vocational University: Captive Knowledge and Public Power. BY EDGAR LITT. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969. Pp. 159. \$3.95, paperback.)

The title of Professor Litt's book—*The Public Vocational University; Captive Knowledge and Public Power*—reveals its major thesis. The university to which he refers is the large state university and its captivity is brought on by its dependence on the Federal Government for grants and direction. His thesis is that higher education has become a "captive domain" gathering vocational knowledge which is used for political ends. Due to this captivity the university concentrates on the teaching of technical, impersonal knowledge rather than the cultivation of the inquisitive mind. Instead of being the state's critic, it treats the student to a "chauvinistic glorification of the national state." The products of this education are passive students skillful in applying knowledge to the technostucture and ready to assimilate quickly into it, rather than creative, truly intellectual and politically active human beings. The faculty, in turn, is less oriented towards dialogue between "adults and students" or inquiry with intellectuals and reformers and "more concerned about political relations with men of power." (p. 9) He compares the public university to the small liberal arts college—Amherst and Oberlin are cited—with its emphasis on humanistic studies and finds the university wanting.

This deficiency is seen as all the more alarming because large proportions of the students at the university are the children of the urban, immigrant working or lower middle class. For them the current curriculum tends to promote parochialism and to retard capacity for personal growth and intellectual criticism. In lieu of the establishment-oriented politics of consensus, which to him is apolitical, Litt would like to see the students become more politicized with a capacity for questioning the premises as well as the practice of many of our political institutions. In this context he makes some intriguing suggestions for engaging students in community action and for increasing their contacts with non-college groups to bring about a fresh new look at politics.

His major attack on the vocational university is levied against its "practical" curriculum which he judges to be inhibitory of intellectual growth and human development. Instead of the "practical curriculum," he suggests the introduction of an updated, relevant, but genuinely liberal arts curriculum with heavy emphasis on the humanities and social sciences. In this context he advocates an imaginative revision of the core curriculum and opportunity for ample experimentation in content and teaching methodology. He develops in some detail his notion of an experiential or human development curriculum. The developmental curriculum is seen as potentially liberating for the human personality, conducive to self-awareness, the shedding of old values, and the making of new decisions. It stresses intellectual eminence and increased political participation, participation which is change-rather than status quo-oriented.

Professor Litt's book can be admired for its educational prescriptions and yet be criticized for its diagnosis and its practicality. To deal with the diagnosis first: His exposé of the ills which beset the large universities is to-the-point although these same "ills" beset the best private universities since utilization of federal funds is as high there, in some instances higher, than in the public ones, and since training of personnel for the technocracy, the corporate world, and the professions is as much part of their curriculum as it is in the public university. The book can also be criticized for frequently failing to supply evidence for a major and otherwise cogent point. For example, what is the evidence that vocationalism and acceptance of grants has led to increased service to the state when compared to the universities of yesterday? The main critique, however, must be reserved for the practicality of his plan. It is unlikely that any university, public or private, can really model itself educationally after Amherst and Oberlin not only because—as he points out—they have different student bodies but because the small college gen-

erally has no graduate school and is essentially dedicated to teaching. The university is designed as a research institution and a training institution for professionals; the emphasis on research and on technical skills therefore is all but unavoidable. Nor can we really seriously plan for such an education when our goal will have to be to admit more students than ever before—students who, because of their background, have no choice but to be vocationally oriented.

The author's preference for a liberal arts curriculum dedicated to the cultivation of the human intellect and its critical functions strikes a very responsive chord with this reviewer. Like the author, the reviewer feels that this is what education should be all about. Such education is even more needed today than it was 50 years ago because the universities are becoming host to ever larger number of students for whom this will be the only exposure they will ever have to such a cultural tradition. Having said this much the reviewer, however, hastily has to add that what ideally ought to be does not seem to be synonymous with what realistically can be. Neither students nor faculties nor taxpayers seem at the moment prepared to repeat on a large scale the experience of the small liberal arts college. Students came to college either in search of practical training or in search of relevance. In neither case do they express but scant interest in the more analytic, reflective courses dealing with literature, the historical past, or theoretical issues. Nor would they welcome renewed emphasis on course requirements—even in the name of a core curriculum. Taxpayers, on the other hand, are becoming increasingly more reluctant to finance the small classes, experimental curricula, light teaching loads, etc. which go along with, his type of quality education. The demands for open admission only compound the dilemma. The faculty on the other hand has long recognized that the greatest returns in the profession come as a result of publications and not from the number of undergraduates they educate well. Moreover, while they probably share with Professor Litt his preference for a critical and politically engaged student body, many may of late have come to look upon it as a mixed blessing and one not always conducive to the pursuit of academic excellence and serenity. All of which can spell only one thing, namely larger classes, more instruction by teaching assistants, poorer student advising, and lower standards for admission.

In short, while the Litt formula is appealing, the temper of the times and the very real need for mass education probably will limit its usefulness. There is nothing wrong with the Litt formula provided there were enough money and innovative spirit available to try it. Money and innovative

spirit, however, are in short supply these days in academia.—ROBERTA S. SIGEL, *State University of New York at Buffalo*.

The Air Force Plans For Peace 1943-1945. BY PERRY MCCOY SMITH. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. Pp. 132. \$5.95.)

This is a study of what could have been a most significant round of military decision-making, but probably wasn't. Smith's analysis covers the planning of two committees nominally entrusted with post-war planning for the Air Force from 1943-1945. We are tempted to take the deliberations of the Post War Division (of the Air Staff, Plans) and the Special Project Office seriously by default, if no one else held an explicit mandate to plan for what became the most significant military force of the post-World War II world. Yet Smith shows the produce of these committees to be relatively unrelated to this future world, except for the major structural accomplishment that the Air Force won its independence from the U.S. Army. Analyses almost never speculated about the Soviet Union as an enemy; was this because even the military was caught up in the naive assumption of close post-war relations with Stalin's country? And what does it do to the revisionist interpretations which credit the United States with launching the Cold War early in 1945, primarily in brandishing air power?

Smith argues that Air Force officers could not take the Soviet Union seriously as an enemy simply because the Russians did not yet have any strategic air force. Yet this at least suggests that no one in the White House or the State Department bothered to label Moscow as the likely enemy, if war scenarios could be shaped by such narrow professionalism. The Air Force planning committees were indeed not even privy to the atomic bomb. Perhaps this was legitimated by uncertainty as late as 1944 on whether the bomb would work, but how meaningful could planning be in the summer of 1945 without this information? Air Force officers, to be sure, could assume victory through air power in the future even with simple high-explosive bombs, but wouldn't a knowledge of nuclear weaponry have made all such speculation a little more reasonable? These planners thus had no clue that Japan might surrender in 1945 rather than 1946 and 1947. Could anyone have been attaching importance to these committees if he could not fill them in on such basic premises?

Smith never really makes clear how seriously he himself takes the role of these committees. It is difficult to write a Doctoral Dissertation and book without implicitly premising that the objects of study are functionally very significant. Some of Smith's sentences thus suggest great importance, others much less, for the "decisions" generated.

To assess the significance of these committees accurately, some questions could have been raised which this book does not answer. What about the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which is mentioned only once in passing in the entire book? Was there any exchange or interchange between it and the Air Force planning here described, Some coordination might have to be present to prove that this exercise was being taken seriously. What about General Lemay's change of bombing tactics in 1945 over Japan, from the nominally anti-capability precision bombing which the A.A.F. had conducted in Europe, to a sort of counter-morale area-bombing campaign resembling that of the R.A.F.? What about post-war structuring of the independent U.S. Air Force, Does it show signs of being determined by the plans of 1943 to 1945? General Orval Anderson is briefly described as having been a functional forerunner of the planning bodies as late as 1943. Anderson, unlike his successors, was willing to point by name to the USSR as a potential enemy for the postwar world. Yet it hardly is probable that Anderson engaged in no more of this activity after 1943, or indeed after 1945. Are we thus to exclude him from discussions of Air Force planning for peace in the 1943-1945 period, and thus keep the planning records clean of any preventative war talk?

Smith encounters (and acknowledges) a familiar problem in doctrinal history, namely, whether the written analyses really reflect what seemed plausible at the time. Generals may indeed have been reluctant to write down the name of Russia as the potential enemy, and yet have generally understood it. Air Force theorists may have learned a lot from Douhet, or a little; Douhet's writings to be sure were available in translation, and thus could serve as a convenient base line from which to depart in any strategic speculation. Yet what about the experiences of the RAF, communicated verbally or on paper? And if one uses Douhet as a crutch for lecture outlines, does this really make that author more influential than anyone else? Smith has reinforced his access to documents by a good selection of interviews, explicitly recognizing that memory after twenty years can be as misleading as twenty-year old paperwork.

One can too easily dismiss "future of the universe" studies as meaningless exercises upon which good talent is wasted as tributes to the false god of rationality. There are indeed cases of Air Forces and other military services being shaped by such exercises; if the 1943-45 plans shaped the size or composition of the future size of the U.S.A.F., then they were indeed worth study even if no one in 1944 realized their significance. Yet the book does not settle this issue of impact.

A final question arises on what the substance generated by these committees demonstrated

about bureaucrats in general, military or civilian. Smith broadly seems to acknowledge that the independence and relative status of the Air Force as bureaucratic goals explain many of the opinions endorsed on the post-war world. Yet the author avoids committing himself to any particular theory of bureaucratic politics and its interface with the rational public interest. His evidence is grist for such theorists' mills, but he does not etch out his own theoretical assumptions very clearly, nor does he cite many such theorists as they might apply.

The author suggests a budgetary imperialism model at points, in that the Air Force aspired to autonomy in the 1930's in hopes of getting one third of the military budget, but aspired to the same autonomy after 1945 in hopes of winning almost the entire budget. Yet it is not clear that the book is (or should be) asserting budgetary expansion as the unifying theme for all such bureaucratic rivalry. The mere word "autonomy" suggests other considerations besides size of budget, e.g. immunity from being overruled on its allocation.

All in all this is an interesting and well-written book. If only we could tell how important its subject was.—GEORGE H. QUESTER, *Cornell University*.

On Understanding Poverty: Perspectives from the Social Sciences. Ed. by DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN (New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 425. \$10.00.)

On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience. Ed. by JAMES L. SUNDQUIST (New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 256. \$8.50.)

These two collections of articles, both produced as part of a seminar on poverty at the Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.), are an excellent representation of ideas currently held about attacking poverty. The two books manage to show the reader the best of these ideas and the inadequacies of these ideas. They are useful for presenting a significant controversy about the causes of poverty, for including several outstanding articles, and for provoking thought about the inadequacies of poverty research.

The significant controversy about the causes of poverty is described in a simplified manner by Daniel Moynihan:

... opinions can be seen to cluster around two general positions—distinct, but not entirely incompatible ... the question about the poor is whether they really are different or simply have less money. (vol. I, p. 23.)

If the poor 'really are different,' then an anti-poverty strategy would have to emphasize the improvement and expansion of social work, so that case workers could have more of an impact on poor people. The poor person would be 'educated' out of his lethargy and into the active, productive citizenship of a middle class person. On the other

hand, if the poor 'simply have less money,' then an anti-poverty strategy would emphasize a guaranteed annual income. In general, sociologists argue for an expansion of social work, and economists argue for a guaranteed annual income. Moynihan claims that the failure of the war on poverty can partly be traced to intellectual disagreement on the nature and causes of poverty.

Moynihan describes the gravity of the disagreement:

It was thus a matter of considerable interest and some unsettlement for the seminar to realize, after a preliminary *tour d'horizon*, that many persons who had been speaking the same language had nonetheless very different meanings in mind. There was no common understanding as to the nature of poverty or the process of deliberate social change. (vol. I, p. 19)

In this respect, the main failing of the book is the omission of transcripts of the conference sessions relevant to this disagreement. The dialogue is referred to in various articles, and James Sundquist partially describes it in "The End of the Experiment," but the reader is mostly forced to construct the dialogue in his own mind, by reading the various articles and specifying disagreements and possible resolution of disagreements. Readers are not likely to do this.

For this reviewer, the best resolution of Moynihan's controversy is found in Robert Levine's article, "Evaluating the War on Poverty." Levine speaks as an OEO (Office of Economic Opportunity) administrator, from the frame of reference of cost-benefit analysis:

Let it be said at the outset that we define poverty in terms of command over economic resources and that this definition is not universally acceptable. ... Let it be said in partial pacification of those who would define poverty in less economic terms that the economic definition goes back through the intricacies of poverty to end up with no less emphasis on noneconomic programs than would a noneconomic definition itself. (vol. II, p. 189)

Cost-benefit analysis tends to resolve conceptual differences between sociologists and economists into a search for agreement on the values to be achieved.

Several of the articles are outstanding. Daniel Moynihan's "The Professors and the Poor" is one of these. He gives an interesting chronology of a change in the public mind, from seeing the war on poverty as independent of race, to seeing that war as a 'black problem.' I refer above to his claim that the failure of the war on poverty can be traced to intellectual confusion about the causes of poverty. This condition is traced in turn to two conditions: (1) we lack reliable data about the effects on life styles of increases in income; and (2) we analyze poverty without the experience of being poor ourselves.

Otis Dudley Duncan's article, "Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Race?", uses correla-

tional and causal model techniques on national survey sample data, to show that race, independent of educational and family background, has a large effect on income differences. His article is the most methodologically sophisticated in the two books, and his comments on the policy implications of his findings are excellent. However, he uses *bela* weights from regression equations with very low (i.e. unreliable) correlations.

Oscar Lewis is brought in as the token anthropologist, but his article on "The Culture of Poverty," reprinted from his book, *The Study of Slum Culture*, is probably the best of the two books. He gives the reader an understanding of this culture as a coherent set of beliefs that rationally deal with slum situations, and that is likely to persist in spite of economic advances by poor people. Lewis' article goes a long way toward countering Moynihan's claim that a middle class intellectual must remain confused on the subject of poverty because he has never been poor himself. Lee Rainwater competently carries the reader further into a particular aspect of this culture in "The Problem of Lower-Class Culture and Poverty-War Strategy." He uses interview data from a black, public housing project in St. Louis, to show a 'tremendous disjunction' between sexual behavior and sexual norms, as well as a capacity to live with it:

The great discovery that lower-class people make, which middle- and working-class people find so hard to understand, is that it is possible to live a life that departs very significantly from the way you think life ought to be lived without ceasing to exist, without feeling totally degraded, without giving up all self-esteem. (vol. I, p. 238)

Rainwater argues cogently that poor people cannot establish their own set of norms more in line with their own behavior: they are condemned to their culture of despair until society sees fit to establish a 'floor on family incomes' relative to the national, median income. Such a floor would eliminate the 'present situation in which some families are so far out of the society that the questions of motivation for achievement become really meaningless.'

"The Politics of Local Responsibility: Administration of the Community Action Program—1964—1966" by John Wofford, and "The View from the City: Community Action in Trenton" by Gregory Farrell are examples of that rare chronology which is theoretically interesting. Wofford gives a fascinating account of the development of disappointment and frustration relevant to two OEO goals: (1) reducing bureaucratic red tape in Washington, and (2) promoting consensus politics at the local level. Farrell describes a trial and error process, marked by eventual and perhaps exaggerated success, in building a local action organization; there are several insights, including some on handling clients and recruiting and paying personnel.

Finally, Peter Rossi has an interesting article on methodology, "Practice, Method, and Theory in Evaluating Social-Action Programs." He has a good discussion of the benefits and costs involved in choosing between experimental and *ex post facto* research designs. In a discussion of the politics of evaluating, he argues that administrators should be forced to commit themselves in advance to a reasonable course of action if research produces unexpected findings.

In sum, the two books contain several good articles that make up for the mediocre ones. However, they still leave the reader confused on the causes and cures of poverty, as everyone expects. Perhaps poverty research needs to be redirected toward a consideration of slums as part of an urban system with a supply of jobs and housing and a rate of arrival of migrants to the city, more in accord with the systems analysis used by Jay Forrester in *Urban Dynamics*. It is this reviewer's suspicion that many of the problems discussed in *Perspectives on Poverty* will only be understood and solved if urban systems analysis is used, even though it is ignored in the two volumes.—TERRY JONES, *Bowling Green State University*.

City and Country: Rural Responses to Urbanization in the 1920s. BY DON S. KIRSCHNER. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1970. Pp. 279. \$11.50.)

Richard Hofstadter and other "revisionists" writing during the 1950's charged that some historians had glamorized rural America by emphasizing its decent leadership toward economic justice, meanwhile overlooking its sponsorship of irrational movements that burdened the American system, such as Prohibitionism in the 1920's and McCarthyism during the 1950's. The objective of these movements was to salvage rural America's declining prestige, and they took place during periods of rural prosperity, according to the revisionists.

Kirschner tested this thesis by taking a close look at rural attitudes and behavior in Iowa and Illinois during the 1920's. He concluded that the 1920's were a decade of economic hardship, not prosperity, during which farmers constantly sought economic remedies. But he agreed with the revisionists that Prohibition was a salient issue, uniting rural America in a fervent crusade against "the city." Prohibitionism and related cultural issues "lived a life of their own and flourished on their own terms," (p. 243) unaffected by the high rate of bankruptcies and the low price of corn.

Kirschner argued that Prohibition was not an "irrational" issue, if it is rational to seek status. He said that the 18th Amendment was ingenious in permitting rural America to enshrine its values, and in giving rural citizens reason to hope that

these values, as part of the Supreme Law, would prevail. "Surely," he said, "there was no reason for them to suspect, before the fact, that the experiment would be such a shabby failure." (p. 243)

Kirschner said rural Americans really feared the immigrants who filled Chicago and flourished in its grime and noise. Henry A. Wallace, influential young editor and plant geneticist, said farmers realized the genetic consequences of sharing America with "people of low grade intelligence from southern and eastern Europe." (p. 37) Wallace proved statistically that cities sapped the procreative powers of "native" Americans, while not affecting the new races, and therefore cities could only become "the death chambers of civilization." With stakes so high, ruralites were right to fight back, but Kirschner's theory that Prohibitionism was mainly a "rational" outgrowth of a uniquely rural racism is somewhat confounded by the Al Smith campaign. Kirschner said ruralites abhorred Smith because he personified the ambition of the immigrant, but in fact Wallace and other Midwest farm leaders supported Smith's candidacy (attracted by his farm plank), and Smith ran well in rural Illinois and Iowa, compared with previous Democratic presidential candidates.

The author was honest in noting other, less "rational" motives for Prohibitionism. The 18th Amendment enabled rural minds to draw a geographic line between good and evil—between the rural districts of Illinois whose representatives voted for the Amendment, and the urban districts which opposed it then and subsequently. To draw such a geographic line required a superb hypocrisy—overlooking rural carousing and crime, refusing to concede that rural hearts were already being won away from simple living by the materialistic appeals in the ads, movies, and on the radio. Kirschner said, "Unwilling at first to surrender to the larger meaning of that choice, they mounted an assault against the new urban America, as if the smoke and sounds of battle would hide their shame from the enemy, and more important, from themselves." (p. 252) Yet as the decade went on rural Americans became less anxious rather than more anxious to impose fundamentalist values on others. In 1926, almost half of the rural referendum voters in Illinois seemed ready to give way on Prohibition. (pp. 93-94)

For measures of rural attitudes and behavior, Kirschner relied mainly on editorial comment appearing in about three dozen small town newspapers, and roll call votes in the two state legislatures. "Typically it was in the country press that the rural mind was reflected and reinforced," (p. 261) Kirschner asserted. Kirschner selected legislative roll call votes which reflected a rural-urban division. He separated these by subject matter and placed them in time sequence. Each vote was bro-

ken down by party and by rural-urban (with subdivisions for Chicago-other cities, and for rural poor—average—above-average areas). He provided his eyeball interpretation of each raw vote breakdown, aided by accounts of the debates. Most of the significant votes were entered as tables, but it was not clear what the reader was supposed to learn from them. Kirschner's interpretations were sensitive and usually persuasive.

On cultural issues, rural legislators usually maintained a united front, and urban legislators did not. On economic and governmental issues the reverse was true, permitting the cities to protect and enhance their economic interests. Rural legislators were pragmatic in their choice of economic and governmental objectives but lacked the self-confidence to bargain, when this was desirable. They preferred to try to checkmate the cities by refusing to reapportion seats, by refusing to authorize the use of the initiative and referendum, and home rule, and by keeping certain subjects outside the law. Rural legislators lost their most important objective—property tax relief—because they refused to allow cities to raise money by other means. The important new expenditure of the decade was for highways, and conflict among rural regions permitted urban legislators to negotiate the formulas for dividing road funds. Exemplary of rural intransigence and its results was an Illinois constitutional convention in which rural delegates had their way on virtually every issue, and thereby assured defeat of the proposed constitution at the hands of urban referendum voters.—DON HADWIGER, *Iowa State University*.

Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty. By LEONARD FREEDMAN. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969. Pp. 212. \$3.95.)

A science of public policy captures the imagination of most social scientists. Currently the effort of making scientific political value judgements holds captive a great deal of scholarly time and libidinal energy, a great many pages of professional journals, periodicals and books. Ostensibly Edgar Litt's *Public Policy Studies in American Government Series* portrays applications of the analytical skills of the political scientist to the "output" side of public policy. His fourth choice of manuscripts, Leonard Freedman's *Public Housing*, contributes to the proliferation of pages of legal description and subjective evaluation of policy; however, the choice does little to extend scientific understanding of the relationship between public policy decisions and political behavior. Consequently, the book fails to illustrate the skills of the political scientist qua scientist.

According to Freedman, American government and the American political system work against the interests of the poor. Like any other book

with a thesis, debatable alternative theories compete to explain its contents. Since the tests of the validity of a debate rest with the rhetorical and argumentative skills of the debators rather than with the rigors of scientific disproof, Freedman might have done better by advancing his implicit thesis of political behavior: to wit, propitious times and great men make public policy—ill writ or well writ for the poor.

This thesis better describes Freedman's presentation of fact and fancy in the evolution or devolution of public housing policies within the United States. Accordingly one learns upon reading the first chapter of the book that the Great Depression, an enlightened Democratic president, and a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives are the essential ingredients for the promulgation of political rewards to benefit the poor. The wartime housing shortage provided the circumstances for the support and expansion of public housing by the executive branch of government through to 1949. Times changed in 1949 with the election of the 80th Congress and Jesse Wolcott's ascendancy to the chairmanship of the House Banking and Currency Committee. While the Democratic majority remained and while other "enlightened" leaders returned to their seats in Congress, they were not enough to protect enlightened public housing against the Republican minority and Wolcott's political cunning.

Of course when times and Congress turn against a given policy there always remains the hope of executive succor. Fate and the election of another Great Man—Eisenhower—dashed these hopes against the concrete abutments of private housing and freeway development. And so Freedman unfolds the acts and actors, the plots and sub-plots of Public Housing Policy for the reader.

Perhaps in the second millennium there will be another Great Depression, another Roosevelt, World War II, Wolcott, and Eisenhower and then the political scientist will have his chance at scientific test. Until then he will have to assuage these inclinations to tests of the more generalizable parts of the book. These are found in the chapters dealing with poverty, race, and public ownership.

In addition to the legislative and executive greats, pressure groups, poverty groups, racial minority groups and public attitudes toward public ownership also determine policy outcome. Freedman presents a cursory analysis of the role of pressure groups effecting the legislative process of legitimizing public housing. The analysis is descriptive and chronological in development. The chapter contains a rather exhaustive check list of formal organizations and their leaders. These organizations and leaders are classified as "opposition groups" and "pro-public housing groups." No empirical rationale is provided for

this classification nor is any attempt made to analyze the extent or agreement or disagreement over means and ends between and among the two categories of pressure groups. The reader doesn't know whether the system of classification is mutually exclusive or overlapping. An analysis of membership overlap or pressure group interests could have solved this problem. Such an analysis would also have gone a long way in developing the science of public policy.

The intellectual influence of Oscar Lewis, Kenneth Clark, Michael Harrington, Harrison Salisbury, and Morton Deutsch reflects directly in the generalizable nature of the analysis of poverty and racial influence. If public housing is a result of grass-roots movement then Oscar Lewis' findings on the cyclical nature of poverty and the notorious social and political disorganization of the poor suggests the demand is not theirs. Clark's, Harrington's, and Salisbury's independent observations further suggest public housing to be a middle-class defense against the poor. Since public policy must be consistent with the dominant ideology or ideologies and since the American ideologies are hostile to concentrations of public power and public ownership, government housing for and by the poor is virtually impossible. Site restrictions, administrative restriction, and cost-design restrictions also militate against an interpretation of public housing as a product of altruistic concern for the plight of the poor and racial minority groups. Freedman finds racism in realty practices and the threat of racial insurgency partially explain the entry of Black people into public housing and the exodus of poor whites steeped in the racism of the dominant classes. He overlooks or leaves for inference the implications of public housing on the "block busting" practices of realtors. These implications may explain some of the upper-class resistance to governmental redistribution of housing values.

An evaluation of the book and the research it represents raises one of the larger questions before the discipline of Political Science. Have we been too rigorous and dispassionate and do we now need descriptive studies relevant to policy makers? This book is intended to answer the latter need. It partially succeeds by identifying private and public leaders, their organizations, their laws. It fails by ignoring the need for analytical frameworks to guide future quantitative analysis of actors, their strategies and their policy outcomes. The meaning of many of Freedman's facts remain uncertain. The book is, perhaps, a natural and necessary precursor to more scientific investigations of the same phenomena. In the development of scientific knowledge, the subjective and normative presentation of facts and values appear first on the scene. Later the more rigorous student subjects

some of the assumptions and inferences to tests of disproof.—R. E. JOHNSTON, *Wayne State University*.

Campaigns: Cases in Political Conflict. By WALT ANDERSON. (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 242. \$6.95.)

Case studies of significant national and state political campaigns are excellent material for understanding as well as for teaching when authors do their homework on the superabundance of available information and without naivete about the realities of political life. But this volume fails to relate in depth the campaigns to yesterday or today.

The good guys ride white horses in stereotyped silhouettes. The author imagines that many candidates smeared as Socialists by opponents are really such and is sure that only "radical theorists" think labor and farmer are allies. Presidential primaries did not diminish because of the disillusionment of idealists but because of their inconvenience to political machines. The reader does not discover the calculated ambivalence of Lincoln's 1858 statements on race nor that a change of 1 in 1,000 votes would have cost him both presidential elections. Bryan and La Follette are replaced by Theodore Roosevelt as the Progressive leader and Pershing's black cavalry at San Juan Hill in front of TR is only one of the missing ingredients of the TR story. La Follette is accused of being a dictator, though TR is not, and is slandered with the resurrected legend that the Wisconsin Progressive was unbalanced because he criticized newspaper publishers to their faces. After LBJ, can TR be "the most energetic president"? Needlessly superficial are the Kennedy and Nixon chapters and to conclude that the religious issue was buried in 1960 is to misread a close election and to forget that New

York has had no Catholic governor since 1928. Also omitted is the understanding that the 1960 McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire was a facsimile of the 1952 Kefauver race, triggered by a blunder of the same presidential assistant and dependent on Republican finance as well as publicity.

Skimmed over the surface also are state campaigns, with serious omissions and errors. Wade Hampton was not chief of Confederate cavalry nor Benjamin Tillman a possible presidential nominee, though his sparking primaries over the nation is almost ignored. The "composite" picture of Senator Millard Tydings, Sr., and Communist Earl Browder is not clearly identified as a fraud; and also unstressed by the author who makes the San Fernando Valley his home is the management of the smear campaign against Upton Sinclair by Earl Warren. Pumpkin papers are swallowed as uncritically as the *La Guardia* legend. Is it correct that "Reagan's chief interest in college was the student body"? Callaway Gardens is not in Columbus, Ga.; and Carter did not lack for outside finance. And missing from the account of the Lester Maddox and "Bo" Callaway campaign are many stories of interest, such as Lester's "Do you want a man for governor who never had to look for a job, never had to read the want ads, never had to wait for a pay check, never had to buy on the installment plan, never had to put off buying anything?", along with a former governor's pleading "There is a lot of difference between a man who knows better and one who doesn't," and the letter in the *Atlanta Constitution* "To Avoid BO, use Lesterine."

When Alfred Tennyson wrote of "the fairy tales of science," he did not envisage political science.—CHARLES G. HAMILTON, *Aberdeen, Miss.*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

L'Organizzazione Partitica del PCI e della DC.

By F. CERVELLATI CANTELLI, V. CIONI POLACCHINI, P. DE VITO PISCICELLI, S. GUARINO CAPPELLO, G. POGGI, G. SANI, G. SIVINI, A. SIVINI CAVAZZANI, a cura di Gianfranco Poggi. Istituto "Carlo Cattaneo," Vol. II, Ricerche sulla Partecipazione Politica in Italia (Bologna: il Mulino, 1968. Pp. 591.)

No one interested seriously in Italian party politics should go very long without reading this book, the second volume in a series focussed on political parties and participation produced by the noted Carlo Cattaneo Institute of Bologna. A while ago, an Italian political scientist complained that empirical studies of Italian politics seemed to come mainly from foreigners. The authors who contribut-

ed to the three sections of this new volume have done much to overcome this imbalance. Using varied, and, in the main, effective tools of analysis, they approach the internal life of the two major Italian parties—the Communists and Christian Democrats—from three different standpoints: organization, mass membership and leadership. They come up with a product that is part exposition of research findings and insights, and part compendium of basic background data for the study of political parties in Italy.

The section devoted to the organizational life of the two parties, prepared by Giacomo Sani and Stefania Guarino Cappello, demonstrates how a thorough analysis of the party literature and documentation, carried out by a scholar with a real

sense for complex organizations, can make an important contribution to an understanding of party behavior. (This is more true of the Communists, who have produced a body of documentation immensely richer and more descriptive of their organization than have the Christian Democrats). The chapter by Sani on the PCI as an organizational system shows both the genius for synthesis that is characteristic of Italian scholarship at its best and a thorough empirical grounding, something often lacking in work by Italian scholars. The synthetic chapter on the DC is, in contrast, disappointing, as is the absence in this hefty essay of any real framework of comparison. For instance, much of the evidence collected on the PCI suggests that its organizational problems are universal (and not uniquely Leninist) and result from its leaders' self-conscious decision to work within the political system as legitimate participants. Some of the same problems seem to afflict the DC, but in the absence of an explicit comparative framework, it is hard to know exactly how similar the difficulties of the two parties are.

Explicit comparison is one of the major virtues of the section on the two parties' mass membership, a statistical and historical analysis by Giordano Sivini and Ada Cavazzani. (A fourth aspect—the activists—appears in a separate volume, *L'Attività di Partito*, edited by Francesco Alberoni). In this section, some standard aspects of organizational sociology—the number, composition and consistency of the registered members, the relationship of members to voters, the rather special problems of organizing among the young and the female—are treated with both the historical flair that is traditional in Italian scholarship and with a statistical finesse that will serve many a future scholar with a precious resource. With all that, the section has less of a theoretical structure than the first, and one somehow feels that more might have been done with the material in the way of inference and interpretation. Sivini does do more in a later article, and there is much promise of more to come from his direction in the study of political parties.

The third section of the book, contributed by Gianfranco Poggi and Vittoria Cioni Polacchini, examines the whole topography of the "classe dirigente" of the parties. The Italians have contributed this term to the world. They are never without skill in probing the phenomenon, as Poggi shows in his theoretical introduction. But the treatment of the statistical data, drawn from questionnaires collected from parliamentarians and organizational leaders of both parties, adds little to the standard presentation of background, recruitment and career pattern variables that have become a standard implement of political sociology. Moreover, and here we anticipate a general criticism of the

volume, the research on the leadership of the two parties is not at all related to the two previous sections of the book, with the result that the overall impression is of three strata of analysis, all obviously interdependent, but presented in airtight packages.

There are several reasons for this general defect. First, as Poggi tells us in the general introduction, in the planning of the larger project, the Cattaneo Institute allocated "a maximum of autonomy" to the participants. But, second, the problem is compounded by the fact that the work in this volume was divided into concrete, rather than analytical, slices. Thus organizational history from 1946 to 1963 is treated in two different guises, but the *process* of decision-making within the organization falls between everybody's stools. This most critical aspect of organization ought really to have integrated the volume, and in its absence, the overall impression of the volume is more of a source book on Italian party organization than of a report on five years of Cattaneo Institute research.

A second basic problem, already alluded to above, is the lack of an overall conceptual framework to inform the work, not only of these authors, but of the Cattaneo participation series as a whole. One must be satisfied with a rather broad inventory of "meanings" of the term "participation" in the general introduction, but the term has no fundamental role in the general strategy of this series of volumes. Paradoxically, then, *L'Organizzazione Partitica del PCI e della DC* is weak where Italian scholarship has generally been strong—in general theory and in the elaboration of a conceptual apparatus—while it excels in the solid empirical grounding that foreigners have sometimes found weak in Italian political writings. Whatever the cause, the fault does not lie with the authors of this volume, who have carried out the tasks assigned to them supremely well.—SIDNEY TARROW, *Yale University*.

Le vestali della classe media: Ricerca sociologica sugli insegnanti. By MARZIO BARBAGLI AND MARCELLO DEI. (Bologna: il Mulino, 1969. Pp. 373. L.4.000.)

Most American political scientists are unfamiliar with the degree of theoretical and methodological sophistication now extant among Italian social scientists. This impression has persisted despite laudable efforts to correct it by such scholars as Joseph LaPalombara, Sidney Tarrow and Samuel Barnes. Several recent volumes published by *il Mulino*, one of which is reviewed here, should do much to demonstrate that the work of Italian scholars can be neglected only at considerable intellectual cost. In this connection one should note the following titles; Giorgio Galli (ed.), *Il comportamento elettorale in Italia*, Gianfranco Poggi (ed.), *L'organiz-*

zazione partitica del PCI e della DC; Francesco Alberone (ed.), *L'attivista di partito* and Agopik Manoukian (ed.), *La presenza sociale del PCI a della DC*.

Le vestali della classe media by Marzio Barbagli and Marcello Dei is one of the volumes which should not escape notice. The authors are generally concerned with investigating the relationship between public policy, in this case educational reform, and the Italian system of social stratification. In particular they focus on the impediments to governmental reforms aimed at enlarging the social composition of the scuola media. They suggest that the primary source of resistance originates with the teachers and principals who fundamentally oppose reform and are openly hostile to students from the lower classes. Moreover they observe that the teachers reinforce the prevailing social structure by rewarding values of passivity and obedience rather than independence and creativity.

In order to test these insights, these scholars construct a complex research design through which to investigate the phenomenon in question; namely resistance to change in the school. They ground their inquiry in a large body of survey data. These data consist of lengthy interviews with 374 teachers, 200 parents of students and 328 mail questionnaires completed by school principals. The interviews were conducted between 1966 and 1968 in Florence, Bologna, Pistoia and Arezzo.

The volume's four chapters draw heavily on these interviews yet each reveals a neat mesh between theory and data. Chapter one focuses on the sociological configuration of the teaching profession in order to bring into sharp relief the social structure of the new scuola media. The authors present a number of interesting findings concerning entrance into the profession, professional satisfaction, and the relationship between perceptions of professional prestige and status insecurity. Chapter two employs a multi-variate approach to explain the central phenomenon of resistance to change in the schools. Chapter three concerns the attitudes of teachers towards sex education as predictors of their general resistance to change and as an indicator of their unwillingness to engage in genuine intellectual exchanges with the students. Chapter four brings the whole volume together by examining the changing role of the teacher in Italian society and the attitudes of parents and principals toward the role. The chapter also contains important evidence on the propensity of teachers to socialize the students to subordinate roles. Finally, there is a methodological appendix and a copy of the instruments used in the interviews.

The findings of chapters two and four are of most interest to the political scientist. The first rigorously isolates the causes of resistance to

change in the schools via the construction of four Guttman scales which are entitled as follows: 1) Resistance to Change; 2) Personal Rigidity; 3) Authoritarian Teacher; 4) Political Conservatism. Age and the profession of the father are also considered. The Simon-Blalock causal modeling technique is used to sort out the most acceptable models for male and female teachers. Among the men the most powerful predictors of resistance to change are political conservatism and social background, while among the women the most important factor is political conservatism in combination with age. The fact that resistance to change is rooted in political conservatism is indeed a significant finding and should serve to stimulate further research along these lines.

In chapter four, Barbagli and Dei make a largely convincing case for their proposition that most of the teachers in the scuola media use the sanctions of their profession to control political and social deviants. Their case would have been even stronger, however, if they had gathered data on student perceptions of the restrictive nature of the teachers behavior, instead of making inferences about "socialization to subordination" on the basis of data from parents, teachers and administrators.

In sum, the volume is an extremely important contribution to our understanding of the attitudinal and societal features of the Italian teachers' role which tend to reinforce mechanisms of societal exclusion and impede public policy intended to democratize the Italian political system.—TIMOTHY M. HENNESSEY, *Michigan State University*.

Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development. EDITED BY COLIN LEYS. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 289. \$7.50.)

A collection of nine papers from a 1968 conference at the University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies with introduction by the editor, now of University College, Nairobi. All are about development; all are by Britons; all are eminently scholarly. Some are genuinely interesting to developmentists, either because they put part of the field into excellent perspective or because they suggest interesting approaches or avenues of research. A large bibliographical index is useful.

Lays, who has encouraged many young students of development, sympathizes with those who have suffered "... the outpouring in recent years of collections of papers in the social sciences"—the "... things in books' clothing. ..." Defensively, he argues that this collection is more—that, in it, is achieved a synthesis of English traditions of historical empiricism and political theory with American behavioralism, seen as Parsonian sociology carried to excess,

The book's contents do tell us something about movement in British political science, but they do not demonstrate the emergence of a neo-classical synthesis or rebirth of theory. The thread Leys finds to link them into a book is weak; the essays must be judged separately.

Robert Dowse's essay on the *military* and development is an excellent, scholarly account of what we know, what we don't and why, and what we should do now. The field is cramped by military's dislike of being researched and by the vagueness of our categories. The latter has affected that part of the field academics have concentrated on—coups. We have largely neglected how the military acts once in power, its political influence when not in control, and even the social background of its members. The author reviews the results of factor analysis—an effective Occam's Razor even with sparse and dubious data, but does not provide the needed "good theory at the right level of generality." An able discussion of the Ghanaian military illustrates some of his ideas.

Morris-Jones neatly situates the concept of *political recruitment*, as yet little used in less-developed countries, and reviews its utility—both sufficiently general and sufficiently precise (more so than mobilization, for instance). He notes that the term implies the selecting agency's exclusive initiative, which is hardly the case. Much can be learned about development, he suggests, by widening the study of recruitment (entry?) through work on 1) typical career routes (via biographies), 2) aspiration patterns (which sorts of people are clamoring to be recruited and which are not, and 3) catchment areas (a category less clearly explained).

When Morris-Jones studies recruitment of members of the Indian parliament and state legislative assemblies, one has to agree that use of the concept to elucidate development politics is just beginning.

Feldman examines the consistency of *Tanzanian agricultural modernization* with the government's cooperative *ujamaa* ideal. His empirical base is narrow: his wife's work with 49 tobacco farmers and P. H. Gulliver's on Nyakusa land tenure. Nevertheless, the generalizations are convincing (and devastating for the *ujamaa* ideal) and the conceptual framework, full of promise for future research on rural change.

Instead of asking whether local society is resistant to social disturbance, Feldman looks at the *economic stress* imposed on traditional ways by new development options, i.e. the cost of not changing. That cost measures loyalty to traditional patterns and explains selective adoption of innovation.

In commercial agriculture, the economic stress of cooperative management is found to be high;

ujamaa organization declines with modernization. Social stratification has not yet appeared, because land is a free good; hired laborers are not proletarianized, but labor by choice and have access to land. Growth of population and commercial agriculture, however, will create land scarcities and stratification.

Alec Nove's lucid article on *Soviet development* and political organization contains little that he hasn't said before. It is interesting nonetheless, and refreshingly free from footnotes. Nove traces the victory of "teleological" over "genetic" planning, culminating in Stalinist centralized growth policy. He is careful to count the economic costs of terror, of the primacy of politics, and of a pricing system in which planners could not calculate alternative costs. He suggests how the results might have been bought more cheaply, but recognizes that Russians were plowing a new furrow and that it is illusory to believe that high Russian rates of accumulation could have been achieved without severe repression.

The article is on the margin of this collection. Nove admits that 1918 Russia was not the low-income countries of today, saying only that all countries are unique and Russia's experience is one source of lessons. Other articles, like Feldman's and Vincent's, emphasize the limited administrative capabilities of today's less-developed countries and their distance from Soviet experience.

Colin Leys points to the lamentable consequences of letting economists do all the writing about *planning*. What planners actually do is not—probably could not be—the "synoptic" process Tinbergen describes. Business-firm management furnishes the closest analogy to planning; Leys looks there for analytic clues.

The most useful distinction—between plan-making and implementation is hardly revolutionary. Most important is the urging to governmentists to study planning as politics, plus the methodological advice: look for 1) type and distribution of authority in the planning system, 2) "activators" available, and 3) mechanisms for decision-making. Leys' discussion of Tanzanian planning is instructive.

Despite its heavy scholarship and footnoting, Joan Vincent's article on *anthropology* and development makes a number of telling points about the peculiar strengths of her discipline. Political scientists recognize that at least the newer low-income states tend to be, as Zolberg says of Africa, "... an almost institutionless arena. . ." It is the pre-state institutions that count, and that is what anthropologists study. They generally work in the field; governmentists in the capitals. The former are running out of closed societies of primitive people to study, so they are ready to take on de-

velopment. One may not agree, for instance, that stratification is the essence of the modern state, but it seems obvious enough that good political science of development should be much more anthropological.

Peter Nettl, who died tragically in 1968 and to whom the collection is dedicated, contributed a very literate article on *development theory*. The universal priority of development is asserted; the author emphasized that we don't agree completely on what it is and that existing theories are better at pointing up problems than at providing solutions. Theory is essential; without it we are doomed to gather data at random. However, the article concludes with the need unfilled. As a starter, the author suggests loosening the connection between economic development and other types, and giving up teleological notions that equate development with Westernization and minimize the contribution of the poor to the rich. Attractive as these notions are, this reviewer feels that following them sacrifices what little conceptual clarity we have and misunderstands much of the drive for development.

Surveying *single-party politics* in the *Ivory Coast*, Martin Stanisland argues that the party's successful takeover of the bureaucracy had led to its bureaucratization. His beginning is certainly promising; he castigates existing literature on African politics as banal and circular as a result of 1) ingenuously believing what ruling elites say about themselves and 2) using sloppy definitions and concepts. The reader's appetite is whetted but, unfortunately, he is in for a disappointment.

Stanisland's analytical concepts—"levels" and "arenas" at/in which "political resources" are used by politicians to capture "prizes"—do not appear either very novel or promising. His recapitulation of Ivorian party history, drawn from well-known sources, is marred by slightly reckless generalizations and annoying factual errors (Ivory Coast is called a French overseas department—p. 144; most French post-war investment is said to have been drawn from the local budget—p. 160; . . .). Stanisland destroys a few straw men, then elucidates the state of the party as revealed by his 1967 research in three administrative towns. The conceptual framework reveals nothing that would have been hidden from the informed layman.

Shafer's prolix article on *public administration* leaves developments in this field exactly where the author began—deadlocked. He complicates his task by trying to account for everything administrators do, whether administration or politics.

The "deadlock" is the realization that Western public-administration precepts contain cultural bias and that applying them uncritically to development situations, as "scientific" managementists once advocated, might not be appropriate to rapid

change. Bureaucratic administration fits this pattern too, Shafer says, but he fails to resolve on an alternative. Politicization of administration may be good, or it may not.

The author's only suggestion to planners is to try taking administration advice from temporarily posted, ad-hoc teams. Those experienced with short-term, visiting experts in low-income countries (mea culpa) will cringe at the thought.—W. I. JONES, *Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio*.

Abgeordnete in der Parteiendemokratie. By PETER GERLICH AND HELMUT KRAMER. (Vienna: Verlag fuer Geschichte und Politik, 1969. Pp. 246. 6S210.-)

This study of the political subculture of the *Gemeinderat* of Vienna, which is at once municipal council and state diet, leans heavily on the approaches to the study of legislative behavior introduced by the writings of John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau. The latter, in fact, presided over the beginnings of the project in 1964/1965. Ninety-eight of the 100 members of the *Gemeinderat* were interviewed and some of their comments are quoted at length. The project sought to ascertain (a) the composition of the body, (b) the careers of its members, and their attitudes toward (c) their party and (d) their constituency, and (e) their conception of their functions. The authors claim only to have explored but not exhausted their study of the role conceptions and images of their legislators for lack of comparable exploration of the role conceptions of administrators, party leaders, journalists, associated representatives and other roles interacting with those of the members of the *Gemeinderat*. The quantitative manipulations in this study use two kinds of data: attitude sets, such as the segments of the legislators' role conceptions toward various other agents, and social background data taken mostly from official sources. The sociological information includes age, sex, previous occupation, outside occupations, seniority, rank or offices held, committee memberships and data on the members' political socialization.

Since the legislative setting in Vienna and elsewhere in Austria has not been sufficiently examined before, the authors set their empirical explorations into an ample framework of institutional description and historical sociology. The changing character of Viennese legislative assemblies and their composition over the last one hundred years gives meaning to recent changes in recruitment patterns. The evolution of the dominant political parties—the smaller ones are rather neglected in this book—explains some of the notable differences which emerge in their role conceptions and in the social backgrounds of their members. To the uninitiated mind, this historical and institutional background is quite indispensable to an ap-

preciation of the empirical findings. In fact, the indispensability demonstrates the irrelevance of empirical and behavioral research when it is divorced from a thorough knowledge of the setting. The thorough coverage, in any event, should facilitate comparison with legislative behaviors and subcultures elsewhere, or at least protect the comparative researcher from the most obvious pitfalls.

Gerlich and Kramer proceed from the historical background to the sociological tabulations on the membership. Their findings that the *Gemeinderat* is more representative of contemporary Viennese society than were earlier legislative assemblies is contrasted with American findings and with the inherent contradictions of representative theory and practice. How can legislators be perfect "social representatives" of a society whose members have to work full-time at their trade and who have, precisely for that reason, delegated their representation to more or less full-time representatives?

The most interesting chapter of this study, to the mind of this reviewer, is the chapter on the political socialization of the deputies. Alone the incisive impact of historical events between the wars and the discussion of how early the respondents became involved in politics permit fascinating glimpses of Austrian political culture. There are, for example, significant differences between the Socialists (SPÖ) who start with politics early in life and under more family influence than members of the People's Party (ÖVP) who were often impelled more by friends, colleagues and associations. Youth organizations played an important recruitment function in both parties. The nomination patterns to candidacy for the *Gemeinderat* again differ substantially with the SPÖ deputies being placed in nomination chiefly by their district organizations while the party leadership and the chamber organizations play a larger role with the ÖVP. The authors also devoted some attention to the process by which new deputies are broken in, and to the place of *Gemeinderat* membership in the total career expectations of the deputies.

The rest of the book is a competent replication of the Wahlke-Eulau approach to the study of subjective legislative role images. Gerlich and Kramer segment the total role images in orientations vis-a-vis the respective party and the constituency from which the deputies were elected. Despite their emphasis on the stronger party role in Austria as compared to the United States, their treatment of this segment appears to be rather meager. The relations to the constituency, to the voters, special interests and associations, and the delicate balance between orientations according priority to the city over the districts and vice versa, on the other hand, are covered convincingly and in depth. The tabulation of role images of the

decision-making postures—ritualists, popular tribunes, etc.—and the attitudes toward the administration and the clientele of voters and organized interests brings no great surprises. One would hope that the various replications of the *Legislative System* model might soon be subjected to systematic cross-national comparison.

The authors made no attempt to corroborate the subjective role conceptions of their legislators with their actual behavior. Thus, we are still groping in the dark regarding the relevance of this aspect of the political subculture of the *Gemeinderat* to its actual functioning. They did a considerable service, nevertheless, to the study of continental European legislatures by relating their concepts and findings to the ongoing debate about the decline of parliamentary democracy. Since this debate so often languishes in sterile juxtapositions of 19th century representative theories with mid-twentieth century political realities, the exploration of the subjective role conceptions of legislators in itself is likely to contribute to a broader appreciation of contemporary representative functions beyond myth and cultural pessimism. There can be little question but that the authors succeeded admirably in explaining some of the functions of the Viennese *Gemeinderat* to whomever cares to read their study.—PETER H. MERKL, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

Le phénomène gaulliste. By JEAN CHARLOT. (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1970. Pp. 206. 24 F.)

Recherche sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle: Analyse statistique des allocutions radiodiffusées 1958-1966. By JEAN-MARIE COTTERET AND RENÉ MOREAU. (Paris: Armand Colin, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. Travaux et recherches de science politique, 1969. Pp. 247. 39 F.)

Le phénomène gaulliste raises high hopes, promising to "immerse the men of politics and a good number of the French in perplexity,"; nevertheless, the book is likely to prove disappointing to those familiar with Charlot's earlier effort, *L'U.N.R. Étude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique*. In his latest work the merchandise is somewhat worn and noticeably absent is reference to or development of phenomena that one might hope to find—e.g., relationships between Gaullism and the military, the full meaning of various important conflicts within the Gaullist organization, interaction in and after 1967 between Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, Gaullism and the handling of communications media (especially the *O.R.T.F.*). These are but some of the many *lacunae* characteristic of the study. Finally, the reviewer cannot help note in Charlot's study how *Le phénomène gaulliste* and *Le phénomène gaulliste imaginaire* occasionally get in each other's

ray, particularly when he claims that the *U.D.R.'s* internal convergences completely overshadow those contradictions harbored by it—and when he states that these contradictions most often contribute to the advantage of a modern organization engaged in the business of contributing consciously to the construction of a modern party system.

Charlot views *Le phénomène gaulliste* as a mutation of the French political system. The departure of de Gaulle marks for him not the end of Gaullism but simply the termination of "a Gaullism." Charlot finds—"in contrast to the findings of so many others"—that *Le phénomène gaulliste* is not simply a moment in an endless cycle but a truly different and durable development in French political life representative of the passage from a system of weak and multiple political parties to a system of the dominant party (perhaps even to bipartism?) and the birth of a "party of voters" based on other than cadres and militants. Moreover, this party's multiple ideological tendencies lack for Charlot the diversity characteristic of a "party of militants," contributing not to the *U.D.R.'s* disadvantage but to its "richness."

Charlot concludes that the opposition to Gaullism failed to fully appreciate its nature, taking cognizance of its leader while underestimating the support given the *U.N.R.*, *U.D.V.* and *U.D.R.* Believing that the organization would disappear with the departure of de Gaulle, the opposition ignored the constant reinforcement of another Gaullism—the Gaullism of a party—whose growth contributed eventually to both a qualitative and structural transformation of the party system. Charlot notes after 1958 that the history of Gaullism was one of ascending "new Gaullists" and descending "old Gaullists"; with the "arrival" in 1967 of the *modernes*, the organization underwent profound transformation—restructuring, liberalizing and modernizing itself. Finally, Charlot finds it "astonishing" that de Gaulle made foreign policy his *domaine réservé*, commenting that Pompidou's *domaine réservé* would be education, not national defense, and that after all these years of imperial grandeur Pompidou represents "perhaps" the "firm wisdom of a Louis XVIII."

Recherches sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle was reviewed extensively in France in 1969 and discussed on the radio-television service presentation *France-Culture*. French assessments of the work include, "a remarkable application of the *ordinateur* in the field of letters," "scientific and dry," not intended for "*esprits légers*," etc., etc.

Cotteret and Moreau, who describe their book as at the crossroads of "four new sciences—political science, statistics, linguistics and communications," seek through use of the *ordinateur* to ini-

tiate a step in the direction of producing an instrument of study that can be applied to a vocabulary. Examining statistically the 62,471 words articulated in radio-television addresses by General de Gaulle between 1958 and 1965, the authors establish a typology that distinguishes between two kinds of speeches—*discours-appels* and *discours-bilans* (in the former utilization of the pronouns *je-vous* is elevated and use of the pronoun *nous* practically extinct, whereas in the latter utilization of the pronoun *nous* is elevated and use of the pronouns *je-vous* disappears almost completely). The authors determine if the speeches containing the pronouns *je-vous* have in common a series of words whose frequency of utilization is superior to the average utilization of the other words; the method then is repeated with the speeches containing the pronoun *nous*. Consequently, the authors discover around *discours-appels* a word-network consisting of "*république, état, peuple, moi, confiance, nation*," and around *discours-bilans* "*notre, année, économique, monde, développement, progrès*."

Having established two types of *discours*, Cotteret and Moreau make the following comments on each. *Discours-appels* are brief, direct (so as not to weary the listener), rich in vocabulary and of a marked interpellative character, whereas *discours-bilans* do not interpellate, they merely state. *Discours-appels* seek to convince the listener that he is directly concerned, while *discours-bilans* seek to convey to the listener the feeling of having collaborated in what the General is summarizing. Among the *discours*, only three fall outside the authors' typology and all are related to the presidential campaign of 1965 (here the authors acknowledge that the usual schema is abandoned and replaced by a scene with but three actors—de Gaulle, the press corps and the French—and the General plays no longer with the public but before it, seeking to raise emotions and to give information).

The authors relate to the nature of the times and to de Gaulle's style and personality the frequency of his speeches, the number of words articulated by him, the length of his sentences and the richness of his vocabulary. Speeches delivered by de Gaulle at the beginning of his *septennat* were frequent and incisive; nevertheless, with the passage of time, his speeches became more "ample" and less percussive, with assurances to the listener that *tout va bien*. Although the length of de Gaulle's speeches generally did not vary, the length of his sentences increased with the years—convincing the authors that this acceleration was tied to the deintensification of the political events then in play (and leading them to suggest that "Perhaps the day will come when we will be able to measure the well-being of the state by the

length of sentences of its political men?"). Finally, the authors conclude that the richness of de Gaulle's speeches corresponds very well to those texts written in modern French.

Recherches sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle searches for links between words and times and suggests the need for systematic analyses of the means of communication so as to facilitate new approaches to the study of political phenomena. Many of the techniques applied to de Gaulle's vocabulary will be familiar to those acquainted with efforts undertaken elsewhere by those involved in the study of linguistics. Finally, if the results obtained by Cotteret and Moreau are somewhat disproportionate to their prodigious efforts, this is entirely understandable in a work of this kind. *Recherches sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle* merits more than passing attention and one hopes that it will not be brushed aside in cursory fashion by those impatient with the methods employed in it.—LOWELL G. NOONAN, *San Fernando Valley State College*.

The Jana Sangh: Biography of an Indian Political Party. By CRAIG BAXTER (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. Pp. 352. \$12.50.)

Until the Congress split in the fall of 1969 the Jana Sangh was India's second largest political party. It is the fastest growing party in India, and the only one of the major parties which is run and operated by persons with little or no background in the umbrella-like Congress Party. In this sense "illegitimate" in its birth, the legitimacy of the Jana Sangh is also doubted by many Indians because it challenges the fragile framework of secularism within which India's multitudinous communities live together. The epithets which it evokes from opponents—"right," "rightist," "reactionary," "communal" and even "fascist"—are an indication also of its organizational discipline and the militancy of the youth organization, the R.S.S., from which many of its members are drawn. Yet this large and controversial party has received little scholarly attention, and Baxter's study is to be welcomed.

Baxter frames his study as a biography, beginning with the party's origins in the Hindu Mahasabha, which arose in response to the Muslim League; turning then to its ideological and organizational ancestor, the revivalist Hindu R.S.S., which continues to supply the party organization with its very powerful secretaries. The major portion of the book is devoted to documentation of party growth and policy articulation, in which party conferences and Indian general elections are the major events. There is one chapter on each of the four elections which reports on party organization, manifesto, tactics, and results, ending with an

appraisal of policy toward alliances with other parties. Alternating with these chapters are accounts of success in other elections, organizational development, parliamentary impact, and extra-parliamentary activities, which include the tragic Kashmir Satyagraha in 1952 that resulted in the death of the party's founder and the anti-cow slaughter agitation in 1966. The care in tracing changes in policy toward Kashmir, the national language controversy, foreign policy, and land reform is a significant contribution of the book.

Two themes of much interest emerge: the failure to effect electoral alliances, and the internal party conflict between R.S.S. and non-R.S.S. wings. The two are, of course, related. In the first two elections the party's most natural allies were the Hindu right parties which it unsuccessfully courted, losing seats which might have been gained if votes had not been divided. In the fourth election its most likely ally was the classically liberal Swatantra Party, with which a useful alliance was formed in states where the Jana Sangh was weak, but not in the two states where such an alliance would have enabled it to gain many more seats. On the whole, this is not a good record. Yet the arithmetic manner in which Baxter assesses the costs of non-alignments—adding the votes of the two would-be allies to determine if the total would have won the seat—provides only a partial assessment. More insight is needed into the reasons for the failure to align, which would enable an assessment of the costs of alignment as well, in terms of the seats the party would have forfeited to its allies, and compromises in the party program.

The non-R.S.S. wing of the party has been more willing to make these compromises than the R.S.S. dominated party organization. More attuned to electoral prospects, the non-R.S.S. leaders espouse the more pragmatic politics of negotiation on Kashmir, electoral alliances, and participation in coalition governments. The R.S.S. cadre are more concerned with cultural purity and cohesion of Hindu India, with an ambivalence toward politics which has made political investigation of the Jana Sangh difficult. They have urged the party to enter elections alone with the militant Hindu views for which the party is known—opposition to cow slaughter, recovery of portions of Kashmir now in Pakistan, etc. This is a familiar and important conflict in strongly issue-oriented cadre parties operating in electoral systems. Yet with little material on the internal party divisions in which this conflict is articulated, Baxter misses also its implications for the party's capabilities in the pluralistic social environment. Unlike the Congress, the Jana Sangh is not an aggregative party. Baxter finds an increasing flexibility after 1967 in adapting to local issues and power constellations, to the

point of state units taking opposing sides on the same issue, but concludes that major concessions are unlikely. Though not explicitly linked to internal party affairs, this conclusion seems to indicate that the organizational cadre will continue their redominance. According to most analyses of Indian politics their non-aggregative model will limit the party's capabilities; yet so far the Jana Sangh has done remarkably well.

With such an emphasis on electoral politics, one misses much of the dynamic of this party. It is known for discipline in containing these factional conflicts, which Baxter attributes to the R.S.S. training of party cadre. Yet with no description of the early morning exercise sessions and the other modes in which the R.S.S. firms its recruits, the loyalty and militancy of the Jana Sangh cadre remain effectively unexplained. Similarly with no depth analysis of any of the communal incidents for which the Jana Sangh is frequently blamed, the party's relationship to a crucial set of emotional issues remains unarticulated. It is a mark of the scholarly tone of his work that Baxter does not place much emphasis or find a label for the party. Without materials of this kind, however, his characterization of the Jana Sangh as a conservative party appears more as caution than analysis.

There are more conceptual questions as well which one would like a study of the Jana Sangh to illuminate. How is Hindu tradition reshaped by being placed in party platforms: How might the Jana Sangh help to formulate a conception of nation and community which would make modernization more accessible to the many new political participants for whom western secularism has few referents: What role does tradition play for the apparently modernizing sectors, students, intellectuals, and urban middle class, who have been attracted to the Jana Sangh—increasingly so recently. Baxter suggests that the cow and the nuclear bomb cannot both be accommodated, that modern technology will bring a secularism which the Jana Sangh opposes—this also I would like to leave as a question.

No study can move in these many directions. Baxter's biography has provided much useful material and opens up a set of questions which many scholars will want to consider—perhaps the most important compliment to any work.—CAROLYN ELLIOTT, *University of California, Santa Cruz.*

The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership. BY JOACHIM C. FEST. Translated by Michael Bullock. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970. Pp. 402. \$10.00.)

Joachim Fest has written a balanced account of the Third Reich in which he focuses on the personalities of its leaders. He divides his book into three parts, the first dealing with Hitler, the sec-

ond with those who in Mr. Fest's judgment were next in command (Göring, Goebbels, Heydrich, Himmler, Bormann, and Röhm), and the third with "functionaries" such as Franz von Papen, Hans Frank, and the commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss. The third part also contains studies of three groups of "functionaries" none of whom, according to the author, had a typical member. These groups are the generals, the intellectuals, and all the women who were mobilized in one way or another into the service of the Third Reich.

Apart from the problem of ranking his subjects according to their places in the Nazi hierarchy, Mr. Fest had to decide whom to deal with and whom to ignore. He tries to justify his failure to discuss certain high officials by saying that their personalities were not very different from those of some of his subjects. But it remains unclear why there is a study of Albert Speer and none, let us say, of Hjalmar Schacht, why Rudolf Hess is dealt with and not Robert Ley, and so on. Also, we are left to derive what we will about two especially interesting groups, the judges and the civil servants, from a general discussion of Weimar conservatism which occurs in passing in the chapter on Papen. One wonders why the generals but not the civil servants rate a chapter. Mr. Fest answers this question by saying that to deal with the civil servants and other groups whom he ignores would withdraw attention from the guilt of the entire German population. But ethical problems aside, why then single out any groups for special treatment?

Yet I spoke of the book as balanced, and the fact that Mr. Fest treats a number of things in passing was one of my reasons for doing so. To cite two examples besides his discussion of Weimar conservatism, he uses the chapter on Bormann to discuss the governmental structure of the Third Reich and the one on Goebbels to deal with Nazi propaganda. The digressions contain nothing less than a summary of the collective wisdom of the social sciences on the structure and the appeals of the Nazi regime. This summary and the studies of individuals and groups combine to make the book a reasonably comprehensive account of the Third Reich.

Other factors add to the balance of the book. Mr. Fest is restrained (and convincing) in his attempts at psychoanalysis. And his concluding remarks about the future of the Bonn Republic could not be more sober, though readers who overrate the importance of the recent decline of the National Democratic Party (NPD) may find his outlook too dreary.

Mr. Fest has distinguished himself in West Berlin and West Germany as a radio and television journalist. Unfortunately, he fails to bring the proper methodological rigor to his book. This lack

is most pronounced in his numerous references to ideology. He does not offer an explicit definition of the term. One must invariably read a definition into the context, and the definitions are by no means uniform. Still, the remarks taken together form a most sensible statement on the relations between ideas and political behavior in the Third Reich.

The author does give some thought to the problem of defining "totalitarianism." He says that totalitarianism differs from "the classical forms of coercive government" in its attempt to remake man, and proposes this attempt as its defining characteristic (p. 292). His suggestion recalls one of Hannah Arendt's themes in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. To be sure, before the definition could gain wide usage agreement would have to emerge on whether all regimes which are considered totalitarian, and these alone, sought to remake man. Mr. Fest does not offer the necessary evidence, or even reveal all his assumptions about what would constitute human re-creation. There is the further problem that the definition might increase the danger, already great in some conservative circles, of overestimating the extent and the causal significance of totalitarian leaders' aims with respect to human nature. But fortunately Mr. Fest does not make this mistake in dealing with the German case, informed as he is about the roles played by Nazi ideology in the various senses of that term.

For sources, Mr. Fest relies mainly on books, journal articles, and the records of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. His most original and enlightening chapters are on individual Nazi leaders other than Hitler. These chapters can be seen as an extension of Miss Arendt's insights into the banality of evil. The part of the book devoted to Hitler is largely a survey of well-known material which had appeared before the German edition was published in 1963. (The notes in the English edition take account of some of the more recent material.) The most disappointing chapter is the one on the intellectuals. It scarcely recognizes the problem of men such as Wilhelm Furtwängler and Werner Heisenberg who, whatever they thought of the regime, continued to exercise their extraordinary talents under it and to lend it their prestige.

Several comments on technical matters ought to be made. Michael Bullock has produced a serviceable translation, though it is an obvious misreading of the original to put down that Göring shared with Renaissance man a supreme sense of style and a refined feeling for life, and Papen's political party (the Center) deserves to have its name capitalized. The publishers would have enhanced the value of the book if they had reprinted the pictures of the subjects from the German edition.

The book is nevertheless the best available introduction to the Third Reich. Especially in Germany, where psychoanalysis has traditionally been more suspect than it is here, the book should raise the general level of ability to recognize political figures with severe emotional disturbances, and that will be a very useful function indeed.—GLENN SCHRAM, *Marquette University*.

The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism
By JAY B. SORENSON. (New York, Atherton Press, 1969. Pp. 283. \$9.50.)

This book, like a great deal else published today, bears out Alexander Erlich's remark in his parallel *The Soviet Industrial Debate 1924-1928*, that "The ideas of the twenties are far from dead in our days." There have not of course been any genuine discussions in the Soviet Union since 1928, and while the country has changed massively since then it is certain that their own experience is more relevant to current Soviet problems than ours.

Erlich's book was an attempt to reconstruct the debate in terms of economic theory; Professor Sorenson is concerned primarily with the politics and institutional structures which helped to produce the modern Soviet regime. As such it is a fascinating study of a certain type of politics—that of a bureaucracy, where there is no recall or referendum to a broad constituency, and no limits placed by cost accounting. The winners are not necessarily "right" in any economic or political sense, but it is they who write the history and determine policy into the future. In the case of the events described in this book it may very well have been Burkhariu who was "right," in all senses except the final one, victory.

For many purposes the story ends in 1921 at the 10th Party Congress with the final departure of the Communist Party from any real pretence at a genuinely popular role. The Congress was preceded by the dangerous mutiny at Kronstadt which was crushed by force, and by a long debate on the role of the "unions" in the new Soviet State. The answer was a resolution "On Unity" which left and leaves no room for "factionalism" or any real debate within the Party, much less outside. Lenin himself presented this resolution and so can be considered the author of the Stalinist tyranny, and certainly of Stalinist labor policy.

The rest of the book details how these decisions were implemented, the growing power of Stalin within the Party and the Party within the state. As Professor Sorenson indicates, the basic millenarianism of Lenin and of most of the other Bolsheviks pushed them to decisions which were seldom fully rational, and have proved in many cases harmful to their own goals. The process continues

day. Brezhnev, faced with the usual serious crisis in agriculture and a growing industrial crisis, can only ask Soviet workers to go once again into the breach, to fight on to victory, all military metaphors, and not overly applicable, one would think, to what are basically flawed economic structures. Professor Sorenson makes it clear why and when Soviet politics and Soviet economics became hopelessly entwined, so that any reforms on the economic side threaten the power and integrity of the communist Party.

All and all a very useful book. Professor Sorenson does not entirely avoid the usual difficulty of identifying "workers," working class, trade union movements, labor movements, though he does struggle to make clear which he is speaking about and when. This is especially necessary for the early years when the "spontaneous organization of the 'working class' seems to have taken the form of factory committees of an anarcho-syndicalist cast. In many cases the Bolsheviks imposed trade unions as a method of control. The genuine unions which had roots in the Tsarist period, like the railway workers, became opposed to Bolshevik control and had to be crushed. The whole picture of "labor" is further clouded by the traditional strong ties of the Russian industrial worker to his native village and by the failure except in a few crafts for any sense of class identity to develop.

One does not have to go as far as the late Isaac Deutscher in assuming that an emerging "working class" will come to play a major role as a class in the full Marxist sense in future Soviet politics to develop a feeling that the present Soviet labor union structure has its weaknesses, and that the relationship "labor-unions," and Party-State may be a critical one in the future. It is interesting to note that in the recent (1966) *Industry and Labour in the USSR*, a work by Soviet industrial sociologists, there is no attempt to discuss the role of the trade unions. One suspects no Soviet sociologist would care to comment.

Professor Sorenson also struggles with the subject of historical inevitability vs. the only too obvious Bolshevik manipulations, and comes out strongly for the proposition that the Soviet Regime was the product of a series of accidents. This is of course a hardy perennial, and has been handled better elsewhere.

It is a pity, especially in view of the useful documentation and bibliography, that the book was not provided with an adequate index.—LOIS STONE, *SUNY at Albany*.

The Working-Class Tories: Authority, Deference, and Stable Democracy. By ERIC A. NORDLINGER. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 276. \$8.95.)

This book is one of a series of writings in recent

years about "the working class Tory vote." Nordlinger joins several political scientists and journalists in placing a great emphasis on those members of the English working class who cast their vote upwards to the middle class Tory party. While such a voting pattern surely does exist, it is baffling why, in contemporary English politics, this is considered so important or, for that matter, so unusual. For if one broadens the field of view to also include a look at middle class voting behavior, one finds that not a very much larger percentage of the working class vote Tory than the middle class vote Labour (32% and 20%, respectively). Further, it is significant that these figures were derived using objective class definitions, and, if people's own subjective class identifications are instead employed, then the figures come yet closer together (28% and 21%, respectively). Data taken from Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, pp. 106, 76).

Nordlinger again embraces the views of others when he explains much of this working class Tory voting as due to deferential attitudes. For years, citations of "deference theories" have been prominent in the literature as explanations of the working class Tory vote; however, actual survey results have shown that the large majority of the reasons given are not deferential, but rather give the same reasons the rest of the English population gives for voting Tory. The reasons are fairly common and expected ones concerning "bread and butter" issues, government management, and the personality and ability of party leaders (without attempting to construe the latter as "deference"). These reasons are just as valid for the working class as for the middle class—especially if one considers that the Tories were just completing a well-managed and prosperous fourteen year rule at the time of Nordlinger's study in the summer of 1964, and that they had been actively appealing to working class interests ever since the Reform Bill of 1867, as McKenzie and Silver amply document in their book, *Angels in Marble*.

Of course, there are a scattering of "deferentials" among the working class. But the answers to open-ended questions in surveys show that they are a minor phenomenon. Nordlinger approached his data in such a way—predicated upon an Ecksteinian theory of attitudes toward authority relations—that he overemphasized the "deferential" aspect of working class Toryism, so much so that to him it is the vital key to England's stability as a democracy.

There are several reasons why this overemphasis on the deference explanation resulted. First, Nordlinger did not incorporate the middle class into his sample, so contrasts of its political attitudes and voting behavior with those of the working class were impossible. This distorted his perspective as

to the importance and uniqueness of working class voting deviancy and the deferential theory underlying it. Second, he did not place enough emphasis on—or more accurately, he did not derive the vital deductions from—the open-ended questions he asked about the parties, and they provide definite clues as to the place of “deference” versus other explanations the working class gave for supporting the Tories. Third, he defined “deferentials” on the basis of answers to two close-ended questions—presenting structured, forced-choice questions that may have had little relevance to the subject’s actual thinking about politics and the parties. (Open-ended questions asking the things people like and dislike about the parties should instead have been used to define who the “deferentials” were—they reveal the spontaneous feelings of subjects.) The fact that only 28% of the working class Tory voters replied affirmatively to two dichotomous questions, and, hence, were classified as “deferentials” in Nordlinger’s scheme, should have alerted him that this was not a sizable quantity on at least two counts: one, 28% is a small figure relative to the emphasis Nordlinger placed on it; two, one would expect 25% of the working class Tory sample to choose the two affirmative replies by chance alone.

A last effort by Nordlinger to emphasize the importance of the 28% deferential figure is also questionable in its interpretation. Several questions purporting to tap “acquiescence” to political authority showed somewhat higher values than the 28% figure. But a real problem is in understanding the meaning of these results. Were individuals truly conscious of and acquiescing to the political authority structure, or were they rather manifesting a disinterest in or remoteness from politics in general? If the working class is little involved in politics, it is difficult to impute a general feeling of conscious deference toward the political authority structure typified by Tory rule.

The rest of Nordlinger’s analysis basically contrasts the working class Tory “deferential” and “pragmatic” voters (the latter are the 72% residue) with the working class Labour voters, on various social, attitudinal, and behavioral variables. The Tory “pragmatists” are those working class Tory voters who answered the two close-ended questions in any combination other than giving affirmative replies to both. A fourth category in the tables Nordlinger presents in his book is “all working class Tory voters,” combining the “deferential” and “pragmatist” categories.

Throughout the multitude of tables presented, one is more impressed with the absence of analytic differences between the working class Tory and Labour voters than by their presence. Small differences are the rule and not the exception. In the

case of comparisons between all Tory and all Labour voters, it is possible that either (a) the two groups did not in reality differ much on various criteria or (b) they just were not different on the particular criteria Nordlinger selected for his analysis. As for the comparisons of the two separate categories of Tory voters, “deferentials” and “pragmatists,” with Labour voters one feels restrained because it is difficult to know what weight to put on the categories as defined. Several of the cross-breaks indicate the volatility of the “deferential” group, and, although there probably are some true “deferentials” in this category, there seems to be a lot of “random noise” here also. The residue “pragmatist” group of the Tory voters and the Labour voters seem to be quite similar—the first being attracted to the Tories for their issue and the second being attracted to Labour for its policies. But essentially, it is socio-economic considerations which probably underlie the vote decisions of these two groups.

One of the several cases in which Nordlinger does not find a relationship is when contrasting age (or “political generation”) to his typology of working class Tory and Labour voters. This is surprising since both the McKenzie-Silver and Butler-Stokes studies found a relationship, and, the latter especially, probed it to reveal still other factors than issues which prompted working class Toryism—basically, the socialization of children into Tory allegiance by parents who lived during the time when Labour was not a major contestant on the electoral scene. The strength of such identification increases over time as has been shown in American voting studies, shaping attitudes toward leaders, issues, etc.—without necessarily implying “deference” but rather the intrinsic value placed on psychological identification with a party. These socialized children are now the older cohorts of the Butler-Stokes sample and are largely responsible for the greater percentage of working class who vote Tory than middle class who vote Labour mentioned above. The cross-class voting of the younger cohorts, on the other hand, balances out—the younger set choosing their parties more on the basis of policy and issue reasons.

Other causal factors also seem to have been missed by Nordlinger in explaining working class Toryism—regional differences, religious differences, the “government turnover” philosophy of the people, and the decline of the Liberal party in British politics with its resulting redistribution of the working class vote. Despite Nordlinger’s stated intentions, he picked very few relevant variables and engaged in hardly any multivariate analysis. In essence, one learned little from Nordlinger’s work about the phenomenon of working class Toryism, the factors affecting it, or the proper per-

pective in which to place its relevance and importance on the larger British political scene.—JEROLD G. RUSK, *Purdue University*.

Latin American Peasant Movements. EDITED BY HENRY LANDSBERGER (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 476. \$12.50.)

Though peasants have comprised more than half of the population of Latin America and in recent years peasant movements have emerged in a number of countries, only isolated case studies have appeared in print. *Latin American Peasant Movements* by Henry Landsberger is the first serious attempt to provide us with a collection of detailed case studies of peasant politics. Moreover the editor, in his introductory essay, has provided us with a thoughtful comprehensive analytic framework for understanding the dynamic factors affecting the emergence and growth of peasant movements. The title of the opening essay, "The Role of Peasant Movements and Revolts in Development" is a misnomer; rather the bulk of the article is concerned with the emergence of peasant movements, the impact of development on their growth and the social-economic and political determinants of peasant politics. The opening essay purports to provide a common framework for analysis, though most of the contributors "deviate" considerably from it, perhaps because some of the essays are derived from doctoral dissertations written independently of this book.

The major value of these essays is found in the abundant descriptive details and the attempt to isolate variables accounting for movement variations. Unlike the impressionistic and discursive essays written by many of the older Latin Americanists we find the beginning attempts to apply quantitative techniques (Powell and Pearson's essays, for example) and in-depth political-anthropological studies.

The countries in which movements are studied include Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Peru (two essays), Guatemala and Brazil. An excellent concluding essay by Ernest Feder discusses the impact of ruling class repression on peasant movements, an area of research which unfortunately is too often neglected by U. S. political scientists.

As a pioneering effort, the essays in this casebook have a number of defects—both in methodology and in the analysis of the descriptive material.

In his essay "Guatemala: The Peasant Union Movement" Neal Pearson bases a substantial part of his analysis of peasant political attitudes on a secondary analysis of data collected from imprisoned peasants. Data based on interviews which could be political-incriminating and lead to possible physical elimination is hardly reliable. Hence

Pearson's assertion that "there was no significant correlation between being informed and membership in any of the organizations" may have been largely a product of the circumstances in which the "interviews" were taking place: interrogation in a jail by a member of the State Department, Office of Intelligence Research.

In their accounts of the activities of the opponents of peasant movements in Brazil, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Mexico there is almost a total absence of discussion of the role of the U. S.—though it is well known that the CIA was intimately involved in reversing the agrarian movement in Guatemala; that the U. S. provided economic and diplomatic support to the military junta that seized power and suppressed the peasant movement in Brazil; that the U. S. provided the financial and technical resources that reconstituted the Bolivian Army which eventually ousted the peasant-based MNR; that U. S. military expeditions invaded Mexico and attempted to destroy the peasant armies, etc.

Powell's account of the "success" of the peasant unions in Venezuela is a gross misrepresentation of its actual accomplishments—which he states in general terms but fails to detail. The great majority of Venezuelan peasants have either migrated to the growing urban slums or remained landless. The majority of agrarian reform "beneficiaries" have been given inadequate technical and financial assistance resulting in their subsisting on isolated plots of land. Furthermore, the power of the large landowners has not been seriously challenged in rural areas; together with a new class of middle class farmer (about twenty percent of the agrarian reform beneficiaries) they devour the larger part of the credits and marketing facilities made available for agrarian development; and the future trend is for these conditions to be accentuated.

A large and significant peasant movement organized by left-wing Catholics—who have since been forced out of the Christian Democratic Party—and Marxists has emerged for the first time in Chile during the past six years. Unfortunately Professor Landsberger chose to discuss a seventeen year old episode involving a defunct peasant union in the South of Chile. While his analysis is suggestive, his attempt in the concluding paragraphs to link his case study up with contemporary political developments is feeble. The members of the Catholic Left which have organized the majority of the unions were in grammar school when the events Landsberger describes took place. Furthermore the Marxist parties have enjoyed far more success in gaining the allegiance of the peasantry than Professor Landsberger is aware of. During the 1964 elections, in the central valley, a plurality of male rural voters cast their ballots for the Social-

ist-Communist candidate. These facts are hardly indicative of a "crushing defeat."

The account of the Mexican peasant movement by White also exaggerates the degree of success and fails to adequately take account of the enormous number of peasants who have not been materially affected by the revolution. Along with the bulk of the Mexicologists he fails to recognize the emergence of new exploitative classes which have emerged in the last twenty years and which clothe their political rhetoric in the language of peasant revolution while liquidating or co-opting grass roots peasant leaders who attempt to extend the revolution to the present day.

There are occasional intellectual lapses among some of the authors attempting to interpret peasant behavior that reveal some of their prejudices. For example, Powell inelegantly informs us that: "Current peasant choices of agrarian reform benefits and housing over education are perfectly consistent with everything we know (SIC) about the absence of deferred gratification behavior in backward peoples." One wonders who really is "backward": a peasant in search of a home and land for survival or a U.S. professor advising him to defer these "gratifications"....

On the other hand the article by Cotler and Portocarrero on Peruvian peasant unions and Cynthia Hewitt on Brazilian peasant movements are more balanced accounts, less influenced by the liberal biases found among the other contributors.

Huizer and Hewitt compile a comprehensive bibliography which will be especially helpful to the specialist largely because many of the entries are not generally available.—JAMES PETRAS, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

The Unionization of Teachers: A Case Study of the UFT. BY STEPHEN COLE. (New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1969. Pp. 245. \$8.00.)

Teacher Unions and Associations: A Comparative Study. EDITED BY ALBERT A. BLUM. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. 353. \$9.50.)

As interest in the politics of education expands, there has been an increased concern with the role of teacher organization. In 1967, Harmon Zeigler wrote *The Political Life of American Teachers*, a study based primarily on a survey of Oregon teachers. Also in that same year, James M. Clark published *Teachers and Politics in France*, a pressure group study. Two years later Alan Rosenthal wrote *Pedagogues and Power*, a comparative study of teacher organizations in five American cities. Now Stephen Cole has produced a sociological history of the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the nation's largest union local; and Albert Blum has edited a collection of essays on teacher movements in nine countries.

The growth of UFT, now more than 50,000

members strong, is a story worth telling not only because of its implications for American education, but also because of its significance in the development of unions for professionals, particularly government workers. Professor Cole, a young sociologist from Stony Brook, uses two principal research methods: interviews with 22 union leaders and a survey based on mail questionnaires returned by 331 New York teachers after their strike of 1962 (supplemented occasionally by a second survey of 126 teachers in Perth Amboy, New Jersey taken after their strike in 1965).

Until 1960, the history of teacher organizations in New York City was a tale of utter frustration. Fragmented along subject matter, grade level, geographical, ideological and religious lines, the teachers were at one time "represented" by 160 different groups. During the depression, teaching in New York City was one of the best jobs in the country. After World War II, however, neither salaries nor status of teachers kept pace with other professions. Dissatisfaction mounted but the necessary militancy to overcome internal divisions and to take action was slow to develop.

Part of the problem is that the ability to strike is both symbolically and functionally the key to successful union organization. Yet, traditionally, teachers feared to use this weapon, believing that whatever economic gain might be garnered would be offset by a loss of professional and class status. Furthermore such strikes were everywhere illegal.

The UFT was formed in March 1960 by a merger of the CATU, a dissident group of high school teachers, and the Teachers Guild, the remnants of the socialist movement among teachers. Six months later, the new union launched a strike to achieve collective bargaining and in 1962 another strike for wages. As strikes go neither was much of a spectacle. Most teachers crossed picket lines, and in the face of this low support and court injunctions, union leaders called the strikes off after the first day. But collective bargaining was won and the day after the second strike. Governor Rockefeller "found" \$13 million in additional state aid for the schools. This meant \$1000 a year raise for each teacher plus substantial fringe benefits. It was a lesson the teachers could not ignore and union membership boomed.

Cole's analysis of the strike focuses on two issues: which teachers were most likely to strike and which social conditions make such strikes effective?

Who are the militant teachers? Fifty-nine percent of the teachers in New York's public schools are Jewish as are an even higher percentage of the most visible union leaders. Cole finds, however, that militancy is related less to being Jewish than to family background that was lower-class, Democratic and pro-union. In Perth Amboy, where Jews

were more middle-class, Catholics were the most militant. Indeed there appears to be a negative correlation between intensity of religion and union militancy.

Other factors relating to militancy were youth, male sex, and teaching in a high school or even more a junior high. (These latter schools have the most discipline problems and the highest staff turnovers.) The educational philosophy of respondents, if one accepts the questions Cole asked as valid indicators, was not a factor.

Perhaps because of his limited sample size, Cole made no attempt to determine the attitudes of Black or Puerto Rican teachers regarding the strike. Given the current conflict between these minority groups and the UFT and the anti-union stance of the Afro-American Teachers Association, these attitudes would have been an interesting dimension to the study. In the light of these current hostilities, there is a certain irony in the unintentional assist the civil rights movement gave to union solidarity. According to one union organizer:

The teachers have been very afraid of committing illegal acts, and this is why the civil rights movement has been so important. Without the civil rights movement there never would have been so many teachers' strikes. The civil rights movement has given legitimacy to breaking the law when the law is immoral. The law prohibiting teacher strikes is immoral. . . . (p. 74)

As Cole points out the response of the men on the other side of the bargaining table to the growth of union power was generally weak or erratic. None of the potential techniques of social control—displays of paternalism, token concessions, co-optation of leaders or legal sanctions—was used very effectively. Sanctions, the author suggests, were particularly difficult to apply because of the prolabor stance of Mayor Robert Wagner's administration and because the relevant statute (the Condon-Wadlin Act) called for instant dismissal of strikers, an overkill penalty few authorities were willing to invoke. These are clearly important factors, but Cole's failure to interview members of the school board or other political officials makes this chapter more speculative than necessary.

The most interesting policy question Cole discusses is whether unionization has had a negative effect on the professional interest of teachers in the improvement of schools. On this issue, which is the classic controversy between the National Educational Association and the American Federation of Teachers (the UFT's parent), the author is rather skeptical about the union's position. When there has been a choice between increasing the strength of the organization or advancing educational reform, Cole believes, UFT leaders have chosen the former. While on two issues, salaries and class size, the union has won substantial gains

for its membership and education generally; the leadership has also blocked reform of teacher licensing and evaluation procedures. The union has opposed the kind of faculty participation in hiring and promotion decisions common in universities on the grounds that such participation by its members would obscure management-labor distinctions.

This conflict between the well-being of the organization and the desperate need to reform urban schools may have a great influence on the future of teachers unions. Unfortunately, however, Cole's book was completed before the recent struggle over school decentralization in New York City began and he devotes only two pages in an epilogue to the subject. Though the decentralization issue is far from settled in New York and is just now emerging in other cities, the demand for accountability and performance that it represents may in the long run affect the union's ability to advance the economic interest of teachers, guard such perquisites as tenure or maintain internal solidarity. If as Cole found, the young, the poor and the liberal were the most ardent union members a decade ago, these same groups today often view unions as part of the establishment. These educational militants have found a new cause and a new enemy.

Albert Blum, Professor of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State, has collected ten original essays on teacher unions and associations ". . . to better understand the organizations teachers are developing as they make their demands." (p. vii) The volume, arranged alphabetically, includes chapters on Canada, England, West Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Thailand, the United States, and a final chapter on international teacher organizations. This internal arrangement and the nation-by-nation format suggest that the essays were commissioned and assembled without considering the need for a common analytical framework.

Consequently, the contributions which are also written from several disciplinary perspectives, produce very little in the way of comparative analysis. Many of the essays are unfocused descriptive inventories of the various organizations in each country rather than explorations into the sources and consequences of organizational behavior.

Blum suggests the concepts of professionalism and unionism as an organizing theme, while arguing that a major purpose of comparative study is ". . . to permit us to see our own problems and our answers to these problems from a wider vantage point." (p. vii) Professionalism/unionism may be appropriate categories for analyzing some aspects of the American scene; however, their ideological flavor, American origins, and tendency to reduce the complexity of stances taken by professional

organizations, suggests that they alone cannot serve as a framework for the comparative study of teacher organizations.

A preferable approach might have utilized the well-established literatures on organizational theory, industrial relations, group politics (particularly Lipset and Schwartz' essay "The Politics of Professionals" in Vollmer and Mills, *Professionalization*) and comparative political behavior to articulate the goals of research in this field.

A framework for the comparative analysis of teacher organizations must perform at least three tasks. First, it should help identify those variables which cause the diverse patterns of organizational behavior among teachers. Second, the framework ought to provide the analyst with a device for comparing the structure and behavior of teacher organizations. Third, and most difficult, it should provide some criteria for identifying the most important probable consequences of organized activity on the part of teachers. Ideally, the scheme should help us explore the "feedback" effects of organizational behavior on the society and the organization itself. It should also suggest what impact these patterns of behavior have for the governance of education and the quality of education.

Moscow and Doherty approach this ideal in their fine overview of the United States. They argue that the behavior of local affiliates of the NEA and the AFT is probably more satisfactorily explained by variables such as state-to-state differences in collective bargaining laws, alliances with labor organizations, increases in the proportion of men in the profession, competition between the rival organizations, and changes in the level of educational quality rather than by their professionalism or unionism identification. They also suggest that the professionalism—unionism issue, linked as it is to the problem of educational quality, cannot be resolved until an "... adequate yardstick exists by which one can measure education quality." (p. 331)

They surmise:

... that urban schools have deteriorated in recent years, but it would be foolish to attempt to show a cause and effect relationship between bargaining (a characteristic of unionism) and the decline in quality. ... In fact it might be easier to show that it was the decline in educational quality that precipitated bargaining, and that without some form of collective activity, the erosion would have been much more rapid. (p. 331)

Although the essay on Canada by Douglas Muir is a substantial and well-written piece, it focuses on the diverse legal frameworks regulating teacher's rights to bargain collectively rather than on explanations of the organizational behavior of Canadian unions and associations. There is only a passing reference, for example, to the complex mosaic of the fascinating teacher movement in Que-

bec, where associations reflect the linguistic and religious cleavages of the province.

Similarly, Natarajan's chapter on India is also entirely descriptive. The author does not speculate on the possible consequences for the development of teacher organizations of the decentralization represented by the "Community Development Blocks."

Professors Heenan and Wranski in their chapter on Thailand describe a myriad of specialized teacher organizations such as the Pre-School Education Association of Thailand. They devote three pages to a listing of the welfare and continuing education programs of the *Khuru Sapha*, the government sponsored "company union" which all Thai teachers must join, without explaining why teacher organizations in Thailand have not achieved even a minimal degree of autonomy.

Victor Alba's essay on Mexico also fails to explain why teacher unions may have lost their autonomy. Why the teacher unions became largely linked to the Ministry of Education rather than the official party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*) is a critical question he left unanswered.

The outstanding contribution to this volume is the chapter on Nikkyōso, Japan's most important and powerful teacher union. Solomon Levine, who authored *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan*, accounts for the rise and decline of Nikkyōso since the occupation, tracing its relationship to the labor movement, the Ministry of Education, and its ability to adapt to the centralized, decentralized and again re-centralized system of education in Japan since 1945. In what might well have served as a model for the entire volume, Levine's *tour de force* focuses on "... those features that appear useful for comparing Japan's experience with other nations." (p. 142)

While Blum's book takes the first step of suggesting that the comparative study of teacher organizations is worthy of our further attention, there is obviously much theorizing and research to be done.

Only eleven years ago, Thomas Eliot in an essay in this Review (December, 1959) accurately complained that political scientists had woefully neglected the politics of education. Since then, however, the number of universities offering courses in the field has grown to at least 44 and reading lists, albeit with some significant gaps, can be assembled for both American politics and the comparative politics of education. Cole and Blum have made useful contributions to these lists and several more comprehensive and theoretical works in the field are on the way.—PAUL M. COHEN, *Teachers College, Columbia University*. GEORGE R. LA NOUE, *Teachers College, Columbia University and Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute*.

Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment. EDITED BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH. (Berkeley: University of California, 1969. Pp. 441. \$9.50.)

This anthology of recent writings by seven contributors grew out of a conference on contemporary Yugoslavia held at Stanford University in December of 1965. Five of these articles were prepared for that conference; two others (on Yugoslav Marxist thought and on Yugoslav modernization) were commissioned. In light of these facts, this volume is surprisingly coherent in its diversity. In short, it represents a solid contribution to the study of contemporary Yugoslavia, and, although flawed, is well worth purchasing. To give some idea of the book's usefulness, I shall comment briefly on some of its weak points and its strengths. First off, how is it "flawed"?

The weaknesses of these efforts taken as a whole consist of being misleading, uneven and occasionally blatantly inconsistent. Like some comely women, this book is very attractive—even though its feet are much too big. The title, that is to say, is misleading, for one does not expect fully one third of the text of a work on "twenty years of socialist experiment" (sic) to survey pre-1945 Yugoslavia. The market abounds with a wide variety of competent works that provide that "necessary foundation." Unevenness is to be expected in an anthology, even among writers such as these seven who primarily are historically oriented. But the inconsistencies seem to indicate that several of these contributors did not take time to apprise themselves of each others efforts. For example, compare Tomasevich (p. 62) with Vucinich (pp. 25, 278) on the significance of the Concordat which was rejected by the Yugoslav parliament in 1937.

Turning to the body of the book, it offers much to inform the observer of modern Yugoslavia. Wayne Vucinich presents inter-war Yugoslavia in an even-handed fashion, setting the heavily historical tone that characterizes the entire book. Occasional lapses into historicism and a conspicuous absence of well-founded generalizations mar a generally profound presentation of Yugoslav political development during that period.

Jozo Tomasevich does deliver (as promised in the preface) "the finest short treatment of the enormously complicated Yugoslav war scene currently available," indicating in passing that Yugoslavia's stormy relations with the USSR began as early as 1942. Noteworthy is his judicious seven point conclusion.

Woodford McClellan's "Postwar Political Evolution" and Phyllis Auty's "Yugoslavia's International Relations (1945-1965)" jointly provide a sensitive analysis of Yugoslavia's domestic and international political metamorphosis during those

two decades. As Tito remarked bitterly to Phyllis Auty in 1951, the Yugoslavs have seldom had very satisfactory relations with the Russians. Perhaps this candid comment from the George Washington of Yugoslavia could serve as the implicit theme of this book.

George Macesich is quite disappointing in his efforts to inform the reader of "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia." Evidently an economic historian by nature, he immerses the reader in waves of economic statistics that all too seldom are examined for meaning. The facts too often are mute; Macesich describes not wisely but too well, often leaving major tasks of explanation and evaluation to the reader. Most inexcusable, however, is his cursory treatment of what several of these writers admit to being perhaps the most important contribution of the Yugoslavs to Marxist theory and practice: the principle of self-management and self-administration, in both economic and political spheres of activity. Closest to a general appraisal is his opaque statement (pp. 229-230) that

Strict application of such principles of management to an economic enterprise when coupled with the assumption of income-maximizing worker-managers has been shown to be theoretically inferior to existing practices in capitalist firms. . . . This does not mean that the Yugoslav system is not workable. It does mean that it is not fully efficient in the economic sense.

One wishes that Macesich would join his sometimes astute theoretical remarks to a firm description of the effectiveness of those principles in practice, especially as to how they vary in implementation from one region to another within Yugoslavia.

Vucinich, in his second contribution "Nationalism and Communism" draws the reader again back to inter-war Yugoslavia, and leads him up to date through a historical labyrinth of internecine warfare that strain a Westerner's imagination. Truly, as George Bailey commented (in *The Reporter*, July 1, 1955), Yugoslavia "harbours a family of nations united by the fear that their hatred of each other may be exploited by the outsiders." The Yugoslav communists have been able to surmount those animosities by pioneering in the construction of an independent, unitary (yet federal!) socialist state. Paradoxically, this not only allows for, but encourages real, sustained effort at political and economic decentralization. Although not yet fully achieved, this is a tribute to Yugoslav native pragmatic ingenuity and to their stubbornness in the face of a usually hostile, powerful USSR.

M. George Zaninovich presents "The Yugoslav Variation on Marx" in such sophisticated and persuasive fashion that it almost defies critical com-

ment. This talented theorist weaves together six threads of discussion into a colorful fabric that displays well Yugoslavia's "interesting and lively theorizing"—warts and all. The struggle of national liberation as a founding act of the Yugoslav state is quite stimulating reading. The immediate post-liberation, heavily Stalinist beliefs are forgotten by many current adulators of Yugoslavia. The basic Yugoslav conception of man and the man-nature relation is another artful exploration in mythology and political anthropology. Very intriguing is Zaninovich's discussion of the Yugoslav theory of state and society, which comprehends such matters as centralism, bureaucracy, etatism, decentralization, and self-government, touching also upon the newly qualified role of the Party. The Yugoslav theory of dynamics and socio-economic change shed light on the "socialist transformation" and the transition to communism. Finally, the nature and implications of the much-touted "young Marx" are examined for insights into current internal criticisms of the Yugoslav regime, as well as into the justifications offered by that regime itself for their rather bold theoretical (and practical) innovations.

This brilliant essay deserves close reading, for it will stand for some time as a major contribution to the study of Marxist theory and practice in general, and of modern day Yugoslavia in particular. The data of this article (as well as all others in this volume) are heavily based on a wide and deep reading of diverse Yugoslav sources in Serbo-Croatian. Further, the footnotes are valuable (and quite readable) for following lines of the argument in greater depth.

Logically it would seem that Joel Halpern's finely wrought work of condensation on "Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State," would follow the Macesich offering in the procession of authors—but it doesn't. Rather, it serves as the concluding piece of this book, perhaps because it leaves the reader content after being simultaneously enlightened and entertained, in the best sense. Halpern's grasp of a wealth of data, presented with great verve, is formidable. His comments, weaving together economics, history, anthropology, geography, education, and political science, happily propel the reader to think about urbanization of the villages and peasantization of the towns, the role of extended families and kin ties in easing the pains of modernization, the emancipation of Yugoslav women, the Eastern European concept of *kultur*, and, most ingeniously, school primers as an index of regional modernization. This book ends on the up beat.

One final note. The excellent index merits mention. Unfortunately the binding, although a colorful and attractive grey and red, broke after one month's use (U.C. publishers, are you listening?).

Overall, this is an excellent source of stimulating and carefully considered thoughts on that most deviant socialist state, Yugoslavia. It is well worth reading.—GEORGE WAYNE BRADLEY, *San Francisco State College*.

Australian Federalism in the Courts. By GEOFFREY SAWER. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 262. \$12.50.)

The Effect of Judicial Review on Federal-State Relations in Australia, Canada, and the United States. By RICHARD E. JOHNSTON. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970. Pp. 320. \$12.00.)

Albert Venn Dicey, the *doyen* of English and Empire constitutional jurists in the golden age immediately before the outbreak of World War I criticized federalism as meaning, variously, weak government, conservatism, and finally legalism. Geoffrey Sawyer, an Australian lawyer, and Richard Johnston, an American political scientist from North Texas State University, address themselves to this third aspect of Dicey's triadic criticism of federalism, for each is concerned with the political impact of the courts on federalism in the exercise of judicial review of the constitution. Both books are comparative in emphasis, Professor Johnston's expressly and Professor Sawyer in fact if not in stated design. Any study of the judicial interpretation of the Australian Constitution, of course, could hardly avoid taking note of American experience, since not merely did the Founding Fathers of the Australian Constitution borrow freely from the American Constitution in drafting their own constitutional text, but two of the leading judicial personalities, Isaacs and Dixon, were well acquainted with American Supreme Court decisions and drew freely upon them in their judgments.

Sawyer's book is a non-technical book, clearly intended for the general social science reader as much as for law students. In a country that treats its constitution, and even more its constitutional judges, soberly and ponderously, Sawyer has provided us with illuminating flashes of personal character and temperament of the individual judges which do much to explain otherwise idiosyncratic or aberrant judicial opinions. The frequent wit and irreverence and also the facility of style in Sawyer's handling of the discussion of what are surely the most consistently long and also the most determinedly academic and conceptual court judgments among all the federal countries, may help to introduce a new and much-needed element of American-style Legal Realism into Australian constitutional law.

All the same, one cannot help wondering again after reading Sawyer's book, how much Australian federalism, as law-in-action today, is really a response to calls for ethnic-cultural diversity or

gional particularism as in other federal societies; and how much, by contrast, it is a purely artificial, lawyer's creation—a sort of play within a play, built upon the scholarly erudition and the conceptualistic elaborations of what must surely be the ablest public law bar in the Commonwealth Countries. Felix Frankfurter used to recognise the degree of logical refinement of Australian constitutional jurisprudence in his remark, repeated more than once to visiting legal delegations, that the High Court of Australia was the World's strongest English-speaking court. It may be a tribute to the resilience of Australian society, if not rather a testimony to its relative un-complexity and freedom from internal strife, that it has survived such a continually rich diet of legal logic—*Begriffsjurisprudenz*—without too much of a political strain developing between the positive law and the society that it is intended to serve. If cases like the *Bank Nationalisation* case of 1948, in the political conflict between a Socialist federal government and a *laissez-faire*-oriented judiciary may seem, on a superficial view, to confirm the old maxim from American Constitutional history that those who can no longer control the legislatures tend to look to the courts as guardians of their special interests and privileges, these cases are easily balanced by the more usual political non-events like the *Air-lines of New South Wales*, (No. 2), case (1965), where a Conservative federal government and a Socialist state government were joined in battle over the power to regulate internal, intra-state, air traffic; and where the court, on a basis of legal logic and without apparent regard to policy, happily upheld both jurisdictional competences, federal and state.

Professor Johnston, for his part, selects a rather wider canvas than Professor Sawyer, looking to judicial review of federal constitutions of the United States, Canada, and Australia, under the four main headings—inter-governmental immunity of instrumentalities; taxing and spending; foreign affairs; trade and commerce. He has done a thorough and comprehensive survey of the case law of the three federal systems surveyed. However, making allowances for the breadth of the subject and the comparative brevity of his treatment, I would have two main criticisms. First, in seeking to give us, in effect, a judge's-eye view of each of the three federal constitutions surveyed, Professor Johnston necessarily tends to imply that the institutional emphasis and balance in each of the three is the same, and that all three constitutions are judge-oriented in terms of really important community policy-making. A study of the constitutional law-in-action in each of the three federal systems might indicate, however, that this is just not so. Tax disputes that in Australia and in the United States might reach the courts, in Canada

today tend to be fought out in the Balkan War-type skirmishes and ambushes of the regular Dominion-Provincial Prime Ministers' Conferences and in the dependent Dominion-Provincial Tax Structure Committee. The *locus* of community policy-making, in federal constitutional matters in Canada, has tended therefore to shift from the federal Supreme Court (where it was dominant in the area of judicial liberal activism of the 1950's), to other arenas in the 1960's. And this brings us to the second main criticism. In relying, as he does, very largely on secondary, rather than primary, source materials, Professor Johnston is the victim of a certain political time-lag. His chapters, not merely on the taxing and spending powers but even more perhaps on the foreign affairs power, really need supplementing, in the case of Canada, by detailed examination of the federal constitutional implications of French Canada's "Quiet Revolution," inaugurated after 1960. The "Quiet Revolution" has already transformed very many aspects of the working federal constitution of Canada; but it is still essentially untested in the courts, and probably, if the present governmental preferred attitudes (federal and Provincial) prevail, never will be.—EDWARD McWHINNEY, *McGill University*.

People vs Politics: A Study of Opinions, Attitudes and Perceptions in Vancouver-Burrard 1963-1965. BY J. A. LAPONCE. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. Pp. 219. \$10.00.)

The average American is the most closely studied political animal in history. For the last three decades social scientists have been examining how he herds together, which mating calls he heeds, and how he "would vote if an election were held today." In Canada however, such information is limited. Our knowledge about polar bears still exceeds that about Progressive Conservatives.

Many factors have hampered the formulation of scientific explanations of the voting behavior of Canadians. Most significantly, lack of funds and expertise discouraged reliable national samples until the elections of 1965 and 1968. Thus the formulation and validation of theories has been difficult. However, small area studies have proven useful heuristically and for limited tests of hypotheses. The work considered here is the most thorough and imaginative to date. It is essentially an account of the behavior of electors in the federal constituency of Vancouver-Burrard during the federal and provincial elections held from 1963 to 1965. However, Professor Laponce also provides many insights into the voting behavior of Canadians generally.

The primary data sources are two random samples of the constituency. The first consists of 334 respondents (289 were interviewed before the 1963

federal election; 45 were interviewed after because of a previous refusal or non-contact). The second survey consists of 306 respondents, all of whom were interviewed before the 1965 federal election. These studies were supplemented by a reinterview of 115 respondents from the 1963 survey in November 1964, and by another random sample which produced 147 respondents before the provincial election of October 1963. In addition, data from several national surveys by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion were used to make more general inferences.

One of the most informative parts of the study concerns voluntary non-participation. In his first survey of 1963, Laponce found four types of people who chose not to vote in the election. The first type he calls boycotters. Comprising .6 percent of the potential electorate, they refuse to vote because they are opposed to politics generally. Another 2.4 percent of the potential electorate are classified as retired voters. These are former participants who no longer vote because of their age or health. A third group are called barbarians (8 percent). These are mostly poorly educated females who have little knowledge of politics, a poor perception of campaign issues, and little interest in voting. The fourth type of non-voters are called spectators (6.7 percent). They are mostly men who tend to abstain for political reasons even though they are better informed than the barbarians.

Laponce also presents some interesting findings on non-voting in the federal election of 1965. He shows, for example, that between 1963 and 1965 the level of non-voting among well-informed Liberals increased at a much greater rate than among poorly-informed Liberals. A common explanation of this phenomenon has been that well-informed Liberals abstained because they were cross-pressured by the unspectacular performance of Lester Pearson, or because none of the parties were particularly attractive (joint avoidance). However Laponce shows that Liberal voters and Liberal abstainers gave almost the same high ranking to both Pearson and the Liberal party. In addition, Diefenbaker and the Conservative party received almost the same low score among these two groups. If anything, turn-out among the well-informed was higher for those who were cross-pressured than for those who were not (p. 43).

Another set of interesting findings concerns the impact of different types of issues on the voter. Laponce defines two types of issues. Private issues are those which are already of concern to the voter, whereas public issues are those which the campaign brings to his attention for the period of the election. Private issues have greater impact on the voter, particularly when parties discuss them in the campaign. In contrast, public issues which

do not become private fade away once the campaign is over. Evidence of these differences comes in part from a reinterview of 110 respondents from the 1963 survey, eighteen months after the election. More people remembered "pensions" as an issue than had mentioned it during the campaign (an increase from 9 to 18 percent), whereas "defence and nuclear arms" dropped from 62 to 20 percent (p. 82). When respondents in the 1965 survey were asked to recall the issues of 1963, 10 percent said "pensions" but only 4 percent remembered "defence and nuclear arms" (p. 82).

After analyzing voters' opinions about the parties and leaders, Laponce examines how voters change allegiance to other parties. He begins by using CIPO data to show that in Canada generally a party can expect to lose between 5 and 20 percent of its electorate at each election. He then turns to his Burrard data to examine the pattern of electoral migrations between 1962 and 1965. Migrants followed one of three pathways. Temporary migrants switched and then returned to their original party, one-step migrants switched and remained with their new party, while two-step migrants supported a different party in each of three federal elections. Next Laponce investigates if voters follow an ideological continuum when they switch parties, preferring those parties closest to them on the continuum. He finds that the NDP-Liberal-Conservative-Social Credit ordering produces the most consistent pattern of changes but still does not account for between one quarter and one third of the transfers. He concludes the work by assessing the value of various socio-economic variables as indicators of partisanship, and shows which characteristics distinguish the supporters of each party.

Like the competent confessor, no reviewer examines a book and finds it without sin. The main weakness of this book involves explanation. While the author says much about which people vote or how they change parties, he says little about why they do so. Part of the blame rests with the sample size. For example, the small number of respondents makes it difficult to relate issue orientation to electoral migration in other than a cursory fashion. However, the author is also at fault.

Professor Laponce begins by stating that this work is essentially concerned with measurement, not with formulating and testing a theory, or with relating variables in a systematic experiment (p.x.). Throughout his work therefore, he introduces concepts through analogies or hypotheses and then presents relevant data. Unfortunately, however, the significance of the analogies is seldom pursued once the data is presented, and while the hypotheses are tested adequately, they explain little since they are not derived formally. Thus, while the author is concerned with measurement

rather than with theory, it is often difficult to assess what he is measuring. This is particularly true in his use of typologies where the conditions for classification tend to be arbitrary.

Despite these weaknesses however, the book is well worth reading. Students of Canadian politics will find it particularly valuable, not only for what it says about Canadians, but as an example of how to conduct significant research at the local level in a careful and inexpensive manner.—WALLACE D. GAGNE, *McMaster University*.

The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966. By C. S. WHITAKER, JR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Pp. 563. \$13.50.)

The Politics of Tradition calls to mind Martin Landau's thoughtful critique of contemporary political science:

Restless, uncertain of direction, anxious about our status, we continue to reach out to other domains for concepts and images. Any new language suggestive of scientific yield bids fair to be transported into political science. Hence, it is difficult to fathom Robert A. Dahl's statement that 'the impact of the scientific outlook has been to stimulate caution, rather than boldness, in searching for broad, explanatory theories.' On the contrary, in the last fifteen years, we have transferred theories with a boldness that defies scientific caution. We have done exactly what Dahl has urged: we have introduced 'broad, bold, even highly vulnerable general theories,' as well as theories of lesser order. Those who embrace scientific perspectives have done this more explicitly; those who don't, more implicitly. Our problem, accordingly, is not a lack of theory—even general theory—but an abundance of theory. We possess such a vast number of theories, models, concepts, schemes, frames of reference (these are the terms we use) as to make one dizzy. But even more, all appear to be impregnable to the erosions of experience. They have enormous staying power: few, if any, are ever discarded. And when we become impatient over their limited yield, someone is sure to suggest another expedition into 'seemingly unrelated disciplines' to bring back 'new ways of looking at things' i.e., a new language. ("Due Process of Inquiry," *American Behavioral Scientist*, IX, 1965, p. 6.)

Perhaps the most striking examples of incautious borrowing from a cognate discipline can be found in "theories" and "models" which purport to explain sociopolitical change and modernization. The intellectual debt owed by Riggs and Apter, among many others, to the sociologists Weber, Tonnies, and Durkheim needs no elaboration here. It is sufficient to note that the payoff for political science continues to be meager, indeed. Why? C. S. Whitaker, Jr. addresses this question in his impressive case study of continuity and change in Northern Nigeria.

Whitaker enters two basic objections to the literature under discussion. First, he observes that theories and models of sociopolitical change tend to be organized around a concept whose applicability is not universal: modernization. According to the author, that concept rests on the problem-

atic assumption that societies undergoing substantial change are somehow destined to follow the "progressive" course of Westernization. Put differently, the concept of modernization bears the stigmata of evolutionary determinism and ethnocentric bias.

Second, Whitaker observed that the concept of modernization is frequently associated with a dichotomization of social characteristics which need not be mutually exclusive. Typically, dichotomized social characteristics—for example, achievement-ascription, specificity-diffuseness, and universalism-particularism—are arranged in a typology of "traditional" and "modern" societies; the error of reification is committed when nominally "ideal types" are made to subsume concrete cases. Whence came the image of mutually exclusive elements in contrasting "traditional" and "modern" societies? From ideal types propounded by the aforementioned sociologists, among others: traditional versus rational authority, *gemeinschaft* versus *gesellschaft* society, mechanical versus organic solidarity, and so forth. (It is worth noting here that sociologists and political scientists generally fail to heed the following rule pertaining to ideal types: since ideal types are intended to have an explanatory function, they must be treated as theoretical systems with empirically verifiable hypotheses. The familiar refrain that they are intended instead to illuminate divergence from empirical fact betrays unsound theory and methodological error. This point is discussed further in Carl Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," in Maurice Natanson, ed., *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 1963, pp. 210-230.)

In sum, Whitaker rejects the notion of a necessary relationship between sociopolitical change and modernization. Moreover, he rejects the idea that an initial innovation must stimulate further innovation in a "eurhythmic" pattern. According to the author, notions of "eurhythmic" change and dichotomized social characteristics together produce the expectation that in the contact between Western and non-Western societies the latter will totally accept or reject modernity. He prefers a conceptualization of social change without reference to modernization, one that calls attention to the possibility of "creative adaptations to change, [i.e., to] action that succeeds in utilizing or manipulating new or alien elements to serve established ends and values (and vice versa)." (p. 12) Drawing on data from the emirate systems in Northern Nigeria, Whitaker argues persuasively that "a stable symbiosis of modern and traditional elements" (p. 467) is more likely to result from contact between Western and non-Western societies than a total displacement of traditionality by modernity.

Space limitations preclude a thorough examination of the data presented in *The Politics of Tra-*

diation. Accordingly, I would merely call attention to a section of the study which lends particularly strong support to the notion of "stable symbiosis": the chapter on "Popular Elections and *Neman Sarautu*." Therein Whitaker analyzes the complex process by which parliamentary government and popular elections were adapted to the traditional practice of *neman sarautu* (Hausa: "pursuit of office and title"). Indigenous elites, often educated in the Western manner, used the novel institutions (1) to defend class interests, and (2) to galvanize political competition for both traditional and "European" offices. Analogues to this situation can be found elsewhere in Nigeria. For example, my own research in Idoma revealed that popular elections introduced at the district level by the British were adapted to the traditional "game" of lineage competition for the clan headship.

I shall conclude by taking exception to one aspect of an otherwise solid book. In the final chapter, the author observes that ambivalence toward factors associated with modernity was reflected in the actions of Northern political leaders. Here is one example: in order to execute the social and political role expectations which were held for them, district heads and other high Native Authority officials were forced to violate the British norm of financial integrity; public funds were often used by these officials for private purposes. (p. 463)

Studies of role conflict in Subsaharan Africa are replete with similar cases. Unfortunately, neither previous investigators nor Whitaker probe the relationship between role conflict and ambivalence; indeed, they do not even define the latter concept. Their claims of leadership ambivalence are necessarily weakened by the lack of a conceptual definition and hard data. I have observed elsewhere that ambivalence—defined as difficulty in choosing behavior from among given role alternatives—need not accompany the perception of role conflict. Empirical data obtained by me in Idoma revealed the following: Native Authority officials experience far less ambivalence in role conflict situations involving factors associated with modernity than is generally assumed to be the case ("Methodological Considerations in the Study of African Political and Administrative Behavior: The Case of Role Conflict Analysis," *African Studies Review*, April 1970.)—ALVIN MAGID, *State University of New York at Albany*.

India's Static Power Structure. By J. D. SETHI. (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969. Pp. 212. Rs 25.)

Professor Sethi is an economist trained at the L.S.E. and at present teaching at the Delhi School of Economics. His book is a casual and discursive

collection of essays on current Indian politics written for several leading Indian news magazines between 1966 and 1968. Unfortunately, the value of such a contribution depends largely on the extent of the author's "inside knowledge" of decision making and his ability to articulate his experience in concepts which are precise and current. Professor Sethi's analysis has the mark of an educated and informed newspaper reader but lacks the buttress of access or method and suffers as a consequence. Likewise, although he is familiar with much of the current scholarly literature, he is frequently enticed into an ideological idiom. The book is, nevertheless, interesting as an articulate indication of the response of India's urban intellectuals to the political events following Shastri's death.

The theme of Professor Sethi's book is stagnation in Indian politics. The stagnation to which he refers is the obvious decline in executive stability and authority in India since the 1967 elections and the consequent immobilization of governmental initiative. Symptoms of this immobilism are mentioned in passing as increased communal violence, economic crisis, fissiparous tendencies within the nation, and what he interprets as increasingly erratic governmental responses to a variety of problems from bank nationalization to allocations of grants to universities. The causes are to be found in the cultural betrayal of India's leading intellectuals and the venality of her politicians. The intellectual leaders of the nation have lost touch with their culture, its values and sentiments, and are ignorant of both the limitations and potential of their society. They have produced a "Nehruvian consensus" which is in essence Western and stand here accused of intellectual treason—of looking to the West rather than to their compatriots for meaning, approval, direction and money. The political parties, which might have been expected to resist these tendencies, have failed because the factionalism of self-seeking politicians has incapacitated them for their vital functions of linking elite and mass, evolving a true national consensus, institutionalizing autonomous executive leadership, and imposing normative restraints on the struggle for power. Indira Gandhi, Sethi argues, compounds her father's intellectual guilt by exacerbating his institutional decay. She has adopted, he explains, a deliberate strategy of destroying the only viable national political organization in India, the Congress Party, because she cannot control it. Her vicious attack on Morarji Desai, a major rival, concomitantly humiliated and alienated one of the few top leaders seriously committed to the party and national government as institutions. She has destroyed the integrity of the party with appeals to factions within the opposition parties in the name of "national consensus." She has weak-

ened the central government by wooing state leaders, the *quid pro quo* being justified by the principle of "decentralization." She has dissipated resources and stimulated insatiable demands by indulging in "populist" appeals to the masses. Her success will mean, he wrote several months before the Party split, the destruction of the Congress.

Sethi's preference, one hesitates to call it a solution, seems to be a xenophobic nationalism reminiscent of the thirties rather than the liberal internationalism of the Nehru tradition. Politically, he prefers a functional division of powers within the Indian federation with priorities and responsibilities clearly established by the central government. India's problems, he argues, can be solved only by strong leadership which keeps the nation's energies focused on economic growth through high investment rates. Concern over India's diversity and consumption needs is not unreasonable, it should merely be reduced to its proper proportions.

Sethi's arguments are not implausible, nor are they unique. In fact, in spite of his criticism, one would find these sentiments generally acceptable and frequently articulated within these same "intellectual" circles. His frustration is the fate of a nationalist middle class which has believed the myths of its nationalist leaders and now searches for the culprit who has destroyed natural community of sentiment and interest of the Indian people so widely proclaimed during the freedom struggle. Personally, Sethi has also, perhaps unconsciously, accepted the myths of western nationalism which hold up the socially integrated, culturally homogenous nations of Europe as a model for Asia and, intolerant of pluralism, he sees as a fatal flaw that diversity which may see as the essence and vitality of India's unique cultural tradition.

Sethi's frustration with the immobilism and factionalism of party politics is a recurrent theme among Indian intellectuals. It is unfortunate, however, that he did not bother to analyze the articulation between polity and economy so that one might better understand the precise areas most effected by political crisis. One is given the impression that nothing happens in India without government initiative and wonders, in consequence, about the origins of the "green revolution" amidst all this political confusion. Likewise, it is important to distinguish between elements of economic policy and elements of political expediency in the analysis of decision making as it is to distinguish the influence of economists and administrators from that of factional leaders.

Sethi's conclusion that Indian politics are bewildering and stagnant, expressed in the term "factionalism," is an all too common escape from rigorous analysis. In the first place, he either ignores or dismisses such concepts as "ruralization" or "sanskritization" as devices for ordering his data

and for translating factional confusion into aspects of structural change. Second, there is no mention of the rise of lower caste leaders to elite positions, the political decline of Brahmins or the entry of new regions into politics. Certainly, India's power structure cannot be considered static in the face of such momentous developments. Finally, institutional restraints on the factionalism of the party's recruitment process continue to operate. The influence of the civil service persists, non-factional paths are available to Ministerial posts, and highly independent Congress dignitaries occupy positions such as Governorships or directors of national industries. The spillover of factionalism into the actual process of decision-making has simply not been demonstrated.

One final point of interest, the volume is dedicated to the memory of C. Wright Mills.—NORMAN K. NICHOLSON, *Northern Illinois University, DeKalb*.

Science and Technology in British Politics. By NORMAN J. VIG. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968. Pp. 190. \$6.00.)

The content of this case study is largely addressed to the "science policy debate" that engaged Britain's major political parties during the period from 1959 to 1966. Relying upon government records, party documents, and forty interviews with leading political and administrative officials, the author has carefully addressed himself to two broad areas of concern: an account of the specific events that affected the emergence of "science policy" in Great Britain and an effort to see the entire phenomenon as a reflection of general political processes steeped in partisan difference and competition.

The emergence of science policy is handled in three chapters that deal (1) with a brief (but incisive) description of civil science programs before the Conservative Government of 1959-64 (2) with policy decisions on civil science by the Conservative Government of this period (3) and with recent attempts by the Labor Government to shift scientific and technological resources from military defense to applied civilian research production.

The author suggests that science policy matters prior to the Conservative Government of 1959-64 were complicated and intensified by several problems in science and technology that began to emerge during the aftermath of the Second World War, although many of them were rooted in older historical practices. Briefly stated, these problems centered around the shortage of scientific and technological manpower, the backward state of applied research and development in British industries, and the necessity to create new forms of government organization for planning and administering support for civil science and development.

The manpower shortage is attributed in large part to the reluctance of British universities to develop and stimulate scientific curricula and research opportunities until well into the 20th century. Yet even in those cases where pure science was found acceptable and research laboratories established, applied science and technology were regarded as inferior vocational or mechanical competences. Thus, a whole tradition of class bias and "classical" scholarship had to be mitigated before shortages in scientific and technological manpower could be approached as a serious matter of Government policy.

In British industries applied science and technology were also neglected—in some measure because of the educational pattern of the universities—but also because the English manufacturing system was built on industrial processes and management concepts that had their origin in the early industrial revolution. From this perspective basic scientific findings could scarcely be considered as important resources for industrial production and process innovation.

It was only in response to severe industrial shortages produced by the First World War that attention was drawn to the prospect of government support for increasing Britain's long-range economic capacity through scientific research and development. The main instrument for achieving this objective was the creation of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (1916) which assumed responsibility for a number of operations: funding post-graduate work in basic research, allocating research monies for projects and equipment, stimulating industrial research through matching grants for cooperative Research Associations, and establishing and maintaining a network of State research institutions. The formal decision-making authority for the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was committed to the hands of a Privy Council Committee composed of ministers from departments with related interests. But in practice it was loosely supervised by the Lord President of the Council who was responsible to Parliament. Informal direction and encouragement was given to the Department by an advisory council consisting of representatives from the universities, industry, and government.

While the decision-making activities that surrounded the DSIR and its advisory panels became the basic administrative pattern for civil research into the 1960's, there were other forms of government organization that shared as well in the cultivation of scientific research. The Medical Research Council (1919) and the Agricultural Research Council (1931) were each founded to promote and coordinate rather specific scientific concerns, but in neither instance was a separate department created. They were operated instead un-

der the Lord President and a system of advisory councils similar to those of the DSIR. Moreover, there were a number of administrative and service departments that maintained research facilities prior to the Second World War, such as the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fuel and Power, Health, the Post Office, the Colonial Office, the Admiralty (oceanography) and the Air Ministry (meteorology).

This decentralized and largely autonomous pattern of civil science was directly affected by the exigencies produced by the Second World War. Scientists and other professionals were drawn into government administration and research programs were developed (particularly atomic energy and aviation research) that would heavily influence post-war policy. And yet, in general, the wartime application of science was focused on short range goals and lacked sufficient organizational mechanisms to make it a coherent area for overall policy determination.

By 1959 the failure to "modernize" essential industries and to give British commerce a competitive edge forced the Conservative Government to consider additional means through which science could be brought to bear upon national economic policy. Yet the activities of the Conservative Government were limited. It created a new Minister for Science and accepted the utility of the civil development contract. But its operational policies as well as its announced political commitment were against detailed government control and planning for science.

The present Labour Government, however, has shown a disposition to the contrary. It has tried to shift scientific resources from defense to civilian production and in the process has created new forms of government organization for coordinating science-related policies. The Ministry of Technology, for example, which was created by the Labour Government is now being converted into a far more powerful Ministry of Industry for extending control over a wide range of industrial engineering. Moreover, manpower needs in science and technology are being met by incorporating Colleges of advanced Technology into the university sector, and programs are underway for sponsoring industries in computer and machine tool production. But despite this increased activity, the author is insistent that a "national science policy" does not yet exist in Great Britain—in terms of a systematic, costed and budgeted plan for all phases of science-related Government investment.

The second broad concern to which the book is addressed deals with the circumstances that permitted science policy to be exploited as a partisan political issue. Five chapters are devoted to a discussion of the major participants (parties, Parliament, and interest groups) that sought to articu-

ate a national position for the development of science and technology. It is very much to the author's credit that he has explored the external political dimensions of science and brought his analytical facilities to bear on the emergence of science as an instrument of national political purpose. This aspect of science reflects perhaps the most important characteristic of all post-industrial societies—the general collapse of meaningful distinctions between the public and private realms, between sustained support for an autonomous science and the realization that national goals may require the extended use of scientific resources. As the author points out, the participants in the “science policy debate” did not disagree over the political ends to which science might be subjected, but rather over the pace and means by which they might be accomplished.

Science and Technology in British Politics is a work rich in detail, with due caution exercised over what may be inferred from the events described. It will be useful for anyone concerned with comparative science policy or who wishes to speculate about the relation of science to society. My only disappointment (a purely idiosyncratic one) is that the author did not choose to explore what the “politicization” of science might mean for the conduct of scientific inquiry—how it might influence the selection of relevant areas of research or perhaps even the evaluation of scientific evidence itself. But surely an author has the right to establish the parameters of his study, and within the limits imposed upon the present work, Professor Vig has given a competent and worthwhile performance.—MARLAN BISSETT, *Purdue University*.

Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model.

By STEPHEN S. COHEN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 310. \$8.50.)

Although the development of French planning has generated an abundance of studies and research, its political aspects have often remained unexamined. This book addresses itself, in part, towards meeting this need. To the extent that it does so, it is possibly the best book on French planning currently available to English-speaking political scientists.

French planning works, the author points out, because of its non-coercive approach. The planners seek to achieve their objects largely through dispensing information and incentives. In the latter category, are such items as cheap investment capital, accelerated depreciation allowances, special tax reductions and outright grants. Consequently, while French businessmen accepted planning only as an alternative to nationalization, many of them have since become outright enthusiasts.

The planners, notes Cohen, have also shown po-

litical adroitness at keeping opposition to a minimum. The Planning Commission has purposely remained small and acts chiefly “as a broker among power groups, of which big business and the Ministry of Finance are by far the most important.” Another helpful factor has been the emergence of a new breed of *hauts fonctionnaires* who have been intensively and broadly educated at France's post-war École National d'Administration. They bring to their jobs a broad perspective of the national interest as well as an “old boy” network of mutual school associations which helps overcome inter-agency rivalry and distrust.

These new bureaucrats see themselves as representing the general interest, a concept which, Cohen says, is “straight out of Rousseau.” Indeed, it is. However, political theorists will also see a good deal of Saint-Simon in this technocratic meritocracy.

When it comes to the actual mechanics of planning, Cohen makes clear that the various “modernization” commissions, to say nothing of the Economic and Social Council, are not usually the main levers of action. It is more customary for top level bureaucrats to reach an accord with a key industry leader and for the latter to get his colleagues in line. Sometimes no agreement is reached and the industry or any of its members will undertake projects without the government's approval. However, the fact that the planners can offer incentives and the fact that they usually share a common background with business leaders keeps disagreements to a minimum.

Trade unions, small businesses and other groups play only a minimal role in the planning process but, at least to some degree, this is their own fault. Not only do trade unions, for example, often not possess the expertise to make a solid contribution but their leaders, particularly those who are Communists, are hostile to the whole planning process. The same factors partly explain Parliament's inability to play a significant role in planning. The non-Communist left tried to slash military expenditures and increase consumer spending and investment in the Fifth Plan in 1964, but the Communists withheld their support. As a result, the “counter plan” fell through and the stage was set for the “events of May” in 1968.

Although Cohen does take note of these and other political developments, political scientists may wish for more data and analysis of the impact of planning on party policies, political campaigns, interest group activity, etc. Furthermore, even when it comes to discussing the way planning is carried out within the bureaucracy and in the bureaucracy's relations with business, his book lacks the detail and specifics needed to see the actual workings of the process.

Some may also quarrel with Cohen's contention

that economic planning must inevitably make France into a "corporatist" democracy with no possibility of any significant redistribution of economic power. The participation movement is currently gaining ground in France as well as other European countries, and as knowledge workers replace industrial workers, this trend may acquire increasing momentum. Cohen's own material indicates that a less revolutionary and more reformist trade union movement could wield much more influence over a plan's formulation and execution.

Cohen's book raises, at least in this reviewer's mind, some questions regarding our own discipline. Political Science has produced its share of books on the ill-fated Fourth Republic, but few, if any, of these works have devoted more than cursory attention to what appears to have been the Republic's most significant governmental contribution. Has Political Science become so preoccupied with some elements of the political process that it is neglecting others?

Political Science has also made increasing use of sociological data in recent years. In the light of Cohen's book, the question arises if it is not time to start devoting more thought to economic interrelationships as well?

Finally, the study of Comparative Public Administration has been flourishing of late. But, since it is mainly concerned with cross-cultural comparisons, its scholars have tended to devote their efforts to studying under-developed nations and other countries unlike our own. Cohen's book makes one wonder whether it might not be time to channel more academic energy into studying industrialized lands so that American scholarship may yield more ideas as to how the American polity can cope with its own rising tide of politico-economic problems?—GEORGE E. BERKLEY, *North-eastern University*.

The Government and Politics of Tibet. By RAM RAHUL. (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969. Pp. 160. Rs. 20.)

This book gives brief accounts of the political history of Tibet, the structure of the Lhasa government before the Chinese Communist takeover, and the place of Tibet in the politics of Asia. The author claims—a claim supported by The Fourteenth Dalai Lama in a "Foreword"—that his is the first book to appear on the subject.

The author's subject, however, has several aspects. The history of Tibet and accounts of its relations with the great powers have been treated more thoroughly in numerous works. The social base of the Tibetan political system has been covered more comprehensively by Carrasco, although he had only secondary sources. What is new in Professor Rahul's book is a reasonably detailed description of the principal offices of the Lhasa

government and of their formal functions and powers, and suggestions regarding the political power of various elements of the polity, such as the monasteries, the nobility, and the highest lamas. The combination of this new material with the historical summaries produces an interesting and original introduction to the government and politics of Tibet.

For readers familiar with other "traditional" political societies—roughly, literate agrarian societies with low levels of technology—the material on governmental organization and political power will be suggestive and should help them gain perspective on the political life of traditionalism. This material, however, is too limited to provide more than hints about how the Lhasa government itself really worked, where power really lay, and what policies the government actually pursued. For example, the author says that the Dalai Lama "has full power over the country in all matters, and his work is absolute law" (p. 10), yet he also reports that from the seventeenth to the twentieth century no Dalai Lama lived for more than twenty-three years, that there were extended periods (such as from 1933 until 1950) when the Dalai Lama was a minor political figure and the government directed by a regent, and that even the great Fifth Dalai Lama periodically and for years at a time devoted himself "exclusively to religious affairs" (p. 11). An autocracy frequently without its autocrat requires explanation. Of special importance is the relationship between the religious and political roles of the Dalai Lama, a relationship the author does not examine.

Since, however, the Lhasa regime in its pre-Communist form has disappeared forever, any information on it is welcome. Professor Rahul should be encouraged to turn his attention to those official documents that were brought from Tibet and to former officials of the regime in order to discover what the Dalai Lama's government did, the methods it used, and the goals of its actions.—C. W. CASSINELLI, *University of Washington*.

The Christian Democratic Party in Chile: A Study of Political Organization and Activity with Primary Emphasis on the Local Level. By GILES WAYLAND-SMITH. (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centre Intercultural de Documentación, 1969. Pp. 314.)

In the 1960's, Christian Democracy surged forth as a dynamic alternative to the traditional, Cuban, and Nasserist military approaches to governance. Above all, its remarkable electoral success in Chile in 1964 and 1965 seemed to some observers to presage a continent-wide movement of major proportions. Whatever the ultimate verdict on that score—and it is somewhat dim at this writing—an outpouring of publications focused on the Chilean

phenomenon. In large measure, they concentrated their attention on the PDC's national organization, doctrine, and performance level in government.

While not ignoring the national context in this study, Professor Wayland-Smith has chosen to stress the otherwise largely neglected local party units by probing Cristian Democratic organization, goals, recruitment process, and performance levels in three Santiago communes. His data was compiled by interviews and by the use of a questionnaire; his analytical approach is broadly structural-functional.

Three preliminary chapters ably trace the rise of the Christian Democratic party in Chile, its ideological tenets, and the political environment of the Santiago communes the author has taken for his sample: lower class Conchalí, mostly middle class Nuñoa, and well-to-do Las Condes. In this regard, it is to the author's credit that he offers sharp images of the visual features and life styles of each commune so that the empirical evidence that follows is located in recognizable settings.

Politically, all three communes comprise a cross section of Chile's multiparty electorate, with the Christian Democratic percentage of voters being almost identical in each commune. The PDC's local organizational strength built up gradually during the 1950's and 1960's at a time when the other parties suffered from weaker communal organizations—a significant factor in Eduardo Frei's electoral triumph in 1964.

Although the communal parties clearly are creatures of the national PDC organization, they also reflect in structure, membership composition, and attitudinal patterns the individual nature of each commune. Thus, in its organizational form, Nuñoa represents almost an ideal local grouping in terms of what is called for by the party's bylaws. It is highly developed, its headquarters serving as a regular meeting place for all kinds of Christian Democrats in the area—and strong ties have been forged between local leadership and the bases. In contrast, Las Condes constitutes more of a paper organization with a leadership nucleus and virtually no structural bases. Conchalí falls in between the other two communes in its structural makeup. This diversity also exists in doctrinal orientations. All recognize the same general goals for restructuring Chilean society, though the lower class areas prefer immediate, tangible ones, while the middle classes' attachments are more toward global and futuristic achievements.

When considering socio-economic characteristics, Christian Democrats rank "above average" in education, religious commitment, occupational standing, and income, though individual communes vary according to certain criteria (e.g., a higher percentage of women adhere to the PDC in

the poorest commune than in the others). The somewhat elitist nature of Christian Democratic membership—mostly middle class but not wealthy—conduces to "a communality of interest and perspective which yields both cross-communal social cohesion and an internal pressure tending to reinforce the specifically ideological and radical contours of the party" (pp. 5/14–15).

In general, the communal parties' activities are similar, but they differ in emphases. Conchalí carries on many service functions, focuses heavily on organizing mass rallies, and relies on a highly pragmatic style. The Las Condes grouping stresses electoral matters, focuses on inner-directed activities that reinforce membership commitments, and is globally ideological in style. Nuñoa stresses service activities and is mixed in its focus and style.

Wayland-Smith concludes that whereas lower class groups can be kept more or less satisfied with the PDC if they feel their claims are reaching the government and a few tangible benefits materialize, middle class elements owe their allegiance to the PDC primarily for ideological reasons rather than for personal gains. As a consequence, they "may undergo a period of waning commitment if global goals become mechanical or subverted or if a sense of emergency declines" (p. 7/12). Although the author does not deal with the factionalism which plagued the Christian Democrats during the last years of Frei's regime, his thesis helps to explain this occurrence. Finally, he suggests that the Christian Democrats, like the Marxist parties, have successfully brought lower class elements into the political system and cultivated working class leadership to sustain the organizational bases. However, in contradistinction to the Marxist parties, the Christian Democrats' political socialization and professionalization of the lower classes has established "a certain foundation for the development of a political system in which conflict leads not to open rebellion but rather to a more equitable and peaceful accommodation of opposing interests" (pp. 7/16–17).

Professor Wayland-Smith has produced an unusual and thoughtful book. He is quick to point out occasional limitations in his data which cause some findings to be suggestive rather than definitive. Still, other research—including that of this reviewer—tend to support his conclusions. Certainly, some interesting and important new dimensions of the Chilean Christian Democratic party are provided in this fine study.—BEN G. BURNETT, *Whittier College*.

The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon. By CALVIN A. WOODWARD. (Providence: Brown University Press, 1969. Pp. 338. \$8.50.)

When independence came to Ceylon, many people tended to see Ceylon as an example of what

were considered to be the positive aspects of British colonialism. The island seemed prosperous and the problems associated with high rates of population growth such as unemployment, pressure on the land and demands for services such as education did not diminish the euphoria of freedom. Eventually, the euphoria vanished and the problems remained.

Ceylon's problems are very much like those of any developing state; Ceylon, according to Professor Woodward, "has made the transition to self-rule perhaps better than any other new state." Among the factors responsible for this happy state of affairs are "competent and dedicated leaders" and a "responsible party system." Professor Woodward analyzes the origins and growth of this party system in the work reviewed here.

The history of Ceylon's party system precedes independence. The Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was formed in 1919 for the purpose of articulating the interests of non-revolutionary Ceylonese nationalists. The CNC's goals were constitutional change and its style was gradualist. While communal differences are usually de-emphasized in the *ad hoc* character of an independence movement, the moderate program of the CNC was not sufficiently compelling to submerge these differences. The CNC fragmented along communal lines. This fragmentation was the beginning and indicated the direction of Ceylon's party system.

Parties contested the 1931 election for seats on the State Council but its structure mitigated against the growth of political parties. However, independence was the real stimulus to parties and, according to Professor Woodward, from independence to the present, change is the outstanding characteristic of Ceylon's party system.

Immediately after independence, the political parties were organizations of notables. Parties offered little basis for popular identification other than the notables they could attract to run on their tickets. Because the parties had so little to offer potential candidates, there were a great many independent candidates and there was very little party discipline. The election of 1947 was contested mainly on the basis of personality. Identification with a major party apparently did not seem necessary as over half of the candidates (some 180) ran either as independents or as representatives of minor parties. None of the major parties returned over half of their candidates. The United National Party (UNP) which had hoped for a majority, nevertheless, earned a popular vote plurality. Because of this and its organizational strength, the UNP became the center of the coalition government. The UNP formed a government of comprehensive character. Unfortunately, the consensus achieved under the UNP was vague at best and never included Tamil or Marxist parties. Professor

Woodward notes that from the perspective of the UNP, the great danger was that the Opposition seemed more revolutionary than loyal.

From 1947 to 1952, the parties underwent a period of self-definition and organizational development. The 1952 election was more party oriented than any previous one. The parties contested the election of 1952 more as organized units than previously. The UNP won a majority and was able to govern alone. Professor Woodward attributes the UNP victory to a fragmented Opposition, among other things.

After 1952, it was clear that the Opposition had to forge some type of unity if they were to replace the UNP as the government. At the same time, the UNP social base was eroding through neglect and this was to be the strength of the Opposition. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, a former UNP minister and founder of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), a Sinhalese socialist party, combined his party with Philip Gunawardena's Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP), a Marxist party, the Bhasa Peramuna, a communal organization, and a group of independents to form the Peoples' United Front (MEP). This electoral coalition capitalized on the UNP's social neglect and became the government.

The MEP could not maintain its electoral unity and by the 1960 elections, it was in disarray. This situation was a revival of the 1947 and 1952 elections where the Left was fragmented. Although the results of the election were indecisive, forcing another election, the UNP had made a comeback. In the second 1960 election, the SLFP emerged as the majority party.

At this point, it was apparent that Ceylon's party system was a viable one. The parties were capable of providing alternative governments, power was transferred in an orderly manner, oppositions learned to work together and after the 1965 election which the UNP won, the system had evidenced capacity for parties' comebacks.

Analysis of the events outlined above leads Professor Woodward to a strong admiration for Ceylon's party system's adaptive capabilities. He characterizes the system as multiparty and bipolar.

Professor Woodward's functional view of parties is the basis for his Replacement Theory of Party Growth. The Replacement Theory holds that parties are first formed as notables' vehicles to public office and the political ambitions of the notables are the main impetus to party growth. The growth of a party may be measured by the extent to which it is able to replace notables as the viable political unit.

Because the theory is inductively derived, it may have no application beyond Ceylon. More importantly, it is not fully adequate to explain Ceylonese party politics for at least two reasons.

First, it does not deal with charisma. There does not seem room under the rubric of the theory for the emergence of a charismatic leader in an established party system. Indeed, the teleology of the Replacement Theory would seem to forbid a charismatic leader. Second, the concern with party growth as a function of notables' ambitions merely implies the importance of social groups' demands. To emphasize the ambitions of notables at the expense of social demands is to deny the influence of the broader social system on the subsystem studied.

The utility of the Replacement Theory is as an ordering device, which adds a new perspective to our understanding of Ceylon's party system. The strength of the book is the description, based upon extensive research, of Ceylonese political parties and their interactions. This is the task Professor Woodward has set for himself and he has done it. —KENNETH H. ESCH, *University of Hawaii*.

Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. By ELEIZER BE'ERI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970. Pp. 51. \$9.50.)

Of the important Arab States of today, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Iraq have "military regimes." The remainder—Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia continue to be governed by civilians; but only Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are governed without overt support from the military establishments. Tunisia's successful reliance on its One Party, and Saudi Arabia's reliance on a fragmented tribal system have assured both states a tranquility denied the rest of the Arab states. To varying extents, the Army plays critical roles in upholding the regimes in Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco. It may be conjectured that within the very near future these too are likely to follow the path charted by other Arab regimes and succumb to the military. Should Tunisia fail to weather the test of succession to the Presidency once its ailing President removes himself from the political arena and Saudi Arabia is freed from the firm grip of its chief balancer—King Faisal—the odds are that they both will be "ripe" for the intervention of the military in politics.

To suggest that there is a certain degree of ripeness in an Arab society that makes intervention by the military likely is to run counter to one and perhaps the major thesis advanced by Mr. Be'eri, namely, that developmental requirements have little to do with bringing about military coups. His work in large measure is devoted to refuting a thesis long nurtured by Arab militarists and faithfully echoed by Western scholars that, given the social and economic conditions of the contemporary Arab world, the incompetence of the civilian systems, and the disillusionment with the limited practice of constitutional government,

eventual seizure of power by the military establishment is inevitable. Mr. Be'eri quotes former President Abbud of the Sudan who upon seizing power in 1958, claimed that his coup was "natural" because the evolution of society requires at the helm a committed and competent group with sufficient discipline and cohesion to translate to reality the vision long held by the advanced ranks of the intelligentsia and radicals of a better Arab society. In one form or another, all previous writers on the intervention of the military in Arab politics have accepted the validity of this hypothesis and have maintained that the peculiar character, training and social and economic origins of the military officers make them highly suitable agents for disciplined social and economic change.

Not only does Mr. Be'eri subject this thesis to serious examination but his examination ranges widely and minutely over the course of recent Arab political history; he seeks to prove that the intervention of the military long predated radicalisation of Arab politics, or any concern and commitment to constructive social and political change. Thirty-one chapters, in six parts, to which are added two appendices, ought to provide the reader not only with a history of the successful as well as unsuccessful military coups but also with useful information on Arab politics in general and some comparative material on the intervention of the military in Latin America and other areas. The careful and patient reader will come out with a detailed if confused picture of the rationale of the military intervention in Arab politics; whether or not he is also persuaded that the intervention is primarily motivated by personal struggles for power rather than by concrete social and economic forces, he will be grateful for the abundance of the information provided. The reader will also learn much about the politics of the Arab states as these are perceived by a Marxist-Zionist scholar.

Mr. Be'eri, for example, examines minutely the achievements of the Free Officers in Egypt in terms of the liberation of the country from foreign control, industrialization, agrarian reform, etc. The reader is given enough information on other military regimes in Syria or Iraq to compare their achievements with those of the Free Officers in Egypt. Whether he will conclude, as Mr. Be'eri did, that their achievements are not as significant as their proponents claim is another matter. But Mr. Be'eri considers the limited achievements of the military regimes as one more reason for questioning the "natural" course theory of Arab politics. One of the principal rationales of military intervention is that the military can and did do more for social and economic change than previous civilian regimes. When Mr. Be'eri measures them against their own claims, the military regimes are found wanting.

The reader is left with two principal suggestions to ponder. On the one hand Mr. Be'eri's thesis is that the Arab world has had its experience with militarism—and a not very good one at that—largely because of its Islamic heritage. It seems that, since all other “explanations” of the intervention of the military in politics have been disproven empirically, then the most obvious one must be the cultural explanation. Previous writers have been equally unconvincing in suggesting this as the explanation. And second, the intervention of the military has essentially succeeded in ushering in or continuing a tendency towards fascist-like systems which, according to Mr. Be'eri, more accurately characterize Arab regimes. The left-wing rhetoric of the regimes of the Ba'th, or for that matter of Arab socialism, merely disguises fascist-like systems. Of course this too is open to serious question.

Mr. Be'eri disarms his readers at the beginning by admitting that, as an Israeli, he might not be able to write on Arab politics objectively; he also questions whether objectivity in such cases is possible or feasible. One does not have to argue the case on theoretical grounds. It is obvious that the Arab-Israeli chasm has deprived Israeli writers on Arab politics of the opportunity to appreciate the true dimensions of change in Arab society and institutions that in large measure have been effected by the military regimes. Behind the facade of authoritarian control of the center, more grass roots institutional change and participation in politics have occurred over the past two decades than in the previous century. If there is a ferment today in the Arab mind and among the intellectuals, such a ferment is in part to be attributed to the achievements of the military systems in terms of altering the social and economic structures of Arab society. That classes have not been broken and that an actual revolution by the peasants and workers has not taken place may be a question of time only. When they do occur, their appearance will have been substantially facilitated by the advent to power of the military officers. No amount of interviewing of prisoners of war, irrespective of rank, or reading of documentary accounts by an intelligence service, are adequate substitutes for a true knowledge of the complex processes of change that have been taking place in the Arab world. The failure of Israeli intelligence to assess properly the reaction of the Arab people to the June 1967 war alerts us to the fact that their inadequate understanding of the social and political bases of Arab society contrast very sharply with their correct appreciation of the military-technical situation. To rely on their documentation as Mr. Be'eri does leads to strange and in many ways obsessed conclusions.—IBRAHIM ABU-LUGHOD, *Northwestern University*.

Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation. By G. ANDREW MAGUIRE. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 393. \$13.50.)

This book treats the men and events which shaped the coming of independence in Sukumaland, a tribal region in northwestern Tanzania. It covers the period from 1945 to 1965; years which encompass profound changes in Tanzanian politics. A unique feature of this study is its analysis of this change from the viewpoint of the Sukuma people, the single largest tribal grouping in Tanzania. The two decades considered here include the heyday of British efforts to direct development in Sukumaland, the emergence of indigenous resistance to these efforts, the achievement of independence, and, finally, the transition from an anti-colonial movement to a party responsible for governing the nation.

In his treatment of the first decade of political ferment in Sukumaland, Maguire analyzes the alliance which develops between African elites in the towns and discontented farmers in the rural areas and documents the importance of the rural areas in the move toward national independence. The author's treatment of British plans for promoting rural development in Sukumaland stresses the influence of individual colonial officers in the direction of local development plans and suggests the impracticality of many of these projects. In reaction to these efforts, often involving compulsion, the peasants became supporters of the urban African politicians. Significantly, Maguire shatters the neat, but frayed, traditional-modern formula for studying political change in the developing areas by showing that the anti-colonial politicians included individuals from all ranks of Sukuma society and that traditional political institutions had virtually no influence or impact on the nationalist movement. He documents the conflict between the British-maintained native authorities and the aspiring elites and shows that the emergence of the native authority system under British tutelage was in itself a violation of the traditional role of the chief in Sukuma society. Its untenable position between British authority and African society ultimately led to its emasculation before the drive of the new politicians for democratic self-government.

A detailed analysis of the development of the cooperative movement demonstrates the ties between town and village in the emergence of anti-colonial sentiment in Sukumaland. Of particular interest is the author's conclusion, conflicting with earlier studies, that the cooperative movement played no appreciable political role in the drive to independence. Although there was considerable overlap of interests, membership, and leaders between the social and political organizations and

the cooperative movement, the latter limited itself, by mutual agreement, exclusively to the problems of cooperative development. This was especially the case after political activities were banned in late 1954.

Maguire shows that nationalist politics in Sukumaland predated the party of independence, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), by at least ten years, and traces in detail the rise, decline and transition of TANU's predecessors including the Sukuma Union and the Tanganyika African Association. He includes a particularly effective treatment of the trauma of TANU's transition from anti-colonial movement to the governing party as perceived from the villages of Sukumaland. After documenting the disaffection of local people with the often callous methods of local party officials, the author shows the effort of national officials to deal with this dissatisfaction by encouraging competition within the single-party system. The effectiveness of this effort in Sukumaland is demonstrated by the fact that prominent local TANU officials were defeated in the 1965 election and not one of the area's seven incumbent members of the national legislature was returned, including the important Sukuma cooperative leader, Government Minister and TANU stalwart, Paul Bomani.

Maguire skillfully intermingles data from official records and interviews to create colorful portraits of personalities involved in the move toward Uhuru in Sukumaland. This technique for interpreting events influenced by both expatriate officer and African leader puts individuals—particularly the often unseen middle and local level official—back into the study of political change and shows how the personalities of these officials often became the most important factor determining policy directions. A survey shows sixty-three such sketches in the book; twenty-five of which are quite detailed. Of these twenty-five, sixteen are clearly middle level and local, rather than national. Of these sixteen, five were TANU opponents during this period. The study thus also considers those neglected individuals who, though figuring prominently, do not survive in the highly competitive arena of African politics. While others may question Maguire's interpretation of all these personalities, this technique has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the work.

Most Africanists will agree with Maguire's plea for detailed case studies as the necessary next step toward a fuller understanding of African politics. Few scholars are likely, however, to succeed as admirably as he has here. It is not that others may not possess the scholarly skills of the author; considerable as this study proves them to be. Rather the massive amount of grass-roots data upon which the study is based—constituting one of the

most impressive features of the book—is due in some degree to good fortune. Considering the atmosphere in which the social scientist must today work in much of Africa and the simple passage of the first stages of independence and development, it is unlikely that future scholars will be so successful in securing information, access to participating individuals and in experiencing vicariously the transition from colonial rule to independence which was the opportunity of the author. The finished product is a credit to the officials who facilitated this research and to the author who has so skillfully prepared this study.

Two mild criticisms may be made. The Local Government Service Commission was to begin appointing Divisional Executive Officers in early 1969, not 1965 as noted in the book, and the author fails to note that all of Julius Nyerere's major writings, treated in some detail here, are available in collections considerably more accessible than the sources cited in the bibliography. These are, however, minor quibbles to a book which is a must for students of African politics and political change.—Clyde R. Ingle, SUNY College of Arts and Science, Geneseo.

Partier og erhverv: Studier i partiorganisation og byerhvervenes politiske aktivitet 1880-1918. By VAGN DYBD AHL. (Aarhus, Denmark: Erhvervsarkivet, Universitetsforlaget i Aarhus, 1969. Vol. I, Pp. 406; Vol. II, Pp. 235. 90 D. Kr.)

The emergence of political science as an autonomous and vital academic discipline has followed an uneven pattern of development in Scandinavia. For the most part, Denmark has trailed far behind Sweden, Finland, and Norway in the production of systematic empirically-based political studies. Happily, the gap now appears to be narrowing. In 1959, an Institute of Political Science was established at Aarhus University. Already, several volumes which draw on the Institute's growing data bank have been issued, with several others in various stages of preparation. Vagn Dybdahl's book, while not a product of the Institute, deserves to be considered as a suitable and worthy companion piece to these publications. Indeed, Dybdahl's work, which is in reality a pre-defense printing of his doctoral dissertation, can easily be seen as a link between the practices of the past, when the study of governmental affairs was parceled out and submerged within the economics, law and history curricula, and the present aspirations underlying the newly liberated field of Danish political science.

The general task to which the author addresses himself is to explore the patterns of interaction between the various urban-based economic interests and the political system, with special attention given to the political behavior and influence

of the merchant and artisan groupings. The perspective from which Dybdahl has chosen to view the matter is a historical one. Utilizing a scheme which conceptualizes the political parties as the vital representational links between societal interests and the centers of governmental decision-making, he restricts his investigation to the period 1880-1913, when the modern Danish party system was going through its formative and consolidative stages. Principal attention is confined to the two major "city parties," the Social Democrats and the Right or Conservative Party (*Højre*). Thus, Dybdahl's specific purpose is to examine the character and shape of the ties between the new political organizations and the various urban electorates at a time when these bonds are initially being forged.

If the study's historical thrust serves to establish its linkage with the classical mold, the manner in which Dybdahl has gone about his work certainly earns for the book the right to stand among the products of the more modern school of Danish political science. Not content to depend exclusively upon information taken from secondary sources, the author has fashioned his work from a formidable array of original data, much of it quantitative, gleaned from both public and private archives.

One illustration of this is Dybdahl's ingenious use of public election lists. These rolls, which contained the names of all enfranchised males together with their occupations, were frequently used for purposes of recording and tabulating individual voting choices in the period prior to the introduction of the secret ballot in 1901. Unfortunately, adequate lists are preserved only for the Copenhagen and Aarhus areas and then only for scattered elections and constituencies—ten lists in all. To his credit, Dybdahl is quick to recognize and warn of the limitations inherent in employing such scanty evidence. From this fragmentary material, however, he is able to construct for all of the major urban occupational groupings a series of fascinating participatory and partisan profiles which collectively span the two decades immediately preceding the turn of the century.

Strikingly visible, for example, is the rising involvement of the working class in the nation's political life: In 1881 only fourteen percent of the eligible blue collar voters in Copenhagen's First Election District exercised their franchise, the lowest level of activism exhibited by any group. However, according to the preserved list from the Third District of Copenhagen County, by 1898 workers were voting in that constituency at a rate approaching eight in ten—78.8%—far ahead of the other occupational electorates.

Bringing aggregate data into play, Dybdahl also demonstrates the progressive urbanization of the Conservative Party under the impact of the Danish industrial revolution. Initially a party with a

balance of rural and urban support, the Conservatives increasingly found their partisans concentrated in the larger cities. Thus, Dybdahl estimates that by 1913 about seventy-five percent of the party's voters were urban dwellers.

The full range of insights produced by the author's incisive mining of a veritable mountain of source material is simply too great to mention here. Suffice it to say that in addition to probing the voting behavior of the urban population, the study focuses on three other broad areas of interest:

- 1) An investigation is conducted into the occupational backgrounds of the candidates nominated for the *Folketing*, the popularly elected lower chamber, between 1876 and 1913. Among other things, Dybdahl uncovers a marked disparity between the occupational composition of the parties' candidate groups and that of their respective voting publics. Generally speaking, working class individuals and urban tradesmen were consistently underrepresented among Social Democratic and Conservative nominees. A similar analysis is also applied to the members of the now defunct upper house, the *Landsting*, for the period 1866-1910.

- 2) Dybdahl then takes a searching look at the organizational, leadership, and program development of the Conservative and Social Democratic Parties from their respective inceptions through the outbreak of the First World War. He points out that, in contrast with the patterns found in most other European contexts, the Danish Conservative Party developed an extensive network of branch organizations more or less simultaneously with its consolidation as a parliamentary party. Of interest is the fact that manual workers made up a large share of the membership in the local Conservative Associations and Clubs which flourished in the 1880's. In the 1890's, however, the number of branches and their membership began to tail off sharply as the parliamentary struggle between the Conservatives and Liberal Party cooled and, it is to be suspected, as the organizational élan of the Social Democratic Party made itself felt among the lower classes. Although both the Social Democrats and Conservatives were dependent on the urban centers for their electoral sustenance, shopkeepers, artisans and similar self-employed tradesmen were, as was the case with the candidate groups, poorly represented on the ruling councils of both parties.

- 3) The relatively weak and divided political position of the urban petty bourgeoisie is one of the central themes developed by the author in his final substantive chapter. The vehicle for Dybdahl's efforts to probe the actual dynamics of the policy-making process is a case study of

the attempts launched in the early 1890's to promulgate a revised Trade Act. At this time, many shopkeepers and artisans were particularly interested in limiting access to trading licenses and securing protection against private chain operations and consumer cooperatives. Yet, a draft bill introduced first in 1893 which would have tightened the existing regulations repeatedly died in committee until it was dropped from the agenda in about 1900. In part, its fate was shaped by the ambivalent position taken by the Conservatives who, torn between a positive artisan wing and a negative free trade-industrial wing, gave only moderate and uncertain support to the measure. The Social Democrats were in much the same boat. While they were desirous of wooing the small tradesman vote, their enthusiasm was counterbalanced by a wish not to alienate the urban cooperative movement for which the party had a certain ideological and in some cases organizational affinity.

In each chapter Dybdahl musters an abundance of documentary and statistical material which serves to give his analysis depth and authenticity. So rich is this lode that a supplementary volume in which the author has collected his detailed data contains nearly 130 pages of tables, charts, and the like.

Some weaknesses are detectable. An English translation of the summary chapter, which is also included in the second volume, is rather poorly done. At one point, Dybdahl appears to have misconstrued the "cross-pressure hypothesis" and thus his contention that it is not supported by his findings is a questionable one. These are minor flaws, however, which scarcely detract from the value of the work. All in all, it is an impressive addition to the small but growing library of Danish political studies and one which students of the country's governmental affairs will undoubtedly welcome and use for years to come.—KENNETH S. PEDERSEN, *San Diego State College*.

Die Deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des National-Sozialismus. BY KARL DIETRICH BRACHER. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1969. Pp. 580. \$10.00.)

Professor Bracher of the University of Bonn has written a study of political mobilization, which should interest students of general comparative politics as well as modern European history. The twin engines of propaganda and organization provided the driving force of the National Socialist movement, and their study rightly serves as the unifying theme of this important book. Although the treatment of ideology both as a system of values and as a basis for mobilization is vital, the study appears to be lacking in balance, for ideology receives relatively little attention. The author

describes National Socialist beliefs in the traditional manner by stressing that they were a pot-pourri of wholly negative appeals to anti-semitism, anti-parliamentarianism, and unrestrained nationalism. This ideological conglomerate disguised a struggle for power which ultimately led to the creation of a new Byzantinism in the form of the Third Reich.

Recent scholarship suggests, however, that the dismissal of ideology as the mere handmaiden of propaganda is misleading. Hans-Jochen Gamm (*Der Braune Kult*, 1962) and Wilfried Dim (*Der Mann, der Hitler die Ideen gab*, 1968), both of whom Bracher cites, interpret National Socialist ideology as an interlocking set of values sufficiently coherent to provide a means of legitimizing for many the regime and its policies. Gamm develops the mystical significance of National Socialist rituals and symbols, such as banners. Daim presents a view of National Socialism according to which the movement represented to its adherents the third stage (the first two having been a "paradise of racial purity" followed by an "age of racial degeneration") of a global historical process which would result in the triumph of a superior race. The eschatology of National Socialism justified the "Thousand-Year Reich" as the preparatory phase of the final battle between superior and inferior beings and made plain the essentially dialectical nature of Hitler's world view. Bracher appropriately directs our attention to a quotation from a speech Hitler gave in 1922:

There are . . . only two possibilities: either victory for the aryan side or its destruction and victory for the Jews.

Unfortunately, Bracher does not fully develop the ideological connotations of the concepts "aryan" and "Jew." The term "aryan" proved to be far broader than the word "German," and Bracher errs in suggesting that National Socialism was primarily an extreme form of German nationalism. Indeed, Hitler's goal was the elimination of the bourgeois state and its concomitant doctrine of nationalism (cf. E. Sandvoss, *Hitler und Nichts-sche*, 1969). The "aryans" were to constitute an elite recruited from America, England, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries as well as Germany. And it is historically quite apparent that only a fraction of the German nation was regarded as being biologically eligible for membership in this new master race. George Stein (*The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War*, 1966) provides empirical evidence to the effect that "race" and "nation" were not identical in National Socialist ideology by pointing out that by 1945, German citizens were outnumbered in the regime's praetorian guard by foreigners and ethnic Germans from outside the *Reich*. There were, for example, 125,000 West Europeans alone in the Waffen SS: an im-

portant statistic when one considers that this organization was theoretically biologically superior to all other components of the movement and therefore given the task of fathering the future masters of the world. Himmler's 1940 directive ordering his followers to kidnap throughout occupied Europe children suitable for potential SS recruits leaves little doubt as to the transnational character of National Socialism, a factor which Bracher almost ignores. The "Jew," too, was a symbolic stereotype of a mythical enemy and not always a member of a specific religious community. Goering's boast that he would determine who is a Jew is representative of this attitude.

Perhaps one of the most difficult assertions of the book to accept is the presumed historical connection between the NSDAP and the NPD. Bracher correctly identifies three common characteristics of both parties: their reliance on the Protestant agrarian vote as a principal source of electoral strength, equally autocratic internal structure, and bias against the Left and any form of internationalism. Accordingly, Bracher warns that the National Democrats (NPD) could poison the democratic political life of the Federal Republic and recommends that the party be banned. In the *Land* elections of June 14, 1970, the NPD made its best showing with a total 3.3 per cent of the vote in Lower Saxony. Among those who lost their seats in the *Landtag* was the party leader, von Thadden. Under these circumstances the proposed outlawing of the NPD would be an exaggerated response to a group which has repeatedly failed to demonstrate its appeal to the West German electorate. That Bracher and other scholars rely upon legal sanctions of this type instead of expressing their faith in the common sense of the German voter in dealing with the NPD suggests a more serious questioning of German democracy than the existence of the party itself. Nevertheless, we are not so far removed from National Socialism as to be able to ignore with impunity any manifestations of its revival in a new historical context. It was undoubtedly both as a warning and an expression of hope for a future without tyranny that Bracher dedicated this work to his children.—JAMES H. WOLFE, *University of Maryland*.

Guerillas in Latin America. The Technique of the Counter-State. By LUIS MERCIER VEGA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 246. \$6.50.)

Originally published in France under the title *Technique Du Contre-Etat*, Mercier Vega summarizes the guerilla movements of recent years in Latin America. Part I, "Chemistry and Alchemy," deals with theoretical concepts, the ambiguous roles played by the Soviet Union and

China, and briefly considers the personal backgrounds of the guerilla fighters. Part II, "The National Situations," cites specific events and trends in guerilla activity in Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay, in that order. The last chapter of this Part refers in over-simplified brevity, to Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay. The latter is dismissed with a single sentence. Part III, "Documents," is at the same time boring with inconsequential details (the daily shifting of camp sites, burying of supplies, positioning of patrols, and inventory of captured weapons) and revealing of unexpected divisiveness and bitterness among leftist and Communist organizations. Among the documents reprinted—usually in attenuated form—are the diary of an Argentine insurgent, a War Ministry report by the Peruvian government, a Commission on Inquiry in Venezuela, a propaganda tract celebrating an attack by Colombians on a train, the text of the Venezuelan Communist party denunciation of Fidel Castro, and passages from Ché Guevara's booklet on guerilla warfare. Much of the volume's translation into English is by Daniel Weissbort, whose talents are less literary than literal. A necessary two-page List of Abbreviations helps somewhat in following the often tortuous course of splintered and mutually hostile revolutionary parties and "liberation" groups. The effect is that one reads bits and pieces of what is a wide-spread phenomenon affecting a dozen or more countries, with a great variation of ideological and regional implications.

Mercier Vega, a Chilean citizen, comes by his interest in, and knowledge of, guerilla tactics, honestly and pragmatically. He fought in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930's, and with the Free French forces in Africa and the Middle East during the 1940's. He also has radio and press reportage experiences of guerillas in other countries.

Altogether, the figures of Ché Guevara and of Fidel Castro, while receiving frequent mention in this slim volume, are far from dominating the Latin American revolutionary Left. Both in the chapters on theoretical concepts, and in the selection of diaries and documents, Mercier Vega makes it clear that several others aspired to national and regional leadership. There has obviously been much romanticizing of their own roles by the commanders of small bands of extremists, who time after time ran afoul of the orthodox Communist party command in their own country, and failed—as did Guevara in Bolivia—to attract support of either rural peasants or urban proletariat. Potentially of great interest, where new insights would have been of significance, the author's treatment of Russian and Chinese influence, is lacking in incisiveness or novelty. The Soviets feel that coexistence assures the consolidation of the

socialist camp; and "there are not sufficient grounds for concluding that a pro-Chinese apparatus on a continental scale exists." The author concludes that none of the armed movements corresponded to a theoretical scheme: "the attempts at subversion were much more of a case of classical political pressure, despair or adventurism, than of the application of the theories of the counter-state."—WILLARD F. BARBER, *University of Maryland*.

German Politics and the Spiegel Affair: A Case Study of the Bonn System. BY RONALD F. BUNN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968. Pp. 230. \$7.50.)

The Spiegel Affair. BY DAVID SCHOENBAUM. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968. Pp. 239. \$4.95.)

Die Spiegel-Affäre. Ed. JÜRGEN SEIFERT. (Olten and Freiburg/Br.: Walter-Verlag, 1966.) Two volumes.

Vol. I: *Die Staatsmacht und ihre Kontrolle.* BY ALFRED GROSSER AND JÜRGEN SEIFERT. (Pp. 611. DM28.)

Vol. II: *Die Reaktion der Öffentlichkeit.* BY THOMAS ELLWEIN, MANFRED LIEBEL, AND INGE NEGT. (Pp. 522. DM28.)

The Spiegel affair resulted from a spectacular *faux pas* in the shadowy area of political justice and hastened the end of the Adenauer regime. The "night and fog" aspects of the dragnet police raids against personnel and offices of the independent news magazine and the conduct of leading members of the government in responding to public protest offended the sensibilities of important sections of the West German public. The forced resignation of Defense Minister Strauss was seen as a victory for a vigilant public opinion, reinforced by a strong echo from abroad, and as salutary evidence that the Bonn parliamentary system is responsive to public demands. But the criminal investigation and the excessive police action, which were based on an ill-founded suspicion of treason deriving from a Spiegel cover story on the Bundeswehr that attacked Strauss, pointed to weaknesses inherited from the past.

The affair raised basic issues of a strategic, institutional and legal nature, which barely reached the general public and were only gradually considered and resolved. The last implications from the Spiegel affair had not yet been drawn when these books were written from the perspective of the mid-1960's.

Their combined merit lies in pinpointing the issues and establishing the pattern of responsibility for the Spiegel action, which neither the government, parliament, the courts, nor even the opposition saw fit to clarify. The findings honor the late Otto Kirchheimer and Constantine Menges, for they confirm the soundness of their widely known

study of the Spiegel case in the Harbrace Casebook *Politics in Europe*, edited by Gwendolen Carter and Alan Westin.

For a comprehensive case history of the entire affair one must turn to Schoenbaum's unpretentious carefully researched book that was written for a wider audience. A trained historian who followed the affair on the spot as a free-lance reporter, Schoenbaum pays equal attention to issues and processes. Viewing the affair as "epilogue and overture at the same time," he offers insights into the personalities, institutional processes, and problems of the Bonn system as it gradually emancipated itself from the matrix of Allied tutelage and the conserving bonds of the Adenauer regime. Regrettably the publication omits most reference notes and lacks a bibliography and index.

Bunn's effort is narrower in scope and less successful. It focuses on selected phases of the political process during the six week crisis period, which commenced with the police raids against the Spiegel—at the height of the Cuban missile crisis—and ended with the reconstitution of a CDU-CSU-FDP cabinet, or the condition that Strauss be excluded and that Adenauer resign as Chancellor in less than a year.

The specialist can turn with profit to Seifert's collection of research studies, interpretative essays and source materials, which can be discussed here only in passing. In his own major research contribution, Seifert examines in a series of sharp analytical sketches the role of the public officials in the planning and execution of the police action and the subsequent covering up of the traces of responsibility. He shows that the personal complicity of Strauss and his State Secretary is much greater than was demonstrable while the affair ran its course. He also analyzes the role of the political parties in the counter-action that shook and then restored the government coalition. Grosser addresses himself to some of the basic questions raised by Seifert, moderating the latter's rather critical conclusions from the more detached vantage point of a foreign observer who judges the Bonn Republic in contrast to Weimar and modern France. A detailed chronology of the affair and a selection of key documents complete the first volume, taking up nearly two thirds of the space.

The second volume offers a thorough documentation and provocative analysis of the public reaction to the police action, the conduct of Strauss, and the government's inept and insensitive response to justified concern. Liebel contributes a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the domestic press and, more briefly, of other specialized publics—youth groups, writers and artists, university professors, the churches and trade unions—and the results of public opinion polls and the local elections in Hesse and Bavaria that occurred

during and affected the crisis. Negt examines the Spiegel affair in the mirror of the foreign press. Ellwein's interpretative essay picks up two related questions posed by Liebel. Viewed as a test case for the autonomous communication media, what conclusions can be drawn about (1) their commitment to the values of liberal democracy and (2) their influence on the decision-making political organs? Ellwein answers in a more differentiating manner than Liebel who concludes that (1) the press was only prepared to protect its self-interest and (2) the SPD and FDP would not have challenged the Spiegel action on their own. Ellwein concludes that in the Spiegel case the public performed its critical function and thereby enhanced the controllability of the government in general. A sample of press commentaries and public declarations by various groups completes this volume.

The trouble with Bunn's book is that the doubts regarding its purpose and approach, that surface in his preface and introduction, are justified. It gives the appearance of a collage of research fragments—two of which had been previously published—without a central theme, let alone an adequate theoretical framework. The author admits that he has slighted what he calls the "technical-legal features" of the affair and disclaims any intention of writing its case history. Yet the book contains material that would seem irrelevant to any other purpose. Bunn claims at one point that the study was "designed primarily to examine the functioning of the West German political system as it sought to respond to and resolve the crisis produced by the affair." It attempts more and achieves less.

More than half of the book describes the affair's background and origin. The public reaction was keyed to the impassioned crusade which the Spiegel had led for over two years against Strauss with the avowed aim to block his ascent to the Chancellorship. Bunn shows that the political system did more than respond to the crisis; it helped create it. Without the intervention of the communication media and the political parties there could not have been a major political affair. On account of the high level of public awareness and the involvement of most of the primary institutions and personalities, the crisis period lends itself to a systematic analysis of the Bonn system's styles, procedures, and power differentials. Bunn attempts this only in part and hesitates to draw conclusions. Some processes are overlooked, others barely noted. For example, a full chapter exploits a previously published analysis of a limited sample of newspaper clippings for the purpose of discussing the role of the press in framing the issues and articulating the protests of other organized publics immediately after the initial police raids. The subsequent role of the communication media in intensifying the crisis is virtually ignored. Liebel dem-

onstrates that a large segment of the press abandoned its initial reserve only after Strauss' previously denied involvement had been partially unveiled at the end of a series of parliamentary question hours.

Of all the actors, only the FDP receives the benefit of sustained analysis. For Bunn seems convinced that it alone was in a position to resolve the crisis of confidence by enforcing the principle of ministerial responsibility against Strauss through its temporary withdrawal from the government. He clearly shows the ambivalence of the FDP leadership, then headed by Mende, as it was driven by the pressure of events to play its promised role as the liberal corrective against the abuse of power in a bourgeois coalition. One might wish that Bunn had paid even more attention to the internal processes and the parliamentary role of the FDP, to the exclusion of other concerns, for it is here that the book contributes to our understanding of West German politics.

Bunn cautiously suggests that the FDP's "third force rationale is not entirely irrelevant to the Bonn system." But he fails to contemplate the possible consequences, if the affair had occurred two years earlier when the CDU/CSU possessed an absolute parliamentary majority, or to discuss the implications of the trend towards a two-party system. It could be argued that the presence of a parliamentary third force merely affects the style of settling conflicts without altering a political system's capabilities.

Bunn concludes with a catalogue of institutional strengths and weaknesses, but one is left to wonder about the nature and viability of the Bonn system. He praises the control function of an independent press, the SPD opposition, and the FDP coalition partner. He notes the efficacy of the parliamentary question hour as a control instrument in exceptional situations. He also identifies two flaws which have been since corrected: (1) the automaticity of criminal prosecutions under the "legality principle" in cases of political justice; (2) the practice of assigning State Secretaries as watchdogs on Ministers of the coalition partner. But, on the whole, his presentation leaves the impression that the origin of the affair, as well as its resolution, were the accidental product of circumstance and personality.

Schoenbaum attaches greater significance to the largely autonomous role of the federal prosecutors and the judiciary. Apart from the encouragement and direction it received from Strauss and his State Secretary who presumed to act on behalf of Adenauer, the Spiegel action was the product of anachronistic law, inadequate procedures, and poor judgment on the part of a state bureaucracy that uncritically accepted the judgment of constituted authority and frowned on those who questioned it.

Ultimately the affair posed the key issue—later explored before the Federal Constitutional Court—where, and by whom, the line is to be drawn in concrete cases that might involve a confrontation between the right to inform and criticize, as a correlate of public control of military policy, and the duty to protect secrecy, as a correlate of national security.

Schoenbaum explores the origin and the implications of the incriminating cover story that attacked Strauss' strategic conception, divulged the Bundeswehr's inadequate performance in the recent Fallex-62 NATO maneuvers, attributed this to Strauss' faulty planning, and suggested that Strauss' atomic ambitions were being opposed not only by Bonn's alliance partners but from within the Defense Ministry. A full English translation of the story is appended to Bunn's book, which offers a brief summary but otherwise avoids the problem.

The purpose of the police action was to secure evidence in support of the charge that alleged state secrets in the cover story had been procured by the Spiegel from as yet unknown sources in the Defense Ministry. Military publicists in the West found nothing that jeopardized NATO security and little that had not been previously published elsewhere. A month-long search of the Spiegel offices and archives failed to uncover the vast conspiracy of treason and even high treason that Strauss and Adenauer imagined and the federal prosecutors thought possible. It merely netted a Bundeswehr colonel who had contacted the Spiegel out of concern over Strauss' preference for a pre-emptive atomic strike strategy at a time when the Kennedy administration switched to a strategy of graduated deterrence. The federal prosecutors' efforts to vindicate themselves through convictions failed to bring a single defendant to a formal trial. If trials had been held under the existing law, which derived its pedigree from the Bismarck era, they might have led to politically inopportune convictions and a miscarriage of justice. The last cases were dismissed for insufficient evidence in 1965. Three years later the law was liberalized under the guidance of Justice Minister Heinemann, formerly an attorney for the Spiegel.

All authors agree on the culpability of Strauss. Grosser allows that if Strauss had resorted to half-truths and untruths for reasons of state it would have been excusable. That he lied to the public and parliament mainly for personal advantage rendered his conduct morally objectionable and his continuance in office politically untenable. Here the parallel to the Profumo affair that rocked the Macmillan government one year later

ends, for Strauss was able to recapture ministerial honors. As long as he remains the undisputed leader of the CSU, he will be a potent national figure on account of the constellation of Bonn politics. Bunn and Schoenbaum describe the bargaining reality of a parliamentary four-party system throughout the government crisis. We still lack sufficient knowledge about the internal structure of the CSU to be able to explain the phenomenon of Strauss, but it seems clear that the Bavarian electorate's failure to punish the CSU at the height of the Spiegel crisis actually strengthened his leadership. Since the CDU and CSU are Siamese twins with separate identities and inseparable bodies, the CSU—and consequently Strauss—were bound to exercise a disproportionate amount of influence. This could not be changed as long as a SPD-FDP governing coalition was impossible or impracticable for arithmetical and attitudinal reasons.

Taking the long view, Schoenbaum suggests that the Spiegel affair, not unlike the Dreyfus affair in the Third Republic, may be seen as a turning point in the evolution of the Bonn Republic. From the perspective of the mid-1960's—as Strauss was returned to the cabinet under the aegis of a great coalition which in the eyes of many intellectuals signalized the atrophy of responsible government and the malaise of social stagnation—most of the other authors share the then fashionable view that the Spiegel affair temporarily disturbed the system without changing its premises. They underrate the affair's demonstration effect tied to rapid generational change—in our post-industrial society a question of as little as five or ten years. Their own accounts show that the affair brought out stylistic predispositions and substantive concerns that challenged established patterns. The government's authoritarian demeanor as well as the efficacy of political protest had a profound effect on several attentive publics, especially among the young whose political consciousness was formed under the Bonn System. The methodological problems standing in the way of measuring demonstration effects need not keep one from postulating more or less direct connections between the Spiegel affair and each of the following: the rise of an extra-parliamentary opposition, the modification of the proposed state of emergency legislation, the liberalization of the criminal code and judicial practice in the whole area of political justice, the formation of a social-liberal SPD-FDP coalition, and major changes in Bonn's foreign and military policy along lines propagated by the Spiegel for more than a decade.—CHARLES R. NAEF, *Colgate University*.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The American Threat: The Fear of War As an Instrument of Foreign Policy. By JAMES L. PAYNE. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 241. \$7.95.)

This book purports to broaden understanding of international affairs through an analysis of the threat of war as an instrument of foreign policy. Explicitly eschewing any intent to advance specific policy proposals, the author pleads a larger purpose, namely, "to delineate some basic problems and perspectives of the statesman, particularly of the American statesman in the Cold War era." (p. xiv)

For a number of reasons the study falls conspicuously short of its mark. Conceptual difficulties arise early when the author confuses his explanation of state behavior, through what is offered as a theory of threat, with his defense of the use of coercive threats as the principal justification for American policy abroad. In attempting to construct a behavioral foundation for his analysis, moral and legal principles are rejected as satisfactory explanations of state action. According to the author, the superiority of one moral code over another cannot be validated; and legal rationales can buttress any claim, however absurd. The author's kind of statesman acts, therefore, in terms of his understanding of the status quo defined as "the mutually perceptible distribution of rights over which war may be provoked between hostile nations." (p. 66) The author would have us accept "right" to mean an enemy state's perception of the physical punishment it would incur if it violated the "rights" of its opponent. In this view, aggression becomes the transgression of an opponent's right as the opponent views it and as that right is perceived by the other rival. The congruence of the two views defines the status quo. Under conditions of Cold War, where the United States is pictured as engaged in a worldwide struggle against implacable foes, global peace is said to hinge on the articulation and consistent defense of a status quo in which "ours" (American) and "theirs" (Communist) is clearly defined. (p. 76)

Defining the status quo offers no insurmountable difficulties for the author. It is tantamount to the categorical imperative that the United States assume global defense commitments everywhere in order to meet its pledge to oppose forceful Communist expansion anywhere. This obligation is allegedly thrust upon the United States more as a required response to Communist expectations of American behavior than as a moral or political duty. Even small incursions by lesser Communist states must be met by a coercive response lest the

credibility of the American deterrent be weakened and larger Communist powers, like Russia and China, be encouraged to embark on more ambitious imperialist ventures.

A number of questionable devices are employed to demonstrate that the author's logical analysis is fatter to contemporary state behavior. At various points American strategic problems are reduced to simplified allegories or analogies. The United States is compared to a lonely traveler pursued by a wolf pack (the Communist states). He must attack even the harmless cubs otherwise the others "will suppose that the prey is weakening and may close in." (p. 112) Or, the complex choices confronting American strategists are reduced beyond recognition to a scenario in which "Lightening Joe," the aspirant sheriff, must draw on "Rough Pete," the town gunman, if expectations have been raised, even through groundless rumor, that he has made a challenge. (pp. 123-24)

Motives are freely attributed to world leaders to illustrate their presumably compulsive concern with the maintenance of a credible deterrent posture over all other state objectives. When former Secretary of State Dean Rusk is quoted as saying that the United States has security commitments with just over 40 states, the author gratuitously allows that Rusk really meant to say the entire non-Communist world, but was constrained from being more explicit out of deference to domestic criticism. (pp. 128-29) President Kennedy's supposedly flaccid management of the American threat establishment is held responsible (causally and morally) for Khrushchev's precipitation of the Berlin Crisis in 1961-62. Explanations of preceding Berlin confrontations go begging. Similarly not addressed is the significance for deterrence theory of Russian responses to the largest military demobilization and one of the largest mobilizations of military force in American history, respectively, under the Truman and Kennedy administrations. Even de Gaulle's decision to build a *force de frappe* is laid to Kennedy's hesitancy to employ force despite the troubling fact that the inauguration of the French strategic strike force preceded his entry into office.

On the other hand, the Johnson administration's expansion of the Vietnam War in 1965 is alleged to have frustrated Chinese attempts to launch "a tri-continental people's war," (p. 148) and its dispatch of troops to Santo Domingo is said to have strengthened the American global deterrent which, in the author's mind, was crucial to avoid "a long and costly struggle" in Vietnam. (p. 205)

Except for random citations from *The Pen-*

kouskiy Papers, the reader looks largely in vain for original documentation, however inconclusive, to sustain the author's interpretations of Russian, Chinese, and American behavior. But in the absence of such evidence, how can the principle of mutual perceptions of status quo rights be applied? Moreover, it is precisely in those areas where the great powers are in dispute that the status quo is mutually in question. The author's conception of the status quo loses its operational relevance at the very moment when the demand for clarity of rights between rivals is most pressing. Nor can the author's notion of the status quo be saved by illogical leaps that oblige the United States to extend uniform and unreserved security guarantees to all non-Communist countries and to respond to all forms of Communist aggression automatically and inexorably. (p. 138) This antiseptically presented imperative loses much of its force when it is revealed as a thinly disguised policy recommendation resting on scanty and selective historical data and on perhaps arresting, but imprecise, comparisons. And, as a matter of record, American presidents have been more cautious and flexible than the author's procrustean logic admits in minimizing American security guarantees to non-Communist states. Even its formal treaty commitments have been differentially defined, depending on the ally, in the NATO, SEATO, RIO, and ANZUS Pacts and in bilateral accords with South Korea, Nationalist China, and Japan.

The author's attempts to base American military strategy on depoliticized principles of action falsifies the problems facing American statesmen. The study dismisses public opinion as "schizophrenic and animalistic." (p. 194) A democratic people are portrayed as incapable of appreciating the necessity of projecting threats abroad. Yet how can such threats be effectively marshalled if the human and material requirements for their construction cannot be raised among the populace except in appeals to political interest and prudence, legal rights, and moral duty—all of which are repudiated by the author as insufficient bases for state action?

The critical problem facing the American statesman is to establish a viable equilibrium between competing requirements for domestic consensus and national security. Offering for emulation the examples of such imperialists as Frederick the Great (pp. 12-13, 154) and Disraeli (pp. 196-200) deflects our attention without improving our understanding of the problems facing American statecraft today. Doubts may be registered, too, over the author's plea for more faith in those American statesmen who apply "tradition, precedent, and received knowledge" to contemporary problems. (p. 195) Whose tradition should be followed? Alexander Hamilton or Thomas Jefferson?

Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson? Skepticism may be also raised over the author's call for more trust in "middle-echelon bureaucrats" whose ennobling task is "to check proposals to see that they are consistent with that great bundle of tradition and value which forms the only secure locus for a safe and, ultimately, a moral foreign policy." (p. 201) A democratic people may be ably served by its bureaucracy, but it cannot survive the abdication of its political responsibilities to public servants who are exempt from an electoral test.

What begins as an attempt to present a behavioral understanding of the use of threats in American foreign policy ends with the soporific intonation of pastoral counsels of doubtful strategic efficacy, political applicability, or moral validity. Judged by the author's own standards, the conclusion is difficult to resist that this study confuses, more than clarifies, "the problems and perspectives of the . . . American statesman in the Cold War era."—EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ, *University of Virginia*.

The Great Powers & Africa. By WALDEMAR A. NIELSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 404. \$11.95.)

For the Africanist or student of American Foreign Policy it will be most profitable to begin with the final section of this book which suggests a future U.S. policy toward Africa. The general reader should read the previous chapter for background information on the post-colonial African policies of Britain, France, Russia, China, Belgium, Germany, and the United States. The comparison of American Foreign Policies with other countries active in Africa is useful for pointing out the dimensions of our policy—in this case the shallowness.

Nielson, President of the African-American Institute, strongly argues for a revision of U.S. policy. As he sees American policy, it has deteriorated from a barely adequate framework under Kennedy to a clearly inadequate one. Even more gloom is ahead, he fears, because of the general reaction against any active American policy toward developing countries. The reaction to the Vietnam War may account for the general unwillingness to formulate policies which would call for continuing or increasing commitments of money, staff, and planning. However, Africa has always had a low priority in American policy, and as we have gained confidence in understanding African developments, we have once again returned Africa to the bottom of the list.

The need for a bold policy is derived from several sources: first, a growing constituency for Africa among the blacks and the youth in America; second, the national interest in preventing great power confrontation by insuring progress among African nations; third, the nations vision of itself

and its relations with others as the "dominant civilization in the world of the late twentieth century."

In making the case for an active American policy toward Africa the author defines four issues as central to American interest. (1) What will be the future relationships among African and European countries, especially former colonies and the metropolises? (2) What is the American interest in fostering political change in the "White Redoubt" of Southern Africa? (3) What should be American strategic and military policy in Africa? (4) What should be done about problems of development? These four general areas are certainly central to U.S. policy, and the author has posed the problems in their toughest form in order to make clear his argument for an active U.S. policy.

The trend in American policy which has led to pessimism in Africa regarding our willingness to provide capital and technical assistance should be reversed. Reducing aid and limiting bilateral agreements dissipated the best policy tool available in Africa, and the U.S. has set a model for European countries to limit their aid appropriations. Moreover, the U.S. has not maintained leadership in making funds available through agreements and international institutions. In 1962 the U.S. contributed .8% of GNP in public and private aid; in 1967 it was down to .57%.

He also calls for a stronger stand against the minority governments in Southern Africa. This policy would not aim at overthrowing governments by force. There are good reasons for not committing the U.S. to military endeavors in Southern Africa, as most readers are likely to agree. However, short of military assistance there are a number of ways for the U.S. to help bring about change. An approach of *creative tension* would search for the economic and political actions which would develop the nationalist forces in Southern Africa as a "driving, courageous, unified, sustained, and intelligent" movement.

The U.S. should continue to define its responsibilities for peace-keeping and international security in a narrow way. However, the U.S. should not assume that a "low profile" will prevent problems from developing in a way which will eventually require our unilateral reinvolvement. Rather, the U.S. should try to strengthen the multilateral forces, particularly the OAU, to deal with African situations without recourse to great powers outside Africa. The U.S. should encourage tacit agreement with other great powers to abstain from intervening in African affairs. In a "strategically sterile" environment the U.S. would find few reasons to be drawn into local affairs. The danger of intervention for strategic (anticommunist) reasons was illustrated in the Congo. Although the U.S. generally did not become a competitor of the USSR in

the Nigerian war, a whole series of conflicts which would tend to involve the U.S. can be imagined easily.

The fourth policy change would encourage the U.S. to work *with* European countries in aiding Africa rather than leaving the problem to them. American action and initiative is crucial to developing an over-all framework for trade and capital. This problem has wider implication than just Africa, for restructuring U.S.-European relations also requires American initiative. Africa only becomes part of an unassembled triangle.

Nielsen's arguments attempt to define positively the American interests in Africa. It is a long-range policy, set by an image of ourselves which emphasizes the best of American international relations. This does not permit a minimal involvement.

By defining the *goals* we ought to pursue and the policies which are likely to further these goals, the debate about American policy is likely to remain rational. As long as we formulate conceptions of American foreign policy with the understanding of internal and international developments, that Nielsen has shown, there is hope that American power may be an effective force for development. Unless we make these kinds of assessments we are in danger of forming policy on the basis of short run "budgetary constraints," or "isolation sentiment," which do not help us decide how power should be used.—JAMES E. LOESEL, *Washington and Lee University*.

Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World. By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Pp. 353. \$11.00.)

Notwithstanding the fact that an immense amount has been written on the subject of Yugoslav foreign policy, very little attention has been paid to the country's relations with the newly emerging nations of Africa and Asia. Yugoslavia has nevertheless played a key role in efforts to form a non-aligned bloc, and close relations with the developing nations have been a primary concern of Yugoslav foreign policy in recent years.

Professor Rubenstein, with the skill and insight born of a thorough knowledge of Communist diplomacy, has chronicled Yugoslav efforts to create a coalition of the non-aligned nations, a group which could be an active factor in strengthening the United Nations, hastening the dissolution of military blocs, and—in the spirit of the UNCTAD conference of 1964—developing greater trade between the developed and lesser developed nations. The resulting volume provides important insights into the evolution of Yugoslav foreign policy as well as shedding new light on the problems that have accompanied the development of the concept of non-alignment.

Yugoslavia, in the author's view, initiated the

campaign to create a non-aligned group of nations out of practical considerations. The desire of the Yugoslavs to avoid diplomatic isolation, hopes of economic gain, and the fact that stressing ties with the newly-emerging nations was a policy calculated to provoke a minimum of dispute within the Yugoslav Party, all were important considerations guiding Yugoslav actions. At the same time, one of the most interesting and valuable aspects of Professor Rubenstein's treatment concerns the underlying principles which have guided the Yugoslavs in developing the idea of non-alignment.

For, as this account suggests, Yugoslavia differs from the other non-aligned and newly emerging states not only by virtue of the fact that she is a European power, under Communist rule, and only partially underdeveloped, but also because she is more genuinely internationalist and more adversely affected by cold war tensions than her African and Asian partners in non-alignment, many of whom have become primarily "regionalists" in recent years and (as in the case of Nasser) not adverse to accepting the economic and military aid which flows from great power rivalries. Although siding with the radical nationalist leaders of African and Asia on most issues, Yugoslavia's approach toward non-alignment has been more consistent, and in the last analysis more constructive, than that of most of the third world nations.

The author's conclusions nevertheless raise the question of whether Yugoslavia will continue to place as much emphasis on relations with the African and Asian nations in the future as in the past. Regionalist tendencies have been driving the newly emerging nations away from the broad principles of non-alignment congenial to the Yugoslavs. At the same time Yugoslavia faces pressures to concentrate more on economic and diplomatic problems arising from the integration of Western Europe and the renewed threat posed by Soviet military activities in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Personal diplomacy, in which Tito has placed such great store in his relations with the third world, has suffered a setback with the death or removal from power of the radical nationalist leaders of the 1960's. Finally, the growing domination of the Soviet Union over Egypt has been a source of concern to Yugoslavia and has raised certain doubts concerning the utility of Yugoslavia's unswerving support of Nasser and his policies.

While examining basic questions connected with the evolution of Yugoslavia's policies toward the non-aligned nations, Professor Rubenstein has also sought to show how the multifarious instruments of modern diplomacy—work in international organizations, offers of economic assistance, or the development of personal contacts among leaders, for example—have been utilized by the Yugoslavs in

their campaign to make themselves the leader and spokesman for the non-aligned group. Although the result is a certain amount of repetition (the book is organized more functionally than chronologically), this approach does provide insights into the techniques employed by a medium-sized power with limited resources in pursuit of rather ambitious foreign policy goals.

The author is lavish in his praise of the skill of Yugoslav diplomats. He does nevertheless point out what appear to be inconsistencies in the Yugoslav approach to peaceful co-existence and non-alignment (for example, the Yugoslav failure to react to the intervention of Egypt in the affairs of Yemen). He is quite critical of the Yugoslav position at the Belgrade conference of the non-aligned in 1961; one would like to hear the Yugoslav viewpoint on this famous incident in which Tito downplayed the importance of resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union. On the other hand there are parts of the book in which the official Yugoslav point of view is perhaps overly stressed, if only because the Yugoslavs were very free in providing the author with information on the Yugoslav position on the problems under discussion.

Professor Rubenstein's account is a skilled and mature analysis of a complex subject important both to students of the problem of non-alignment and persons interested in Yugoslavia. The book should contribute to a new, and broader, approach to Yugoslav foreign policy, which up to now has been considered almost exclusively from the point of view of cold-war politics.—PAUL SHOUP, *University of Virginia*.

Arms For The Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy. BY WYNFRED JOSHUA AND STEPHEN P. GIBERT. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. 169. \$6.95.)

As the authors of this compactly-written little book demonstrate, military assistance has become an essential instrument of Soviet foreign policy toward the underdeveloped world. Since the 1955 arms agreement with Egypt, Moscow has distributed some \$6 billion in arms to 25 countries in the Third World, an amount slightly larger than that spent for the same purposes by the United States.

The authors find three major political objectives underlying the Soviet arms aid program. First has been the Kremlin's desire to weaken Western, especially American, influence particularly in countries close to the Soviet border. Thus, Soviet aid in the 1950's to Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and India was, at least in part, designed to undercut John Foster Dulles' efforts to join Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan in a defensive alliance aimed at the Soviet Union. A second major objective has been an offensive one, i.e., to extend Soviet political in-

fluence in the developing world. By means of arms aid to countries like India, Ghana, Indonesia and other eminent representatives of the Third World, Moscow seeks to promote the image of the Soviet Union as the champion of anti-colonialism and national independence and to foster military and, hopefully, diplomatic dependency on the USSR. A third aim, one whose importance has grown significantly during the past decade, relates to Moscow's desire to counter the growing activity of Communist China. Russian military aid policies in South and Southeast Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa, seek to prevent China from becoming the predominant source of revolutionary leadership in the Third World.

In light of these three objectives, which obviously overlap and intertwine, the authors analyze Soviet military aid to the major regions of the developing world. While often sketchy, this regional survey pulls together a considerable array of hard-to-find information and, more importantly, clearly outlines the main features of Soviet military aid diplomacy. They observe, for instance, that Moscow has chosen to concentrate its arms aid program on relatively few countries. In fact, as they note, 86% of all Soviet military aid has gone to the countries of the Middle East and Asia, with Egypt, Indonesia, India and Iraq being the main recipients. Only 1% of the total Soviet aid program (as of 1967) went to Africa and the 13% which went to Latin America was all sent to one country, Cuba.

These figures, according to the authors, clearly demonstrate the essentially conservative character of Soviet arms policy. "The military aid program indicates . . . that Soviet policy, like that of imperial Russia, still emphasizes regions adjacent to the Soviet Union and is still cautious about moving into distant areas. . . ." (p. 132) While generally true, the authors themselves supply evidence which seems to contradict this interpretation. Substantial Soviet aid to distant Indonesia, which alone received \$1.2 billion in arms (over 20% of the total) and to Cuba clearly indicate rather broader horizons than they suggest. Further, as the text notes, influence can be peddled rather cheaply in the underdeveloped world. Thus, for the relatively small sum of \$10-15 million in military aid, Moscow managed to place 1000 advisors in far away Ghana, some of whom were assigned command positions in Nkrumah's private army. In fact, at the time of the successful coup in February 1966, a number of Russian officers were killed in the attack on Nkrumah's official residence. Thus, though generally careful in their arms aid policy, the Kremlin seems more venturesome than the authors are willing to admit.

Soviet caution is further revealed, in their judgement, by Moscow's practice of limiting the

type of assistance it is prepared to offer. Thus, despite a 1965 request by Egypt, the USSR has refused to supply nuclear arms to any Third World nation. Furthermore, Moscow's aid to Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis has been limited to defensive weapons. In addition, as the authors point out, the bulk of Soviet aid to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces have been mainly weapons useful in fighting a limited conflict.

While such policies, to be sure, indicate a sense of self-restraint, it is open to question whether the USSR's policies are as cautious as has been suggested. In the past, where circumstances have seemed propitious, the Soviet leaders have been strikingly bold in their arms policies. In 1962, for example, missiles with major offensive capabilities were positioned in a Cuba far removed from the Soviet border. Furthermore, from 1961 through 1965, Moscow provided the armed forces of a highly belligerent Indonesia under Sukarno with a large number of modern offensive weapons. And, more recently, Soviet military aid to Nasser directly contributed, as the authors admit, to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. Since 1967, despite the increasingly serious danger of renewed conflict and the growing risk of an American-Soviet confrontation, Soviet military aid to Egypt has steadily increased.

Rather than "conservative and cautious," (p. 126) I prefer their terms "pragmatic and opportunistic." (p. 157) This characterization would have come across more clearly had the authors referred to Moscow's earlier experiences in military aid diplomacy. During the 1920's, the Kremlin extended military aid to anti-Western movements in the underdeveloped world, including those led by Kemal Attaturk and Chiang Kai-shek, despite their hostility towards local Communist elements. In the late 1930's, Moscow provided the Kuomintang with considerable amounts of arms and ammunition, sent over 3000 advisers to China and allowed several hundred Soviet airmen to fly with Chiang's fledgling airforce. This assistance, designed to support China in its war with Japan, was also used by Chiang against the Communist forces of Mao Tse-tung. In the mid-1940's, with the aim of expelling British influence from the Middle East, the USSR furnished arms to the Israelis. Without this assistance, Israel quite conceivably would not have survived, a point which both Moscow and the Arabs would undoubtedly prefer to forget. While the analogy is somewhat strained, Soviet policy toward the war in Vietnam is curiously reminiscent of its highly pragmatic attitude toward the Spanish Civil War. Too obligated ideologically not to give any assistance, but fearful that Communist success might lead to undesirable consequences—the creation of a Communist Spanish Republic might have frightened Britain and

France into the arms of Germany and Italy while completely Communist Vietnam may align itself with Peking—Moscow in both cases has pursued a policy which does not give major support but merely makes a show of support.

The authors of this study are to be commended for a fine general survey of recent Soviet military aid diplomacy. Their comparison of Soviet and American military aid programs, whose general features are surprisingly similar, is of considerable interest. The work is marred, however, by poor editing. More careful monitoring for inconsistencies might have reduced the contradictions between the general conclusions and the evidence cited or, at least, compelled the authors to seek to reconcile them. The book, in addition, would have benefited from a stronger analytic perspective. Other than a rather brief attempt at correlating the UN voting records of Third World nations with those of the sources of the military assistance they receive, there was little systematic effort to analyze the effectiveness of the Soviet military aid program. Despite these shortcomings, this is a highly useful study of a little-examined and distressingly important subject.—MORTON SCHWARTZ, *University of California, Riverside*.

The Foreign Policies of France 1944-1968. BY GUY DE CARMOY, TRANSLATED BY ELAINE P. HALPERIN. (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. 510. \$15.00.)

Guy de Carmoy has attempted to catalogue and assess the major foreign policies of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, as well as the general attitudes of the contending domestic groups. He has done so less from the point of view of a detached observer of events than a partisan. Indeed, M. de Carmoy ran in March 1967 for the National Assembly as a supporter of François Mitterand. The protagonists of European unity clearly emerge as the heroes of this interpretation of French foreign policy. And, just as clearly, Charles de Gaulle is cast in the rôle of villain. This is as true of the Fourth as of the Fifth Republic.

De Carmoy organizes his analysis of the policies of the two republics in terms of the "three major trends [which] have altered the realities of international politics during recent decades" (p. ix): the new hierarchy of states which emerged from war, technology, and demography; the decolonization movement; and the construction of Europe. In general, he believes that the leadership of the Fourth Republic on the one hand and General de Gaulle on the other adjusted to these trends in radically different ways. Rather than seeing a general continuity of policy from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics, De Carmoy perceives the Fourth Republic as "enclosed between the two reigns of Charles de Gaulle" (p. 174), an important and, in

foreign affairs, basically sound interlude between the "vast enterprises" of General de Gaulle.

He argues that the Fourth Republic ultimately failed because it "pursued objectives that were too ambitious for her limited resources . . . [and] could not be reconciled because of the conflicting ideologies that underlay them" (p. 182). Specifically, the leaders of the Fourth Republic erred in attempting to follow a global policy based on colonial possessions while at the same time seeking continental security and reconciliation. The inability to escape from the colonial mission or to follow consistent supranational policies in Europe and the Atlantic area were the result of a heavy historical and ideological baggage and of the exigencies of domestic political pressures. In effect, the "innovative" foreign policies of the Fourth Republic in respect to European unity and Atlantic alliance were constantly jeopardized by domestic divisions and colonial policy.

Foremost, in De Carmoy's view, among the domestic political pressures which undermined the "positive" thrusts in the policies of the Fourth Republic was General de Gaulle. In the three areas of defense, colonial policy, European unity, M. de Carmoy essentially portrays a morality play with the forces of Gaullism progressively in the ascendant. Hence, he concludes on the question of defense that "the idea of joint defense and loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance conflicted with the notion of an exclusively national system . . . France's Atlantic policy declined as the Fourth Republic lost ground and the Gaullist opposition gained." (p. 62). And on the subject of Europe, "divided on all major problems, [Frenchmen] had in their ranks the most eminent champions and detractors of a united Europe" (p. 124). With regard to decolonization, De Carmoy declared that "successive governments, accused by de Gaulle and his friends of abandoning French colonial interests, were unable to formulate a consistent policy or explain to the public the often painful alternatives that inescapably confronted the nation" (p. 173). The pressures, concluded De Carmoy proved to be too much and a crisis of regime brought to power "a man of the past . . . largely responsible for the inconsistencies of French foreign policy" (p. 189).

M. de Carmoy does give General de Gaulle qualified praise for improving France's domestic situation and for extricating the Republic from the Algerian tangle. Yet despite the thrust given industrialization by the monetary reform, it could not keep pace with an expanding population and accelerated urbanization. The character of de Gaulle's assault on the international monetary system and the European Communities, as well as the project for an independent deterrent, are portrayed as in part to blame for France's internal ills. De Carmoy's principal criticism in these areas

seems directed at the presuppositions and manner of de Gaulle's actions which denied the ultimate validity of a supranational framework, which is seen by De Carmoy as essential to a strengthened European economy. Moreover, by treating collective frameworks as purely instrumental, de Gaulle's policies threatened as well the organic ties which linked the German Federal Republic to Western Europe.

In the area where General de Gaulle is often praised, the resolution of the Algerian conflict, M. de Carmoy is also reserved. Basically he believes that de Gaulle was too slow to launch negotiations, alternately too ambiguous and too rigid in his positions, too determined to treat the problem as exclusively French, and too inconsistent in his policy preferences. De Carmoy does not interpret these actions so much as indicative of de Gaulle's attempt to maneuver hostile and contradictory elements in the French polity, but as exacerbating those elements and eventuating in the least favorable termination of French sovereignty in North Africa.

In traditional fashion, De Carmoy interprets de Gaulle's policy objectives as independence and great power status for France. The Franco-German alliance, the Atlantic Alliance, the European Communities, the African associations, bilateral arrangements are all seen as means rather than enduring ends. M. de Carmoy concludes in fact that de Gaulle was able to limit the various instruments of Western unity without, however, improving France's security or its long-run influence. And, indeed, in one of De Carmoy's most provocative theses, de Gaulle's rapprochement with Russia is seen as endangering the entire continent. The joint Franco-Soviet declaration of 1966 is portrayed as "a step toward a reversal of alliances" (p. 480) and a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" over which France and Russia would preside and through which Germany would be neutralized. In effect, "the Fifth Republic reversed the foreign policy of the Fourth; during his second reign Charles de Gaulle has pursued the foreign policy he began during his first" (p. 478). The result of this venture, however, will be, in M. de Carmoy's view, not a Franco-Soviet condominium but Soviet domination.

M. de Carmoy's thesis is well-stated but often too little documented. This is particularly true of his analysis of the Fourth Republic. His discussion of such issues as the European Defense Community, the Suez crisis, and the French decision to acquire a nuclear capacity are presented in cursory fashion. In many chapters he seems to chronicle dates and events without probing motivation and meaning. Moreover, the book would have been strengthened by a better analysis of the domestic forces and constraints in the policy process. This

would have been particularly helpful in assessing the years just before and after de Gaulle's return to power.

On the other hand, several of De Carmoy's chapters are well-stated, interpretive essays. Indeed, many of his chapters on the Fifth Republic seem to fall into that category. As such they are often extremely provocative and sweeping theses.

Guy de Carmoy's study is a well-organized and written interpretation of French foreign policy since 1944. It does not constitute a thorough and balanced appraisal of that period, but it does provide a generally interesting introduction to France's post-war policy.—ROBERT S. WOOD, *University of Virginia*.

Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective. By ROBERT G. WESSON. (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1969. Pp. 492. \$9.50.)

To the extent that our survival depends on policy choices, the foreign policies of the major, i.e. thermonuclear, powers are crucial. Yet despite some two decades of intensive research into Soviet politics, we long lacked a comprehensive, interpretive history of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Perhaps in response to the semi-centennial urge, a number of surveys of Soviet foreign policy have now appeared. Of each it may be asked: Is its historical narrative reliable? Does it provide insights into Soviet foreign policy or demonstrate the application of new methodologies to the subject matter? Which is its most suitable audience?

Writing on Soviet foreign policy so as to elicit affirmative answers to such questions is a formidable task. That lack of reliable material common in studying Soviet domestic politics is only partly offset by the records of states which have maintained foreign relations with the U.S.S.R. Nor have recent efforts to apply formal conceptual frameworks to the stuff of Soviet foreign policy yet provided a convincing analysis of, say, Soviet policy in the Cuban missile crisis or the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Given these difficulties, the best preparation for writing about Soviet foreign policy may be a coherent personal stance. It is such qualities that make the works of Louis Fischer or George Kennan valuable. It is also the outstanding virtue of Adam Ulam's *Expansion and Coexistence*, the work most nearly comparable to this one. Ulam consistently relates Soviet foreign policy to the political perspectives of particular leaders, and to domestic politics generally.

The major flaw in Wesson's work is the lack of any single unifying principle. Soviet foreign policy is discussed more in sequence than in perspective. This difficulty is found both in the work overall and in particular sections such as Wesson's discussion of the origins of the Cold War. Wesson re-

marks in his preface that, "... we are no nearer than ever to [understanding Soviet foreign policy]. Perhaps it is not really possible [to do so].” Since Wesson feels that our understanding of the Soviet political system as such as “at best tentative and superficial,” his pessimism is understandable.

Of course, the author does analyze Soviet foreign policy repeatedly; he is not, after all, producing a chronicle. In the paragraph quoted above, Wesson tells how he intends to interpret Soviet foreign policy. (The Soviet response to the outside world may explain “the mainsprings of its behavior.”) He will show how Soviet foreign policy has evolved in response to internal needs, ideology, the passage of time, and to problems of controlling the sometime Bloc. In practice, however, Wesson’s approach is to select, seemingly at will, one or another possible explanatory factor. Nowhere in this book is there an explicit statement of the principle guiding this selection; one is left with the suspicion that selection is governed by convenience and “reasonableness.”

There is no focused discussion of the role of leadership styles in relation to any one leader, or to a specific era of Soviet history. On page 96 we read, “How much was attributable to the personal character of Stalin no one can determine. Certainly, the period of his rule was marked by his personality.” But his character does not, it seems provide a “large answer to the whys of Soviet foreign policy,” because circumstances determined his rise. Sometimes Stalin is described as oriental, crafty, and ignorant of the outside world; sometimes he is called moderate and is given high marks for policy successes. His most ambiguous foreign policy venture, the pact with Hitler, is variously explained; the relationship of Stalin, as a policy-maker, to this policy is not made clear. It is hard to tell what Wesson thinks of the policy itself.

Wesson argues (page 157) that the experiences of World War II, especially those of fruitful relations with the West, affected the outlook of Soviet policy makers. Indeed, he suggests (pages 172-4) that the advent of less “leftist” American policy makers after Roosevelt’s death helped to evoke uncooperative responses from formerly friendly Soviet officials. This analysis is not necessarily wrong, but one cannot identify the principle that leads Wesson to argue for a breakdown of mutual trust as a major explanation of Cold War origins.

Similarly Wesson’s treatment of ideology is uncertain. It is never made clear whether ideology is a major factor in shaping policy; the author sometimes argues that ideology helped, sometimes that it hindered realization of Soviet aims. Moreover, Wesson does not clearly distinguish between consequences of Soviet policy that had contra-ideo-

logical or other undesirable effects, and consequences that were dysfunctional in terms of goals. Thus he demonstrates and decries the baleful effects of Leninism on the European labor movement. But did the splintering of European radicalism hamper Soviet foreign policy? Would the U.S.S.R. have more influence over French policy if the French Left were a united, radical, non-Bolshevik mass movement?

Here we come to a further problem of Wesson’s analysis: despite his explicit statement that security (not defined) is the consistent goal of Soviet foreign policy, the book is not organized around the attainment (or lack of attainment) of this goal. If Soviet policy makers perceived security to lie in social transformations of the international environment, then the failures of world revolution—or even more, its frightening success in China—would indicate a focus on these policies. If security was thought of as a favorable military-weapons situation, then an analysis of Soviet foreign policy should concentrate on such questions.

All too often in this book, the merely spectacular displaces the important. How else can one explain the inordinate amount of space devoted to the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968-9? On Wesson’s own showing, the military intervention in Prague was not a new departure in Soviet policy, but rather a defensive consolidation of the Soviet position. Yet Wesson spends some twenty pages on the crisis, while arms control and related issues get only scattered attention.

This concentration on Czechoslovakia is partially explained by Wesson’s semi-explicit contention that here was an instance of Soviet foreign policy flowing from domestic (in this case, nationalities) policy. At issue here are not Wesson’s accurate facts but rather the lack of systematic evaluation of the relation between domestic and foreign policy. The book contains many digressions on Soviet domestic politics: is their purpose information or explanation? Curiously enough, Wesson devotes very little space to the institutions and procedures of Soviet foreign policy, from the *Narkomindel*, to the Comecon, to the changing training of Soviet diplomats.

The strongest aspect of Wesson’s book is his keen sense of the contingent nature of Soviet foreign policy, its frequently wasteful and confused policies, how much it resembles the policy of traditional states in small-minded and often fruitless cynicisms. There are also an admirable summary of Sino-Soviet relations, and a good exposition of the post-Khrushchev policy toward the Third World. Of course, every reader will have his own specific disagreement, such as the statement (page 180) that Stalin “had no real German policy” in 1944-5.

Wesson’s work will give readers a competent,

wide-ranging history of Soviet foreign policy. Will it also give them a heightened understanding of that policy? This reviewer prefers Ulam's provocative individuality to Wesson's cautious surrender to complexity.—HENRY KRISCH, *University of Connecticut*.

The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy. By R. BARRY FARRELL. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1969. Pp. 181. \$5.95 cloth, \$3.50 paper.).

Professor Farrell's book can be judged neither by its cover nor by its title. Consequently, the scholar hoping for a book which discusses the dynamics of the Canadian foreign policy-making process and which contributes needed material for the burgeoning field of the comparative study of foreign policy is certain to be sadly disappointed. Instead, this "book is about Canada's diplomatic organization," and even then the prime "concern is the Department of External Affairs and the Foreign Service Officers who run that Department." (p. 2). The overall contribution of the volume, given its expressed purpose, will be discussed later, but, for the moment, an assessment of Professor Farrell's success in achieving the goals he set for himself seems to be in order.

No advantage seems to be gained by briefly reviewing the material covered by Professor Farrell except to say that he is mainly concerned with the organization of the Department of External Affairs and the Foreign Service Officer corps, the roles of the Prime Minister, the cabinet, the "under cabinet," and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the structure of Parliament, and the nature of federal-provincial relations as these relate to Canadian foreign policy. It is adequate to state that the author has probably identified the appropriate governmental actors, even though the completeness of his description of them varies. For instance, it is interesting to note that nearly twice as many words are devoted to the place of women in the Department of External Affairs as is given to a description of External Affairs Officers, a topic which is dismissed in eighty-five words. (pp. 80-81). We have no quarrel with Professor Farrell's assessment of the importance of women, but the treatment of the External Affairs Officers seems to be rather incomplete.

Essentially, then, the author is concerned with the structure of the organizations charged with responsibility in foreign policy. In the process of leading us through this organization-chart-in-prose, Professor Farrell combines the type of material one would expect to find in a government manual, historical illustrations which sometimes replace rather than supplement analysis, and data on the ethnic, educational, and regional backgrounds of cabinet ministers, Foreign Service Offi-

cers, and Heads of Missions, as well as on the pertinent employment patterns in the department of External Affairs.

Unfortunately, though, while presenting the structure, the author has failed to discuss the dynamic relationships among and within the foreign policy participants he identifies; thus the book is essentially a skeletal organization chart. At one point, the observation is made that "all the heads of departments [in the cabinet] must agree on common foreign policy." (p. 20). However, there is no discussion of how decisions are reached in the cabinet or what happens if there are major disagreements. Similarly, it is not clear how various problems are brought before the cabinet for consideration. Later on it is stated that foreign policy officials are increasingly subject to "the thrusts of controversial opinion," (p. 140), but a discussion of Canadian public opinion on foreign policy matters, its origins, its transmission to policy-makers, its influence cannot be found. For the most part, the interesting material on the backgrounds of cabinet ministers and Foreign Service Officers remains merely interesting but not particularly enlightening since only a feeble attempt is made to relate the data to either the content of foreign policy or the nature of the foreign policy process. Referring to two tables, the author says of the Foreign Service Officers that "the consequent decline in morale becomes striking." (p. 107). However, evidence is not presented which indicates that morale is indeed declining, nor is there much discussion of the consequences of this trend. As a result, most of the data, while interesting, do not seem to be particularly relevant.

In summation, Professor Farrell has provided the outline of the governmental foreign policy organization, but he has not considered those customs, procedures, practices, and relationships which make the numerous institutions and individuals a dynamic problem-weighting, decision-making, and policy-implementing organization that is worth studying. Even the chapter entitled "Responsibility and Political Control" which discusses provincial-federal relations, the role of Parliament, and professional responsibility within the foreign policy bureaucracy is concerned mainly with structure and hardly at all with substance.

Up to this point, we have briefly commented on Professor Farrell's success in accomplishing the goals he set for himself, but now we shall turn to an assessment of the author's conceptualization of the book and its contribution to the literature on foreign policy. In the last chapter, prior to a presentation of nine suggestions or predictions about the conduct and content of Canadian foreign relations, Professor Farrell says, "Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy are shaped by many other factors beyond the diplomatic organization." (p.

166). He declines to discuss these "other factors" in the present volume, yet a majority of the author's predictions about Canadian foreign relations are based on unidentified and unexplained assumptions about the importance of these "other factors." It is difficult to discuss adequately anything more than the structure of the organization without considering these other variables, and certainly one's area of analysis must encompass such factors if the aim is to understand the making of foreign policy.

We have already mentioned the neglect of public opinion by Professor Farrell, and we must add to this the existence of only a slight reference to the role of interest groups and the failure to consider the influence of Canadian political parties and the general dynamics of Canadian politics. These and many other factors may be of varying importance in the foreign policy-making process, but at least their impact must be assessed. In addition to the numerous non-governmental factors, a book on the formulation of Canadian foreign policy should discuss in some depth the role of other departments of government. The foreign relations activities of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and the Department of National Defense were purposefully neglected by the author with the justification that he wished to concentrate "on the development and implementation of Canada's political foreign policy," (p. 2); it is strongly suggested that the activities of these other departments also influence "political foreign policy."

Many of the problems mentioned heretofore might have been avoided had Professor Farrell provided some kind of conceptual framework to organize the subject. This failure is particularly disturbing since Professor Farrell edited the compilation, *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, which has stimulated so much of the recent activity in the comparative study of foreign policy. It is a pity that *The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy* does not heed the challenges issued in this earlier collection.—DAVID H. BLAKE, *University of Pittsburgh*.

The Majority of One: Towards a Theory of Regional Compatibility. By MINERVA M. ETZIONI. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1970. Pp. 238. \$7.50.)

The main title of this study ("The Majority of One") alludes to the overwhelming predominance of the United States within the Organization of American States. Its substance is therefore appropriately enough concerned with the achievement of American policy interests within that organization and in particular the working out of an increasing American preference for use of the OAS, as against alternative use of the United Nations,

in the handling of Latin American disputes which might legally and logically have been referred to either. The survey of these developments is competent and the tendencies which it sees are accurate.

In evaluating its usefulness as a descriptive account alone I am impelled to suggest only three perhaps not very important cautions: (1) Mrs. Etzioni's research is limited in its primary sources almost entirely to official UN (and, to a lesser extent, OAS) documentation plus published memoir materials of a few of the main participants in these events and thus her account does not get much beyond the legalistic description of what actually did happen with very little explanation of why it happened that way or at whose particular behest. (2) The author is, not at all unexpectedly, more or less predisposed against the very facts of U. S. predominance and preference for the OAS which she describes and her presentation of them will accordingly give more satisfaction to some students of approximately the same events than it will to others. (3) She offers no significant discussion of developments after the Dominican crisis of 1965 which makes her work more than usually outdated for a book of this publication date (1970). The historical-legal-descriptive account, nevertheless, is still a sound one. None of its findings or arguments would need to be essentially revised as a result of even complete "correction" of these relatively modest shortcomings.

The sub-title of the study is "Towards a Theory of Regional Compatibility" or, as chapter 1 labels it, "a new theory of international organization." This really expresses the *raison d'être* of the work, or at least of its publication. The Richard Falk preface is touting this aspect of the analysis in particular when it refers to the whole work at one point (p. 10) as "a pathbreaking book of great interest." But the author is not well served either by the grandiloquence of her introducer or by her own compulsion, for whatever reason, to graft onto a perfectly acceptable descriptive analysis a theoretical construct that is lacking in rigor and even in relevance to her own case.

First, as to rigor. The argument is that we should get away from the old dichotomy between "universal" and "regional" characteristics of international organizations and replace it with the concepts of "compatible" as compared to "incompatible" regionalism. These last are to be applied through separate consideration of the "jurisdictions" and "divisions of function" or competing (universal and regional) international organizations, the interactions between which are to be perceived as "upward" or "downward transfers." At best, this terminology gives new names to what we all know. Thus, if NATO is cited as an "incompatible" regional organization because it

focuses "primarily on threats [to security] from outside the regional group" whereas the OAS is at least in part "compatible" since it is "prepared to confront aggression anywhere—even within [its] own membership" (p. 22), one wonders what has happened to the older, equally serviceable distinctions between collective defense and collective security, which say the same thing and which are being displaced by nothing better.

More significantly, the new theory does not much help to explain or predict. We might, for example, agree on the labeling of an "upward transfer" after we saw one, but what would this tell us about the reasons for international organizational behavior or the possibility of its being repeated, or not, in the future? The new theory in the end is simply and fuzzily normative, at least in nomenclature. If an action is recognizably "compatible" or "upward" (incidentally, these are both "good" words) in character it is to be either sought or cherished; if it is either "incompatible" or "downward" it is to be lamented. In the history of OAS-UN relationships which she describes Mrs. Etzioni has, not surprisingly, much to lament. She could have lamented just as persuasively without these labels.

Ultimately, this is precisely what she does. She is for the most part critical of United States policy, which analytical position, however, is not much illuminated by resort to the new theory and certainly does not depend on it. She is very disturbed, for instance, with the early "failure of the OAS to restore peace and to restrain United States activities" in the Dominican crisis of 1965 (p. 204), but this failure as such has little to do with whether that organization was behaving "incompatibly" at the time, which presumably it was, and derives instead from the quite commonplace inability of the weak to influence the strong in almost any institutional setting.

Finally, the new theory is not a general theory at all except in the most tenuous and tentative way. In a brief statement of "conclusions" (pp. 208-218) which includes much of the very little non-Latin American material that this book contains, there is only one reference to an OAU action, whose allegedly "incompatible" character is itself at least arguable; one other reference apiece to "incompatible" actions of both NATO and the Soviet bloc, which organizations were virtually 100% "incompatible" in nature to start with; and allusions to two events that "might well" or "very well" happen "in the future" in Africa and in the Near East and one prospective development in regard to China that would be "not impossible." This is slim evidence on which to argue a general "continuum [she means: tendency] towards regional incompatibility in the adoption of enforcement action" (p. 213). Even if the finding of such

a trend is true, so to label it offers, once again, virtually nothing of either explanatory or predictive value. No very useful theoretical paths have been broken here.—KEITH S. PETERSEN, *North Carolina State University*.

Dag Hammarskjöld's United Nations. By MARK W. ZACHER (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. 295. \$7.00.)

Professor Zacher examines in detail Dag Hammarskjöld's conception of the United Nations and the role of the Secretary General within it. He is particularly concerned with Hammarskjöld's conception of the organization's goals and bases of power and more importantly the strategies and tactics that the Secretary General assumed for himself and the United Nations. Strategies are defined as "... courses of action which are oriented to a particular structure of relationships in a political system and particular issues in that system," and tactics are defined as "... policies which indicate how certain actors should act in the processes of initiating, utilizing, and directing specific means of action." (p. 4)

Hammarskjöld is portrayed as a liberal democrat, a man who viewed himself as a citizen of the world, and a man whose training in economics and Swedish governmental service led him to accept the perhaps naive notion that he was solely a civil servant and not a politician. Hammarskjöld was to maintain from the time he became Secretary General until his death during the Congo crisis that he could be and was an impartial servant of international organization and law.

The Secretary General viewed the fundamental purposes of the United Nations through an extrapolation from the UN charter which sought "... the prevention of armed conflict through negotiation, the prohibition of the use of force 'save in the common interest,' equal economic opportunity, political equality, and the rule of law or justice." (p. 22) Hammarskjöld felt that the United Nations had five bases of power from which to achieve the Charter's goals. First, the organization derived power from the responsibilities members were required to accept via the Charter and UN decisionmaking bodies. Second, an emerging United Nations gained power through an impartial, skilled, international civil service led by a unitary executive. Third, the total diplomatic facilities of the United Nations, both formal and informal, gave power and legitimacy to the organization. Fourth, the increasing interdependency of nations in the world coupled with the fact that most of these nations were UN members increased the probability of power acquisition. Finally, the United Nations gained power from its capacity to provide technical and economic assistance to member nations.

Zacher, in the bulk of the volume, provides a propositional inventory of strategies and tactics derived from Hammarskjöld's behavior and statements. These strategies and tactics are discussed in the context of the peaceful settlement of disputes, the control of the use of force, the promotion of arms control and disarmament, and the attempt to build a peaceful world order.

In the promotion of peaceful settlements of disputes Hammarskjöld was primarily interested in keeping the great powers out of non-bloc disputes, a strategy he called preventive diplomacy. Tactically the role of the Secretary General in settling disputes should involve, if possible, private diplomacy rather than open public debate, and a conciliatory public posture that never takes partisan stands. The Secretary General, Hammarskjöld contended, should play a mediating role only when such a role is not opposed by the great powers, or parties to a dispute. In seeking peaceful settlement of disputes Hammarskjöld was sensitive to the probabilities of success and avoided United Nations participation in disputes that could not be settled, and hence would impair the legitimacy of the organization or any of its agencies.

As to controlling the use of force, Hammarskjöld was opposed to involving the UN in the maintenance of order among bloc nations or in conflicts between great powers except when such disputes were so critical to world peace that a nonpartisan agency was the only hope for tension-reduction. Peacekeeping forces, as in the Middle East and the Congo, were manifestations of Hammarskjöld's desire to return situations to the existing status quo and substitute or preempt external forces for UN forces. As with the settlement of disputes, the role of UN forces should be nonpartisan, low-keyed, and their use should be tied to great power and disputing party acceptance of them.

Hammarskjöld's strategies for promoting arms control and disarmament negotiations entailed bringing the scientific communities from the Soviet and Western blocs together and attempting to create a United Nations framework for negotiations that incorporated participation by non-aligned nations and the Secretary General. Tactically, Hammarskjöld tried to involve the United Nations in all phases of such negotiations, opposing schemes to exclude the UN and third world nations.

Finally, for the promotion of a peaceful world order, Hammarskjöld contended that such an order was tied to political and economic equality; that the UN could be the site for national participation in world policymaking on an equal basis and that to provide the economic component of stability, the UN must provide economic assistance to third world nations. Each tactic that in-

creased United Nations participation and hence its legitimacy was a step toward a peaceful world. Self-determination, law, political equality, economic development, were all prerequisites for peace and therefore necessary United Nations tasks.

Professor Zacher's analysis is informative and systematic, some fifty principles of strategy and tactics are abstracted from Dag Hammarskjöld's behavior and statements as Secretary General. This study will provide useful analytical and historical material for beginning and advanced students of the United Nations. However, what remains troubling to this reviewer, given the continued escalation of the Vietnamese War, constant tensions in the Middle East, and big power economic and political involvement in the third world, is what remains to be written.

We need comparative data on Hammarskjöld's and U Thant's goals, strategies, and tactics, and some feel for the relative successes of the two Secretaries Generals. We must critically assess the role of the United Nations in the international system of the 1960's and predict and prescribe policies for the United Nations of the 1970's. Lastly, and most importantly, we must begin to think speculatively and imaginatively about possible alternative international and national institutions designed to increase personal participation in decisions that affect one's life and about institutions that redistribute wealth, provide social services, and increase personal freedom while reducing cross-cultural violence. What place, if any, does Dag Hammarskjöld's United Nations have, given the goals suggested?—HARRY R. TARG, *Purdue University*.

Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. By JOHN M. RICHARDSON, JR. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1969. Pp. 272. \$8.50.)

This book exhibits many of the characteristic merits and defects of empirical academic research on government programs and policies. Least characteristic and most meritorious is the \$10,000 cost of three years work including over forty interviews and an examination of the files of thirty university overseas projects. The resultant account of the sad story of AID-university relations is careful, reasonable, and fair. Less creditable are its unmitigated lifelessness and the dutiful genuflections to general "theory" which will surely earn for our social science a place in intellectual history beside that of medieval scholasticism.

The main, and to my mind best, part of the book presents a largely historical review of AID-university relations during six periods which Richardson identifies with the term of various agency directors or non-directors:

1. The Period of Genesis (1949-53), in which

university contracts—several originating in personal friendships of university and foreign officials—became embroiled in the conflict between the Mutual Security Administration emphasis upon strategic considerations and the Technical Cooperation Administration's "do good" philosophy.

2. The Period of Proliferation (1953-55), associated with the directorship of Harold Stassen and the establishment of the Foreign Operations Administration, during which the number of institutions involved in overseas projects rose from seven to over sixty.

3. The Period of Retrenchment (1955-57) under economist John Hollister, director of the FOA successor International Cooperation Administration.

4. The Period of Inertia (1957-61) or leaderlessness under four different directors, in which staff, in effect, ran the agency for better and, often, worse.

5. The Interregnum (1961-62) of Fowler Hamilton's Agency for International Development.

6. The Period of Harmony (1963-66) under David Bell, best of the agency administrators, when many new contracts were initiated and a sense of rapport developed between agency and university representatives.

However, Robinson rightly distinguishes the off-again on-again harmony between agency and university brass from the more consistent hostility, cross-purposes, and red-tape that have marred relations between operating personnel in the field, on campus, and in Washington.

Other agencies, such as State and Justice, have remained remarkably oblivious of academia; but it cannot be said that any other agency, not even the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has contracted with universities for so long so large and important a program the quality of whose administration has oscillated so consistently between the pedestrian, the poor, and the atrocious.

Why this should be so is of both practical and theoretical interest, and Richardson attempts both a practical and theoretical explanation.

On the practical side, he observes that the university program has been a small frog in a big government pond; that many significant determinants of agency-university relationships have been uncontrollable by either party; that university contracts have been handled like procurement contracts with industry; and that agency personnel have been more concerned to enforce regulations than to achieve program objectives. It has been difficult for the agency to give universities the degree of independence necessary for the successful conduct of their work while retaining sufficient responsibility to protect both the government's interests overseas and the agency's interests at home.

His theoretical explanation is less satisfactory not because it is in any way unreasonable but because it is in every way insufficient, is subjected to no empirical test, and is compared with no other equally reasonable explanation of the facts at hand. We are told that the broad goals of an agency are not always "complementary," that they may be served by concrete measures whose actual effects on the goals are not always measurable, and that "Often the complementarity between the organizational maintenance goals of the Agency and the university-contract program has been very low." Indeed. We are also treated to a "matrix of relationships" and several sets of symbolic axioms.

A glossary with the full name and life span of the many initials under which foreign aid agencies have been incarnated would have been helpful.—HAROLD ORLAND, *The Brookings Institution*.

Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. By KING C. CHEN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 436. \$12.50.)

When Lyndon Johnson said in 1961 that "help" for the South Vietnam government was necessary because the enemy would have to be met in San Francisco if it was not stopped in Southeast Asia, he could not have had the Vietnamese Communists in mind as the main enemy. Nor (if he was in possession of the facts) could he have been referring to the Soviet Union, which had generally maintained what we now call a "low profile" in Southeast Asia, not to mention California. He could only have meant Communist China, which at the time was taking an active interest in foreign politics, at least in Asia. Unfortunately, the revival of the Vietnam war in the early 1960's occurred at a time when American understanding of Asian Communism was at a low ebb (partly as a result of the McCarthy-era purge of China specialists), and little was known about the relations between Peking and Hanoi. Since the United States entered the war, however, much excellent work has been done on the subject, including the book under review. (How regrettable it is that scholarship of this nature must be generated by conflict, when were it more timely it might prevent such conflict!)

King C. Chen, who has made extensive use of hitherto unavailable Chinese and French sources, sees the recent wars in Vietnam as but episodes in the two-thousand-year history of Sino-Vietnamese relations. He pictures the Vietnamese as willing absorbers of Chinese influence, whether it be Confucianism centuries ago, or Maoism today. (The final judgment here probably must await further study based on Vietnamese sources.) Nevertheless, the Vietnamese (of whatever political persuasion) are always wary because of China's occasional aggression against the exploitation of their country

(most recently during the occupation of 1945-46). Thus, it is extremely unlikely that Chinese troops will ever be invited into Vietnam.

What emerges from the author's detailed account of relations between the various governments and political forces in the two countries during the Japanese occupation and revolutionary wars is a picture of extremely able and agile leaders, each of whom attends first to his conception of his own nation's interest, and then to partisan goals. Internationalist obligations are low-priority, if they are attended to at all. Here again there is historical continuity, for when China is weak or preoccupied (whether during the Sung Dynasty or the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), she has little taste for becoming involved in the affairs of nations to the south. But suspension of international cooperation does not mean suspension of ideological commitment, and there can be little doubt about Ho Chi Minh's unflagging commitment to Marxism. This applies to the period of the common resistance against Japan, and what Professor Chen considers to have been Ho's essentially dishonest "commitment" to the principles of Sun Yat-sen. Of this epoch in Sino-Vietnamese relations, Chen writes with considerable authority, having been in south China during World War II and interviewed Chinese leaders who were in personal contact with Vietnamese revolutionaries. However, Ho Chi Minh was a complicated man and Marxism is a complex ideology. It seems doubtful that Ho was being deliberately misrepresentative when he told the Chinese Nationalists that though he was a Communist, "Communism will not work in Vietnam in fifty years." (p. 82)

This study is more historical than political science. Nevertheless, it abounds in raw material for scholars in a number of disciplines. Perhaps some social scientist will be able to explain what Professor Chen observes but cannot explain—why America has passed up so many opportunities for peaceful settlement in Indochina.—JAMES D. SEYMOUR, *New York University*.

China's Turbulent Quest. By HAROLD C. HINTON. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970. Pp. 340. \$7.95.)

Professor Hinton of George Washington University published a major work on Communist China's foreign policy entitled *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, pp. 527) in 1966, when he was still associated with the Institute of Defense Analysis. The book was considered as one of the most detailed, comprehensive, and well-documented studies of Communist China's foreign policy strategy and external behavior up to 1965, and had widely been circulated for a variety of teaching and reference purposes. The new volume under review is in es-

sence an updated, but condensed, version of his 1966 book under a different title.

In the new book Hinton expands the analysis to cover a number of significant developments since 1965. Domestically, China has gone through an unprecedentedly dramatic political upheaval of the Cultural Revolution. The upheaval brought into the open the acute ideological and policy struggle between the "two lines," the Maoist and the Li-unist. Externally, the Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet dispute have escalated further to a level of no return and created great strains on Chinese foreign policy. On the other hand, the new book abridges the 1966 version and drops all the footnotes. Clearly the new book is intended for the general public and non-specialists who, Hinton thinks, would not care to be burdened with details and elaborate documentation. For those who are acquainted with his 1966 book, the structure, approach and conclusions of the new book are not unfamiliar.

Organized in three parts, the book first traces chronologically Communist China's policy lines and behavioral patterns: from the legacy of the Chinese Communist movement, the "armed struggle" of the early fifties, the peaceful coexistence of the Bandung era, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the escalation of the Vietnam War, to the diplomacy of the Red Guards. The analysis focuses mainly on the conflicting orientations between the Maoist strategy of the "people's war" and the more moderate approach of "state diplomacy" favored by the non-Maoists. Shifting focus from the temporal to the spatial dimension, the second part discusses China's external relations with individual nations in various political and regional camps. A brief discussion of the structure and process of China's foreign policy making and implementation is also included. The first two parts are designed to shed light on China's foreign policy from the two different perspectives of temporal and geographical settings. Unfortunately, the two parts become awkwardly repetitive. The book closes with the author's overall assessment of China's failures and achievements and their implications for American foreign policy.

On his research strategy, Hinton stated in his 1966 book:

I proceed on the basis of no general theory of social or political action. . . . I prefer history, in the sense of observed data and inferences from them. . . . I believe that what is sometimes called kramlinology, demonology, or the study of esoteric communication is essential to an understanding of Communist China. (p. viii)

In 1970, his methodological orientation remains unchanged. (p. x) His enthusiasm about the historical approach is clearly reflected in the extremely rich collection of detailed information and skillful use of source materials contained in the

book. However, the book falls short of the standard of methodological and theoretical rigor that the contemporary social science analysis demands. It is unfortunate that Hinton does not utilize empirical theory to organize the massive data and impressive factual knowledge he possesses. Nor does he develop hypotheses for systematic analysis and conceptualization. On the whole, the book is descriptive, rather than analytical and explanatory.

Hinton's reliance on the "kremlinologist" approach has led him to dwell extensively on such factors as the ideology, personality, and motivation of key political actors, rather than on the more definable sociological variables used by the "objective-capability" analyst. As a result, his inferences are often derived from intuitive judgment with little empirical evidence and at times appear highly speculative (see pp. 43, 73, 137, 138, 206 and 286).

Hinton's conclusions suggest that Communist China is essentially not an "expansionist power" in the conventional sense of conducting aggressive war on foreign territories (p. 285). The leadership under Mao prefers the strategy of the "people's war" by encouraging "self-reliant" revolutionary movements "from below" in the Third World with China's moral and material support. The rationale of the strategy is clear: it is "at modest risk and cost to Peking" (p. 253) and has proved effective in countries besieged by political and social instability. Confronted with such a strategy, Hinton cautions the U.S. to avoid "excessive military intervention" (pp. 304-307). But he argues that the U. S. should never "withdraw precipitately." (p. 307) Basically Hinton subscribes to the concept of "military containment" as a key instrument of American policy.

Regardless of its usefulness under certain conditions after World War II, the strategy is essentially a "negative" response to challenge from the left and based on fear of political change. A regime that requires military protection from without when confronted by internal insurgency is probably one whose political viability cannot be saved. Indeed, if China's basic strategy is the "people's war," as Hinton points out, and as Mao recently reaffirmed in one of his rare important statements issued on May 20, 1970, then the validity of "military containment" should be reexamined. The development of the Vietnam conflict and the ineffective American military intervention serves a clear case in point.

In this respect it is rather disturbing to note that Hinton criticizes the failures of the U.S. to make the invasion of North Vietnam a "credible threat" (p. 303) or to actually "invade just north of the 17th parallel" (p. 304) as a "basic strategic mistake." He assures the reader that "an American

invasion of North Vietnam need [not] lead to a Sino-American War." (p. 304) He would now probably find the American intervention in Cambodia a sound strategic move. Moral and intellectual vulnerability of such arguments notwithstanding, it is doubtful that the Korean experience and the pattern of the expansion of war in Indochina would substantiate his arguments.

A rather common shortcoming in foreign policy making and analysis alike has always been the inability of the policy-maker and analyst to perceive and appreciate the adversary's viewpoint. Hinton seems to be no exception. His conclusions suggest that much of Communist China's international isolation and failures are due to Peking's own behavior" (p. 285) and are therefore "self-inflicted" (p. 286). Clearly, a balanced evaluation of China's hostility and belligerence toward the West, and toward the U.S. in particular, should take into account the initiatives taken by the U.S. in building up the military containment that China finds provocative and threatening. In the eyes of the Chinese, it is the Americans who have fought and are still fighting at China's doorsteps and have organized a series of bilateral and multilateral alliances to encircle China. Although Hinton is now prepared to go along with some conciliatory steps on the trade of nonstrategic goods and China's admission to the United Nations, the reader may wonder how far such steps would go while the U.S. continues to maintain its basic military and political posture around the peripheries of China.—YING-MAO KAU, *University of Illinois*.

Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions. By JORGE CASTAÑEDA. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. 243. \$10.00.)

Several "musts" characterize the modern international lawyer. First, he must be in tune with the forces of the world's social complex, for these forces give reality to the direction and depth of legal change. Thereafter, he must be particularly attentive to the social ends of the world community so that his influence on public decision makers will cause them to give due attention to relevant forces and values. Moreover, he must be persuaded that a world's legal order consists of a process and is not simply a condition.

The world legal community, restricted to a more primitive and more uncoordinated life-style than that enjoyed by many national States, has a fundamental interest in the identification and development of its processes. This central concern is also reflected in analytical inquiries into the "sources" of such community law. One listing is to be found in Article 38 of the Statute of the World Court. However, with the emergence of a myriad of important and seemingly permanent international organizations, there has been an increased

recognition that within such forums there have been new processes at work. These have such forums there have been new processes at work. These have been producing new principles, standards, and rules of law for a constantly changing community. Moreover, the emerging community has been an augmented one consisting of States, international organizations, and individuals claiming in their own right the benefits of a dynamic jural order.

In this book, Dr. Castañeda, a distinguished Mexican international lawyer and foreign office official, has examined a fundamental law creating procedure by the organs of the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly. He has also analyzed comparable procedures on the part of other important international entities. He has demonstrated that the nonrecommendatory resolution of such organs is a constitutive legal process, and has identified the areas within which such resolutions (also known variously in practice as "declarations," "recommendations," "agreements," "pronouncements," as well as by other terms) have mandatory operative effect. The author gives much attention to those areas and situations where such an effect may reasonably be believed to exist.

Such areas are two: internal to the organization, and external. The latter deals, according to his structure, with (1) international peace and security, (2) the existence of facts or concrete legal situations, (3) a situation where the binding force rests on instruments other than the Charter, (4) those which express and register agreement among the members of an organ, and (5) those which contain declarations or other pronouncements of a general nature. The author admits that this classification is not without its difficulties and complexities. They should be regarded as an initial classification, nothing more. Nonetheless, the formulation of such a scheme is a major contribution.

The traditional view of law is that it should be complied with—more or less, and always preferably more. The author makes it clear that resolutions of international organs, if they are to be law, must be complied with. Considering their reception by the community, can they be law? Most assuredly. And, in suitable situations, are they law? Most certainly, and to the same extent that formal treaties constitute a process and source of international law.

In both instances, the resolution and the treaty, the position of the so-called sovereign nation-state must be taken into account in assessing the jural quality of the prescriptive event. However, in measuring the role of the State, it must be noted that the formal organization of an international institution, such as the UN, is in more instances than not a great deal more important and more

impressive from a political point of view, than a vast proportion of its individual members; that the member States which have given adherence to the adopted resolutions are more important and more impressive than those which have voted in opposition or have abstained; that even the imperfect mandate of sovereignty has been much reduced in importance because of the elimination of the unanimity rule in international organizations (although in some instances there is the competing concept of "consensus"); and, also because of the increased acceptance of the view that it is the function of customary international law (produced by non-states or by fewer than the totality of States in the community) to bind States, even against their will.

Also, and of vast importance, it has come to be recognized that the Charter of the UN is a constitutional document. This has meant that one can rely on the legal doctrine of effectiveness of the institution to support its operations when they follow the spirit or general purpose of the organization. In this manner valid action can be taken on the basis of the powers implied from the constitutional prescriptions which are either granted or are not denied by the constitution. Where such powers have been perfected by practice which has received community approval, the resulting constitutional "gloss" provides doctrinal support for the law of such resolutions.

Additionally, the author takes full account of such factors as the intent of the drafters of the constitutional documents, the language selected including logical interpretations of such language, and the practice of the organs and the constituent States. Because of his concern for the mandatory or binding quality of resolutions, he examines them as "legislative" or law-creating instruments. It is his view that they can serve such a function as well as putting preexisting customary international law into a formal and identifiable written form.

It has long been the position of many international lawyers that a sympathetic attitude ought to be taken to the subject of proof of the existence of customary international law, since it does not literally speak for itself. It might be urged with equal conviction that a sympathetic attitude ought also be taken toward the question of whether a given resolution in a specific situation sets forth a principle, standard, or rule of international law. Why, indeed, should the *form* which surrounds a General Assembly resolution when unanimous or nearly so, be thought to be relevant to the binding force of the norm which it signifies? Should not the vote in its favor, with the seemingly non-rebutable presumption that the position reflected in the vote is entitled to respect and will be respected, have the same significance in the for-

mation of a binding duty as a duly subscribed and ratified treaty? Such resolutions can give us the base for a modern if not "instant" international law at a time when the treaty—with its ancient appurtenances and appendages—has not always kept pace with world needs.

The resolution, like some swiftly moving customary international law of the space age, constitutes in suitable cases a process for the ready identification and promulgation of international legal norms. Dr. Castañeda has shown that logic and experience indicate that the resolution serves this function.—CARL Q. CHRISTOL, *University of Southern California*.

Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations. By JOHN W. BURTON. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 246. \$7.95.)

"Controlled communication" refers to the participation of scholars in meetings that take place between representatives of nations involved in a conflict. The technique is based primarily on the assumption that conflict is subjective and therefore avoidable or resolvable if perceptions of the parties in conflict can be altered, different interpretations of behavior and assessments of values and costs can be offered, and new options introduced into the discussion. The task of the scholars is *not* to suggest specific *substantive* interpretations or solutions to problems, as might be done in more conventional discussions which include third party participation, but rather to interject *theoretical* observations about the nature of conflict. In the author's words, "The strategies of control seem to be those of the clinical psychoanalyst, the caseworker, the industrial psychologist and the family counsellor" (68).

The purpose of the book is to give a report on the usefulness of this controlled communication technique "as a means both of the analytical study of world society and of conflict resolution and avoidance" (xii). In the first part of the book, the author outlines the procedures for setting up the discussions; the difficulties involved in determining parties to a conflict, gaining permission for the foreign representatives already assigned to London to engage in the academic experiment, and then establishing and controlling the communication once the discussions were launched; and, finally, some hypotheses and insights apparently generated by the discussions.

In the second part of the book, the author makes an assessment of the significance of controlled communication. He describes this technique as the logical extension of two distinct trends. The trend in the analysis of interstate politics progresses from "broad generalizations and synoptic accounts of history to micro-studies of the be-

havior of states and processes that enable the observer to come closer to the subject matter" (173). Simulation and content analysis are recent developments of analytical techniques designed to examine these latter, more narrowly focused processes; and controlled communication, consisting of features common to both of these techniques, represents a logical extension of these developments.

The second trend concerns the role that is proposed for third parties in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The author argues that "there has also been a progression in dealing with conflict from direct authoritarian judgments" (such as court rulings) to those of decreasing involvement of the third party, such as arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and good offices, in that order. The reason for this trend is that experience in peace-keeping in this century has demonstrated that "it is only the parties involved that are in a position to resolve conflicts, and that external coercion has a counter-productive effect" (170). Controlled communication, therefore, is another step in the direction away from third-party involvement and toward self-imposed solutions, since in situations of controlled communication the third party members (the scholars) do not deal with the substantive issues, but rather the theoretical context of the conflict.

Given this unique place of controlled communication as an extension of the two trends just mentioned, "controlled communication thus provides a meeting point of analysis and resolution of conflict" (174).

Overall the book is quite stimulating, providing some fresh insights into the development both of the analytical study of international politics and the roles of third parties in negotiation. Furthermore, the author makes a persuasive argument that controlled communication may prove to be an important addition to the ways by which third-party intervention in negotiations contributes to the resolution or avoidance of conflict. The only evidence that controlled communication did, in fact, make such a contribution, however, are the assurances of the author. And he is quite cautious: "All that can be said is that communication was established where previously it did not exist, perception and attitudes of participants altered during the exercise, and events followed, some of which could have been directly or indirectly related, but which could have been due no less to many other influences that were operating on the parties simultaneously" (217).

The lack of detailed comment about what occurred during the discussions, as exemplified in the above quotation, leads to the principal objection of both the book and the technique: the severe restraints imposed by the need for secrecy. As the

author admits, "Parties engaged in violent conflicts cannot be expected to respond to a request to meet, even for academic purposes, unless not only what transpires but even the fact of meeting is secret. The secrecy aspect inhibits discussion among colleagues, injects into academic life an unwelcome element, and imposes some restraints upon publication of research papers" (232-33). Unfortunately, he then dismisses these objections all too easily: "However, this is no new experience; it is becoming more and more familiar as interaction between government and scholar develops. There are means of generalization after many separate analyses" (233).

The author apparently misses the crux of the objection to secrecy when he implies that because it is not new, its limitations have somehow been circumvented. The whole thrust of the behavioral movement, with which the author seems to identify so strongly, indeed the whole thrust of the social sciences in recent years, has been to make open to group scrutiny the substance of the data and the procedures of data analysis that form the basis of generalization. A scientist's work, his entire research cycle, must be subject to evaluation and replication if consensus on the findings is to be reached. Even speculative findings, which make up much of the theoretical observations in Professor Burton's work, suffer substantially when the conditions or events which stimulate the observations cannot be revealed. Perhaps fifty (?) years from now, when the data and detailed analyses are revealed, the work will be considered quite valuable. But, in the meantime, as Scott Greer argues in *The Logic of Social Inquiry* (Aldine, 1969), "outside the pressure cooker of policy-making, outside the nation state, is a larger scientific community which must be shown—not harangued" (8).

Despite these objections, the book is well worth reading. It reports on a new and potentially important technique of conflict control, a technique which the author convincingly argues deserves further study and experimental application. The limitations of controlled communication, as an analytical method for the study of world politics, should not detract from the book's original contribution to the literature on the role of third parties in the peaceful settlement of disputes.—DAVID W. MOORE, *United States Military Academy*.

Development Assistance in the Seventies: Alternatives for the United States. By ROBERT E. ASHER. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970. Pp. 235. \$6.95.)

The United States foreign assistance effort continues to be treated as an annual and emergency one. It is also a steadfastly American undertaking, largely planned and implemented by a national

aid establishment under the close scrutiny of Congress. The program's primary mission has never been developmental; it has been more consistently designed and rationalized as a means of supporting the viability of friendly states against invasion and insurrectionary violence. If early post-war conditions made this type of approach at least understandable, present circumstances make it untenable. The current fundamental and world-wide revolutionary situation is as threatening to world order as it is unyielding to cold war diplomatic styles.

In a new work, Robert Asher, a well known student of development assistance, argues for an enhanced and restructured American aid effort, one which is conditioned by the responsibilities of affluence and the new parameters of the international system. Many of the proposals which he offers are quite familiar; some were being debated more than a decade ago. But combined they suggest a new and substantial departure from both the organization and the substance of previous endeavors, one which the author feels would serve to establish patterns of mutuality and self-help in the international development effort.

Asher sees as a primary need the reorganization of the U.S. development assistance enterprise—to give it a more multilateral and autonomous character. Multilateralization would be accomplished by a shift of the major portion of the nation's capital assistance program to international agencies and by systematic efforts to increase the reliance on recipient nations and international advisory groups for planning and review of the remaining bilateral undertakings. Even the responsibility for in-country programming and performance monitoring operations would increasingly devolve to multi-national agencies, with a subsequent reduction in the number of U.S. administrative personnel in the field. American technical specialists would begin to be hired directly by recipient nations with U.S. technical assistance agencies coming to serve primarily a brokerage function.

Related structural reforms would be directed at increasing the autonomy of American bilateral aid institutions. The fundamental modification would involve replacement of the Agency for International Development with three essentially independent agencies: a development cooperation bank, a technical cooperation foundation and a private investment corporation. The new agencies would have considerable discretion, receiving from Congress a general rather than a detailed mandate and necessary appropriations on a multiyear basis. They would also enjoy substantial flexibility in seeking additional sources of finance independent of the appropriations' process. Their operations would be kept distinct in every way possible from military assistance programming.

Finally, Asher proposes numerous substantive changes. They include a marked increase in the volume of new aid (with the now familiar 1% of G.N.P. offered as a target figure), efforts to ease the terms of trade and debt-servicing obligations of low-income states, and reductions both in the lending rate and in restrictions imposed on the recipient nation's utilization of aid resources. He sees these substantive reforms, particularly the latter ones, as primary means for operationalizing the concept of self help.

Together the proposals suggest his central assumptions: The U.S., through a systematic de-Americanization of responsibility for its aid program and the provision of meaningfully increased resources, could serve to create the type of responsible and development-specific bargaining relationships between rich and poor states which would facilitate both the more effective utilization of aid resources and economic growth itself.

There is much which is unexceptionable in Asher's assumptions and proposals, certainly within the limits imposed by the range of subjects he chose to cover. Some omissions, however, might be mentioned. For instance, there is the question of the capacity of international development assistance institutions to carry the burdens the author's reforms would impose on them. Decentralization of responsibility by itself would hardly serve to order the relationship among the multitude of existing agencies with their differing specializations, constituencies, experiences and development models. Their past difficulties with the coordination of effort testifies to the problem. But Asher has little to say on the matter of establishing priorities and roles despite its clear relationship to the effective implementation of his reforms. Perhaps he felt such a consideration would have taken him too far afield. The reader may note, however, indications at other points of his willingness to be discursive—in numerous brief asides on matters ranging from population problems to protectionist sentiment in the fisheries industry.

A more serious omission, I think, is his failure to translate an awareness of the political dimensions of development into proposals for change. He discusses at several points the critical importance of a nation's leadership and institutional capacities in determining the rate and stability with which growth occurs; he alludes to the well recognized fact that aid can be uncorrelated or even negatively related to institutionalization and economic growth; he refers to the insensitivity toward political and social aspects of development which has characterized both multilateral and bilateral assistance programs. But this sensitivity is not reflected in either the substantive or organizational changes he advances. He fails to convey in them the need or the means for introducing political

criteria systematically into development assistance programming. There is, for instance, no major proposal of the type recently advanced by the Presidential Task Force on International Development—for the creation of a U.S. international development institute to have as one of its primary tasks research on the problems of "social and civic development."

These observations aside, Dr. Asher's effort is a worthy one. As a balanced mixture of undogmatic advocacy and careful analysis it highlights critical issues and provides a sensible assessment of American opportunities and responsibilities in the area of aid and development. Times, of course, are scarcely propitious for the reforms as such. Asher himself displays few illusions, especially about the current prospects for those core proposals which would increase the amount of assistance while reducing Congressional controls over the commitment of resources. It should be noted, however, that his work has apparently found a singularly receptive audience in the International Development Task Force. Certainly there are repeated and striking similarities between Asher's major recommendations and those which the Task Force has more recently advanced.—ROBERT W. HUNT, *Illinois State University*.

United Nations in Economic Development—Need For A New Strategy. BY SUDHIR SEN. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1969. Pp. 351. \$10.00.)

Mr. Sen has spent some ten years in technical assistance work at the United Nations. He is mightily disappointed at what he considers to be the lack of a creative and meaningful response by the U.N. "family" to the crisis of development. He lays the blame on poor management. An expert's answer to a problem that is quite likely much more profound than Mr. Sen's technical treatment implies.

The book is not a critical analysis of the whole range of the economic development programs of the U.N., but rather a terribly redundant account of the severe weaknesses of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and of the subsequent U.N. Development Programme. The treatment is both general and specific.

The author argues that the weaknesses of the EPTA procedures flowed from the failure to follow the guidelines for the awarding of money adopted by the General Assembly. Rather than take a hard look at projects suggested, the governing body strives above all for consensus, takes the country requests at face value and balances the agency allocations so as to avoid friction. Referring to the Expanded Programme, Sen charges, "Its bad procedures have produced bad programmes and poor leadership. They have been more

conducive to bureaucratic growth than to economic growth." (306).

All efforts to right the situation seem to have ailed. Even the merger of the EPTA and the Special Fund did not result in new standardized, effective procedures. Instead, "The entrenched no-changers, through adroit manoeuvres and capitalizing on the multiple rifts in the U.N. system, won an outstanding victory." (141).

One wonders why it is so. Certainly not regard for national sovereignty. Perhaps it is the jealousy of the participating agencies. Mr. Sen seems to think so. It seems that the phenomenon of trying above all to protect what one has operates at the level of the U.N. as well as in Congress and city councils. It would seem that international experts in economic development management cannot rise above petty self-interest. Or perhaps the cause is related to the recently identified "Peter Principle", namely, "In a Hierarchy Every Employee Tends to Rise to His Level of Incompetence." (Laurence J. Peter and Raymond Hull, *The Peter Principle*, Bantam edition, 1969, p. 7).

In any event, what to do about it? Half the book is devoted to fairly extensive and specific recommendations for reform. The recommendations are essentially three in number.

- (1) to merge the two components of the current UNDP and to reform internal procedures.
- (2) to redesign the structure and procedures of

the specialized agencies and to bring all development activities of the U.N. under one general manager.

- (3) to institute at the country level a single representative to serve as a responsible, top-level development diplomat.

Following these structural changes, Sen argues that priorities could be dealt with intelligently and the potential of the U.N. could become actual accomplishments.

The approach Sen suggests is surely a sensible one. The reader is left wondering why the abuses have been allowed to continue. That question, the author does not really answer. Questions need to be raised about the real values and objectives of the men and organizations involved, the broad environment in which the technical assistance program goes on, and the politics of the many parties related to the development enterprise. From these broad perspectives one might get some clues to what does seem, on the face of it, to be a tragically absurd state of affairs.

This book is a ripping account of mismanagement from a man who has been on the inside. The book is badly organized and redundant. Some judicious pruning would have strengthened the force of the argument. Yet the proposal strikes this reviewer as a sensible one.—LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN, *Denison University*.

ERRATUM

The book review of *Les Groupes Communistes Aux Assemblées Parlamentaires Italiennes (1958-1963) Et Françaises (1962-1967)* in the June

Review, 4th paragraph, line 10, p. 649, should read "as unimportant as one might superficially assume."

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 7-11, 1971, at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

As of January 1, 1971 the Book Review Editor of this REVIEW will be Professor Philip Siegelman of San Francisco State University. All correspondence pertaining to book review matters should be sent to Professor Siegelman at the following address:

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ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATIONS*

March, 1971

- James W. Clarke and E. Lester Levine, Florida State University, "Marijuana Use, Social Deviance and Political Alienation: A Study of High School Youth"
- M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, and Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, "The Division of Political Labor between Mothers and Fathers"
- Chong Lim Kim, University of Iowa, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy in Japanese Prefectures"
- Gerald H. Kramer, Yale University, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964"
- Frank Levy, University of California, Berkeley, and Edwin M. Truman, Yale University, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Another View"
- Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago, "Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy"
- Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Harvard University, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government"
- Theodore R. Marmor, University of Minnesota, "Income Maintenance Alternatives: Concepts, Criteria, and Program Comparisons"
- Robert Melson, Michigan State University, "Ideology and Inconsistency: The Politics of the 'Cross-Pressured' Nigerian Worker"
- Adam Przeworski and Glaucio A. D. Soares, Washington University, St. Louis, "Theories in Search of a Curve: A Contextual Interpretation of Left Vote"
- Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "The Democratic Guarantee: An Index and Some of Its Analytic Arguments"
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Note on the 'Equilibrium' Division of the Vote"

Michael Taylor, University of Essex, "Party Systems and Governmental Instability"

Donald S. Zagoria, Hunter College, City University of New York, "'Rice' and 'Feudal' Communism in India"

June, 1971

- Blair Campbell, University of California, Los Angeles, "Prescription and Description in Political Thought: The Case for Hobbes"
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- John E. Jackson, Harvard University, "Senate Roll Call Voting: Statistical Models"
- Arend Lijphart, University of Leiden, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method"
- John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam"
- David E. RePass, University of Minnesota, "Issue Salience and Party Choice"
- Paul M. Sniderman, Stanford University, and Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley, "Self-Esteem and Isolationist Attitudes: Psychological Sources of Political Beliefs"
- Sidney G. Tarrow, Yale University, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Voter Involvement: The Case of France"
- Jack E. Vincent, Florida Atlantic University, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly"

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- William J. Crotty, Northwestern University, "Party Effort and Its Impact on the Vote"
- Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Frasure, Duke University, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties"

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
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
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
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
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
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
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